

KINSHIP, ACHIEVEMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN TRIBAL
SOCIETIES: REPORT OF 1300 INTERVIEWS WITH
RUBBER WORKERS IN LIBERIA, WEST AFRICA

by

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
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What can be called the conventional view concerning the operation of family, kinship and other ascriptive ties during social change in non-Western countries is subjected to an extensive critique. The conventional view typically characterizes social organization in non-industrial areas as primarily subject to ascriptive principles. Social values are conceptualized as "tradition," "primitive," or "custom-bound," and it is asserted that an emphasis on family ties and ascription is part of an integrated set of phenomena found in non-industrial areas.

With respect to industrial societies, the conventional view asserts that ascriptive principles do not operate to any important degree. These societies are described by concepts such as "modern," "civilized" or "individualistic," and it is argued that an emphasis on individual achievement and competition are part of an integrated set of phenomena found in more developed societies. The conventional view stresses the interrelatedness of all parts of society and therefore societies at different levels of development must

have different social structures and social values. In this view, social change becomes a shift from phenomena which characterize the "traditional" society to phenomena which characterize the "modern" society. Since these two societies are in opposition at so many points it is asserted that the shift is generally sudden and dramatic.

This dissertation criticizes the conventional view for its assertion that societies can be divided into these two types and that social change generally can be conceived of as a transition between these types. Societies with different levels of technology may in fact have similarities in their social organization. Social relationships are regular and recurrent but the same regularity may be found at different technological levels. In addition to offering a unique theoretical synthesis, the dissertation offers empirical data on the existence of achievement orientations among tribal peoples.

A total of 1330 workers were sampled at four rubber plantations in Liberia, West Africa. The majority can be described as achievement oriented. Variables reflecting the conventional view, e.g. "modernization," "industrialization," and "urbanization" were used in an attempt to explain these findings. Specifically studied were education, work experience, "adaption to wage-labor," self-conception and urban experience. Achievement orientation

was not positively related to any of these variables. Instead, this dissertation accounts for the existence of an achievement orientation among tribal people by showing that the amount of achievement orientation varied by tribe. Two factor analyses and a cluster analysis show that although a basic similarity existed among the tribes, i.e. all stress achievement, men from three Kwa-speaking tribes in our sample, the Kru, Krahn, and Grebo, were more achievement oriented than men from the other seven tribes.

This variation by language group suggested that an explanation for the existence of achievement responses should be sought in the social structure of the tribes. Historical and ethnographic data showed that the Kwa-speaking group have a distinctive history of occupying coastal jungle areas and governing themselves through decentralized political authority. They did not have secret societies nor did they congregate in dense populations. The Mande and West Atlantic-speaking peoples had been pushed toward the coast by expansionary pressures from the interior. These latter peoples were relatively more stratified, had secret societies, were more likely to have farmed, and had a centralized political authority. The existence of centralized authority and secret societies probably weakened individual achievement emphases. This evidence shows the existence of achievement orientations among tribal peoples

and provides an explanation for it that contrary to expectations of the conventional view does not make reference to modernization.



INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to review orthodox sociological conceptions of social change in non-industrial areas, cite the evidence which shows the necessity for their modification and offer suggestions as to what this modification entails. The following chapters should be read as steps of an argument. Each chapter is part of a systematic repudiation of an entire intellectual perspective.

Chapter One offers a description of existing, orthodox, theoretical thought. This thought is called "the conventional view." A full intuitive understanding of it is difficult to convey since no detailed point-by-point description of it exists. Few descriptions of any complex perspective fully exhaust its assumptions, propositions and implications, or demonstrate its conceptual integrity. This chapter is a composite description of existing social change conceptions. The composite is taken from introductory books primarily, but also relies upon specialized writings. The reader should be especially careful to note the repeated assertion that an emphasis on achievement and social mobility is characteristic of the division of labor in industrial societies and an emphasis on kinship, sex and other relatively unchangeable ascriptive properties is

characteristic of smaller, "primitive," non-industrial societies. This assertion, and by implication the assumptions which generate it, is the theoretical "hypothesis" which the dissertation "tests."

Chapter Two examines an assertion of the conventional view that has already been disproven. It is still occasionally repeated today that industrialization transforms existing extended family patterns into nuclear family patterns, i.e., extended families "break down" under the impact of industrialization and are replaced by forms, like the nuclear family, which are more compatible with a modern economic system. This is a familiar assertion in American sociology. It existed for as long as it did because it was integrated with other ideas asserting compatible processes. The empirical repudiation of any one part of an integrated perspective must inevitably tend to question the empirical adequacy of other ideas in that perspective. The empirical repudiation of customary assertions about the operation of family patterns within processes of industrialization and urbanization is related to an examination of achievement, ascription and kinship. Family ties are one kind of fixed, ascriptive social relationships, and to assert that they operate differently than has been customarily thought is to affect analysis of kinship and achievement.

Chapter Three reviews the responses of so-called

"traditional" peoples to western economic situations. "The conventional view," as exemplified in the work of Wilbert E. Moore, is shown to provide an inadequate empirical understanding of non-industrial social structures and processes of change within them. A substantial number of empirical findings are reviewed. Their topics include labor and economics in "traditional" societies, labor commitment, history of labor migration, and contemporary labor migration. The cumulative effect of these findings is to show the necessity for building better conceptions of social change.

Chapter Four reviews the evidence on achievement, showing how the "conventional view" analyzes it, the lack of evidence supporting that analysis, and the evidence contradicting it. Enough doubt exists to seriously question the assertion that industrial societies emphasize achievement and "traditional" societies do not.

Chapter Five reports the statistical findings of interviews with 1300 rubber tappers in West Africa and shows, across a number of questions, that a majority of the respondents give achievement responses. This tendency is not associated with "urbanization," "modernization" or "industrialization." The proof for this is found in Appendix A. Statistical evaluation finds that responses vary by tribe, i.e., the traditional social structure is

the source of these responses.

Chapter Six pursues the findings of the previous chapter by looking at the historical development of West Africa and ethnographies of the tribes represented in the sample. Historical records and cultural ethnographies substantiate the statistical conclusions. All tribes in the area emphasize achievement, but non-agricultural tribes with decentralized political control and minimal social class differences stress achievement more. These results are corroborated by separate lines of analysis and verified by at least one other independent study. However, they are not compatible with the conventional view.

Chapter Seven summarizes the preceding chapters, reviews theoretical critiques of "the conventional view" and offers general suggestions as to how it should be modified. Any modification must account for existing empirical findings, be created from a wider base of knowledge and achieve a better appreciation of what "urbanization" and "industrialization" actually entail.

CHAPTER ONE

DESCRIPTION OF CONVENTIONAL VIEW

Introduction to Conventional View

This chapter describes conventionally accepted sociological beliefs on social change in "underdeveloped countries." The prevailing images are summarized in concepts like "modernization" and "industrialization" and reflected in introductory textbooks. A standardized format exists in the introductory text. It presents the world view of American sociologists and until now high agreement existed on the topics and concepts that should be introduced to beginning students. Topics associated with social change in overseas countries, e.g., economic development, the procedures and quality of cross-national studies, comparative sociology, and distinctions between "traditional" and "modern" societies are not generally included in the introductory format. If present at all they are tacked on in the closing chapters.

This sociological ethnocentrism and its seeming lack of concern with other countries seems primarily due to the fact that sociology as we know it today is largely constructed of data collected in the United States. Brown and Gilmarten

say "Substantive research in our journals is today even more culture bound and time bound than in 1940-41 . . . sociologists are tied to provincialism . . . they do not always study the topics (for example, social change) that they verbally pronounce to be important."¹ Approximately ten per cent of all doctoral dissertations are written on data collected outside of the United States. A number of plausible factors, such as language deficiency, funding problems, and pressure to finish a degree quickly can be suggested to account for this situation. Concomitantly, sociologists have relied on other social sciences for cross-information. For example, Marsh's Comparative Sociology² shows that of the 143 journals cited in his 1146 item bibliography only 28 of them contain the words social or sociology in their title. A look at the relative frequency of articles in the two major sociological journals, the American Sociological Review and the American Journal of Sociology, that use data from non-industrial countries supports the observation. The result is that American sociology is primarily based on empirical knowledge of the United States' patterns and secondarily on Western European

¹Julia Brown and Brian Gilmarten, "Sociology Today: Lacunae Emphases and Surfeit," The American Sociologist, 4 (November, 1969), p. 287.

²Robert M. Marsh, Comparative Sociology, New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1967.

patterns. Most sociologists neither have training in overseas research nor have they analyzed the potential relevance of comparative information to their own interests. Introductory textbooks reflect this bias.

The introductory textbook is important for two reasons: first, it is the usual means through which strangers-inexperienced strangers, are introduced to the body of concepts and information called sociology. Secondly, a comparative reading of several books reveals the assumptions and perspectives they use to analyze phenomena. What follows is a series of quotes from introductory books. They are given in order that the reader might understand what the prevailing view is about the phenomena that concerns this thesis. Later chapters will focus down to one specific proposition within this conventional view. Broadly stated, what is the role of kinship in contemporary social change? Specifically stated, are industrial societies primarily achievement minded and non-industrial societies non-achievement minded, i.e., do the former use a person's achievement in evaluating and judging him and the latter use other factors, like kinship and fixed characteristics? This thesis moves from a series of general comments to an empirical contribution examining this issue in West African tribal societies.

In one of the most popular introductory texts, Broom

and Selznick, we find the following

Achieved status. Under feudalism a person's occupation and station in life were ascribed, fixed by tradition and inheritance. The son of a serf was also a serf, and the son of a blacksmith in a feudal village was trained to become a blacksmith. In a system of free labor, ascription gave way to individual choice and achievement.

Division of labor on an achieved rather than inherited basis is congenial to the development and expansion of industrial capitalism for the following reasons: (a) Achievement is better adapted to specialization, which is a characteristic feature of industrial capitalism. When occupations are inherited and training takes place within the family, the number of possible specializations is limited. (b) With technological advance, job requirements change and new jobs are created. It is unlikely that the technological advances that have played a major role in the expansion of industrial capitalism could have developed to such an extent without an emphasis on achieved status and its accompanying ideals of initiative and acquisition.

.

Preindustrial man does not want to accumulate wealth for its own sake. Employees often work hard to satisfy an immediate need but cannot be spurred to further effort once that need is satisfied. In industrial societies higher pay usually holds down the rate of labor turnover. Preindustrial workers tend to leave the job when their requirements are satisfied, and higher pay may, therefore, result in increased labor turnover.

.

In nonindustrial societies kinship systems are also economic systems, and the marked change in a man's economic role when he enters the industrial labor force disrupts his accustomed social relations. The social penalties of this disruption may keep him home even if he has economic incentives for working. Furthermore, peasants and artisans often dislike or think they would dislike the rigid time schedule and discipline of the factory.

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The first industrial recruits are usually the landless, the hungry, the politically powerless, and the socially disaffected, who are pushed rather than pulled into industrial employment. The push is often provided by the beginning of industrialization itself.³

Ascription and achievement are extensively considered later in this thesis. Let us not define them for the moment but simply note that one of the more frequently stressed ideas in this part of Broom and Selznick is that ascription characterizes non-industrial peoples and achievement the industrial society. In the second paragraph they say pre-industrial man is not interested in accumulation per se and describe a backward bending supply of labor curve. Their last quotes describe how kinship interferes with economic growth by constraining participation in "modern" economic systems.

But social change is also occurring in other areas, to which we refer (somewhat disdainfully) as "underdeveloped" countries. Changes in these societies are caused by such varied factors as Western technology, industrial methods, modern medicine, adequate sanitation, and mass communications. These elements, furthermore, are being introduced to societies whose culture and social structure have heretofore remained virtually unchanged for a thousand years. The marriage customs, family systems, sexual roles, class relationships, moral norms, cultural values, and personal aspirations of many underdeveloped peoples are

³Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, Sociology: A Text with Adapted Readings (4th ed.), New York: Harper & Row, 1968, pp. 463-468.

virtually the same as they were at the time of the Crusades.

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In their efforts to eliminate, or at least alleviate, the problems of underdeveloped countries, the Western nations have encountered a variety of difficulties, ranging from apathetic ignorance to outright hostility. A pervasive fallacy of these well-meaning Western efforts is the idea that the above problems are wholly (or at least largely) economic in origin, and that the underdeveloped countries merely require large and continued injections of Western technology and capital. The problems are more complicated, however, and social engineering calls for sociological, as well as economic, knowledge. In other words, "most of the problems of 'economic development' facing backward countries are non-economic in nature."⁴ (underlining in italics.)

The first paragraph states a point of view that many believe, i.e., no change of any significance has ever occurred in non-industrial areas, and when it does occur it is due to outside factors. Although few writers would admit to such a crass generalization it nevertheless underlies the continued existence of ideal types and dichotomies such as modern-traditional and rural-urban. This existence is reiterated across the discipline in introductory textbooks and in many papers. For example, Halpern says,

A modern society is a society marked by persistent, system-transforming change, whether intended or unintended, controlled or uncontrolled. Hence, whenever any society begins to experience such

⁴Francis E. Merrill, Society and Culture (3rd ed.), Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965, pp. 500-501.

change, it has thereby (however early or belated in history) entered the modern age.⁵

And

A traditional society is a pre-modern system (1) whose relationships are dominated by polarities capable of dealing only with system-maintaining change (i.e., strains); and which (2) in its history only rarely experienced incoherence, i.e., system-disintegrating change.⁶

These conceptions define a "modern society" in terms of change and a traditional society is one that does not change much. This is the gist of the definitions. The problem of measuring actual rates of social change in different contexts is not even seen to be a problem.

Beisanz and Biesanz extensively compare "traditional" and "modern" societies. Since few introductory books make the comparison in such detail we cite extensively from them.

Besides industrialization, the modernization process includes a demographic revolution that results from a sudden drop in death rates and a shift from rural to urban living. It also entails separation of the educational process from family and community and its formal institutionalization in a school system designed to train people for increasingly specialized and demanding occupations. Achieved status becomes more important than ascribed status. Physical and social mobility and other

⁵Manfred Halpern, "Conflict, Violence, and the Dialects of Modernization," a paper presented to the Panel on "Conflict, Violence, and Political Transformation," at the 64th Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 6, 1968, p. 32. (Mimeographed)

⁶Ibid., p. 33.

aspects of modernization affect the structure and function of the family, as we shall see in Chapter 19. Authority and administration change from a traditional or feudal type to a rational and legal bureaucracy, whether democratic or totalitarian. The exchange of goods and services becomes rational and impersonal; labor is treated as a commodity. Values and beliefs change in the direction of secularization, rationality, and materialism.

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Traditional society is organized on a small scale and in a rural setting, typified by the non-literate tribe, the medieval manor, the peasant village. Therefore primary contacts are possible among all the members of the society.

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The extended family is the cornerstone of a traditional society. Its members share the family income regardless of their contribution to it, the old, the ill, the disabled, and even the lazy being cared for by the productive members. . . .

In a traditional society status lines are clearly drawn in a rigid hierarchy and depend mostly on ascription. That is, a man's position depends mostly on things he cannot help: the status of his parents, his age, his sex, and perhaps some fortuitous circumstance such as being born with a caul. Everyone in a traditional society has his prescribed place and duty. The superior protects; the subordinate obeys. A modern society, in contrast has an open and mobile class structure in which status depends largely on achievement; that is, on individual efforts to gain the education and skills an industrial society needs and rewards. The labor force of necessity is hierarchically organized, for industry needs both the managers and the managed; and various skills are differentially valued and unequally rewarded. But advancement within this hierarchy is far more likely to reflect achievement than ascribed qualities.

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In traditional society, life seems to be an inte-

grated whole; the various aspects of culture blend "seamlessly." Because the economy is "embedded" in other institutions it is hard to label one activity as wholly economic and another as wholly religious or political. Family life, religion, government, and the activities of getting food, clothing, and shelter from the environment are all woven together and all imbued with a sacred meaning. Thus work in a folk society is often accompanied by songs and chants, blessed by ceremonies, and crowned by feasts. It may also be considered a "beast" to which man is enslaved all his life for little return, but in either case it is seen as an integral part of the society's way of life. Because of the way economic activities are integrated with the other aspects of life, economic rationality is at a minimum.

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The traditional society is custom-bound. Its members do not consider any new and unconventional ways of manipulating their environment to adapt it better to their needs. . . .

Members of traditional society believe that to keep things as they are is the greatest good. This is true of the social order as well as the physical. Everyone accepts his own status as given and sacred and cannot conceive of himself as occupying any other. In the traditional society of the Middle Ages, for example, the belief system included the principle that all vocations had worth and dignity in God's eyes and that the goal of income was simply to maintain a person in the standard of living that was customary and just and fair for persons of his status. Because customary methods of production sufficed to maintain this station in life, it did not occur to medieval man to try to raise his productivity. The true goal of life on earth was seen as salvation in the hereafter; earthly life was an unimportant incident along the way.

The industrial society, by contrast, is a changing society, geared to the idea of progress and the desire for increasing control, through science and technology, over the natural environment. It offers fulfillment of wants here on earth through individual work and effort. Problems are regarded as existing to be solved. . . . All industrial societies, no

matter how they are organized, value science, rationality, technical knowledge and skill, hard and efficient work, progress, modernity, education, mobility, and high productivity.

To sum up, then, a traditional society is small-scale, homogeneous, custom-bound, ascriptive, and dependent on subsistence agriculture. Its members abhor deliberate change, regard their duties and statuses as given and sacred, share feast and famine according to the whims of nature, and see life as a whole, and imbued with sacred meaning. A modern industrial society is large-scale, heterogeneous, progressive (or at least changing), mobile, and highly productive. Its members seek change in the name of progress, seek higher status through their own efforts according to largely secular and rational values, and suffer want through failures of man-made arrangements more often than through natural calamities. They see life as segmented, with the sacred in a compartment by itself and with work and play being quite distinct.⁷

Biesanz and Biesanz give a thorough description of what this writer thinks are the typical sociological cliches about social change in unfamiliar lands. After using five pages to describe these differences, the qualification is added that "the traditional society" here described exists only in a few isolated places. This tacked-on qualification cannot undo the images left in the readers' minds. Rather such a qualification is equivalent to saying, not all of the above is exactly true but it is mostly true so we can generalize about it. This book was published in 1969 and represents conventional sociological wisdom. It is the

⁷John Biesanz and Mavis Biesanz, Introduction to Sociology, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969, pp. 461-66.

prevalent orthodoxy that has been diffused throughout the discipline and its superficial plausibility increases the difficulty of modifying it. In beginning a criticism of it the very first point to note is that no empirical data have been offered in any of the above books to support those generalizations!

For example, we can examine a recent (1969) doctoral thesis that used achievement and ascription in its theoretical explanation. Poston argued that if we examine the forty-eight states, we should expect to find occupational discrimination by sex to be correlated with the relative degree of industrialization within the state. That is, the lower the state on a measurement of industrialization the higher its rate of sexual discrimination in assigning occupations. The theoretical rationale for this is stated in the following passages:

In striving to conceptualize societies which place different emphases on the sexual division of labor, it helps to conceive of two quite different ideal types--the primitive society and the industrialized society. In the ideal primitive society, division of labor is based on age and sex alone. The traditions and historical conventions implicit in the social organization of this type of society prescribe that males and females are to be employed in different occupations. Ideally, therefore, ascription is the only criterion for job allocation. Total inequality by sex should obtain in all occupational categories in this most primitive form of social life.

Conversely, the ideal industrialized society places a premium on the performance and competence of its workers. Its division of labor is based on achievement. Sex is no longer a criterion for job alloca-

tion. Theoretically, any person, if qualified, may be employed in any occupation, despite his sex (or age, or color). When this ideal society is experiencing full industrialization, productivity and efficiency are the sole objectives of the economic system. Therefore, labels of ascription are no longer the criteria for job allocation. It is recognized that these two ideal types may not actually exist, but they provide a basis for anticipating an inverse relationship between the level of industrialization of a society and its degree of occupational differentiation by sex.⁸

The first chapter of Poston's thesis cites anthropological references to "the primitive society" but contains no references to empirical studies which directly prove the theoretical basis of the argument. It has no discussion of differentiation within a single society, either modern or primitive, no justification for assuming that individual states within the United States can be compared to the small pre-literate tribal societies that anthropologists reflect when they say "primitive," and in short, the theoretical rationale is disjointed from the actual data collected. The hypothesis studied may be correct but its rationale is dubious.

The contemporary view, as an intellectual set of ideas, is compatible with either establishment or anti-establishment writings. Apologists of imperialism as well

⁸Dudley Louis Poston, Jr., "Industrialization and Occupational Differentiation by Sex: United States, 1950-1960." Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Oregon, 1968, pp. 194-5.

as its critics have found the conventional view useful. The belief that industrial man is distinctly different from tribal man and that industrialization and urbanization have a disintegrating effect on rural social structure is double-edged. It can be used to show the inadequacies of non-Western areas and the continual need for economic investment by Western companies, as it can be used to show the harmful and destructive effects of Western influences upon unsuspecting non-technological peoples. The image of a tribal society is also involved as a mythological-ideological justification by American cultural dropouts which contrast the presumably self-sufficient, warm, close, rural group to the urban cities of our nation. For a leftist example, Irving Horowitz, a sociologist well known for his critical attacks on policies of the federal government, writes:

Since primitive societies neither retrogress nor progress, they maintain a belief in the fixity of social relations. Thus, while what we term underdeveloped societies change slowly, traditional societies lack not only the fact but the very idea of human development; that is, they do not possess a plan, a direction, or a goal. . . .

The traditional society is characterized by little change from generation to generation; a behavioral pattern governed almost exclusively by custom; status determined almost entirely by inheritance (ascriptive); low economic productivity; and a social organization and life style grounded on the

principle of hierarchical command.⁹

Or again, "In the sphere of social processes, one finds a parent-oriented society, with movement determined by age and sex, no less than class and caste. Veneration based on age is a characteristic of underdeveloped or traditional societies such as 'feudal' China."¹⁰ Such views are compatible with different political policies and this compatibility contributes to the continued usage of the views.

Thoughts on the Origin of the Conventional View

The origins of this view are obscure, although some historical developments in society are easier to reconstruct than others. Historically, sociologists have never gone overseas in large numbers and consequently never built a comparative sociology. However, the need to use cross-cultural information has always been recognized. Weber and Durkheim did extensive library research on comparative materials. Nor have sociologists a tradition of implicit expectation about field work. For example, in anthropology field work has literally become a rite de passage and as a profession the psychology and personal meaning of the experience are passed on informally. The psychological

⁹Irving L. Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 61.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 440-41.

feelings of secret superiority that successful field work often invoke are labeled "the bush syndrome," and the mechanics of it are understood. Sociologists do not have a comparable body of tradition and informal knowledge.

The conflict between a recognition of the need for cross-cultural data and the lack of a tradition in getting it results in a reliance upon others, especially anthropologists and economists, for basic information about non-Western societies. This writer has closely collaborated with American anthropologists in two countries and has spent numerous hours discussing field techniques and philosophical assumptions. After much thinking about the historical influence of anthropology on sociological conceptions of other countries, he has come to believe that the origin of the contemporary view is closely related to classic anthropological field technique. That is, generally put, the methods used to collect the information affect the nature of the results.

Anthropologists have typically lived for a year in a small village as the major requirement for membership in that occupation. The large accumulation of single village studies heavily influenced social change conceptions in the 1940's since they (a) corroborated a prevalent sociological suspicion about the merits of urban areas, e.g., Wirth's much reprinted essay on urbanism as a way of life, (b) fit

into a typological thinking about rural-urban differences that goes back to the founding fathers, and (c) were a source of empirical information which sociologists recognized that they needed but did not have.

However, these reports of single village living carried a set of implicit assumptions which were also absorbed. Abetted by a desire for abstraction, the study of social change in non-industrial countries became synonymous with the study of change at the village level and kinship became synonymous with social structure. Theorists relied on what information they had at hand and what they had was a prototypical primitive village which had roughly the same general characteristics across all primitive societies.

Understanding of society may be gained through construction of an ideal type of primitive or folk society as contrasted with modern urbanized society. Such a society is small, isolated, nonliterate, and homogeneous, with a strong sense of group solidarity. The ways of living are conventionalized into that coherent system which we call "a culture." Behavior is traditional, spontaneous, uncritical, and personal; there is no legislation or habit of experiment and reflection for intellectual ends. Kinship, its relationships and institutions, are the type categories of experience and the familial group is the unit of action. The sacred prevails over the secular; the economy is one of status rather than of the market. These and related characterizations may be restated in terms of "folk mentality." In studying societies comparatively, or one society in the course of change, with the aid of these conceptions, problems arise and are, in part, solved as to the necessary or probable interrelations of some of the elements of the ideal folk society with others. One such relationship is that between disorganization

of culture and secularization.¹¹

Kuper writes:

Sociological theories of the city stem mainly from the conspicuous contrast between modern complex urban societies and rural nonindustrialized societies. Studies of urbanization in modern Africa are directly or indirectly influenced by the classical works of Durkheim, Maine, Tönnies, and Weber, transmitted in part through Wirth and Redfield. It is in this broad tradition that Professors Schwab and Miner frame their contributions. The focus is on typology and causality. "Urban" and "folk" are conceptualized as contrasted ideal types, each viewed as an integrated social structure or mechanism with its own forms of equilibrium and its own social (largely demographic) and psychological attributes. Until fairly recently more thought was directed to examining and refining characteristics of heterogeneity, density, permanence, isolation, secularization, individualization, and literacy than to analyzing structural process.¹²

Anthropologists generalized from the village to the tribe and at times the two are discussed interchangeably. That is, it is assumed that the village studied is typical of most villages in the area and that behavior observed in it is representative of behavior found in the tribe as a

¹¹Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," The American Journal of Sociology, 52 (January, 1947). Redfield's article is reprinted in Ronald Freedman et al., Principle of Sociology (rev. ed.), New York: Holt Rinehart & Wilson, 1956; Thomas Lasswell, et al., Life in Society, Chicago: Scott Foreman & Co., 1965; and Logan Wilson and William Kolb, Sociological Analysis, New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1949. It is also reprinted in the Bobbs-Merrill Series.

¹²Hilda Kuper, Urbanization and Migration in West Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, p. 11.

whole. Phenomena that a sociologist would be apt to study such as migration within a group of villages, or coalition formation in tribal politics, are not typically considered by anthropologists. For example, David Morris writes:

It is true that mobility of population in India has been historically limited. My point is that it is entirely inappropriate to deduce from this the proposition that social structure was responsible for the phenomenon. Village studies cannot be used to prove a purported relationship between social structure and limited mobility because until very recently anthropologists were not interested in the kinds of materials needed to furnish answers to the problem. However, certain characteristics of the Indian economy will suggest economic reasons for restricted mobility.¹³

Morris goes on to argue that demand for labor was low and until it increased no population shifts occurred. However, after 1834 when demand did rise, mobility was not a problem. This is a subtle bias since the single village study is still the most widely used methodology in anthropology. The single village study is a reliable and proven method of obtaining solid social information and to believe it has serious limitations is, emotionally and analytically, a difficult admission.

Two major anthropological field problems are where to begin field study, i.e., the best location, and then how to

generalize from that locale to the larger tribe. Both of these are sampling problems. A concern with sampling, a concern felt more deeply by sociologists than anthropologists, arises when studies of small groups are made and the researcher wishes to generalize to a larger population or say that his results are applicable beyond the people he immediately encountered. If a locale is selected for opportunistic reasons such as an "in" which facilitates admission, then no guarantee exists that the site is typical of anything but itself. Concomitantly, without empirical justifications it is inappropriate to make the assumptions that the village studied is part of a homogeneous culture and therefore the culture can be discussed using village examples. These problems are compounded since systematic re-study is the exception rather than the rule. Oscar Lewis' re-study of Tepotzlan is a case in point. Using a different theoretical perspective he found instances of assaults and murder which Redfield had not been aware of.¹⁴ Usually the assumption is made that generalization is possible. The specific conditions affecting what can and

¹⁴Goldkind restudied Chan Kom, where Redfield did his first field work and also concluded that Redfield provided a very inaccurate description of village life, a description that consistently ignored all aspects of its social stratification into classes and its ideological factionalism. Victor Goldkind, "Social Stratification in the Peasant Community: Redfield's Chan Kom Reinterpreted," American Anthropologist, 67 (August, 1965), pp. 863-84.

cannot be generalized have not been scrutinized closely enough.

The Contribution of Marion Levy

The impact of anthropological conceptions is most noticeable in the now defunct "school of structural functionalism." Desiring abstraction although not preferring simplicity, Parsons devised a series of general dichotomies describing all social relationships, the pattern variables. When attacked by critics for an inability to study change, these dichotomies were applied to non-industrial areas and change was analyzed as a shift from one set of concepts to their opposites. Historically, the growth of radical sociology, or the radicalization of sociology, has justified criticisms that Parsons' schema would not analyze social change.

The pattern variables were originally developed to describe all possible social relationships, but a question of level exists. The ways two people initiate and respond are different from how two villages or two countries affect one another. Parsons' dichotomies were used to describe "the traditional society" and later generalized to "the underdeveloped country."¹⁵ Levels of analysis became confused. This description of social change was influential and has

¹⁵Bert F. Hoselitz's articles are an example.

existed longer than the amount of empirical evidence sustaining it should have permitted. This situation will continue to persist as long as prestige and influence rests with prominent theorists who seem to be doing little, if any, actual research.

The last major work published by a theorist associated with these dichotomies has been Modernization and the Structure of Societies by Marion Levy. Fourteen years in writing, it is 855 pages of abstract conceptualization about social structure. His analyses of the differences between modern and traditional societies is summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1¹⁶

	X	Y
1. Cognitive aspects	Rational	Traditional
2. Membership criteria aspects	Universalistic	Particularistic
3. Substantive definition aspects	Functionally specific	Functionally diffuse
4. Affective aspects	Avoidant	Intimate
5. Goal orientation aspects	Individualistic	Responsible
6. Stratification aspects	Hierarchical	Nonhierarchical

¹⁶Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 153.

A partial feeling for the tenor of the book may be obtained from the commentary on these concepts.

In Part I, above, one of the major distinctions between relatively modernized and relatively non-modernized societies was the different emphases in different spheres that the members of those societies placed on the X and Y forms of the relationship aspects. Throughout this work, there is a great deal of hypothesizing that the role of changing emphases on different clusters of the relationship aspects is of the first importance in the transition from relatively nonmodernized to relatively modernized societies. Many problems of the transitions can be understood in these terms. The exploration of just how these relationship aspects tend to cluster and under what conditions these and other clusterings take place, has only recently begun in social science. The two major clustering effects illustrated in Table 2 may be rather confidently relied upon. For any relationship in which there is a switch in emphasis from a Y to an X category in any of the first three aspects, one should expect a shift from an emphasis on a Y category to an X category in the other two as well. There would also be a switch toward X₄ if the emphasis was previously on Y₄. If such a switch does not take place, or if one finds an emphasis on an X in any one of the first three aspects and not in the other of the first four, he can draw one of two possible inferences: (1) the relationship concerned will prove to be highly unstable, or (2) it will be fitted into and buttressed by other relationships in a peculiar fashion.

There is another general avenue for theory formation in these terms. Certain emphases on relationship aspects are characteristic not only of different societies but more importantly of their various subsystems. This has many implications for general theories of social change. One of the major reasons that the structures of relatively modernized societies are in fact a sort of universal social solvent of the social structures of other societies is that for certain structures likely to be initiated intentionally or unintentionally, the members of relatively modernized societies emphasize X qualities in the first four aspects whereas members of most of the relatively non-modernized societies emphasize Y qualities in at least the first three aspects. Moreover, the disintegrative

impact of the importation of such structures is never confined to the minimal departures from emphasis on the Y categories necessary to establish firmly an emphasis on the X categories for altogether new relationships. The disintegration may go quite far even though the emphases on the X category are not at all firmly established.¹⁷

The closing comments on disintegration are another way of talking about the rapid impact that Western countries have had and the presumed destruction of traditional social structure that has resulted from it. This is a theme that Levy continually stresses throughout the book. Levy's Table 1 and the quote above should be recognized as a more abstract way of presenting the same ideas we encountered in Biesanz and Biesanz or Broom and Selznick. Levy goes on to say

The distinction between achieved and ascribed is now one of ancient tradition as the field of social analysis goes. This distinction is close to, if not identical with, the distinction already used in another context under the heading of universalism and particularism . . . substitute predominantly universalistic for achieved and predominantly particularistic for ascribed.¹⁸

As soon as specific examples are given to clarify the abstractions, we arrive at statements similar to those found in the introductory books. As this thesis attempts to show, neither Biesanz and Biesanz's clear assertions nor Levy's abstract pronouncements may be "rather confidently relied

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 170-71. Underlining mine.

¹⁸Ibid.

upon."

Levy's opus has not been treated kindly by critics.¹⁹ Smelser, Horowitz and Wheeler all pointedly comment on its absolute lack of empirical documentation and the overly abstract language that is repeatedly used. None of these objections would be serious were Levy an unknown or obscure writer. Instead he is a "Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at Princeton University and a faculty associate in the Center of International Studies." A rhetorical question might well be asked: is there a relationship between the ideas that Levy expresses and the social class of the students who attend Princeton University? For example, in a section on "mob action" he writes

. . . In Iran under the leadership of Mossadegh, the mass demonstrations incited and executed against the properties, policies and personnel associated with an oil company as the hated symbol of imperialism were certainly examples of mob action in the sense intended here.²⁰

That Prime Minister Mossadegh was overthrown by a Central Intelligence Agency coup in 1953 is not mentioned by Levy. The coup resulted in a new government which was favorable to American oil interests, notably Standard and Gulf. The CIA

¹⁹Neil J. Smelser and Irving L. Horowitz, "Review Symposium," American Sociological Review, 31 (December, 1966), pp. 857-81. See also Wayne Wheeler, "Social Change and Modernization: The Problem of Open vs. Closed Models," Sociological Quarterly, 9 (Spring, 1968), pp. 158-69.

²⁰Levy, op. cit., p. 324.

agent in charge of the operation, Kermit Roosevelt, became in 1960 a vice-president of Gulf. Levy's book includes only six passing references to imperialism, one of them in the above quote, only five references to the United Nations, none to major economic spokesmen for third world countries such as UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Disarmament), none to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, Central Intelligence Agency or GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), and six references to Marxism, i.e., the book explicitly avoids "economic" questions, as if a definitive 855 page work could be written on "modernization" without examining international economies and the foreign policies of the major industrial countries.

Levy's description of the traditional society is taken directly from Parsons' pattern variables.²¹ Hoselitz and Moore, prominent among sociological theorists on social change, also used the pattern variables as a theoretical schema.

Three of the five pairs of pattern alternatives stated by Parsons are more immediately applicable to our problem. These are the choice between modalities of the social object (achievement vs. ascription); the choice between types of value orientation standard (universalism vs. particularism);

²¹Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shilo (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1951. P. 77 contains mostly the same contents as Levy's Table One. See also pp. 76 ff. On p. 134 of his opus Levy acknowledged his debt to Parsons.

and the definition of scope of interest in the object (specificity vs. diffuseness). In applying these three pattern variables to the distinctions between industrialized and predominantly non-industrial societies, we find that the former are characterized by the preponderance of achievement standards in the distribution of economic roles and objects; that they also employ universalistic criteria in this distribution process; and that economic roles in these societies are typically functionally specific. Primitive and other non-industrial societies, on the other hand, exhibit predominantly features of ascription, particularism, and functional diffuseness in the corresponding fields of social action.²²

In summary, this chapter has introduced the conventional view of social change in non-industrial countries as it appears in both introductory and more specialized works. Other examples could be cited to what "the conventional view" consists of and how it has been used. It should be stressed that this view is not a fixed one, two, three list of propositions. Rather it operates as a paradigm as described by Kuhn,²³ a set of implicit assumptions and overt propositions, not always publicly articulated, which define, guide and interpret research in a scientific field. All such views like this, especially in the absence of long research traditions, are reconstructions of reality. The specifics of any analysis speculating or describing such a paradigm are open to debate. The writer's purpose here is

²²Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, Industrialization and Society, UNESCO Monitor, 1963, p. 16.

²³Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962.

to provide a rounded understanding of what it entails. This thesis will later describe the accumulation of contrary empirical evidence which implies necessary revisions that must be made in this view. The evidence presented here on West African societies is intended as a contribution to our understanding of kinship as a social pattern. This understanding involves a way of thinking about kinship that is different from the conventional view. Chapter Two reviews evidence on the extended and nuclear family and "industrialization." The chapter opens a more specific introduction to the contributions of this thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

FAMILY PATTERNS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

Having introduced the conventional wisdom in Chapter One this section continues a critique of it so that the theoretical contribution of this thesis may be put into proper perspective. This critique will build into and introduce the thesis's specific empirical contribution on the role of achievement principles in social change.

The "conventional view" is a set of loosely integrated but mutually supporting ideas. By the classic conception of theory as a set of related ideas, or by Kuhn's conception of a paradigm, these ideas do form a theory even though they are not typically labeled as such. The ideas have also been used as implicit assumptions which may or may not be overtly proclaimed. This lack of sustained systematization allows an analyst to study separate propositions within the set, entirely aside from whether or not the conclusions of that study affect other propositions. The result of this lack of integration is that differing amounts of information have been collected for each proposition. We begin this criticism by reviewing the evidence for a proposition whose empirical adequacy has been generally discredited. Since this thesis will focus on a proposition whose adequacy is

not clearly doubtful, it is instructive to examine a proposition that has been empirically falsified.

Until the early 1960's it was commonly asserted that pre-industrial countries basically had an extended family pattern and that processes of social change, urbanization and industrialization, as part of their encompassing effect on society, replaced the extended family with a nuclear family pattern.¹ This assertion closely dovetailed with the importance supposedly placed on kinship in "the primitive society" and how industrialization is essentially disruptive and antagonistic of traditional social structure.

Furstenberg, in denying the applicability of this, presents it in detail:

The proposition that industrialization destroys traditional family structures has long been accepted by sociologists and laymen alike. In industrial societies a new kind of family, the "isolated nuclear family," has been recognized; in societies presently industrializing, the older family systems are thought to be under great strain. Analysts of the American family have both assumed and asserted that the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy is accompanied by the weakening of a family system characterized by such traits as low social and geographical mobility, high parental authority over children, marital harmony and stability, dominance of husband over wife, and close ties within the extended family. It is similarly assumed that the modern family possesses few of

¹For example of this in the economic literature see Peter T. Bauer and Basil S. Yamey, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 66-67.

the characteristics of the pre-industrial family. Just as the older family pattern served the needs of a farming economy, it is frequently said that the modern family serves the needs of an industrial economy.²

Greenfield criticized statements like this in 1961.³

He reviewed evidence by Johnson on Japan which said the Japanese stem family was sufficiently generalized in nature to adapt to Japanese technological growth and that no basic change of its structure had occurred despite industrialization. He cited: Garigue, who reported extensive kinship networks among urbanized industrialized French-Canadians that existed historically and will probably continue to exist; Wagley, who studied kinship in seven Brazilian communities and found kinship ties operative in both rural and urban areas; and Firth, Young, Shaw, and Townsend's London studies which also found operative extended family ties.

Greenfield went on to describe kinship on the island of Barbados in the Caribbean Sea and implied his analysis could be generalized to other islands in the West Indies. It had a densely populated society, without a peasantry or an industrial labor force, yet it has always had an almost

²Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., "Industrialization and the American Family: A Look Backward," American Sociological Review, 31 (June, 1966), pp. 326-37.

³Sidney M. Greenfield, "Industrialization and the Family in Sociological Theory," American Journal of Sociology, 67 (November, 1961), pp. 312-22.

classic nuclear family pattern.

On the tiny sugar-growing island of Barbados, then, we find the same small nuclear family, articulated with the larger society in precisely the same way as we find in industrialized Western society, but without urbanization and industrialization. The industrial revolution, in fact, has not yet come to the island.⁴

He goes on to say the nuclear family is native to Northern Europe and possibly antedates the Vikings. It certainly antedates the industrial revolution in England and the United States. Greenfield says it was with the acquisition of great wealth that we find the development of the extended family since only then could one generation support several generations simultaneously and that subnuclear matrifocal families arise at a subsistence level since everybody must work and conjugal bonds are weakened. This is the opposite of what the conventional view implies, but it does account for empirical data which shows the proliferation of family aid among wealthier parts of the population.

Greenfield's historical claims were independently tested by Furstenberg and Lantz, et al.⁵ and supported. Furstenberg studied accounts of European travelers in the first half of the 1800's, prior to American industrializa-

⁴Ibid., p. 320.

⁵Herman R. Lantz, et al., "Pre-Industrial Patterns in the Colonial Family in America: A Content Analysis of Colonial Magazines," American Sociological Review, 33 (June, 1968), pp. 413-26.

tion and found their description of the American family had "striking similarities" to contemporary descriptions-- tensions such as: the voluntary choice of mates, the loss of freedom for women at marriage, women's discontent with total domesticity, lack of discipline of American children and the inferior positions of women in society. All three were noted prior to industrialization. Some of them such as the lack of parental restrictions on children and desire of women to improve their situations may have facilitated the growth of the industrial system. Lantz, et al. did a content analysis of fifteen colonial magazines published between 1741-1794. Studying "selected" aspects of the family they found that some aspects of the American family structure, such as an emphasis on romantic love and personal happiness, usually attributed to the affects of industrialization, were emphasized in colonial magazines. Limited contradictory evidence exists, and an acceptable conclusion to be drawn from Greenfield, Furstenberg and Lantz et al. is that the American family pattern has remained approximately similar despite industrialization. Only the rate of divorce seems to have noticeably increased.

Goode writes

Like most stereotypes, that of the classical family of Western nostalgia leads us astray. When we penetrate the confusing mists of recent history we find few examples of this "classical" family. Grandma's farm was not economically self-sufficient. Few families stayed together as large aggregations

of kinfolk. Most houses were small, not large. We now see more large old houses than small ones; they survived longer because they were likely to have been better constructed. The one-room cabins rotted away. True enough, divorce was rare, but we have no evidence that families were generally happy. Indeed, we find, as in so many other pictures of the glowing past, that in each past generation people write of a period still more remote, their grandparents' generation, when things really were much better.⁶

Sussman and Burchinal in a heavily documented review of the family literature concluded

There exists an American kin-family system with complicated matrices of aid and service activities which link together the component units into a functioning network. The network identified by Litwak as extended family relations is composed of nuclear units related by blood and affinal ties. Relations extend along generational lines and bilaterally where structures take the form of sibling bonds and ambilineages, that is, the family circle or cousin club. . . .

Understanding of the family as a functioning social system interrelated with other social systems in society is possible only by rejection of the isolated nuclear family concept. Accepting the isolated nuclear family as the most functional type today has led to erroneous conclusions concerning the goals and functions of these other social systems.⁷

They begin their review article with a brief historical note pointing out that Durkheim, Simmel, Toennies, and Mannheim

⁶William J. Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns, Glenco, Illinois: The Free Press, p. 7.

⁷Marvin B. Sussman and Lee G. Burchinal, "Kin Family Network: Unheralded Structure in Current Conceptualizations of Family Functioning," in Kinship and Family Organization, Bernard Paiser (ed.), London: John Wiley & Sons, 1966, pp. 131-32.

stressed the isolation of the small family in urban society and Linton, Wirth, and Parsons supported this position. Without well documented evidence, the nuclear family emphasis and the supposed effect of industrialization on it have largely prevailed in many textbooks.

The textbooks are written by family sociologists. Few among them, either texts on the sociology of the family or those written for marriage and family preparation course, give theoretical or empirical treatment to the maintenance of the family system by the mutual assistance activities of the kin group. Among the texts examined, only one considers in any detail financial arrangements among kin members.⁸

Sussman and Burchinal are pointing out a situation in their particular area that exists across many topics in the field of social change. Older views have come down to us, without sound empirical documentation, and been repeated and repeated like bad cliches. They also point out that little research was done until the 1950's. This article was written in 1966, and the subsequent evidence they cite took a generation to accumulate. Enough studies have been done in the period 1950-1966 to establish the existence of mutual aid and social activities among nuclear families belonging to the same kin group. Their review of the research cites approximately forty studies substantiating the evidence of kin network. These are not large extended families wherein

⁸Ibid., p. 124.

eight or ten adults spanning several generations form the same kin group live together in one dwelling. Rather, they tend to be small extended families or "stem" families. This is not a criticism of Sussman and Burchinal since many primitive societies do not have large extended families living in the same house.

This research on American data is corroborated by findings from urban areas in non-industrial countries. Aldous⁹ reviewed evidence on the West African cities of Brassaville, Leopoldville, Stanleyville, Dakar, and Lagos. She found clear evidence of the continued existence of extended family organization. Leslie's work on Dar es Salaam¹⁰ found the same

The basic unit in town is the kinship group of cousins, uncles and nephews; it is on relatives of this degree of nearness that a stranger to town depends until he can fend for himself. Very few come to Dar es Salaam without a relative to go to, and most, particularly of the more numerous communities, have a positive web of kinship ties criss-crossing the town.

Bruner¹¹ in his study of kinship patterns in the

⁹Joan Aldous, "Urbanization, the Extended Family, and Kinship Ties in West Africa," Social Forces, 41 (October, 1962), pp. 6-12.

¹⁰J. A. K. Leslie, A Survey of Dar es Salaam, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 3.

¹¹Edward M. Bruner, "Medan: The Role of Kinship in an Indonesian City," in Kinship and Family Organization, Bernard Paber (ed.), London: John Wiley & Sons, 1966, p. 424.

Indonesian city of Medan concluded that for the people he studied kinship has not been superseded or lost in an urban environment. His data supported these propositions:

1. The urban Batak form a single kinship community, and the sense of ethnic identity is stronger among Toba Batak in the city than in the village.

2. The range of the kinship system has been extended more widely in the city to encompass a larger number of more distantly related persons.

3. Social relationships among urban kinsmen are generally less personal, intimate, and familial than in the village.

4. The minimal lineage, which includes some members who reside in the village and others who live in the city, continues to be a meaningful, cooperative, cooperate group.

5. The urban Batak form clan associations, a corporate unit intermediate in size between the lineage and the community, which serve many social and ceremonial functions not performed by the village clan system.

6. The nuclear family is more important in the city than in the village.

Wilkinson in his essay on Japanese Industrialization¹² pointed out the contributions of traditional family organization to industrial growth. The emergence of an industrial elite was not so much an achievement minded hustling by individual entrepreneurs as it was the result of cooperative family effort. Today almost one-third of the Japanese

¹²Thomas O. Wilkinson, "Family Structure and Industrialization in Japan," American Sociological Review, 27 (October, 1962, pp. 678-82.

labor force is employed in small family owned businesses, versus only 2.5 per cent of the American labor force. He concludes by reiterating that theories of social change and development were created by Western writers who were unfamiliar with non-Western urban-industrial traditions and therefore built into their theories social events which are not necessarily valid for non-Western peoples.

The United Nations' 1955 study of urbanization in five Asian cities concluded that migration and the urban industrial worker are not associated with family disorganization.¹³

Orenstein,¹⁴ studying Kingsley Davis' assertions that "Westernization" weakens traditional family patterns, did a study of family size data from the census of India. He came to the conservative conclusion that the extended family in India has not weakened but might have even become stronger. He did not find a decrease in family size with increasing urbanization. In coming to his rejection of the conventional view of the family he complained about the vagueness of the hypotheses that Kingsley Davis originally

¹³UNESCO, The Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization: Five Studies in Asia. Calcutta, 1965.

¹⁴Henry Orenstein, "The Recent History of the Extended Family in India," Social Problems, 8 (Spring, 1961), pp. 341-50.

promulgated and had harsh comments about a peculiarly Western conception of progress that invokes individualism as the terminus for all theories of history.

One of the early empirical tests of the hypothesis that the extended family breaks down under the impact of industrial and city growth was done by Oscar Lewis in 1952.¹⁵ First he studied the rural village of Tepoztlan then he studied one hundred families from Tepoztlan who were living in Mexico City. He found family unity and extended family ties had increased in the city. There were fewer incidents of separation and divorce, and ties to Tepoztlan remained strong. Tepoztlan families in Mexico City were aided by an association composed of people from the Tepoztlan area. (This is a common social structure in urban areas of non-Western countries.)

Stepan criticized the same hypothesis as Lewis and cites Wagley, Leeds and Morse as other Latin American researchers who found data contradicting the conventional view.¹⁶ Morse has a long research review on the historical and contemporary Latin American city¹⁷ and after examining

¹⁵Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization without Breakdown: A Case Study," Scientific Monthly, 75 (July, 1952), pp. 31-41.

¹⁶Alfred Stepan, "Political Development Theory: The Latin American Experience," Journal of International Affairs, 29 (1966), pp. 223-34.

¹⁷Richard M. Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of

a series of studies concluded that the disorganization that presumably characterized American migrants to American cities has not generally occurred. He flatly says Burgess' study of Chicago is not the typical experience for all other urban locations. Stepan's later point is well taken especially since many American textbooks invariably mention Burgess (or Hoyt) in describing typical patterns of urban growth.

In the Birmingham, et al., review of aspects of social structure in contemporary Ghana,¹⁸ they make the point that free unions or urban common law marriages cannot be considered as deviation from expected behavior but rather are an integral part of traditional marriages. The existence of such marriages is not evidence for the breakdown of traditional social institutions.

No discussion of the forms of marriage in Ghana can be complete without mentioning a form of union which, although not constituting legally valid marriage, nevertheless appears to be an important form of marital union. This is cohabitation of persons of opposite sex without the formality of marriage. In the Post Enumeration Survey sample 4 per cent of the males and 5.6 per cent of the females were living in this sort of union. An interesting feature of these

Function and Structure," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 4 (July, 1962), pp. 473-93.

¹⁸Walter Birmingham, I. Neustadt, E. N. Omaboe, (ed.), A Study of Contemporary Ghana, Vol. II, Some Aspects of Social Structure, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967.

unions is that they are not more important in the larger urban centres than in the rural areas.

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One may conclude that these unions are not necessarily the result of urbanization. The explanation is to be sought in the indigenous social arrangements of the various ethnic groups. In many of these groups a period of cohabitation may precede the marriage proper. Among the Ashantis, for example, Fortes has pointed out that "a marriage may begin with a period of cohabitation approved by the parents of the couple and accepted as proper marriage for all practical purposes." In such cases the husband does not have exclusive sexual rights in the wife. This means that he cannot claim damages if his wife commits adultery with another man and he cannot claim paternity of a child conceived by his wife with another man.¹⁹

Imoagene, in discussing the ways in which migrants assimilate into urban areas, found that "urban adjustment" was strongly affected by membership in a tribal/clan/village association. That is, members of such associations tend to be more "adjusted" than non-members and this effect stood up even when length of time was controlled for. This is not a startling result since Banton, Little, Abu-Lughod, Lewis, Gutkind, and others have pointed out the ways associations based on ascriptive criteria like ethnicity, lineage, language or area of origin, help to facilitate a migrant's stay in a non-Western city. Ascription becomes a positive factor in the creation of adaptive social

¹⁹Ibid., p. 208.

groupings.

Schwab, in an otherwise conventional description of Oshogbo, a Yoruba city, writes

Because kinship was the central institution in traditional Oshogbo and provided the predominant structure for ordering relationships, the transformation in kinship relationships which has accompanied Westernization is central to the social system of modern Oshogbo. For many years anthropologists and sociologists asserted that Westernization undermined and destroyed extended kinship systems. More recently, this assertion has been questioned, and there is a growing realization that extended kinship systems may be very resilient even under unusual transitional stress. In Oshogbo there has certainly been a reduction in the scope of kinship rights and obligations. At the same time, kinship claims and loyalties persist and, although modified, the lineage system remains a primary focus of cohesion and source of stability and control.²⁰

And Colson writes

Changes in the organization of family units now going on in contemporary Africa are tied to other economic and social changes. Casual observers have assumed that the trend is either towards a strengthening of patrilineal ties or the emergence of the independent conjugal nuclear family. The evidence seems to indicate that the reverse is true. In many areas, both rural and urban, contemporary conditions work to the strengthening of matrilineal ties uniting domestic units at the expense of patrilineal ties. Equally significant is the new independence given in many areas to the nuclear family, but this is one based on a woman and her

²⁰William B. Schwab, "Oshogbo--An Urban Community?" in Urbanization and Migration in West Africa, Hilda Kuper (ed.), Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965, p. 99.

children rather than on the conjugal tie.²¹

And Liebenow in his book Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege says "The basic building block of tribal society has been the nuclear family, consisting of a man, his wife or wives, and his offspring."²²

The concept of "network," developed by British social anthropologists from their studies in East and Central Africa, is partly defined in terms of ascriptive ties of family and tribe. The concept of "network" is one starting point in the analysis of African urbanization. It stresses the fact that rural migrants are closely tied to traditional kin networks as well as non-kin associational networks. These latter may or may not be based on ethnic identity or linguistic similarity. Rural migrants are not amonic, confused and suffering from "social disorganization."²³

²¹E. Colson, "Family Change in Contemporary Africa," Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 96 (January 20, 1962), pp. 641-52.

²²J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia The Evolution of Privilege, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

²³For an explication of "network" and its utility in analyzing African urbanization see Max Gluckman, "Anthropological Problems Arising from the African Industrial Revolution," in Social Change in Modern Africa, A. Southall (ed.), London: Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 67-82; J. Clyde Mitchell, The Kalela Dance, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958; A. L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958; and Peter C. W. Gutkind, "African Urbanism, Mobility

The claim we have examined above is that industrialization and urbanization seriously disrupt family patterns. This claim stems from basic assumptions the "conventional view" has made about social change, i.e., the proposition of family disruption is a specific example of a general assumption. It has been typically assumed that social change, sometimes conveniently labeled "industrialization" or "urbanization," leads to the destruction of traditional social structure. The whole assumption is exemplified by the demise of the extended family. In short, change is destructive. This assumption finds embodiment in other forms while never being stated in a bold or blunt manner. The "modern" and the "traditional" are in conflict with one another and the traditional disintegrates under the rapid and extensive impact of western technology.

So much evidence on the extended family has accumulated in the last fifteen years that the burden of proof is now on those who would continue to uphold the conventional view. For example, the collection of research reports in Piddington's Kinship and Geographical Mobility ends with a comment by Christopher that "the evidence is not all in, but the way 'returns' are going it looks like our thinking on

and the Social Network," in Kinship and Geographical Mobility, Ralph Piddington (ed.), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965, pp. 48-60.

the extended family may be in for some drastic revision."²⁴ This is a much studied area and the writer makes no claims to have even reviewed a major part of it. However, the studies we have looked at make two major points: nuclear family patterns existed prior to industrialization and extended family patterns continue to exist after industrialization, i.e., there is no one family organization that is the most optimal or compatible with a machine technology and densely populated urban areas. As Goode says,

It seems impossible to cut down the size of the effective conjugal family to its nuclear core only, either in the West or in any other society, without some type of political or coercive force. The additional kin who are included are there because of a direct emotional tie with some members of the nuclear core, a ties supported by the institutional structure.²⁵

This has been a relatively easy proposition to evaluate since so much research has been done on it in the last generation that it is now reasonably clear what this evidence implies. The next chapter will continue the examination of the conventional view by tracing the theoretical evolution of Wilbert Moore, a theorist of social change, whose reputation was closely identified with conventional assumptions.

²⁴Ibid., p. 184.

²⁵Goode, op. cit., p. 371.

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University Park, Denver, Colorado 80210

August 13, 1970

Miss Leslie Hendrickson
Department of Sociology
University of Oregon
Eugene, Oregon 97403

Dear Miss Hendrickson:

Your name and handwriting lead me to believe that I'm addressing you correctly, but if I've made a mistake, I apologize.

I went through the entire dissertation (surely there wasn't more?) with profound interest. I think that your treatment of my theoretical migrations in your Chapter Three is absolutely fair. You did not, I think, pick up later amendments, such as those in my small books The Impact of Industry and Social Change. But that would not have affected your diagnosis much.

You have taken, I believe, on some issues that divide us an extreme, or adversary, position. All right; fair game. But to suppose that wage labor, or a monetized economy, or urbanization have no social consequences is also not a tenable position. The evidence is entirely on my side of that controversy, if we define the issues that sharply. I think that I have been nearly as self-critical as you have been suitably critical of the "conventional" view, and I believe you have recognized that.

I enclose a paper of mine that you probably have not seen. It was prepared for some symposium or other, and not yet published. You may still think that my position is too "conventional." But then we get into only a set of empirical questions. And I'll give you fairly long odds on my generalizing propositions. As you may imagine, I've been debating these issues with Levy for years.

I guess that you would like to have the copy of your thesis returned. It has already migrated from Eugene (where I took my M.A.) to Princeton to Denver. Where can I send it to you?

Cordially,



Wilbert E. Moore
Professor of Sociology and Law

CHAPTER THREE

THE REACTION OF NON-INDUSTRIAL PEOPLES TO INDUSTRIAL WORK

Wilbert Moore's Industrialization and Labor

Having introduced the conventional view and reviewed a change in the understanding of a specific proposition, this section is a description of how the perspective as a whole has changed. Given the goal of describing how an entire gestalt has changed, the most thorough method of description would be to catalogue its parts and view all the evidence for each part. This is the clearest and least ambiguous proof. However, it is also a boring procedure and limited by the restrictions of time and space. It is never possible to review all of the evidence for all parts of a complex perspective. Therefore a compromise is typically adopted in which some of the evidence is reviewed for some of the parts. This section is also a compromise. Its purposes are twofold: first, to trace the changes in "the conventional view" through an analysis of the theoretical history of Wilbert E. Moore's writings on social change in non-Western countries. Secondly, this review of Moore's work is also a review of the evidence which must be explained by any theory

of actual historical social change as we know it in this century.

Wilbert E. Moore of Princeton University is an influential sociologist who has extensively written on industrial sociology and social change. The first purpose of this section is to trace the evolution of his ideas over a twenty-year period. In other words, we examine the evolution of the conventional view by tracing the evolution of a prominent theorist who has been closely identified with it. This is an arbitrary selection, made because it renders the problem of analyzing the paradigm more manageable, and because Moore has published for over twenty years, thus a reasonable selection of his writings can be found. This tracing purports to document the following points: (a) In 1950, at the beginning of the twenty-year period, his views were "conventional." That is, what he believed is substantially the same as the views described in Chapter One, (b) in the beginning his views were not an adequate guide to the empirical world as we know it through fact and figures, and (c) his views gradually changed and are now substantially different.

In 1951, Moore published a fine and ultimately influential analysis of labor migration called Industrialization and Labor. Its stated purpose was: to consider "The problem of labor supply in its full social and psy-

chological significance is, therefore, the core of our inquiry. Specifically, what are the cultural, institutional, sociopsychological factors that induce or impede the transition from non-industrial to industrial employment?"¹ The book has a tripart organization. The first is a thorough review of empirical studies on "barriers and antipathies," "pull" and "push" determinants, morale and efficiency of workers, problems of using comparative evidence, the classical theory of wages and general comments on industrialization. The second part is a report of field research in Mexico and the third part is a concluding chapter.

Industrialization and Labor has to be evaluated carefully since a disjunction appears to exist between its theoretical presentation and the empirical documentation offered to substantiate it. A concise theoretical statement is made in several places. The following passage is found in Chapter Two and repeated in the Conclusion.

Any society has some degree of resistance to change, whether the source of the change be internal or external. That resistance arises from the nature of society itself. As a complex organization of interrelated human activities, oriented to certain goals and fulfilling certain functions necessary to its own survival, a society provides more or less adequate answers to the common problems of human existence. To the degree

¹Wilbert E. Moore, Industrialization and Labor, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1951, p. 5.

that a particular society approximates the model of perfect integration, the established and normatively sanctioned patterns--for example, socialization, assignment of status, maintenance of order, and production and distribution of goods and services--are internally consistent and self-perpetuating. It follows that an innovation in the organization of production and the means of gaining a livelihood will initially encounter resistance approximately proportional to the integration of the established structure.²

After this segment Moore writes,

This fundamental principle has numerous implications and applications. Among the common barriers identified in the comparative survey, the following are of special importance: ignorance of alternatives and of the skills for their adoption; the security system, both emotional and economic, provided by the social structure of nonindustrial societies; the status-system of nonindustrial societies, which generally depends largely upon inherited position, rewards the performance of duties according to traditional expectations, and minimizes impersonal, functionally specific types of economic relations and division of labor; the "freedom" and socially recognized skill of the independent producer in primitive and peasant societies.³

The above quotes are a summary statement of his thinking on social change in 1951. From the assumption that "traditional" or "primitive" society "approximates the model of perfect integration," it follows that they are therefore resistant to change since all parts of these societies presumably reinforce one another. Implicit here is the assumption that "social change" is the consequence of outside variables which are inevitably destructive. Open

²Ibid., p. 302.

³Ibid., p. 302.

expression of this appears throughout the book.

Any and every contact with a cash economy was bound to have a disruptive effect not only on the subsistence economy but also on the whole structure of society of which the economic foundation was subsistence production; this effect was all the more drastic since the changes resulted not from development from within, or from within a similar society, but from the requirements of a vastly different society.

The sheerly disruptive effects of cultural contact may be subject to condemnation on general humanitarian grounds, and especially criticized by enthusiasts for the "noble savage" and for what might be called "cultural equilateralism." Whatever merits these views have in the abstract, they have little hope of prevailing against the cultural imperialism of modern industrial societies. In any event, disruption of tightly integrated patterns is exactly called for if rapid economic transition is to take place. It is, perhaps, an overly nice regard for the sensibilities of unspoiled primitives, abetted by an unwillingness to grant their equality in Western patterns of economic and social organization, that has accounted for part of the slow and limited economic development in major areas of the world, and especially in those under colonial administration.⁴

The claim that a lack of economic development is directly traceable to a colonial reluctance to interfere with native customs is unusual even though it is immediately qualified. Most economic theorists point to variables such as capital accumulation, infant industries, imperialism, tariffs or other factors to account for a lack of economic progress. Moore also notes that "the native worker not yet integrated into industrial traditions may prefer the

⁴Ibid., p. 192.

'leisure' that allows him to re-establish his relations in his native community after the achievement of a very limited monetary objective."⁵ These conceptions of the primitive society, economic development, and labor migration will undergo considerable revision in the next twenty years.

At the end of this early work he raises a key question and answers it.

What is the most general explanation that may be given the pervasive strength of the industrial system in subverting social systems and surmounting or penetrating the natural barriers that a balanced nonindustrial system possesses? The findings of this study do not provide a definitive answer, even to the more limited aspect of that question to which it is addressed. But a tentative generalization may be hazarded; it is the positive, institutionally sanctioned, and structurally necessary prescription of mobility that is at once the source of productive efficiency of the industrial system and the source of disruption of nonindustrial systems.⁶

Given a conception of non-industrial societies as rigid, isolated and well-integrated any sizeable amount of labor mobility would truly be a key factor in causing its disruption. That is, any behavior involving social movement of any substantial kind is erosive of customs and authority based on repeated, unanalyzed, adherence.

Since this thesis comes to a focus in the analysis of the importance of achievement versus fixed ascriptive characteristics it is worthwhile to quote one additional

⁵Ibid., p. 163.

⁶Ibid., p. 311.

passage. This is a proto-typical theoretical statement describing the conventional view. It could have been cited in Chapter One of this thesis. This writer believes that "most sociologists" would still hold it to be substantially correct.

It is typical of the industrial way of life that in a large measure the participant's position in the system, and his daily contacts with other persons, are related to what he does rather than who he is. Individual mobility, transitory relations, rewards by merit, are emphasized in extreme degree. The obverse of the attitude of escape from the rigor of customary controls is the positive orientation toward the industrial mode of status-fixing and the patterning of social relations.

5. Aspirations for individual mobility. In most primitive and peasant societies the idea and significance of change are strictly limited. In the most general sense, the societies are conservative. This means that the notion of progress, or of orderly development, is not commonly encountered. For the group as a whole, the emphasis is upon preservation of the established structure. When shortcomings are recognized, they are likely to be interpreted as departures from received norms, often viewed as having been more honored in past generations. Improvement then consists of going backward. This difference in general cultural orientation, stated here as a difference in kind, is actually one of degree. The degree is often so great, however, as to mark a fact of fundamental importance in the spread of industrial patterns.

Expressed in terms of the position of the individual in the social structure, and the socially engendered goals toward which he directs his efforts, the contrast is equally sharp. In a social structure that is fairly rigid, and changing so slowly as to appear immobile, the individual's adult status is likely to be largely fixed at birth, by "status ascription." The differentiating characteristics most commonly used as a basis for fixing adult roles are those of sex, age, and kinship relations. These serve to provide a minimum division of labor, and

may account for most kinds of specialization embodied in the social structure.

Even in these circumstances, the individual's statuses and roles change, but largely as an orderly process determined in advance on common principles, such as moving through standard age grades, and assuming the kinship roles appropriate to one's age, sex, and kinship position.

The status-system embodied in the specialization characteristic of industrial production assumes, and must assume, much greater flexibility than can be afforded by status ascription.⁷

The views cited above are pretty familiar, and are not too different from those introduced in Chapter One. It is reasonable to infer that in 1951 Moore held to the conventional view. As mentioned above, Industrialization and Labor is difficult to evaluate since a gap exists between his theoretical views and the empirical documentations he offers. The book is a first-rate work, it has a fine review of the pre-1950 literature on social change in non-industrial countries and an excellent bibliography. Nevertheless, it still has problems. Having become acquainted with its theory we turn to the data offered to support the theory.

The first chapter is entitled "Barriers and Antipathies" [to labor migration] and the first barrier is called "ignorance." This is a forerunner of later arguments made by "communication theorists." Ignorance is a result of

⁷Ibid., pp. 98-99.

a lack of communication and therefore it is claimed that improved literacy and better communication is one of the key stimulents to economic development. Stated abstractly it is difficult to disagree with other than to point out that a stress on this factor fits with the theoretical assumption that primitive societies are isolated and ignorant of what goes on around them.

The second barrier cited by Moore is "loss of traditional forms."

Perhaps the most pervasive attitude of withdrawal from the industrial pattern, or of only limited, temporary, and reluctant adherence to it, arises from loss of traditional forms that give security. It is typical especially of the first impact of new economic patterns that they threaten or disrupt the previous social relationships, while not immediately supplying new security devices in their place.⁸

The first empirical evidence offered is Forte's study of the Tale in the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Moore writes,

For example, the labor migrant among the Tale people of the northern territories of the Gold Coast enjoys urban goods and services, and indeed the urban way of life as a whole, but does not break tribal contacts. When he returns to his home village, he conforms to tribal patterns, for it is only within these patterns that any stable marriage and familial system has been worked out. The work at the labor centers becomes then a youthful adventure, and possibly an economic aid to the establishment of a family, but is more nearly a matter of "sowing wild oats" than a full acceptance of the new work opportunities.⁹

⁸Ibid., p. 21.

⁹Ibid., pp. 21-22.

This does not prove the theoretical point. The existence of a stable labor migration streams is not evidence proving that industrial patterns "threaten or disrupt the previous social relationships from loss of traditional forms that give security." This was one of the points mentioned in the opening quote of this section. The rest of the evidence that Moore cites in this section (by Wilson, Read, Boecke, Broeh, Firth, Thompson, Troncoso, Leonard, Raman, Buchanan, Broughton, Tawney, Vinacke, Elkin, Hubbard, and Shih) makes no comments about the destructive effects of social change, rather they are a series of studies showing that industrial values in almost all non-industrialized areas have a continued and strong relation to the rural area. What has resulted is a stable half rural-half urban adjustment.

One form of this adjustment is a system of migratory labor. Moore clearly dislikes it without offering empirical evidence to show it actually is "wasteful and inefficient."

Whether the result of deliberate policy in segregating native territories while using native workers in mines, plantation agriculture, and factories, as in parts of Africa, or the result of opportunistic measures for recruitment of laborers only negatively or halfheartedly interested in new forms of economic activity, the wasteful and inefficient system has received a remarkable series of trials. So long as the worker's reluctance to commit himself permanently to the new types of employment persists, or so long as full participation is withheld from him, these

compromise forms will continue.¹⁰

This bias is undocumented.

The main import of the studies cited by Moore is to show that a settled urban labor force does not exist. The studies do not show that traditional forms provide sufficient security for people with them, that mobility did not exist before western contact, and that "industrial patterns" threaten or disrupt traditional patterns.

The third barrier to "labor recruitment and industrial tradition" is "lack of appreciation of new status system." "Appreciation" is not well defined and the evidence offered on this does not directly refer to a lack of appreciation per se. The studies cited to prove this point are heterogeneous as might be expected with a label like "appreciation" and are related only in that they refer to prestige in "traditional" or "modern" societies. They point out that where employment opportunities are better in a local area workers will not migrate from it, that extensive labor mobility exists, that new types of employment may attract workers from particular segments of the existing social order such as youth, that caste labor turnover is high, that existing cultures may stress leisure instead of work (Moore cites China as an example), and people may prefer clerical

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 29-30.

work to manual labor. None of which really clarifies what "a lack of appreciation of new status style" is or how it would differ from a rational economic decision not to enter an urban job because a higher real income is attainable in a rural area.

The last three barriers are hastily crammed together: They are "qualitative differences in income and occupation," "loss of freedom as an independent producer," and "loss of socially recognized skills." Again the evidence offered is varied in its content and is not always pertinent. For example, on the fifth barrier, a "loss of freedom as an independent producer," Moore cites studies by the International Labor Office

In Indo-China, indentured workers on long-term contracts have been known to revolt against harsh discipline, and show great resentment against lying recruiters who secured their services with false promises. In other areas the tales of returning workers concerning their treatment have made subsequent recruiting more difficult. The confinement of workers to labor camps in Peru is apparently one factor in their anxiety to return to their homes.¹¹

These studies do not describe protests against industrial wage work, urban living or so-called factory discipline per se. Rather, they sound like natural reactions of men everywhere to conditions of enforced servitude. Again the evidence is not always relevant to the theoretical idea.

¹¹Ibid., p. 45.

In general, a reading of Chapter Two gives the impression that Moore has a distinct theoretical position but that the evidence he accumulated did not substantiate it. Chapter III is entitled "Economic Change as a Choice Among Evils." The chapter is a description of what these evils are. For example, the first one is "pressure of population on developed resources." The literature on this point is voluminous and easily documented. Population pressures on agricultural areas can be intensive. His second evil is "loss of markets for craft skills and products." The evidence to support this point is less than compelling. He cites Levy and Lee on Chinese handicraft industries, the International Labor Office on Indo-China, Hughes on French Canada, and Broughton on handicraft work in India. At the same time he notes that this evil has not happened in many parts of Latin America and that qualifications have to be put on its occurrence in other areas. It is not generally demonstrated that the description of skilled or semi-skilled craft work is a factor in pushing people from agricultural areas. The third evil is "impairment of trade and similar employments" and he writes of this,

This, however, constitutes more of a logical possibility than it does a frequently reported occurrence. With the exception of a few important areas like India and China, preindustrial economies are not characterized by wide development of commercial markets. Typically the outside traders do not damage substantially the employment opportunities in the areas they enter, if they bring the market mode of

exchange with them. Thus the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Arabs and East Indians on the east coast of Africa, the Americans in frontier outposts in Indian territory, or British traders in the South Pacific or West Africa have not notably disrupted local employment opportunities.¹²

His fourth evil begins political factors. The fourth is "direct coercion of workers." For example,

Forced labor, in various forms and degrees, has been more common in world economic development than has free contract labor.

.

Direct chattel slavery was of considerable importance in the economic development of the New World, and, it is claimed, in the process of capital accumulation in the Old World as well. The resistance of the indigenous populations of the West Indies and North American continent to both material inducements and force and the availability by purchase of Negroes enslaved by West African chieftains provided the rationale for a system of forced labor in American commercial agriculture.¹³

The evidence Moore offers to prove this point is sufficient. He goes on to cite sources from the Dutch Indies, Southeast Asia, French West Africa, Spain, Portugal and Latin America. Liberia, the country where the data of this thesis was collected, has had numerous charges of forced labor brought against it, and critics of Firestone, whose one hundred thousand acre rubber plantation at Harbel, Liberia, is one of the world's largest, say that forced labor was used there until 1960. A large literature on

¹²Ibid., p. 58.

¹³Ibid., p. 59.

colonial practices and imperialism substantiate Moore's point. It should be pointed out that force or military conquest is not generally used as an independent variable in sociological analyses. That a large amount of change in "traditional societies" has been induced by technological mastery of destructive weapons is not proof that "traditional social structure" is inherently incompatible with industrial requirements. The evidence offered for this point, while it does prove the point, does not add to the validity of Moore's theoretical presentation.

If by social change we mean armed force to subject a local population for economic reasons then social change is disruptive of traditional social patterns. Or if by social change we mean population increase against scarce resources then it too is disruptive. These two points and how their mechanisms work are well documented, but the rest of Moore's points are not.

The fifth and sixth evils are "indirect coercion through taxes" and "a avoidance of military draft." These are analytically separate forms of forced labor, but in practice they too are compulsory and the evidence for them is also extensive. Taxes have been one of the classic ways to force local population to work for foreign dominated economies. Moore cites work in British Africa by Moore, Hunter, Noon, Van der Hast and Weischoff. For example,

Schapera in the Bechuanaland Protectorate found that forty per cent of the migrants gave taxes as the reason for working and another twenty-eight per cent mentioned a combination of taxes and desire to purchase consumer goods. The French colonies had a system of "prestation" in which forced labor was mandatory unless commutated by a money payment.

It is appropriate here to mention that the "backward bending supply of labor curve" has classically been used as a justification for both taxation and low wages. The argument has been that tribal people prefer a tribal life and will not work for money unless forced to through taxation. Moreover, if you paid them higher wages they would simply return to their tribal area at a faster rate. That is, labor turnover is due to some kind of massive rural inertia and it can only be overcome by taxation and low wages which ensure that tribal people will continue to work in Western economic occupations. These arguments were repeated to the writer on the plantations he visited by Dutch rubber planters to justify paying their rubber tappers eight cents an hour.

Evils seven and eight are "social factors labeled evasion of religious and magical controls" and "evasion of familial and other obligations." Moore is aware that primitive societies are not "completely integrated and

unchanging" and he says this in his discussion of empirical evidence. This is a different emphasis than in his theoretical discussion. There the emphasis is on integration and not its absence. The role of witchcraft and magical practices in labor migration is difficult to evaluate. Cases do exist where workers left an area to escape witches. Almost all researchers have examples of this and my own work is no exception. One of my questions was whether or not the worker thought people had more respect for him on the job or at home. A worker I talked to told me he was at home and the people there poisoned five of his children so he took his remaining child and fled. This does go on but how important it is cannot be evaluated. Moore says it is of minor importance. However, Moore is caught in a small dilemma here. If you say that fear of witchcraft and avoidance of family obligations are factors that push people from rural areas then this implies that rural social structure is not relatively placid, isolated and mostly unchanging. Moore maintains his theoretical assumptions by denying the importance of these pushes. That is, Moore thinks it is not the case that "the traditional society" has built in conflicts and problems which will inevitably change it independently of outside stimulation. These pushes are in direct opposition to the notion that the major barriers to labor mobility is the loss of security from traditional

forms. These two chapters do not provide a firm empirical base for the theoretical exposition that opened this discussion of Moore. Specifically the evidence cited does not show that industrialization or urbanization seriously disrupt existing cultures so that they no longer operate in a reasonable manner.

Rather this pre-1950 evidence strongly supports four points: First, ignorance is a factor but there is no evidence that so-called traditional societies prefer to be innocent. Secondly, having been exposed to its possibilities, traditional cultures have made a recurrent and seemingly stable adaption to wage labor. Thirdly, the early stages of historical contact of Western nations with other cultures was often through military conquest and this subjugation undoubtedly had disruptive consequences. And fourthly, population pressure, technological skill at food production, and wage levels are probably more important determinants of labor mobility than a theoretical loss of security, status differences between industrial and non-industrial work or the "socially recognized skill of the independent producer."

Chapter IV of Industrialization and Labor is called "The Search for New Opportunities" and is a series of points with the evidence for them. This chapter lists so-called "pull" factors. The previous two chapters stressed "push"

factors and were linked with theoretical statements. However, this chapter is different since it describes "pull" factors and is not reflected in the theoretical perspective. The conventional view and Moore's 1950 perspective de-emphasize, minimize pull factors since discussion of them are not congruent with the dramatics of describing the rapid and penetrating shock of industrial proliferation.

First we examine Moore's pre-1950 evidence, then we will introduce post-1950 evidence on "pull" factors. The first pull factor mentioned is "Wages and the demand for goods and services." In the opening paragraph of this section Moore says

And here one encounters the pervasive doctrine that primitives and peasants are commonly contented with their lot, and only mildly, if at all, interested in working for wages. Some of the evidence that gives this theory moderate support in certain cultures has been reviewed [in Chapter II, the second and third barriers].¹⁴

When he described the evidence in Chapter II he indicated a belief in it, a belief repeated in his summary chapter. This immediate quote indicates, at the minimum, an implicit contradiction. Now he reviews the evidence showing a desire for wages and a willingness to respond to economic incentives.

In the Bantu societies of Southern and Eastern Africa

¹⁴Ibid., p. 78.

cattle were the standard of wealth but the wide development of money wages has led to variety of compromises, if not outright commitment to a monetary economy. Among the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia money was transmuted into material goods which were used to increase social power in the tribal hierarchy. Coulter reported that other groups in Northern Rhodesia were extensively using a monetary system. The Baganda of Uganda had a politically advanced kingdom prior to the European and money expenditures for the hiring of agricultural wage laborers was an old practice. Culwich, in Tanganyika, found money was a general standard of value and was not limited to specific purposes. Read found the same true for the Ngoni of Nyasaland. In general, throughout East Africa by the 1930's money had become both a symbol of prestige in local communities and a means for upward social mobility. The same is generally true in South Africa.

The evidence is substantial that natives have taken up urban ways, and have eagerly sought not only manufactured goods but also services and types of recreation available on a commercial basis. Some investigators have, therefore, been led to conclude that the supposed "fixed demand" of native laborers for money, or for the goods obtainable with money, is more than likely an erroneous inference drawn from the prevailing "fixed supply" of money represented in low wages and the cheap-labor policy.¹⁵

¹⁵Ibid., p. 82.

Greaves denies the colonial notion that natives have an inelastic demand schedule and says rather the provision of consumer goods to native populations has not been part of colonial economic planning. He says,

. . . no metropolitan power [of a tropical colony] has relied on the spread of commodity wants to stimulate a native labor supply." In denying that the people of undeveloped areas have fixed wants, or an inelastic demand schedule, Greaves suggests rather that the goods have not in fact been offered, and that insufficient attention has been paid to qualitative differences in demand, including living conditions. That the demand scale will be different, and not necessarily in conformity with European ideas of what is good for the native, does not make it worse, and certainly does not make the demand inoperative. (Brackets not mine.)¹⁶

So far Moore reviewed evidence from tribal British East Africa primarily. His next evidence is an "old, peasant civilization" where he says "some degree of monetary exchange has long been built into customary practices."¹⁷ He reviews evidence from India, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and China showing a familiarity with wages and market conditions. For example,

The experience in Japan indicates that even very low wages were adequate to induce peasants to enter the factories as long as agricultural areas were depressed, but that when the worker had some option in his economic activity, higher wages had to be offered. As this is certainly in conformity with ordinary economic calculation, its significance for present purposes may be minor. It does, however, suggest that wages increase in importance as an

¹⁶Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 84.

incentive precisely in those circumstances that offer the potential worker some choice.¹⁸

It is not clear what Moore means when he says "its significance for present purposes may be minor."

In summary of this section, a point by point comparison of Moore's 1951 theoretical views with the empirical evidence he offered to substantiate them shows a disjunction between the two. The theoretical views, which are closely similar to the conventional views are generally either unrelated to or contradicted by the pre-1950 information. It should be noted that the information does not need to be re-evaluated or re-collected. It can be accepted as given. Proof of this is found in an analysis of the post-1950 evidence, which corroborates the general findings of earlier studies. The following look at this evidence does not claim to be exhaustive and has a regional bias since the field work of this thesis was done in Africa. However, enough literature is examined to put the burden of proof on those who would maintain that "traditional" and industrial social structures are unique and different and that a change from one to the other involves the substitution of a drastically different set of social ideas and practices.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 86-87.

Post-1950 Evidence on Industrialization
and Migrant Labor

Elliot Berg wrote his doctoral dissertation on labor migration in West Africa and authored numerous articles about it. If any one "best expert" on the topic exists he is a likely candidate for the title. He opens a discussion of the backward bending supply of labor curve with the following paragraph.

Few discussions of labor supply in under-developed countries fail to bring up the backward-sloping labor supply function. Wage-earners in newly-developing countries are alleged to have relatively low want schedules or high preference for leisure as against income, so that they work less at higher wage rates and more at lower ones. In the underdeveloped world, and notably in Africa, this has been the almost universal opinion of foreign employers of native labor, an opinion shared by outside observers.¹ It was no less common a view in eighteenth century England, where a typical complaint was that "If a person can get sufficient in four days to support himself for seven days, he will keep holiday the other three; that is, he will live in riot and debauchery."¹⁹

The first footnote in Berg's paragraph cites Moore's Industrialization and Labor as an example of an "outside observer." Berg goes on to say,

The widespread conviction that labor supply functions in countries in early stages of development tend to be backward-sloping is no mere intellectual curiosity. It is one of those ideas in

¹⁹Elliot J. Berg, "Backward-Sloping Labor Supply Functions in Dual Economies--The Africa Case," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75 (August, 1961), p. 468.

history which has had genuine impact on the practical world of affairs. It has served as a rationale for wage and labor policies which influenced the course of economic and political development not only in Africa but elsewhere as well. It has also been brought into the arena of methodological debate to serve as part of the underpinning of theories which claim that the analytic tools of "Western" economic theory are inapplicable to "dual" societies.

Given its popularity and its influence it is surprising that this hoary concept of the backward-sloping labor supply curve has been exposed to so little systematic analysis, particularly since there runs through most discussions of the matter a considerable confusion over fundamentals. The sources of this confusion are twofold. First, many writers tend to mix the present with the past; they write of contemporary nonindustrial societies as ideal types of pre-industrial societies untouched by contact with the market economy. Most contemporary non-industrial societies, however, even in Africa's isolated corners, are societies in varying degrees of transition. They have been in contact, however sporadic and tangential, with the goods and ideas of the outside world for two or three generations at least. They have consequently undergone changes which have made them responsive to the money economy outside the villages. Discussions of labor supply which heavily underscore the immobilities of labor in underdeveloped countries, the unwillingness of villagers to enter wage employment, the indifference to monetary incentives are concerned more often with the past than the present.²⁰

The first source of confusion that Berg cites is common. This tendency appears in Levy's writings and in the quotes from Moore cited earlier. Contemporary anthropological techniques are not generally adequate to distinguish among societal characteristics that have always existed, and thus are "traditional" in some meaningful sense, versus

²⁰Ibid., pp. 469-70.

those that are relatively recent, i.e., only fifty to a hundred years old. Moreover, the lag time in the construction, publication and dissemination of social change theories may create a situation in which by the time the theory has become accepted it has also become outdated.

Continuing Berg, in West Africa around five per cent of the population is in paid employment during any part of the year. (In Liberia it is approximately seven to nine per cent.) In the rest of the continent the figure is between five and ten per cent, except in South Africa where it reaches a high of twenty-five per cent. Thus, out of approximately 170 to 180 million people in sub-Saharan Africa possibly eight million work at paid labor during any part of the year. All areas produce crops for export, although only West Africa, Uganda and parts of Tanganyika produce on a substantial scale. Thus, literally all areas have been touched by a market economy in some way and any theories of social change that make reference to the isolated homogeneous "primitive society" are simply talking about a world that does not exist any more, if it ever did. Labor recruitment, as a "problem" of moving raw manpower, i.e., bodies, out of agricultural sectors arose and was "solved" between 1880 and 1930. By 1930, before industrialization made any substantial headway, a wage labor recruitment problem did not exist. Most adult Africans

have had some contact with wage work and a money economy.

Berg explicitly rejects the view that classical economic theory is not applicable to labor migration analyses.²¹

What are the factors that determine whether and for how long an individual African villager will offer his labor for paid employment in the exchange sector? In general terms, they are the same factors that determine how much labor an individual in any market economy will offer for hire: the nature of the individual's preference between income and leisure, the level of his non-wage income, the rate of wages.²²

He also denies the concept of the "target worker." The concept may have once been applicable but "wants" now are not rigidly defined. The idea that an individual's labor behavior is characterized by a search for fixed, limited definite wants is not adequate to characterize individual supply curves. Individual wants do not seem to be characterized by clear and limited objectives. A general desire to improve economic well being is also functioning in a noticeable manner and affects labor supply curves.

Berg goes on to say that aggregate economic behavior

²¹The applicability of Western economic analysis to "primitive" economic systems has been frequently debated. The formal-substantive controversy is an example of this debate. See D. Kaplan, "The Formal-Substantive Controversy in Economic Anthropology: Reflections on the Wider Implications," South-West Journal of Anthropology, 24 (1968), pp. 228-51; E. Le Clair, "Economic Theory and Economic Anthropology," American Anthropologist, 64 (1962), pp. 1179-1203; and G. Dalton, "Economic Theory and Primitive Society," American Anthropologist, 63 (1961), pp. 1-25.

²²Berg, op. cit., pp. 472-73.

is related to local conditions.

The level of income derived from village sources, and changes in the level of this income are major influences on the supply of labor presenting itself for employment in the exchange sector. . . . First, at any moment of time, differences in the average per capita village income between areas are closely associated with differences in the rate of emigration. Within a given country or region, those areas where village incomes are relatively high tend to have relatively low emigration rates. Evidence of this tendency is plentiful, and can be found in all parts of Africa.²³

Enough information has been collected over a seventy-year period to show that labor migration is directly related to harvest productivity, most dramatically so in times of crop failure. Labor migration is closely tied with market prices for agricultural products. A decline in price for peanuts, groundnuts, cotton, tobacco, rice, etc. brings migrants out of rural areas to work for money. The supply of migrant labor is sensitive to even small changes in market price. Berg gives conventional views some benefit of the doubt in saying that labor supply might have been inelastic with respect to wage increases, but still, classical economic analysis is applicable for early labor conditions. In both 1902 in the South African gold mining industry and 1903 in Ghana's mining industry, the 'idea of a target worker and the backward sloping supply of labor curve were used to justify wage cuts. Both industries experienced severe labor

²³Berg, op. cit., p. 480.

shortages which were directly related to industry's labor policies rather than to "ignorance" or a desire by local people to retain the security "traditional forms" allegedly gives them.

Thus both on an individual and aggregate level, Berg rejects conventional views on the reaction of "primitive" tribal groups to "industrialization," as exemplified by wage work. Berg's economic analysis of the backward sloping supply curve is supported by Rottenberg, both generally and specifically on Antiguan data.²⁴ Vatter rejects it both for the United States and "underdeveloped" countries.²⁵ Kannappan²⁶ rejects it pointing out the economic rationality of so-called "labor turnover" and says that if you pay low wages "low" relative to real income alternatives, then you should expect high labor turnover.

²⁴Simon Rottenberg, "Income and Leisure in an Underdeveloped Economy," The Journal of Political Economy, 55 (April, 1952), pp. 95-101; Simon Rottenberg, "On Choice in Labor Markets," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 9 (January, 1956), pp. 183-99.

²⁵Harold G. Vatter, "On the Folklore of the Backward-Sloping Supply Curve," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 14 (July, 1961), pp. 578-86.

²⁶Subbiah Kannappan, "The Economics of Structuring an Industrial Labour Force: Some Reflections on the Commitment Problem," British Journal of Industrial Relations, 4 (November, 1966), pp. 379-404.

Byl and White, in a 1966 article²⁷ entitled "The End of Backward-Sloping Labor Supply Functions in Dual Economies," deny the utility of the idea and think it should be eliminated from economic analysis.

Byl writes in another article:

In 1955, the average population density in French-speaking West Africa was very low (4 per sq. mile) and, in addition, the geographical distribution of this population did not correlate with the loci of new economic opportunities. This produced serious labor shortages in the latter areas and spurred the movement of migrant workers that persists until today. Nevertheless, recruitment of a labor force in French-speaking West Africa presented less serious obstacles than in the rest of the continent--mainly for three reasons: the demand for labor outside the villages was less important, relative to population, than in most other African countries; the people had been exposed longer than elsewhere to trade markets and money; and, finally, West African economic development rested on peasant agriculture that used hired labor, the labor force was thus led into a modern wage-earning life, not directly in mines and factories, but through the intermediary stage of working for African farmers.²⁸

The Mossi, a West African tribe of over two million, were especially important. Byl says that they were well aware of economic coalitions and the wages they could expect. They went to Ghana instead of the Ivory Coast because wages were higher in Ghana and they tended to come in smaller

²⁷Adhemal Byl and Joseph White, "The End of Backward-Sloping Labor Supply Functions in Dual Economies," Cahiers Economiques et Sociaux, 4 (March, 1966), pp. 33-42.

²⁸Adhemal Byl, "History of the Labor Market in French-Speaking West Africa," Cahiers Economiques et Sociaux, 5 (June, 1967), pp. 167-188.

numbers when the wages were lower. Byl goes on to cite data from the early 1960's showing

. . . absenteeism and labour turnover were proving to be quantitatively less important, at any rate in urban areas, than had generally been supposed . . . With some exceptions the verified rates prove to be not dissimilar to those experienced in technologically-advanced countries. . . .²⁹

He raises another point which is unusual in a general theoretical environment which stresses the dangers of overpopulation. Reiterating an observation of Lord Hailey, who wrote one of the first African Labor Surveys, and Berg, Byl says that Africa is a case of economic development with a limited supply of labor. Labor was and is in short supply thus theories stressing disguised unemployment in agriculture are not generally relevant to Africa. This is also true for Liberia specifically. This writer has yet to see a study of birth rates in Liberia that mention less than a fifty per cent infant mortality rate for all animals, human and otherwise. Reported rates have been as high as sixty-five per cent. No studies have mentioned land scarcity even though the predominant agriculture pattern is that of shifting rice cultivation. This situation will remain unchanged in the foreseeable future since no increase in the quality of health care is anticipated.

The difficulty of reconstructing empirically what

²⁹Ibid., p. 170.

actually was going on before Europeans came is enormous. It is evident that this writer is not satisfied with conventional views on the subject. The basis of this dissatisfaction is the belief that pre-European social conditions have not received adequate empirical documentation. After pointing out underpopulation and consequent low labor supply, Byl says

Africans who wished money could not only hire out to Europeans, or work for an African farmer, but could also grow cocoa and coffee for their own account. When the government and European firms required labor for public works or private enterprise, labor was difficult to get, although the demand was small. As a result forced labor was introduced. This found three main forms (37): prestations or labor taxes, labor battalions (deuxieme portion), and a system of officially sponsored forced recruitment for private employers called authorized recruitment.³⁰

This is an absolutely crucial point and we should be clear on what it implies. A free market economy was already allocating scarce labor supplies in a rational manner. Forced labor was governmental interference in the operations of a free labor market. Forced labor was not a means of prying ignorant custom-bound farmers from their traditional social order. Rather it was a redistribution of the labor supply which probably benefited larger European companies. This has obvious implications for our understanding of what the "primitive society" is theoretically like and what

³⁰Ibid., p. 179.

effect "modernization" and "industrialization" presumably have on it. This writer has searched for other evidence but this historical period happened eighty to ninety years ago and evidence of what these tribal societies were like then is terribly difficult to come by, especially if an analyst is skeptical of anthropological reconstructions. Modern anthropology is a post-1900 activity.

Myers³¹ in his work on India found that the development of a "stable committed" industrial labor force is more related to managerial policy than rural poverty. This view is emphasized by Lambert,³² and also M. D. Morris.³³ In describing the old view Morris writes in 1965,

Whatever the specific line of causation accepted by scholars, the general conclusion is that workers retained their rural links to an extent which limited the supply of labor for industrial development. As a consequence, disciplined urban-industrial (i.e., proletarian) types of behavior did not develop. The failure of a proletarian outlook to appear was accompanied by the purported high rates of absenteeism and labor turnover and the

³¹Charles A. Myers, "India," in Walter Galenson (ed.), Labor and Economic Development, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959.

³²Richard D. Lambert, Workers, Factories and Social Change in India, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

³³Morris David Morris, "The Recruitment of an Industrial Labor Force in India, with British and American Comparisons," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2 (April, 1960), pp. 305-28; and, Morris David Morris, The Emergence of an Industrial Labor Force in India: A Study of the Bombay Cotton Mills, 1854-1947, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965.

slow growth of trade unions in Indian industry.³⁴

Then he says,

Interestingly enough, neither of these hypotheses nor the conclusions drawn from them have been tested by any substantial exploration of the historical material. Generally, what has been written is either tautological in character or deficient in analysis. Much of the literature tends to base interpretation on hypothetical psychological and sociological propositions which themselves are highly suspect. Moreover, the methodology is questionable. The historical argument typically rests on scattered fragments of evidence taken indiscriminately from all areas of the country and from all sorts of industry, seasonal and perennial, large-scale and small-scale; it relates to all kinds of labor, casual and permanent, unskilled and skilled. It is impossible to generate a satisfactory analysis from this sort of mélange, particularly during a period when modern industry was making only its first timid mark on the economy and there was no national market for labor.³⁵

This writer came to the same conclusion independently of Morris and his data is revealing. He found no labor supply problems because the Indian population historically has been as mobile as, for example, European populations at equivalent stages of economic development. The rapid movement of people into Bombay was directly related to the rapid expansion of textile industries in the city. The Indian rural areas were over-populated and when urban economic alternatives became available people in rural areas responded to them.

³⁴Morris, The Emergence of an Industrial Labor Force in India, op. cit., p. 3.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 3-4.

Morris' description of factory operation is certainly nowhere near the image sociologists have in mind when they speak of "rationalization" of factory discipline. For example,

The time schedule during the day was also not fixed. Most mills claimed to stop work for half an hour during the middle of the day. Actually, if the typical mill stopped work at all during the day, it did so for no more than fifteen or twenty minutes. And there was no fixed time for the break to occur. The time of closing was equally uncertain. Workers had no time pieces and there were no clocks in the mills. The worker knew that his day had ended only when the machinery began to slow down.³⁶

Morris believes that management policy was the key factor affecting rates of labor turnover.

There is no question that employers could have initiated a tighter and more precise system of labor utilization and discipline had they so wished. But such an approach would have required more expensive supervision than could be obtained from the jobbers without producing any obvious immediate benefits to the enterprises. Given the particular competitive advantages which the Bombay mills possessed, it is unlikely that a more elaborate and exact system of labor recruitment and supervision would have contributed to the enhancement of profits.³⁷

As long as the mills made money, and they made high profits, then there was really no economic incentive to rationalize labor relations or work conditions.

In an earlier article (April 1960) comparing labor recruitment in textile industries in India, Britain, and

³⁶Ibid., p. 102.

³⁷Ibid., p. 203.

America, Morris says,

[there is a] tendency to argue that the cotton mills in each of the three countries faced a general shortage of labor which inhibited growth in the early stage, a careful reading of the evidence shows that with some minor exceptions in rural mills in Britain and New England the supply of raw untrained labor was quite adequate.³⁸

In each of the countries employer policy was a more influential determinant of labor turnover than worker psychology. The Luddite mentality is overestimated.

Powesland in 1957 reported that the Baganda by 1900 had developed a considerable readiness to work for money.³⁹

Ardener et al. in their study in the Cameroons found that the amount of migration was directly correlated with local economic conditions and that when plantations had labor recruitment problems it was because they under-estimated the economic alternatives open to workers and paid wages which were too low to effect a sufficient supply.⁴⁰

Elkan's book Migrants and Proletarians, a study of

³⁸Morris David Morris, "The Recruitment of an Industrial Labor Force in India, with British and American Comparisons," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2 (April, 1960), pp. 305-28. Quote from p. 326.

³⁹p. G. Powesland, Economic Policy and Labor, Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 1957.

⁴⁰Edwin Ardener, et al., Plantation and Village in the Cameroons (Some Economic and Social Studies), published for the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research by the Oxford University Press, 1960.

urban labor in Uganda, goes into the economic rationality and historical roots of the alternating pattern of wage work with rural work. He came to the conclusion that the pattern of alternating migration maximized individual real income since the worker, usually a male, would gain income from both his own wage work and the rural work done by his wife(s). In other words, a high degree of economic rationality underlies this pattern. Elkan found no simple correspondence between local economic conditions and rate of migration from his locality, however, "the correspondence is probably close enough to cast doubt on some new economic explanations of labour migration."⁴¹ He also rejects the concept of a target worker and relates urban work to rural social position.

If we define targets not in terms of particular objects like bicycles or particular sums of money, but more generally, as means to attaining a permanently higher standard of life, the concept is still useful and can indeed serve to throw light on the reasons why people engage in employment only temporarily. Their purpose, or target, in seeking employment is not to enjoy an immediate increase in their standard of life, but rather to save as much money as possible in a more or less given time with which to increase the productivity of their farms.⁴²

⁴¹Walter Elkan, Migrants and Proletarians (Urban Labour in the Economic Development of Uganda), published on behalf of the East African Institute of Social Research, London, New York, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 40.

⁴²Ibid., p. 131.

Elkan goes on to discuss underlying reasons for the continued existence of migratory labor.

If the future income of a farm, however small, cannot be capitalized the farm must exercise a strong pull. So long as a man cannot obtain compensation for vacating his land, and on the other hand cannot normally maintain his right to it unless he or his family are in actual occupation, he has no inducement to vacate it and he is therefore bound to regard employment as in some sense temporary.⁴³

This writer is not familiar with the literature on African land tenure, other than knowing the topic is both large and complex. Land tenure patterns operate as a factor, but it is difficult to estimate their relative effect, especially when contrasted, for example, with the effect of a lack of housing in urban areas, which would also inhibit permanent residency in urban areas.

Herskovits, in a commentary on Elkan, makes comments that this writer considers most important, especially since Herskovits is one of the first American anthropologists into Africa.

I find his [Elkan's] analysis of the concept of the target worker especially penetrating. As one who has been concerned for some time with the study of various aspects of change in African life, I find that intellectual ground-clearing operations of this sort make up a considerable component of any attempt at scientific analysis. The amount of misconception, based on the repetition of ideas never tested by reference to the facts, seems to be especially large in the discussion of problems of this sort. Of these misconceptions, the idea that

⁴³Ibid., p. 136.

the target of the African worker must be immediate rather than long run goes deep. It stems, I imagine, from the concept of the African as a man incapable of long-term planning, who lives for the moment, this idea in turn being the intellectual descendant, in perhaps a more sophisticated form, of the earlier conception of the lovable but improvident savage. It is analogous, in the skew it gives any approach that incorporates it, to assumptions that underlie studies of the national income of African countries, whereby the factor of internal trade is overlooked because of the application of models derived from the non-African scene to the analysis of African economies. As Elkan shows, it is of the greatest importance, in considering the questions of industrialization and urbanization in Africa, to keep the role of the rural kinship group fully in the picture, and to understand that in its institutional role it is more than just a sociological phenomenon, but is to be compared to various systems of social security among ourselves. That is, in this case the transfer of the rural-urban dichotomy of Europe and America to the African scene distorts the picture and lessens clarity of thought.⁴⁴

First, Herskovits agrees with Elkan's critique of the "target worker." Secondly, this "intellectual ground-clearing" is indispensable. This thesis itself is a ground-clearing effort. It attempts to state, as precisely as possible, the conventional view's treatment of major topics in social change and "underdevelopment" and then present, as thoroughly as possible, the actual empirical evidence on the topics. This writer agrees with Herskovits. There is a large amount of misconception and the misconception is "based on a repetition of ideas never tested by

⁴⁴Melville Herskovits, "Comment on Walter Elkan's 'Migrant Labor in Africa: An Economist's Approach,'" American Economic Review, 49 (May, 1959), pp. 200-202.

research." In my considered judgment, Levy's work, cited earlier, is an outstanding example of this repetition. Thirdly, the role of the extended family and the existence of non-Western social orderings such as clan, lineage and tribe should be emphasized and observed more closely. Family structure is closely tied to migratory patterns. Finally, the dichotomy between rural-urban, modern-traditional and the variations on this needs to be rethought. This dichotomy and all of its implications has literally become a set of blinders, a device that implicitly channels analysis into an automatic habit of thinking. Sociologists have had this habit so long that any set of ideas which is incompatible with it provokes theoretical withdrawal symptoms. This point will be returned to in the final chapter of the dissertation.

Reynolds and Gregory in their work Wages, Productivity, and Industrialization in Puerto Rico⁴⁵ agree with the general direction of the evaluations cited in this section. They found little resistance or confusion on the part of workers when initially introduced to industrial work and that labor turnover rates differed considerably across plants and were related more to managerial policy than

⁴⁵Lloyd G. Reynolds and Peter Gregory, Wages, Productivity, and Industrialization in Puerto Rico, Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965.

worker psychology. Rural Puerto Ricans who came to the factory did not complain about routine, supervision or machinery, and had a sound knowledge of the job market and alternative options open to them.

All in all, these workers' adaptation to the industrial way of life impressed us as surprisingly complete and rapid, a matter of a year or two rather than 10 or 20 years. They seemed also to have gained in satisfaction. Eighty percent of the sample said they liked factory work very much, 17 percent liked it moderately well, and only 3 percent gave a negative verdict. These results run counter to the hypothesis that industrialization, while it raises the worker's consumption level, may reduce his satisfaction as a producer and a human being.⁴⁶

Reynolds and Gregory also make an emphatic rejection of the "backward bending supply of labor curve."

The Puerto Rican evidence, then, runs strongly against the hypothesis of fixed income aspirations and a backward-bending labor supply curve. We suspect that this hypothesis applies to few groups of workers anywhere in the underdeveloped world. This makes one wonder why it has been so frequently advanced, and often uncritically accepted. One possibility is that in the absence of firm evidence social scientists have been unduly impressed by casual employer opinions.⁴⁷

Hill has published a well known work on The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism.⁴⁸ As the title indicates "capitalism," as a description of economic behavior, was the best term that

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 299.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 301-302.

⁴⁸Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism, Cambridge: University Press, 1963.

Hill found to describe the actions of the farmers that took advantage of the opening of the cocoa market. She points out that the "traditional family" was a major capital source in the acquisition of farm land and that economic development is closely associated with organized planned migration. The "traditional" societies in this area already had institutions of sale, mortgage, credit and non-kinship based corporate land holdings before a "modern" market economy existed, and the shift to "modern" production was simply a continuation of previous patterns. The expansion of migrant farms was rapid due both to the continual re-investment of proceeds from previous cocoa sales and to the high economic rationality hard work and thrift exhibited by the farmers.

Meyer Fortes, in commenting on Hill's work makes the following points about kinship:

In the course of this analysis she examines and refutes some of the most time-honoured clichés about such issues as communal land-tenure, the mis-called "extended family," and the alleged lack of foresight and thrift among tropical peasants.

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What does emerge clearly is that we have in the "company" a form of communal enterprise rooted in traditional family patterns but based on a kind of contract, and not on kinship status (to use Maine's well-known formula). We can describe it, perhaps, as a non-corporate collective. There are experts who maintain that contract relationships are incompatible with the traditional African 'extended family' organization and that individual land-

ownership is not consistent with communal principles of tenure. We can see from Miss Hill's observations (which are amply confirmed by anthropological studies in many parts of Africa) why this thesis is unacceptable.⁴⁹

These comments were made in 1963 and that is still recent.

Harbison, writing about Egypt noted⁵⁰ that interviews with managers pointed to the inability to discharge as the biggest labor problem rather than the commitment and recruitment of workers.

Chaplin's work on The Peruvian Industrial Labor Force,⁵¹ theoretically, is a broad debunking of conventional views. He found no nostalgia for the rural way of life from 1900 on, the Lima mills did not have much labor turnover and that management is responsible for much of what instability there was. And a general, recruitment of industrial workers simply did not proceed according to conventional expectation.

⁴⁹Meyer Fortes, in his "Forward" to Polly Hill's The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism, Cambridge: University Press, 1963, pp. vi, viii.

⁵⁰Frederick Harbison, "Egypt," in Walter Galenson's Labor and Economic Development, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956.

⁵¹David Chaplin, A Discussion of Major Issues Arising in the Recruitment of Industrial Labor in Peru, Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin. (Mimeographed.) See also David Chaplin, The Peruvian Industrial Labor Force, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Barber, in a study of African economic behavior in Rhodesia⁵² opened his article with an explicit focus on the actual characteristics of the labor force. With data from 1941 on he found the number of migrants from an area was closely tied to existing economic opportunities. Those areas where alternative ways existed to make money, e.g., cash cropping, also had lower rates of migrancy. He concluded that labor migration will continue to exist since it is an economically rational means to maximize real income. Until real wages rise sharply, any permanent "commitment" to a life of urban-based wage labor will result in a loss of income from rural sources. Except for the upward mobility, living in a city is neither socially nor economically preferable to rural life.

Velsen's study of labor migration among the Tonga of Rhodesia⁵³ found that thinking about this process as if it were part of a conflict between old and new was not fruitful. A "compartmentalization" or "segregation" of behavior has occurred. The Tonga go to urban areas, work there, form associations, etc. Sooner or later they return to the rural

⁵²William J. Barber, "Economic Rationality and Behavior Patterns in an Underdeveloped Area: A Case Study of African Economic Behavior in the Rhodesians," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 3 (April, 1960), pp. 237-51.

⁵³J. Van Velsen, "Labor Migration as a Positive Factor in the Continuity of Tonga Tribal Society," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 3 (April, 1960), pp. 265-78.

society and greater rates of "urbanization" may be simply that larger numbers are staying longer periods. It does not mean that they have become integrated or settled into a way of life that has broken links to the rural areas. "Urban" and "rural" are not separate and incompatible entities.

The conventional view is not without representation in the post-1950 period although such representation is infrequent. Wells and Warington provide a conventional theoretical perspective even though some of their empirical information is at odds with their theoretical analysis. They worked in West Africa in Nigeria and the Cameroons. For example, in their introduction they say:

The contrast between work in the tribal economy and in the rationally ordered, disciplined work systems of industrialized communities is striking. In the tribal economy there is a direct relationship between effort and the satisfaction of basic needs. Little conscious planning or foresight is called for, the character and sequence of activities being determined by the natural environment and the rhythm of the seasons. Sustained effort for set periods of time is not required. Specialization merely involves the allocation of duties according to sex and age, and is sanctioned by custom. The same tribal authority governs the entire way of life, in which there is no sharp dichotomy between work and other activities.

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But industrial unrest can exist quite independently of trade unions. It can show itself in high labour turnover, irregular attendance, inattention to work and consequent low productivity.

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To a large extent labour turnover is to be explained as a phenomenon of the transition from the tribal economy to the industrialized society. Many of the workers involved in the movement are migrants leaving their tribal community for limited periods, and with specific ends in view.⁵⁴

They also emphasize a backward bending supply of labor curve and speak of native reluctance to accept factory discipline. However, there is the recognition that management policy may also be influential if not critical in influencing turnover rates. As long as companies lack central labor offices and continue to hire by departments a higher rate of labor turnover will exist. This writer came to the same conclusion in thinking about the plantations that he visited. As long as each division within the plantation hires its own workers a high rate of turnover will exist. This "turnover" is actually a shifting from division to division. Since all divisions are seeking the same labor skills, in effect, the result is to create a labor market with each division being an independent demand source. A situation that structurally encourages shopping around even though, overtly, all receive the same wages. It is probably the case that working conditions differ by division on a plantation although what these differences are may not be

⁵⁴F. A. Wells and W. A. Warrington, Studies in Industrialization: Nigeria and the Cameroons, published for the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 5, 13, 16.

apparent to the European staff.

Powesland, in his history of migration in Uganda, makes these points:⁵⁵ Migration began and ended in approximately a ten year period from 1897 to 1907. The Ganda were attracted to wage labor but soon found they could make more money selling cotton. Then the British introduced forced labor since the British government and the British companies were not willing to pay wages high enough to compete with the economic returns from cotton. Forced labor was then a device for artificially increasing the supply of labor in order that wages may be kept low on the demand side. The existence of continued low wages eventually encouraged more crop growing since the economic returns were greater at the latter and more and more exemptions were gotten from forced labor by crop growers. In general, the colonial government was not anxious to encourage the growth of an industrial labor force since the probability of higher wages and increased costs for social services was an economic cost the British rulers did not wish to undertake.

Patterson's work on the Pokot of Northern Kenya shows that British rule brought no benefits to the Pokot. After conquering them militarily in 1910, for the next fifty years

⁵⁵p. G. Powesland, "History of the Migration in Uganda," Chapter II of Audrey J. Richard's Economic Development and Tribal Change, Cambridge: Heffer & Sons, Ltd., pp. 17-51.

the British taxed the Pokot, arrested those tribal people who protested and at independence in 1963 left them with an eighty per cent infant mortality rate. In turn, the Pokot steadfastly refused to cooperate in any way whatsoever with British rule. They did not work for the low wages offered by the British and killed collaborators. Patterson makes the point that this was a rational and economic reaction to an objectively oppressive situation.

Gutkind, in 1968, said,

However, change and modernisation can take many forms, and it is, I believe, false to assume that major transformations are contingent on industrialisation and urbanisation. Within the foreseeable future Africa will continue to be predominantly agricultural, although the non-agricultural sector will steadily, if slowly, increase in importance. What is significant for Africa, as well as Asia and Latin America, in the mid-1960's is that even without major and rapid industrialisation important economic, political and social changes are taking place. In a sense Africa is modernising without dramatic and extensive changes in her mode of production and the mode of residence of her people or the development of a complex, non-agricultural way of life.⁵⁶

Gutkind defines change as a "realignment and restructuring" of the social positions of people and groups.

Change gives a vastly increased range of choices to the individual: the chance to sever old links and forge new ones, leading to new networks of personal, social, economic and political relations.

⁵⁶p. C. W. Gutkind, "African Responses to Urban Wage Employment," International Labour Review, 97 (February, 1968), p. 136.

These networks are the result of a new, as yet uncertain, commitment to non-agricultural activities. So far we have only some very crude indications of what this commitment implies. Some of the more obvious ones, however, are the increasing migration of Africans from the rural areas, the consequent increase of the urban population, the increasing duration of urban residence and, when ties with the rural areas are maintained, the fact that they now serve rather specialised functions which are rooted in change and modernisation. A large number of Africans move readily and continually between village and town, their return to the former often being a temporary break from urban commercial and industrial life, so that they are no longer totally immersed in the social, economic and political life of the tribe.⁵⁷

The continued existence of supportive relationships between rural and urban areas is indicative of the slow rate of transformation within Africa as a whole. As pointed out earlier, less than ten per cent of the population lives in non-agricultural areas. In general, the technological base of these areas is not sufficient to absorb larger numbers of people. Living conditions in these areas are not currently attractive and no economic booms to better them are foreseeable. A small proportion of the population is, in terms of the conventional view, a stable, committed industrial labor force. No radical or drastic increases in this proportion are expected since economic conditions are currently adverse to an increase. Thus only a limited number of individuals can take advantage of new alternatives

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 136-37.

offered in the urban areas. Rural areas, and the practices within them, will be both influenced by and intimately connected with urban places. Rural areas are being changed in the absence of the kind of industrialization we are familiar with in Europe, Japan and the United States.

Watson also emphasizes this point.

However, the widespread use of items of European material culture has so far brought only superficial changes to tribal life. Although the Mambwe wear European clothes, read books, ride bicycles, and listen to the wireless, these changes have not yet seriously affected their kinship and political relationships. The bonds of kinship are still effective, even within the industrial sector, where kinsmen can assist one another in many ways. They tend to congregate in the same labour markets, and to take up similar work, and this association keeps their social ties in constant use. They value the money and goods that they get from wage-labour, but realize that at present there is no final security for them in urban employment, and that real security lies only within the tribe. They have a very shrewd appreciation of the relative importance to themselves of town and country. The kinship ties continue to function within the new economic system because they are related to the land rights, and these are more important to the Mambwe than casual employment for wages.⁵⁸

Vogel in 1968 made a general review of the literature on labor migration in East Africa.⁵⁹ He emphasizes the

⁵⁸William Watson, Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy: A Study of the Mambwe People of Northern Rhodesia, Published on behalf of The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958, p. 221.

⁵⁹William M. Vogel, Is Labor Migration of Decreasing Significance in the Economies of East Africa? Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University, Maxwell Graduate School of

economic bases of migration.

Thus there is a body of opinion that places a considerable weight upon the poverty of the tribal areas as the main motivation for migrancy. The U. N. Study suggests that: "Generally areas with low farm income and few employment opportunities show the greatest proportion of migrants." Elkan corroborates this analysis by suggesting that when cash cropping does catch hold in an area, the incidence of migrancy is significantly reduced. He cites two examples: in 1924 in Buganda and the Eastern Province of Uganada there was a rapid increase in cotton production which resulted in the "practical elimination" of migrancy.

Similarly, Elkan tells us of the district of West Nile which introduced cotton production on a modest scale in 1925. This had the immediate effect of reducing the number of people who were available for labor recruitment. Philip Gulliver, who studied the patterns of migrancy among the Ngoni of Tanganyika, agrees that this is a significant factor in causing migrancy. He writes that: "In those parts where cash-cropping is now heavy very many young men no longer migrate."⁶⁰

Vogel goes on to express disbelief in the concept of a "target worker."

The U. N. study, however, rejects the entire idea of a target worker as an inaccurate interpretation of the data, at least over the past decade and a half. The target theory is inaccurate, the U. N. study argues, because it neglects the very real possibility that wants may increase even as the target worker is on the job. Thus, the study has found that "by the time a worker has achieved a particular target he has already acquired new ones."

The study postulates a feedback process in which

Citizenship and Public Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 3/L, Program of Eastern African Studies, (February, 1968). (Mimeographed.)

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 8.

a dynamic relationship is established between the individual and his environment. A man works in the city, and in fact, he may have gone there to earn a specific amount of money. Once there, however, he finds that there is almost [sic] an infinite quantity of things which he would like. After living in the city for a while longer these so-called luxuries become necessities, and he remains even longer to obtain them. Thus, he may stay on for as long as 10 or 20 years or more. The U. N. study suggests that as a worker becomes more aware of the value of money he becomes "more sensitive to economic incentives."⁶¹

And he also establishes the economic rationality underlying labor turnover by examining labor turnover as a function of wage level. His data was taken from the Nyanza textile industries for 1962.

The table shows three things quite clearly: firstly, that all groups of workers have lower rates of turnover the higher they are in pay scale; secondly, that the rates for migrant workers show the greatest variation, contradicting the assumption even more clearly that workers are not responsible to wage incentives; and thirdly, that in the highest grades the migrants have the lowest rate of turnover.

In the light of this data the U. N. study concludes that wages are a significant factor in the creation of a stable and permanent labor force. In spite of all the previous evidence to the contrary, we must conclude that the workers "do respond to economic incentives."⁶²

Vogel ends his literature review with an examination of migrancy rates across time. His analysis of studies done in East Africa shows that migrancy is actually declining. Migrants stay at their jobs for longer periods of time than they did in the 1950's. This is due both to the growth of

⁶¹Ibid., p. 14.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 27-28.

an urban work force and to the use of labor saving devices by management. In Vogel's own conception, his most significant major generalization is that labor migration in East Africa is rapidly decreasing and that the emergence of an urban proletariat is rapidly taking place.

Some historical markers should be remembered in thinking about the literature just cited. Skinner, in his work on labor migration among the Mossi of Upper Volta,⁶³ reports that the Mossi have been migrating in large numbers since 1900 at least and will continue to do so for sound economic reasons. However, Skinner also goes beyond this to discuss migrant communities in West Africa.⁶⁴ He points out that our earliest written accounts of West Africa mention the existence of "foreign quarters" in all areas. For example

There were permanent stranger communities in many West African societies even in early times. Many chroniclers report the presence of stranger groups in such population centres as Ghana, Malle, Gao, Djenne, and Timbuktu. European travellers in the western Sudan at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century reported the existence of stranger communities in the aforementioned towns as well as in Segou, Kano, Kong, Sokoto, Salaga, and Ouagadougou. The major exceptions

⁶³Elliott P. Skinner, "Labor Migration Among the Mossi of the Upper Volta," from Hilda Kuper's Urbanization and Migration in West Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.

⁶⁴Elliott P. Skinner, "Strangers in West African Societies," Africa, 33 (October, 1963), pp. 307-320.

appear to have been the coastal towns, whose populations seem to have been primarily local and ethnically homogeneous. But even here, according to early Dutch travellers, there lived African merchant communities from neighbouring interior countries.

The foreign Africans or strangers in the African polities and societies of the pre-Colonial period were primarily merchants and their families, engaged in both local and foreign trade. These strangers lived in special wards (sometimes called zongos) under the control of their own chiefs or headmen, a pattern which Es Sadi described from Timbuktu as early as 1352, the time of Ibn Battuta's visit.⁶⁵

Labor migration and trade have been carried out on a large scale in West Africa for as far back as our written records exist. Some appreciation of this can be gotten from the works of Basil Davidson and other African historians that have attempted to reconstruct a realistic and factual account of pre-imperialistic cultures. Our general understanding of labor patterns has come a long way since colonial writings. Several generations of anthropological research and historical revisionism have substantially added to our knowledge. A sense of this coming can be gotten by reading colonial writings on African populations. For example, the following was written in 1933 by Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, O.B.E. (Mil.):⁶⁶

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 308.

⁶⁶Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, O.B.E. (Mil.), The African Labourer, published for the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures, London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1933.

The primitive African was thus to a marked degree dependent upon, and influenced by, his companions; crowd psychology thus dominated behaviour, and the individual separated from his fellows was liable to great instability of conduct. This feature was enforced by the circumstances of tribal life where solitude was very rare; almost always in the company of friends, the African had little incentive to the evolution of personality, and remained an extravert; lack of opportunity for meditation rendered him practical and materialist, except in so far as his misconception of the relations of spiritual cause and natural effect made him superstitious.

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The solidarity of society naturally led the African to rely on this to a very large degree; the knowledge that disaster would be accompanied by the ready help of friends and neighbours largely minimized the fear of it, and, in consequence, there was less need to foresee or take precautions against misfortune. The tribesman thus tended to become thriftless and improvident; he lived mainly for the moment, expecting the leaders of the community to make such arrangements as they might consider advisable, and relying confidently on the success of concerted effort to meet calamity, should this occur. Being largely relieved of the results of his own foolishness or incompetence by the generous aid of his neighbours, he largely lost fear of the future.⁶⁷

In summary of this section, we see repeated examples of rural social structures which accommodate quite willingly to cash economies if adequate real income is offered. If it is not offered then non-industrial activities are followed. These examples are congruent with the pre-1950 empirical information that Moore presented but these examples also

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 9.

contradict his theoretical emphases, in particular, and the emphases of the conventional view in general.

Wilbert Moore's Later Theoretical Writings

Moore published several articles in 1955 and these are noteworthy since they generally repeat the same theoretical emphases introduced in Industrialization and Labor. In May of 1955 he published "Labor Attitudes toward Industrialization in Underdeveloped Countries" in the American Economic Review,⁶⁸ in which he says,

The potential worker in undeveloped areas is typically required to give up traditional forms of organization and reciprocal obligations that have combined to afford him security--both material and affective. The kinship system in any nonindustrial society is likely to provide a major barrier to individual mobility. . . .

[Also found] is the lack of appreciation of the new status system. This may take the form of a relatively low and highly particular appeal of wages, often commented on with reference to "native" laborers, but also commented on by preclassical writers in economic theory with reference to workers in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution. The principle bears extension, however. New occupations simply do not fit traditional standards of prestige, or are valued negatively because they involve manual labor and merit placement irrespective of age, kinship position, caste, or other forms of "ascribed" status. To the extent that the potential worker operates as an independent producer, the

⁶⁸Wilbert E. Moore, "Urbanization and Industrialization of the Labor Force in a Developing Economy" "Labor Attitudes Toward Industrialization in Underdeveloped Countries," American Economic Review, 45 (May, 1955), pp. 156-165. Quotes from pp. 158-159.

change to wage labor involves some loss of "freedom," even if it offers higher rewards. . . .

If wages have a limited appeal to nonindustrial populations and new employments are negatively valued, it is not surprising that workers are more commonly "pushed" than "pulled" into modern forms of economic activity. Much of the "push" is in fact the largely unintentional consequence of external intervention. The successful attempt to reduce mortality has the effect of deteriorating man-land ratios, thus increasing agricultural underemployment and causing the landless and impoverished rural dweller to seek and accept other means of livelihood. . . .

Mobility on the basis of individual performance is generally not markedly present in undeveloped areas and does not generally form a part of the positive value system. Whether for the individual or for the system as a whole, continuity and not change is likely to be the major value. . . .

The complex of ideas expressed in these 1955 quotes are a repetition of what Moore said in 1951, and they too are contrary to the empirical evidence as we know it. That is, at this stage in his theoretical development Moore is still using the conventional view, the same view, essentially, that is popularized in introductory sociology textbooks (when and if these texts mention anything about the sociology of third world non-Western peoples). In the same vein, in 1955, Moore also argued that the long term result of "economic development" is to be a "convergence." That is, regardless of beginnings, countries will become basically similar as "industrialization" proceeds. This is a corollary of the conventional view and is compatible with its assumptions. If "industrialization" is a radically

transforming change of local conditions all over the world, and if this process requires a fixed, delimited set of ideas and behavior to operate it, then it does follow that as countries "industrialize" they will tend to become similar. In other words, the level of technology specifies the form and content of social organization. Moore describes some of the changes that he thinks must be made:⁶⁹

Certain normative or institutional changes, which appear to relate primarily to the economy but also have additional functions in a society, must also be effected. The complexes may be referred to as property, division of labor, and exchange. Property rights must be freed for traditional restraints on use and transfer; labor must be freed of barriers to new employments and allocated according to skill; goods and services must be allocated to production and consumption by some form of monetary-market system. All of these imply placing a positive value on mobility, which is a revolutionary change in most non-industrial societies.

There are also concomitant changes. If economic development reaches the point where there is a rapid growth of manufacturing activity, labor must be retained. The very "servitude to the clock" that is so central to urban-industrial societies is alien to the life-organization of peasants, handicrafters, or even traders, all of whom tend to be task-oriented.

And again,

Perhaps the most fundamental and disturbing changes are those in family and kinship organization. For obvious reasons, the kinship unit is central in any society. Though the industrial system does not destroy family functions, it radically alters them. The necessity for geographical and occupational mobility without extended burdens of kinship position

⁶⁹Wilbert E. Moore, "Creation of a Common Culture," Confluence, 4 (July, 1955), pp. 229-38. Quots pp. 235-36.

and duties tends to produce radical separation of the generations and adult siblings. In short, the mobility required in a higherly industrialized society encourages a small-family system. Rapid changes in skills, chiefly developed among the young, often make youths undeniably but uncomfortably superior to their elders.

In 1955 Moore also published a long essay called Economy and Society⁷⁰ which had two pages in it on industrialization. He presented a fragmentary four-stage theory of development and briefly mentioned the points he made in the above two articles. In an April 1960 article, "Notes for a General Theory of Labor Organization,"⁷¹ Moore presents a four-stage evaluatory scheme of development that agrees with the ideas presented in 1955.

There is a substantial basis for thinking that a generalized sequence exists in the historical and contemporary evolution of labor organizations and their relations with employers, and thus that various "early" stages of such evolution can be identified in areas now industrializing.

The sequence evident in "early" industrialization will be presented in terms of four stages, all prior to "advanced" industrialization and "mature" labor relations.

1. "Modern" or "patronal" management, with uncommitted workers, essentially reluctant refugees from the preindustrial economic sector.
2. "Modern" or "patronal" management with

⁷⁰Wilbert E. Moore, Economy and Society, Garden City: Doubleday, 1955.

⁷¹Wilbert E. Moore, "Notes for a General Theory of Labor Organization," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 13 (April, 1960), pp. 387-97. Quotes pp. 395-96.

committed, loyal employees.

3. Both groups "modern," but with the rise of independent or quasi-independent unions of employees. . . .

4. The rise of status-conscious industrial unions, attempting a "labor monopoly," and exemplifying the radical disparity in wealth, power, education, and specific skills between managers and workers.

Speculations about evolutionary sequences in social history existed in Ancient Greece. Theorizing on "economic development" has consistently resorted to stages as a means of unifying theoretical speculation. Hopefully, understanding moves from static conceptions to a knowledge of the dynamics. If we believe that (1) a fixed set of characteristics, a cultural configuration, can be found to uniquely describe "the traditional society," and (2) that another distinctly different set of characteristics defines "the modern society" and (3) the latter will cause rapid and extensive changes in the former (4) so that the former will dissolve and eventually be replaced by the latter then (5) we have a "convergence" theory consistent point-by-point with the conventional view. In the above sequence described by Moore we find a sketchy description of western historical experience being passed off as an understanding of the contemporary relations between management and labor in non-industrial countries.

In 1960, a collection of articles was edited by Moore

and Arnold Feldman.⁷² A theory of development was implicitly presented as its opening chapter. The empirical adequacy of the theory is difficult to evaluate since it rarely mentions a geographical area, an historical date, a government, or tribe by name. It is abstract and difficult to falsify both because it is abstract and because no overall schema sufficiently co-ordinates its segments. That is, it cannot be listed part-by-part and then judged as to its adequacy.

"Labor commitment" is the key variable. It is implicitly suggested that this concept is so significant that it can stand synonymously for the social development of poorer countries. Moore and Feldman define commitment as "involves both performance and acceptance of the behaviors appropriate to an industrial way of life." This approach implies that an "industrial way of life" in fact exists and thus a non-industrial way of life must also exist. It is assumed that these ways of life are uniquely different and that "development" is a shift in overt behavior and mental values. As a postulated construct this is a variant on the "traditional-modern" dichotomy and this assertion of difference is another way of expressing the conventional view.

⁷²Wilbert E. Moore and Arnold S. Feldman, Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960.

Feldman and Moore divide the rest of their essay into three parts; each discussing one "loci of commitment": the workplace, market, and society. At the end of the essay they describe "development" as an entire process.

This sequence is important for any attempt to understand the transitional phase of commitment in currently industrializing societies. It emphasizes the sociological obstacles to development, in that initial exposures to the new forms are limited to specific contexts. Thus even when commitment to a specific context occurs, there is no guarantee that over-all commitment to an industrial social organization can be achieved more easily; the opposite may be true. In the easiest period of transition partial commitment may present fewer difficulties than the type of commitment characteristic of the later stages of transition. The transitional phase culminates in the involvement of the individual in all the loci. At this point commitment requires rejection of the most basic values, and a greater extent of substitution of new integrating principles than in any previous point.

Here again we have a simple three step process: We begin with primitive, "underdeveloped" countries ("currently-industrializing"). Sudden and rapid changes occur to them ("rejection of most basic values") and then they are "industrialized." The theoretical perspective of this thesis positively implies that this conventional three step description distorts our understanding of what is going on in non-Western areas.

Feldman and Moore's position was strongly criticized by the rest of the contributors to the book. In the closing

⁷³Ibid., p. 65.

chapter Feldman and Moore recognized a basic denial to the idea that "labor commitment" is a major theoretical problem.

Starting from one extreme, there seems to be some support for the position that commitment, as defined, will rarely be problematical. Some subscribe at least partially to the view that as soon as the opportunity for industrial labor presents itself, people will take advantage of it with reasonable promptness. The initial sections of Morris' chapter can be interpreted as providing supportive evidence for this position.⁷⁴

This thesis has already discussed the work of Morris, Gregory, and Elkan and Fallers and how their studies provide empirical data which is not congruent to Moore's theoretical views. Other writers in the collection also criticized the conventional view: Udy said that some of the tribes in his HRAF sample already possessed so-called "bureaucratic" norms as part of their social structure and that hunting and gathering societies were achievement oriented. Belshaw's description of "traditional religion" is a far cry from the typical cliché that religion in traditional societies is static, fixed, and anti-progressive.

We can no longer assume that religious practice is customary in the sense of unchanging; there is now considerable evidence of experimental, thoughtful, and dramatic alteration in cults, mythology, ritual and the like, all of which must have repercussions in the culture involving modified ways of using time and other resources.⁷⁵

Herskovits begins by saying Feldman and Moore do not under-

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 366.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 93.

stand the situation and makes a strong plea for needing better information about non-industrial societies. We simply do not really know how compatible non-Western social structures are with an industrial factory system. And Singer opens his article by saying,

Recent discussions of economic development have shown a commendable broadening of horizons in the attention given to social, cultural, and psychological factors. In some analyses, however, the assertions about the role of these factors have assumed a definiteness that seems premature in the present state of our knowledge. This is particularly true of analyses that stress the inconsistencies between the values and traditions of preindustrial societies and the requirements of industrial societies. Such analyses are usually based on certain assumptions about traditional societies, on case studies where resistance to industrialization has been found, and on extrapolations of the sequence of industrial development observed in England, the United States, and the other industrially advanced countries of the West. The anthropologists' "cultural pattern" theory has also begun to appear in these analyses.⁷⁶

This writer agrees with Singer's caution about the conventional view, for this is what Moore and Feldman have essentially presented and while it is more sophisticated than Moore's 1951 and 1955 writings it is still basically similar to them. Singer's next paragraph renders a listing of what he calls the "theory of uniform sequence."

The general line of argument in these analyses of economic development may be schematized by the

⁷⁶Milton Singer, "Changing Craft Traditions," Chapter 14 in Moore and Feldman's Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas, op. cit., p. 258.

following propositions:

1. There is a linear sequence of industrial development that is essentially the same wherever it occurs. The complete version of this sequence is provided by the history of industrialization in England.

2. This sequence is started, maintained, and accelerated by a specific complex of values and motives necessary for a functionally integrated industrial society and its associated "culture pattern."

3. Most of the newly developing countries are deficient in the required values and motives in this complex and are characterized by preindustrial and nonindustrial value patterns, which are inconsistent with it.

4. If the newly developing countries are to follow the sequence of industrial development, they will need to adopt the industrial value complex and get rid of their traditional value patterns.⁷⁷

Shortly thereafter he says

Present knowledge of comparative economic development is not sufficient to permit a definitive refutation or confirmation of this theory. The literature on the subject is meager and scattered and needs systematization and appraisal.⁷⁸

This doctoral dissertation is part of that appraisal.

Singer goes on to extensively criticize Moore and Feldman's opening essay.

It is in this context that the paradigmatic analysis of industrialization and the Feldman-Moore version of it are most vulnerable to criticism.

To set up requirements for industrialization that are highly idealized extrapolations from the most advanced industrial societies as measures for indus-

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 258-59.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 259.

trialization in newly developing countries is surely to put the process on too remote a pedestal. Where in the older industrialized societies are the integration and total commitment that this construct projects? Many peoples have learned to live with machinery of different kinds, but only in the theoretical analyses of professional ideologues has this many-sided fact been generalized into an "industrial system."

The incompatibility of such a "system" with pre-industrial societies is further exaggerated when it is compared not with existing situations in these societies but with a hypothetical and idealized construct of "traditional society" and "traditional values," which are never supposed to change. Specific failures of industrialization in these societies are, immediately referred to some feature of this hypothetical traditional system; and the diverse, concrete resistances are generalized into a monolithic conservative force of "traditionalism." The battle between this force and "industrialism" is a clash of hypothetical constructs, which does not realistically reflect obstacles to economic development.⁷⁹

This is heavy criticism and in an August 1961 paper Moore and Feldman modify their description of industrialization.⁸⁰ They open their 1961 paper by asking "Are Industrial Societies Becoming Alike?" and then say "To many sociologists the answer to our titular question is so clearly affirmative that one might simply say 'Yes' and let us proceed with suitable dispatch to the next paper."⁸¹

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 262-63.

⁸⁰Arnold S. Feldman and Wilbert E. Moore, Are Industrial Societies Becoming Alike? A paper presented at Meeting of American Sociological Association, Saint Louis, August, 1961.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 1.

However, in this paper Feldman and Moore answer "Yes and No." Now the issue is treated problematically. First they recount their earlier reasoning which led them to a convergence belief.

Much of the support for the common structural characteristics of industrial societies derives in fact from analysis of the industrialization process, particularly in the contemporary context. The analytical studies typically ask, What are the social changes that can be expected to accompany and follow successful industrialization? Implicitly or explicitly, some salient structural features of industrial societies are identified as the terminus of a path of progress, and resistances, tensions, and strains in the transformation of the pre-industrial social order to an industrial one are then identified and appraised.

The degree of functional determinism, that is, the extent of the requiredness of elements in an industrial social structure, differs from one interpreter to another. However, virtually no one rejects the notion that industrial societies share a core set of social structures that together provide a kind of extended operational definition of industrialism itself. This core would include the factory system of production, a stratification system based on a complex and extensive division of labor and hierarchy of skills, an extensive commercialization of goods and services and their transfer through the market, and an educational system capable of filling the various niches in the occupational and stratification system. If one goes much beyond this list of degree of requiredness or variability becomes distinctly controversial.

Now we do not reject this mode of interpretation, and have ourselves recently indulged in it in our chapters in the volume on Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas. However, there are two major difficulties in extending this analysis to all elements and features of social systems and to a prediction of a growing and enduring convergence

among industrial societies.⁸²

While "industrialization" is still assumed as an inevitability, societies are now recognized to be different in their starting positions; and different in their "trajectories" or possible future historical development. Most importantly of all they make a major modification in their concept of the industrial society.

Now this finally brings us to the question of the increasing similarity of industrial societies. Here our basic theoretical position, with readily manifest empirical grounding, has far-reaching interpretive consequences. Stated baldly, the crucial fact is that there is no stable and enduring terminus to the industrialization process. In general, the rate of change increases at an accelerating rate. This casts in doubt, to put it mildly, all the conventional notions that the similarities of all industrial societies, and all industrializing ones, will become virtually complete, if, like mystical Marxists or millennialist Christians, we are content to wait.⁸³

They say "We are essentially forced back to a more minimal picture." They now allow for greater variability in the means through which industrialization may be achieved and greater variability among end results. While still stressing the dangers of a "complete relativism," the concept of "labor commitment" is no longer referred to. By admitting "industrialization" might be achieved in different ways, a theorist now has to specify the reasons for the existence of these different ways. If a theoretical

⁸²Ibid., pp. 1-2.

⁸³Ibid., p. 8.

position admits of some variability it leaves the door ajar for the admission that so much variability might exist as to be a serious theoretical problem. If there are no commonly encountered social forms or social beliefs in non-industrial areas then the utility of a concept such as "the traditional society" is minimal. Little justification exists either for using it or assuming it has a meaningful referent. Feldman and Moore end their article by saying,

We have not retreated to the womb of relativistic particularity, for both structural and dynamic generalization is possible. But we do think the leverage provided us by comparative statics is rather less than had been hoped, because the place to stand turns out to be moving at high speed and very shaky in transit. It is not simply our deepened understanding that makes the world complex. It really is.⁸⁴

A year later Feldman and Moore go beyond these comments and make a fuller criticism of the "conventional view." The following is in sharp contrast to Moore's writings in the early 1950's and the model he and Feldman collaborated on in 1960.

The essential character of the assumptions underlying most of the discussion of industrialization may be summarized by three interrelated but analytically separable positions.

1. Economic transformation is viewed as the intermediate phase of a three-stage model of social transformation: (a) a static, pre-industrial stage, (b) a dynamic, transitional stage, and (c) a static stage following the "industrial revolution."

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 10.

2. During transition, industrialism is viewed as an externally induced system that has a problematic impact on the presumably static and resistant traditional structure. Structural analysis is used to trace through the consequences of the new set of social elements, but only rarely is attention given to the interaction of structures in juxtaposition, and the resulting modification of the structure of industrialism.

3. Although antecedent cultures are conceded to be widely diverse the process of industrialization is viewed as leading to a common destination. When the transition is complete, the required structural changes in social systems will have been made, the boxes will be "filled in," and the post-industrial societies, implicitly static, are explicitly alike. . . .

When more searching questions are raised regarding rate and sequence of change or interaction among components in the course of alteration, the weaknesses of the three-stage model are revealed.⁸⁵

This rejection of the conventional view is accompanied by a statement of general theoretical caution about conceiving of society as an integrated whole.

The chief feature of the model of society that most sociologists and anthropologists use is its emphasis on system and the strict interrelations of social events. This functional approach emphasizes the continuities, which are real and essential elements of social systems, and it provides a kind of check list for tracing out the consequences of given changes. Its chief errors are that it tends to obscure tensions and strains, and to pay relatively minor attention to the variable probabilities of change occurring within the system, and especially the growing element of

⁸⁵A. S. Feldman and W. E. Moore, Industrialization and Industrialism Convergence and Differentiation. Reprint of Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, Washington, D. C., 2 (September 2-8, 1962), pp. 152-53.

deliberate change in social systems.⁸⁶

Having rejected stage theories and an emphasis on "functional integration," it is difficult to figure out what Feldman and Moore are replacing their earlier views with. They now make continual reference to strains and tensions. For example,

The effects of sequence, rates, and timing of change upon the trajectory of a society in the course of industrialization share some fundamental characteristics. For each of these forms of change are potential sources of strain and conflict to the extent that they violate some "natural" trajectory towards industrialism.⁸⁷

However, the article does not take a clear position on whether or not a "natural" course does in fact exist. The rest of the article is difficult to evaluate since no coherent replacement is offered for the rejected view. Society is said to be a "tension management" system since change is internal and self-perpetrating. Change was close to being defined as a strain or tension and industrialization is seen as a continual strain. The article has no conclusion and no strong theoretical assertions emerge from it.

In a 1963 article,⁸⁸ Moore, writing alone, extensively

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 152.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 159.

⁸⁸Wilbert E. Moore, "Introduction: Social Change and Comparative Studies," International Social Science Journal, 15 (April, 1963), pp. 519-27.

critiques stage theories and dichotomies, continues his post-1960 emphasis on variability among industrial societies and verges close to denying the existence of "industrial norms," i.e., there may not be a set of ideas and behaviors which are uniquely associated with industrialization.

In a 1964 article that appeared in Chapter 23 in the Handbook of Modern Sociology, Moore takes a middle position. He repeats his criticism of the conventional view and goes through the major middle level generalizations about "development." He talks about Clark's hypothesis of a shift from primary to tertiary services, Engel's law of consumption, Matthews on population, the relation between urbanization and industrialization, the effects of migration on city growth and the role of kinship. Earlier in this thesis evidence on the compatibility of kinship and industrialization was reviewed. Moore's comments on this latter point are illustrative of his middle position. He shows that he knows what the evidence is and then takes a middle position seeking to reconcile the conventional view with more recent empirical findings. In general, this compromise is retained throughout the article.

Though reliable evidence is lacking, it appears proper to speculate that the initial impact of modernization on extended kinship structures is much more severe than the long-range effect. The development of easy transportation and communication may reduce the significance of geographical separation

of nuclear units, and the kinship system itself may accommodate to the social inequality of its single familial units. This is clearly the case in the contemporary United States.⁸⁹

Moore's 1964 article on "The Adaptation of African Labor Systems to Social Change" is not as abstract as previous writings in the late 1950's and early 1960's. It is a decent review of empirical studies of African social change. Moore again adopts a half-way position. He still works within the conventional view but no longer exclusively believes in it. For example, he recognizes that "The migrant labor system appears as the most economic choice which the African can make. . . ."⁹⁰ Yet immediately following this he says,

A reasoned guess, however, is that the seeming stability of this structured compromise between divergent economic systems is spurious. "If this system provides a sort of statistical equilibrium it does not follow that it produces anything like a stable social equilibrium. Native labor migration serves as a bridge between rigid and otherwise incompatible types of social restraint. . . . The restraints . . . appear to be subject to pressure that may lead to their collapse."⁹¹

⁸⁹Wilbert E. Moore, "Social Aspects of Economic Development," Chapter 23 of Robert E. L. Faris' Handbook of Modern Sociology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, pp. 882-911. Quote p. 904.

⁹⁰Wilbert E. Moore, "The Adaptation of African Labor Systems to Social Change," Chapter 13 of Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz, Economic Transition in Africa, Great Britain: Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 284.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 284.

He footnotes his own writings from 1946 as support for this view. That is, he quotes himself from eighteen years ago. Factually he recognizes and is aware of the economic rationality underlying migrant labor systems, but still does not believe the rationality conceptually. Another example is,

By implication, all or most forms of economic organization and labor systems not in conformity with the norms and patterns of the older industrial economies are "transitional." This is a view that some scholars concerned with Africa would reject. They argue that the viable strength of indigenous social systems is such that the future forms of African economies will represent a mutual adaptation between the demands of the commercial-industrial system and the variable social systems found in pre-modern and contemporary African societies.

The position may have both theoretical and factual support. It seems quite clear that the literature of economic development has fairly consistently underplayed the organizational flexibility and adaptability of the commercial-industrial system. At the same time, at least some students of contemporary Africa argue that such systems as that of migratory labor represent stable adaptations between divergent systems. The very considerable development of wage-labor patterns, whether seasonal or settled, in the commercialized agricultural undertakings established by native farmers lends some further support to the view that the "stabilized sector" may not only include agriculture, but include it in ways somewhat alien to "Western" conceptions. It remains true that there is a labor market more or less corresponding to industrial economic patterns. Its exact dimensions are difficult to assess, and the significance of the deviations and their stability are disputed.⁹²

⁹²Ibid., p. 287.

To speak in terms of "transitional" patterns is another way of talking about a shift from traditional to modern. Yet Moore also clearly recognizes that in the African literature a strong body of evidence has accumulated to deny that these societies are "traditional" in conventional terms or that industrialization when or if it comes will be similar to Western experiences.

Aside from a few factual errors such as the repeated comment that rural areas are over-populated and suffer under-employment, the article is good and raises important questions. Moore responds to the evidence as it comes in. The central questions become focused: What is the variability among pre-industrial societies? What are the ranges of ideas and behavior compatible with rationalized production methods? And how many changes will non-Western countries have to make to become industrial? We have reached a point in American sociology where these questions have become problematical and we search for new answers since older ones are discredited.

In a 1968 article on "Developmental Changes in Urban Industrial Societies" Moore writes

It is only proper to note here that the dynamic appraisal of societies was never abandoned by those social scientists who were heirs to the Marxist tradition, and that tradition has been revived, revised, and refined in such recent works as those of

Coser (1956) and Dahrendorf (1959).⁹³

After complimenting what is informally called the "conflict school" in sociology, he goes on to say

The incorporation of social development into the main body of social theory has involved several related changes in assumptions and conceptual models.

The first necessary change is the rejection, as the exclusive model for social analysis, of the conception of society as a self-equilibrating system. Interdependence and persistence of patterns are indeed demonstrable, and examples of restoration of prior order, after disturbances, can be identified. Yet this conceptual model must treat change as extrinsic and exceptional, and even internal deviance or dysfunctions are difficult to countenance.⁹⁴

This is a critique of functionalism that its critics have been making for many years. It is significant that Moore has come to use the same formulas. In this article he again reiterates the proposal that society is best viewed as a tension management system. Instead of using the concept of "modernization" he now uses the words "developmental change."

This commentary on Moore is not intended as an analysis of his writings per se. Rather, the focus here is on "the

⁹³Wilbert E. Moore, "Developmental Change in Urban Industrial Societies," in Perspectives in Developmental Change, Art Gallaher, Jr. (ed.), Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1968, pp. 201-05. Quote from pp. 202-03.

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 203-04.

conventional view," the evidence denying it and how opinions on it have changed over time. This writer believes that its rejection is still too recent to be fully appreciated by sociologists and other concerned parties. In Moore's writings we can cite 1960 as a turning point. We can even see specific evidence, e.g., Udy's finding of bureaucratic-rationalistic norms among his "traditional societies," that impressed Moore and that he mentions in later articles. Moore now seems to be in a middle position, recognizing that an older perspective has been discredited, but still using it since nothing has replaced it. Any impartial observer reading through the evidence presented here and then looking at theoretical claims of the conventional paradigm would probably agree (a) that Moore has changed his views over time and (b) the older paradigm has not been robust enough to account for empirical evidence as we know it.

CHAPTER FOUR

ACHIEVEMENT AND ASCRIPTION

The purpose of this chapter is to narrow the theoretical discussion and explain why a particular hypothesis was chosen to research. The "conventional view" comes close to being a theory in the usual sense of a delimited set of concepts bound in a coordinated way; but a better description of it is to label it a paradigm in Kuhn's terminology. It has been a pervasive idea system which permeated the literature on social change. No single author has listed its contents or given a short capsule summary, and, almost by definition, its contents are not capable of being exhaustively listed. A large amount of experience in the philosophy of science concludes that an amorphous paradigm cannot be decisively refuted using the "critical experiment." However, the customary format for dissertations is modeled on this type of refutation. That is, a single hypothesis is taken as representative of a theoretical perspective and the evaluation of that perspective is dependent upon the outcome of the hypotheses's test. This dissertation follows that mode of argument since it is comfortable and familiar to the social sciences and since it is a sound logical procedure. The theoretical perspective is the

conventional view and the major hypothesis tested in this dissertation is the statement that achievement characterizes industrial peoples and ascription characterizes non-industrial peoples.

The first step in hypothesis testing is to show that the hypothesis is derivative from the theoretical perspective. We have already seen this in Chapter One and in Moore's writings. Another example is from Ali.¹

Having made these three general points, I should try to summarize what I think are the traditional attitudes of workers and then compare them with the attitudes found in highly industrialized societies. I want to draw attention to three characteristics of traditional societies in South-East Asia. Firstly, the status of a person is an ascribed status, not an achievement one. In other words the norms of a traditional society are ascription norms. The second characteristic, to use the terms popularised by Talcott Parsons, is particularism, and the third, diffuseness. I will try to explain what I mean by these three terms.

The words "achievement" and "ascription" are frequently used in discussions on social change. It is important to realize the issues that underlie their at times awkward sounding usage. All groups of men place restrictions on who can do what behavior. For example, not everybody is allowed to be a police chief. The persons who occupy that job are selected because they have particular

¹Aamir Ali, "Economic Development and the Traditional Attitudes of Workers," International Institute of Labour Studies, Reprint Series No. 4, Geneva: 1964, p. 81.

properties which most people in the general population do not have. And so it is with all jobs, including unskilled manual labor. Society places many restrictions on individual behavior. Each job can be viewed as the possession of a set of social behavior, i.e., the legal ability to perform a certain set of behaviors. Since many of these behaviors influence the lives of other people a close scrutiny is usually kept by the affected people on who is given access to influence. Criteria become established to decide which persons shall have which job. The concepts of "ascription" and "achievement" represent a long established way of describing these criteria in general terms. The distinction between the two is hazy at the middle but basically it is dichotomy between what a person is and what he does. The "is" includes age, sex, birth order, height, family background, college attended, and other social facts which are not readily changeable by the individual. Criteria requiring these events are usually called "ascribed." That is, they are ascribed to the individual and he does not have the legal or biological ability to change them. The "does" includes work experience, educational attainment, regional location, friends and other events which the individual has more control over and can presumably alter. Criteria requiring events of these kind for access to a social position are usually called "achieved."

This distinction is important since it enables a theorist to describe how a society is organized and what life experiences its members will have. Repeated throughout the conventional view is the assertion that achieved criteria are emphasized in industrial societies and ascribed criteria are emphasized in non-industrial societies.

The distinction is usually credited to the anthropologist Ralph Linton. In his 1936 book, The Study of Man, he spent a chapter describing an "ascribed status."

Ascribed statuses are those which are assigned to individuals without reference to their innate differences or abilities. They can be predicted and trained for from the moment of birth. . . . The majority of the statuses in all social systems are of the ascribed type and those which take care of the ordinary day-to-day business of living are practically always of this type.²

As a basic distinction it is intuitively clear. This clarity is one reason why there has been so little theoretical³ or empirical examination of it. The series of quotes cited in the first chapter of this thesis are familiar to sociologists since they or their facsimiles are commonly

²Ralph Linton, The Study of Man, New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936, p. 115.

³Theoretical controversy on "ascription" is almost nonexistent. For example, see the discussion between Leo F. Schnore, "Social Mobility in Demographic Perspective," American Sociological Review, 26 (June, 1961), pp. 411-14, and Irving S. Folsom, "A Clarification of 'Ascribed Status' and 'Achieved Status,'" Sociological Quarterly, 10 (Winter, 1969), pp. 53-61.

encountered. As those quotes indicate, "ascription" has a broad meaning. It is used as a synonym for kinship and family ties, and it is also used to characterize a fixed, or rigid social structure in which no substantial individual social mobility occurs. The traditional society is said to be ascriptive. By this is meant, it has a division of labor based primarily on sex and age, a social organization in which the family role is the most important social role, and a rigid, hierarchial political authority. In contrast, the individual society is presumably organized on achievement criteria because its highly specialized division of labor requires technical knowledge and its emphasis on occupational mobility requires a mobile population willing to disrupt family ties and geographical loyalty. It has been customary to say that achievement orientations are necessary to industrial society, i.e., achievement motivations exist at higher levels of technological development.

For example, it is commonly believed that family obligations hinder small businessmen in African countries because they are a drain on his economic resources and prevent rational utilization of his capital. The person in this example is usually called an "entrepreneur" or "innovator" to indicate his behavior is unusual or different for his culture. Family obligations are seen as "ascriptive" ties which retard economic development. Much theoretical specu-

lation exists about the person's unusual or peculiar psychological motivations.

This is an image familiar to most readers of books on social change and economic development. The image is easy to understand and fits the implicit assumptions prevalent in the discipline about urban-industrial societies and rural non-industrial societies. Because the image is familiar to us, because it is repeated by our peers in books and conversations, because it fits the assumptions of our discipline and the foreign policies of our government, we believe it and accept it as fact. To critically examine this image and to evaluate its empirical adequacy is thus not simply the examination of an idea but rather it becomes an effort to change our understanding of reality.

Examine the following quotes carefully since the views they represent are what this thesis purports to empirically test.

As I have shown elsewhere, we may characterize societies at different levels of economic development by describing them in terms of contrasting pairs of pattern variables as these were defined by Talcott Parsons. Economic development may then be considered as being associated with a transformation of social behavior from a form which in its economically relevant aspects it is oriented towards ascription, particularism and functional diffuseness to a form of social behavior oriented towards achievement, universalism, and functional specificity. In somewhat different terms this may be stated by saying that a society on a low level of economic development is characterized in the main by the following features: Economic roles are distributed on the basis of what status a per-

son has rather than whether he has shown the necessary competence to fill the role; and economic relations in general, for example, exchanges of goods and services, are based often on traditionally prescribed and sanctioned acts and performances rather than on attempts to arrive at a balancing of values through bargaining or the use of a price mechanism. (An example of the principle of ascription in the realm of a system of exchanges is the medieval doctrine of just price.) But in the little advanced country the attainment of and selection for certain economic roles is based merely on ascription rather than achievement; the overall pattern of distribution of roles between classes of the society is particularistic rather than universalistic. Mobility is difficult or, in extreme cases, absent, both between social groups, different professions, and often also between different localities.⁴

Hoselitz repeats these same views in 1963.

Let us now return to the pattern variables. The achievement-ascription dichotomy is closely related to, though not identical with, the contrast between status-oriented and contract oriented societies. If we apply this dichotomy to economic objects, we find that, in a society in which ascription is the norm, economic roles are distributed ideally on the basis of who a person is rather than of what he can do. A practical example of a society based on ascription would be an "ideal" caste system, in which each caste is in full control of a certain occupation--that is, where only members of a specific caste are admitted to that occupation. Now the caste system--though it may have come close to this ideal in some localities, at certain times--has never, as a whole, exhibited fully ascriptive features. But it is quite clear, from the example given, that, in a society in which economic roles are assigned on the basis of status or ascription, social mobility is made difficult, and social

⁴Bert F. Hoselitz, "A Sociological Approach to Economic Development," reprinted from Bert F. Hoselitz, "A Sociological Approach to Economic Development," *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studio sul Problema dell'Area Arretrate*, Milan, 1955.

change, to the extent to which it depends upon mobility, is severely impeded.

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However, the transitions from allocating economic roles according to a system of ascription to assigning them on a basis of achievement, and the replacement of functionally diffuse by functionally specific norms for the definition of economic tasks, appear to have occurred in all cases of successful modernization.

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We may conceive of the little community as a set of institutionalized relationships, among persons, based primarily on ascriptive characteristics. The cohesion and compactness of the small community are enhanced because economic roles are tied to ascriptive status, and because, even where there is a considerable degree of specificity in different economic roles (as, for example, in the Indian village), ascriptive norms provide a stability and internal rigidity that render change from within exceedingly difficult. Only the breakup of the small community, or its infiltration from the outside, tends to reduce the significance of ascription in the distribution of economic (and other, e.g., political or deference) roles.⁵

Psychological Study of Achievement

The above statements contain the same lack of empirical documentation that characterize most expositions of conventional ideas. In general, the empirical evidence directly referring to the concepts of ascription and

⁵Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, Industrialization and Society, North American Conference on the Social Implications of Industrialization and Technological Change. Chicago, 1960, pp. 17-19.

achievement is not extensive. This distinction was one of Parsons' and Levy's pattern variables and a small literature exists on possible ways of measuring the pattern variables.⁶ This literature is less than impressive. When measured adequately, the variables were not uni-dimensional. For example, Williams was not able to measure universalism-particularism and achievement-ascription, and Scarr pulled ten different factors out of a set of scales purporting to measure universalism-particularism. Measurement procedures in this area have not progressed beyond Stouffer's original suggestions in 1949, and a field worker literally must begin from scratch.

Another, and larger body of literature exists on

⁶Samuel A. Stouffer, "An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms," American Sociological Review, 14 (December, 1949), pp. 707-17. Jerome Laulicht, "Role Conflict, The Pattern Variable Theory, and Scalogram Analysis," Social Forces, 33 (March, 1955), pp. 250-54. Elliot G. Mishler, "Personality Characteristics and the Resolution of Role Conflicts," Public Opinion Quarterly, 17 (Spring, 1953), pp. 115-35. Robin M. Williams, Jr., "Friendship and Social Values in a Suburban Community: An Exploratory Study," The Pacific Sociological Review, 2 (Spring, 1959), pp. 3-10. Louis R. Dean, "The Pattern Variables: Some Empirical Operation," American Sociological Review, 26 (February, 1961), pp. 80-90. Allen D. Grimshaw, "Specification of Boundaries of Constructed Types through Use of the Pattern Variable," Sociological Quarterly, 3 (July, 1962), pp. 179-94. Harry A. Scarr, "Measures of Particularism," Sociometry, 27 (December, 1964), pp. 413-32. Peter Park, "Measurement of the Pattern Variables," Sociometry, 30 (June, 1967), pp. 187-98.

achievement as a psychological motivation. McClelland's The Achieving Society⁷ is a major work in this latter body and its importance warrants extended comment. It opens in general terms with grand theories of social change, e.g., Toynbee and Spengler, lacks a sustained examination of contemporary conditions in non-Western countries and does not justify the pertinence of a psychological emphasis on economic motivation. The contrast between Myrdal's Asian Drama⁸ and McClelland's opening chapter makes clear what this writer means by "lacks a sustained examination of contemporary conditions." The opening chapter has neither a general examination of economic growth nor a critique of "achievement" as a psychological need. The book is a long series of empirical studies which purport to substantiate McClelland's thesis that peoples with high need achievement have been and will be more economically advanced.

However, these claims are difficult to believe. For example, this writer simply does not believe that a country's economic growth can be predicted from a content analysis of twenty-one children's books. No evidence is presented as to who reads the books or how much influence

⁷David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society, New York: The Free Press, 1961.

⁸Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama--An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, New York: Random House, 1968.

such books have on later behavior. The connection is too tenuous, especially when the relationship is posited for all geographical areas throughout all historical periods. The book ends by suggesting "A General Plan for Accelerating Economic Growth" which essentially says that the problem of increasing economic development can be solved by subcontracting to American private enterprise since it has high entrepreneurial motivations. The Arabian-American Company's (ARAMCO) oil operation in Saudi Arabia is cited as an example. McClelland's suggestion is so utterly out of touch with the factual situation that it cannot be taken seriously, except as it reflects the relationship between Harvard University and American capitalism. A reading of Myrdal's Asian Drama, documents of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),⁹ any of the United Nations World Economic Surveys,¹⁰ or the growing literature on imperialism present the reality of international economic growth as serious analysts debate its

⁹For example see Raul Prebisch, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development: Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York: United Nations, 1964.

¹⁰See The Capital Development Needs of the Less Developed Countries, New York: United Nations, 1962.

issues.¹¹

This critical view of McClelland is emphasized despite the fact that his evidence supports the specific theoretical hypothesis that this thesis tests. McClelland tested for the relationship between achievement-ascription and economic growth. He writes,

All sociological theorists agree that achieved status distinctions should be more frequent in rapidly growing economies, whereas ascribed status distinctions should be more common in slowly developing societies. However, the results do not strongly confirm the prediction: at both time periods achieved status distinctions were more common in stories from the rapidly developing economies.

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But what about ascribed status? Is it mentioned less often in the more rapidly developing economies? It has the advantage of not being positively or negatively associated either with n Achievement scores or with the achieved status category. Unfortunately it shows no relationship with economic development either. In 1925 it appeared slightly less often in stories from the more rapidly developing economies, as predicted, but in 1950 it showed just the reverse trend.

These results are rather puzzling in the light of the widespread agreement among sociologists as to the importance of these two changes in social structure for the "modernization" of society.

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The countries can be reclassified in terms of level

¹¹For example, see Paul A. Baran's The Political Economy of Growth, Monthly Review Inc., 1957, for a classic analysis of the effect of foreign private enterprise. Baran is not cited in The Achieving Society.

of economic development rather than in terms of rate of gain. Do the wealthy industrialized countries in 1950 show more instances of achieved status and fewer instances of ascribed status in their readers than the backward underdeveloped countries? The answer is a clear "no"; if anything, the nonindustrialized countries show a slightly higher emphasis on achieved status. The same comparison made also in 1925 reveals no difference.¹²

And again,

In examining the results of the value analysis as a whole, one gets the impression that a number of well-known and eminently reasonable theories about economic development did not come off particularly well. Thus the more successful countries economically speaking did not stress ascribed status less, affective neutrality more, man's ability to conquer nature more, the importance of satisfying material needs, or perhaps even economic rationality or planning. In all of these cases, as in the case of ascribed status, there is no evidence that the factor accompanies rather than precedes economic development and not much comfort in the thought that the readers must not be measuring the variable in question very well.¹³

In the same psychological tradition, studies using the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a cartoon projective test, to measure achievement motivation have frequently been attempted. This literature is marked by internal debate.¹⁴

¹²McClelland, The Achieving Society, op. cit., pp. 183-84.

¹³McClelland, The Achieving Society, op. cit., pp. 190-91.

¹⁴John Scanzoni, "Socialization, n Achievement, and Achievement Values," American Sociological Review, 32 (June, 1967). Joseph A. Kahl, "Some Measurements of Achievement Orientation," The American Journal of Sociology, 70 (May, 1965).

For example, the April 1968 issue of the American Sociological Review¹⁵ contains critiques of Scanzoni's article by Loh, Crockett and Nun. The issues involve the dimensionality of n Achievement, and its relation to socialization, occupational values, and economic development. To the uninitiated the debate is confusing since it goes beyond factual problems and hinges on "what did McClelland really mean" kind of questions.

In addition to internal debate, this literature also lacks definitive research findings.¹⁶ That is, theoretical work on achievement motivation does not satisfactorily account for results contrary to expected findings. The phenomena is probably too complex for the set of concepts used. To illustrate, here is Crockett's abstract.

This study examines the influence of strength of achievement motive on intergenerational occupational mobility in the United States. Atkinson's theory of achievement motivation, shown to be relevant to the study of occupational mobility, predicts that strength of achievement motive--among persons sharing equal opportunity--will be positively associated with upward occupational mobility and negatively associated with downward occupational mobility. In the national sample studied, the expected results are clearly obtained with regard to upward mobility among persons reared in the lower social strata, but

¹⁵American Sociological Review, 33 (April, 1968), pp. 284-91.

¹⁶See also S. Lipset and R. Bendix's critique of the achievement literature in their book Social Mobility in Industrial Society, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, pp. 236 ff.

predicted relationships are not found among persons reared in the middle and upper social strata. The hypothesis concerning strength of achievement motive and downward mobility is not supported. The results indicate the fruitfulness of considering personality variables in conjunction with social structural variables in the study of occupational mobility.¹⁷

An interaction effect exists among need achievement, mobility and social class origin, but the details of this effect are obscure. Another illustration is from Rosen who found that an achievement motive per se is not a sufficient cause of upward mobility.

The relationship of four demographic factors--family size, ordinal position, mother's age, and social class--to the socialization process and their impact upon the development of achievement motivation is examined in a study of two independent samples of young boys and their mothers. The data were obtained by means of a projective test, personal interviews, and group administered questionnaires. An analysis of the data indicates that these demographic variables are relevant to the development of achievement motivation, but their effects are complex, intricately interconnected with one another, and difficult to assess individually.¹⁸

Cohen writes,

Objective records of behavior are required so that known high achievers in all tribes can be separated from known low achievers on some measurable scale other than the standard test. Indications are

¹⁷Harry J. Crockett, Jr., "The Achievement Motive and Differential Occupational Mobility in the United States," American Sociological Review, 27 (April, 1962), pp. 191-204.

¹⁸Bernard C. Rosen, "Family Structure and Achievement Motivation," American Sociological Review, 26 (August, 1961), pp. 574-85.

already available that such validation procedures produce odd results; for instance well recognized progressive groups like the Chagga and Kikuyu in East Africa score low on need achievement.¹⁹

Morgan,²⁰ an economist, made a sympathetic review of the literature on achievement motivation and concluded it had real value although no coherent coordinated theory emerged from the review. Given the internal debate, its ambiguous research findings, a reliance on a particular interpretive projective test and an unclear theoretical link to social structure, this writer concluded that this would not be a suitable literature in which to carry out research on the empirical adequacy of the conventional view.

The Empirical Literature on Achievement-Ascription

In this writer's knowledge, the single best theoretical discussion of ascription and achievement is made by M. G. Smith, an anthropologist.²¹ He extensively discusses the distinction as part of a general theoretical critique on

¹⁹Ronald Cohen, "Research Directions in Political Anthropology," in Norman N. Miller (ed.), Research in Rural Africa, Michigan State University, African Studies Center, 1968, p. 28.

²⁰James N. Morgan, "The Achievement Motive and Economic Behavior," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 12 (April, 1964), pp. 243-67.

²¹M. G. Smith, "Pre-Industrial Stratification Systems," in Neil J. Smelser and Seymour M. Lipset (eds.), Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, Chicago: Adline, 1966, pp. 141-76.

standard sociological assumptions about stratification. First he raises the question as to whether it is more important to study the empirical distribution of a stratification system or the principles which produce it, and he sides with the latter study. "Achievement" and "ascription" are concepts tapping into important variations among stratification principles. Smith analyzes the assertion that achievement characterizes industrial social systems and ascription characterizes non-industrial systems, and treats the assertion as a theoretical by-product of basic assumptions about stratification. He builds two separate lines of evidence to deny (a) that all societies exhibit stratification and (b) all members of a family have the same status. After developing these lines of evidence he writes,

It is clear that many societies exhibit a stratification which differentiates family members as well as families. Thus, neither of the two general assumptions on which the functionalist theory of stratification rests are empirically valid. Neither is stratification universal, nor are families universally exempted from it.

If we ask why, given their inconsistency, these postulates of universal stratification and the unstratified family are combined, the answer seems to be that on this basis it is easy to distinguish different types of stratification system by reference to the family. The reasoning might be summarized as follows: (1) All societies are stratified. (2) In all societies, families are homogeneous units of status placement. (3) Stratification systems differ in the ways they treat families; some restrict opportunities to a limited number of families, others distribute them to all member-families equally. Systems of the first type are ascriptive and particularistic, while those of the second stress achieve-

ment and universalistic criteria. (4) Since systems of both types exhibit both stratification and familial status unity, a single general theory is applicable to all.

Ethnographic data show that these assumptions, and the theory that seeks to justify them, are invalid. The "universal necessities" imposed by functional prerequisites are simple misapprehensions. If my argument holds, the critical sources of difficulty for this functional theory are twofold: first it seeks to explain structure by function, when the reverse is the wiser procedure. Structures are highly differentiated and complex, while functions tend to be generalized and rather abstract. Just as Malinowski failed adequately to account for the known range of variation in the family by his very general functional theory of the family, so it is probably impossible to "explain" the known variety of social structures by a single functional theory of stratification. Secondly, in seeking universality, this theory creates difficulties for itself by regarding any set of observable inequalities in the distribution of advantage as stratification, irrespective of the mode of their institutionalization. Given this, the errors regarding relations between family and stratification seem inevitable. But in segmentary lineages, which are political structures despite their familial components, and in age-set systems, though positions of unequal advantage and responsibility are general, the mode of their institutionalization involves an automatic serial rotation of these positions, since the modal life-cycle and life-chances are equal and standardized. Stratification consists in institutionalized differentiations of access to positions of differing advantage, rather than in the mere fact of social differentiation.²²

In addition to showing inadequacies in standard stratification assumptions Smith also attempts to show that the stability of a society is more related to its political structure than to either an achievement or ascriptive

²²Ibid., pp. 159-60.

assignment of status. He does this by showing the existence of both stable and unstable societies with a similar emphasis on achievement-ascription. He says that many societies do not place emphasis on one or the other but combine these principles. He uses the following examples in discussing stable stratification systems with a mixed emphasis.

This baronial competition has numerous parallels in other intermediate societies. In India, Kshatriyas were rivals or allies; in Buganda, Anuak, Zulu, Swazi, etc., royals fought for the throne while eligible commoners, recruited restrictively, competed for lesser offices open to them. Among the Hausa-Fulani, royals competed for the throne, noble lineages for reserved office, clerics for clerical office, slaves and eunuchs for theirs also. In Japan, daimyo were recruited mainly from daimyo and samurai competed with samurai. We cannot simply write off these combinations of restriction and competition as transitional phenomena, as Nadel would have us do. The combination of competitive achievement and restricted eligibility is too variable and widespread to be glossed over lightly. Examination may show that it is in one form or another a universal feature of all stratification systems. Certainly such mixed systems vary widely in their particulars, and merit detailed study. Even modern industrial societies whose ideologies explicitly stress universalistic and achievement orientations exhibit restrictive particularisms which, despite their educational and financial bases, effectively preserve racial and social inequalities. Without this structured contrast with ideology, the conflicting interpretations of American stratification by such writers as Parsons, Mills and Warner are incomprehensible.²³

Such combined societies exist and have existed, been industrial and not been. Smith's work derives the

²³Ibid., pp. 168-69.

hypothesis this thesis is testing from stratification assumptions, assumptions which he shows to be incorrect, and then sets limitations on the utility of the distinction by showing the empirical frequency of mixed cases. Smith's observations deserve a wider sociological audience than they have received. At the minimum, they are clearly incompatible with the conventional view's treatment of the issues embodied in the distinction between ascription and achievement.

Empirical studies of these topics seem rare. This view is corroborated by Robert Marsh. "In reply to your questions, I fear I cannot be very helpful because, of Parsons' pattern-variables the one concerned with ascription-achievement has almost never been measured and empirically studied."²⁴ Marsh made one of the few empirical studies of ascription and achievement. Using family background as an indicator of ascription and social mobility as an indicator of achievement, he compared officials in pre-industrial China to contemporary American engineers. Holding occupational demand constant, he found the relation between father's status and son's mobility to be basically the same in each society. He suggests that the presumed "openness" of American society is due to a greater occupational demand

²⁴Robert M. Marsh, personal communication, November 26, 1968.

rather than a unique cultural emphasis.²⁵

Goode complained that he had not been able to locate an adequate empirical study of even the American population's commitment to the idea of evaluation by achievement.²⁶ He did so in the context of an article entitled "The Protection of the Inept." In his opening comments he says,

We are assured that we live in an achievement-oriented society, and the norm is to place individuals in their occupations by merit. Nevertheless, the inquiries of sociologists and psychologists demonstrate that as the child passes through the successive gateways to higher education, the cumulative effect of class, race, sex, and other readily ascribed traits grows rather than lessens. For example, lower class or Negro children who could perform well by comparison with their more advantaged peers in the first few grades drop farther and farther behind. The gap between them widens.²⁷

And his article considers the following issues:

1. Does the evidence suggest there is a widespread pattern of protecting the less competent?
2. In supposedly achievement-oriented societies, is this protection merely an evasion of widely accepted achievement norms, i.e., is it "real," as contrasted with "ideal," behavior, or do people in fact accept many norms contrary to achievement?

²⁵Robert M. Marsh, "Values, Demand and Social Mobility," American Sociological Review, 28 (August, 1963); also Robert M. Marsh, The Mandarins: The Circulation of Elites in China 1600-1900, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961.

²⁶William J. Goode, "The Protection of the Inept," American Sociological Review, 32 (February, 1967), pp. 5-19.

²⁷Ibid., p. 5.

3. What are the specific or general processes and patterns protecting the less able?

4. Presumably, different social structures handle the problem of ineptitude differently. What consequences flow from these differences?²⁸

His conclusions are speculative and justified by illustrative evidence rather than data but he said, yes, there is a widespread pattern of protecting the incompetent and that people do in fact accept many norms contrary to achievement. Good says we have more rhetoric than reality in assertions that industrial societies are characterized by an achievement emphasis. It is probable that a stronger argument can be made. For example, a full exposition of discrimination by sex shows that this discrimination is widespread throughout all sectors of American society, noticeably so in the professions. Evidence like Goode's, and like statistical facts on sexual occupational discrimination, present a picture of American society different from that taught in introductory sociology books. Although this thesis does not build the case, it is nevertheless a fact that a strong case can be built to show that industrial societies are not necessarily achievement oriented.

Goldschmidt describes three Northern California Indian tribes, the Yurok, Karok and Hupa, with a class system based

²⁸Ibid., p. 6.

on possession of private property.²⁹ They combined a lack of political centralization with an individual acquisitiveness unknown in other California tribes. They both practiced slavery as a payment of financial debt and would shoot other tribe members who poached on their land. They placed a high public emphasis on achieving and possessed a culture, according to Goldschmidt, which approximated the sixteenth century capitalism of Weber's protestant ethic.

Zurcher, using the Stouffer-Toby Role Conflict Scale, found Mexican bank employees more concerned with harmonious social ties than American employees, who were more concerned with office efficiency.³⁰ It should be noted that the difference had little effect on their adjustment to work in the rational efficient work atmosphere of the bank.

Porter³¹ and Form and Geschwender,³² in critiques of the social mobility literature referred to evidence showing

²⁹Walter Goldschmidt, "Ethics and the Structure of Society: An Ethnological Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge," American Anthropologist, 53 (October-December, 1951), pp. 506-24.

³⁰Louis A. Zurcher, et al., "Value Orientation, Role Conflict and Alienation from Work: A Cross-Cultural Study," American Sociological Review, 30 (August, 1965), pp. 539-48.

³¹John Porter, "The Future of Upward Mobility," American Sociological Review, 33 (February, 1968), pp. 5-19.

³²William H. Form and James A. Geschwender, "Social Reference Basis of Job Satisfaction: The Case of Manual Workers," American Sociological Review, 27 (April, 1962), pp. 228-37.

an absence of achievement motivation on the part of American workers and said the assumption that an achievement ethos pervades American society should be revised.

Silberman's study of Meiji bureaucracy³³ found a "certain degree of acceptance" of achievement norms before 1868 and a large degree of acceptance by 1873. After 1873 the Japanese governmental bureaucracy could be described in rational Weberian terms. He suggests that a combination of ascription and achievement is the optimal meld for economic growth since it maximizes essential factors such as political experience and technical knowledge.

Marsh, in his book, Comparative Sociology, writes "In all societies--regardless of degree of differentiation--major, relatively full-time, functionally significant roles (e.g., occupations) are evaluated according to the degree of knowledge or responsibility required of the performer. The use of this common criterion in all societies may explain the hierarchy described above."³⁴ The "hierarchy" mentioned above is the similarity in occupational rankings that has

³³Bernard S. Silberman, "Criteria for Recruitment and Success in the Japanese Bureaucracy, 1868-1900: 'Traditional' and 'Modern' Criteria for Advancement," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 14 (January, 1966), pp. 158-73.

³⁴Robert M. Marsh, Comparative Sociology, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967, p. 184.

been found across societies.³⁵ This line of research was stimulated by Inkeles and Rossi in the context of a study of industrial society. They showed that people in six different industrial countries ranked occupations in a similar way, and suggested that the high correlations might reflect "a relatively invariable hierarchy of prestige associated with the industrial system"³⁶ despite cultural differences among the countries. In other words, the authors presented an empirical finding and a theoretical explanation for it. That explanation was congruent with the "conventional view"

³⁵Alex Inkeles and Peter H. Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," American Journal of Sociology, 61 (January, 1956), pp. 329-39; Edward A. Tiryakian, "The Prestige Evaluation of Occupations in an Underdeveloped Country," American Journal of Sociology, 63 (January, 1958), pp. 390-99; Charles E. Ramsey and Robert J. Smith, "Japanese and American Perceptions of Occupations," American Journal of Sociology, 65 (March, 1960), pp. 475-82; E. Murray Thomas, "Reinspecting a Structural Position on Occupation Prestige," American Journal of Sociology, 67 (March, 1962), pp. 561-65; Kaare Svalastoga, Prestige Class and Mobility, Toronto: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1959, pp. 62-67 and 79-108, esp. the tables on pp. 91 and 108; David M. Lewis and Archibald O. Haller, "Rural-Urban Differences in Pre-Industrial and Industrial Evaluations of Occupations by Japanese Adolescent Boys," Rural Sociology, 29 (September, 1964), pp. 324-29; Archibald O. Haller and David M. Lewis, "The Hypothesis of Intersocietal Similarity in Occupational Prestige Hierarchies," American Journal of Sociology, 72 (September, 1966), pp. 210-16; J. Michael Armer, "Inter-society and Intrasociety Correlations of Occupational Prestige," The American Journal of Sociology, 74 (July, 1968), pp. 28-36.

³⁶Inkeles and Rossi, op. cit., p. 339.

which stressed the uniqueness of industrial societies.

However, later studies have shown that a similar ranking emerges from populations in non-industrial areas and enough studies have been done to establish this as a reliable conclusion. Thus later research has shown the phenomena exists in places that the standard theoretical explanation could not account for since it stressed the differences between industrial and non-industrial countries rather than potential similarities. This entire line of research is an example of a paradigm which generates an empirical line of research that the paradigm cannot account for. Armer concludes,

While subsequent research involving more circumscribed samples may find less agreement in occupational prestige evaluations than the present or previous studies, the evidence is clear that a high degree of intersocietal uniformity does exist in the evaluation of occupational prestige by large segments of traditional as well as modern societies. The importance of this finding is more fully recognized when the uniformity is compared to the great variation between societies in the evaluation of other widespread social categories, such as religious, ethnic, and sex categories. As yet, however, no theoretical explanation has been advanced which adequately deals with this unusual cross-cultural uniformity. A major implication of these results is the great need for such a theory based on an analysis of social and social-psychological processes and conditions shared much more widely than just among modern industrial or semi-industrial nations.³⁷

³⁷Armer, op. cit., p. 36.

These results are surprising only to those who continue to believe in the conventional view. The empirical distribution of occupation and the ways occupational groups react with one another are different across societies. However, the principles underlying occupational prestige, evaluation of occupational performance, and assignment of people to positions may be similar. In other words, an emphasis on individual accomplishments and individual achievement evaluated only by merit might be found across many societies, both industrial and non-industrial.

Lambert's study of textile factories in Poona, India concluded,

To summarize our conclusions, then, concerning the possible effect of the factory in producing the general transformation outlined in the Introduction--substituting contract for status, decreasing the primary group organization of work, encouraging the growth of achieved status attributes, increasing mobility, and raising aspiration levels--the internal organization of the factories does not represent nearly so sharp a break with the past as might be expected.³⁸

The factories he examined were not "rationally" ordered. For example, the newer the factory the more its recruitment practices reached out for better educated workers, regardless of the work to be performed. In addition, the companies have little or no measurement of individual

³⁸Richard D. Lambert, Workers, Factories, and Social Change in India, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 222.

performance. Lambert says that higher education is irrelevant since work requirements are unrelated to it. Education may be an achieved status but inside the factory it is not since it is unalterable within the factory. From the point of view of status assignment within the factory education is an ascribed status and to make it a job requirement is irrational since it is unrelated to job performance.

Data from socialist countries do not typically appear in American sociological doctoral dissertation. This dissertation is not an exception. Djilas's New Class describes the creation of a new upper class in Eastern European countries, especially his own, Yugoslavia. A new upper class emerged based on ascriptive membership within the Communist Party and created by access to privilege and power that party membership and political power bring. Having a successful revolution is not a sufficient guarantee that a new and even more centralized ruling class may emerge. As party members pass these privileges on to their children we see the emergence of an industrial power in which kinship (ascription) plays an important part.³⁹ Domhoff's analysis of the American ruling class⁴⁰ shows a similar ascriptive

³⁹Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System, New York: Frederick Praeger, 1957.

⁴⁰G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967.

emphasis. Access to an entire life style and choice of occupational histories is mediated through ascriptive ties instead of individual accomplishment. This is true in capitalist as well as a "socialist" country. In other words, the operation of ascriptive ties that a society uses are not invariably linked to the same level of technological sophistication or economic-political government.

The voting trends analyst of the Nixon organization, Kevin N. Phillips,⁴¹ who is now Special Assistant to Attorney General John N. Mitchell, has written a well documented analysis of American politics to explain and defend the Republican Party's victory in 1968. His description of the American electorate is heavily couched in ascriptive categories and emphasizes that this is the best way to understand the behavior of the American electorate.

For a century, the prevailing cleavages in American voting behavior have been ethnic and cultural. Politically, at least, the United States has not been a very effective melting pot. In practically every state and region, ethnic and cultural animosities and divisions exceed all other factors in explaining party choice and identification. From New York City, where income level has only minimally influenced the mutual hostility of Jews and Irish Catholics; to Wisconsin, where voting analysis requires an ethnic map of the state's Welsh, Belgian, French, Swiss, Finnish, Polish, Dutch, German, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian and Yankee populations; to Missouri, where partisanship has long pivoted on

⁴¹Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority, New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1969.

Virginian, New England, hillbilly and German settlement patterns and ensuing Civil War sympathies--everywhere ethnic, regional and cultural loyalties constitute the principal dynamics of American voting.⁴²

These hints and indications that an industrial society like the United States contains a much greater emphasis on ascriptive principles than American mythology is willing to admit, are complimented by what data we have from non-industrial countries which show the operation of achievement principles. For example, James points out that discrimination against women in the Bombay textile industry is not based on ascriptive principles.⁴³ Rather management discriminates because women have a history of greater labor militancy than men. The discrimination is based on rational evaluations of their effectiveness as labor organizers.

Thus fragmentary and scattered evidence tends to deny long-standing assumptions about the operation of achievement principles in "modern" and "traditional" societies. Unlike other assumptions in the "conventional view," the linking of achievement emphasis to industrial societies has not been generally discredited. We have nowhere near the amount of evidence on that linking that we have on, for example, the

⁴²Ibid., pp. 39-40.

⁴³Ralph C. James, "Discrimination Against Women in Bombay Textiles," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 15 (January, 1962), pp. 209-20.

existence of extended family patterns in industrial society. The current situation is that writers continue to recite the conventional view in discussing achievement even though its other assumptions are recognized to be out-dated. For example, Gordon's work on kinship patterns first states:

This view of preindustrial societies as being particularistic and socially and geographically stable and industrial societies as being the direct opposite is contrary to fact. Significant geographical mobility for economic and other reasons has been documented for eras long before industrialization in England (Raftis, 1964). And, Goode (1963a: 245-46) also mentions the fact that "there was relatively high class mobility based on achievement in twelfth and thirteenth century Europe and the T'ang through Ch'ing dynasties in China. Therefore, in addition to level of technology, settlement pattern (shifting versus permanent) and mean community size (small versus large) will be used as variables. Permanent settlements, large community size, and the presence of industrialization should be associated with the presence of neolocal residence in the society. Previously cited controversy over the extended family indicates that no relationship between family organization and settlement pattern, community size, and level of technology need exist.⁴⁴

However, Gordon goes on to link achievement norms with an increase in population and occupational specialization. "Large communities (as measured by mean community size) indicate greater mobility--both geographical and social--and the presence of achievement norms. . . . In short, as

⁴⁴Daniel N. Gordon, Kinship, Settlement Pattern and Technology: A Cross-Cultural Analysis. Presented to the 64th Annual Meetings of The American Sociological Association, September 1-4, 1969, San Francisco, California, p. 6. (Dittoed.)

settlement size increases, geographical mobility, social mobility, and achievement norms also tend to increase."⁴⁵

Seibel and Jaeger studied achievement and ascription in a German and an American iron ore mine in Liberia.⁴⁶ First they stated the conventional view:

1. Introduction: Perceived basis of status allocation. The distinction between industrial and traditional, or developed and underdeveloped, or relatively modernized and relatively nonmodernized societies is not solely based on differences in the economic and in the technological system of the two types of societies but also on differences in the social system. Until recently, social scientists shared the holistic view that the economic, technological and social systems are closely inter-related and form one functional unit so that one type of social system is found, and necessarily found, in all technologically and economically advanced societies while another type of social system is universally found in all technologically and economically backward societies. One part of the social system for which this relationship to the economic system is strongly asserted is the system of status allocation.⁴⁷

After describing ascription and achievement as forms of status allocation, they write,

Since social scientists took it for granted that achievement is a feature of the status allocation system of industrial societies and ascription of traditional societies, little effort was made to gather empirical evidence to substantiate this

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁶H. Dieter Seibel and Wieland W. Jaeger, Achievement and Authority: Sociological Studies in Liberian Mining Industry, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 1969.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 15.

hypothesis. However, there has been at least some evidence which seems to contradict the popular belief in the dichotomy between achieving industrial society and ascriptive traditional society.⁴⁸

They then reviewed the evidence known to them and suggested a comparative study of a foreign-run industrial enterprise in a non-industrial society would be a way of resolving this question. They interviewed 355 staff members at the German run Bong Iron Ore Mine in Liberia, also took a random sample of 500 workers (actual N = 383) from the Bong Mine and then interviewed 75 staff members at another iron ore mine run by the American controlled Liberia Mining Company. Both mines are large multi-million dollar operations. They found the German staff at the Bong Mine to be much more ascriptive than the Liberian workers.

The results are:

SUMMARY

1. Industrial societies are generally considered achievement oriented while traditional societies are characterized as non-achievement oriented. This difference should show in a dual system like Bong Mining Company whose employees originate from both modern and traditional societies.
2. The differences actually found are opposite to what they were expected to be. With regard to German and other European employees, BMC is not, and is not perceived as, an achievement system.
3. With regard to Africans employees, BMC is, and is perceived as, an achievement system.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 17.

4. LMC is, and is perceived as, an achievement system with regard to both American and African employees.

5. Nevertheless, achievement is considered by BMC staff members as the ideal basis for status allocation.

6. At the same time BMC staff members have internalized the BMC system of status allocation to the extent that they are satisfied with their position as well as with promotion opportunities.

7. Measures of social control for the maintenance of achievement are applied, to a significantly larger extent, by staff members in LMC and African employees in BMC than by German and other European staff members in BMC.

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9. BMC and LMC are both rather authoritarian, as probably most industrial enterprises are, with regard to both the formal and the informal structure of decision making. However, while in BMC authoritarian patterns extend into the social sphere by creating social bars between supervisors and subordinates and by being formalized in a hierarchical system of housing, this is not so, or much less so, in LMC.

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Thus in terms of the indicators used to measure authoritarianism, the data do not support the hypotheses (1) that Germans are more authoritarian than Americans and (2) systems of status allocation based on achieved criteria are less authoritarian than systems based on non-achieved criteria.⁴⁹

Seibel and Jaeger end by noting that the hierarchical social arrangements and poor work climate at the Bong Mining Company do not effect production schedules. The mine is

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 5-6, 39.

producing what it was planned to produce and it could increase its production if necessary. The amount of iron ore that is mined, concentrated and shipped is irrelevant to the rigid fixed social relationships existing among the German staff. The technology used is independent of the social relationships among the people using it.

In summary, the "conventional view" is succinctly expressed by Goode:

The prime social characteristic of modern industrial enterprise is that the individual is ideally given a job on the basis of his ability to fulfill its demands, and that this achievement is evaluated universalistically; the same standards apply to all who hold the same job. His link with the job is functionally specific; in other words, the enterprise cannot require behavior of him which is not relevant to getting the job done.⁵⁰

This view is probably wrong. Enough evidence exists to show that continual repetitions of this sentiment are misplaced and the literature on social change needs a more realistic appreciation of what it is that is changing. It is difficult to respect the reputation of theorists like Levy who continue to assert unreal propositions on topics which either have no evidence to support them or contradictory evidence denying them. The next chapter describes how

⁵⁰William J. Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns, Glenco, Illinois: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1963, p. 11.

ascription-achievement was studied in the author's West African study and what the results are.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE STUDY OF ACHIEVEMENT AMONG LIBERIAN TRIBES

Research Procedure

A description of how the data were collected necessarily precedes its presentation in order that its quality may first be appraised. The Ph.D. proposal was written in-country with an awareness of local conditions. It was a momentary summation of hunches and analysis that had slowly built in the writer's mind over the previous years. The design decisions were made after a three-week visit to Cocopa Rubber Plantation, the first research site. During the visit the writer lived in a nearby village, talked to local people, plantation staff, workers, missionaries, and a nearby anthropologist. On the basis of this visit the writer decided to use a short questionnaire with simple questions and aim for a large number of interviews. This design is infrequently used in non-Western countries since most detailed social research is done by anthropologists who still typically do intensive studies of a single area or of an activity within an area. The use of survey research technique to sample across tribes is infrequent. Most anthropology departments still do not introduce their

students to the full range of contemporary methodological techniques available to social scientists and most sociologists who know statistics work on research projects in industrial countries.

The Cocopa site was used as a pre-test. In addition to pointing out the defects of the questionnaire, the pre-test showed that random samples were impractical because of: (a) inefficient labor registration, (b) high monthly turnover among divisions due to de-centralized control, (c) a fear that replies would not be anonymous, and (d) management's understandable requirement that interviewing not be done on company time. With the exception of Uniroyal's plantation in Bassa, control of labor is generally left to lower Liberian staff. Each of the separate divisions keeps a daily record of both the quantity and quality of each person's work, and this record is sufficient for the economic operation of the plantation. The records on the work force are scattered across the plantation rather than being centralized in a single location. De-centralization is both a cause and a consequence of high monthly turnover in divisions. A tapper can quit work on one division, change his name, and be rehired on a different division. For example, a major part of the monthly turnover rates of 15 to 20 per cent at B. F. Goodrich are due to this shifting around. In other words, the entire work force has a yearly

rate of turnover that exceeds 150 per cent. However, this does not necessarily interfere with the economic operations of the company since migration among divisions does not necessarily imply a loss of skilled manpower. This turnover does, however, make random sampling impossible.

In addition, false names were given 10 to 15 per cent of the time to the interviewers, even by headmen. Research for the sake of research is not generally understood in this cultural area. The writer was thought to be a job recruiter for the new diamond mines, "a spy," a company spy, a government inspector and a banker who was looking for a place to build a new bank, i.e., this is why so much was asked about money. Motives of people asking for information are carefully examined and the most frequently asked question was "what good will it be to me to answer these question?" This fear is not restricted to the tribal workers. It operates at all levels. For example, Seibel's study of the German staff at the Bong Mine found a similar suspicion that it was unwise to talk about management. In turn, management itself as this writer encountered it, has the very difficult problem of operating within a political-legal environment that at its clearest, is generally ambiguous to foreigners. The vague diffuse fear of possibly saying something that might offend someone exists at all levels. For the purposes of this research it meant that

workers would refuse to admit who they were if you came looking for them specifically, or they would give false names if you interviewed them. This combination of factors eliminated the feasibility of random sampling, and the analysis of financial information about the company's operation.

Thus, for a variety of reasons, it was difficult to random sample. Other researchers have experienced similar problems. Even though Seibel and Jaeger were attached to the staff at the Bay Mine and presumably had the active cooperation of management they were nevertheless only able to interview 383 out of their sample of 500 workers. Handwerker, in his study of Bassa households in Marovia, encountered a refusal rate of greater than 75 per cent.

Since statistical guarantees could not be obtained, a proportional quota sampling was used. A list of the number of workers in each division was obtained at each of the four plantations and the same percentage of non-randomly selected workers would be interviewed in each division. For example, Cocopa employed about 800 workers. A sample of 200 seemed feasible. Some 20 per cent of the workers in each division were interviewed. From 15 to 20 per cent of the workers were interviewed at each plantation. The interviewers would go out to the camps in the afternoon and talk to whomever was there until the percentage quota was met

and then they would go to the camps of the next division. The samples are not statistically random but they are large enough to have prima facie reliability. Division of labor was controlled for, i.e., the proportion of truck drivers interviewed is the same as the proportion of tappers. The majority of the interviews were done by hired interviewers. This eliminates one possible source of bias arising from a white man doing the interviewing, but introduces possible error in asking and recording information. The information reported here has an unknown proportion of error in it arising from using hired interviewers. Since interviewers were not told what exactly was being sought for, the use of different interviewers at each plantation would randomize this source of bias. Any trends in the data appear despite interviewers' error rather than because of it. Large N's also help to randomize error.

Description of Sample

We begin the examination of the data by looking at the demographic characteristics of the sample. We will consider education, pay rate by hour, age began work, length of time at company work, per cent of working life spent working for money, age, number of wives, length of time spent at place interviewed.

TABLE 1
EDUCATION

	%	N
0. no English	62.2	809
1. grade 1-2	7.4	96
2. grade 3-4	8.5	111
3. grade 5-6	10.4	135
4. grade 7-8	5.3	69
5. grade 9	2.6	34
6. grade 10-11	1.5	20
7. grade 12	1.5	20
8. vocational training, uncom.	0.2	3
9. vocational training, compl.	0.3	4
	99.9*	1301

*The percentage in this and the following tables may not equal 100.0 because of rounding errors.

As Table 1 shows approximately two-thirds of the respondents made no claim to understand English, Liberia's official language. Only 10 per cent claimed to have more than a primary school education.

TABLE 2
PAY RATE BY HOUR

	%	N
0. 8-14 cents	88.1	1143
1. 15-25 cents	8.5	110
2. 26 cents and up	3.4	41
	100.0	1295

The minimum agricultural wage in Liberia is eight cents an hour, although some plantations pay nine cents. The majority of workers on the rubber plantations are tappers or do maintenance work and are paid the minimum wage. The industrial minimum wage is fourteen cents an hour. In all of the wage labor sector only those men who work for private farmers get paid less than agricultural laborers.

TABLE 3
AGE BEGAN COMPANY WORK

	%	N
0. under 15	20.1	239
1. 15-17	17.4	207
2. 18-20	23.8	283
3. 21-23	15.0	178
4. 24-26	12.6	150
5. 27-29	2.9	34
6. 30 and older	<u>8.1</u>	<u>96</u>
	99.9	1187

Most men started working for companies before they were twenty-five, and 20 per cent started before they were fifteen years old.

The distribution in Table 4 is reasonably even. At least a third of the men have worked at wage labor for substantial periods, not only on rubber plantations but for other kinds of employers as well.

TABLE 4
LENGTH OF TIME AT COMPANY WORK

	%	N		%	N
0. less than one year	3.7	49	7. 7 years	6.1	82
1. 1 year	5.2	69	8. 8 years	6.4	86
2. 2 years	7.0	93	9. 9 years	9.2	123
3. 3 years	8.5	113	X. 10 to 15 years	15.3	204
4. 4 years	6.9	92	Y. more than 15 years	17.0	227
5. 5 years	9.0	120			
6. 6 years	5.7	76			
				100.0	1334

TABLE 5
PER CENT OF WORKING LIFE SPENT WORKING FOR MONEY

	%	N
0. 0-20 per cent	17.8	237
1. 21-40 per cent	17.5	234
2. 41-60 per cent	18.2	243
3. 61-80 per cent	20.0	267
4. 81-99 per cent	26.5	353
	100.0	1334

The distribution in Table 5 is also reasonably even indicating the sampling technique is picking up a wide variety of work experiences. We have men who spent all their working lives in paid labor and men who have farmed for most of their lives.

TABLE 6

AGE

		%	N		%	N	
1.	0-18	3.1	36	7.	33-35	8.6	100
2.	19-20	6.1	71	8.	36-38	8.7	101
3.	21-23	12.0	140	9.	39-41	7.2	84
4.	24-26	14.8	172	10.	42 and older	<u>11.1</u>	<u>129</u>
5.	27-29	14.4	167				
6.	30-32	13.9	162			99.9	1162

Approximately 40 per cent of the sample are between the ages of twenty and thirty. The above distribution is only an approximation since many of the respondents did not keep track of their ages in precise years.

TABLE 7

NUMBER OF WIVES

		%	N		%	N	
0.	not married	26.5	354	5.	5	0.4	5
1.	1	53.1	708	6.	6	0.0	0
2.	2	16.0	214	7.	7	0.1	2
3.	3	3.4	45	8.	8	0.1	1
4.	4	0.3	4	9.	9 or more	<u>0.1</u>	<u>1</u>
						100.0	1334

As Table 7 shows, approximately three-fourths of the sample said they have one wife or less. Less than 4 per cent said they had three or more. A small amount of error enters in since some men may have had a wife outside the

plantation which they did not report. However, the distribution is probably not too inaccurate since no economic or social reasons exist to assume low paid agricultural workers would have more than one wife.

TABLE 8
LENGTH OF TIME SPENT AT PLACE INTERVIEWED

	%	N		%	N
0. less than six months	12.8	171	6. 6 years	4.3	57
1. 1 year	13.5	180	7. 7 years	2.8	37
2. 2 years	11.5	153	8. 8 years	3.2	43
3. 3 years	11.2	149	9. 9 years	3.9	52
4. 4 years	9.7	129	X. 10 to 15 years	8.2	109
5. 5 years	8.2	109	Y. more than 15 years	10.9	145
				100.2	1334

According to Table 8, two-thirds of the men have worked at their present place five years or less. Twenty per cent have worked at one place for over ten years.

In summary of this section, we see a group of men who have worked in agriculture most of their lives either as farmers or as low paid wage labor. Most neither read nor write English. In general, these are not urban or "modern" men. In the next section we show the majority of them give "modern" responses to the questions we asked them.

The Achievement Responses

The problem of measuring an emphasis on achievement, or its absence, was not satisfactorily solved. Enough of the partial solution exists to allow commentary. However, no test emerged which yielded a single, simple, reliable score for each person. No test exists in the literature and no test created itself under field conditions. This writer followed a classical format of offering alternative choices to each question, one choice mentioning an achieved property and the other a fixed property. No assumption is made that an underlying dimension exists within the questions or that a suitably selected combination, if properly weighed, would yield a valid index. Such assumptions put the cart in front of the horse since the rationale required to justify them presupposes a thorough knowledge of processes underlying the patterns of answers. Yet it is this very knowledge that we hope to infer from the questions.

As indicated previously in this dissertation, the major hypothesis to be tested is that achievement characterizes the industrial society and ascription characterizes the traditional society. The design of this dissertation tests for that relationship by inferential methods. We do not have comparative data and thus cannot empirically speak about achievement in industrial society. Our design is based on Popper's suggestion that the best logical way to

test a theory is to falsify it. That is, if a theory implies a prediction and if that prediction is false, then it is logically valid to conclude that the theory is incorrect. According to the "conventional view" ascription characterizes "traditional" society. As the previous section shows, the sample of people we interviewed is largely rural people. Thus according to the conventional view they should consistently choose ascriptive responses to our questions. Our data show that the respondents do not choose ascriptive responses. Thus an implication of the conventional view is empirically falsified.

The following analysis will deal with a series of questions and examines their results one-by-one. Rather than using an index or similar measurement technique, a series of questions is shown and a general tendency is inferred from the results.

Each of the following attitudinal questions aims to compare an achieved property such as intelligence or strength with ascribed property, birth order, sex, etc. Each of the questions will be presented in turn along with the total number of replies to each alternative.

TABLE 9

AGE-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

Q 34. Two men both do same good work. One man older, plenty family. Other man younger, no got family, not got children. Both work for you, how you pay them. Older man get more, young man get more, both same?

	%	N
0. Older get more	34.5	449
1. Younger get more	9.5	124
2. Both get same	<u>56.0</u>	<u>728</u>
	100.0	1301

A clear majority give the achievement response that both men should receive the same money for equal work. We do not have comparable data on American populations, however, that response should also be the most frequently chosen. When asked why, the most frequent justification was the mention of an equal work-equal pay principle.

TABLE 10

AGE-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE

Q 37. Man with small money got two sons, both want money for school business. Big son is dull, but small son is plenty clever. Who should man give money to?

	%	N
0. Older boy who dull	3.3	43
1. Small boy who clever	67.7	892
2. Both	<u>29.0</u>	<u>382</u>
	100.0	1317

Two-thirds of the respondents chose the achievement response. Birth order is not as important as personal characteristics. Very few people would directly give the money to the older son. As in the above question, the justifications are very pragmatic. The stupid son will waste the money and the money is too important to be wasted. The persons who would give money to both justify this decision because the stupid son is a son and the man is under obligation to help him. Almost never will the stupid son receive money in preference to the smart son. A high social valuation is placed upon intelligence and careful expenditure of money.

TABLE 11

SEX-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

Q 67. Man with small money got boy and girl. Both need money for school business, girl plenty smart, boy he not clever. Who man give money to, smart girl or dull boy?

	%	N
0. Dumb boy	12.5	48
1. Smart girl	52.6	202
2. Both	<u>34.9</u>	<u>134</u>
	100.0	340

This question was first asked at the last plantation therefore the N is small. Even if a woman is involved at least half of the sample pick the achievement response and say they would give the money to the female. Justifications make reference to the adjective "smart" rather than to intrinsically valuable properties of femaleness.

TABLE 12

POLITICAL STATUS-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

Q 36. Two men. Who should we respect more? One man he town chief, work plenty hard, other man he clan chief, but he lazy. Who we respect more?

	%	N
0. Lazy clan chief	13.3	172
1. Hard working town chief	74.7	967
2. Both	<u>12.0</u>	<u>156</u>
	100.0	1295

So many people pick the "hard working town chief" that the variable cannot be used for further analysis. A clan chief is distinctly higher in power and prestige in the official government hierarchy but three out of four respondents react to the adjectives of "lazy" and "hard working."

TABLE 13

SECOND POLITICAL STATUS-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

Q 52. Two men. Who should we respect more, one man he clan chief, work plenty hard, other man he town chief, but he lazy?

	%	N
0. Hard working clan chief	83.7	643
1. Lazy town chief	6.1	47
2. Both	<u>10.2</u>	<u>78</u>
	100.0	768

Question 52 was first asked at the third plantation visited so tappers at the first two plantations did not reply to the question. This is why the N is 768. The question itself is a reversal of Question 36. Now the adjectives are reversed and it is the clan chief who is hard working. The results are consistent with this dissertation's expectations: (a) a comparison of Questions 36 and 52 shows that an overwhelming majority respond to the adjectives characterizing the behavior of the chiefs rather

than to the actual positions themselves, and (b) being a clan chief does have an effect, but this effect is small compared to a change in the adjectives. That is, by Table 12, 74.7 per cent picked the "hard working town chief" reply and in Table 13, 83.7 per cent picked the "hard working clan chief." The nine per cent difference between the two may be plausibly attributed to the higher prestige of the clan chief's position since the same justifications were given for both answers. A high social valuation is placed upon hard work. These are subsistence economies and to be lazy is to go hungry. As the data itself bears witness, a consistently strong emphasis on hard work was commonly encountered.

TABLE 14

FRIEND-FAMILY COMPARISON

Q 38. If you got small money and both your best friend and a family man want money for same business, who you give money to?

	%	N
0. Family man	36.0	463
1. Friend	25.6	329
2. Both	<u>38.4</u>	<u>494</u>
	100.0	1286

Conventional theoretical speculations about "primitive" societies invariably stress the overwhelming importance of kinship ties that presumably characterize such societies. Two separate streams of analysis seem to be merging on this question. The evidence cited in Chapter Two points out that a much greater reliance on kinship ties actually exists than the individualistic mythology of American industrial society is willing to admit. This evidence emphasizes the importance of kinship ties in contemporary "modern" societies. A second line of evidence de-emphasizing the importance of kinship and other ascriptive ties in "traditional" societies was cited in the previous chapter. The data from Question 38 substantiate this de-emphasis. It is probably the case that a wide range of situations exist in which the obligations of family and close friends overlap. The large percentage of respondents choosing the category "both" is indicative of this overlap. Either can make similar requests for time, money or other resources. Admittedly this is crude data, but few other researchers have empirically asked these questions before. The justifications for preferring one over the other were generally the same regardless of which was chosen. With the exception of referring to blood ties, the same justifications were offered regardless of whether friend or family man was chosen.

TABLE 15

SECOND FRIEND-FAMILY COMPARISON

Q 51. Is friendship business stronger than family business?

	%	N
0. Family business stronger	61.0	478
1. Friendship business stronger	19.7	154
2. Both equal	<u>19.3</u>	<u>151</u>
	100.0	783

When asked directly which is more important, family or friends, a majority chose family. This cannot be used as proof that family ties receive a unique or unusual emphasis in cultures of this geographical area because it is not known what results would have been found had this question been asked of an American population. The evidence in Chapter Two and the existence of folk proverbs such as "blood is thicker than water" give us no reason for presuming that an American population would answer this question any differently. No other situation is asked in this question. As we saw in Table 14, when the question of money demands is raised only 36 per cent replied that they would give money to their family.

TABLE 16

FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

Q 56. You got small money and both your best friend and a family man come to you, need money, friend he work plenty hard, but family man he lazy. Who you give money to?

	%	N
0. Lazy family man	28.5	109
1. Strong friend	51.8	198
2. Both	<u>19.6</u>	<u>75</u>
	100.0	382

Unfortunately this question was only asked at the last plantation but the general trend is clear, achievement adjectives clarify a situation and their placement strongly alters the results received from asking about unspecified situations. The justifications for these answers are the same as justifications for the earlier family-friend questions. A man who works hard should be given more respect, even if family ties are involved.

A majority of anthropological ethnographies of rural people analyzes kinship. In part this focus stems from customary field technique. The anthropologist typically enters an area without an ability to speak the local language. It is easier to gain rapport and knowledge by learning innocuous kinship vocabulary, mapping kinship relations, and personal histories, than by asking about

local sexual practices or political faction. Such an emphasis is also necessary in completing an initial census of the village. It is reasonable for a non-anthropologist to raise a question of methodological bias. To what degree do anthropological field techniques affect evaluations of the importance of kinship patterns. This is a relevant, although unanswerable question. Little attention or emphasis has been paid to the importance of voluntary associations in tribes. Yet in Liberia we know that they exist, are organized around both work and recreational activities, that membership is limited to a single sex, and that these voluntary associations may have a relatively high division of labor within them. This emphasis on kinship is compounded by an academic environment that increasingly stresses quantification and formal technique. Linguistic patterns (and language) can be qualified and formally analyzed. An ability to quantify the phenomena also affects theoretical judgments as to its importance. The cumulative effect of these events has been to create the impression that in tribal societies kinship obligations are literally equivalent to all important social roles.

A conservative interpretation of the data reported above implies that kinship obligations have their limitations and these limitations involve criteria emphasizing achievement. It is reasonable to speculate that kinship

ties which are efficient in obtaining satisfaction for a person will be preferred over similarly efficient bonds of friendship. However, ineffective kinfolk will not be preferred over efficient friends. This is not true for all, but our information implies it is true for a majority.

In the hypotechnological vocabulary of an earlier theoretical era, when an evaluation of role performance is combined with a theoretical description of role, the resulting conceptual entity cannot a priori be classified as either achievement or ascription, because some questions must be answered factually.

In summary, by the conventional view these are surprising results. When adjectives stressing hard work and intelligence were contrasted with age, sex, birth order, political position and kinship ties, a majority of the respondents chose the former. We have no comparable data from Euro-American samples on these questions. So while we cannot effectively criticize the often repeated assumption that industrial populations emphasize achievement, we can criticize the often repeated, still-repeated assumption that social relationships in non-literate tribes are characterized by rigidly prescribed custom bound ways of feeling and living. In the data cited above the effect is very strong because it is apparent despite many opportunities for errors of translation, poor questions, and poor

interviewing to randomize the results. That is, the phenomena are strong enough to appear despite the distortions introduced by unknown amounts of error. This is prima facie evidence that the conventional view is, in matters of fact, wrong.

Modernization Variables as a Potential Explanation

How are these results to be accounted for? In terms of the conventional paradigm an immediate and obvious explanation is the following: "While it may be true that these results indicate an achievement emphasis your samples are taken from men doing wage labor work on rubber plantations thus it is natural that as a group the majority should give these responses. In other words your sample is biased since you did not sample directly from village populations." The conventional view would search for variables which are reflective of "western influence," "modernization," "urbanization," "industrialization," and then show that "rational" western responses vary systematically with these variables. That is, the more modernized a person the greater his tendency to respond with achievement replies. A simple linear function should be observable in examining sub-categories of variables reflecting "modernization."

In other words, it is not sufficient to simply show

the existence of achievement responses among rural peoples. It must also be shown that the tendency to give these responses is independent of variables stressed by the "conventional view."

The dependent variables referring to achievement that were previously introduced: age-performance comparison Q 34, age-family-performance comparison Q 37, sex-performance comparison Q 67, political status-performance comparison Q 36, second political status performance comparison Q 52, friend-family comparison Q 38, and friend-family-performance comparison Q 56, were run against a set of six possible independent variables.

These six independent variables presumably reflect "modernization" and if the "conventional view" is correct they should systematically vary achievement responses. The forty-two cross tabulations are reproduced in Appendix A. These tables are put in the Appendix to enable the reader to analyze the data for himself if he so desires. Only five of the forty-two cross-tabulations were statistically significant at the .05 level. Tables 17 and 18 show some of the essential information.

Table 17 was constructed by collapsing Education, Q 1, into three levels. The first row contains the proportion of people with 0-2 grades of school which chose the achievement responses. If the conventional view is correct the percentages within each column should increase.

TABLE 17
 PER CENT GIVING ACHIEVEMENT RESPONSES BY
 YEARS OF EDUCATION

	Q 34	Q 36	Q 37	Q 52	Q 56	Q 67
0 - 2	55*	73	66	82	50	52
3 - 4	53	79	68	85	54	56
5 - 12	64	74	76	87	22	42

*Thus 55 per cent of the people with 0-2 grades of school chose the achievement response in Q 34, and 45 per cent chose non-achievement responses.

The columns were obtained by taking the achievement category of each dependent variable and computing the proportion of people who chose the achievement response. For example, in column one, 55 per cent of the respondents at the lowest educational level chose the achievement category in Q 34. Only the columns for age-family performance Q 37 and second political status-performance comparison Q 52, show a tendency to increase with educational level. The columns for friend-family-performance Q 56 and sex-performance comparison Q 67 are difficult to interpret since they were asked at the last plantation and only a score of respondents claimed to have more than an eighth grade education.

Does Table 17 show a clear tendency for the proportion of people choosing the achievement response to increase as education increases? No, the table does not show this.

The evidence is mixed. We find that a majority of the respondents at all educational levels chose achievement responses.

Table 18, which shows achievement responses by amount of urban experience, shows a clearer rejection of the conventional view.

TABLE 18
PER CENT GIVING ACHIEVEMENT RESPONSES BY
YEARS URBAN EXPERIENCE

	Q 34	Q 36	Q 37	Q 52	Q 56	Q 67
0	55	75	71	86	42	63
Less than 1	59	74	66	81	53	47
One or more	52	75	65	83	50	58

Urban experience Q 23 was collapsed into three categories. The first row includes those people who never saw Monrovia, Liberia's largest city. The second includes those who "visited" Monrovia and the third row includes those people who lived in Monrovia for some length of time. The results approximate a random distribution. The proportion of people choosing achievement responses does not increase with amount of urban experience. None of the six columns shows a linear increase.

Thus an analysis of education and urban experience, two

variables frequently cited by conventional writers, does not support conventional expectations.

Modern Men

Corollary to the conventional view is a search for "modern men" as begun and exemplified by Lerner.¹ Of it, Armer writes:²

Central to social psychological interest in developing areas of the world are questions concerning the nature, degree and distribution of changes in individuals. What changes in values, attitudes and behavior lead to, follow from, or occur concomitantly with socioeconomic change of societies? Comments concerning modernization of individuals may be found throughout the theoretical and empirical literature on socioeconomic development, but recently there have been at least a half dozen publications dealing explicitly and, to a large extent, exclusively with the problem. Among these are three discursive studies by O'Connell, Inkeles, and Peshkin and Cohen, and three studies by Smith and Inkeles, Doob, and Kahl which attempt to develop measures of modernity. These six studies define and describe the cognitive orientations which are assumed to characterize men in "modern" societies, by which is usually meant urban, industrial societies as distinct from "less advanced" areas of the world.

¹David Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, New York: Harcourt Brace & World, Inc., 1958. The most recent article is by Alex Inkeles, "Making Men Modern: On the Causes and Consequences of Individual Change in Six Developing Countries," American Journal of Sociology, 75 (September, 1969), pp. 208-25.

²Michael Armer, "Individual Modernity: A Review and Reconceptualization," a paper read at the American Sociological Association meetings, August 1968, San Francisco, California.

Although the resulting lists of "modern man" characteristics overlap in a number of respects, an examination clearly indicates a lack of consensus on the meaning of individual modernity.

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"What is the modern man, and what makes him what he is?? Modern society is conceived as one characterized by "urbanization, education, mass communications, industrialization, politicization" which contribute to the "transformation of traditional man [to] . . . certain new ways of thinking, feeling and acting."³

Armer's review of the literature concludes:

The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this brief review of studies is that consensus does not exist on the cognitive components characterizing "modern man". Although some components appear in several of the lists (e.g., receptivity to change, personal efficacy, and positive evaluation of science), none of the components are mentioned in all six sources. Of course, consensus is not an index of the validity of ideas since it may also result from shared misconceptions, but lack of consensus among independent scholars certainly challenges the creditability of all conceptions. This is especially true because of the largely speculative nature of the modern man conceptions and the absence of objective procedures for justifying the selection of components.

In short, serious conceptual problems face scholars interested in psychological modernity despite, or perhaps because of, the several attempts to identify the psychological components.⁴

Armer's analysis on the lack of consensus in the "modern men" literature provides sufficient justification for questioning its empirical adequacy. Its ideological

³Ibid., pp. 1-2.

⁴Ibid., p. 5.

assumptions have also been critically scrutinized.⁵

A search was made in this data for "modern men." A card sorting of the dependent variables 34, 36, 37, 38, 52, 56, and 67 found no distinct group which consistently gave "western" responses. In general, a group of "well educated," "urbanized," "modern men" who consistently give "modern" responses to the attitude questions does not exist in our sample. First, a majority of the respondents give "modern" responses. Secondly, the majority of the 1300 conversations reported here are with illiterate men who have spent two-thirds of their working lives farming. Forty per cent of our sample has never seen Monrovia. This is not the typical sample of middle class high school or college students that is typically interviewed in African research.⁶ This sample is primarily composed of agricul-

⁵In the last three years a wide ideological attack has been mounted on the assumptions of sociology and the other social sciences. In the "sociology of social change" a germinal article has been Andre Frank's "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology," Catalyst, (Summer, 1967), pp. 20-73. In March of 1967, another basic critique was written by Kathleen Gough, "New Proposals for Anthropologists," Current Anthropology, 9 (December, 1968), pp. 403-31. These early critiques have been extended and enlarged into a sizeable literature. A repetition of it would be redundant but this writer is sympathetic to its general emphases and criticisms of the conventional view. See also Robert I. Rhodes, "The Disguised Conservatism in Evolutionary Development Theory," Science and Society, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, pp. 383-412.

⁶The listing of card decks for Africa in the Survey Research Center at the University of California are all on student surveys.

tural laborers who do manual field work and get paid eight cents an hour. So explanations of this data in terms of "modern men" are rejected.

Tribal Social Structure

Explanations in terms of industrialization and urbanization have been accorded such a priority that for many theorists such explanations literally exhaust the set of possible independent variables. People raised and trained in the paradigm which this thesis calls "the conventional view" are especially prone to couch their understanding of social change in terms of an impact due to outside forces. To them, the data reported here is an anomaly. We have "modern" responses from people who have no theoretical business giving us responses like that. Moreover, an independent study by Seibel and Jaeger on a random sample from an iron ore mine in the same country found the same general results. Or, better phrased, found results which permit the same inferences. To this point, the validity of the data is still open to interpretation, but its reliability is reasonably established. It is established enough to put the burden of proof on the critic.

How are we to understand these responses? The understanding exists, but it requires a shift in perspective. Generally, writers on social change look at things from the

point of view of the city's effect on the countryside rather than the countryside's effect on the city. For example, in the United States we still have no decent studies of "country" sub-cultures in American cities, no analyses of country and western music, and no studies of the assimilation of "Okie" migrants into California. More generally, industrialization and urbanization are seen as outside forces introduced into areas whose previous cultures and social arrangements were not equipped to handle or control forces of such large magnitudes. The details within this point of view have been described earlier.

The shift in perspective required to sympathize with the results reported in this dissertation is to see events from the point of view of the countryside. The importance of industrialization and urbanization is not minimized. The growth of an industrial economy and the concentration of population into central areas are transforming processes and justifiably deserve the attention they have received. However, not all aspects of social change can be explained by them nor is there compelling evidence that they even have operated the same way in different countries. They have their limitations and the social change literature suffers from the lack of a balanced appreciation of them. These limitations include political consideration, geographical variation and properties of non-urban sectors. All three

are important limitations.

"Political considerations" include questions on foreign policy determinants, i.e., who actually makes foreign policy and why do the great powers pursue particular third world policies, what is the depth and extent of business control in third world countries, what has been the actual effect of colonialism and imperialism, and how successful have countries been in shaping their own culture, e.g., a study of Algeria's or Libya's revolution? In American sociology, a concern with such questions is still largely a "radical" activity. But until a thorough study of them is made we will simply not be able to understand contemporary social change in non-industrial countries.

"Geographical variations" include an understanding of region-by-region variations due to history, climate and location. Some areas have more favorable locations than others as trade routes or for raw mineral production. For example, Liberia has poor rivers with many rapids which prevent the use of water transport. It also is different because it did not first link up its coastal cities as other West African countries did, but went straight inland. It does, however, have the proper climate for rubber and also possesses extensive iron ore deposits. All of these factors affect social change but sociologists and anthropologists usually take them as givens or leave them to

economists and geographers.

Finally, by "properties of non-urban sectors" we mean the culture and social structure of the rural countryside. A review of Chapter One shows the kind of comments made about rural peoples and the lack of empirical evidence to substantiate the comments. This dissertation is a contribution which, hopefully, will add to a greater concern and integration of country with city. That is, we begin our effort to understand these "modern" responses by looking to "traditional" social structure. Even if a moderately persuasive case could be made for the importance of "modern" variables in generating these responses, as it can for Seibel and Jaeger's data since they studied an "industrial" work site, the justifications of searching for "traditional" variables is strong enough to warrant the attempt anyway. If "traditional" social structure significantly varies by region then social change patterns across regions will also be different.

This writer has done research in Latin America and Africa and now firmly believes that any theory of "modernization" or "socio-economic development" which fails to distinguish the two continents as separate situations will not be an adequate theory. To cite some obvious differences, in the former case, we have single language countries with a dominant church and written histories. In the latter we

have multi-language "countries" with no dominant secularized church and inadequate historical records. Liberia is a case in point. The basic mapping of what languages are in the country and where their linguistic boundaries are has just been started. The concept of "tribe" is critical here and represents an obvious starting point to analyze the data. The following data demonstrates its importance but the neglect of its importance also makes its analysis more difficult, as we shall see.

The importance of "tribe" as a variable became apparent in a superficial exploration of the data. Cross-tabulations of it with all other variables have more departures from random patterns than other potential explanations. Not only were a greater number of chi-squares significant, but they were also more significant, i.e., they had greater differences between them and random patterns. The next step in the analysis was to use factor analysis to search for mathematical dimensions which might underlie the data.

Two questions are at issue. First, how many dimensions underlie the items? Secondly, how many dimensions underlie the tribes? That is, are the tribes "qualitatively" different from one another or do they load on the same dimension? We define "qualitatively" in terms of orthogonal areas in an n-dimensional space.

The first factor analysis took questions Q 34, Q 36,

Q 37, Q 38, and Q 51, which have already been introduced as dependent variables and added to these attitude questions another attitude question, Q 35, on whether or not a woman should work; Q 01, amount of education; Q 42, preference for being a town chief or working in Monrovia; Q 44, satisfaction greater with work or home; and Q 20, self-conception as civilized or country. These ten questions had twenty-eight possible responses. The initial data matrix had ten rows, one row for each tribe with twenty-five or more respondents to it, and twenty-eight columns. Each column being one of the response categories. The individual cell of this data matrix contained the percentage of people in a tribe who chose that response category. This data matrix, and its transpose yielded a factor analysis of items and a factor analysis of tribes.

The first analysis of items proved difficult until it was realized a degree of freedom problem is created by correlating percentaged categories since a low loading in one sub-category implies a high loading in another sub-category of the same question (each question only had two or three sub-categories). Thus a negative correlation is built into the analysis. While this may be a diagnostic device for analyzing sub-categories it violates independency assump-


tions. Item analysis was thus discarded.⁷


The first factor analysis of tribes encounters no degree of freedom problem since each correlation is a correlation between independent response profiles. One factor was retained, indicating a very high linear similarity among the tribes. That is, these tribes may differ, but they differ in positions upon the same continuum rather than in a qualitative way. One factor was found, indicating a high linear similarity, however, this result does not establish the degree of similarity among groups of tribes, assuming such groups exist. So the correlation matrix was cluster analyzed.

This correlation matrix is a correlation of response profiles across the twenty-eight sub-categories. This same correlation matrix is graphically portrayed in the cluster analysis.

The three tribes whose patterns are indicated by the solid line in the cluster analysis are the Kru, Krahn and Grebo. These tribes are all Kwa-speaking tribes in Southern Liberia. On these items, they might as well be the same tribe since their results are so close together. This is

⁷Non-metric factor analyses such as Guttman's Partial Order Scalogram Analysis (POSA) and Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) were considered but rejected since in the former ordinality of item sub-categories could not be assumed and in the latter no advantage over metric factor analysis was apparent and SSA is more expensive to run.





CLUSTER ANALYSIS

TABLE 19
CORRELATION MATRIX FROM FIRST TRIBAL FACTOR ANALYSIS

	KPELLE	KRU	LOMA	KISSI	BASSA	GREBO	GOLA	GIO	MANO	KRAHN
KPELLE	--	.76	.84	.83	.92	.81	.92	.82	.93	.83
KRU		--	.68	.74	.64	.96	.73	.57	.71	.94
LOMA			--	.84	.85	.74	.89	.81	.80	.77
KISSI				--	.80	.75	.87	.85	.85	.78
BASSA					--	.65	.88	.88	.91	.66
GREBO						--	.79	.63	.75	.96
GOLA							--	.85	.90	.78
GIO								--	.94	.61
MANO									--	.74
KRAHN										--

the only distinct group. The Loma and Kissi tend to vary together and so do the Bassa, Mano and Gio. The Gola and Kpelle appear to occupy middle positions. None of these latter seven tribes really forms a distinct cluster like the Kwa group does.

A second factor analysis was run on the same theoretically important items Q 34, Q 36, Q 37, Q 38, and Q 51, and the other added ones. However, this time only one key category was picked from each item.⁸ For example in Q 34

⁸Let the first two digits represent the question and the third the chosen category of the question. The data

the achievement response of "give the money equally to both men" was chosen and in Q 36 "give the money to the smart son." This use of one category eliminated the degree of freedom problem since correlations based on response categories were now independent. The second item analysis yielded four factors which was plausible considering the diversity of subject matter of the questions. Q 34, Q 36, and Q 37, the three questions which "unambiguously" tap into achievement responses, did not load on the same factor. This implies that we do not have sufficient information on these cultures to analyze for underlying dimensions.

The second tribal factor analysis yielded two dimensions. The loadings are given in Table 20, Tribal Factor Analysis #2.

These are factors rotated to maximize independence. Factor 2 clearly pulls the three Kwa-speaking tribes in the South out as a separate group. No other tribe has such high loadings on the second factor. The remaining seven tribes all have high loadings on Factor 1. Why should a sub-set of categories from the same items bring out two factors? The answer appears to be that when only these theoretically important sub-categories are examined "noise" from the

matrix used were the tribes' percentage responses to 342, 351, 361, 371, 382, 010, 422, 440, 512, 200, and 230, e.g., category 2 was chosen from Q 34 and so on.

others is eliminated and a better discrimination among the tribes is possible. The correlation matrix from which the two factors were extracted shows a greater variation within it than the first matrix.

TABLE 20
TRIBAL FACTOR ANALYSIS #2

	Factor 1	Factor 2
KPELLE	.830	.454
KRU	.169	.956
LOMA	.919	.004
KISSI	.885	.336
BASSA	.942	.135
GREBO	.183	.971
GOLA	.947	.256
GIO	.880	.221
MANO	.736	.535
KRAHN	.262	.950

For example, compare the correlation between the Kru and the Loma between the first and second matrices. In the first matrix it is .68, in the second it is .19. The same patterns still exist but they are accentuated since there seems to be a greater difference between the three Kwa-speaking tribes, the Kru, Krahn and Grebo, and the remaining

TABLE 21
CORRELATION MATRIX FROM SECOND TRIBAL FACTOR ANALYSIS

	KPELLE	KRU	LOMA	KISSI	BASSA	GREBO	GOLA	GIO	MANO	KRAHN
KPELLE	--	.57	.72	.83	.91	.57	.92	.74	.84	.65
KRU		--	.19	.48	.31	.95	.43	.30	.56	.94
LOMA			--	.84	.82	.18	.89	.75	.56	.28
KISSI				--	.82	.47	.92	.86	.79	.56
BASSA					--	.28	.95	.78	.75	.36
GREBO						--	.42	.40	.65	.96
GOLA							--	.83	.76	.49
GIO								--	.89	.41
MANO									--	.67
KRAHN										--

tribes on these categories than when all of the categories taken together. That is, evidence from both the cluster analysis and the factor analysis indicates a high linear similarity in the way tribes answer the questions, but there are significant variations within that similarity. Three of the tribes group together. These same tribes speak languages from the same linguistic grouping and are next to each other geographically within Liberia.

Thus, we have so far shown that the existence of "modern" responses cannot be explained by reference to "modernization" or "urbanization." And we have also shown

that rural social structure, as exemplified in the variable "tribe," does vary with the questions on achievement.

Analysis of Tribal Differences

The results of the analysis to this point indicate that rural social structure as exemplified by the variable "tribe" does statistically vary with the achievement responses. Liebenow lists the tribes in Liberia and their sizes. The tribal distribution for this sample is included with it. As Liebenow shows the ten largest tribes in Liberia are also the ten largest in this sample of rubber workers. Only those tribes for which the number of respondents was greater than twenty-five were used in the factor analysis and in the examination of tribal differences. Ten tribes were above this arbitrary cutting point.

A control for tribe was made by dividing the ten tribes into two groups. The basis for decision was the cluster and factor analyses. They loaded seven tribes in one factor and three on a second factor. Below is a map of these tribes, and the directions from which they entered Liberia.

The three tribes loading on the second factor and also forming a clear cluster are the Kru, Krahn and Grebo. These are all Kwa-speaking tribes in the South. These three tribes are treated as a single group and the remaining seven tribes were treated as a second group. Having found




TABLE 22
 TRIBAL AFFILIATION OF LIBERIA'S POPULATION, 1962*

Tribe	Size	Per Cent	Rubber Sample	Per Cent
Kpelle	211,081	20	176	13.2
Bassa	165,856	16	209	15.7
Gio	83,208	8	92	6.9
Kru	80,813	8	155	11.6
Grebo	77,007	8	262	19.6
Mano	72,122	7	155	11.6
Loma	53,891	5	40	3.0
Krahn	52,552	5	63	4.7
Gola	47,295	5	33	2.5
Kissi	34,914	4	85	6.4
Mandingo	29,750	3	4	0.3
Vai	28,898	3	25	1.9
Gbandi	28,599	3	21	1.6
Belle	5,465	.5	2	0.1
Dey	5,396	.5	5	0.4
Mende	4,974	.5	18	1.3
Miscellaneous	2,299	.5	31	2.3
Total tribal	984,120	97	1323	99.2
Alien African	8,875	1	7	0.5
No tribal affiliation	23,478	2	3	0.2
Total population	1,016,473	100	1333	99.9

*From J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Last two columns my data.

that "tribe" has an effect, we now wish to find out what the effect is. So we take each of the questions examined earlier and examine how the two groups answered the questions.

TABLE 23

AGE-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WHEN TRIBE IS
CONTROLLED FOR

Q 34. Two men, both do same good work, one man older, plenty family. Other man young, no got family, not got children. Both work for you, how you pay them. Older man get more, young man get more, both get same?

	Total		Group 1*		Group 2	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
0. Older get more	34.5	449	27.6	112	36.8	263
1. Younger get more	9.5	124	3.7	15	14.3	102
2. Both get same	56.0	728	68.7	270	49.0	350
	100.0	1301	100.0	406	100.0	715

*In this table and the next series of tables Group 1 includes the Kru, Grebo, Krahn. Group 2 includes the Kpelle, Loma, Kissi, Bassa, Gola, Gio and Mano.

The presumed achievement response here is that both men should be paid equal pay for equal work rather than one man or other receiving more because of age or economic position. The third row shows that Group 1, the three Kwa tribes, has a distinctly higher rate of picking the achievement re-

ponse. Overall, half the persons chose "both get same," but almost 70 per cent of the Kwa group chose it.

TABLE 24

POLITICAL STATUS-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WHEN
TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR

Q 36. Two men, who should we respect more? One man he town chief, work plenty hard, other man he clan chief, but he lazy. Who we respect more?

	Total		Group 1		Group 2	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
0. Lazy clan chief	13.3	172	11.0	46	15.0	111
1. Hard working town chief	74.7	967	77.9	325	72.3	536
2. Both	12.0	156	11.0	46	12.7	94
	100.0	1295	100.0	417	100.0	741

When we examine the percentage of respondents to the achievement response "strong town chief" we again find that a substantial majority of the people in both groups chose it in preference to a "lazy clan chief" or "both." That is, even though the clan chief has a much higher social position few say they are willing to respect him more than a hard working town chief. Group 1, the Kwa group, has a slightly higher percentage than the total sample and the other seven tribes.

TABLE 25

SECOND POLITICAL STATUS-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WHEN
TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR

Q 52. Two men, who should we respect more, one man he clan chief, work plenty hard, other man he town chief, but he lazy.

	Total		Group 1		Group 2	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
0. Hard working clan chief	83.7	643	84.8	335	80.5	206
1. Lazy town chief	6.1	47	6.1	24	7.4	19
2. Both	10.2	78	9.1	36	12.1	31
	100.0	768	100.0	395	100.0	256

This is a reversal of Q 36. The adjectives describing performance are reversed. Both groups score in the 80's, whereas in Q 36 they scored in the 70's. A hard working clan chief is more respected than a hard working town chief, which is reasonable. Note that the Kwa group scores slightly higher than Group 2. These differences are indicative although four out of five pick the "hard working" alternative. When that alternative was placed in front of town chief 75 per cent chose it. When it was placed in front of clan chief 84 per cent chose it.

TABLE 26

AGE-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WHEN
TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR

Q 37. Man with small money got two sons, both want money for school business. Big son is dull, but small son is plenty clever. Who should man give money to?

	Total		Group 1		Group 2	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
0. Older boy who dull	3.3	43	1.9	8	4.0	30
1. Small boy who clever	67.7	892	70.0	291	67.3	511
2. Both	29.0	382	28.1	117	28.7	218
	100.0	1317	100.0	416	100.0	759

The achievement response is "small boy who clever" and the majority of respondents chose this. As in the two previous questions, the Kwa in Group 1 score higher than the total sample and Group 2, the other seven tribes.

TABLE 27

FRIEND-FAMILY COMPARISON WHEN TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR

Q 38. If you got small money and both your best friend and a family man want money for same business, who you give money to?

	Total		Group 1		Group 2	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
0. Family man	36.0	463	48.6	197	28.0	207
1. Friend	25.6	329	20.7	84	28.4	104
2. Both	38.4	494	30.6	124	43.6	366
	100.0	1286	100.0	405	100.0	740

This question is different from the previous three as it does not make reference to hard work or achievement. It was originally asked to check out the commonly held belief that "family" is the key variable to analyze in order to understand the social structure and economic organization of non-literate societies. The total results show that when presented with this situation "family man" was not the most frequently chosen reply. Almost half of the Kru, Krahn and Grebo in Group 1 chose this reply. This is the same group that scored higher on the achievement responses of the previous three questions. In other words, it is possible that an emphasis on achievement may exist in the same culture with an emphasis on family.

TABLE 28

SECOND FRIEND-FAMILY COMPARISON WHEN
TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR

Q 51. Is friendship business stronger than family business?

	Total		Group 1		Group 2	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
0. Family business stronger	61.0	478	68.6	273	50.4	132
1. Friend business stronger	19.7	154	17.8	71	21.8	57
2. Both	19.3	151	13.6	54	27.9	73
	100.0	783	100.0	398	100.0	262

Q 38 is a stronger re-phrasing of the previous question. When no situations at all are specified 60 per cent of the respondents say they place an emphasis on family. As in the previous question, this varies by tribe since the three Kwa tribes in Group 1 again stress family much more than do the other seven tribes in Group 2. Question 51, above, is a stronger re-phrasing of Q 38 and both tap into the same phenomena. A rank order correlation for the ten tribes was computed for sub-category zero, "family man," on questions 38 and 51. $Rho = .80$ indicating that, in general, the ten tribes proportionately increased their percentages from Q 38 to Q 51. The three Kwa tribes also

stressed achievement more, and the next question compares an emphasis on family to an emphasis on achievement.

TABLE 29

FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WHEN
TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR

Q 56. You got small money and both your best friend and a family man come to you, need money, friend he work plenty hard, but family man he lazy. Who you give money to?

	Total		Group 1		Group 2	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
0. Lazy family man	28.5	109	35.4	17	29.0	73
1. Strong friend	51.8	198	39.6	19	53.2	134
2. Both	19.6	75	25.0	12	17.9	45
	100.0	382	100.0	48	100.0	252

The previous question did not use achievement responses and the three Kwa tribes in Group 1 had a much higher percentage responding to the alternative "family man." Q 56 was first asked at B. F. Goodrich, the last plantation the author visited, so the Group 1 N only equals 48, forty of them are Grebo. This is not a good sized sample but the writer will use it anyway. The differences between Table 28 and Table 27 are striking. The placement of adjectives referring to achievement results in noticeable shift. The Kwa group drops from 70 per cent to 35 per cent, the other

seven tribes drop from 50 to 30 per cent. The Kwa group shows the greatest reaction to the achievement adjectives, dropping 35 per cent. Although this was an extensive drop the Kwa end up with a higher percentage of people preferring to give money to the "lazy family man." It should be remembered that two-thirds of the respondents picked "strong friend" or "both."

This evidence in this chapter shows an overall tendency on the part of the workers to choose achievement answers. Within this general tendency is a tendency for the Kwa tribes to score slightly higher in their achievement responses. This tendency is strong enough to be pulled out as a separate factor. This general finding is corroborated by Dieter Seibel. He writes,

The only tribes on which I have some definite knowledge about the traditional system of status allocation are Kpelle (closer to the ascriptive end of the continuum) and the Kru tribes (Kru, Grebo, Krahn-Sapo, Belle, De - of the latter two, I have only 3 individuals) which are closer to achievement end of the continuum. So, I compared the 115 Kpelle and the 104 members of Kru tribes in my workers' sample (381). I compared the mean score of adaptation to wage labor which is composed of several factors with which you are familiar from my questionnaire.

I did two tests: a one-way analysis of variance resulted in an F ratio of 15.25, the T-test came up with 3.906. In both tests, the difference is significant at the 0.001 level, and indeed beyond it. So, it appears we got something, according to our

predictions. I hope, your results are also in the predicted direction.⁹

To this point we have shown that (a) a majority of these rice farmers-rubber workers pick achievement responses, (b) variation in responses is not associated with "modernization" or "urbanization," but (c) the answers do vary by "tribe." That is, the search for an explanation cannot be account for by "outside" factors, rather we have to go into "traditional" social structure to find an explanation for the existence of responses from people who, according to the conventional view, have no business making those responses. The next chapter reviews what little ethnographic information we have on the tribes within the area. The anthropological evidence is introduced to complement, validate and elaborate the survey research findings described in this chapter.

⁹Hans-Dieter Seibel, personal communication, April 24, 1970.

CHAPTER SIX

HISTORY AND ETHNOGRAPHIES OF THE LIBERIAN TRIBES

Liberia has been the meeting place of three language groups: Mande from the interior, West Atlantic from the north and Kwa speakers who are indigenous to the area.¹

¹An excellent literature exists on the history of West Africa, the climate and geography of Liberia and the history of Liberia as a country. This literature is available if the reader is interested in it but this chapter will focus on the indigenous culture and social structure of tribal groupings. For a short description see United States Army Area Handbook for Liberia, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1964, pp. 23-34. A platoon of the Army Topographical Battalion, headquarters in Italy, is stationed outside of Monrovia and has been working on mapping the country. Its work includes both aerial photography and gravitational readings using a Losch-Romberg Gravity Meter. The basic political work on Liberia is J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969. The basic economic work is Robert W. Clower, et al., Growth Without Development, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1966. Both are less than laudatory in their description of government operations. However, these criticisms can be over-emphasized. Liberia, as an African country, is subjected to the same predatory trade policies that third world countries everywhere experience: Its foreign debt burden is drastically increasing, it now must import food having lost its previous self-sufficiency, the capital development of its economy is increasingly planned by the foreign corporations who invest there, its cost of imports rise faster than its income from exports, it has no control over the price it receives for its natural rubber and iron ore, and the market for natural rubber will continue to decline thus aggravating an already bad unemployment rate, and its military officers are rotated to the United States for counter-insurgency training. In the long run it is the "Americo-Liberian" elite which suffers the most from these conditions since it is they who control the country's government.

From his work on sickle cell gene distribution, Livingstone has reconstructed historical migration in West Africa. Seventy-five per cent of the malaria in West Africa is due to the mosquito, Anopheles gambiae. It cannot breed in (a) shaded water, (b) water with a strong current, (c) brackish water and (d) alkaline or polluted water. His argument is, if we consider the types of water found in the tropical rain forest we see that only these types of water are found there. Therefore, non-forested agricultural areas will have higher numbers of mosquitos. Sickle cell anemia is a genetic adaption by human beings to malarial conditions. That is, the higher the rate of exposure to mosquitos the greater the frequency of sickle cell genes in the population. Therefore, tribes will have differing frequencies depending on their geographical location and cultural practices, and relatively speaking, we can tell how long tribes have been agricultural. For Liberian tribes Livingstone has the following distribution.

We see that the Kwa speaking Greba Krahn Kru, and Webbo have the lowest frequencies. These tribes have only taken up agriculture in the last few hundred years and still live in dense tropical forest. Livingstone writes:

Although there is no correlation of the frequency of the sickle cell trait with the linguistic sub-families in this part of West Africa, the tribes with low frequencies in both Portuguese Guinea and Eastern Liberia seem to be the indigenous inhabitants of West Africa who have been forced back into these areas by

TABLE 30
 THE FREQUENCIES OF THE SICKLE CELL TRAIT IN
 THE TRIBES OF LIBERIA^a

Tribe	Investi- gations	Number Examined	Number Positive	Sickle Cell Trait (%)
Kissi	17	298	58	19.46
Mende	17	77	13	16.88
Gbandi	17	352	54	15.34
Vai	17	93	13	13.98
Kpelle	17	982	128	13.03
Loma	17	511	65	12.72
Gola	17	183	22	12.02
Belle	17	29	3	10.34
Bassa	17	811	58	7.15
Dei	17	53	2	3.77
Mano	17	709	15	2.12
Gio	17	428	9	2.10
Grebo	17	69	1	1.45
Krahn	17	154	1	0.65
Kru	17	148	1	0.68
Webbo	17	77	0	0.00

^aFrank B. Livingstone, "Anthropological Implications of Sickle Cell Gene Distribution in West Africa," American Anthropologist, 60 (June, 1958), pp. 533-62. Table on pp. 538-39.

later migrants from the east. The distribution of the West Atlantic languages along the coast with some isolated pockets in the interior indicates that the speakers of these languages were once more widespread and have been forced back to the coast by more recent invaders.²

He also writes:

Also from Nigeria, some of the Kwa peoples spread in similar fashion through the West African tropical rain forest to the Ivory Coast and forced other Kwa peoples, the Kru and Lagoon speakers, westward into the Ivory Coast and Liberia. The Kru and Lagoon peoples were probably in the tropical rain forest as hunters and gatherers prior to this spread of agriculture. Agriculture has since been introduced to most of the Kru and Lagoon peoples, but it usually has rice as the basic crop, which comes from a different center of dispersal, or manioc, which was introduced into West Africa from the New World. Even today in the Ivory Coast, as several botanists (Miege 1953; Chevalier 1952) have remarked, there is a sharp boundary of yam cultivation on the Bandama River, which is also the border between the Baoule and Kru peoples. In addition, the yam cultivators, such as the Agni, have an elaborate ritual associated with the yam harvest (Rahm 1953; Miege 1953), which indicates great reliance on this crop. Although the Kru peoples have for the most part adopted agriculture, there is still more reliance on hunting in the Kru area (Kerharo and Bouquet 1949), and there are some groups who are still mainly hunters.³

Thus the Kru, Grebo and Krahn have a way of living and social history which is different from the other Liberian tribes. It is therefore not surprising that a factor analysis loaded these tribes onto a separate factor. The historical information we have about the area is congruent with the statistical analysis of the previous chapter. The

²Ibid., p. 544.

³Ibid., p. 552.

Mano and the Gio have the lowest rates after the Kru, Krahn and Grebo. They are Mande speaking tribes who entered Liberia from the direction of Upper Volta. The Kpelle and other Mande peoples, and the West Atlantic group came down from the north through Sierra Leone and the northeast through Guinea.

At the border between the Mano and the Kpelle, the frequency of the sickle cell trait increases sharply. Although these peoples both speak Mande languages, they belong to different subgroups of the Mande sub-family (Prost 1953). Kpelle is related to Mende and Susu to the northwest in Sierra Leone, and this tribe has undoubtedly come into Liberia from that direction. However, Mano and the other Mande languages whose speakers have low frequencies of the sickle cell trait are related to several Mande languages in the Upper Volta Province of French West Africa and also to a Mande language in Nigeria. Vendeix (1924) states that the Dan, and Tauxier (1924) that the Gouro, came into their present habitats from the northeast. Donner (1939) states that the Dan came from the north into the forest and forced the Kru peoples ahead of them. It would thus appear that these Mande tribes with low sickling frequencies came into their present location by a different route than that of their Mande neighbors to the northwest in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Bobofing, who speak a language related to these Mande languages whose speakers have low sickling frequencies, have 25 percent of the sickle cell trait and are some distance to the northeast of the Dan and Gouro; so that it seems that the sickle cell gene was introduced after the separation of these languages. The Mandingo are to the north of the Mano, Dan, and Gouro, and between them and the Bobofing. From the 12th to 15th centuries A.D. when the Mali Empire, which was ruled by the Mandingos, was at its height, these people are known to have expanded out from their original homeland. It would appear that this expansion of the Mandingo forced the Mano, Dan, and Gouro into the forest and separated them from their relatives to

the northeast.⁴

For the purposes of this dissertation several points need to be established: First a substantial cultural uniformity exists among the peoples of West Africa. Secondly, tribes in the area are differentiated into distinct cultural groupings.

Forde writes:

Thus the linguistic distributions in West Africa suggest several important underlying features of cultural development. First, since apart from the Saharan extensions into the savanna around Lake Chad, all the languages of West Africa appear to be ultimately derived from a common stock, one would expect to find significant elements of a common early tradition in the cultures of all West African peoples. Little systematic enquiry has so far been given to this question but there are many indications that underlying the great regional and tribal differences in the elaboration of cult and cosmological ideas there is a very widespread substratum of basic ideas that persists in the rituals, myths and folk tales of West African peoples.⁵

Forde also describes the cultural differentiation and his description is applicable to the forest peoples in this sample: the Kru, Grebo and Krahn.

As far as they can be judged, from those existing forest peoples who have remained outside the spheres of the most complex state organization of northern

⁴Ibid., p. 546.

⁵Daryll Forde, "The Cultural Map of West Africa: Successive Adaptations to Tropical Forests and Grasslands," in Simon and Phoebe Ottenberg (eds.), Culture and Societies of Africa, New York: Random House, 1960, pp. 116-138. Quote from p. 123.

origin or of later developments in response to European commerce, the older patterns of social organization in the forest belt, while variable, were all small in scale and rooted in local ties of kinship. The local community, rarely exceeding a few thousand persons and often only a few hundred strong, was virtually autonomous, with its own organization into groups of kinsfolk and its own system of authority. It had external contacts with similar neighboring groups, intercourse that was sufficient to maintain general similarity of speech, custom and social organization. Beliefs, skills and social innovations could spread widely from one to another and a sense of cultural unity maintained among a considerable number of communities. Their interrelations were not regulated from above, they took the form of chains of friendships and alliances, liable to be broken by feuds and intermittent hostilities. A lineage system (patrilineal, matrilineal, or even dual) whereby kinsmen in one line of descent maintained solidarity for both internal organization of their own group and for external cooperation and competition with similar groups, appear everywhere to have provided the first order of grouping within a locality. Among some peoples the lineage principle was more widely extended to embrace a series of local communities conceived and organized as a body of kin, segmented into ultimately related groups. Elsewhere, and associated with peoples living in larger compact settlements comparatively isolated geographically and socially from one another, a village organization, with territorial, age-set and status-associations, is superimposed on the system of kin groups of more restricted significance. Nowhere, except where the extraneous influence of invading minorities is both traditionally asserted and intrinsically probable, were politically centralized states with an administrative and territorial system of government established. The relations between lineage or small clan-organized tribes or between autonomous village communities were those of give and take in trade and intermarriage, punctuated by differences settled through arbitration, feud or warfare.⁶

⁶Ibid., pp. 125-26.

Forde's description verifies the statistical findings in the previous chapter which showed the Kwa speaking group to be both more achievement oriented and more family oriented. He goes on to describe other cultural variations which are applicable to the smaller West Atlantic and Mande tribes in Liberia.

But the agricultural patterns of the Western Sudan have also gone through several phases of development as more advanced techniques and additional crops and associated crafts were developed in some areas. Among some of the savanna peoples, as we have seen, there persists a more primitive economy with a less productive agriculture, lacking textiles and other specialized crafts and often dependent on a sporadic trade for iron. When we consider the social organization of such peoples we find it broadly similar in character to that of the forest peoples in the high degree of autonomy of small local communities and the importance of extended kin groups for the organization of social relations within and between them.

The more advanced and productive agricultural systems and the elaboration of specialized crafts in cloth and metal, on the other hand, are associated with a different social order. Such peoples whether Mandinka in the West or Hausa and Kanuri in the East are organized in states, which although they vary greatly in size, have basic features of social organization in common, namely the centralization of authority in a ruler with his councilors and subchiefs drawn from an aristocracy of birth; an elaborate etiquette of obeisance, expressive of ranking and subordination of classes in the social order; the collecting of tax and tribute to maintain the central organs of government and its agents. The more primitively organized peoples referred to above have persisted only in areas which have not been dominated and incorporated in these states and one of the processes of incorporation was very apparent when Europeans first penetrated and began to administer the various territories in the Western Sudan. The kin-organized tribes on the periphery of the centralized states were the slave-raiding reservoirs of the former. Only

those in the more remote and difficult country remained unmolested.⁷

From these general descriptions we narrow the focus to Liberia specifically. d'Azevedo, who did field work among the Gola, writes about the lack of adequate ethnographic information on tribes in Liberia.

The particular section of the coast under consideration here will be referred to as the Central West Atlantic region comprising a bloc of peoples in southern Sierra Leone and western Liberia. Ethnologic investigation in this region has been sparse and uneven. There are few complete reports for any of the groups, others have been but briefly described in surveys, and there are some sections--particularly in Liberia--about which there is scarcely any information. British and French research has maintained a high degree of mutual insularity in approaches, as well as a territorial exclusiveness. Both have been concerned primarily with the study of the larger ethnic populations within their respective provinces of political control, and have tended to make generalizations about the characteristics of entire ethnolinguistic entities from data derived from the investigation of particular communities, chiefdoms, or sections. Important features of variation within groups, as they pertain to an understanding of local adaptation or the effects of intertribal contact, are minimized.⁸

This was written in 1962 and the lack of ethnographic accounts has not improved since. The above comments also help to put the contributions of this thesis into perspective. No survey research techniques have even been

⁷Ibid., p. 127.

⁸Warren L. d'Azevedo, "Some Historical Problems in the Delineation of a Central West Atlantic Region," Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 96 (January 20, 1962), pp. 512-37. Quote from pp. 512-14.

applied to a comparative study of tribal populations. Nor have studies attempted to corroborate and validate their findings using historical and demographic information. Typical studies involve research in a single location and then generalize their findings to the entire tribe or geographical area.

d'Azevedo presents the following picture. From the north, Western Atlantic and Mande tribes have formed a common cultural heritage.

Such matters as traditions involving intertribal marriages between members of ruling lineages, the heterogeneous and mobile populations of chiefdoms briefly united by alliance or conquest, the rich mutual reference that appears in legend and genealogy concerning coastward migration under pressure of advancing Mande peoples, and the political and economic problems created by the concentration of new populations in the forest area, all have contributed to a common content of references to the past and to a high degree of cultural homogeneity among peoples of diverse origins.⁹

These tribes have developed Poro and Sande types of secret society.¹⁰ Poro has not yet, if it ever will, diffused to the Kru, Krahn and Grebo. However, it has begun to effect the Bassa, a Kwa-speaking group north of the Kru, and neighboring Mande tribes. The following description does not apply to the Kru, Krahn and Grebo. It applies in part

⁹Ibid., p. 515.

¹⁰For an early account of secret societies see F. W. Butt-Thompson, West African Secret Societies, London: Witherby, 1929.

to the Bassa, Mano and Gio, but it does apply to the Northern and Northwestern tribes: Kpelle, Loma, Kissi, Gbandi, Gola, and Vai. This latter group includes both the West Atlantic and Mande tribes.

The societies of this region are small autonomous monarchies whose wider sphere of diplomacy and alliance in the recent past frequently involved tenuous federation of chiefdoms over wide areas regardless of tribal or linguistic affiliation. A complex structure of authority obtains in these small political units in which aspects of power are relegated to the ranked-lineage hierarchy, to the secret societies, and to the secular administrative apparatus with its varying degrees of clientship and bureaucratization. The extent to which particular circumstances have tended to concentrate power in one or the other of these institutions accounts for much of the variation of form to be found among the chiefdoms within and among the tribal groups. Genealogical material and other evidences from oral traditions would substantiate the view that there has been a transition, over the past two or three centuries, from an emphasis on kinship in the organization of political units to a territorial and village emphasis involving more complex and heterogeneous groups. The peculiar form of secret society known as Poro appears to have emerged as a crucial institution in defense of traditional principles of ranked-lineage authority in competition with the rise of secular, individualistic political principles represented by new war lords, conquest, and immigrant populations imposed upon the older system. In a highly mobile and diversified adaptive situation, the Poro provided a sacred and secret arm of political authority and intergroup diplomacy that helped to maintain stability through appeal to the gerontocratic and hierarchical principles derived from the ideal model of the ranked-lineage structure of the past.¹¹

Thus Liberia has been the meeting place of three language groups, two of which, the West Atlantic and Mande,

¹¹Ibid., p. 516.

have culturally merged over the last 300 years. The southern Kwa group is distinct from the other two groups.

The position developed in the present paper is in substantial agreement with Murdock's view that the cultural homogeneity characteristic of this southern extension of the West Atlantic area is attributable primarily to tribal contacts and borrowing within the area, and that "the original cultural differences among the three linguistic groups have become very much blurred." However, this is only true of the Mande and West Atlantic speakers of Sierra Leone and northern Liberia. It does not hold for the Kwa-speaking peoples south of the Saint John River in central Liberia. None of the available sources would substantiate Murdock's claim that the Poro-type secret society, circumcision, and rice cultivation are general throughout the entire area with one or two exceptions in the western Ivory Coast. These features are still in the process of spreading southward from the Central West Atlantic cluster of peoples and from the eastern Mande. Their appearance among the Kwa-speaking peoples is weak and extremely recent. Poro has been adopted by certain Kru peoples adjacent to the Kpelle, Mano, and Gio, but it has not spread southward into the major coastal groups. Those groups adopting Poro also adopt circumcision practices. Among most of the Kru, Grebo, and other Kwa-speakers of central and southern Liberia these practices are abhorred. They have begun to spread southward during the past few decades under influence of Liberian and European medical services and, through contact with people, to the east and north due to increased mobility and communication. Rice cultivation and intensive slash-and-burn agriculture are sporadic and have been noted among these groups only in the past century. It is clearly a result of the influence of Liberian colonists, the depletion of forests, and the disappearance of game.

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Of special significance for the present discussion is the fact that southern Liberia and the western Ivory Coast appear to be the locus of a sharp division of these agricultural traditions. The Bandama River, which separates the Baoule and the Kru peoples, is also the northernmost boundary of intensive yam cultivation. Where yams appear in agriculture north

of this boundary, their harvest is not associated with the elaborate ritual that is found among the Agni and other Kwa-speaking peoples farther to the south. The Kru, Bassa, and many other Kwa-speaking peoples of the central Liberian forests have not been intensive farmers until quite recently, and still rely more upon fishing, hunting, and forest gathering than do the West Atlantic-speaking and Mande-speaking peoples to the north and east of the Saint Paul River. Thus the forests of southeastern and central Liberia appear to represent an area of hiatus between the spread of Sudanic agricultural patterns from the northeast, and the root and wild-forest crop complex from the easterly tropical forests of the Volta and Niger deltas.

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Although rice has spread more rapidly as an intensive crop along the West Atlantic coast than either cotton, millet, or sorghum, it can be dated no earlier than one century ago for many of the southern Bassa, Kru, and Grebo peoples. Among the Grebo, rice cultivation has appeared only in the present century through the influence of Liberian settlers and government development programs. Minimal yam and cassava cultivation were a mere supplement to fishing and forest gathering prior to this time.

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Thus it would seem that the area between the Mano and the Saint John Rivers represents a convergence of a number of distinct cultural traditions arriving in the coastal forests of Sierra Leone and Liberia from three directions and at different historical periods. This convergence has taken place within the past three centuries in a very narrow corridor along the coast. The close proximity of these peoples and the intensity of their political and economic interrelations during the ensuing period are given added significance by the fact that the Poro-type secret society is represented in its most classic form among them and that they are the most culturally homogeneous cluster of peoples within the Central West Atlantic region despite their language differences. These peoples are the Mende, Vai, Gola, Kpelle, and De.

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The phenomenon of north-to-south shading of population density is accompanied by a similar distribution of the size of villages and chiefdoms. Mende towns in the Sierra Leone may contain 1000 or more persons; chiefdoms may vary from 5000 to 20,000 persons. The size of these units increases to the north and eastward among the Temne, Limba, and Susu. Among the Gola, the largest towns that I visited seldom exceeded 100 huts or about 500 persons; the most populous chiefdoms did not exceed 3000 to 5000 persons. This appears to be the case for most of the peoples surrounding the Gola in the western province of Liberia. On the eastern border of Liberia, however, the Mande-speaking peoples have several large towns approaching the Mende and Temne figures. Yet among the Sapu, Pudu, Kru, and Grebo to the south, the largest villages reported are from 50 to 90 huts, and much smaller hamlets are the general rule.¹²

d'Azevedo ends a most useful description by saying,

Rice cultivation and slash-and-burn practices were carried on intensively throughout the interior. Non-African tree crops such as coffee, cocoa, rubber, and fruits were grown on large tribal and colonial plantation. As the European demand for African timbers increased, forests were thinned, and entire sections were turned into scrub and grassland by agriculture. However these developments did not directly affect the Kwa-speaking peoples or the territory south of the Saint John River. These peoples had not been incorporated into the confederacies and other political and economic alliances of the Central West Atlantic region immediately to the north. The true rain-forest belt has now receded into central Liberia where it extends southeastward to a considerable depth along the coast. Migration was never an important factor in this area, and the populations are more stable. Until very recently the Kwa-speaking groups have constituted an almost impregnable bulwark against the spread of intensive rice cultivation and other Sudanic and Central West Atlantic features. They have, nevertheless, adopted many of the new American crops transmitted through Europeans and Liberian colonists.

¹²Ibid., pp. 518-31.

The populations of the chiefdoms of the Kru, Grebo, and other Kwa-speakers remain ethnically homogeneous in contrast to the extreme heterogeneity of the Central West Atlantic groupings. Their social organization, languages, and economic activities are looked upon--even in the present day--as alien and mysterious by the Central West Atlantic peoples immediately to the north of them.¹³

Two clear assertions emerge: (a) this geographical area has cultural homogeneity in it and (b) heterogeneity exists between the southern Kwa group (Kru, Grebo and Krahn) and the other Liberian tribes. These assertions directly corroborate the results obtained from the factor analytic techniques used in the previous chapter.

General Differences Among Liberian Tribes

Having shown that historical reconstructions are compatible with the statistical findings reported previously, the logical next question is why do the tribes differ. An influential early (1940) writing on this topic was African Political Systems by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard¹⁴ which distinguished between centralized and segmentary systems. This was expanded by Brown¹⁵ who pointed out four types of

¹³Ibid., pp. 536-37.

¹⁴M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems, New York: Oxford University Press, 1940.

¹⁵Paula Brown, "Patterns of Authority in West Africa," Journal of the International African Institute, 21 (October, 1951), pp. 261-78.

political authority in West Africa: The first exercised only in and through kinship groups; the second with authoritative associations and kinship groups; thirdly, by kinship groups, associations and state organizations; and fourthly, by state organizations and subordinate kinship groups while associations are absent or of minor political importance. These initial discussions have been built up by other writers such as Tait and Middleton¹⁶ and Cohen and Middleton.¹⁷ These analyses have set forth the key factors to look for in considering differences among tribes.

We have already discussed historical differences among Liberian tribes. A few commentators have mentioned these differences explicitly.

Liberty writes:

Social differentiation varied according to community. Among the Vai, Mandinka, and Liberian, it was most pronounced; visible but less rigid among Kpelle, Lorma, Gola, Kisi, and Gbandi; less apparent among the Dey, Belle, and Bassa [these three are Kwa tribes]; and almost non-existent among the Kru. Political structure ran the entire centralization gamut from the highly centralized proto-Western Liberian, to the equally centralized sudanic Mandingo, to the proto-sudanic Vai, to the confederated Gola and Lorma, the more loosely con-

¹⁶John Middleton and David Tait (eds.), Tribes Without Rules: Studies in African Segmentary Systems, London: Routledge and Kegan, 1958.

¹⁷Ronald Cohen and John Middleton (eds.). Comparative Political Systems: Studies in the Politics of Pre-Industrial Societies, New York: Natural History Press, 1967.

federated Kpelle, Gbandi, Dey, Kis, Bassa, and Belle. The economic basis of the communities reflected a like diversity. A few like the Lorma and Kpelle were agriculturalists with sizeable towns and a market economy which provided most of the indigenously-made items of trade. Others like the Gola practiced a mixed economy of agriculture, hunting and food gathering, occasionally employing their strategic geographic location to supplement their sources of income. The Vai and Mandingo depended largely upon their commercial skills and the manufactures of their artisan stratum. The Kru were a kind of rural proletariat, fishermen and boathandlers. And the Liberian were preoccupied with trade ventures.¹⁸

Liebenow writes:

The process of political and social decentralization of authority was most severe among the coastal Kru and among the Grebo and Krahn in the southeast. The most that could be found there were clusters of villages or towns, few of which numbered over several hundred inhabitants. Within these small units, most of the political, social, and economic transactions of traditional tribal society took place. The Gola, Mende, Vai, Loma, and Kpelle in the north and west were organized into larger units under chiefs. As noted above, however, the tribe was broken into a number of relatively autonomous units. The Vai, for example, are divided into nine chiefdoms, only four of which are located in Liberia. The political fragmentation among the larger Kpelle community is far greater.¹⁹

The Kru Tribe

Both the above writers are in substantial agreement

¹⁸C. E. Zamba Liberty, "The Decline of the Dey," paper presented at First Liberian Conference, Stanford University, August 1-2, 1969. Quote from pp. 2-3.

¹⁹J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege, op. cit., p. 39.

with each other and with the historical picture previously presented. The Kwa group has less political centralization and less social differentiation. The Kwa group has not been studied as well as other tribes such as the Kpelle and Gola. However, we can make the following points.

Fraenkel writes:

Traditionally the Kru were organized in a large number of independent towns, each with its own chief, who owed no allegiance to any other ruler, although he might have under him the heads of smaller villages which were usually offshoots of the main town. There was frequent fighting between the towns, usually over the question of land, and alliances of several towns sometimes took place, but these were only temporary, and Kru political structure contained no machinery for permanent co-operation between one town and another.²⁰

Fraenkel says that the river system on the Kru part of the coast made the construction of a coastal road from Monrovia quite difficult and that this area of Liberia has always been the most isolated. Even at the height of the dry season this writer found the 650 km. laterite road almost impassable since the dense jungle shades and prevents evaporation of the 150 inches a year rainfall.

Fraenkel continues saying the basis of social organization in Kru town is the panton, or exogamous particlan. The clan organization, based on kinship, cuts across towns

²⁰Merran Fraenkel, "Social Change on the Kru Coast of Liberia," Africa, 36 (April, 1966), pp. 154-72. Quote from p. 154.

and acts as a segmentary lineage in the event of war or disputes among towns. The lineages do not appear to be ranked hierarchically since towns have a system of checks and balances which allocates political office and prevents any one panton from becoming too strong. A system of age-grade sets cuts across the panton organization. The military basis of the age set system has disappeared and it now carries out civic and ceremonial duties.

The central government's imposition of chiefs on this area created confusion. The "chief" as a political system was based on experience with the Vai-Gola region to the north which was traditionally organized into chiefdoms, unlike the Kru which were organized into politically autonomous towns.

Seibel makes the following two points, both of which corroborate the statistical findings of the previous. First, all the Liberian tribes are generally achievement oriented. Secondly, the Kwa group is more achievement oriented than the tribes to the northwest.

In all Liberian tribes status is largely allocated on the basis of achieved criteria. The differences, though of a minor scale, existing between the tribes confirm the hypothesis about a connection between traditional system of status allocation and receptivity to achievement systems in modern settings.

As far as the traditional system is concerned, the existence of an incipient class system, of chieftaincy, and of strong secret societies extending their power into many spheres of secular life among the Kpelle and the absence of these institutions

among the Kru tribes places these two groups on different points on the achievement-ascription continuum.²¹

The initial crude beginnings of a complete ethnography on Liberian tribes has been started by the Tubman Center of African Culture and its preliminary report on the Kru has been published.²² Pertinent to our purposes, it makes the following points. The Kru have a complex social organization, and traditionally had a well developed set of political and administrative positions and independent polygynous families. Public offices were balanced among kinship groups but performance of office was largely evaluated by achievement criteria. Publicly the Kru peoples maintain an achievement emphasis and deny the existence of stratification although some stratification exists now and slave owning did exist. The secret societies of Poro and Sande are not prevalent among the Kru tribes although they have filtered down to neighboring tribes including the Bassa, Mano and Gio. Historically the Kru tribes are known as fierce and warlike.

²¹H. Dieter Seibel, "Achievement and Ascription in Liberia: A Comparative View," paper presented on the panel 'Change and Development in Liberia,' Liberia Conference, August 1-2, 1969, Stanford, California. Quote from p. 9.

²²Kjell Zetterstrom, "Ethnographic Survey of Southeastern Liberia--Preliminary Report on the Kru," Robertsport, Liberia: Tubman Center of African Culture, 1969.

The Bassa Tribe

The Bassa are a Kwa speaking tribe but are farther to the northwest than the Kru, Grebo and Krahn and thus, as would be expected, are more influenced by the Mande and West Atlantic tribes. The result is a cultural mixture.

Handwerker's study of Bassa in Monrovia makes reference to social structure in the rural areas.²³ As with the other Kwa tribes, the Bassa are politically decentralized with small villages predominating. Lineages may have been partially ranked within villages. Like the Kru, no indigenous markets on any sizeable scale existed. The Bassa sold slaves to non-African slaves and like the Kru peoples, worked as stevedores and deckhands. Moral and sacred leadership had more ascriptive requirements than political or military leadership which was based on achievement primarily. Unlike the Kru peoples, the Bassa circumcise and participate in Poro and Sande, and age-grade organizations are not prominent if they exist at all. Nor do Bassa villages have a clear "clan" (panton) organization. Rice farming probably diffused to the Bassa from the Kpelle.

²³Winston Penn Hardwerker, "A Preliminary Study of Migration, Settlement and Social Organization in the Bassa Community, Monrovia, Liberia," unpublished Master's thesis, University of Oregon, 1969.

Siegmann's study of the Bassa for the Tubman Center²⁴ complements the above description. Siegmann says the Bassa have clans but they are not as important as they are among the Kru, Grebo and Krahn. He presents a similar picture of political decentralization, small politically autonomous villages, with leadership selected for an ability to resolve disputes and guided by a council of elders which acted as a check on the leader. The Bassa then are a buffer zone between the cultural practices of the Kru peoples to the southeast and the Mande to the northwest.

Kpelle and Gola Tribes

Better historical and ethnographic information exists on two other Liberian tribes: Gibbs' work on the Kpelle²⁵ and d'Azevedo's on the Gola. Little ethnographic information exists on the Sapo, Webbo, Krahn, Gio, Mano, Loma,

²⁴William Siegmann, Report on the Bassa: Ethnographic Survey of Southeastern Liberia, Robertsport, Liberia: Tubman Center of African Culture, 1969.

²⁵James L. Gibbs, Jr., "The Judicial Implications of Marital Instability among the Kpelle," unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1960; "Poro Values and Courtroom Procedures in a Kpelle Chiefdom," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 18 (1962), pp. 341-50; "The Kpelle Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the Informal Settlement of Disputes," Africa, 33 (1963), pp. 1-11; "Marital Instability among the Kpelle: Towards a Theory of Epainogamy," American Anthropologist, 65 (1963), pp. 552-73; "The Kpelle of Liberia," in Peoples of Africa, ed. by Gibbs, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, pp. 119-240.

Belleh, Dey and Vai. On the Kpelle Gibbs writes:

The Kpelle have an incipient class system that distinguishes three classes: to nuwai (rich men), loi lonni (sons of the soil), and tii ke nuwai (workmen or clients)--an upper class, middle class, and lower class, respectively. This is termed an "incipient" class system because the range of attributes on which the classes differ is small, the ratio of intraclass interaction to interclass interaction is small, and the number of people in both the upper and lower groups is small.

This class system has historical origins because it stems from the domestic slavery once practiced by the Kpelle, although slavery has, of course, been abolished by the Liberian government. In earlier times there were three classes: freemen, slaves, and pawes.²⁶

No discussion of Kpelle or Gola society can be made without an understanding of Poro.

Little writes:

One of the most interesting problems of pre-colonial history is the relation of so-called secret societies to indigenous government. In West Africa they are concerned mainly with the ownership and use of supposedly supernatural medicines and the propagation of certain cults.

These are the functions also of other associations, but what principally distinguishes secret societies from the ordinary medicine society or cult is the esoteric basis of their activities. Not only do the secret societies employ particular rituals, signs, symbols, and forms of knowledge which are withheld from non-initiates, but these things are required as a special source of power through being kept private. Associations of this kind are prevalent in southern Nigeria, and are particularly numerous in the coastal area of rain-forest in general, including the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and parts of Ghana and Portuguese Guinea. They are not secret in

²⁶Ibid., p. 214.

any other respect. On the contrary, not only is the existence and general purpose of these societies known to every grown-up person, but in many places the wide range of their activities makes them the dominant social force. They are frequently responsible for tribal education, regulate sexual conduct, supervise political and economic affairs, and operate various social services, including entertainment and recreation as well as medical treatment.²⁷

Little goes on to say the institution is probably more than 400 years old and has diffused throughout this section of West Africa. No hard information on membership, actual political influence or any important facet of Poro is available and none is being collected.²⁸ The absence of hard information is not due to a lack of interest in Poro, rather the absence is due to intense security precautions which prevent information from passing to non-members, especially white men.

One of the major problems in analyzing Poro is that of determining its relation to the public political hierarchy of chiefs.²⁹ The extremely rapid rates of social change

²⁷Kenneth Little, "The Political Function of the Poro," Africa, 35 (October, 1965), p. 349.

²⁸A search of bibliographic items in Rural Africana and Research in Rural Africa indicate no research is being done on Poro. In a personal communication to this writer Little said he knows of no research being done on it.

²⁹See Eugene A. Walter, Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence, with Case Studies of Some Primitive African Communities, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

and flux that have characterized this geographical area has already been mentioned. Poro developed as an integrative social organization that drew members from potentially warring tribes and enforced its authority across wide areas. The British colonial system of indirect rule, which was also used by the Liberian government, created a series of appointed chiefs which supposedly represented the indigenous tribal hierarchy. However, this political structure does not accurately reflect historical conditions of Sierra Leone or the Northwestern and Central sections of Liberia where the non-Kwa speaking tribes are found.

Little writes:

Needless to say, quite apart from the question of Poro, the indigenous system was much more complex than this. True, a number of individual chiefdoms existed, each relatively independent and under the control of its own chief, sub-chiefs, and headmen. But, according both to tradition and the earliest written accounts of conditions in the Guinea Coast, the underlying situation involved an intricate network of political ties and affiliations corresponding, in some ways, to quite large hegemonies or confederacies. The impression gained is that these arose out of the exigencies of tribal warfare, which seems to have been almost continuous in certain areas, prompting a constant need for military alliance and for protection on the part of weaker chiefdoms. For this reason, but also as a result of conquest, there was often a single chief, or "high chief", whose general leadership over a group of chiefdoms was recognized by his neighbours. Each of the latter kept his own administration, but the arbitration of the high chief was accepted in important cases, including disputes between fellow members of the

"confederacy".³⁰

Little suggests that:

It is hardly necessary to repeat that under the warlike conditions obtaining, the system of political relationships just described was largely the result of military factors. Fighting being on a limited scale, personal qualities of leadership, including audacity and skill in ambush, were more important than the number of a man's followers or the ethnic and kin relationships between groups.

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. . . [S]ome sanction was necessary which could operate more widely and more effectively than mere physical force or even traditionally ingrained attitudes of allegiance.³¹

In other words,

. . . [W]ith growing political centralization, the judicial and executive function of a secret society may be retained and its members as the personal agents of the ruling chief may constitute the effective police of the state.³²

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Political control, then, was divided between the two institutions. Also, it was vested in the hands of relatively few individuals. Principally, there were the officials of the Poro, and there was the chief, who, as well as directing the civil affairs of the chiefdom, might also occupy a senior grade in the society. In these terms, positions of leadership were hereditary or could be achieved by ritual means. In addition, individual chiefs obtained extra power through military success which they were able to retain because an interlocking organization of local Poro lodges cut across kinship lines and the local

³⁰Little, op. cit., p. 64.

³¹Little, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

³²Little, op. cit., p. 67.

group. The latter organization kept the scale of political interaction potentially wider than that encompassed by a single chiefdom. It offered, despite continuous warfare and inter-chiefdom rivalry, a framework of relationships upon which political integration could proceed.

By these arrangements--to paraphrase Morton-Williams's analysis of the Yoruba state--there was produced a system of social control capable of working in a small community, or in one of several thousands, and adapted to a confederation of petty chiefdoms.³³

The existence of secret centralized societies puts a check on individualistic pursuits. The end result is described by Gibbs. His description of the Kpelle ethics is noteworthy since it is a description of "traditional society" and processes operating within it that are in sharp contrast to the descriptions offered by the conventional view in Chapter One.

Kpelle culture has two conflicting dominant themes. The first is a stress on personal autonomy and the individual achievement of status. Eligibility for high rank such as chieftaincy is not ascribed primarily on the basis of birth as a member of a particular lineage or clan as it is in many middle-range African societies. Rather, it is achieved on the basis of individual effort. A Kpelle may climb ahead of his fellows through the possession of certain obtainable skills. Most important is the ability to work hard, that is, to farm well, and to manage his economic resources skillfully. This will enable him to attract wives, themselves the major source of wealth, for Kpelle women claim to be drawn to a man mainly by his industriousness. The possession of interpersonal skills enables a man to hold his wives and the clients whom they may attract. He will then become known as a man who knows how to "hold people

³³Little, op. cit., p. 70.

good," and, if he has a gift for oratory and settling palavers, he will be selected for political office. Some of this know-how he may acquire by starting adult life as the client of a prominent man or by working in bride service for the daughter of such a man. The variability of marriage forms and residence patterns in Kpelle society exists because men make marriages less to give expression to a particular kinship principle than to enhance their status by taking a step in the process of acquiring power over people.

The basic quest is for the individual acquisition of wealth through hard work and shrewd investment of this wealth in persons. At advantageous times one collects the social debts thus created. Throughout there is not too subtle a stress on the instrumental manipulation of others to one's own advantage. What is significant is that this is an individual enterprise, not one of a corporate group. However, if a man is prudent, he will not neglect his supernatural resources. He will protect and enhance his gains by investing in medicines and charms to hold his wives and protect his crops; perhaps he will use sorcery to slow the process of his rivals. But he will approach the creator god or the ancestors only when in dire straits.

In a society where the achievement principle is widely followed, it is clear that competitive rivalries and shifting allegiances can be a source of considerable friction. This is especially true where, as in Kpelle society, kinship groups are weak and exercise few restraints on the individual. Those in constituted authority are constantly faced with the unsettling possibility of being replaced by the newly powerful.

The counterweight to the theme of individual advancement is the stress on conformity and regulation as exemplified in the tribal societies. Through the initiation schools they assure the continuity of basic Kpelle values and by the application of combined ritual and secular sanctions, they ensure adherence to those values. This means that individual Kpelle are guided by the same expectations in the competition for power. They play by the same rules and for the same stakes, which means that no one goes too far in the means he uses to acquire position. If he does, the sanctions are forceful and effective.

Through its officials, the Poro regulates the speed with which a man with a following may acquire formal political or Poro office.

Using game board maneuvers as an analogy, one would say that no one can advance along the game board too fast. Thus only those men who have demonstrated respect for proper authority and traditional values win the game, whereas others are not allowed to proceed too far. In short, those with ritual and secular power who form the top echelon of the Poro and society as a whole take care to allow themselves to be replaced only by those who share their outlook. This is especially significant if, as noted above, these Poro gatekeepers are themselves selected by the inherently conservative ascriptive hereditary principle. Thus, the Poro minimizes the disruptive effects of the achievement principle and competition for individual status, and serves as a stabilizing and conserving force in society.

Following this Gibbs says the Kpelle are "strikingly similar" to most of the neighboring tribes: Vai, Gola, Mano, Gio, Loma, Mende and Kissi. d'Azevedo's description of the Gola is approximately similar. He several times speaks of "achievement-oriented Gola society,"³⁵ and goes on to discuss Poro and centralized political control.

In summary, the available ethnographic information supports both the statistical conclusions of the previous chapter and the historical evidence that began this chapter. All the tribes in this geographical area are achievement

³⁴Gibbs, "The Kpelle of Liberia," op. cit., pp. 229-30.

³⁵Warren L. d'Azevedo, "Common Principles of Variant Kinship Structures among the Gola of Western Liberia," American Anthropologist, 64 (1962), pp. 504-20.

oriented, and of them, the Kru are more achievement oriented since the existence of centralized political authority enforced by a secret society puts greater limitations on individual accomplishment.

Social Complexity and Ecological Adaptation

These findings are corroborated by independent lines of theoretical speculation. Sahlins, in his comparative study of Social Stratification in Polynesia³⁶ arrives at the general conclusion that as economic productivity increases the society becomes more stratified. Productivity creates a surplus which adds non-economic roles and creates a system of redistribution. Sahlins is careful to limit his generalization to the geographical area from which his data was collected. However, his description of three forms of stratification, the ramage, descent and atoll, and their association to types of economic resources is suggestive. These forms of social organization may be thought of as adoptive variations to ecological conditions.

The ramage form is centralized, a high chief is the direct descendent of the founder, lineages are ranked by distance to the founder, succession is by a primogenitive

³⁶Marshall D. Sahlins, "Social Stratification in Polynesia," The American Ethnological Society, Verne F. Ray, (ed.), Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958.

principle and the ramage form is the most stratified of the three forms. Descent-line societies are composed of local groupings of small, unrelated lineages, descent lines, no definite rule of succession exists, territorial councils do the ruling and the descent lines, which are not ranked, have a representative on the council. These two forms of social organization are alternative solutions to the problem of distributing surplus production, solutions related to the particular type of basic adaption of the culture. A ramage form develops where the spatial distribution of rich resource zones is too scattered to be exploited by one household or the range of crops is quite large and must be grown in different areas. Kin ties provide an equitable distribution of different products and are maintained. Descent line society develops where rich resources are concentrated in a single space or the range of crops is small. No economic distribution by kin networks develops and isolated, nucleated settlements are the rule. Both the ramage and descent forms of social organization are an adaption to the differential placement of resource zones and range of crops. Both forms are adaptations to abundant resources and are more socially stratified than the atoll form.

The atoll form is an adaption to scarce resources and is different from the previous two forms. The social organization may be quite complex but it is not stratified.

The society undergoes an intensive specialization so that all available resources are exploited. The result is a complex social organization with many associations, age-grade societies, village organization and double descent succession. The long occupation of a limited area under conditions of low productivity may result in an intensive ecological specialization.

Qualifications can be made but in general, the social organization of the Kru tribes approximates the decentralized non-stratified, low productivity, atoll organization. To be relatively unstratified does not necessarily imply a simple social organization or simple ecological specialization. Kru tribal members, historically, have worked as deckhands on ships for at least 400 years, and also been fishermen, hunters and farmers.

The social organization of the other Liberian tribes in our sample approximates the more centralized, stratified ramage social organization. Outside of the dense rain jungle, resources are more abundant since farming and trade possibilities are available. The Kpelle and Gola have ranked lineages, centralized chiefs and at least a rudimentary social class system.³⁷ The same opportunities for

³⁷The abolition of slavery by the Liberian government in 1930 literally created a social revolution among the Vai, Gola, Kpelle, and other tribes whose ruling families had much of their wealth in slaves. For a fuller account of

material accumulation which stimulated the constant warfare also fostered the growth of pan-tribal occupation associations and secret societies, of which Poro is the most well known. As the ethnographic reports of Gibbs and d'Azevedo indicate an achievement emphasis is still emphasized but its expression is restricted and this restriction shows up in the statistical data.

None of the Liberian tribes have a completely centralized bureaucratic government. Wide regional variations in political autonomy exist and the class system is not rigidly developed. Based on the preceding theoretical analyses it is reasonable to assume that, in general, these tribes are achievement oriented and that Kru, Krahn and Grebo are relatively more achievement oriented than the other tribes.

In summary, these last two chapters have attempted to present a coordinated picture of a geographical area using survey research techniques, historical information and anthropological reports. Both an emphasis on achievement and a differential emphasis by tribal grouping are shown to be a natural and plausible part of an entire complex of events. Enough descriptive materials have been presented

the destruction of the old social class system see Warren L. d'Azevedo, "A Tribal Reaction to Nationalism (Part 2)," Liberian Studies Journal, 2 (1969), pp. 43-63.

to enable the reader to compare the actual conditions of these tribes with the images of "the traditional society" given by the conventional view. Given their turbulent and chaotic social histories and the continual ecological requirements of low productivity economic organizations under difficult climatic conditions, it is not surprising to find an explicit achievement ethos. Any strong stress upon allocating responsibilities on the basis of fixed ascribed characteristics such as sex, age or specific genealogical ties would probably be mal-adoptive and result in the eventual elimination of that social grouping.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE NEED FOR A THEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTION

Summary of Previous Chapters

Before starting the concluding chapter it is useful to briefly summarize. The opening chapter describes a perspective that this writer feels has been the prevailing orthodoxy in the sociological study of social change in non-Western countries. This orthodoxy was described as it appears in contemporary introductory textbooks and more specialized writings. Since the "conventional view" operates as a paradigm and not as a theory, the opening chapter attempted to give a full range of its assumptions and assertions. It was pointed out that one of its assertions is that "achievement" characterizes industrial societies and "ascription" characterizes pre-industrial societies. This assertion is supported by other assertions and assumptions that, in general, say: most, if not all, of the important social events occurring in "pre-industrial" societies are due to outside factors summarized in the concepts "industrialization," "urbanization," "modernization" or more recently "developmental change." Central to this view is the distinction between "traditional" and "modern."

These social conditions are thought to exist and be opposed alternatives. Social change is a shift from "traditional" to "modern" and the shift is caused by the processes of "industrialization" et al. Moreover, this shift is rapid and discontinuous, creating urban slums and "social disorganization."

The second chapter focused on a single assertion, that "industrialization" broke down a previously existing extended family and replaced it with a nuclear family. This assertion is also found in the references cited in the opening chapter and plausibly fits into the three stage model of social change that is characteristic of conventional thinking. Enough clear empirical evidence has slowly been developed to say this assertion is incorrect. If this evidence is accepted, then the assumptions of the perspective which generated it must inevitably be questioned. Thus the second chapter is the beginning of a partial empirical refutation of the conventional view. Philosophers of science such as Popper and Kuhn, indicate that neither a theory nor a paradigm can be definitively rejected. No complete empirical refutation of the conventional view is possible. Rather, enough evidence is slowly accumulated to show its assertions and assumptions need to be re-analyzed.

Chapter Three attempts several aims: It takes a prominent theorist, W. E. Moore, and examines his influential

classic work Industrialization and Labor. It traces his writings over a twenty-year period and points out the changes in his theoretical views. It also reviews post-1950 empirical evidence on industrialization and labor. The purpose of this chapter was to move beyond the rhetoric of the conventional view and list the empirical evidence which already exists that contradicts its assumptions. Until 1960 Moore's views reiterated conventional conceptions. However, under the stimulus of adverse empirical criticism his views became modified and this is reflected in his writings.

Chapter Four reviews the evidence on the importance of ascription and achievement. The assertion that an emphasis on achievement is unique or especially prevalent in "modern" industrial societies is shown to be seriously debateable. This belief is shown to lack adequate empirical documentation. The complementary assertion that an emphasis upon fixed, rigid, custom-bound, family-linked principles characterizes "traditional" societies also lacks empirical documentation.

Chapters Five and Six report on the statistical evaluation of interviews with 1300 rubber workers, and on the historical and ethnographic characteristics of the Liberian tribes. We found that a majority of the men we interviewed are "achievement-oriented," that an emphasis upon achievement is not associated with "modernizing"

experiences since the emphasis varies by tribe. The historical and ethnographic information shows this part of the West Africa coast is anything but stagnant and unchanging. It is an area that has undergone rapid and extensive change for as far back as existing historical documentation goes. In a strict sense, these results are not generalizable to other geographical areas, but had the conventional view been generally correct in its emphases, then we should have found evidence for it in this area.

Theoretical Critiques of the Conventional View

Having reviewed previous chapters, especially emphasizing the empirical contradictions they raise with conventional assumptions, this concluding chapter will review recent theoretical criticisms of the conventional view. The purpose is to gain a better understanding of social structure in so-called traditional countries. We begin by reviewing theoretical attacks upon the conventional view.¹

Blumer writes:

¹An early critique of the "conventional view" that anticipates later, more systematic critiques was made by the last Chinese sociologist to public in the American Sociological Review. See Francis L. K. Hsu, "Incentives to Work in Primitive Communities," American Sociological Review, 8 (December, 1943), pp. 638-42; see also, William R. Bascom, "West Africa and the Complexity of Primitive Cultures," American Anthropologist, 50 (January-March, 1948), pp. 18-23.

What does the introduction of industrialization do to the traditional order of preindustrial societies? The conventional answer of sociologists is that industrialization undermines the traditional order. Industrialization is regarded as displacing existing occupations, shifting production from the home and the village, producing migration and urbanization, fostering social mobility, introducing monetary and contractual relations, arousing new wishes and expectations, and promoting secular and rational perspectives. The impact of such changes is alleged to break down the existing family system, disrupt the prevailing class structure, disintegrate status and role arrangements, undermine paternalistic relations, weaken the established system of authority, transform traditional tastes, and erode established values. My studies convince me that this widely held view is markedly inaccurate. I wish to sketch its major deficiencies and suggest a more balanced conception.²

Blumer goes on to correctly say that "industrialization" as a concept is too broad. As commonly used it subsumes a heterogeneous collection of processes and events: machinery, electrical power, a western market, transportation networks, credits, educational facilities, and people with abilities to operate the preceding. The concept includes so much that it is not a useful term. Similarly, the concept of the "traditional society" also subsumes such a heterogeneous collection of historical experiences and present situations as to be largely useless for serious

²Herbert Blumer, "Industrialization and the Traditional Order," Sociology and Social Research, 48 (January, 1964), pp. 129-38, quote from p. 129. See also Herbert Blumer, "Early Industrialization and the Laboring Class," Sociological Quarterly, 1 (January, 1960), pp. 5-14.

analysis.

Given this heterogeneity neither a general theory of "industrialization" is possible nor can a theory of social change be built around it. Blumer goes on to indicate that a wide variety of responses are possible to potential changes, and non-industrial countries exhibit all combinations of responses. Blumer identifies five responses: "rejective," "disjunctive," "assimilative," "supportive" and "disruptive." That is the pre-industrial society might reject "industrialization," exist in a dual, "disjunctive," economy, assimilate it, be supported by it, or be destroyed by it. Of these responses, Blumer firmly rejects the conventional view.

First, it would be a mistake to assume that the picture of differential responses is to be found only at some initial stage of early industrialization, only to pass over subsequently into a single current of descriptive response. To the contrary, each one of the five responses may be a continuing affair, maintaining itself during decades of contact with the industrializing process. Second, it should not be thought that the rejective, disjunctive, assimilative, and supportive responses take place only in scattered and insignificant parts of the traditional order. They may cover broad and important areas of the social order. They operate in all of the major areas on which sociologists are prone to fasten their concern--such areas as the class structure, the authority system, the organization and life of families, the structure of social roles and status systems, the institutional organization, the system of values, and the array of tastes and aspirations. Traditional arrangements in such areas do not merely disintegrate or fade away before the imputed onslaught of the industrializing process; they may meet industrialization in any or all of the other four ways, with great frequency and with great

vigor. Third, we have no evidence to support a claim that the disruptive response--or for that matter any of the other four--is in some ultimate sense the most important or the most dominant of the five responses. The idea, in itself, of trying to rank them in an order of comparative importance is probably meaningless because of the great variety of the situations in which they occur. But even if we entertain the idea we must note that we have no comparative studies of the five responses. Indeed, scholars are so ill cognizant of the rejective, disjunctive, assimilative, and supportive responses that they have not even singled them out for individual study.

Enough has been said, I trust, to belie the conventional idea of industrialization which is so deeply embedded in both scholarly and lay thought. The idea that industrialization is a massive force which proceeds relentlessly to undercut the pillars of the traditional order into which it is introduced is false. The blithe way in which the idea has been taken for granted by scholars and the tenacity with which they cling to it tell a great deal about peculiarities of scholarly thought but nothing reliable about the empirical world onto which the idea is projected. The idea, it may be mentioned in passing, seems to have originated in the colorful and largely inaccurate depictions of the Industrial Revolution in England; and to have subsequently taken root largely because of involvement in the political and social agitation of the 19th century. Whatever may have been its history, the idea has become fixed in sociological lore. Yet, despite its axiom-like status the idea turns out to be untrue when matched against empirical reality.³

This is a strong and emphatic condemnation of a widely believed perspective and of so-called "scholars" who continue to recite it without subjecting its assumptions to empirical study. In its place, Blumer urges we make a more

³Blumer, "Industrialization and the Traditional Order," op. cit., pp. 136-37.

careful study of the ways in which non-Western cultures selectively pick and choose which aspects of "industrialization" they want. A sociological analysis of "industrialization" must include the historical awareness that the world's largest nation has, as governmental ideology, the belief that the Western political organization associated with the development of machine technology is an exploitative organization. We know that China will be an industrial power quite soon, already they have the means to use atomic warheads. However, we know almost nothing about the social organization of the Chinese people. Their reaction to Western influence has been selective. The goal of possessing large scale heavy industry is clearly accepted but mostly everything else associated with Western industrialization has been rejected. The sociological literature on Chinese social organization is non-existent.

Goddard opens a critique of the distinction between primitive and modern by saying:

We have the idea in sociology that precise, clearcut distinctions can be made between primitive and modern societies. The most common assumption is that, in contrast to modern societies and the intermediate stages thought of as leading up to them, primitive societies possess simple, undifferentiated social structures that are ordered solely in accordance with principles of kinship. Not all societies conventionally designated as primitive are thought to meet this criterion, but at least some are supposed to do so. In these cases the social structure is "compactly" contained in the kinship system; relationships of consanguinity,

affinity and alliance effectively establish and exhaust social relationships.⁴

He goes on to elaborate the supposed differences between "traditional" and "modern" societies and says it is not surprising that the image of the truly primitive is nearly always linked to an evolutionary emphasis since social differentiation is thought of as starting from a simple undifferentiated level. Since the society has a simple institutional development internal sources of change are infrequent and change, if it is to occur, must come from the outside. The stronger the outside the greater the rate of change, i.e., the more communications, the more foreign aid, the greater the Western influence, etc., the more modern a "pre-industrial" society will become.

Talcott Parsons' evolutionary position, as reflected in his article "Evolutionary Universals in Society,"⁵ is used by Goddard to illustrate his argument. Parsons presents an evolutionary view of how the primitive society changes. "The evolutionary origin of social organization seems to be kinship."⁶ "The key to the evolutionary importance of

⁴David Goddard, "The Concept of Primitive Society," Social Research, 32 (Autumn 1965), pp. 256-76. Quote from p. 256.

⁵Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American Sociological Review, 29 (June, 1964), pp. 339-57.

⁶Ibid., p. 341.

stratification lies in the role in primitive societies of ascription of social status to criteria of biological relatedness. The kinship nexus of social organization is intrinsically a 'seamless web' of relationships which, in and of itself, contains no principle of boundedness for the system as distinguished from certain subgroups within it."⁷ That is, kinship, or ascription, is a "seamless web" it contains no rule or principle for distinguishing subsections, or making a "seam," within the group of biologically related people. In other words, the basis for social organization within the "primitive" society is kinship and kinship is an ascriptive principle which cannot be used to internally differentiate the group. Thus stratification is a "breaking out" of this lower evolutionary stage and that is why it is theoretically important.

Social stratification in its united development may thus be regarded as one primary condition of releasing the process of social evolution from the obstacles posed by the strong emphasis on kinship in much of the sociological literature on stratification tends to obscure the fact the new mobility made possible by stratification is due primarily to such breaks in kinship ascription as that across class lines.⁸

Kinship groupings become differentiated on the basis of prestige and this differentiation leads to a tendency toward vertical differentiation of the society. This tendency

⁷Ibid., p. 342.

⁸Ibid., p. 344.

is sufficiently strong to override the "pressure of the seamless web of kinship to equalize the status of all units of equivalent kinship character. Relative prestige differences give a differential access to economic advantage and political power. A system of "cultural legitimation" simultaneously to legitimize the social inequality. The undifferentiated "we" of the collectivity becomes a culturally sanctioned division into an "us" and "them." Goddard says:

What Bellah and Parsons are attempting is the identification of an original transition: from the rigid and massively reified social structures of the authentically primitive to an "open" form of social organization, a paradigmatic break from the "closed" to the "open" society.

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My purpose is to examine the distinction between "primitive" and "archaic" society, and to try to determine whether any sense can be given to it in the light of the available evidence. The first part of the discussion consists in asking whether a truly primitive society, or something approaching it, is anywhere to be found in reality, either among existing societies conventionally designated as primitive, or in the shape of valid inferences from archaeological or prehistoric evidence.⁹

Goddard answers no to this question.

Of this latter possibility, we can say at the outset that we have very slight knowledge of the social organization of Neolithic man, and certainly not enough to reconstruct actual types of social structure and corresponding forms of consciousness.

⁹Goddard, "The Concept of Primitive Society," op. cit., pp. 258-59.

There may be good a priori grounds for assuming that social structures were simple and undifferentiated, and we might also conclude this from the considerable amount we know of the material culture, but beyond this it is impossible to go. In more recent history the position is much better. A great deal is known of early Western and Middle Eastern societies. But all the evidence points to the existence of quite highly differentiated societies which, despite the universal significance of kinship, appear well past the primitive stage we are attempting to isolate.¹⁰

Even the so-called "primitive" societies of today such as smaller Brazilian tribes might be the descendents of more complex societies. The primitiveness of even the few objectively simple social organizations we know about today can only be insisted on if we make the assumption that their culture has remained relatively unchanged for thousands of years. This is not a plausible assumption. All of us are adult.

Goddard goes on to develop the general argument that meaningful social class differences must be posited in all so-called "primitive" peoples. Goldkind's work in Chan Kom and his critique of Redfield substantiates this.¹¹

Corollary to this, and due to the same over-emphasis on kinship, is an ignorance of the existence of voluntary associations. The size and frequency of voluntary associations in "primitive" societies is neither mapped nor understood. We know such societies exist but studies of their

¹⁰Ibid., p. 259.

¹¹Goldkind, op. cit.

functioning and importance are non-existent. We cannot assume kinship is equivalent to social structure or that it forms the basis of it.

Goddard concludes that no "real" differences between "traditional" and "modern" can be established and that in the end as Durkheim says, societies are simply different "ways of existing."

Gusfield lists seven fallacies in contemporary social change theory:¹² (1) developing societies have been static societies, (2) traditional culture is a consistent body of norms and values, (3) traditional society is a homogeneous social structure, (4) old traditions are displaced by new changes, (5) traditional and modern forms are always in conflict, (6) tradition and modernity are mutually exclusive systems, and (7) modernizing processes weaken traditions.¹³

¹²Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," American Journal of Sociology, 72 (January, 1967), pp. 351-62.

¹³See also Hilda Kuper, Urbanization and Migration in West Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, p. 4 ff; James Allen Dator, "The 'Protestant Ethic' in Japan," The Journal of Developing Areas, 1 (October, 1966), pp. 23-40; Hideo Kishimoto, "Modernization versus Westernization in the East," Journal of World History, 7 (April, 1963), pp. 871-74; P. C. Lloyd, "The Yoruba Town Today," Sociological Review, 7 (July, 1959), pp. 45-63; Gideon Sjoberg, "Folk and 'Feudal' Societies," reprint from The American Journal of Sociology, 58 (November, 1952), pp. 231-39; William Bascom, "Urbanism as a Traditional African Pattern," Sociological Review, 7 (July, 1959), pp. 29-42; W.

Scattered evidence, mostly from India, is used to support his list of fallacies. Again these issues cannot be definitively proved since they are as much perspective as assertion of fact. Rather Gusfield's work is a "gut" indictment by one person who accumulated enough evidence in a country he was familiar with to reject conventional assumptions and suggest that theoretical alternatives can be built around their denial.

Tilly begins a monumental study of over 4000 incidents of French urban violence between 1830 and 1860 by stating the conventional view of social change, i.e., urbanization, as a destructive force.

Why and how does urbanization affect collective violence? Sociologists have some well-fixed ideas on the subject. After stressing the disruptive personal effects of migration and the "frictions" produced by the rubbing together of urban and pre-urban value systems in expanding cities, Philip Hauser tells us that:

Another group of serious problems created or augmented by rapid rates of urbanization are those of internal disorder, political unrest, and governmental instability fed by mass misery and frustration in the urban setting. The facts that the differences between the "have" and "have not" nations, and between the "have" and "have not" peoples within nations, have become

Penn Handwerker, "Some Aspects of Household Organization: Organization among Urban Bassa," Eugene: University of Oregon, Department of Anthropology, 1969; and Robert E. Baldwin, Economic Development and Growth, New York: Wiley, 1966, pp. 112 ff. These references provide additional evidence for Gusfield's views apart from other sources cited in the body of the text.

"felt differences", and that we are experiencing a "revolution in expectations", have given huge urban population agglomerations an especially incendiary and explosive character.

In Hauser's view, the breaking of traditional bonds and the conflict of values feed disorder, while the swelling city's combination of misery and heightened hopes nearly guarantees it. Change produces tension, tension breaks out in collective explosions, and a form of action more frenzied than that of stable, developed countries erupts into life.

Hauser's analysis, I believe, sums up the predominant sociological position. Seen from the outside, the set of ideas looks solid and chinkless. Unpeeled, it reveals gaps and tangles.

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Turn this set of ideas over. On the other side is stamped a complementary set: that there is a sharp disjunction between healthy and pathological social states, between the normal and the abnormal, between order and disorder, which justifies treating different specimens of disapproved collective behavior as manifestations of the same general phenomenon--"deviance". The responses which other people give to the disapproved behavior win another general label--"social control".

Collective violence almost automatically receives both the complementary treatments. It is easy to treat it as the final expression of a fundamental pathology which also shows up as a crime, delinquency, family instability or mental illness. It is even easier to treat it as radically discontinuous from orderly political life.¹⁴

¹⁴Charles Tilly, "A Travers Le Chaos Des Vivantes Cités," a paper presented to the Sixth World Congress of Sociology Evian-les-Bains, September 1966, to appear in Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, April, 1968, pp. 2-3. Also, Charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in Nineteenth Century French Cities," revised version of a Public Lecture delivered at Reed College, February, 1968.

After this he cites five reasons for not believing in these ideas.

The work of his group on the properties of individuals known to be involved in urban violence and the social characteristics they represent supports the following assertions:

But the second thoughts on the nature of collective violence we encountered earlier suggests some different predictions: a weak connection of political disturbances with crime, misery or personal disorder, a corresponding rarity of the criminal, miserable or deranged in their ranks, a strong connection with more peaceful forms of political contention, a significant continuity and internal order to collective violence where it does occur, a long lag between urban growth and collective outbursts due to the time required for socialization and formation of a common consciousness on the part of the newcomers, a tendency for disturbances to cluster where there is a conflict between the principal holders of power in a locality and more or less organized groups moving into or out of a modus vivendi with those holders of power, a marked variation of the form of the disturbance with the social organization of its setting.¹⁵

The continuing empirical study by Tilly and his colleagues is another example of a different theoretical perspective being developed in reaction to older perspectives which were not well founded. Tilly actually found an inverse correlation between rapid urban growth and political violence.

¹⁵Tilly, "A Travers Le Chaos Des Vivantes Cités," op. cit., p. 11.

Nettl and Robertson¹⁶ first describe the conventional view using Parsons' pattern variables. Next they criticize it for its abstractness and inability to account for any actual events. They criticize both "industrialization" and "modernization." About "modernization" they say:

In both sociology and political science one can further isolate three major deficiencies in the use of such terms as modernization and modernity. First, as previously implied, the major problem is that of confusion and vagueness. Second, normative statements frequently assume prominence in discussions in this sphere. The most obvious tendency to note at this point is the frequent suggestion--sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit--that the typical condition of modernity pertains to the social, political and economic characteristics of Western liberal democracies. Third, in close proximity to this tendency, is the suggestion that modernity represents a single, final state of affairs, namely 'the state of affairs' to be found in a number of Western societies.

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The structural differentiation model, as it stands at present, is limited in respect to the societies to which it can be fruitfully applied. In the use of the theory of structural differentiation in the conventional manner we find one of the main reasons for the equation of modernity with Western liberal democracies. The idea of structural differentiation owes much in its evolution to the economic concept of the division of labour in capitalist or neo-capitalist societies. In fact, culture-boundedness in conceptualization and economic tendencies are both prominent features of the intellectual uses to which structural differentiation has been put.¹⁷

¹⁶J. P. Nettel and Roland Robertson, "Industrialization, Development or Modernization," British Journal of Sociology, 17 (September, 1966), pp. 274-91.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 281-82.

Sheth's Oriental factory study¹⁸ recapitulates several major lines of argument of this thesis. He criticizes the conventional view as it occurs in the works of Parsons, Hoselitz, Moore and Kerr et al.,¹⁹ and points out how these conceptions are shown to be empirically inadequate "in the light of intensive sociological studies of industrialization in different parts of the world." His concluding paragraphs summarize his empirical study.

What, then, is the nature of relationships in an Indian factory such as Oriental? Are they the type of relationships supposed to be characteristic of a rationalistic, industrial society? Or are they the type of relationships allegedly found in the traditionalistic, non-industrial society? They are predominantly neither, and partly both. In one sense the factory is an ordinary factory and could compare with a similar factory anywhere else. In another sense, it incorporated the features and values of Indian society and thus was unique to the social world within which it operated. In a third sense, it imbibed the norms and values of informal groups and in this respect, again, I believe it had much in common with industrial organizations elsewhere. The overall picture that emerges is of an inter-mixture of traditionalistic and rationalistic norms--particularism alongside universalism, ascription flanked by achievement, and so on. What, in this

¹⁸N. R. Sheth, The Social Framework of an Indian Factory, North Manchester, Indiana: University Press, 1968.

¹⁹Sheth specifically mentions Bert F. Hoselitz and W. E. Moore (eds.), Industrialization and Society Proceedings of UNESCO Conference on Social Implications of Industrialization and Technical Change, 1963. Moore's books Industrialization and Labor and Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas which are discussed in Chapter Three of this dissertation and Clark Kerr et al., Industrialization and Industrial Man, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

event, is the validity of the argument that the values of a pre-industrial society are incompatible with those of the industrial society? In Oriental, one finds a coexistence of the two sets of values and neither seems to hinder the operation of the other.²⁰

Goode, in his book World Revolution and Family Patterns, gives a general critique of both "urbanization" and "industrialization."²¹ Both contain so many diverse meanings that neither is really useful. The former is probably subsumed under the latter, or at least, increasing concentration of population implies some change in technology. But beyond this he says it is probably impossible to tell the variables apart. He makes the philosophical point that each concept contains so many variables that they are their own cause and effect, hence, really cannot be used to explain very much.

Weinberg also makes general theoretical critique of the conventional view especially about its assumption that industrial societies, and hence all societies, will tend to converge towards generally similar social structures. He writes:

The concept of convergence has become often inextricably connected with modernization theory, which in its turn, uses an evolutionary-functional

²⁰Sheth, The Social Framework of an Indian Factory, op. cit., pp. 202-203.

²¹William J. Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963, pp. 168 ff.

model, associated with Parsons, Moore, Smelser, Levy and Eisenstadt. Modernization is defined as the use of inanimate resources for the multiplication of human effort, with manifold consequences for structural arrangements in an inter-dependent social system. Societies evolve from small-scale, traditional, kin-oriented and relatively undifferentiated units towards large-scale industrial societies with a high degree of differentiation of organizations and roles. Traditional systems of action, such as the family, contract their scope, and industrial systems, such as the market, extend theirs. The use of inanimate resources "constrains," in Moore's terminology, the interdependent elements of the social system to adapt to industrialism. A common terminus is often denied, even though industrial societies are "teleonomic" because deliberate change is a shared feature, and because societies solve their perennial problems, whether related to industrialism or not, in different ways. The objections to this approach become objections to convergence as such, and they are: . . .²²

His objections are that (1) there is often an uncritical acceptance of evolutionary theory by functionalists as a solution to the problem of social change, (2) the interdependence of social systems is exaggerated, (3) social change of any significance which is unconnected to industrialization is not recognized, (4) social change is portrayed in a mechanistic, teleological sense since it is maintained the "traditional" order must inevitably be changed toward a "modern" industrial economy, like the United States, and (5) these views emphasize the psychological and

²²Ian Weinberg, "The Problem of the Convergence of Industrial Societies: A Critical Look at the State of a Theory," Comparative Studies in Society and History, forthcoming, p. 10.

social-psychological postulates of similarities between personality structures in industrial societies and emphasize the need for similar personalities in non-industrial societies to the detriment of understanding social structure.

Weinberg goes on to point out that little empirical evidence has actually been collected to substantiate the conventional view. He ends by concluding that the concept should not be discarded all together, rather, if we actually make empirical studies without over-emphasizing evolutionary assumptions, then we should probably find limited cases of convergence.

A substantial body of evidence is developing to show that kinship ties, i.e., an ascriptive emphasis, provide important mechanisms through which economic development operates at an individual level. This evidence is in marked contrast to conventional emphases that existing kinship patterns must/will be disrupted by outside influences.

Isaac, with his own data and other literature to substantiate him, writes that kinship ties are not nearly as inimical to economic growth and development as many scholars have assumed them to be.

A common-sensical explanation--and, indeed, one encountered frequently in the professional literature--of why more indigenous populations do not follow the lead of the strangers who trade among them is that indigenous peoples are caught in a local web of kinship that stifles innovation and enterprise. This line of reasoning has come under severe attack in recent years. Jones (1969: 266-27)

concludes:

The field studies [in Keyna, southern Nigeria, and Sierra Leone] revealed few if any signs of impairment of the function of the marketing system because of familial ties.... none of the studies reported the kinds of problems referred to by...others that prevent the African trader from controlling his enterprise and employing his earnings as he sees fit. The explanation may be that traders who are so bedevilled by their kinsmen do not remain solvent for long and are not likely to make up a very large proportion of the traders who are active in the market at any one time. Perhaps so, but none of the studies show what may be regarded as unusually high turnover of trading businesses. Whatever the reasons, the important fact is that a great many Africans are able to carry on successful trading businesses, however persistent the claims of kinsmen may be. Furthermore, there is a general evidence of family cooperation in trade whether in the form of advancing funds or in the acceptance of kinsmen as partners and employees.

In a similar vein, I have pointed out in Chapter IV of this dissertation and elsewhere that the kinsmen of Pendembu's entrepreneurs frequently make positive contributions toward initial capital accumulation and toward sustaining an established business. This is true even in the case of many of the entrepreneurs belonging to the minority tribes, because many of them have resided in the community long enough to have become involved in local kinship networks--although in most cases, not to the extent that the majority of the residents are involved in similar networks. I have also stressed that relatively few business failures in Pendembu could be attributed to the entrepreneurs having consumed their capital to meet kinship obligations. Furthermore, the lack of an aggressive and expansive policy on the part of most of Pendembu's entrepreneurs cannot be laid to drains imposed by their kinsmen. I have attempted to demonstrate that low initial capital inputs, low consumer incomes, and a low level of business aspirations are more important factors in

keeping businesses small than are drains by kinsmen.²³

Benedict¹ reviews a wide range of literature and ends by stressing the importance of the family firm in economic development. The social roles involved are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily conflicting.

Andre Frank's article,²⁵ "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology," is an early attack upon conservative political biases of the conventional view. The literature of "radical sociology" has increased greatly in the three years since its publication and been broadened into an attack upon sociology as an entire profession.²⁶ However, the points Frank makes about the conventional view's treatment of economic development have not been superseded. Frank identifies three inter-related modes of thinking about social change: The first is the ideal type

²³Berry LaMont Isaac, "Traders in Pendembu, Sierra Leone: A Case Study in Entrepreneurship," unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Oregon, 1969, pp. 213-15.

²⁴Burton Benedict, "Family Firms and Economic Development," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 24 (Spring, 1968).

²⁵Andre Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology," in John Hillman (ed.), Catalyst, 3 (Summer 1967), pp. 20-73.

²⁶Martin Nicolaus's speech on "Fat-Cat Sociology," to the American Sociological Association Meetings, Boston, September 1968, is a case in point.

approach as typified by Hoselitz's use of the pattern variables, and stages as typified by Rostow. The second is the diffusionist approach and the third is the psychological approach as exemplified by McClelland. Each of these is examined for its empirical adequacy, theoretical adequacy and policy effectiveness. Of them, Frank concludes:

Having examined the three modes of approach to and analysis of the problems of economic development and cultural change separately, we can briefly evaluate them conjointly. What first forces itself into view is the wide and deep similarity in the extent of the three modes' empirical inaccuracy, theoretical inadequacy, and ineffectiveness of policy. Yet this similarity should not surprise us. It is no more than the reflection of their fundamental similarity in points of departure, both ideologically and analytically. Thus, the first mode is ideal-typical in that it sets up the supposedly typical characteristics of development. The second mode concerns itself with how these typical characteristics of the first mode are supposedly diffused from the developed countries to the underdeveloped ones. Finally, the third mode, and herein lies its pioneering service, tells us how the typical characteristics that are identified in the first and diffused according to the second mode are to be acculturated by the underdeveloped countries if they wish to develop. This, in a nutshell, is the sum total of this received theory and analysis of economic development and cultural change.

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The direction in which to look for an alternative theory of economic development and change that is more adequate for the underdeveloped countries is suggested by the common shortcomings of the three-part approach of received theory reviewed here. Firstly, where this approach is empirically wrong about the past and present reality of the underdeveloped part of the world, the developed part of the world, and the world as a whole; an adequate alternative theory will have to come to terms with

the history and contemporary reality of development and underdevelopment. Secondly, where the approach is theoretically inadequate because it cannot identify the determinant social whole, because it takes account neither of the history of the underdeveloped part nor of its relations with the developed part, and least of all of the world as a whole, and because it does not conform to the structure of that world's social system; an alternative theory must reflect the structure and development of the system which has given rise to, now maintains, and still increases both structural development and structural underdevelopment as simultaneous and mutually produced manifestations of the same historical process. Thirdly, where the development policy of this approach is ever more politically conservative and counsels accepting the structural status quo with folded hands while waiting for others' gifts with open hands, an alternative policy for economic development and cultural change will have to be politically ever more revolutionary and help the peoples of the underdeveloped countries to take the destruction of this structure and the development of another system, into their own hands. If the developed countries cannot diffuse development, development theory, or development policy to the underdeveloped countries, then the people of these countries will have to develop them by themselves. These three modes of approach are the emperor's clothes, which have served to hide his naked imperialism. Rather than fashioning the emperor a new suit, these people will have to dethrone him and clothe themselves.²⁷

In summary the issues raised in this dissertation go beyond the ability of any one graduate student to encompass in a concluding chapter. It is far more difficult to criticize an existing perspective than suggest a systematic replacement. Besides a perspective, a paradigm generally

²⁷Frank, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology," *op. cit.*, pp. 71-73.

results from the work of many men over a long period of time.²⁸

The critics this dissertation has cited do not provide an alternative theory capable of any sort of prediction for the probable reason that no such theory is possible. For example, we have no systematic theory examining urban differences in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Differences between the continents are not typically considered in theories of rural change. We are nowhere near a general theory of social change strong enough to account for urban growth, labor migration and political activity simultaneously. American sociology has no literature to speak of on or from third world socialist countries. This lack includes a shameful lack of knowledge about the world's largest country, China. Nor does any literature describe or explain how Vietnamese peasants can build a political movement which incurred two million known war dead and sustain it in the face of the terror and firepower of the world's most powerful military force. Thus, not only do we lack adequate theories, but we have no information about many relevant phenomena.

The rate at which theoretical cliches change is also

²⁸The above critiques do not include critiques by Douglas R. Pullman, "Social Change in Economic Development Theory," The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 3 (February, 1966), pp. 9-22, and Rhodes, op. cit.

reflective of the absence of any coordinated theories. Attempts to describe what is going on have variously been called "labor commitment," "industrialization," "modernization," "development" and "developmental change." Concomitantly, countries which used to be called "colonial possession" or "underdeveloped" are now called "pre-industrial," "less-developed," "modernizing," and "developing." The optimism of such concepts is itself a bias since the economic development of non-industrial countries is an empirical condition, not a theoretical assumption. Good evidence exists that economic development is not progressing very rapidly if it is progressing at all.

A growing literature exists on imperialism.²⁹ It has arisen recently and continues to grow rapidly. Tendencies to rhetoric aside, it is the only integrated theory of economic development that has attracted widespread belief. As Frank's comments indicate it is even more harsh on the conventional view than other critics. Proponents of the

²⁹For example see A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967; Peter Worsley, The Third World, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964; Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969; Carl Oglesby and Richard Shaull, Containment and Change, New York: MacMillan Co., 1967; Pierre Jabe, The Pillage of the Third World, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968; and Gabriel Kalko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

conventional view tend to ignore imperialism as a theory instead of debating its merits. This is a silence which will probably become uncomfortable.

Predicting futures is always difficult. However, enough criticism of the conventional view has been made to see several directions. An empirical sorting out seems to be underway. That is, over time we find a better specification of the conditions under which the conventional view holds and those conditions where it does not hold. For example, it is probably the case that kinship ties may retard or aid capital accumulation. We have examples of each possibility. The problem now is to understand the conditions under which these possibilities occur and then seek an explanation for these conditions. Achievement and ascription may be used as another example. As properties of social structure they vary by geographical areas depending on local historical and cultural conditions. This is an empirical question. We cannot continue to assume that achievement characterizes industrial countries and ascription characterizes non-industrial countries since real doubt exists that this commonly asserted assumption is in fact true. Rather, we have to empirically determine what is emphasized in what circumstances. Then an explanation can

be found for these circumstances.³⁰ No short cuts exist. A balance between induction and deduction has to be maintained. When it does not exist the quality of knowledge deteriorates. An empirical sorting out on key theoretical issues is now necessary since the theorists responsible for the conventional view were not good enough at theory building to account for the existence of real events.

A close interdependence between "parts" of society should not be over-stressed, especially technology. Only a small number of people have access to any one portion of scientific or technological knowledge. The rest of the population may maintain unusual ideas about that knowledge. We lack accurate measurements of how fast different parts of society actually change in relation to each other. The evidence on family patterns and "industrialization," as reviewed in Chapter Two, implies that family patterns to a noticeable degree, are independent of technological levels within the society. Religious beliefs also change quite slowly and the change appears to be more related to the number and kinds of people who believe them, rather than a change in the content of the belief. It is true that all society is inter-related. However, we have enough empirical

³⁰Examples of what this writer means are the work of M. G. Smith and Sahlins, cited earlier in the dissertation.

evidence to doubt that changes in one sector are quickly responded to by changes in another. Nor do we have an accurate understanding of ranges of disagreement on specific issues. To what degree do the ranges of opinion expressed by rubber workers on the questions asked them correspond to ranges we would get if we sampled from industrial populations? Not only do parts of a society have a measure of independence from each other but within parts there may be variations also. Achievement and ascription are differentially emphasized for different social groups within the same society, regardless of what the general orientation of that society is. For example, it is probably the case that women everywhere are trained to have less of an achievement orientation in general.

Concomitant with the above is the need to get outside of the United States if anything more than a sociology of America is going to be built by American sociologists. In a country of two hundred million people there are only a handful of sociologists to begin with and of these few only a thumbnail's worth go overseas. This writer assumes we realize that an adequate knowledge of social structure presupposes knowledge about other societies. A closer cooperation is required with both foreign scholars and alien disciplines such as anthropology. A course in comparative sociology should be required of graduate students. Only

until we build an awareness of other possibilities will we have a decent knowledge of our own society. This awareness must be accompanied by a cleansing of cultural chauvinism that permeates the conventional view's descriptions of "traditional" and "modern." It must also be accompanied by a better understanding of international relations and what it means to be an American in a poor country. Until we have a desire to collect hard-to-get information, and an awareness of our own social position, we are not going to get much beyond an "air-conditioned" sociology.

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APPENDIX

This Appendix presents forty-two cross tabulations. The row variables, 1, 2, 4, 7, 20 and 23, are variables typically taken as representing "modernization," "industrialization" and "urbanization." The column variables are described in Chapter Five and presumably tap achievement emphases.

Modernization Variables

1. Education

- | | |
|---------------|--------------------------------|
| 0. no english | 5. grade 9 |
| 1. grade 1-2 | 6. grade 10-11 |
| 2. grade 3-4 | 7. grade 12 |
| 3. grade 5-6 | 8. vocational training, uncom. |
| 4. grade 7-8 | 9. vocational training, compl. |

2. Pay rate by hour

- | | |
|----------------|--------------------|
| 0. 0-8 cents | 5. 29-33 cents |
| 1. 9-14 cents | 6. 34-43 cents |
| 2. 15-20 cents | 7. 44-48 cents |
| 3. 21-25 cents | 8. 49-58 cents |
| 4. 26-28 cents | 9. 59 cents and up |

4. How long, how many years in all, you work for company business?

- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0. less than one year | 6. 6 years |
| 1. 1 year | 7. 7 years |
| 2. 2 years | 8. 8 years |
| 3. 3 years | 9. 9 years |
| 4. 4 years | X. 10 to 15 years |
| 5. 5 years | Y. more than 15 years |

7. Seibel's wage-labor index originally had a range of 0 to 42, but for purposes of analysis it has been collapsed into five categories with as close an approximation to equal row marginals as possible. Presumably, the higher the score the higher the commitment to wage-labor.
20. You be countryman, half-half, or kwi?
0. I am country man
 1. half-half
 2. I am kwi man
23. You work or live in Monrovia?
- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| 0. never see | 5. four years |
| 1. visited | 6. five years |
| 2. one year or less | 7. six years |
| 3. two years | 8. seven years |
| 4. three years | 9. eight years or more |

Achievement Variables

34. Two men, both do same work. One man older, plenty family. Other man young no got family, no got children. Both work for you, for same work, how you pay. You give older man, younger man more or both same?
0. older man get more
 1. younger man get more
 2. both get same
36. Two men. Who should we respect more? One man town chief he work plenty hard other man clan chief, but he lazy. Who should we respect more?
0. lazy clan chief
 1. strong town chief
 2. both

37. Man with small money got two sons, both want money for school business. Big son is dull, but small son is plenty clever. Who should man give money to?
0. older boy who dull
 1. small boy who clever
 2. both
38. If you got small money and both your best friend and a family man want money for same business, who you give money to?
0. family man
 1. friend
 2. both
52. Two men. Who should we have more respect for, one man he clan chief work plenty hard, other man he town chief but he lazy man.
0. hard working clan chief
 1. lazy town chief
 2. both
56. You got small money and both your best friend and a family man come to you need money, friend he work plenty hard family man he too much lazy. Who you give money to?
0. lazy family man
 1. strong friend
 2. both
67. Man with small money got boy and girl. Both want money for school business, girl plenty smart, boy he not clever. Who man give money to, smart girl or dumb boy?
0. dumb boy
 1. smart girl
 2. both

TABLE 31. EDUCATION BY AGE-PERFORMANCE

	Count	Var 34			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 1	0	265	90	454	809
		32.8	11.1	56.1	62.2
		59.0	72.6	62.4	
	1	33	11	52	96
		34.4	11.5	54.2	7.4
		7.3	8.9	7.1	
	2	36	13	62	111
		32.4	11.7	55.9	8.5
		8.0	10.5	8.5	
	3	61	4	70	135
		45.2	3.0	51.9	10.4
		13.6	3.2	9.6	
	4	27	4	38	69
		39.1	5.8	55.1	5.3
		6.0	3.2	5.2	
	5	10	1	23	34
		29.4	2.9	67.6	2.6
		2.2	0.8	3.2	
	6	9	1	10	20
		45.0	5.0	50.0	1.5
		2.0	0.8	1.4	
	7	5	0	15	20
		25.0	0.0	75.0	1.5
		1.1	0.0	2.1	
	8	0	0	3	3
		0.0	0.0	100.0	0.2
		0.0	0.0	0.4	
	9	3	0	1	4
		75.0	0.0	25.0	0.3
		0.7	0.0	0.1	
Column Total		449	124	728	1301
		34.5	9.5	56.0	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 29.30835 with 18 Df Significance = 0.044.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent.
= .00 with Var 34 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.01. Significance = 0.178.

Gamma = -.03.

TABLE 32. EDUCATION BY POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count	Row Pct	Var 36			Row Total
			0	1	2	
	Col Pct					
Var 1	0	112	589	105	806	
		13.9	73.1	13.0	62.2	
		65.1	60.9	67.3		
	1	13	71	13	97	
		13.4	73.2	13.4	7.5	
		7.6	7.3	8.3		
	2	12	85	14	111	
		10.8	76.6	12.6	8.6	
		7.0	8.8	9.0		
	3	12	106	14	132	
		9.1	80.3	10.6	10.2	
		7.0	11.0	9.0		
	4	10	58	3	71	
		14.1	81.7	4.2	5.5	
		5.8	6.0	1.9		
	5	6	24	2	32	
		18.8	75.0	6.2	2.5	
		3.5	2.5	1.3		
6	4	15	1	20		
	20.0	75.0	5.0	1.5		
	2.3	1.6	0.6			
7	2	14	3	19		
	10.5	73.7	15.8	1.5		
	1.2	1.4	1.9			
8	0	3	0	3		
	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.2		
	0.0	0.3	0.0			
9	1	2	1	4		
	25.0	50.0	25.0	0.3		
	0.6	0.2	0.6			
Column Total	172	967	156	1295		
	13.3	74.7	12.0	100.0		

Raw Chi Square = 14.32370 with 18 Df Significance = 0.707.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent.
= .00 with Var 36 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.01. Significance = 0.175.

Gamma = -.03.

TABLE 33. EDUCATION BY AGE-FAMILY

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 37			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 1	0	30 3.6 69.8	560 68.0 62.8	234 28.4 61.3	824 62.6
	1	4 4.1 9.3	56 57.7 6.3	37 38.1 9.7	97 7.4
	2	3 2.7 7.0	70 63.6 7.8	37 33.6 9.7	110 8.4
	3	3 2.2 7.0	98 72.6 11.0	34 25.2 8.9	135 10.3
	4	2 2.8 4.7	47 66.2 5.3	22 31.0 5.8	71 5.4
	5	0 0.0 0.0	25 73.5 2.8	9 26.5 2.4	34 2.6
	6	1 5.0 2.3	18 90.0 2.0	1 5.0 0.3	20 1.5
	7	0 0.0 0.0	12 63.2 1.3	7 36.8 1.8	19 1.4
	8	0 0.0 0.0	2 66.7 0.2	1 33.3 0.3	3 0.2
	9	0 0.0 0.0	4 100.0 0.4	0 0.0 0.0	4 0.3
Column Total		43 3.3	892 67.7	382 29.0	1317 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 17.94028 with 18 Df Significance = 0.459.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent.
= .00 with Var 37 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .00. Significance = 0.330.

Gamma = .01.

TABLE 34. EDUCATION BY FRIEND-FAMILY

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 38			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 1	0	302	194	313	809
		37.3	24.0	38.7	62.9
		65.2	59.0	63.4	
	1	32	27	33	92
		34.8	29.3	35.9	7.2
		6.9	8.2	6.7	
	2	36	27	43	106
		34.0	25.5	40.6	8.2
		7.8	8.2	8.7	
	3	45	41	45	131
34.4		31.3	34.4	10.2	
9.7		12.5	9.1		
4	22	18	30	70	
	31.4	25.7	42.9	5.4	
	4.8	5.5	6.1		
5	10	10	13	33	
	30.3	30.3	39.4	2.6	
	2.2	3.0	2.6		
6	9	4	6	19	
	47.4	21.1	31.6	1.5	
	1.9	1.2	1.2		
7	6	7	7	20	
	30.0	35.0	35.0	1.6	
	1.3	2.1	1.4		
8	0	1	2	3	
	0.0	33.3	66.7	0.2	
	0.0	0.3	0.4		
9	1	0	2	3	
	33.3	0.0	66.7	0.2	
	0.2	0.0	0.4		
Column Total	463	329	494	1286	
	36.0	25.6	38.4	100.0	

Raw Chi Square = 11.06277 with 18 Df Significance = 0.891.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent.
= .00 with Var 38 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .01. Significance = 0.200.

Gamma = .02.

TABLE 35. EDUCATION BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 52			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 1	0	363	31	48	442
		82.1	7.0	10.9	57.6
		56.5	66.0	61.5	
	1	47	2	5	54
		87.0	3.7	9.3	7.0
		7.3	4.3	6.4	
	2	62	5	8	75
		82.7	6.7	10.7	9.8
		9.6	10.6	10.3	
	3	78	4	7	89
		87.6	4.5	7.9	11.6
		12.1	8.5	9.0	
	4	38	3	4	45
		84.4	6.7	8.9	5.9
		5.9	6.4	5.1	
	5	19	1	4	24
		79.2	4.2	16.7	3.1
		3.0	2.1	5.1	
6	18	0	0	18	
	100.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	
	2.8	0.0	0.0		
7	14	1	0	15	
	93.3	6.7	0.0	2.0	
	2.2	2.1	0.0		
8	2	0	1	3	
	66.7	0.0	33.3	0.4	
	0.3	0.0	1.3		
9	2	0	1	3	
	66.7	0.0	33.3	0.4	
	0.3	0.0	1.3		
Column Total		643	47	78	768
		83.7	6.1	10.2	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 12.88013 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.798.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent.
= .00 with Var 52 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.04. Significance = 0.031.

Gamma = -.10.

TABLE 36. EDUCATION BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 56			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 1	0	80	125	45	250
		32.0	50.0	18.0	65.4
		73.4	63.1	60.0	
	1	4	13	7	24
		16.7	54.2	29.2	6.3
		3.7	6.6	9.3	
	2	9	23	8	40
		22.5	57.5	20.0	10.5
8.3		11.6	10.7		
3	5	16	6	27	
	18.5	59.3	22.2	7.1	
	4.6	8.1	8.0		
4	7	8	4	19	
	36.8	42.1	21.1	5.0	
	6.4	4.0	5.3		
5	1	2	2	5	
	20.0	40.0	40.0	1.3	
	0.9	1.0	2.7		
6	1	5	0	6	
	16.7	83.3	0.0	1.6	
	0.9	2.5	0.0		
7	2	6	3	11	
	18.2	54.5	27.3	2.9	
	1.8	3.0	4.0		
Column Total		109	198	75	382
		28.5	51.8	19.6	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 11.48812 with 14 Df. Significance = 0.647.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent.
= .00 with Var 56 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .08. Significance = 0.007.

Gamma = .14.

TABLE 37. EDUCATION BY SEX-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 67			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 1	0	33 13.1 68.8	132 52.4 65.3	87 34.5 64.9	252 65.6
	1	1 4.3 2.1	11 47.8 5.4	11 47.8 8.2	23 6.0
	2	2 5.0 4.2	24 60.0 11.9	14 35.0 10.4	40 10.4
	3	6 20.0 12.5	16 53.3 7.9	8 26.7 6.0	30 7.8
	4	2 11.1 4.2	10 55.6 5.0	6 33.3 4.5	18 4.7
	5	1 25.0 2.1	0 0.0 0.0	3 75.0 2.2	4 1.0
	6	1 16.7 2.1	5 83.3 2.5	0 0.0 0.0	6 1.6
	7	2 20.0 4.2	4 40.0 2.0	4 40.0 3.0	10 2.6
	9	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	1 100.0 0.7	1 0.3
Column Total		48 12.5	202 52.6	134 34.9	384 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 17.12407 with 16 Df. Significance = 0.377.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent.
= .02 with Var 67 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .00. Significance = 0.486.

Gamma = .00.

TABLE 38. PAY RATE BY AGE-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 34			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 2	0	293	108	551	952
		30.8	11.3	57.9	73.2
		65.3	87.1	75.7	
	1	81	9	103	193
		42.0	4.7	53.4	14.8
		18.0	7.3	14.1	
	2	36	5	37	78
		46.2	6.4	47.4	6.0
		8.0	4.0	5.1	
	3	13	1	20	34
38.2		2.9	58.8	2.6	
2.9		0.8	2.7		
4	2	0	4	6	
	33.3	0.0	66.7	0.5	
	0.4	0.0	0.5		
5	8	0	7	15	
	53.3	0.0	46.7	1.2	
	1.8	0.0	1.0		
6	12	1	3	16	
	75.0	6.2	18.8	1.2	
	2.7	0.8	0.4		
7	0	0	1	1	
	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.1	
	0.0	0.0	0.1		
8	2	0	0	2	
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	
	0.4	0.0	0.0		
9	2	0	2	4	
	50.0	0.0	50.0	0.3	
	0.4	0.0	0.3		
Column Total		449	124	728	1301
		34.5	9.5	56.0	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 43.41075 with 18 Df Significance = 0.000.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent.
= .02 with Var 34 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.09. Significance = 0.000.

Gamma = -.18.

TABLE 39. PAY RATE BY POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 36			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 2	0	123	705	121	949
		13.0	74.3	12.8	73.3
		71.5	72.9	77.6	
	1	22	153	19	194
		11.3	78.9	9.8	15.0
		12.8	15.8	12.2	
	2	14	53	9	76
		18.4	69.7	11.8	5.9
		8.1	5.5	5.8	
	3	5	26	3	34
		14.7	76.5	8.8	2.6
		2.9	2.7	1.9	
	4	2	3	1	6
		33.3	50.0	16.7	0.5
		1.2	0.3	0.6	
	5	3	8	3	14
		21.4	57.1	21.4	1.1
		1.7	0.8	1.9	
6	3	12	0	15	
	20.0	80.0	0.0	1.2	
	1.7	1.2	0.0		
7	0	1	0	1	
	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.1	
	0.0	0.1	0.0		
8	0	2	0	2	
	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.2	
	0.0	0.2	0.0		
9	0	4	0	4	
	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.3	
	0.0	0.4	0.0		
Column Total		172	967	156	1295
		13.3	74.7	12.0	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 13.88737 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.736.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent.
= .00 with Var 36 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.03. Significance = 0.027.

Gamma = -.08.

TABLE 40. PAY RATE BY AGE-FAMILY

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 37			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 2	0	34 3.5 79.1	654 67.6 73.3	279 28.9 73.0	967 73.4
	1	2 1.0 4.7	135 68.5 15.1	60 30.5 15.7	197 15.0
	2	7 9.2 16.3	52 68.4 5.8	17 22.4 4.5	76 5.8
	3	0 0.0 0.0	25 73.5 2.8	9 26.5 2.4	34 2.6
	4	0 0.0 0.0	2 33.3 0.2	4 66.7 1.0	6 0.5
	5	0 0.0 0.0	9 64.3 1.0	5 35.7 1.3	14 1.1
	6	0 0.0 0.0	9 56.3 1.0	7 43.8 1.8	16 1.2
	7	0 0.0 0.0	1 100.0 0.1	0 0.0 0.0	1 0.1
	8	0 0.0 0.0	2 100.0 0.2	0 0.0 0.0	2 0.2
	9	0 0.0 0.0	3 75.0 0.3	1 25.0 0.3	4 0.3
Column Total		43 3.3	892 67.7	382 29.0	1317 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 22.67651 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.203.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent.
= .00 with Var 37 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .00. Significance = 0.295.

Gamma = .02.

TABLE 41. PAY RATE BY FRIEND-FAMILY

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 38			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 2	0	342 36.3 73.9	242 25.7 73.6	357 37.9 72.3	941 73.2
	1	72 37.5 15.6	46 24.0 14.0	74 38.5 15.0	192 14.9
	2	25 32.9 5.4	22 28.9 6.7	29 38.2 5.9	76 5.9
	3	10 28.6 2.2	13 37.1 4.0	12 34.3 2.4	35 2.7
	4	2 33.3 0.4	1 16.7 0.3	3 50.0 0.6	6 0.5
	5	5 38.5 1.1	3 23.1 0.9	5 38.5 1.0	13 1.0
	6	5 31.3 1.1	1 6.2 0.3	10 62.5 2.0	16 1.2
	7	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	1 100.0 0.2	1 0.1
	8	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	2 100.0 0.4	2 0.2
	9	2 50.0 0.4	1 25.0 0.3	1 25.0 0.2	4 0.3
Column Total		463 36.0	329 25.6	494 38.4	1286 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 14.00406 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.728.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent.
= .00 with Var 38 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .01. Significance = 0.160.

Gamma = .03.

TABLE 42. PAY RATE BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 52			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 2	0	448	39	54	541
		82.8	7.2	10.0	70.4
		69.7	83.0	69.2	
	1	120	5	16	141
		85.1	3.5	11.3	18.4
		18.7	10.6	20.5	
	2	47	2	4	53
		88.7	3.8	7.5	6.9
		7.3	4.3	5.1	
	3	14	1	1	16
	87.5	6.2	6.2	2.1	
	2.2	2.1	1.3		
4	2	0	0	2	
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	
	0.3	0.0	0.0		
5	3	0	1	4	
	75.0	0.0	25.0	0.5	
	0.5	0.0	1.3		
6	5	0	2	7	
	71.4	0.0	28.6	0.9	
	0.8	0.0	2.6		
7	1	0	0	1	
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	
	0.2	0.0	0.0		
9	3	0	0	3	
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	
	0.5	0.0	0.0		
Column Total		643	47	78	768
		83.7	6.1	10.2	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 9.33708 with 16 Df. Significance = 0.898.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent.
= .00 with Var 52 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.03. Significance = 0.089.

Gamma = -.09.

TABLE 43. PAY RATE BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 56			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 2	0	77	123	53	253
		30.4	48.6	20.9	66.2
		70.6	62.1	70.7	
	1	19	52	14	85
		22.4	61.2	16.5	22.3
		17.4	26.3	18.7	
	2	7	11	6	24
		29.2	45.8	25.0	6.3
		6.4	5.6	8.0	
	3	2	5	1	8
		25.0	62.5	12.5	2.1
		1.8	2.5	1.3	
	5	3	1	0	4
		75.0	25.0	0.0	1.0
		2.8	0.5	0.0	
	6	1	3	1	5
		20.0	60.0	20.0	1.3
		0.9	1.5	1.3	
	9	0	3	0	3
		0.0	100.0	0.0	0.8
		0.0	1.5	0.0	
Column Total		109	198	75	382
		28.5	51.8	19.6	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 12.33890 with 12 Df. Significance = 0.418.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent.
= .01 with Var 56 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .00. Significance = 0.400.

Gamma = .01.

TABLE 44. PAY RATE BY SEX-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 67			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 2	0	30 11.7 62.5	134 52.1 66.3	93 36.2 69.4	257 66.9
	1	11 13.1 22.9	47 56.0 23.3	26 31.0 19.4	84 21.9
	2	5 20.0 10.4	13 52.0 6.4	7 28.0 5.2	25 6.5
	3	0 0.0 0.0	3 50.0 1.5	3 50.0 2.2	6 1.6
	5	1 25.0 2.1	2 50.0 1.0	1 25.0 0.7	4 1.0
	6	1 20.0 2.1	1 20.0 0.5	3 60.0 2.2	5 1.3
	9	0 0.0 0.0	2 66.7 1.0	1 33.3 0.7	3 0.8
Column Total		48 12.5	202 52.6	134 34.9	384 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 6.71407 with 12 Df. Significance = 0.875.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent.
= .01 with Var 67 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.03. Significance = 0.132.

Gamma = -.07.

TABLE 45. YEARS WORKED BY AGE-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 34			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	0	17	3	27	47
		36.2	6.4	57.4	3.6
		3.8	2.4	3.7	
	1	20	8	41	69
		29.0	11.6	59.4	5.3
		4.5	6.5	5.6	
	2	32	15	44	91
		35.2	16.5	48.4	7.0
		7.1	12.1	6.0	
	3	35	11	66	112
		31.3	9.8	58.9	8.6
		7.8	8.9	9.1	
	4	34	6	51	91
		37.4	6.6	56.0	7.0
		7.6	4.8	7.0	
	5	42	12	61	115
		36.5	10.4	53.0	8.8
		9.4	9.7	8.4	
	6	30	5	35	70
		42.9	7.1	50.0	5.4
		6.7	4.0	4.8	
	7	29	9	38	76
		38.2	11.8	50.0	5.8
		6.5	7.3	5.2	

TABLE 45 Continued

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 34			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	8	31 36.0 6.9	8 9.3 6.5	47 54.7 6.5	86 6.6
	9	43 36.1 9.6	19 16.0 15.3	57 47.9 7.8	119 9.1
	10	75 37.3 16.7	14 7.0 11.3	112 55.7 15.4	201 15.4
	11	61 27.2 13.6	14 6.2 11.3	149 66.5 20.5	224 17.2
Column Total		449 34.5	124 9.5	728 56.0	1301 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 31.64587 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.083.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 04 dependent.
= .00 with Var 34 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .03. Significance = 0.030.

Gamma = .04.

TABLE 46. YEARS WORKED BY POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 36			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	0	10	34	4	48
		20.8	70.8	8.3	3.7
		5.8	3.5	2.6	
	1	6	51	8	65
		9.2	78.5	12.3	5.0
		3.5	5.3	5.1	
	2	10	69	11	90
		11.1	76.7	12.2	6.9
		5.8	7.1	7.1	
	3	19	84	8	111
		17.1	75.7	7.2	8.6
		11.0	8.7	5.1	
	4	10	68	10	88
		11.4	77.3	11.4	6.8
		5.8	7.0	6.4	
	5	13	90	11	114
		11.4	78.9	9.6	8.8
		7.6	9.3	7.1	
	6	13	48	14	75
		17.3	64.0	18.7	5.8
		7.6	5.0	9.0	
	7	11	55	11	77
		14.3	71.4	14.3	5.9
		6.4	5.7	7.1	

TABLE 46 Continued

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 36			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	8	9	64	13	86
		10.5	74.4	15.1	6.6
		5.2	6.6	8.3	
	9	23	84	14	121
		19.0	69.4	11.6	9.3
		13.4	8.7	9.0	
	10	22	152	24	198
		11.1	76.8	12.1	15.3
		12.8	15.7	15.4	
	11	26	168	28	222
		11.7	75.7	12.6	17.1
		15.1	17.4	17.9	
Column Total		172	967	156	1295
		13.3	74.7	12.0	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 20.14369 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.574.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 04 dependent.
= .00 with Var 36 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .02. Significance = 0.093.

Gamma = .04.

TABLE 47. YEARS WORKED BY AGE-FAMILY

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 37			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	0	3	29	16	48
		6.2	60.4	33.3	3.6
		7.0	3.3	4.2	
	1	2	49	16	67
		3.0	73.1	23.9	5.1
		4.7	5.5	4.2	
	2	4	64	22	90
		4.4	71.1	24.4	6.8
		9.3	7.2	5.8	
	3	4	72	34	110
		3.6	65.5	30.9	8.4
		9.3	8.1	8.9	
	4	4	62	25	91
		4.4	68.1	27.5	6.9
		9.3	7.0	6.5	
	5	5	75	37	117
		4.3	64.1	31.6	8.9
		11.6	8.4	9.7	
	6	3	49	24	76
		3.9	64.5	31.6	5.8
		7.0	5.5	6.3	
	7	4	57	19	80
		5.0	71.3	23.8	6.1
		9.3	6.4	5.0	

TABLE 47 Continued

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 37			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	8	1	64	20	85
		1.2	75.3	23.5	6.5
		2.3	7.2	5.2	
	9	3	86	33	122
		2.5	70.5	27.0	9.3
		7.0	9.6	8.6	
	10	5	136	63	204
		2.5	66.7	30.9	15.5
		11.6	15.2	16.5	
	11	5	149	73	227
		2.2	65.6	32.2	17.2
		11.6	16.7	19.1	
Column Total		43	892	382	1317
		3.3	67.7	29.0	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 13.38522 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.921.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 04 dependent.
= .00 with Var 37 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .03. Significance = 0.040.

Gamma = .05.

TABLE 48. YEARS WORKED BY FRIEND-FAMILY

	Count	Var 38			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	0	20	7	22	49
		40.8	14.3	44.9	3.8
		4.3	2.1	4.5	
	1	18	22	28	68
		26.5	32.4	41.2	5.3
		3.9	6.7	5.7	
	2	30	21	35	86
		34.9	24.4	40.7	6.7
		6.5	6.4	7.1	
	3	35	28	42	105
		33.3	26.7	40.0	8.2
		7.6	8.5	8.5	
	4	29	17	44	90
		32.2	18.9	48.9	7.0
		6.3	5.2	8.9	
	5	44	27	44	115
		38.3	23.5	38.3	8.9
		9.5	8.2	8.9	
	6	25	23	25	73
		34.2	31.5	34.2	5.7
		5.4	7.0	5.1	
	7	29	24	26	79
		36.7	30.4	32.9	6.1
		6.3	7.3	5.3	

TABLE 48 Continued

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 38			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	8	30 36.1 6.5	20 24.1 6.1	33 39.8 6.7	83 6.5
	9	36 30.5 7.8	40 33.9 12.2	42 35.6 8.5	118 9.2
	10	89 44.9 19.2	44 22.2 13.4	65 32.8 13.2	198 15.4
	11	78 35.1 16.8	56 25.2 17.0	88 39.6 17.8	222 17.3
Column Total		463 36.0	329 25.6	494 38.4	1286 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 26.05069 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.249.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 04 dependent.
= .03 with Var 38 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.03. Significance = 0.030.

Gamma = -.04.

TABLE 49. YEARS WORKED BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 52			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	0	19	0	0	19
		100.0	0.0	0.0	2.5
		3.0	0.0	0.0	
	1	28	4	3	35
		80.0	11.4	8.6	4.6
		4.4	8.5	3.8	
	2	32	2	6	40
		80.0	5.0	15.0	5.2
		5.0	4.3	7.7	
	3	53	5	3	61
		86.9	8.2	4.9	7.9
		8.2	10.6	3.8	
	4	41	2	7	50
		82.0	4.0	14.0	6.5
		6.4	4.3	9.0	
	5	69	4	6	79
		87.3	5.1	7.6	10.3
		10.7	8.5	7.7	
	6	35	1	4	40
		87.5	2.5	10.0	5.2
		5.4	2.1	5.1	
	7	46	2	3	51
		90.2	3.9	5.9	6.6
		7.2	4.3	3.8	

TABLE 49 Continued

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 52			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	8	41	3	6	50
		82.0	6.0	12.0	6.5
		6.4	6.4	7.7	
	9	28	2	4	34
		82.4	5.9	11.8	4.4
		4.4	4.3	5.1	
	10	111	12	15	138
		80.4	8.7	10.9	18.0
		17.3	25.5	19.2	
	11	140	10	21	171
		81.9	5.8	12.3	22.3
		21.8	21.3	26.9	
Column Total		643	47	78	768
		83.7	6.1	10.2	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 15.94171 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.818.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 04 dependent.
= .00 with Var 52 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .03. Significance = 0.049.

Gamma = .08.

TABLE 50. YEARS WORKED BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 56			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	0	3 30.0 2.8	7 70.0 3.5	0 0.0 0.0	10 2.6
	1	8 27.6 7.3	15 51.7 7.6	6 20.7 8.0	29 7.6
	2	10 38.5 9.2	10 38.5 5.1	6 23.1 8.0	26 6.8
	3	14 35.9 12.8	19 48.7 9.6	6 15.4 8.0	39 10.2
	4	9 31.0 8.3	17 58.6 8.6	3 10.3 4.0	29 7.6
	5	14 31.8 12.8	18 40.9 9.1	12 27.3 16.0	44 11.5
	6	4 13.8 3.7	19 65.5 9.6	6 20.7 8.0	29 7.6
	7	9 32.1 8.3	15 53.6 7.6	4 14.3 5.3	28 7.3

TABLE 50 Continued

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 56			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	8	9	16	7	32
		28.1	50.0	21.9	8.4
		8.3	8.1	9.3	
	9	5	6	4	15
		33.3	40.0	26.7	3.9
		4.6	3.0	5.3	
	10	16	37	14	67
		23.9	55.2	20.9	17.5
		14.7	18.7	18.7	
	11	8	19	7	34
		23.5	55.9	20.6	8.9
		7.3	9.6	9.3	
Column Total		109 28.5	198 51.8	75 19.6	382 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 15.80729 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.825.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 04 dependent.
= .00 with Var 56 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .05. Significance = 0.045.

Gamma = .07.

TABLE 51. YEARS WORKED BY SEX-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 67			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	0	3	7	1	11
		27.3	63.6	9.1	2.9
		6.2	3.5	0.7	
	1	6	14	10	30
		20.0	46.7	33.3	7.8
		12.5	6.9	7.5	
	2	4	16	7	27
		14.8	59.3	25.9	7.0
		8.3	7.9	5.2	
	3	4	21	13	38
		10.5	55.3	34.2	9.9
		8.3	10.4	9.7	
	4	4	15	13	32
		12.5	46.9	40.6	8.3
		8.3	7.4	9.7	
	5	7	20	17	44
		15.9	45.5	38.6	11.5
		14.6	9.9	12.7	
	6	1	14	12	27
		3.7	51.9	44.4	7.0
		2.1	6.9	9.0	
	7	2	14	12	28
		7.1	50.0	42.9	7.3
		4.2	6.9	9.0	

TABLE 51 Continued

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 67			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 4	8	2	19	10	31
		6.5	61.3	32.3	8.1
		4.2	9.4	7.5	
	9	3	8	5	16
		18.8	50.0	31.3	4.2
		6.2	4.0	3.7	
	10	8	37	22	67
		11.9	55.2	32.8	17.4
		16.7	18.3	16.4	
	11	4	17	12	33
		12.1	51.5	36.4	8.6
		8.3	8.4	9.0	
Column Total		48 12.5	202 52.6	134 34.9	384 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 14.27973 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.891.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 04 dependent.
= .00 with Var 67 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .04. Significance = 0.103.

Gamma = .05.

TABLE 52. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY AGE-PERFORMANCE

	Count	Var 34			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 7	0	76	27	123	226
		33.6	11.9	54.4	17.4
		16.9	21.8	16.9	
	1	102	31	150	283
		36.0	11.0	53.0	21.8
		22.7	25.0	20.6	
	2	81	26	175	282
		28.7	9.2	62.1	21.7
		18.0	21.0	24.0	
	3	74	22	133	229
		32.3	9.6	58.1	17.6
		16.5	17.7	18.3	
	4	116	18	147	281
		41.3	6.4	52.3	21.6
		25.8	14.5	20.2	
Column Total		449	124	728	1301
		34.5	9.5	56.0	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 15.18942 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.055.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .03 with Var 07 dependent.
= .00 with Var 34 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.01. Significance = 0.257.

Gamma = -.01.

TABLE 53. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY POLITICAL PERFORMANCE

	Count	Row Pct	Var 36			Row Total
			Col Pct	0	1	
Var 7	0		31	161	29	221
			14.0	72.9	13.1	17.1
			18.0	16.6	18.6	
	1		42	211	32	285
			14.7	74.0	11.2	22.0
			24.4	21.8	20.5	
	2		29	219	31	279
			10.4	78.5	11.1	21.5
			16.9	22.6	19.9	
	3		27	173	28	228
			11.8	75.9	12.3	17.6
			15.7	17.9	17.9	
	4		43	203	36	282
			15.2	72.0	12.8	21.8
			25.0	21.0	23.1	
Column		172	967	156	1295	
Total		13.3	74.7	12.0	100.0	

Raw Chi Square = 5.15643 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.740.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 07 dependent.
= .00 with Var 36 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .00. Significance = 0.450.

Gamma = .00.

TABLE 54. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY AGE-FAMILY

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 37			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 7	0	9	148	68	225
		4.0	65.8	30.2	17.1
		20.9	16.6	17.8	
	1	14	202	75	291
		4.8	69.4	25.8	22.1
		32.6	22.6	19.6	
	2	9	190	88	287
		3.1	66.2	30.7	21.8
		20.9	21.3	23.0	
	3	7	162	62	231
		3.0	70.1	26.8	17.5
		16.3	18.2	16.2	
	4	4	190	89	283
		1.4	67.1	31.4	21.5
		9.3	21.3	23.3	
Column Total		43	892	382	1317
		3.3	67.7	29.0	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 8.47693 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.388.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 07 dependent.
= .00 with Var 37 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .02. Significance = 0.073.

Gamma = .04.

TABLE 55. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY FRIEND-FAMILY

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 38			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 7	0	75	45	101	221
		33.9	20.4	45.7	17.2
		16.2	13.7	20.4	
	1	103	75	103	281
		36.7	26.7	36.7	21.9
		22.2	22.8	20.9	
	2	107	81	92	280
		38.2	28.9	32.9	21.8
		23.1	24.6	18.6	
	3	88	63	75	226
		38.9	27.9	33.2	17.6
		19.0	19.1	15.2	
	4	90	65	123	278
		32.4	23.4	44.2	21.6
		19.4	19.8	24.9	
Column Total		463	329	494	1286
		36.0	25.6	38.4	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 16.53969 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.035.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .02 with Var 07 dependent.
= .03 with Var 38 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.00. Significance = 0.477.

Gamma = -.00.

TABLE 56. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 52			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 7	0	86	5	10	101
		85.1	5.0	9.9	13.2
		13.4	10.6	12.8	
	1	134	6	10	150
		89.3	4.0	6.7	19.5
		20.8	12.8	12.8	
	2	144	16	18	178
		80.9	9.0	10.1	23.2
		22.4	34.0	23.1	
	3	129	10	18	157
		82.2	6.4	11.5	20.4
		20.1	21.3	23.1	
	4	150	10	22	182
		82.4	5.5	12.1	23.7
		23.3	21.3	28.2	
Column Total		643	47	78	768
		83.7	6.1	10.2	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 7.43260 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.490.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 07 dependent.
= .00 with Var 52 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .04. Significance = 0.032.

Gamma = .09.

TABLE 57. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 56			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 7	0	23	27	12	62
		37.1	43.5	19.4	16.2
		21.1	13.6	16.0	
	1	28	41	14	83
		33.7	49.4	16.9	21.7
		25.7	20.7	18.7	
	2	20	44	19	83
		24.1	53.0	22.9	21.7
		18.3	22.2	25.3	
	3	17	37	12	66
		25.8	56.1	18.2	17.3
		15.6	18.7	16.0	
	4	21	49	18	88
		23.9	55.7	20.5	23.0
		19.3	24.7	24.0	
Column Total		109	198	75	382
		28.5	51.8	19.6	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 6.09679 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.636.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .02 with Var 07 dependent.
= .00 with Var 56 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .06. Significance = 0.022.

Gamma = .09.

TABLE 58. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY SEX-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 67			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 7	0	11	36	21	68
		16.2	52.9	30.9	17.7
		22.9	17.8	15.7	
	1	8	38	36	82
		9.8	46.3	43.9	21.4
		16.7	18.8	26.9	
	2	10	42	30	82
		12.2	51.2	36.6	21.4
		20.8	20.8	22.4	
	3	12	31	23	66
		18.2	47.0	34.8	17.2
		25.0	15.3	17.2	
	4	7	55	24	86
		8.1	64.0	27.9	22.4
		14.6	27.2	17.9	
Column Total		48	202	134	384
		12.5	52.6	34.9	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 10.88577 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.2083.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .05 with Var 07 dependent.
= .00 with Var 67 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.02. Significance = 0.235.

Gamma = 0.03.

TABLE 59. SELF-CONCEPTION BY AGE-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 34			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 20	0	261	78	438	777
		33.6	10.0	56.4	60.0
		58.4	62.9	60.6	
	1	89	19	129	237
		37.6	8.0	54.4	18.3
		19.9	15.3	17.8	
	2	97	27	156	280
		34.6	9.6	55.7	21.6
		21.7	21.8	21.6	
Column Total		447	124	723	1294
		34.5	9.6	55.9	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 1.72622 with 4 Df. Significance = 0.785.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent.
= .00 with Var 34 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.01. Significance = 0.241.

Gamma = -.02.

TABLE 60. SELF-CONCEPTION BY POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 36			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 20	0	101 12.9 59.4	584 74.8 60.7	96 12.3 61.9	781 60.7
	1	39 16.7 22.9	161 69.1 16.7	33 14.2 21.3	233 18.1
	2	30 11.0 17.6	217 79.5 22.6	26 9.5 16.8	273 21.2
Column Total		170 13.2	962 74.7	155 12.0	1287 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 7.42448 with 4 Df. Significance = 0.115.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent.
= .00 with Var 36 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.00. Significance = 0.296.

Gamma = -.02.

TABLE 61. SELF-CONCEPTION BY AGE-FAMILY

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 37			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 20	0	25	546	224	795
		3.1	68.7	28.2	60.7
		58.1	61.3	59.6	
	1	10	144	82	236
		4.2	61.0	34.7	18.0
		23.3	16.2	21.8	
	2	8	200	70	278
		2.9	71.9	25.2	21.2
		18.6	22.5	18.6	
Column Total		43	890	376	1309
		3.3	68.0	28.7	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 7.49965 with 4 Df. Significance = 0.111.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent.
= .00 with Var 37 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.00. Significance = 0.452.

Gamma = -.00.

TABLE 62. SELF-CONCEPTION BY FRIEND-FAMILY

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 38			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 20	0	303	189	283	775
		39.1	24.4	36.5	60.6
		65.4	57.8	57.9	
	1	69	66	99	234
		29.5	28.2	42.3	18.3
		14.9	20.2	20.2	
	2	91	72	107	270
		33.7	26.7	39.6	21.1
		19.7	22.0	21.9	
Column Total		463	327	489	1279
		36.2	25.6	38.2	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 8.11222 with 4 Df. Significance = 0.0876.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent.
= .02 with Var 38 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .05. Significance = 0.002.

Gamma = .08.

TABLE 63. SELF-CONCEPTION BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 52			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 20	0	395	31	56	482
		82.0	6.4	11.6	62.9
		61.6	66.0	71.8	
	1	122	9	13	144
		84.7	6.2	9.0	18.8
		19.0	19.1	16.7	
	2	124	7	9	140
		88.6	5.0	6.4	18.3
		19.3	14.9	11.5	
Column Total		641	47	78	766
		83.7	6.1	10.2	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 4.05922 with 4 Df. Significance = 0.398.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent.
= .00 with Var 52 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.06. Significance = 0.003.

Gamma = -.17.

TABLE 64. SELF-CONCEPTION BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 56			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 20	0	83 34.6 76.1	117 48.8 59.1	40 16.7 53.3	240 62.8
	1	13 18.6 11.9	38 54.3 19.2	19 27.1 25.3	70 18.3
	2	13 18.1 11.9	43 59.7 21.7	16 22.2 21.3	72 18.8
Column Total		109 28.5	198 51.8	75 19.6	382 100.0

Raw Chi Square = 13.00151 with 4 Df. Significance = 0.0113.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent.
= .00 with Var 56 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .14. Significance = 0.000.

Gamma = .25.

TABLE 65. SELF-CONCEPTION BY SEX-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 67			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 20	0	27	124	89	240
		11.2	51.7	37.1	62.5
		56.3	61.4	66.4	
	1	11	40	23	74
		14.9	54.1	31.1	19.3
		22.9	19.8	17.2	
	2	10	38	22	70
		14.3	54.3	31.4	18.2
		20.8	18.8	16.4	
Column Total		48	202	134	384
		12.5	52.6	34.9	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 1.79580 with 4 Df. Significance = 0.773.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent.
= .00 with Var 67 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.05. Significance = 0.040.

Gamma = -.10.

TABLE 66. URBAN YEARS BY AGE-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 34			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 23	0	162	60	277	499
		32.5	12.0	55.5	38.4
		36.1	48.8	38.2	
	1	148	30	260	438
		33.8	6.8	59.4	33.7
		33.0	24.4	35.8	
	2	50	9	77	136
		36.8	6.6	56.6	10.5
		11.1	7.3	10.6	
	3	51	18	66	135
		37.8	13.3	48.9	10.4
		11.4	14.6	9.1	
	4	13	3	18	34
		38.2	8.8	52.9	2.6
		2.9	2.4	2.5	
	5	8	0	8	16
		50.0	0.0	50.0	1.2
		1.8	0.0	1.1	
	6	4	2	5	11
		36.4	18.2	45.5	0.8
		0.9	1.6	0.7	
	7	5	0	6	11
		45.5	0.0	54.5	0.8
		1.1	0.0	0.8	
	8	0	0	1	1
		0.0	0.0	100.0	0.1
		0.0	0.0	0.1	
	9	8	1	8	17
		47.1	5.9	47.1	1.3
		1.8	0.8	1.1	
Column		449	123	726	1298
Total		34.6	9.5	55.9	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 20.82578 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.288.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 23 dependent.
= .00 with Var 34 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.03. Significance = 0.046.

Gamma = -.04.

TABLE 67. URBAN YEARS BY POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 36			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 23	0	73	376	51	500
		14.6	75.2	10.2	38.7
		42.7	38.9	33.1	
	1	53	323	60	436
		12.2	74.1	13.8	33.8
		31.0	33.4	39.0	
	2	14	106	12	132
		10.6	80.3	9.1	10.2
		8.2	11.0	7.8	
	3	21	94	22	137
15.3		68.6	16.1	10.6	
12.3		9.7	14.3		
4	5	22	4	31	
	16.1	71.0	12.9	2.4	
	2.9	2.3	2.6		
5	0	14	1	15	
	0.0	93.3	6.7	1.2	
	0.0	1.4	0.6		
6	3	6	1	10	
	30.0	60.0	10.0	0.8	
	1.8	0.6	0.6		
7	2	9	1	12	
	16.7	75.0	8.3	0.9	
	1.2	0.9	0.6		
8	0	1	0	1	
	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.1	
	0.0	0.1	0.0		
9	0	15	2	17	
	0.0	88.2	11.8	1.3	
	0.0	1.6	1.3		
Column Total		171	966	154	1291
		13.2	74.8	11.9	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 17.81396 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.468.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 23 dependent.
= .00 with Var 36 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .03. Significance = 0.038.

Gamma = .06.

TABLE 68. URBAN YEARS BY AGE-FAMILY

	Count	Var 37			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 23	0	17	359	129	505
		3.4	71.1	25.5	38.4
		39.5	40.3	33.9	
	1	12	293	138	443
		2.7	66.1	31.2	33.7
		27.9	32.9	36.3	
	2	7	89	41	137
		5.1	65.0	29.9	10.4
		16.3	10.0	10.8	
	3	4	86	48	138
		2.9	62.3	34.8	10.5
		9.3	9.7	12.6	
	4	1	23	10	34
		2.9	67.6	29.4	2.6
		2.3	2.6	2.6	
	5	2	12	3	17
		11.8	70.6	17.6	1.3
		4.7	1.3	0.8	
	6	0	8	3	11
		0.0	72.7	27.3	0.8
		0.0	0.9	0.8	
	7	0	8	3	11
		0.0	72.7	27.3	0.8
		0.0	0.9	0.8	
	8	0	0	1	1
		0.0	0.0	100.0	0.1
		0.0	0.0	0.3	
	9	0	13	4	17
		0.0	76.5	23.5	1.3
		0.0	1.5	1.1	
Column Total		43	891	380	1314
		3.3	67.8	28.9	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 16.83546 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.534.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 23 dependent.

= .00 with Var 37 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .04. Significance = 0.012.

Gamma = .07.

TABLE 69. URBAN YEARS BY FRIEND-FAMILY

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 38			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 23	0	214	106	167	487
		43.9	21.8	34.3	38.0
		46.2	32.6	33.8	
	1	141	121	175	437
		32.3	27.7	40.0	34.1
		30.5	37.2	35.4	
	2	35	44	57	136
		25.7	32.4	41.9	10.6
		7.6	13.5	11.5	
	3	35	34	62	131
		26.7	26.0	47.3	10.2
		7.6	10.5	12.6	
	4	12	6	17	35
		34.3	17.1	48.6	2.7
		2.6	1.8	3.4	
	5	6	4	6	16
		37.5	25.0	37.5	1.2
		1.3	1.2	1.2	
	6	7	3	1	11
		63.6	27.3	9.1	0.9
		1.5	0.9	0.2	
	7	8	1	3	12
		66.7	8.3	25.0	0.9
		1.7	0.3	0.6	
	8	0	0	1	1
		0.0	0.0	100.0	0.1
		0.0	0.0	0.2	
	9	5	6	5	16
		31.3	37.5	31.3	1.2
		1.1	1.8	1.0	
Column Total		463	325	494	1282
		36.1	25.4	38.5	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 43.52475 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.000.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .02 with Var 23 dependent.
= .07 with Var 38 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .08. Significance = 0.000.

Gamma = .12.

TABLE 70. URBAN YEARS BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 52			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 23	0	271	20	24	315
		86.0	6.3	7.6	41.0
		42.1	42.6	30.8	
	1	235	21	32	288
		81.6	7.3	11.1	37.5
		36.5	44.7	41.0	
	2	59	2	9	70
		84.3	2.9	12.9	9.1
		9.2	4.3	11.5	
	3	28	0	7	35
80.0		0.0	20.0	4.6	
4.4		0.0	9.0		
4	16	0	4	20	
	80.0	0.0	20.0	2.6	
	2.5	0.0	5.1		
5	11	2	1	14	
	78.6	14.3	7.1	1.8	
	1.7	4.3	1.3		
6	7	0	1	8	
	87.5	0.0	12.5	1.0	
	1.1	0.0	1.3		
7	7	1	0	8	
	87.5	12.5	0.0	1.0	
	1.1	2.1	0.0		
8	1	0	0	1	
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	
	0.2	0.0	0.0		
9	8	1	0	9	
	88.9	11.1	0.0	1.2	
	1.2	2.1	0.0		
Column Total		643	47	78	768
		83.7	6.1	10.2	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 18.81517 with 18 Df. Significance=0.403.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 23 dependent.

= .00 with Var 52 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .04. Significance = 0.038.

Gamma = .09.

TABLE 71. URBAN YEARS BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 56			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 23	0	13	12	3	28
		46.4	42.9	10.7	7.3
		11.9	6.1	4.0	
	1	56	118	46	220
		25.5	53.6	20.9	57.6
		51.4	59.6	61.3	
	2	18	29	11	58
		31.0	50.0	19.0	15.2
		16.5	14.6	14.7	
	3	8	12	6	26
30.8		46.2	23.1	6.8	
7.3		6.1	8.0		
4	4	9	5	18	
	22.2	50.0	27.8	4.7	
	3.7	4.5	6.7		
5	2	6	3	11	
	18.2	54.5	27.3	2.9	
	1.8	3.0	4.0		
6	4	2	1	7	
	57.1	28.6	14.3	1.8	
	3.7	1.0	1.3		
7	3	4	0	7	
	42.9	57.1	0.0	1.8	
	2.8	2.0	0.0		
9	1	6	0	7	
	14.3	85.7	0.0	1.8	
	0.9	3.0	0.0		
Column		109	198	75	382
Total		28.5	51.8	19.6	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 16.11143 with 16 Df. Significance = 0.445.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 23 dependent.
= .01 with Var 56 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = .01. Significance = 0.304.

Gamma = .02.

TABLE 72. URBAN YEARS BY SEX-PERFORMANCE

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Var 67			Row Total
		0	1	2	
Var 23	0	3	19	8	30
		10.0	63.3	26.7	7.8
	1	29	103	85	217
		13.4	47.5	39.2	56.5
	2	8	37	16	61
		13.1	60.7	26.2	15.9
	3	1	15	10	26
		3.8	57.7	38.5	6.8
	4	1	12	4	17
		5.9	70.6	23.5	4.4
	5	2	5	5	12
		16.7	41.7	41.7	3.1
	6	1	2	4	7
		14.3	28.6	57.1	1.8
	7	2	3	2	7
		28.6	42.9	28.6	1.8
	9	1	6	0	7
		14.3	85.7	0.0	1.8
Column Total		48	202	134	384
		12.5	52.6	34.9	100.0

Raw Chi Square = 17.82645 with 16 Df. Significance = 0.334.

Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 23 dependent.
= .01 with Var 67 dependent.

Kendall's Tau B = -.02. Significance = 0.192.

Gamma = -.04.

Typed by Joann Brady