AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE ANTI-COLONIAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

by

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PREFACE

In 1765, an Edict of the King of France declared, quite simply: "The colonies differ from the Provinces of the Realm as the means differ from the ends."

Today great nations profess to believe that all territories are entitled to their political and economic integrity, and that all peoples should be free to choose their own governments, without interference from a foreign source.

The first significant event that caused this revolution in Europe's political outlook was the American Declaration of Independence. Since that event, a belief in a traditional American anti-colonialism has been increasingly a source of hopeful expectation on the part of the peoples of South America, Asia and Africa. Today, among such colonial powers as Britain and France there is the acute awareness that the two Greatest Powers areequally averse to the colonial idea. The one, the United States of America, because, it has been alleged, her extreme reverence for freedom is partly derived from an "ex-colonial complex"; the other, Russia, because she attends her expansion from the revolt of the remaining colonies.

It is well known that during the Second World War a great source of friction between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain was the opposition of the former's efforts to update

the Britisher's "Victorian" viewpoints, to the latter's Tory resolution to prevent the liquidation of His Majesty's Empire. The records of Wartime Big Power Conferences show that Roosevelt and his advisers were convinced that the large colonial empires had been, and might be again, a cause of great wars - a conviction that Stalin was not unwilling to foster. This attitude had a considerable effect on decisions at Yalta.

Though belief in an American anti-colonialism had become a part of the political folklore of the modern world, there have been few attempts either to examine the phenomenon itself, or to estimate its consequences on American foreign policy. The purpose of this study is only exploratory. It is limited to an attempt to enquire how and when this sentiment was translated into action. It is an attempt to observe how much it was an inspiration to colonial peoples seeking independence, and how it influenced the attitude of metropolitan countries to their colonies. It is an attempt, in short, to isolate one of the elements in the formation of those ideas that have shaped the world since 1939.

The period chosen for study is that of the Second Great War, when, it is believed, the sentiment of American anti-colonialism was most potent. The question of Indian independence is chosen for particular attention because, in a sense, a subject India was the keystone of the colonial order. Whatever the status of French Africa, or of the Netherlands East Indies, or of the American Philippines, as long as the subcontinent of India remained a colonial possession, the balance of the world's economy and the character of the world's society would have had a distinct, irremediable colonial bias.

There is strong support for the belief that the greatest consequence of the War was the end of old-style colonial empire. Today the question of American attitudes to colonial peoples, or to those with new freedoms, remains as vital as ever. For the greatest event of our time is that "revolution of expectations" that impels the hundreds of millions of subject or former subject peoples to claim full human rights and full political independence; and to demand those means of a richer and fuller life which they now know to exist.

My interest in the subject of this study dates from the time I first faced an American audience, and was startled, and heartened, by the question (to be repeated a score of times since), "When are your people going to get their independence?"

In the pursuit of this study I was encouraged by faculty members and colleagues in the Political Science and History Departments, to whom I wish to express my thanks for comments and judgments.

I am deeply beholden to Mrs. Harriet Smithson of Salem, who read the manuscript and corrected some of my conceptions of America, to Mrs. Hanneman who fearlessly undertook to type from my frequently illegible manuscript, and to the many others whose interest and good wishes were a constant encouragement.

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CHAPTER I

AMERICAN ANTI-COLONIALISM: FROM 1776 TO WILSON

America was the first major colonial territory in modern history to fight for, and wrest its independence from a ruling power. This event was never so distant from their minds as to free Americans from a "colonial complex" - an emotional belief in self-determination and a quick partisanship of the exploited and the dependent in the yet unemancipated places of the earth. In the superb example of American achievement - the creation out of thirteen dependencies of a nation as powerful as any - a premium was placed upon the glorification of independence and of anti-colonial strivings for freedom.

" The Monroe Doctrine announced to the world a new principle - that the American continents were henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. In the New World, at least, America had taken an anti-colonial stand. However, America was not yet ready to carry the crusade for freedom into the New World. Indeed, in 1823 it was the shield of the British Navy, in one of a continuous chain of historical ironies, that was to protect the American continent from re-colonization by the Holy Alliance of European Powers. "

However, through the memory of the revolutionary struggle for independence against King George III, American anti-colonialism was permanently focused on the British Empire. Americans viewed with disfavor the large areas on the map which were still under British rule, and which

refused or were not permitted, to follow America's own example. Early in the history of the new Republic, abortive attempts were made to liberate or to annex British Canada. This was one of the causes of that "futile and unnecessary" War of 1812, (when the British burned Washington).[1] The War stimulated the Anglo-phobia in the United States, and it was over a century before it began to be exorcized effectively.

For the rest of the century America occupied herself chiefly with western expansion and the fulfillment of her own Manifest Destiny by the occupation - some would say colonization - of the rest of the continental surface, between Mexico and Canada. America, growing from a coastal strip of newly independent territories to a continental power bordering on the two main oceans of the earth, turned her back on the Old World. She avoided entanglements with the great powers over their colonial expansions. The question of colonialism did not become a burning issue until American expansion into the South West Pacific collided with European colonialism in what they called Far East Asia.

In this period of continental expansion, American anti-colonialism was mainly an expression of the Anglo-phobia that persisted from 1776. "In their comfortable isolation, America had no foreign bogey other than Britain to denounce".[2] As Kipling put it, France has Germany, Britain has Russia, and America has England, "and, indeed, when you come to think of it, there

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[1] Samuel Morison and Henry S. Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, (New York: Oxford University Press), Vol. I, p. 431.

[2] H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955), p. 524.

is no other country for the American public speaker to trample upon".[1] There was, of course, a strong dislike of the English aristocratic tradition. Democracy in America, as de Tocqueville saw it, was a way of governing men without brutalizing them: the monarchial system, and its concomitant imperial domination, was anathemized as being repugnant to human dignity. As J. M. Muirhead wrote in 1898, "It is not easy for a European to the manner born to realize the sort of extravagant, night-mare effect that many of our social customs have in the eyes of our untutored American cousins . . . . . The idea of an insignificant boy peer, taking precedence of Mr. John Morley! The necessity of backing out of the royal presence!"[2]

An active hostility was evinced by an important section of the United States population - the Irish minority. The Irish Americans kept alive any smouldering hostility against an oppressive and exploiting Britain. George Washington accepted membership in the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick as "a society distinguished for the firm adherence of its members to the glorious cause in which we are embarked".[3] Between 1850 and 1879, 1,879,169 Irish emigrated to America, and constantly invigorated the Anglo-phobia.[4] The pervasiveness of this Irish influence is illustrated

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[1] Rudyard Kipling, "From Sea to Sea", II, p. 14, quoted in H. C. Allen, p. 524.

[2] A. Nevins, American Social History as Recorded by British Travellers (New York: Henry Holt, 1923), p. 440.

[3] H. C. Allen, op. cit., p. 100, quoting from E. F. Roberts' "Ireland in America" (London: 1931), p. 30.

[4] Historical statistics of the United States quoted by Allen, op. cit., p. 105.

by the fact that in 1886 the United States Senate refused to include the crime of "dynamiting" in the extradition treaty which was finally concluded with Britain in 1889.[1] In 1899, John Hay wrote to Henry White in London that all the State Conventions of the Democrats "put the anti-English plank in their platform to curry favor with the Irish (whom they want to keep) and the Germans (whom they want to seduce)".[2] However in disrepute theories of race and national characteristics may be, it is incontestable that the influence of ethnic and religious backgrounds is strong in American democracy. In his book on the Future of American Politics, Samuel Lubell asserts that one of the important factors responsible for American isolation is "anti-British ethnic prejudices".[3] And as Britain, in Americans' minds, was the vicious colonial power, par excellence, the success of her growth and expansion in other continents was viewed without much favor.

The last decade of the Nineteenth Century saw a sharp resurgence of colonialism for which there were many explanations - the most celebrated being found in the Leninist theory of "Imperialism". Lenin saw the period as marking the end of the progressive capitalism of Karl Marx's times, and the substitution of monopoly for free competition. In view of the parallelism postulated between economics and politics, the division of the world into colonial spheres of influence had necessarily accompanied the

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[1] H. C. Allen, op. cit., p. 524.

[2] Q. R. B. Mowatt, The American Entente (London: Edward Arnold, 1939), p. 131.

[3] Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952), p. 132.

division of the world into monopolistic groups. The logical symmetry of this view does not entirely square with the facts. It is a true historical phenomenon, however, that in this period, Great Britain launched out vigorously on the building of a Second Empire. France sought consolation for defeat and manpower and resources for new wars in the acquisition of large areas of Africa, where Germany also claimed her share. Japan, after her decisive victory over China in 1895, advanced her own colonial claims. Barred from South America by the Monroe Doctrine, these nations turned to dismember Africa and the Far East.

Some writers, like Bemis, tend to view America's part in this new imperialism as "a great aberration" from the course of American history.[1] It is perhaps more true to see it as a delayed manifestation of an old process. The delay had come from the priority given to the continental United States of America, and the naval weakness which had had an inhibitory effect on any desire to seek foreign entanglements. Secretary Seward had sought before the Civil War to acquire the Dutch West Indies. But Caribbean and Central American ambitions had failed to reach fruition because they were primarily Southern, and therefore highly suspect in the North. By the end of the 1870's such obstacles to American imperialism gave way. The acquisition of California and Oregon threw open the Pacific to American expansion. This was the period when the United States came of age. Fast as the nation grew, the productivity of its agricultural organization grew more rapidly, and its industrial organization faster still.

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[1] S. F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, (New York: Henry Holt, 1936).

In 1865, the foreign trade of the United States totalled $404,000,000. In 1890, it reached $1,635,000,000. The significant developments could be lost on no realistic politician - every President since Grant was concerned with the expansion of foreign markets.[1] The Republican Party reflecting the dominant and expansive forces of American life began to play the imperialist game.

Politicians and businessmen had plentiful arguments - strategic, philosophic, and philanthropic - to encourage them. Captain Mahan called for big navies and bases to protect American interests present and future. Professor J. W. Burgess discovered that Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon nations "were particularly endowed with the capacity for establishing national states . . . . and therefore, they are entrusted in the general economy of history with the mission of conducting the political course of the modern world".[2] A missionary review announced that to give the world life more abundant both for here and hereafter is the duty of the American peoples by virtue of the call of God. The journalists, emphatic and sensational, called for a "large policy".[3] "The subjugation of a continent", wrote a Pacific Coast journal, "was sufficient to keep the American people busy at home for a century . . . . But now that the continent is subdued, we are looking for fresh worlds to conquer. . . . The colonizing instinct which has led our race in successive waves of emigration . . . . is the

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[1] Morison and Commager, Growth of the American Republic, Vol. II, p. 314.

[2] Ibid., p. 323.

[3] Ibid., p. 324.

instinct which is now pushing us out and on to Alaska, to the isles of the sea, and beyond." This was the blatant imperialism of a Cecil Rhodes.

Indeed, and this is another of the curious ironies, Britain welcomed the vigorous American imperialism. In the cordial comradeship of Empire, Britain brought unofficial pressure to bear upon the American government to annex the Philippines quickly, before Germany had her chance to meddle. Allen notes "that British enthusiasm for American expansion extended as far as a belief in Yankee capacity for colonial government. As the Quarterly Review wrote, 'We have no doubt whatever of the capacity of our kinsmen to grapple effectively with all the difficulties and dangers which they may encounter in the Philippines. We believe that they share the British secret of governing inferior races at a distance with justice and fairness, and with the smallest possible exercise of military power'."[1] Kipling challenged America to

> Take up the white man's burden -
> Ye dare not stoop to less -
> Nor call too loud on Freedom
> To cloke your weariness.

Events moved rapidly under the impulse of such a spirit and such encouragements. In 1878, America joined in a temporary triumvirate with Great Britain and Japan over Samoa - an early departure from her policy of avoiding entangling alliances in relations to objects remote from her hemisphere. In the same year, the United States concluded with Hawaii a reciprocity treaty granting exclusive trade privileges and safeguarding Hawaiian independence against a third party. By 1881, Secretary of State

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[1] H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States, p. 580.

Blaine was to declare Hawaii to be part of the American system, and announced significantly that "if Hawaii's independence were endangered the United States would unhesitatingly seek an avowedly American solution for the grave issues presented".[1]

Cuba presented an immediate casus belli. Some of the reasons for America's willingness to fight Spain were very evident: the popular jingoism which newspapers like the New York World and the New York Journal stirred up in their struggle for circulation; the economic interest which America had in Spain's possession of Cuban sugar (which was to America what the cotton of India was to Great Britain); the new set of world interests which required a big navy to protect them, and the new bases required for that navy. Like the seven years' war of the Eighteenth Century, the war with Spain was fought with attention paid chiefly to commercial considerations. Official strategy was directed with great promptness towards the Spanish colonies. The Philippines were quickly taken, and President McKinley, after prayerful reflection, decided to keep them. In 1899, Secretary of State John Hay proclaimed the Open Door in China - a policy concerned with safeguarding American commercial policy in a China being carved up into protectorates and spheres of influence by the other great powers. After a decade of strenuous and loud activity the United States possessed Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Midway, Wake, Guam and the Philippines, and was asserting greater interest and influence in the Pacific, and in China.

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[1] Morison and Commager, Growth of the American Republic, p. 316.

There was one characteristic of American imperialism which distinguished it from that of the other great powers. French and German expansionism had been relatively unburdened by feelings of guilt or sentimental misgivings. But the crudity of the Philippines conquest was softened by the payment of a purchase price, and many pious utterings accompanied the decision to keep the Islands. President McKinley told his Methodist brethren, writes Morison and Commager, that "1) We would not turn over to France or Germany our commercial interests in the Islands - that would be bad business and discreditable; 2) We could not give them back to Spain - that would be cowardly and dishonorable; 3) We could not leave them to themselves - they were unfit for self-government, and they would soon have anarchy and misrule, worse than Spain's was; 4) There was nothing to do but take them all, to educate the Filipinos and uplift and Christianize them."[1]

Such sanctimonious justifications were produced because in America they were needed. By the time the question of ratification came up, the tradition of American anti-colonialism had revived in full force. Ratification itself was a very hard fought fight.

The first experience of Empire in the Philippines was to produce enough atrocity stories to inflame a public opinion remorseful of its earlier jingoism, and skeptical of this dubious venture. A counter-burst of popular feeling attacked American Imperialism as repugnant to the American Constitution as well as to the American tradition. Among the distinguished anti-imperialists were President Eliot of Harvard, speaking

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[1] Morison and Commager, op. cit., p. 337.

for the intellectuals, Gompers speaking for labor, and Andrew Carnegie who contributed to the movement. Mark Twain charged McKinley with playing the "European game of imperialism", and suggested that the stars on Old Glory be "replaced by the skull and crossbones".[1] William Vaughn Moody hearked back to the idealism of the Sixties.

"Tempt not our weakness, our cupidity . . .
O ye who lead
Take heed
Blunders we may forgive, but baseness we will smite."[2]

The Democratic platform of 1900 declared that "All good institutions among men derive their just powers from the consent of the governed; that any government not based upon the consent of the governed is a tyranny, and that to impose upon any people a government of force is to substitute the methods of imperialism for those of a republic."

Thus, this and successive decades, was to see in America a thorough distaste for the majesty of Empire. There remained, and grew, however, an interest in the trade and commerce with territories beyond the seas, and an irritation both with the exclusiveness of other people's Empires, and the unbusinesslike disorderliness of some of the independent nations. Americans now practiced an anti-colonial imperialism.

In the case of the Philippines, American aims were to encourage its economic utility while preparing it for self-government and protecting it from internal disorder. Thus, President Wilson, true to the Democratic

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[1] Morison and Commager, op. cit., pp. 339-341.

[2] William Vaughn Moody, Poems, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1901).

Party's promises, urged support of the Jones Act in 1916. The Act formally announced the intention of the United States to withdraw from the Philippines as soon as stable governments could be established, in the meanwhile inaugurating far-reaching reforms.

In the case of South America, the United States formally disclaimed any intention of seizing new possessions, but maintained an interested concern in those South American Republics where America had business dealings. In 1913 Wilson had emphasized that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. But he did not mean to herald a new isolationism. America was to intervene, as in the case of Haiti in 1917, in the domestic affairs of the South American Republics. Apparently he felt that, once dictators and outlaws were put down, the American policing, sanitation, and education would cause orderly democratic processes to develop. By a tacit corollary, American opportunities for honorable trade and investment would expand in this orderly atmosphere. But the basic aim, whether for the benefit of investments or for defense, was to develop greater stability in the Caribbean.

The Great War afforded Wilson the opportunity to apply the lately tarnished, newly cleansed American principles to the Old World, and to paint on the canvas of history with a bold sweep of the brush. America's war aims were announced in his famous fourteen point speech of January 8, 1918. The speech, based on the work of a body of experts, the so-called Inquiry - represented the liberal American view of the means of making a world safe for constitutional liberty. Of most significance in this study are the points calling for the removal of economic barriers between nations, the adjustment of colonial claims with attention to the wishes of the

peoples, as well as the governments concerned, the idea of self-determination; and of a general association of nations to secure mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small alike. These fourteen points were greeted with enthusiasm by most Americans. There is no doubt that on the colonial question, as on others, they represented the best sentiments of the American people.

America, in this respect, had made its stand clear. But Wilson was unable to secure the political support which might, possibly, have made it the instrument for the implementation of these purposes. The Republican-dominated American Senate refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty, and the Covenant of the League of Nations that it contained.

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN ANTI-COLONIALISM: FROM THE LEAGUE TO FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

This chapter resumes the search through American history for explanations of the anti-colonial tendencies which Americans accepted as part of their tradition, and which caused European powers, between the wars, to fear American idealists as much as her isolationists. In this chapter will first be shown the effect that the newly demonstrated power had on opinion overseas, despite the comparative abstraction of the Republican Administration and the First New Deal from world affairs. Because of his great importance to this study, the remaining sections will be given to an examination of the evolution of President Roosevelt's political attitudes in regard to American foreign policies, her relations with Latin America, and with her own colonial possessions.

A common error of historical simplification is to state that after Wilson, and the rejection of the League, America retreated into splendid isolation, took no further interest in foreign entanglements, and cynically gave up the task of making the Old World safe for democracy. It can be shown that American interest in foreign affairs remained very high in the Twenties. The number of organizations dedicated to the study of Foreign Policy was at its highest. The Democratic Party persistently reiterated its faith in the League of Nations. And though there was a reaction in

disgust and disillusionment from the tortured course of European politics, there was growing a strong self-confidence in American ideals, and in the particular virtures of the American Way. This was the period when American missionaries, educators, and engineers abroad were building up the vast reservoir of goodwill which was later to prove both a gratification and an embarrassment to United States foreign policy planners.

Projected into the center of affairs by the Great War, America had come of age and had clearly demonstrated her power and prosperity to the world. As Europe became less patronizing and the rest of the world more admiring of the United States, American influences expanded like steam. This was especially so in the Far East. To the millions of Asians, the conflict that raged between 1914 and 1918 had exposed the myth of the solidarity of the white race, and of the stability of Western Civilization. It had brought into view a new power - one that appeared to be the antithesis of Europe in ideals and in policies, and what was more, this was the nation that had been the first to rebel successfully against the colonialism of Europe. A commentary by Chester Bowles, former American Ambassador to India, is highly revealing both as an expression of Asian interest in America, and of an American's dawning awareness of the "demonstration effect" of American history. Bowles writes in his "Ambassador's Report on India, "We sometimes forget that this world-wide rebellion against colonialism, which has already lasted for two centuries and has yet to be completed, was begun by the people of the United States. Until I went to Asia, I did not realize the extent to which our example has been a challenge to the world, and how closely our history has been read. A Ceylonese cabinet minister once said to me, 'Your Boston Tea Party, your

Continental Congress, your Declaration of Independence, your Bill of Rights, even your Constitution, these have been our models.' The contrast between America's great development under freedom and Asia's lack of development under colonialism rankles in the minds of most Asian leaders. 'You won your independence at about the time we lost ours', an Indian said to me sadly."[1] Indeed, the very existence of America was a vital factor in all colonial policies as in all foreign policy, however unwilling or slow the Republican Administration was to act upon this truth."[1]

The victory of the Democratic Party in 1932 did not at once mean a shift in American external policies. Election battles had been fought on the domestic front. "Despite the uncertain relationships that existed in every part of the world, parties in their pronouncements had postponed discussion of basic differences over foreign policy."[2] "The imminence of domestic catastrophe left little scope for a vigorous foreign policy. Even F. D. Roosevelt, who with Wilson's blessing had campaigned with Cox for the League of Nations in 1920, appeared at first to have swung over to a nationalist program in combatting the depression; for the New Deal legislation that affected currency, prices, production and labor suggested the end of the liberal competitive world of Adam Smith and paralleled uncomfortably the experiments in economic nationalism abroad", wrote a contemporary observer.[3] In spite of Hull's reciprocal-trade programs, the New Deal was

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[1]Chester Bowles, An Ambassador's Report, (New York: Harper and Brothers), p. 49.

[2]Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership 1933-1945, (Philadelphia and New York: 1955, J. B. Lippincott Company), p. 123.

[3]Harvey Wish, Contemporary America: The National Scene Since 1900, (New York: Harper and Brothers), p. 553.

essentially a go-it-alone affair. In his presidential campaign, Roosevelt had repudiated Hoover's thesis that depression and recovery were influenced by adjustable world arrangements. In the "interregnum" of early 1933, Roosevelt refused to participate in Hoover's efforts to solve world economic problems by world conference. It was Roosevelt who killed the London Economic Conference in 1933 with a message minimizing the importance of international monetary agreements. The First New Deal, at least, was not international in temper.

In many respects the New Deal was no startling innovation to the rest of the world. Many of the New Deal novelties were already popular economic policies in other parts of the world. Even conservatives in Great Britain were far ahead of America in such matters as social security and public housing. The British statute book, it was said, was raided on a wholesale scale by the New Deal. But one may find precedents at home. Many states, including Oregon, Wisconsin and New York, had advanced legislation with regards to conservation, unemployment and old age pensions. The New Deal seemed revolutionary only because of its rapidity.

But, and this the outside world was to feel, at the heart of the New Deal there was not a philosophy but a temper. There was a genuine human concern for all conditions of men. There was a rejection of any sacred law that denied mercy and regarded hardship and suffering as inevitable. There was a regard for the common man, wherever found, and defiance for royalists, economic or otherwise. As in the case of the shot fired at Concord, the reverberation of these sentiments were to be heard afar - by people who suffered economic exploitation, and were subject to royal or

imperialistic rule.

The leaders of the New Deal considered this 'temperament', like other United States ideals and products, good for export, not only to American colonies like Puerto Rico, but to the colonies of other nations as well. Of these leaders, none expressed the American people's temper so articulately and so conclusively as Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Patrician President, whose liberalism was as inspiring abroad as at home.

In biography too much can be made of boyhood utterance, or adolescent activities. With this saving clause as regards an estimate of their significance, two early experiences of Roosevelt may be noted. In January 1898, while a boy at Groton, Franklin Roosevelt took the negative in the debate "Resolved: that Hawaii be annexed". He said, according to his notes which were preserved, "of all the great powers of the world the United States and Russia are the only ones which have no colonies to defend. All our territory is on this continent and all of it except Alaska is continuous. Therefore, the United States and Russia are the only two countries no part of whose territory can be cut off by a naval enemy . . . Now if we go in for foreign colonies we must stick to that policy, and not only are foreign colonies expensive, but they are dangerous children and may bring political difficulties upon the mother country at any moment. Why can we not leave Hawaii alone, or else establish a sound Republic in which all Hawaiians shall be represented, not a government such as they have at present under the influence of America . . . ."

Several nations of modern times ruled upon the monarchic plan

have seized territory for commercial reasons and because of sympathy with the people resident, but we have no such plea for siezing Hawaii . . . . Why should we soil our hands with colonies? See how Italy's colonial system has utterly failed, then ask yourself what good France's colonies do her."[1]

A second curiosity: Richard Hofstadter recalls that at Harvard, Roosevelt's most serious public interest, and probably his first manifestation of sympathy for the underdog was in a college relief drive for the Boers.[2] He had already begun it seems to advocate the liquidation of the British Empire.

Yet as a young man in public office his mood seemed more of imperialistic Realpolitik than of idealistic internationalism. He was Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President Wilson, and occupied himself particularly in the obtaining of strategic naval bases and coaling stations. He welcomed the purchase in 1916 of the Danish West Indies, later called the Virgin Islands, (and later still described by Herbert Hoover as the poor-house of America). Roosevelt wrote in 1917, "We have simply got to control those islands as a whole - the sooner the better - the next step is to purchase the Dutch interest".[3]

In his attitude towards the colonial peoples under the Navy's jurisdiction Roosevelt expressed a sort of paternalistic imperialism. He

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[1] Elliot Roosevelt (ed.), F.D.R. - His Personal Letters, (New York: 1947), I, p. 60.

[2] Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 315.

[3] Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Apprenticeship, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952), p. 274.

first demonstrated this in 1914 when problems concerning Samoa came to his attention. The question arose whether the Navy Department could properly establish dispensaries for the medical care of Samoans. Roosevelt emphatically agreed. Since the Navy controlled all governmental functions there, "The responsibility for the welfare of the inhabitants necessarily rests primarily on this Department. If hookworm and tuberculosis are prevalent and the establishment of dispensaries would improve conditions . . . it is the duty of the Department to take favorable action". (Navy Department to Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, sixth endorsement, May 18, 1914).[1]

Some of the "Imperialist Realpolitik" was evinced, oddly, in defending the League during his 1920 campaign for the American Vice-Presidency. In one of his speeches he made a false claim, later to be regretted, in answering the argument that the United States would be outvoted by the British Empire in the League. "It is just the other way . . . . the United States has about twelve votes in the Assembly". He went on to explain that Latin American republics in the projected Assembly looked to his country as "a guardian and big brother", and that it would control their votes . . . . You know I had something to do with a couple of little republics . . . . I wrote Haiti's Constitution myself".[2] This last allegation he was later to withdraw, and always to regret.

In the early Twenties he supported the Republican Administration's firmness towards aspirations for self-government by the Filipinos.

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[1] Ibid., p. 274.

[2] Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Ordeal, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), p. 80.

He sharply attacked critics of his friend, General Wood, who in 1922 was highly unpopular with Filipinos and anti-imperialists because he refused to allow the Filipinos more self-government. "I only wish it were possible for me to jump on a destroyer and dash out to the Phillipines to see you", he wrote Wood. "I have heard from a number of people of the great difficulties you found on your arrival, and also of the splendid way you have taken hold of the solving of them. It does seem a pity that both of our parties at home cannot get together and state definitely the American policy towards the Phillipine Islands, Puerto Rico, Haiti and Santo Domingo. The vast majority of people in the country, I have always been certain, understand that complete independence for all of these peoples is not to be thought of for many years to come".[1]

In the six years that followed, according to his biographer, Freidel, Roosevelt "gradually came to see the error of his thinking on imperialism, and strongly sponsored a different sort of program."[2] This alteration came out during the period of his cruel adversity, when a cripple by the pool at Warm Springs. It is certain that he had time to study deeply, and to critically re-examine some earlier beliefs. An article in "Foreign Affairs" in 1928, gives his considered judgment on world organization as a sure safeguard for world peace. He wrote:

> A return, at the close of the most devastating conflict of history, to the old methods of alliances and balances of power would leave the world worse off even than it had been in 1914 . .

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[1] Ibid., pp. 136-137.

[2] Ibid., p. 137.

> Slowly through 1917 and 1918 the American Presidency brought home to the hearts of mankind the great hope that through an association of nations the world could in the days to come avoid armed conflict and substitute reason and collective action for the age old appeal to the sword . . . . The time has come when we must accept not only certain facts, but many new principles of a higher law, a newer and better standard in international relations. We are exceedingly jealous of our own sovereignty, and it is only right that we should respect a similar feeling among other nations.[1]

As President, Roosevelt advanced "Wilsonian" policies on three planes - foreign policy, the Latin-American relationships, and that of American colonial policy. These policies may be more truly described as "American", since much of them were enounced or inspired by sentiments considered to be in the best American traditions. But they were advanced after the Depression at home was checked.

Roosevelt was indeed the first Democratic presidential candidate to repudiate the League. The League was no longer the instrument Wilson had designed, he reasoned. Instead of working for peace, it had become a mere agency for the discussion of European affairs. That was to say, he found it politic to consider American membership in the League as a closed issue, although he was well prepared to follow Hoover's policy of informal cooperation. He made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Congress to let America recognize the World Court. He did not try too hard to conquer the prevailing isolationism of the country, but, implicitly, he endorsed the "Stimson Doctrine" of non-recognition of Japanese Manchukuo, taken by aggression from China. Although opposed to some of its provisions,

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[1] Foreign Affairs VI, July 1928.

Roosevelt signed the isolationist "Neutrality Act" of 1935. Ethiopia's resistance to Mussolini was brief and useless, but it won sympathy in America, and aroused high indignation in the colored population. The United States' actions were limited, however, to a "moral embargo". Roosevelt did not seem to wish to risk the loss of support at home by embarking on an early crusade against Spanish Fascism. The American people, by and large, were unenthusiastic at the possibility of engaging in European conflicts.

His first call to the American people for an active internationalism came in October 1937, when he proposed to "quarantine" aggressor nations, and warned that there was "no escape" by the United States from international anarchy through "isolation or neutrality".[1] There were some who charged that Roosevelt threw himself into foreign affairs in 1938 because of a calculated desire to swing the attention of the country away from the unsolved economic problems at home" . . . . but they "do not know their man", writes Basil Rauch. "There was nothing of conscious cynicism in Roosevelt's psychology".[2] This speech, meant to be a clarion call, produced little stimulation of public sentiment. This had to await Hitler's violation of the Munich agreements, his seizure of Prague in 1939. Then the American citizen began to consider what might happen if new philosophies of force were to encompass other continents, before invading their own. During 1940 and 1941, the leader of the great

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[1] New York Times, Oct. 6, 1937.

[2] Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal, (Creative Age Press), p. 143, New York: 1944.

"Arsenal of Democracy" sponsored many measures that were frankly non-neutral, such as the trade of destroyers to Britain for sea and air bases and the occupation of Greenland and Iceland. In August 1941, President Roosevelt met the British war leader, Churchill, at the historic Atlantic Conference, part of the purpose of which was to strengthen morale in England and to create morale in the United States. By October, American naval vessels were engaged in undeclared hostilities in the Atlantic. Then as Hofstadter put it, "The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor did for him what the Confederate attack on Sumter had done for Lincoln".[1] And like Wilson before him, Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war, for democracy.

In the affairs of Latin America Roosevelt again followed the lines laid down by his predecessors, later adding characteristic touches of his own. "The Hoover Administration which came into office in 1929, and Henry Stimson at the State Department in particular, was intent upon improving United States relations with Latin America, and hastened to put into practice the policy of the good neighbor, which was to be continued and brilliantly executed by their successors."[2]

Roosevelt preceded his inauguration with a tour of Latin America, departing from the attitude of distant haughtiness that seemed to characterize previous presidents. At the Seventh Conference of American States held late in 1932, Secretary of State Hull emphasized

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[1]Hofstadter, op. cit., p. 341.

[2]Dexter Perkins, Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1941), p. 344.

the new view of the United States in advocating a resolution which declared that no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.

A new treaty with Cuba in that year abrogated the Platt amendment, under which the United States had the right to supervise Cuban foreign policy and fiscal affairs, as well as the right to intervene with armed force. That political anti-imperialism was not merely a new disguise for economic imperialism was demonstrated by the manner in which the American "protectorate" over Haiti was terminated in 1934. After conferences with President Vincent, in Cap Haitien, Haiti, the two Presidents announced a plan which accorded full financial independence to Haiti.

From then on, at successive Pan-American Conferences, the Latin American countries came less and less to fear the tête-à-tête with their powerful northern neighbor. There was even something of a return to the spirit of 1823 - when the Monroe Doctrine expressed a spirit of equality and friendly understanding.

But it must not be imagined that Roosevelt viewed Pan-Americanism as a movement unconnected with the national interests of the United States. Pan-Americanism had its origins, according to Perkins, "in a broadening interest in the commercial and financial possibilities opening up in Latin America".[1] What was chiefly characteristic of the New Deal's Good Neighbor Policy was the genuine bonhomie with which it was carried out,

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[1]Dexter Perkins, op. cit., p. 317.

and of which one of the happy consequences was the allegiance of so many of the South American Republics to the Allied cause during the War. The marshalling of these nations against the Axis was considered by many, including Sumner Welles, as one of the acts that shaped modern history.[1] Argentina, whose economy is more in competition than complementary to that of the United States, was, up to the Farrel regime, markedly pro-Axis. But in the interests of hemisphere solidarity, and in a resolute spirit of good-neighborliness, the United States delegation secured Argentina's admission to the United Nations Organization in 1945.

In American colonial affairs, circumstances allowed Roosevelt to exercise a greater initiative over the course of affairs. The Democrats in office resumed the anti-colonialism of Bryan and Wilson. In 1934 a treaty with Panama abrogated clauses of the Treaty of 1903, by which that Republic was made a semi-protectorate of the United States. Less altruistic than the sentiments of the 1898 anti-imperialists were the motives that now urged Philippine independence. The depression of 1929 stimulated interest in their independence. American beet-sugar and dairy product interests viewed Philippine competition as injurious to their own domestic markets. Among the most enthusiastic champions were senators from Louisiana and Utah, the leading sugar states. Labor leaders supported independence to prevent Filipino immigration and preserve the living standards of American workers. Extreme isolationists in their

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[1]Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions that Shaped History, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951).

desire to avoid war with Japan, were anxious that the United States should retreat from the Far East.

Such motives led to the passage of the Hawes-Cutting Act over President Hoover's veto in 1932. The Act granted independence after a ten year probationary period. But the economic features of the Act were so ominous that the Philippine legislature rejected it as a "death sentence".

On March 2, 1934, President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress recommending that the Act be extended. He proposed that a trade conference be called to correct inequalities in the tariff provisions by agreements. This law, revamped as the Tydings-McDuffie Act, was tentatively accepted by the Philippine legislature. The Filipinos accepted the Act as their only opportunity to gain independence, and on the assumption that tariff concessions would be made by the new administration in Washington. But Congress soon violated the spirit of the law by imposing a special tax against coconut-oil imports and fixing sugar quotas. "Efforts of the President to prevent such acts of bad faith were fruitless. Not until 1937 did the Joint Committee on Philippine Affairs meet to consider improvement of trade relations, and its purely advisory work had little success", comments Basil Rauch, the New Deal historian.[1] He adds, somewhat cryptically, "If the motives and the results of the grant of Philippine independence were not all advantageous to the Filipinos, at least their right to choose freely to assume the responsibility of independence had not been withheld by the United States."

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[1]Basil Rauch, op. cit., p. 145.

It can be said that America's attitude to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, was more altruistic. Some extemporaneous remarks made at a welcome-home party at Hyde Park on August, 1934, give a clue to Roosevelt's thinking about these areas. He said, "The people in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and the Canal Zone and Hawaii, no matter what their racial origin may have been, are still our fellow-citizens, and as such we have a very distinct responsibility for them as long as the American flag floats over them. So I wanted to see at first hand what some of their problems were: to see whether this great nation of ours was doing the right thing by these fellow Americans of ours."[1] This is an expression of an attitude that continued almost unchanged. Indeed, a sort of bad conscience over territorial acquisition caused Washington to spend vast sums for the improvement of these areas. In 1943, Roosevelt recommended that the people of Puerto Rico be allowed to elect their own governor. Such a step would have been of vast import in the Caribbean, to colonial powers and their subjects alike. It would have demonstrated to the people of the area the great divergence between America's attitude to their territories, and that of France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, the possessors of the other West Indian colonies.

In his message to Congress making the recommendation, the President said:

> It has long been the policy of the Government of the United States progressively to reinforce the machinery of self-government in its territories and island possessions . . . . In accordance

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[1]S. I. Rosenman, The Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol, III, (New York: Random House,) p. 392.

> with the general policy of this government, I recommend to the Congress that it consider as soon as possible an amendment to the organic law of Puerto Rico to permit the people of Puerto Rico to elect their own governor, and to redefine the functions and powers of the Federal Government and the Government of Puerto Rico respectively."[1]

Rosenman notes that the Congress was slow in acting upon the President's recommendations. Feeling strongly that the principles of self-determination and self-government were among the basic principles for which the war was being fought, the President, on September 4, 1944, sent a letter to Representative C. Jasper Bell, Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, requesting early consideration of this legislation. The recommended legislation was not, however, passed by the Congress during President Roosevelt's lifetime.

On July 25, 1946, President Truman nominated Jesus T. Pinero as Governor of Puerto Rico, and Governor Pinero was inaugurated on September 3, 1946. President Truman also nominated Judge William D. Hastie, the first Negro to be Governor of the Virgin Islands. The effect of this was even stronger in the Caribbean.

Another American initiative, affecting other colonial territories in the Caribbean, was the setting up of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission in 1942. In the words of Cordell Hull, "Security reasons and an honest regard for the welfare of these peoples impelled us to suggest to Britain the creation of a Commission. . . ."[2]

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[1] S. I. Rosenman, op. cit., Vol. XI, p. 475

[2] Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948, II), p. 1236.

The terms of reference of the Commission were broad, including matters of labor, agriculture, housing, health, education, social welfare and economics. It was conceived as a peacetime organization, and its mandate clearly related to a world at peace, but it was immediately plunged into efforts to keep the Caribbean peoples from being starved out by the greater war demands in other areas. The Commission followed the principle of encouraging active participation by dependent peoples in shaping the policy in their area.

"The Commission provided an example that I felt and said could well be followed by other nations, and in other parts of the world", added Hull.[1] Indeed, the South Pacific Commission formed in 1947, was modeled on the basis of the experience gained in the Caribbean.

These commissions may be seen as small but significant expressions of the New Deal dynamic, and as a part of Roosevelt's broad ambitions: to lead his nation towards full production and employment, to enlarge United States trade abroad, to offer the moral virtues of peace and cooperation to all receptive nations, to dissolve the great colonial empires, including his own nation's, and bring sanitation, justice and freedom to the underdogs.

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[1] Ibid., p. 1237.

CHAPTER III

THE WAR: THE COLONIES, AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

Before being struck by the disaster of war, and by the idealism of the Atlantic Charter, the colonial world made a magnificent display on world maps of Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Japan. In the British Empire, including the Sudan, mandates and dominions were sixty-six territories, with a total area of 13,100,000 square miles, and a total population of 470 million owing allegiance to the King. France ruled over twenty-four territories, including mandates, 1,400,000 square miles and 65 million colonials. Italy - a late comer - ruled over five, including Ethiopia and the Aegean possessions, 1,400,000 square miles, and 10 million people. The Dutch Empire comprehended twelve territories, totaling 576,000 square miles, and ruled 59 million subjects. Belgium possessed two, including a mandate, 940,000 square miles and ruled 13 millions. Japan vied with these, with nine territories including mandates, Korea and Manchukuo, 576,000 square miles and 59 million people.[1]

Italy, it will be noticed, had less exciting figures. Italy and Germany resented being among the "have-not" nations. Fascism in Italy had been aided by Italian discontent with her small gains after the great war,

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[1] These figures, in round and therefore only approximate, were obtained, as was much of the information in this section, from the Foreign Policy Association Booklet, In Quest of Empire: The Problem of Colonies, by Walter Consuelo Langsam, pp. 50-51, 1939.

and the consequent promise of the Fascists to remedy this error. The Germans resented their loss, by the Versailles Treaty, of German East Africa, South-West Asia, the Camerons, New Guinea, the Marianas and the Marshall Islands. But they were confident of getting these back; German Universities had never ceased to give lessons in colonial administration.[1]

On January 30, 1939, the sixth anniversary of his rule, Adolf Hitler made some "very pointed remarks" on the subject of colonies. He said:

> The great German colonial possessions which the Reich once acquired peacefully by treaties and by paying for them, have been stolen . . . . The theft of the German colonies was morally an injustice. Economically, it was utter insanity! The political motives advanced were so mean that one is tempted merely to call them silly.[2]

What naturally pained the Germans were the declarations by allied statesmen that "conscience" would not permit the return of millions of "helpless natives" to German brutality and exploitation. The Third Reich believed that the only way to remove the stigma placed by the charge of misrule was to make Germany again a colonial power. Mussolini, welcoming Hitler as partner in colonial ambition, declared in 1937, "Germany must regain her place beneath the African sun . . . . . It is necessary that a great people like the German people recover the position which is due it".[3]

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[1] Walter Consuelo Langsam, In Quest of Empire, (New York: 1939, Foreign Policy Association, Ltd.), p. 79.

[2] Ibid., p. 7.

[3] Ibid., p. 86.

One possible solution for the colonial problems was not received with enthusiasm by any of the colonial powers. The Britisher, Leonard Barnes, in his book, "The Future of Colonies" suggested that the colonial powers convert their possessions into mandates and administer them as agents for the League "in accordance with provisions defined in a League mandate".[1] Support for such a plan was later to come from the strongest possible source - the President of the United States of America.

The first great war had shown to all colonial peoples the lack of solidarity of their European rulers, the fury of their own dissensions and strifes, and the thinness of their pretensions to be the chosen bearers of peace and order to lesser breeds beyond the law.

Events early in the second great war shook and almost destroyed many of the foundations of imperial relations. By August 1940, Hitler's army had overrun Holland, France and Belgium. The French Empire was still held by tenuous strings to Vichy France - but the Free French were now trying to sever them. French Equatorial Africa, under the black governor, Felix Eboue later declared for Free France - an act which amounted to a temporary declaration of independence from Paris. The Vichy government kept firm control over West Africa, the Ivory Coast, Guinea and the Cameroons. The Vichy forces offered strong resistance when a Free French Force and a British naval squadron attempted on September 23, 1941, to seize Dakar. For the moment Vichy France also retained a shaken control over five states - the Sheriffean Empire of Morocco, the realms of Tunis,

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[1] Ibid., p. 92.

Cambodia and Laos, and the empire of Vietnam. The French presence remained effective, though crestfallen in the mandates of Syria and Lebanon.

The Dutch colonies in the Far East - Java, Sumatra, and the other islands of the East Indies - and in the Atlantic, Surinam, Aruba, Saba, had lost their motherland to Nazi Germany. Queen Wilhelmina was in exile, a monarch with an empire, but without a realm. The King of the Belgian Congo was now a creature of Hitler's.

But the Empire and Commonwealth of Britain, extending over nearly a quarter of the earth's land surface, was out of enemy hands and the League of exiled rulers in England could informally agree with Great Britain that their possessions would be protected, preserved and eventually restored.

The only empire promised speedy liberation was that of Italy. Operations were in progress already in Somaliland, involving British colonial troops fighting to free Italy's East African territories. The rapid turn of events in Europe caused great apprehension in America during 1941. Overstepping the widest limits of neutrality, America offered aid and comfort to Great Britain, and to the exiled heads-of-states in Britain. An example of American aid is the transfer of fifty American destroyers to the Royal Navy. One comfort, to be appreciated as an expression of the American President's sentiments at that time were these lines sent by Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill. The President wrote to Churchill on 19 January, 1941, "I think this verse applies to your people as it does to us:

Sail on, O ship of State!
Sail on, O Union, strong and great!
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate.[1]

By the beginning of 1941 America had joined Britain in a "common-law alliance", as it was called, against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Britain was the belligerent partner. America remained technically neutral, while the President waited for interventionist sentiment to expand.

The need to rally all the peoples of the world, as well as his fellow Americans, against the menaces of Hitlerism and Fascism was constantly exercising Roosevelt's mind. He felt it his duty to assume leadership in assuring the peoples of the Americas and of Asia that the anti-Axis cause was the cause of freedom. He gave utterance to his fervor for freedom in an address to the White House Correspondents' Association on March 15, 1941. The speech came at a significant moment: four days after the passing of his Lend-Lease Act, which, according to Rosenman, he always called the "aid-to-democracies bill".[2] One theme, too, was also significant. Roosevelt declared: "There never has been, there isn't now, and there never will be, any race of people on earth fit to serve as masters over their fellow men . . . . We believe that any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its own nationhood."[3]

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[1]Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 24.

[2]Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 272-273.

[3]Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 69.

It was a theme constantly to be repeated, to foe and to ally, alike. By this American audience, described by Rosenman as consisting of newspapermen, hard-headed newspaper owners and editors, the speech was received with "great enthusiasm".

As Lend-Lease Administrator, the President's Assistant, Harry Hopkins, paid his second visit to London in July 1941. At this time, the President's military advisors held the view that the British were attaching too much importance to the Middle East. Their concern for the disposal of the equipment being sent from America justified, they believed, their raising this question with the Churchill government. Hopkins intimated this view to Churchill, who resisted the idea, but jumped at Hopkin's intimation that Roosevelt would welcome a personal meeting.[1] Churchill saw this conference as an opportunity to proclaim the close association of Britain and the United States, and what came to be called the Atlantic Charter, was a British production, suggested by Roosevelt, but cast in Churchill's own words.[2] One commentator saw Churchiavellian tactics in this. "Despite his preoccupations with military power", wrote Louis Wehle, "Roosevelt was never wholly free from the spell of Wilson's dream. It was this that enabled Churchill in August 1941, when the United States was still neutral, to tempt Roosevelt by concurrence in the Atlantic Charter

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[1]H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, (New York: St. Martin Press, Inc., 1955), p. 819.

[2]Winston Churchill, The Great Alliance, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), pp. 433-434.

into what was essentially a preliminary alliance with Britain. Churchill, the astute angler, was able to catch his fish with bait that probably appealed little to his own taste. He knew his man. In addition to its ringing "four freedoms" the document declared for "the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security to follow the war's end".[1] All this gives Roosevelt undeserved credit for political naivete. Indeed, Roosevelt himself desired such a joint-statement as a spur and encouragement for all nations then fighting the Axis. He also saw in the fluidity of the war situation a chance to strike a blow at the colonial concept. For what was in his mind on the way to Placentia Bay, the book of reminiscences by his son, Elliot, provides perhaps the best insight. It is a none-too-exact record which gives, however, at least the essence of the President's views, and of his persistent anti-imperialism.

Before the Conference, the President discussed with his son some of the requests he anticipated from Churchill. "Watch and see if the P. M. doesn't start off by demanding that we immediately declare war against the Nazis."[2] . . . . "The British Empire is at stake . . . . I think I speak as America's President when I say that America won't help England in this war simply so that she will be able to continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples. . . ."[3]

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[1]Louis B. Wehle, Hidden Threads of History: Wilson Through Roosevelt, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), pp. 229-30.

[2]Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce), p. 23.

[3]Ibid., pp. 24-25.
Elliott Roosevelt was able to produce verbatim reports of conversations with his father, without having made a verbatim record. The

Indeed, as President Roosevelt had anticipated, the colonial question provided the less amicable moments of the historic Atlantic meeting. After-dinner discussions between the leaders before their respective entourages grew acriminious on this issue. The President took an opportunity to tell the Prime Minister: "I can't believe that we can fight a war against Fascist slavery, and at the same time not work to free people all over the world from a backward colonial policy."[1] As Elliott Roosevelt wrote: "India, Burma - these were reproaches. Father having once mentioned them aloud, would keep reminding his British hearers of these, sticking his strong fingers into sore consciences, prodding, needling. And it was not from perversity, either; it was from conviction. Churchill knew that; that was what worried him most. Smoothly he changed the course of conversation . . . . to keep the subject away from Father and his mention of the colonial question . . . ."[2]

Later when Elliott suggested that the President and the Prime Minister could only get along if they kept off the subject of India, the President replied: "I think we'll even talk some more about India before we're through. And Burma. And Java. And Indo-China. And Indonesia. And all the African colonies. And Egypt. And Palestine. We'll talk about 'em all. . . ." Roosevelt knew that his meeting with one of the

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truth of his writings will tantalize historians and politicians, but his reports cannot be disregarded.

[1]Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 37.

[2]Ibid., p. 38.

belligerents would draw mixed reactions at home. But he knew also that his most devoted liberal supporters and most of his bitterest enemies among the isolationists were united at that time in their distrust of British Imperialism. He was not to be maneuvered therefore, into using, or appearing to use, American power to prop up the British Colonial Empire.[1] Indeed, in the desperation of Britain's struggle for survival, America could best exert salutary pressure on Britain to apply "Twentieth Century methods", Roosevelt termed it, to the development of her backward colonies. "The peace cannot include any continued despotism. The structure of the peace demands and will get equality of peoples."[2] Thus, thinks the British historian, Chester Wilmot, when Roosevelt added to Churchill's draft the statement that he and the Prime Minister wished to "see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of these", Roosevelt was thinking not only of the occupied countries of Europe, but also of colonial peoples throughout the world.[3]

The implications of Article III of the Charter were closely bound in Roosevelt's mind with those of the trade question, dealt with in Article IV. "The equality of people involves the utmost freedom of

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[1]William Hardy McNeill, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs: America, Britain and Russia, 1941-1946, (Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 40.

[2]Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 36.

[3]Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, (London: Collins, 1952), p. 633.

competitive trade", he told Elliott.[1] The liberalizing of international trade had always been a cardinal article of the New Deal, and there is much to suggest that some of the anti-colonial fervor was due to hostility to imperial preference. Assistant Secretary of State Welles, who was present, was impressed with the unhappy effects which the Ottawa Agreements, providing for imperial tariff preferences, had had on the economy of all nations, and particularly on that of the United States. It was his expectation that the British Prime Minister, now in no position of strength, would be willing to indicate his country's intention "to cooperate fully with the United States in holding out the hope that their two governments would assume leadership in bringing about the elimination of autarchic trade systems, and in abolishing such examples of discriminatory commercial arrangements as the imperial preferences themselves".[2]

Thus, to Churchill's draft of the fourth article, "they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of essential produce, not only within their territorial boundaries, but between the nations of the world". Roosevelt proposed to add the words "without discrimination and on equal terms". According to Churchill, this produced "the only serious difference" of the discussion for he at once objected that these words might call in question the Ottawa Agreements, and "I was in no position to accept them . . . . I could not help mentioning the British

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[1] Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 37.

[2] Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 176.

experience in adhering to Free Trade for eighty years in the face of ever-mounting American tariffs . . . . All we got in reciprocation was successive doses of American Protection . . . ."[1] Churchill, according to his narrative, then suggested the elimination of the phrase "without discrimination" and the additional insertion of the phrase "with due respect for their existing obligations". Thus Article IV finally read:

> They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world, which are needed for their economic prosperity.

To the Americans, it seemed more than the expression of pious hope it was meant to be. Welles wrote, "It was fully understood, however, that the reservation was inserted solely to take care of what it was hoped would be merely temporary impediments to the more far-reaching commitment originally envisaged in that article . . . ."[2] And the United States was to return again and again to the assault on the twin evils, as it seemed, of colonialism and colonial exclusiveness.

Accordingly, when the Conference ended and the world, learning of the secret "Atlantic Rendezvous", heard the Charter proclaimed, there was much ambiguity and mental reservations about the implications of the crucial clause III, as of clause IV. When Deputy-Premier Clement Attlee announced it to the British people, he imagined that Article III applied

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[1] Winston Churchill, The Great Alliance: The Second World War, Vol. III, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), pp. 436-437.

[2] Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 176.

to all peoples, as it said. As President of a still neutral nation, Roosevelt could not at once amplify the official announcement, but he was to make it clear later that he considered it - as a matter of fact and of record - to be of universal application. He allowed reporters to quote him directly as saying, "The Atlantic Charter applies to all humanity".[1] The British learned, observed Sherwood, "That when you state a moral principle you are stuck with it, no matter how many fingers you may have kept crossed at the moment".[2]

The significance of the word "all" was not lost on the world. It was not long before the people of India, Burma, Malay, Indonesia were beginning to ask if the Atlantic Charter extended also to the Pacific and to Asia in general. So acute and embarrassing did the questions become that Churchill was later compelled to take cognizance of them. Reporting to the House of Commons on September 9, 1941, the Prime Minister said:

> At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the states and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke; and the principles governing any alterations in their territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions, and people which owe allegiance to the British Crown.[3]

Thus, both leaders were aware that two constructions could be placed on Article III of the Charter. For the rest of the war, the two

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[1] New York Times, October 28, 1942.

[2] Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 362-363.

[3] Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, cols. 68-69.

brothers-in-arms engaged in a polite but relentless struggle between themselves to determine which of these interpretations should prevail.

CHAPTER IV

THE WAR: THE QUESTION OF INDIA

The possible interpretations of Article III came to the first test over the political status of the sub-continent of British India. It was certainly over the Indian question that feeling ran highest between the two leaders at the beginning of their wartime comradeship.[1] India was the greatest of the British colonies and the nearest to independence. The American people were generally strongly in sympathy with the Indians in their agitation for autonomy.[2] A willing ear was always given to the protests of Indian nationalist leaders, some of whom, like Gandhi and Nehru, had caught the popular fancy. Besides, Gandhi and many of the other leaders whose propoganda was so effective in the United States, held great hopes for America. "If my demands are just, America can insist on Indian independence", he is quoted as saying.[3] The American New Deal administration regarded India as a lamentable example of British imperialism, but, prior to Pearl Harbor, as an exclusive British responsibility. The

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[1] H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States, p. 819.

[2] Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 324. Welles noted that the propoganda of the Indian Congress "has been exceedingly successful in the United States in persuading a great majority of the American people that the only problem before the British Government is to clear out of India . . . ."

[3] Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 69.

coming of war changed this official reservation.[1]

In December 1941, as the advancing Japanese armies threatened India with the first large-scale invasion since British rule, the situation in India deteriorated in a disturbing manner. The great political parties, the Congress Party and the Moslem League, had chiefly in common a rigid hostility to the British Government, and gave small help to proposals for defense. Some of their politicians felt that if India could somehow throw off British connections, perhaps there would be no motive for a Japanese invasion. The peril to India might possibly only consist in her link with a British Empire. If this link could be severed, surely India could adopt the position of Eire . . .[2]

Under these circumstances, fearing the neutralist attitude, and jealous of obtaining the alliance of the Indian people in the fight against Japan, the United States government now felt it to be its responsibility to express its views and offer counsel on Indian affairs. They warned the British that the Indians must not be allowed to feel that they were being called on to fight another Asiatic power in order to preserve European rule in India.

But Churchill would not willingly agree to the leaders of a foreign state intervening as arbiter between representatives of the King-

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[1]Cordell Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 1485.

[2]Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 206, et. seq. "So, not without force, the arguement ran", Churchill commented.

Emperor and Messrs. Gandhi and Nehru. Nor could he trust the Americans as counsellors about the British Empire. "The concern of the Americans with the strategy of a world war", he wrote, "was bringing them into touch with political issues on which they had strong opinions and little experience."[1] He observed cuttingly, drawing on the usual British parallel between the respective "internal" problems of the Negro in America, and the Indians in the Empire, that "In countries where there is only one race, broad and lofty views are taken of the color question. Similarly, states which have no overseas colonies or possessions are capable of rising to moods of great elevation and detachment about the affairs of those who have".[2]

The first skirmish on this subject was in Washington, in the days after Pearl Harbor, when the two grand leaders organized the Alliance, and mapped out the whole strategy of allied defense. Churchill reports that the President discussed the Indian problem with him, "On the usual American lines". He stated that "I reacted so strongly and at such length that he never raised it verbally again".[3] Sherwood does not exaggerate when he wrote that India "was indeed one subject on which the normal, broad-minded, good-humored, give-and-take attitude which prevailed between the two statesmen was stopped cold. It may be said that Churchill would

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[1] Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 209.

[2] Ibid., p. 209.

[3] Ibid., p. 209.

see the Empire in ruins and himself buried under them before he would concede the right of any American, however great and illustrious a friend, to make any suggestions as to what he should do about India".[1]

In the course of the organization of the Grand Alliance some difficult points arose about what governments and authorities should sign the Declaration. "The War Cabinet", Churchill cryptically noted, "did not wish to include India as a separate sovereign power".[2] This closed that particular point. This did not close the whole issue. It was just the beginning of a continuing debate which exacerbated rather than reconciled the attitudes of the President and Prime Minister.

The course of the dispute can be traced in a succession of guardedly-worded letters exchanged between the two leaders during the first half of 1942. At the end of February, Roosevelt instructed his representative, Averell Harriman, to sound out Churchill on the possibility of a settlement between the British Government and the Indian political leaders. Churchill cabled the President on March 4 intimating that the War Cabinet was "earnestly considering whether a declaration of Dominion status after the war, carrying with it, if desired, the right to secede, should be made at this critical juncture".[3] To educate the Americans about the whole of the Indian problem, since they seemed familiar only with the Hindu attitude, Churchill on the same day sent the President full statements of the Indian

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[1]Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 512.

[2]Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 665-666.

[3]Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 209.

position from Moslem sources. A note from Mr. Jinnah, President of the Moslem League, demanded a partition of India, involving a transmigration of millions, which Churchill considered impossible in wartime, with invasion already looming on the scene. Later, on March 7, "in pursuance of my plan of having you informed about our Indian policy", Churchill sent the President a telegram from the Governor of the Punjab, indicating the danger of disturbing British politics at a time when things "are increasingly aquiver".[1]

The President replied with his private views about the subcontinent. Roosevelt expressed diffidence in making suggestions on a subject "which of course all you good people know far more about than I do". But he went on to indicate a move which he considered - in a phrase significant for its indications of his world-view - "to be in line with the world changes of the past half-century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism".[2] Roosevelt drew on the early experience of the United States under the Articles of Confederation to suggest the setting up of what might be called a temporary government in India, headed by a small representative group.[3] He gave Churchill, rather superfluously, a short lesson in early United States history, and expressed his belief that "the analogy of some such method to the travails and problems

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[1] Winston Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 211-212.

[2] Ibid., pp. 213-214.

[3] Ibid., p. 213. Churchill published the letter in his book, and, in an indulgent footnote, added two corrections to Roosevelt's resume of American constitutional history.

of the United States from 1783 to 1789 might give a new slant in India itself, and it might cause the people there to forget hard feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the danger of Japanese domination . . . . "[1]

The conflicts of attitudes are sharply illustrated by the commentaries later made on this plan by Welles and by Churchill. Wrote Welles in 1946, "The British Labor Government, which has patently been moved by a sincere intent finally to solve the question of Indian independence in a manner wholly fair to the Indian people, must have regretted the angry refusal of Winston Churchill four years previously to adopt the suggestions made to him by President Roosevelt. For if those suggestions had at that time been laid before the Indian leaders, it is in the highest degree likely that they would then have been accepted, and that much subsequent danger and controversy might thus have been avoided".[2] But Churchill was to note Roosevelt's letter with the scathing observation: "This document is of high interest because it illustrates the difficulties of comparing situations in various centuries and scenes where almost every material fact is totally different, and the dangers of trying to apply any superficial resemblances which may be noticed to the conduct of war".[3]

Nevertheless, in the days of March 1942, when the Japanese army had entered Rangoon, and when the political deadlock rendered the Indian problem of crucial importance, the attitude of Roosevelt was an

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[1]Winston Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 213.

[2]Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading?, p. 328.

[3]Winston Churchill, Hinge of Fate., p. 214.

important factor to be considered, and contributed to the British government's decision to send Sir Stafford Cripps to India to conduct direct discussions on the spot with the leaders of all Indian parties and communities. In his letter to the Viceroy of India (March 10), the Prime Minister wrote, "It would be impossible, owing to unfortunate rumors and publicity and the general American outlook, to stand on a purely negative attitude, and the Cripp's Mission is indispensable to prove our honesty of purpose and to gain time for the necessary consultations".[1]

When Cripps arrived in New Delhi on March 22, he was soon followed there by Col. Louis Johnson, a former Assistant Secretary of War, now the Presidential representative in India. Sir Stafford had lengthy discussions with the Indian leaders in which, to the outspoken annoyance of the Governor-General, the American representative participated. Governor-General Wavell, according to a dispatch read to Hopkins by Churchill, laid great stress on the fact "that Johnson acts and talks as though he were sent to India as Roosevelt's personal representative to mediate in the Indian crisis."[2] Apparently Johnson viewed this as his duty. However, Hopkins soothed Churchill by pointing out that he believed Cripps had only been using Johnsen for his own ends, being anxious to have Roosevelt identified with his proposals.[3] Churchill, not wishing to involve the United States in what he called "a constitutional question", wrote the

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[1] Ibid., p. 215.

[2] Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 524, Sherwood quotes from Hopkins' notes.

[3] Ibid., p. 524.

Viceroy to assure him that Johnson was not acting as personal representative to the President in those negotiations between the Indian Congress and Cripps.[1]

The Cripps mission acknowledged failure on April 11. Churchill immediately transmitted their telegram to the President, with his reply. Roosevelt was grieved at the setback and told Hopkins in a letter for transmission to Churchill, that the American public feels, almost universally, that the deadlock has been due to the British Government's unwillingness to concede the right of self-government to the Indians, notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust to the competent British authorities technical, military and naval defense control. Roosevelt felt compelled to address Churchill "very frankly" on this issue. "Should the current negotiations be allowed to collapse because of the issues as presented to the people of America, and should India subsequently be invaded successfully by Japan, with attending serious defeats of a military or naval character for our side, it would be hard to overestimate the prejudicial reaction on American public opinion".[2]

He urged that Cripps make another effort, and this time offer the component group in India the opportunity to set up a nationalist government in India, and to have a period of trial before deciding on "their future relationship" with the British Empire.

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[1] Winston Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 218.

[2] Ibid., pp. 218-219.

The Prime Minister's reaction was conclusive and his subsequent commentary bitter:

> I was thankful that events had already made such an act of madness impossible. The human race cannot make progress without idealism, but idealism at other people's expense and without regard to the consequences . . . cannot be considered as its highest or noblest form. The President's mind was back in the American War of Independence . . . . nor was the one upon which the satisfying of public opinion in the United States could be a determining factor. We could not desert the Indian peoples by abandoning our responsibility and leaving them to anarchy or subjugation . . .[1]

But Churchill kept his feelings under control. In the letter of April 12, the day Sir Stafford Cripps left by air for England, the Former Naval Person wrote to President Roosevelt. "You know the weight which I attach to everything you say to me, but I do not feel I could take the responsibility for the defense of India if everything had to be thrown again into the melting pot at this critical juncture . . . ." There was a sincere pleading in the last sentence of his letter, "Anything like a serious difference between you and me would break my heart, and would surely deeply injure both our countries at the height of this terrible struggle."[2] If Roosevelt had expected the fluidity of the war situation to compel a new attitude on the part of Colonial Britain, Churchill was able to plead in turn the limits that the war emergency placed on any alterations in the status quo. The Indian situation, dead-locked at home, likewise remained at an impasse, as regards Anglo-American relations.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 218-219.

[2] Ibid., pp. 220-221.

In American eyes, and, indeed, in the opinion of many Englishmen, Prime Minister Churchill had a bad record on India. Churchill considered India - what his father had described as "that most truly bright and precious gem in the crown of the Queen" - to be an essential part of one of the noblest political creations of mankind, the British Commonwealth and Empire. To maintain the British supremacy, he contradicted his own liberal record by a fierce opposition to Indian self-government, in the years between 1929 and 1935. Thus, in an address before a demonstration at the Albert Hall on March 18, 1931, he denounced any policy of "scuttle".

> What spectacle can be more sorrowful than that of this powerful country casting away with both hands . . . the great inheritance which centuries have gathered? What spectacle can be more strange, more monstrous in its perversity, than to see the Viceroy (Lord Irwin) and the high officials and agents of the crown in India laboring with all their influence and authority to unite and weave together into a conspiracy all the forces adverse and hostile to our rule in India?[1]

This theme was developed in a score of speeches. These speeches were almost as well-remembered in Washington as in New Delhi. It appeared that memories of India, from the days when he served there as a junior army officer - and read with rapture in Gibbon of the Roman Empire of Hadrian and the two Antonines - greatly influenced his judgment. He was unwilling to admit India's capacity for peaceful self-rule, for his memories dwelt on Indian corruption and decay, the illiterate rancor of Hindu against Moslem, and the suffocating system of caste; and he did not wish to view the liquidation of the constructive work of Clive and Dalhousie. In these views, Churchill was to the right of many of his Tory colleagues.

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[1]Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill 1874-1951, (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1951), p. 229.

But in March 1942, he was able to command the support of the Coalition on his views on India.[1] Had he not had the support of his colleagues, he stated in all earnestness, he would not have hesitated to resign.[2] The fact that the Congress Party turned down the proposals of Cripps - himself a known sympathizer for Indian self-rule - and then called for what was virtually open insurrection, played into Churchill's hands. For the moment, the settlement of India's future was left, properly, he felt, to Britain.

The President's convictions remained entirely unaltered. To Roosevelt, Empire was irreconcilable with the new conception of international morality, and the imperative need of a new world order. If this new world order were not invoked, and actively promulgated, before war was over, one would look for it in vain in the static conditions of peace. India was the ideal and the inevitable test case of the Atlantic Charter. Fresh after its proclamation, and not to be put off into the limbo of post-war settlement, rose this problem of its interpretation. For Roosevelt to postpone this issue, even had he been so minded, would have been to lose his case. Roosevelt could not fail to recall that the 1914-1918 War in Europe had given a stimulus to Asiatic nationalism. As a student of Wilson's diplomacy, Roosevelt knew that it was a shock to Asians, when

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[1]Churchill said he was "of course committed to Indian self-government" - Hinge of Fate, p. 207 - but his mind dwelt upon the obstacles to self-government, and his commitment was to a rather distant and undefined future.

[2]Hinge of Fate, p. 220.

they were given to understand by the Great Powers that, in effect, self-determination had no validation East of Suez. He was soon to resume the colonial question, with reference to the Far East, this time with Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister.

In May 1942, the Axis was still very much in the ascendant, or so it seemed, and another carefully stage-managed meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, taking place this time on May 1, near Salzburg, and inevitably ending in "perfect accord", sounded grimly foreboding. Molotov came to Washington via London to resolve with Roosevelt certain outstanding difficulties, the chief of which was the question of Lend-Lease supplies, and the heavy losses of convoys on the perilous long-daylights of the Murmansk routes. To the already heavy and urgent agenda, the President later added the subject of an international trusteeship over islands and colonial possessions to be taken away from "weak nations".[1] He took as examples of the colonies of "weak nations", Indo-China, Siam, the Malay States and the Dutch East Indies. Each of these areas, Sherwood reports him as saying,[2] would require a different lapse of time before achieving readiness for self-government, but a palpable surge towards independence was there just the same, and the white nations thus could not hope to hold these areas as colonies in the long run. Roosevelt noted that a third member of the Big Four, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, had the idea that some

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[1]Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 572.

[2]Ibid., p. 573. Sherwood described the proceedings of the final meeting of the President Molotov and Hopkins, on Monday, June 1, from the record made by Prof. Samuel H. Cross of Harvard, Roosevelt's interpreter.

form of international trusteeship would be the best mode of administering these territories until they were ready for self-government. The President hoped that Mr. Molotov would bring this suggestion to Mr. Stalin. Mr. Molotov declared that he had considered and reported to Moscow the President's earlier proposals as to post-war organization (in particular, disarmament), and that he had no doubt "that the President's trusteeship principle would be equally well received in Moscow" . . . . and that the "President's proposals could be effectively worked out".[1]

Roosevelt felt that the Russian ally, like the Chinese, would be in favor of the removal of outdated colonial systems as a necessary part of post-war reorganization. The significance of this episode lies in the fact that it was the first attempt to sound out the third Great Power on the question and to range the anti-colonial three against the fourth. This alignment was to be an important ingredient in American policy making at subsequent Big Power Conferences.

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[1]Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 573.

CHAPTER V

THE WAR: THE CRISIS OF INDIA

The most fateful possibility of this war, in the opinion of Secretary of State Hull, whose memoirs are revealing on the State Department's Indian policies, was the juncture of German and Japanese forces in the Indian area during those months of uninterrupted disaster in 1942.

As described before, the situation at the time of the Atlantic Charter gave neutral America the opportunity to impress on the British Government the need for a reappraisal - however unwilling - of the colonial question. Yet with Britain fighting for her life, the Americans had to avoid any step that would impede her struggle. In publicly stating their conviction that subject peoples should be assisted towards self-government and eventual independence, the American leaders had avoided specific references to India.

Nevertheless, Hull relates, "We were saying privately everything that the most enthusiastic supporter of India's freedom could have expected and we were convinced that the American people were with us."[1] Hull's writings clearly reveal that enthusiasm for India's independence was not limited to an idealistic President, but was shared by the State Department branch of the Administration, at least. When Ambassador Winant advocated on August 1, 1941, that the United States government suggest to

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[1]Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948), Vol. II, p. 1463.

the British that an agreement on dominion status be made for India, Assistant Secretary Berle and Wallace Murray, Chief of the Near Eastern Division, supported this recommendation. Under-Secretary Welles recommended that this be done in a confidential way, by direct personal contact between Roosevelt and Churchill.[1] A few days later the two leaders drafted Article III of the Charter.

The Americans had known of the interpretation Churchill planned to give Article III in his speech to the House of Commons on September 9, 1941. "Ambassador Winant had tried to persuade the Prime Minister to eliminate the passage from his speech - without success". However, the American leaders had no desire to engage in an open altercation with the British, and made no public contradiction. But Hull "had India in mind" when he made utterances such as these: "We have always believed - and we believe today - that all peoples without distinction of race, color or religion, who are prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment".[2]

Thus, when on August 8, 1942, the Anniversary of the Charter, the Office of War Information suggested an exchange of messages between the Premier and the President, the British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell wrote the State Department to urge that the messages be carefully concerted, and that any reference to India or Burma should be consistent with the

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[1] Ibid., pp. 1483-4.

[2] Radio address of July 23, 1942, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 1484.

Prime Minister's statement of September 9, 1941. It was not to be expected that the exchange of declarations, requested for morale purposes by an allied propoganda agency, would display any breach in the unanimity of Anglo-American relations. The President's message simply avoided going into the question of interpretation of the Charter. The same month, however, Hull pointed out to Halifax that the British Empire would probably run into constant difficulties if it should seek to have the Atlantic Charter applied in separate compartments.

This was the attitude with which Roosevelt, Hull, and other American leaders viewed the failure of the Cripps mission. Hull called in British Ambassador Halifax several times to discuss the disquieting news from India, and "the fateful possibility" of its loss to Japan. On their part, the British government, though still considering India their private concern, continued to keep the State Department informed of developments - certainly as a matter of urgent common wartime interest - and partly, also, to re-educate American opinion, or at least to emphasize the British standpoint.

It was on August 8, again, that a message came from Deputy-Premier Attlee, stating the British government's intention to arrest Gandhi and certain other leaders of the movement if the program of civil disobedience went into effect. Mr. Attlee expressed the confidence of his government that the President would agree that there was no other course open.[1] The President thought it best not to reply to this

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[1] Ibid., p. 1488.

communication, and Hull, concurring, added in his memorandum to the President that "if the British government would repeat with full emphasis its proposal . . . . it might lead to the resumption of discussions". The Americans were concerned lest their position among the Asian peoples be adversely affected by a belief on their part that they were helping Britain maintain her imperial policy in the Orient. "Disturbing indications" reached Washington that the Congress Party supporters were tending to believe that was the purpose of American troops in India. With the President's approval, a draft of instructions for the United States forces was prepared and made public to show that American troops were there for the sole purpose of prosecuting the war against the Axis Powers, and to prove that American hands were guiltless of any support for colonialism".[1]

Meantime, the President had received a trusting appeal for assistance from Gandhi. The reply, under the circumstances, and with respect for the interests of an ally, could only be one of studied vagueness. It stated in effect that the United States Government had consistently striven for and supported policies of fair dealing and fair play and all related principles.[2] The letter concluded with the hope that, "our common interest in democracy and righteousness will enable your countrymen and mine to make common cause against a common enemy". Since Gandhi was in jail on August 5, the letter, which could offer him scant comfort anyway, was not delivered for two years.

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[1] Ibid., p. 1489.

[2] Ibid., pp. 1489-1490.

The campaign of resistance continued - and apparently was viewed with sympathy as well as impatience by the American people. Continuing his discussions with Halifax, Hull remarked that during the deadlock there was in prospect in the United States such a general movement of agitation against India as might create complications later on.[1] He persisted in urging continued British concessions. Halifax, a former Viceroy of India and by now well accumstomed to what Churchill had called "the usual American line" . . . "did not take issue with my views".[2]

The whole subject was dramatized with the return of Wendell Willkie from his trip around the world.[3] On October 26, 1942, in a nation-wide broadcast, Willkie, the defeated Presidential candidate of 1940, reported to the American people that from Cairo onwards, the millions of the East were asking about India and wondering about the application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. He declared, "When the aspirations of India for freedom were put aside to some future unguaranteed date, it was not Great Britain that suffered in public esteem in the Far East - it was the United States". Willkie reported that Asian people asked, "Is freedom supposed to be priceless for the white man or for the Western world, but of no account to us in the East?"[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 1490.

[2] Ibid., p. 1491.

[3] Chester Bowles says that when Willkie set out to see One World, he was asked by timid diplomats to by-pass India. Ambassador's Report, p.69.

[4] New York Times, October 27, 1942.

In a press conference next day, Roosevelt re-affirmed positively that the Atlantic Charter applies to all humanity. To clear up a possible cause of confusion, he added that the agreement had been called the Atlantic Charter because of the place at which it was signed.[1]

In a further speech ten days after, at the New York Times Hall, Willkie criticized the "white man's burden philosophy" in the Western allied powers attitude to the East. He was glad that Roosevelt "stated clearly and without reservations that the Atlantic Charter applies to the entire world". The pact was signed by two men, however, one of whom had given it an altogether different interpretation. Eastern people did not know what was meant.[2]

Four days later Churchill emphatically made clear what he meant. In the triumph of the Alamein victory, and the announcement of the North African landings, he felt able in his speech at the Lord Mayor's Mansion House Dinner, to direct at his North American ally, his best-known utterance on the colonial issue:

> Let me, however, make this clear, in case there should be any mistake about it in any quarter; we mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.[3]

However impressed they might have been by the majesty of his diction, the American policy makers did not lose interest in Indian independence, or alter their attitudes to the colonial problem generally. The

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[1] New York Times, October 28, 1942.

[2] New York Times, November 7, 1942.

[3] New York Times, November 11, 1942.

The United States instead proceeded to take a cautious initiative. William Phillips, former Under Secretary of State and Ambassador to Italy, "one of our most competent diplomats" was sent to succeed Col. Johnson as the President's representative. Phillips received comprehensive instructions in a cable from Hull. Hull writes, "I said that the President and I and the entire Government earnestly favored freedom for all dependent peoples at the earliest date practicable. Our course in dealing with the Phillipines offered, I thought, a perfect example of how a nation should treat a colony or dependency in cooperating with it to make all necessary preparations for freedom. We offered this as a strong example to all other countries and their dependencies."[1] Though thus pluming himself upon the example of American administration, Hull knew the British were not very willing to take lessons in colonial administration from the United States. Hull evidently expected diplomatic skill of a very high order on the part of Phillips, for he suggested that though "we could not bring pressue to bear on the British . . . . we could in a friendly spirit talk bluntly and earnestly to appropriate British officials so long as they understood that it was our purpose to treat them in a thoroughly friendly way". Phillips' situation, already complicated by the nuances of these complicated orders, was rendered difficult and unsatisfactory when the Viceroy of India forbade him to call on the ground that it would be dangerous to the British-Indian situation.[2]

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[1] Cordell Hull, pp. 1491-1492.

[2] Ibid., p. 1492.

The days of Gandhi's fast in prison were of immense concern in Washington. Churchill made it clear that he earnestly hoped Britain's difficulties would not be added to at that time by American intervention. Roosevelt decided that the United States would say nothing further now, but that, in the event that Gandhi died, he would have some statement to make.[1]

In April 1943, Phillips wrote a letter to the President summing up his impressions on the situation in India. It "did not make very pleasant reading". "The British had been completely successful in supressing any movement among the Indians that might be interpreted as leading towards independence. Twenty thousand Congress leaders remained in jail without trial".[2] However, the American government seemed unable to influence British policy in India. And, as the year passed, anti-American feeling among the Indians rose, for the nationalist leaders suspected that the British government would be less intransigent without the buttress of United States troops in the region.

On February 1, 1944, a statement was made by the President, which, on the authority of Hull who helped prepare it, was intended chiefly to dissociate American activities in India, (base for operations in China), from those of the British. "Nobody in India or anywhere else in Asia will misunderstand the presence there of American armed forced if they will believe that their job is to assure the defeat of Japan", without which, the statement pointedly added, "there can be no opportunity for any of us to

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[1] Ibid., p. 1493. [2] Ibid., p. 1494.

enjoy and expand the freedoms for which we fight".[1]

Meanwhile, the Americans took care to keep all propoganda work based in India completely separate from similar work by the British, avoiding that harmonizing of views for which, on the Atlantic Charter anniversary, the British had asked.

In the summer of 1944, the month after the allied assault on Fortress Europe, an unexpected and serious issue arose between the Americans and the British when an American columnist published a large portion of Phillips' letter to the President of the year before. The letter created excitement in America; it evoked reminiscences of Phillips' grandfather, the noted Abolitionist. There was more 'restless, prying, conscientious criticism' by Americans, and resentment in Britain.

The British government repeatedly protested, and requested a statement from the American government dissociating itself from the views expressed in the letter. The President declined to make any such public statement.[2]

By the end of 1944, the danger of Japanese attack had been removed. But the continued American interest showed that the government's zeal for an Indian settlement was not urged only by the strategic factors of the war situation. "India continued", said Hull, "to be one of the principal foci of a general policy on dependent peoples".[3] Such was the American official attitude.

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[1]Hull, p. 1494.

[2]Ibid., p. 1495.

[3]Ibid., p. 1496.

The crisis of India was one of grave concern for the peoples of America, as well as their leaders. There developed a groundswell of anti-colonial feeling of which the American policy-makers could not fail to take cognizance. The war, and the need to thoughtfully re-examine their ideals in the face of Nazi dogma sharpened Americans' moral sense at the same time as it drew their attention to conditions and places in which they had previously taken small interest.

There was small favor for the maintenance of British rule in India. Indeed, to many Americans, this was no longer the question. The problem was how and when India was to gain its independence; whatever the British standpoint, it received scant sympathy. It was evident that the British disliked being maneuvered, or virtually blackmailed, by the sudden circumstances of war into the granting of independence. The British government wanted to be the sole judge of the time and measure of each advance; change must be evolutionary, the continuation and ripening of a long historical tradition. But America, a revolutionary nation, not too much in favor of these Burkean principles, called for a fresh start in India, preceded perhaps by a sort of Declaration of the End of Empire.

Americans tended to sympathize with the Indian viewpoint. On September 14, within a fortnight after the Viceroy had declared India a belligerent in the war against Germany, the Indian Congress had proclaimed:

> If Great Britain fights for the maintenance and extension of democracy, then she must necessarily end imperialism in her own possessions and establish full democracy in India; and the Indian people must have the right of self-determination to frame their

> own constitution through a Constituent Assembly without external interference and must guide their own policy.[1]

To Americans, this seemed entirely reasonable. They viewed with concern, and with an impatience directed chiefly against the British, the campaign of civil disobedience started by Gandhi, the representative and indeed the incarnation of the aspirations of the praying and toiling masses of Indian peoples. For this limited or 'symbolic' disobedience was started, as it seemed, to press India's just claim for immediate freedom.

One of the reasons for the failure of the Cripps Mission was that it not only proposed a partition of India to satisfy the Moslem League leaders, but also allowed the Indian principalities to "Contract out" of the Indian federation. Gandhi, like Lincoln, preferred chaos in India to partition. The abortive Cripps Mission served to convince Americans of the impossibility of successful negotiations limited to British and Indians. With increasing force and vigor, pressure was brought on the American government to take the initiative in resolving the crisis of India. A group of one hundred and fifty-one Americans, prominent in many walks of life, signed and endorsed a statement which was read into the Congressional Record on October 6, 1942. The statement began by placing the problem of India in the context of war strategy:

> The people of the United States view the situation in India with great alarm because it threatens the victory of the United Nations. With increasing numbers of our troops and vast quantities of our supplies in India, we have been offered and have accepted a

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[1] From Julia Johnsen's compilation, Independence for India, (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1943), p. 32.

> large share of her defense which may involve the fate of China and her continued ability to participate in the war. Failure to use the full might of India's 400,000,000 people in the all-out war effort against the Axis would be paid for by the lives of Americans and of our allies.

The statement expressed awareness of the efforts of all parties to reach a solution, and of the immense difficulties involved. It posed the fundamental dilemna:

> We are bound by the closest ties with our British allies in their gallant struggle for human freedom. We are in fullest accord with the people of India in their aspirations for self-government.

The prominent Americans[1] then urged:

> that President Roosevelt tender the good offices of the United States in cooperation with other members of the United Nations to obtain the full participation of the Indian people in the war and to assure their political freedom.

Likewise, a popular assembly of Americans, at a Town Hall Meeting in New York, on August 6, 1942, passed a resolution on India, and sent it to President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Mr. Nehru.

This resolution placed the problem in the larger context of the fight for freedom for all the world. "The cause of India is the cause of all supporters of democracy throughout the world." Then it added, significantly: "It is peculiarly the cause of all of us Americans, who, since

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[1] Congressional Record, October 6, 1942, p. A 3854, and quoted in Julia Johansen's compilation, Independence for India, p. 159. This excellent book of record was the source of much of the material used in this chapter.

The prominent Americans included Louis Adamic, Pearl Buck, W. E. duBois, Freda Kirchwey, Bishop Oxnam, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, Margaret Sanger, Clarence Streit, Walter White and William Allen White.

our own struggle for independence, have supported the aspirations of all other peoples battling against alien rule". It rejected all temporizing:

> The argument that freedom should not be accorded in wartime is to us without merit. The problem of the transfer of power presents no insuperable obstacles. India is sufficiently united under the leadership of the National Congress to maintain order and to help in her defense.

Indeed, the statement endorsed the argument of the Congress Party that an India in bondage could play no effective part in defending itself:

> Not words but deeds will arouse the enthusiasm of masses of men who doubt the professions of democratic aims without their reality. In this spirit, we urge the greatest possible expression of American support of the cause of India's freedom.[1]

The vigorous speeches of Wendell Willkie offer evidence that a sentiment in favor of immediate independence was not the monopoly of the Democratic New Deal. In one of his speeches, recorded in Julia Johansen's book of reference, Willkie took a far-sighted statesmanlike view of the crisis of India:[2]

> India is our problem. If Japan should conquer that vast subcontinent, we will be the losers. In the same sense, the Philippines are a British problem. If we fail to deliver, by force of arms, the independence we have promised to the Filipinos, the whole Pacific world will be the loser. We must believe these simple truths and speak them loudly and without fear. Only in this way can the peoples of the world forge, in this war, the strength and confidence in each other which we will need to win the peace.

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[1] Julia Johnsen, Independence for India, pp. 159-160.

[2] Ibid., p. 174.

Indeed, to gain this confidence, these questions had to be answered: Did the Atlantic Charter apply only to the continents washed by the North Atlantic? Were darker peoples to have no stake in the war between rival oppressors? Could a world war be limited in its implications? The Indian leader, Nehru, saw this world war as part of a great revolution taking place throughout the world. "Causes lie deep", he wrote, "and it would be foolish to imagine that all our present troubles are due to the vanity and insatiable ambition of certain individuals or peoples". To Nehru, those individuals or peoples "represent evil tendencies, but they also represent the urge for change from an order that has lost stability and equilibrium, and that is heartily disliked" by vast numbers of peoples. "Part of the aggressors' strength is certainly due to their challenge to this old system. To oppose these inevitable changes and seek to perpetuate the old, or even to be passive about them, is to surrender on a revolutionary plane to the aggressor countries."[1]

Thoughtful Americans could agree: the "new order" of the Axis must be opposed by a better world order, not by the proposal to return to an unsatisfactory status quo.

Finally, the awareness was clearly brought home to Americans that an ill-construction was being placed by Asians on their "abstentions" over India. The reservoir of goodwill for America, created by the disinterested efforts of missionaries and engineers, and the partisanship

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[1]Johnsen, p. 103-112. The excerpts are from an article entitled "India's Day of Reckoning" and published in Fortune on April 12, 1942.

and sympathy of journalists and travellers, rapidly began to evaporate. People and leaders were alarmed at the prospect of this undeserved Eastern distrust. A strong element in America's policy was thenceforth the continued effort to preserve the good name of non-imperialist America. This need to convince all beholders that the United States did not seek to extend her rule, was to be an essential factor in America's attitude to the colonial question, not only in India, but in all Asia, and in Africa as well.

CHAPTER VI

THE WAR: FROM CASABLANCA TO DUMBARTON OAKS

India was not the sole area to which American anti-colonial policies were applied; neither was Britain the only nation subject to American disapproval on account of a firm imperial grasp on colonial peoples striving for their own independence. It would even appear that the colonial controversy reached a high mark when the eventual disposal of the colonies of France came under consideration in French Casablanca, at the Anglo-American Conference held there in February 1943.

Russia should have been a participant in this Conference held chiefly to discuss the best way of attacking Germany in Europe in 1943. Stalin, in declining to attend, reminded Roosevelt and Churchill about implementing promises of a second front.[1]

On this subject, the record of the meeting can be pieced together from numerous memoranda. So can the details of the meetings between President Roosevelt, and the rival French leaders, Giraud and de Gaulle. However, for the President's personal opinions about the future of France's possessions, a side issue of the Conference, there are only Elliott Roosevelt's recollections of private and informal interchanges between father and son, where conversation was free and unguarded. Elliott

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[1] Churchill quotes Stalin's letter, Hinge of Fate, p. 667.

relates his father as saying that apart from the fact that the Allies would have to maintain military control of French colonies in North Africa for months or years, he was not certain that "we" (presumably the Americans) would be right to return France her colonies at all, without obtaining for each individual colony some acceptable pledge about its future administration. "But after all", Elliott quotes himself, "they do belong to France". The President asked by what logic, custom or historical rule? Why was it so easy for the Japanese to conquer Indo-China? Because the downtrodden Indo-Chinese thought that anything must be better than to live under French rule.[1] There would be another war, the President added, if after this war, Americans allowed millions of people to slide back into the same semi-slavery. His last words of one midnight conversation were, as Elliott remembers, "When we've won the war, I will work with all my might and main to see to it that the United States is not wheedled into the position of accepting any plan that will further France's imperialistic ambitions, or that will aid or abet the British empire in its imperial ambitions".

Though there can be no corroboration of this episode, and no certainty of the accuracy of the quotation, Hopkins' papers and the memoirs of Cordell Hull, show that Elliott Roosevelt was not an inaccurate

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[1] Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, pp. 114-116.
Hull quotes in his Memoirs (Vol. II, p. 1597) a memorandum from the President, who wrote, "France has had the country - thirty million inhabitants - for nearly 100 years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning".

reporter of the views his father always held on the colonial question. Certainly the President was equally distrustful of the activities and intentions of British and French in South-East Asia, and he suspected that they were informally leagued together to sustain each other's colonial possessions.

The next month, when British Foreign Secretary Eden came to Washington for his first visit, Roosevelt made him understand what were America's views on the future of the colonies. On March 27, there was a meeting of Roosevelt, Eden, Hull, Halifax and Strang, the British Undersecretary of State. "The whole idea of the trusteeship of mandated islands, etc. was discussed." The President made it clear that he did not want a commitment made in advance that all those colonies in the Far East should go back to the countries which owned or controlled them prior to the war. He specifically mentioned Timor and Indo-China.[1] On March 29, in a postprandial conversation, Eden and Hopkins reviewed the results of the trip. Eden told Hopkins that "the President had once or twice urged the British to give up Hongkong as a gesture of 'good-will'. He suggested a number of such gestures". "Eden dryly remarked", wrote Hopkins, "that he had not heard the President suggest any similar gestures on our own part". Evidently no important British visitor to the White House was to be left in

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[1] Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 717-719. This time it is to the notes of Hopkins quoted by Sherwood that one is indebted, for this other revealing episode.

Hull noted further that Roosevelt suggested to Eden that a trusteeship be set up for Indo-China. Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 1597. The French dependency stuck in his mind, believed Hull, as having been the springboard for the Japanese attack on the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.

any uncertainty as to the President's colonial attitudes. These attitudes were translated into positive proposals in a policy statement drafted for discussion with the British at the forthcoming conference in Quebec. The conference had been called in view of prospects of victory in Sicily, the Italian situation, and the need to prescribe a grand strategy for the war in South-East Asia.

Intense thought had also been given by policy-makers to the subject of dependent peoples. The draft plan was the work of many months of study, and was written under Hull's guidance by Leo Pasvolsky, with the help of Green Hackworth and Stanley Hornbeck.[1] Portions of the draft paper offer the earliest and most explicit enunciation of United States policy towards colonial peoples. The first part applied to colonies held, or claimed by the Great Powers. The latter part dealt with peoples set free from Axis rule and unprepared for self-government. In the first part of the draft agreement, colonial powers were called upon:

> To make continuous efforts towards the political, economic, social and educational advancement of their colonial peoples.
>
> To make governmental posts available to qualified colonial personnel.
>
> To progressively grant appropriate measures of self-government.
>
> To fix, at the earliest practicable moment, the dates for full independence.
>
> To pursue policies developing the resources of the territories in the interests of the peoples concerned, and of the whole world.

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[1] Hull, p. 1234.

> With regards to territories freed from the Axis, and unprepared for full independence, it would be the purpose of the United Nations to assume a special responsibility analgous to that of a trustee or fiduciary. The duty of the United Nations would be to give fullest cooperation to these peoples in their efforts to prepare themselves for independence.[1]

It will be observed that every effort was made to impose the viewpoint of the United States on the proposed United Nations organization, on the authority of the Atlantic Charter, of which the United States was, of course, a signatory.

The British, who were equally entitled to an interpretation of the Charter, were not amicably disposed to this American draft. Eden disliked the proposals, specifically because of the use of the word "independence".[2] This, and the injunction to develop colonies in the interests of the world, seemed directed primarily at the British Commonwealth and Empire. Hull lectured him for some length on the "usual American lines", citing the Philippines. Eden's position remained unchanged. But Hull believed that the subject was "too important for the long-range advancement of the world to let it drop" after the Conference, and brought it up again and again with the British.[3]

Hull was prepared to take this draft declaration with him at the forthcoming conference in Moscow of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China.

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[1]Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945, (Washington: 1949), pp. 471-472.

[2]Hull, op. cit., II, pp. 1234-1235.

[3]Ibid., p. 1235.

At a final meeting with the United States delegation on October 6, 1943, before their departure for Russia, Roosevelt reaffirmed his support of the American plan for dependent peoples. He urged Hull and his associates to lay great stress on the possibilities of trusteeship. According to Admiral Leahy, the President's Chief-of-Staff, who was present, Roosevelt specifically suggested trusteeship for Korea and Indo-China, and also proposed certain other areas for international trusteeship control to provide a string of strategic bases around the globe. Evidently Roosevelt wished to apply the trusteeship idea to all sorts of situations. Trusteeship "was one of Roosevelt's pet ideas", Leahy noted.[1]

At Moscow, Hull distributed the document to give the conferees a precise idea of the American position. The Russians were insistent that all priority be given to the question of the second front. Consequently, when the colonial draft did come up Hull realized that there was not sufficient time for the conference to consider it. Molotov said he felt that the question of dependent peoples should receive further study, but that his government attached great importance to it. Eden stated that his government was not in agreement with the view set forth in the paper.[2]

It is perhaps significant that Churchill's history makes no reference of these negotiations at Quebec and Moscow, while Hull's Memoirs stress at length the insistence and importance of the efforts he had made.

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[1]William D. Leahy, I Was There, (New York: 1950), p. 314.

[2]Hull, p. 1305.

Hull was later to write:

> "We had definite ideas with respect to the future of the British Colonial Empire, on which we differed from the British". He added by way of explanation, "It might be said that the future of that Empire was no business of ours; but we felt that unless dependent peoples were assisted toward ultimate self-government and were given it when, as we said, they were worthy of it and ready for it, they would provide kernels of conflict."[1]

At the next Big Power Conferences at Teheran and Cairo, the President himself advanced the case of the colonies. At their first meeting, November 28, 1943, Roosevelt and Stalin at Teheran aligned themselves at once in favor of the education of the peoples of the Far East in the arts of self-government. Roosevelt said that reform in India should begin at the bottom. Stalin, who was very knowing in these matters, said that reform at the bottom would mean Revolution. Roosevelt cautioned Stalin against bringing up the problem of India with Churchill.[2] Later, Roosevelt felt he had won the wholehearted support of Generalissimo Chiang and Marshal Stalin for an international trusteeship over Indo-China.[3]

He told his son, Elliott, at another of their after-session dialogues that Chiang had been cheered by his attitude on colonial questions.[4] Thus were Three of the Big Powers ranged against a Fourth. Roosevelt was not inclined to appease this fourth member. Discussing his pet subject, trusteeship, in a memorandum to Hull, he declared that:

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[1]Hull, op. cit., pp. 1477-78.

[2]Sherwood, op. cit., p. 777.

[3]Hull, op. cit., p. 1597.

[4]Elliott Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 165.

> He saw no reason to play in with the British Foreign Office in this matter. The only reason they seem to oppose it is that they fear the effect it would have on their possessions and those of the Dutch. They have never liked the idea of trusteeship because it is, in some instances, aimed at future independence . . .[1]

One section of the American public, at least, got a fresh insight into Roosevelt's thinking from the reports of a Press Conference he held with correspondents of the Negro press on February 5, shortly after his return from Teheran and Cairo. As an example of colonial exploitation, this time, he offered the case of Gambia, in British West Africa. Though the Africans were yet unready for self-government, something should be done to help them. Roosevelt revealed that in a discussion with Churchill he had offered his plan of a system of colonial inspection in order to galvanize ruling officials into making improvements. A United Nations committee would visit each colony and make a progress report. "If you Britishers don't come up to scratch - toe the mark - then we will let all the world know", he told Churchill. Churchill's retort was to ask if such a mission would be welcome in the South. Roosevelt was unruffled by the comeback. "I said, "Winston, that's all right with me . . . . You can right a lot of wrongs with 'pitiless publicity'."[2]

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., then Under Secretary of State, reports a conversation he had a month later (March 17, 1944), with the President, prior to going on a mission to London to discuss post-war problems.

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[1] Hull, op. cit., p. 1597.

[2] Rosenman, op. cit., XIII, pp. 69-70.

Stettinius recorded in his notes that evening that Roosevelt said that he had agreed with Chiang that a trusteeship scheme for Indo-China was the only practical solution. Roosevelt had scolded Churchill for not believing Chiang's views were disinterested. "You have four hundred years of acquisitive instinct in your blood and you just don't understand how a country might not want to acquire land somewhere if they can get it". Churchill would have to realize that a new period has opened in world history, and that he was outvoted three to one. "But", pointed out the President to Stettinius, "we are still going to have a tough time with the British on this issue".[1]

The history of American anti-colonial policies from Casablanca to Yalta reveals both the extent of American sympathy for the nationalist aspirations of colonial peoples, and the limitations placed on its practical expression by the vicissitudes of war and the opposition of those colonial powers that did not welcome American intervention into their colonial affairs, (that is to say by Belgium and Holland, France and Britain).

Thus, the hostility of the British, and indeed the general absence of strong support for the dependent people's plan, must explain the moderation of the second American plan presented at the Dunbarton Oaks Conference, held in August, 1944. This plan was a version of the first - watered down to become acceptable. The United States government was the

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[1]Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, (New York: 1949), pp. 237-238.

most eager of the Great Powers to press on with the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of peace, which would inherit the functions of the League of Nations.

Roosevelt and Hull wanted to secure United States participation in the organization before the American people should fall into reaction against foreign entanglements. Their plan regarding the ticklish problem of the dependencies was drastically modified in order to avoid endless disputes and delay through disagreement with other major partners in the project. It was of such moderation as could hardly have displeased the British. The plan merely advocated a system of International Trusteeship for the administration of "such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent agreement" - territories presently held under mandate, or taken from the Axis powers as a result of war, or "voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration".[1] There was no reference to ultimate independence, but the plan urged the promotion of measures looking towards the political, social and economic advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and their progressive development towards self-government.[2]

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[1]Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Vol. III: Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Comments and Proposed Amendments, United Nations Organization, (London and New York), pp. 607-608.

[2]Not to bring up "our dependent peoples project" was a "great disappointment" to Hull. Hull, op. cit., p. 1706.

It is true that pressure had now come from another source. The United States Joint Chiefs-of-Staff had ideas of their own which conflicted with the Trust principle. American military authorities wanted to gain undivided sovereignty over at least some of the islands of the Pacific wrested from Japan.[1] There was another group of interests that had to be placated. Several senators, concerned about the drastic views of Willkie and Henry Wallace, the Vice-President of America, raised objections concerning proposals for economic and social cooperation with regard to dependent peoples. They were greatly afraid of extreme views being advanced which they thought were very unpopular in the United States.[2]

But it was on the colonial powers that Hull squarely placed the responsibility of opposition to a program embracing ultimate independence. He explained:

> Our prime difficulty generally with regard to Asiatic colonial possessions, of course, was to induce the colonial powers - principally Britain, France and the Netherlands - to adopt our ideas with regard to dependent peoples . . . . We had frequent conversations with these parent countries, but we could not press them too far with regard to the South West Pacific, in view of the fact that we were seeking the closest possible cooperation with them in Europe. We could not alienate them in the Orient, and expect to work with them in Europe.[3]

This difficulty was to remain in postwar years, ironically, with France over Indo-China.

The plan eventually adopted by the United Nations was close to that presented by the American delegation at Dumbarton Oaks, to the

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[1]Hull, op. cit., p. 1599.

[2]Hull, op. cit., p. 1697.

[3]Hull, op. cit., p. 1599.

disappointment of many of those same Americans who had hoped to gain support for a program more satisfying to the aspirations of dependent peoples.

Hull, the redoubtable, returned again and again to the charge. On September 8 of that year a State Department memorandum for the President summarized its policies on colonial areas in SouthEast Asia. The memorandum suggested the value of early, dramatic and concerted announcements by the nations concerned, making definite commitments as to the future of the regions of the area. The memorandum added:

> It would be especially helpful if such concerted announcements could include (1) specific dates when independence or complete (dominion) self-government will be accorded, (2) specific steps to be taken to develop native capacity for self-rule, and (3) a pledge of economic autonomy and equality of economic treatment towards other nations.[1]

This was, in essence, the ideas of 1943. President Roosevelt warmly approved these ideas and subsequently directed that instructions be sent to American officers at home and abroad, and that the British, Dutch and French Governments be informed as well, that "the United States expected to be consulted on any arrangements as to the future of South East Asia".

On what was for him, however, a chapter of disappointments, Hull's words offer a succint commentary:

> It might be thought that we were presumptuous in seeking to present our ideas to the British, French and Dutch Governments as to what they should do with their own Pacific possessions. We had, however, two rights to take such action. One was the fact that the liberation of those possessions would not have been achieved . . . . except by the United States forces. The other

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[1] Hull, op. cit., p. 1600.

> was our interest in seeing that peace in the Pacific, restored by our forces, should continue. And we could not help believing that the indefinite continuance of the British, Dutch and French possessions in the Orient in a state of dependence provided a number of foci for future trouble, and perhaps war.
>
> Permanent peace could not be assured unless these possessions were started on the road to independence, after the example of the Philippines. We believed that we were taking the long-range view, and that a lasting peace in the Pacific was of greater ultimate benefit to Britain, France and the Netherlands - as well as to the whole world - than the possible immediate benefits of holding on to colonies.[1]

Hull was not in office at the time of the Yalta Conference when the United States' anti-imperialist policies played a significant part in the negotiations. However, while serving as Secretary of State, the record of his energetic policies, his disappointments and compromises, and his forebodings tell a great part of the story of the development, zenith, and eventual beginning of decline of American anti-colonialism. His Memoirs show how visionary and yet how thoroughgoing were the first United States recommendations. They show how the American cause was hampered by "some vociferous persons in the United States, including Vice-President Wallace," who argued for an immediate grant of independence.[2] They indicate the inconsistencies in the application of policies: The President opposed the return of Indo-China to France, while in the case of Java, the State Department expected that the exercise of the attributes of sovereignty would be resumed by the Netherlands.[3] They relate how the United States

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[1]Hull, op. cit., p. 1601.

[2]Hull, op. cit., p. 1599.

[3]Ibid., p. 1600.

had eventually to give way on its own early recommendations, because of the need to reconcile the interests of the Colonial powers with American need to obtain their support for policies in Europe and Asia.

CHAPTER VII

THE WAR: THE YALTA CONFERENCE

In 1955, the American Secretary of State released most of the hitherto unpublished papers of the Yalta Conference held ten years before, fanning the embers of a glowing controversy and providing more material for men to discuss, he said, throughout history. The controversy takes its significance from two dramatic errors, both involving the Soviet Union, which have smeared the already spotted canvas of recent history. The first was Hitler's underestimate of Communist Russia's power of resistance. The second was Roosevelt's underestimate of the determined and intransigent nature of Russian Communist expansion.

The great danger to world peace, Roosevelt may have felt, came from a revived, and reactionary colonialism. Was not Naziism in many respects an intensification of some of the characteristics of imperialism?

Old and new suspicions caused Americans to weigh Churchill's Empire in a different balance from Soviet Russia. One was an imperialism - breeder of future wars. One had been a victim. During the war, many had come to feel that it was perhaps a good thing for the world that Russia was Communist. The prospect of two capitalist countries, the size and power of Russia and America, colliding over world markets, in the manner that Germany and Britain were alleged to have done before 1914, would be alarming for the future of mankind. It seemed unlikely that the United

States would clash with the Soviet Russia. They were neither economic nor territorial rivals. It was very possible that there would be difficulties with the resurgent, revitalized Empire, triumphant, victorious, and sustained by Lend-Lease. Such assessments of their two allies could be decisive in the policy making of the United States leaders. There is evidence that Roosevelt thought somewhat along these lines.

He told Mikolajczyk, the Czech leader, in Washington in June 1944 that "Stalin is a realist, and we musn't forget, when we judge Russian actions, that the Soviet Regime has had only two years of experience in international relations. But of one thing I am certain. Stalin is not an imperialist."[1] This opinion seemed to be shared by many of the American leaders. If Major-General Deane, head of the United States Military Mission in Moscow, was to send warning reports, those "higher-up" had high faith in the Russians. General Eisenhower believed, too, that there was a special bond between the United States and the Soviet Union, one that was, by implication, lacking in the Anglo-American relation. He felt that "in the past relations of America and Russia there was no cause to regard the future with pessimism". On the one hand, "the two powers had maintained an unbroken friendship that dated back to the birth of the United States as an independent Republic"; on the other, "both were free from the stigma of colonial empire building by force".[2] This last statement, imperfectly

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[1]Mikolajczyk, The Pattern of Soviet Domination, p. 65, quoted in Chester Wilmot's The Struggle for Europe, p. 639.

[2]Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, (New York: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 473-474.

true, comes down the sounding corridors of American history. It was an echo of the Democratic party statement of 1900. It was the American way of saying that both nations were unblemished by tyranny. This was believed, and this was to become one of the potent myths of history.

The obverse article of faith, as has been shown, was the belief in the unhealthiness of colonialism in the world's body politic. "The colonial system means war" - the President had told his son.

> Exploit the resources of an India, a Burma, a Java; take all the wealth out of all those countries, but never put anything back into them, things like education, decent standards of living, minimum health requirements - all you're doing is storing up the kind of trouble that leads to war. All you're doing is negating the value of any kind of organizational structure for peace before it begins. The look that Churchill gets on his face when you mention India.[1]

Similar sentiments may be quoted from Hull.[2] They add up to the conviction that a world menace lay in Imperialism - Churchill-Empire style. And it was the duty of America, with Russian aid, if possible, to exorcise it.

Besides the broad differences of policy which separated them in the East, besides the differing interpretations of the European future - such as caused America to over-rule the British plan for a Second Front via the soft-underbelly of Europe - besides these, there came the acute problem of the Greek Civil War to further snarl Anglo-American relations. The use of British forces armed with Lend-Lease weapons, against

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[1]Elliott Roosevelt, He Was There, p. 74.

[2]Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 1599-1601.

Greek Communists who had been fighting the Germans, caused grave concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Churchill came under more severe criticism than he ever had over India. In America, it was darkly suspected that Churchill's aims were to buttress the monarchy of Greece, the type of ambition for which democratic America had shown scant enthusiasm. In Washington, feeling ran high. Admiral King gave orders to the United States Naval Commander in the Mediterranean that he "was not to permit any American L.S.T.'s to be used to transfer supplies to Greece".[1] This roused Churchill's indignation. Further sharp exchanges passed over the Atlantic with the results, as Sherwood says, that "relations between the White House and Downing Street were more strained than they had ever been before".[2]

When Churchill met Hull's successor, Stettinius, at the Malta rendezvous, the Prime Minister explained to him that "if the British had not had troops in Greece, the Greek Communists would have taken over the government". "The British", he declared, "had a definite responsibility not to allow this to happen". Stettinius, who had just clashed with Churchill in discussions over policies in Italy, does not appear to have been impressed by this argument, and the conviction remained that Churchill had interfered in the internal affairs of Greece for interested motives.[3]

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[1]Chester Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 637-638.

[2]Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 839.

[3]Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, (New York: Doubleday, 1949), p. 61.

At Malta, Churchill and Roosevelt held only brief discussions. Roosevelt was anxious not to make secret commitments of the 1914-18 style diplomacy, nor to let Russia feel that she was dealing with a Western bloc. "The President knew how overly suspicious the Russians were - a Russian trait that antedated the Communist regime".[1] But in the brief course of the Malta meetings, the British delegation were dismayed to find that their American colleagues were less suspicious of Russia's post-war intentions than they were of Britain's. "The appreciation of this fact - astonishing though it may seem at this distance - is essential to the understanding of what happened at Yalta", wrote Wilmot.[2]

In the opinion of Chester Wilmot, "It was not altogether fortuitous that the Yalta Conference commenced with the Red Army's spectacular victory in Poland, for the time was determined by Stalin".[3] The original iniative was Roosevelt's - he had desired a meeting as early as possible after his re-election. But the Russians, under Stalin, "regard international conferences as opportunities for the recognition of situations which have already been created by the exercise of power; not as occasions for the negotiation of reasonable settlements mutually acceptable."[4]

Whether it was coincidence, or astute tactics, the time of the Yalta Conference found Russia in a comparatively strong military and "moral"

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[1] Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 62.

[2] Wilmot, op. cit., p. 632.

[3] Wilmot, op. cit., p. 628.

[4] Ibid., p. 630.

position, in American eyes. The armies of Konev, Zhukov and Rokossovsky were advancing in giant strides along broad sections of the Russian front, and rapidly approaching the Eastern German frontiers.

On the Western front the perspectives were different. Rundstedt's armies had broken through at the Ardennes gap, and Eisenhower's forces had been in danger of serious reverse. Victory in Western Europe did not look as easy as it had a few weeks earlier. In the Far East, the Americans were striving to recapture Manila. Hard, bitter fighting seemed the only promise for months, possibly years. To deal with the Japanese mainland would involve a series of immense naval operations, of bloody beachheads, and eventually, the preparation of another massive sea invasion into the homeland of a desperate, suicidally-fanatic nation-in-arms.

The Axis, it seemed, could only be beaten, economically, by a firm coalition of practically all the rest of the world working together. After the call for "unconditional surrender" there was no question of offering Germany peace terms to prevent Russian expansion - this was Hitler's last hope.[1] On the contrary it was the general feeling that of the Allies, the one that was most cruelly hurt by the Axis, the one that was making the greatest efforts, was, as victor, most deserving of the spoils. Eisenhower recalled that Russia was the first nation to recognize the revolutionary American Government. In the blue dawn of victory it was overlooked that the United States was very late in recognizing Red Russia, and that Russia had not had time to forget. It would be good to get the tried,

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[1]Wilmot, op. cit., states p. 626-7, "Hitler believed that every step the Russians took towards Berlin would bring the West nearer compromise."

successful anti-Hitler combination to work against Japan. It would be good to bring in the single-minded Russian people whose aim, undivided by colonial considerations, would be directed to crushing the Axis. If inducements were necessary to get the Russian people to bear the great new burden, they could hardly be denied them.

There were strong reasons for seeking Russian aid in the war with Japan. At the Second Quebec Conference, it had been estimated that the war against Japan could be concluded in about eighteen months, after Germany should be defeated. Those close to Roosevelt suggest two reasons for Roosevelt's calling on Russian aid against Japan. According to Stettinius, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, "just before our departure for Yalta," had sent the State Department copies of documents relating to Russian participation in the war against Japan. These documents stated " . . . . We desire Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations and are prepared to offer the maximum support possible without prejudice to our main effort against Japan . . . ."[1] "I knew at Yalta", writes Stettinius, "of the immense pressure put on the President by our military leaders to bring Russia into the Far Eastern War. At this time, the atomic bomb was still an unknown quality . . . . No one knew how long the European War would last nor how great the casualties would be."

Secondly, Roosevelt felt that Russian participation in the conclusion of the campaign against the Axis would ensure Russian cooperation

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[1]Stettinius, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

in the creation of a new world free from Fascism. Roosevelt was prepared to make concessions in order to get the machinery of the United Nations organization started.[1] This attitude explains why he had no objection to Soviet Russia's claim for two extra votes. As Commander-in-Chief, he had a responsibility for American lives unnecessarily lost in an attack on Japan.

A third reason, which was both military and political, concerned the amount of help the United States would or should receive from Britain in the war in Asia.

South-East Asia Command had been an almost entirely British-Empire theater of war, under the English Supreme Commander, Lord Louis Mountbatten. It is Wilmot's conviction that Washington presumed that Churchill was more interested in regaining Britain's lost colonies than in bringing about the early defeat of Japan.[2] The American Chiefs-of-Staff had decided that Britain should not be allowed military control of the Dutch East Indies after their recapture. They felt that if the British got hold of some Dutch territory, it might be difficult to shake them loose. The President had told Stettinius the year previously that, "the British would take land anywhere in the world, even if it were only rock or a sand bar".[3] It is evident that a belief in the necessity of Russian assistance was accompanied by a distrust of the third Great Power's motives in the Far East.

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[1]This was the impression of Admiral Leahy. Leahy, op. cit. 310.

[2]Wilmot, op. cit., p. 641.

[3]Stettinius, op. cit., p. 237.

On February 18, 3:30 p.m., at Livadia Palace, Roosevelt and Stalin met in a conversation heard only by their foreign ministers, Stettinius and Molotov, and their interpreters Pavlov and Bohlen. Bohlen's secret minutes were recently released with other of the Yalta Papers, and some messages relevant to this study throw light on what was said and felt. One of the subjects of this discussion was the political conditions under which the U.S.S.R. would enter the war against Japan, and the conversation bore on Darien - a warm water port at the end of the South Manchurian Railroad. "The President said he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss this matter with Chiang Kei-Shek, so therefore he could not speak for the Chinese. He went on to say that there were two methods for the Russians to obtain the use of this port: (1) outright leasing from the Chinese, (2) making Darien a free port under some form of international commission. He said he preferred the latter method, because of the relation to the question of Hong Kong. The President said he hoped that the British would give back the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China and that it would then become an internationalized free port. He said he knew Mr. Churchill would have strong objections to this suggestion . . . ."[1]

Later in the course of the same conversation, President Roosevelt brought up the question of Trusteeships. Stalin approved of the suggestion of a Trusteeship for Korea by a council composed of a Soviet, an

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[1] "What the Big Three Really Said at Yalta", U. S. News and World Report, March 25, 1955, pp. 148-156.

American and a Chinese representative.

> The President then said there was one question in regard to Korea which was delicate. He personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but he felt they might resent this. Marshal Stalin replied that they would most certainly be offended. In fact, he said, the Prime Minister might "kill us". In his opinion, he felt that the British should be invited.
>
> The President then said he also had in mind a trusteeship for Indo-China. He added that the British did not approve of this idea, as they wished to give it back to the French since they feared the implications of a trusteeship as it might affect Burma . . . .
>
> He (the President) added that the French had done nothing to improve the natives since she had the colony. He said that General deGaulle had asked for ships to transport French forces to Indo-China. Marshal Stalin inquired where deGaulle was going to get the troops.
>
> The President replied that deGaulle said he was going to find the troops when the President could find the ships, but the President added that up to the present he had been unable to find the ships.

The British at Yalta could not have been much surprised at such confidences expressed in intimate <u>tête à tête</u> by their anti-colonial allies. But it must have seemed rather incongruous that while urging the handing over of HongKong to China, Roosevelt was prepared to promise Stalin substantial concessions in Manchuria, and to do so without so much as consulting the Chinese. Leahy appreciated this: "Mr. President," he had whispered in his ear, "You are going to lose out on Hong Kong if you agree to give the Russians half of Darien." Leahy records that Roosevelt shook his head in resignation and said, "Well, Bill, I can't help it".[1]

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[1] Leahy, <u>I Was There</u>, p. 314.

When presented the next day with the terms under which Stalin agreed to enter the Far Eastern War, the Prime Minister felt that he ought to approve, because the whole position of the British Empire in the Far East might be at stake. Churchill had some reason to suspect that since he had been excluded from negotiations concerning the war with Japan, Britain might well be excluded from further discussions about the Far East, if she did not stand by the Americans now. He could also foresee, like Leahy, that if these concessions were made to Russia, Roosevelt would not be in a strong moral position to command the disposal of Hong Kong, or of other British positions in the Far East.

At the next day's Big Three Meeting in Livadia Palace, Churchill seized an opportunity to make it clear, in a stern demonstration to his two allies, that, regarding the British Empire at least, he would brook no nonsense. Bohlen's secret minutes are again quoted:[1]

> Mr. Stettinius then reported on the results of the discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the matter of providing machinery in the World Organization for dealing with territorial trusteeships and dependent areas, as follows:
>
> It was agreed that the five governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.
>
> The Prime Minister interrupted with great vigor to say that he did not agree with one single word of this report on trusteeships. He said that he had not been consulted, nor had he heard of this subject up to now. He said that under no circumstances would he ever consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting inter-

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[1] "What the Big Three Really Said at Yalta," U. S. News and World Report, March 25, 1955.

fering fingers into the life existence of the British Empire. As long as he was Minister, he would never yield one scrap of their heritage. He continued in that vein for some minutes.

Leahy and Stettinius also give descriptions of this outburst.[1] Stettinius was sure "Roosevelt was not astonished at the vehemence with which Churchill attached the trusteeship proposal".[2] There is good reason to suspect that this dramatic show of passion was deliberately planned. Churchill, on previous discussions with the Russians, had known how to achieve results by a show of angry temper. But there is no reason to doubt that the sentiments he expressed were heart-felt. He was unwilling to yield any scrap of the Empire.

Stettinius quickly explained that this reference to the creation of machinery was not intended to refer to the British Empire, but particularly to dependent areas to be taken from enemy control. The Prime Minister accepted the explanation - as if he needed it - but insisted that it be clearly indicated that no reference be made to the British Empire. There was to be none of the ambiguities that clouded the interpretation of the Atlantic Charter.

Despite the obduracy of Churchill, Roosevelt was determined to press his plan of trusteeship for dependent areas. Returning from Yalta he held a press conference aboard the U. S. S. Quincy, on February 23, 1945, with reporters representing the press associations. The President discussed

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[1]Leahy, op. cit., p. 313.

[2]Stettinius, op. cit., pp. 236.

Indo-China.[1]

> For two whole years I have been terribly worried about Indo-China. I talked to Chiang Kai-Shek in Cairo, Stalin in Teheran. They both agreed with me . . . . I suggested . . . . that Indo-China be set up under a trusteeship . . . . Stalin liked the idea. China liked the idea. The British don't like it. It might bust up their Empire, because if the Indo-Chinese were to work together and eventually get their independence, the Burmese might do the same thing to England . . . .
>
> Q. Is that Churchill's idea on all territory out there. He wants them all back just the way they were?
> The President: Yes, he is mid-Victorian on all things like that . . . .
>
> Q. This idea of Churchill's seems inconsistent with the policy of self-determination?
> The President: Yes, that is true.
>
> Q. Do you remember the speech the Prime Minister made about the fact that he was not made the Prime Minister of Great Britain to see the Empire fall apart?
> The President: Dear old Winston will never learn on that point. This is, of course, off the record . . . .

A second "postscript" to Yalta was a sentence from the very last press conference held by President Roosevelt. To the question, "Who will be the controlling government over the mandates taken from Japan, the U.S. or the U.N.?" he replied: "I would say the United Nations. Or it might be called the world, which has been much abused and now will have a chance to prevent any more abuse . . . ."[2]

On August 10, the Japanese surrendered. Japan had been defeated in a military sense before the atom bomb was dropped or Russia entered the war. But which of these events forced the Japanese to surrender? It is

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[1]Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. XIII, pp. 562-564.

[2]Ibid., p. 610.

the suggestion of a later commentator that the Yalta decision was a decisive factor. Louis Morton has written: "Japanese records will not support the conclusion that the atom bomb alone accomplished that result: Russia's declaration of war had at least as great an effect as Hiroshima. In that sense, perhaps, American policy toward Russia was justified ultimately on August 10, when Emperor Hirohito made the fateful decision that brought the Second World War to an end."[1]

One final episode offers a complete commentary on Anglo-American divergence over policy in the Far East. General MacArthur, who was serving as co-ordinator of all surrender arrangements, forbade Lord Louis Mountbatten to accept any local surrender in South East Asia, or to send any re-occupation forces into Japanese-held territory until the over-all surrender had been signed in Tokyo. "The British were thus placed", said Wilmot, "in the humiliating position of not being permitted to reoccupy their own colonies until the Japanese High Command had formally acknowledged defeat to an American general on an American battleship in Tokyo Bay." The British historian asserted that "although this particular manifestation of American anti-colonialism was not revealed until six months after Yalta, the attitude which inspired it was implicit in the policy Roosevelt pursued through the war."[2]

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[1]Louis Morton, "The Military Background of the Yalta Agreements," The Reporter, April 7, 1955.

[2]Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 643.

CHAPTER VIII

POST-WAR: THE U. N. REPLACES THE U. S.

Some European countries had come to fear American idealists as much as her isolationists. They realized in 1945 that one of the consequences of the War was (to a varying extent) some sort of political and moral Americanization of the world. In the particular field with which this study is concerned, it is certainly to be noticed that after 1945 policies were pursued with regard to colonies that were hardly foreseeable in 1939. The great colonial powers began to become "have-not" nations - the phrase has fallen into disuse - with the approbation, or under the stimulus, of world opinion.

In several ways and in varying degrees, much of Roosevelt's hopes were fulfilled; or, at least, the colonial powers so modified their policies as to obviate the necessity of the drastic changes he urged.

Thus the British Empire evolved into a British Commonwealth consisting of free nations and of nations advancing or appearing to advance along "the broad paths" leading "to the evolution of self-governing institutions". In 1946, the title of French Empire was changed into the polite neologism of "French Union"[1]; Metropolitan France formed with the French territories overseas a Union recognizing, without any discrimination, the

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[1] Henri Cullmann, L'Union Francaise, (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1951), pp. 31-33.

full equality of all its human members. These territories send deputies to the French National Assembly, Senators to the Council of the Republic, and contribute half the membership of the Council of the French Union, a politically impotent body sitting in splendid but insignificant isolation at Versailles. The Dutch system has also evolved towards the idea of a commonwealth of nations giving a common allegiance to the Queen.

But not only the great colonizing nations were influenced by American pressure, and the new spirit of the age. Hundreds of millions of colonial peoples, offered both the opportunity brought by the war, and the encouragement and aid of Roosevelt's policies, began to exert influence on their own behalf, and with unprecedented vigor. Nowhere were the colonial peoples content to remain passive. From Jamaica to Java there were restless stirrings and demands that proved embarassing. West Indians who had heard their territories described as "an Imperial slum" began to take thought over the implications of both the adjective and the substantive.

In the Far East, the departing Japanese left a time-bomb: the thought that the European countries had "liberated" the Eastern peoples only in order to re-assert European rule, and resume their exploitation. Thus the returning Dutch and French found their sovereignty disputed by battle-trained nationalist guerillas inspired by both American and Russian revolutionary ideals, and quoting, sometimes together and indiscriminately, from the watchwords of Jefferson and Patrick Henry, Marx and Lenin.

Displaying that capacity for adjustment which is one explanation for the longevity of British institutions, it was the British Empire which responded most fully to the exigencies of the "Americanized world". Two years after the War, India and the new state of Pakistan became independent nations, the Labor Government making the concession which Churchill still opposed, and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, discharging his obligation in a manner that would have pleased Roosevelt. Burma and Ceylon likewise received their independence, the former preferring to sever her bonds entirely with the Empire. In the Caribbean, America's backyard, where an Anglo-American Commission had been functioning since during the War, proposals were implemented in all the British colonies to provide greater measure of representative government.

Until 1939, Africa had been thought of as a continent to be ruled only by Europeans and, as has been seen, there had been much dispute among the European powers as to their respective rights to rule Africans, but very little about the right of Africans to rule themselves. In British Africa steps were commenced leading to the fulfillment of the revolutionary, and still debated idea of the creation of free Black Dominions.

It was the French, not the British, who seemed less able to forget and to learn. The French Army displayed vigor late in the war, in trying to put down a nationalist-minded government in Syria. British action in Syria and Lebanon compelled a reversal of this policy, and eventually the French reluctantly surrendered their mandate. General deGaulle, head of the provisional government of 1944, whose chief aim was to see that the

grandeur of France be undiminished, was much displeased.

It was in Indo-China, however, that the French were most resolute to preserve their pre-war rule. After some time-serving maneuvers in Paris, the government sent out a strong expeditionary force to negotiate for strength with a nationalist government earlier recognized by France. After the rupture of relations, which if not deliberately precipitated, was well anticipated, the French proceeded to recapture Indo-China. Apart from the unexpectedly tough resistance of the Communist-led Indo-Chinese Nationalists in North Vietnam, the French were hampered by the unwillingness of the Vietnamese in the South to fight to preserve "the French Presence". Furthermore, American military aid given to France was at first specifically enjoined not to be used in colonial wars.[1] The Indo-Chinese nationalist leader, Ho Chi Minh, had won the respect of General Marshall, and the French war was viewed with great disfavor in America, as indeed among liberal elements in France.

Later, the fear of Communist expansion was to bring America around to a policy in Indo-China so warlike as to threaten the French with the prospect of a general Third World War, and to stimulate their desire for a peaceful settlement. In retrospect, Roosevelt's anxiety for the future of Indo-China seemed to have been well-justified. It is certain that the events in Indo-China have since compelled the French to follow the British pattern of "adjustment" with regard to the seething discontent of the nationalist-minded multitudes of French North Africa.

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[1]This information was received by the writer from a speech by the French Minister for the Associated States in April 1954.

The Dutch military commanders had chafed at the small role allotted them in the defense and recapture of their possessions. They were, however, committed to a policy permitting a wider measure of self-government under the Dutch crown.

The Dutch returned to Java to find the pre-war nationalist movement now very far advanced. For four years an uncertain situation prevailed, as two governments claimed sovereignty, a situation rendered more uncertain by the vacillating attitude of the United States.

American diplomatists dealt as before with the Dutch authorities to whom they had been accustomed. But popular sympathy in America lay with the Indonesians,- called rebels or nationalists, according to the attitudes and sympathies of the observer. The Indonesian leaders had at first hoped that the Americans had come in 1945 to free them from both of the detested occupations - that of the Japanese and that of Holland.

Eventually American pressure brought through the United Nations compelled the Dutch to grant the East Indian Nationalists' demand for sovereign freedom. In renouncing direct action, Washington had the appearance of "whimsically favoring both revolution and the status quo in South East Asia".[1] A curious consequence of this was a great disillusionment with the American attitude in Indonesia and a tendency to seek sympathy elsewhere.

Carlos Romulo, the former President of the U. N. General Assembly, offers this commentary in his book, "Crusade in Asia":

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[1]Blair Bolles, "U. S. Policy in the South East Asia", in Empire's End in South East Asia, No. 78, Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association.

> If, in the beginning, the attitude of America toward Indonesia had been on the pattern of its generous attitude towards the Philippines, eighty million Indonesians would be with us today, committed on the side of the free world. If, in the beginning, the United States had stipulated that there would be a general liquidation of the colonial system in Asia, this would have sealed the trust of the Asian peoples.[1]

In 1900, the useful if unsuccessful agitation by the anti-imperialists helped to fix, as a national policy, the education of the Filipinos for self-government. American anti-colonialism received its triumphant self-justification with the grant of full independence to the Philippines in 1944. By 1947, with the freeing of India, the world's largest colony, many of the zealous proponents of anti-colonialism felt they could now lay down their cause.

There were now newer considerations coming to the forefront. After its fight on the side of the colonial powers in World War II, America found itself to have taken on some of the attributes of its friends, if not yet of its enemies. Thus, the scheme for a series of international bases - one of the foundations of Roosevelt's future peace - was quietly shelved. Some of the islands taken from Japan were seized as permanent air and naval bases for America; a form of strategic colonialism. President Truman was less visionary than Roosevelt. He was also more easily influenced by military men who believed that America's security was to be preserved not by international trusteeships and indiscriminate liberalism, but by building a defensive line of bases wherever possible

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[1]Carlos Romulo, "Crusade in Asia", U. S. News and World Report, April 15, 1955.

and convenient.

That Americans felt some bad conscience was to be seen in the unimagineable generosity shown to all the peoples compelled to remain subject. In Okinawa, Guam and other territories taken from Japan, every compensation was offered for the comparative lack of independence, and in most cases the natives were well satisfied with the exchange. They were spared the hardships and responsibilities of freedom.

America, it would seem, despite protestations to the contrary, and repudiation of the thesis of economic determinists, has become itself an imperialist country once more. The fact that by habit of thought it was still anti-colonial, while by strategic and economic necessity, as well as by political alliance, it sided with the colonial powers, often placed the country's delegates to the United Nations in a position where, in a paroxysm of perplexity, they must abstain from voting on issues involving colonialism.

Russia meanwhile claimed the position of the first anti-colonial power. The loss of their colonies is expected to hasten the decline of the Great Nations. The colonies might even provide an accretion of manpower and resources to the Communist world. Not content to await the process Russia has resumed (through the Cominform, successor to the Comintern, dissolved in the interest of wartime allied goodwill), an ideological penetration that is no less insidious than the cultural domination of colonialism. It differs chiefly in not being economic, and indeed by Russian definition, imperialism is a form of economic colonialism. America, the economic and

capitalistic giant of the post-war world, therefore is by definition the great imperialist nation of today.

Some substance of truth seemed to be given this attitude by certain American and Cold War policies. With a single-minded anti-Communism which sometimes irritates her allies, America has followed a policy of storing up defenses against a possible Communist aggression, placing in the background the question of the aspirations of Eastern peoples to economic and political independence, and social respect. When twenty-nine free Afro-Asian nations met in conference in Bandung in 1955 - an event which was the fruit of Roosevelt's policies - the United States did not even send a message of goodwill.

The anti-colonial policies of Roosevelt are still being carried through, however, by his memorial and creation, the United Nations. It is the United Nations which has replaced the United States as the representative of anti-colonial opinion. The United Nations has among its members younger nations like the Latin American Republics still influenced by American ideals, and new nations like the Philippines and India, created, in great part, by the force of American idealism. These now form a powerful force against colonialism, often to the embarassment of the United States. The United Nations offers the mechanism - trusteeship, inspection, opportunity for discussion - which carry out the best hopes of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Finally, the United Nations has achieved some of the objectives that President Roosevelt would have desired, such as the creation of the

independent state of Libya and Indonesia. Significantly, power politics of the Great Powers (with United States connivance) kept the United Nations out of the Indo-China situation, Roosevelt's prime example, after India, of outdated colonialism. This was another of the great ironies.

Today the colonial question is considered by delegates and officials of the United Nations as being the most explosive issue before the organization.[1] Dag Hammarskjold, in the U. N. Secretary-General's Ninth Annual Report, lays proper emphasis on this:

> Experience has demonstrated, especially in the post-war years, the complexities of the problems and at times the threat to peace found in the area, still very numerous, inhabited by non self-governing peoples. The many issues in this sphere which regularly confront the United Nations call for a balance between vision and restraint, recognizing the fundamental right to self-determination, as well as the fact that the exercise of self-determination may be self-defeating if not wisely and carefully prepared. The manner in which such issues are dealt with will have a serious bearing also upon the future course of world events.[2]

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[1]Off-the-record conversations and talks of delegates and officials at the recent San Francisco Conference bear out this statement. They consider the issue more dangerous than the East-West Cold War.

[2]From the Introduction to the Secretary-General's Ninth Annual Report, published by the United Nations, Department of Public Information, (New York: 1954).

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

"We are the pick and flower of nations: the only nation that is really generous and brave and just. We are above all things qualified for governing others: we know how to keep them exactly in their place without weakness and without cruelty . . . . The excellence of our rule abroad is proved in black and white by the books of our explorers, our missionaries, our administrators and our soldiers, who all agree that our yoke is a pure blessing to those that bear it . . . ."

Today the words of Professor Murray seem unnecessarily sarcastic.[1] It underlines another consequence of the Great War: the demise of the belief that one nation should have the right or "responsibility" to rule another. In a sense the Great War had been a war against the concept of a super-race. The England of Houston Chamberlain, the France of Gobineau, the America of the 'white supremacists' - these by no means representative of general public opinion - had fought and defeated the notion that any race of men was endowed with a divine gift to rule another. Thus the whirligig of time brought in its revenges, and nothing more was heard of the White Men's Burden.

The "end of colonialism" was a victory of the American philosophy, a triumph of the ex-colonial complex, or what one would prefer to call the

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[1] Quoted in Walter Consuelo Langsam's, In Quest of Empire, op. cit. 93.

"Monroe Doctrine complex". In 1939 it was felt in Europe that great states had a legitimate right, as Big Powers, to claim colonies, or to keep those they already had. Now colonial possession is in disfavor, and must be called by some other name. Colonial nations now seek justification for their continued presence in their colonies. This is not difficult; but in the past colonizers would have resented the necessity to find secular excuses such as the need to protect their wards from confusion, corruption and communism; or their present backwardness, and the need to preserve native cultures. Little is said today about bearing the Gospel to the heathen.

There are many, hundreds of millions, who believe that colonialism is not yet dead, but reigns either as blatantly as ever (the Belgian Congo), or is made respectable and almost pleasing (the West Indies). The meeting of twenty-nine African and Asian nations at Bandung still found a great deal of persistent colonialism to condemn solemnly. In the acute mind-searchings that the Cold War has occasioned, American policy makers, as their predecessors in the New Deal regime, must ask themselves, "How free is the Free World?" Secretary of State Hull had pointed out the restraints that America's alliances place upon her policies. "We could not alienate (the colonial powers) in the Orient and expect to work with them in Europe."[1] Today, these colonial peoples have their own spokesmen and they have these things to say about European alliances:

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[1]Cordell Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 1599.

> To get closer to the heart of Asia, America must use its own heart more. The peoples of Asia will respond with understanding and sympathy to the freedom-loving, the generous-hearted, the deeply humane America of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and Franklin Delano Roosevelt; on the other hand, nothing will more surely repel them than an America that carelessly allows its escutcheon to be blemished by the sins of its European allies.[1]

What do the European allies think of this? Andre Visson in his book on America called "As Others See Us", has written this about "American Messianism":

> Many Europeans fear that in America's desire to emancipate - politically, economically - all the peoples of the world overnight, she may overthrow the very society which she is trying to save. Moreover, many Europeans do not understand why Americans, who insist on the principle of equality for all nations, however backward, continue to practice racial discrimination at home. They wonder whether it is an incurable naievete or an inveterate hypocrisy, and deSales in 1942 gave prophetic warning that American Messianism in its vague and pretentious form, would only stimulate anti-American feeling in Europe.[2]

What was this Messianism? What was it during the Second World War, and what did it become? In view of its momentous consequences, was it not one of the most potent "myths" of history?

Certain aspects of the myth of anti-colonialism have been consistently in evidence through American history.[3] There has been a belief

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[1]Carlos Romulo, Crusade in Asia, excerpts quoted in U. S. News and World Report, April 15, 1955.

[2]Andre Bisson, As Others See Us, (New York: Doubleday, 1948), p. 188.

[3]By "myth" is meant the idee-mythe such as Georges Sorel urged in his "Reflexions sur la violence". Sorel spoke of a myth as an ensemble not of ideas, but of motor images, capable of invoking in bloc a whole set of sentiments. It cannot be well analysed or rationally discussed. It has the advantage that total consciousness possesses over analysis, according to Bergson.

in national freedom, such as had inspired in 1823, the doctrine that the independence of the free countries in the Western hemisphere must be preserved against European reaction.

The passion for freedom has remained and expanded. Western European diplomats have been surprised to learn that the desire to "liberate" Eastern Europe was genuinely felt by large sections of the American people, and was not just a political catchword. The American people have resented limitations on liberty placed on any people, by any political system.

The reverse of this passion for freedom has been a positive hatred of oppressors, and oppressive-seeming regimes, and a willingness to employ strictures against them.

Another aspect of the anti-colonialism was the distrust of old feudalisms, or new ones for that matter, be they controlled by Kings or Commissars. "The American dream" was to get away from these things, and, also, to help others to do so. With a distrust of powerful central government goes a disbelief in the "right" of some to rule others.

Some may see this as evidence of an "incurable naivete" in political affairs. Those who benefitted from it, and they out-number by far the others, have believed that the simple directness of these almost missionary faiths was their best virtue. Formerly Wilson had walked at Versailles with the bemused air of a man of principle at a peace conference. Roosevelt and his successors were in a stronger position to reintroduce morality into international affairs, somewhat to the annoyance

of old-time diplomats, and to the distress of old Empire builders.

Thus, during the Second World War, America insisted on applying democratic principles without exceptions, and compelled colonial powers to see the Liberation of the Continent and the Liberation of India as part of the same fight against tyranny. Democracy was more than an ideal. It was an inexorable principle.

It has not been surprising that, confident in the rightness of their cause - which was also the superior American way - the United States was prepared to intervene high-handedly or to attempt to browbeat the Colonial Powers into changing their policies, and, into "mending their ways".

In war time the characteristic attitudes were given almost free rein. They were held in check, less by consideration for their allies than by fear of aiding the enemy. In Roosevelt, the New Deal temper, a compound of Right and Left Wing Radicalism, found its best expression. Roosevelt was free of the pervasive "Anglo-phobia" that moved certain elements in his Party, but he was as implacably opposed to the maintenance of Britain's colonial glories as any Indian or Burmese. Indeed, he was sometimes at pains, as seen in India, not to appear, despite Lend-Lease, as buttressing the British Empire. It was true that he underrated the difficulties with which colonial peoples would be confronted if the colonial administrators suddenly withdrew. The problems of India or Indonesia were far greater than those of the Philippines. On the other hand, Roosevelt was less susceptible to the propaganda of the colonial powers meaning to hold their own, than subsequent American policy makers.

Indeed, American attitudes, the official attitudes at least, have subtly changed since Roosevelt, though the indications of this change could plainly be seen even during the War.

In the struggle against Fascist aggression the exigencies of the situation compelled Americans to condone, if not support, conditions of which they disapproved. Thus in his letter to Gandhi, Roosevelt counselled patience while making "a supreme effort" to deal with "Axis dreams of world conquest".[1]

In dealings with her allies it was important for American policy-makers to keep a sense of proportion and not let their emotional belief in self-determination open them to exploitation by anyone who could round up enough support to become an "oppressed minority". Indeed in post-war years American foreign policy making has attained a degree of extreme "realism" which has often dismayed those who once complained about her naivete, or her excessive human concern for all places and peoples. Now American policy grown "sophisticated" and far-sighted, is unwilling to create new nations like India which might become a Frankenstien to American foreign policy.

The irony is that America finds herself branded as an Imperial power. Strategically, this is true. And the possessor of Okinawa must necessarily join Britain to oppose self-determination for Cyprus.

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[1]Cordell Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II, pp. 1489-1490.

On economic grounds, America did not, according to the Russian orthodox theory of Imperialism, steal or wrest away the rich colonies of others. Still her power and responsibility called America to an intervention in world affairs which has been branded as "Imperialistic" by the Marxists. And the great dependence of Europe, Asia and South America on America's financial resources give great cause for suspicion that the aid is not disinterested. The Communist bloc refused and denounced Marshall aid. Certainly, indebtedness to America has not been without consequences. The motives for the freeing of the Philippines indicate that altruism can be another agent of a powerful and expansive capitalism. The idealism of Article III of the Atlantic Charter was accompanied by the business-minded stipulations of Article IV.

The consequences of this American anti-colonialism are vast and portentuous. It can be affirmed that American policies, while they altered the maps of Empire changed the course of destiny for hundreds of millions. By increasing the freedom given to the human race, American policies have vastly enhanced the stature of man upon the earth, and altered the moral axis of the world. For America, not content to be the first modern ex-colony to achieve independence and greatness, was determined to champion the liberty of the inhabitants of the world against friends and foe, alike. Americans hoped that the American Revolution would proceed to its total, planetary triumph.

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