

VITA

NAME OF AUTHOR: Min-chih Maynard Chou

PLACE OF BIRTH: Hupeh, China

DATE OF BIRTH: July 3, 1940

UNDERGRADUATE AND GRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

Tunghai University
Dickinson College
University of Oregon

DEGREES AWARDED:

Bachelor of Arts, 1964, Tunghai University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

Modern Chinese History
Sino-American Relations

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Assistant, Department of History, Dickinson College,
1966-1967

Teaching Assistant, Department of History, University
of Oregon, 1967-1969

THE TIENTSIN INCIDENT: A STUDY
OF THE WESTERN APPROACH AND
THE CHINESE RESPONSE

APPROVED:

Paul S. Helle
by
MIN-CHIH MAYNARD CHOU

A THESIS

Presented to the Department of History
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

June 1969

APPROVED:

Paul S. Holbo

Paul S. Holbo

PREFACE

The Tientsin anti-missionary incident of 1870 is one of the important events that helped shape modern Chinese history. It tragically ended the T'ung-chih Restoration--the first massive effort among Chinese officials to try to modernize and revitalize the Confucian state, and unexpectedly, but most profoundly and significantly, it reshaped Chinese internal politics. Yet the topic has never received the exhaustive treatment that it merits. The background of the conflict and the incident have been studied in some detail by scholars and laymen, but the negotiations and the repercussions, which are far more significant, have not been fully explored by historians.

FOR YU NIEN

I have based the present study of these events primarily upon the original source materials of both Chinese and Western languages. I have tried to show what the Chinese and Westerners thought and did in this period. Special efforts have also been made to clear up some misinterpretations and more extensively to discuss Sino-American relations during this period. Although this study has been somewhat limited by my inability to consult the French sources, I have tried to show the importance of the neglected subject in modern Chinese history.

In writing this manuscript, I have received such generous help. I feel most indebted to my adviser, Professor Paul S. Wolbe of the Department of History. For the past two years, he has inspired me to look at history from many different angles and broadened my

PREFACE

perspective. In preparing the manuscript, his suggestions and advice are equally invaluable. I am also grateful to Mr. Warren Tesser, who read the greater part of the manuscript and painstakingly polished my English. The Tientsin anti-missionary incident of 1870 is one of the most important events that helped shape modern Chinese history. It tragically ended the T'ung-chih Restoration--the first massive effort among Chinese officials to try to modernize and revitalize the Confucian state, and unexpectedly, but most profoundly and significantly, it reshaped Chinese internal politics. Yet the topic has never received the exhaustive treatment that it merits. The background of the conflict and the incident have been studied in some detail by scholars and laymen, but the negotiations and the repercussions, which are far more significant, have not been fully explored by historians.

I have based the present study of these events primarily upon the original source materials of both Chinese and Western languages. I have tried to show what the Chinese and Westerners thought and did in this period. Special efforts have also been made to clear up some misinterpretations and more extensively to discuss Sino-American relations during this period. Although this study has been somewhat limited by my inability to consult the French sources, I have tried to show the importance of the neglected subject in modern Chinese history.

In writing this manuscript, I have received much generous help. I feel most indebted to my adviser, Professor Paul S. Holbo of the Department of History. For the past two years, he has inspired me to look at history from many different angles and broadened my

perspective. In preparing the manuscript, his suggestions and advice are equally invaluable. I am also grateful to Mr. Warren Tozer, who read the greater part of the manuscript and painstakingly polished my English. Last, but not least, my thanks are due to my wife, who typed the whole thesis more than three times and rendered numerous other helps. It is she to whom this study is dedicated.

I. BACKGROUND OF THE SINO-MISSIONARY FRICTION		1
Cultural Conflict and Resulting Misunderstanding		2
The Chinese Grievances Against the French Catholics		16
II. THE TIENTSIN INCIDENT AND TSENG KUO-FAN'S MANAGEMENT OF THE CRISIS		19
The Explosion at Tientsin		19
Tensions After the Tientsin Outbreak		24
The Cry of the Dishard Chinese Conservatives		30
Tseng Kuo-fan's Management of the Tientsin Case		33
Tseng Kuo-fan's Removal from the Government-Generalship of Chihli		40
III. LI HUNG-CHANG AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE TIENTSIN CASE		43
Li Hung-chang's Transfer to Chihli		43
The Conclusion of the Case		47
Early Historical Interpretations of the Incident		48
Recent Historical Interpretations		54
IV. THE UNITED STATES AND THE TIENTSIN INCIDENT		53
United States Policy in China Prior to the Tientsin Incident		54
The China Policy of Frederick F. Low		70
Frederick F. Low and the Tientsin Incident		77
V. REPERCUSSIONS OF THE TIENTSIN INCIDENT		83
The End of the T'ung-chih Restoration		85
Li Hung-chang's Rise to Power		91
The Tsungli Yamen Proposal of 1871		95
BIBLIOGRAPHY		103

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

BACKGROUND OF THE SINO-MISSIONARY FRICTION	
I. BACKGROUND OF THE SINO-MISSIONARY FRICTION	1
Cultural Conflict and Resulting Misunderstanding . . .	2
Conflict of Political Prestige and Powers	9
The Chinese Grievances Against the French Catholics . .	16
II. THE TIENTSIN INCIDENT AND TSENG KUO-FAN'S MANAGEMENT OF THE CRISIS	19
The Explosion at Tientsin	19
Tensions After the Tientsin Outbreak	24
The Cry of the Diehard Chinese Conservatives	30
Tseng Kuo-fan's Management of the Tientsin Case	33
Tseng Kuo-fan's Removal from the Governor- Generalship of Chihli	40
III. LI HUNG-CHANG AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE TIENTSIN CASE	43
Li Hung-chang's Transfer to Chihli	43
The Conclusion of the Case	47
Early Historical Interpretations of the Incident	48
Recent Historical Interpretations	54
IV. THE UNITED STATES AND THE TIENTSIN INCIDENT	63
United States Policy in China Prior to the Tientsin Incident	64
The China Policy of Frederick F. Low	70
Frederick F. Low and the Tientsin Incident	77
V. REPERCUSSIONS OF THE TIENTSIN INCIDENT	85
The End of the T'ung-chih Restoration	85
Li Hung-chang's Rise to Power	91
The Tsungli Yamen Proposal of 1871	95
BIBLIOGRAPHY	105

The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 236.

Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 272-273.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND OF THE SINO-MISSIONARY FRICTION

One of the most striking features of late nineteenth-century China was her vigorous anti-missionary activities.¹ The Chinese either passively remained coldly indifferent to Christianity or actively expressed their hostility by writing anti-Christian literature, threatening to retaliate against any who dared enter the foreign religion or had dealings with its transmitters, and participating in anti-missionary riots. After 1860 friction between the Chinese and missionaries was far more extensive than that between the Chinese and any other type of foreigner. There were two hundred and forty incidents involving missionaries between 1860 and 1899, of which fifty-five occurred during the 1860's.² In the archives of the Tsungli Yamen (and after 1901 in the Wai-wu-pu), nine hundred and ten volumes, not including those concerning the Boxer movement, deal with missionary difficulties, or more than twice that for any other category of Sino-foreign relations over a comparable period of time.³ Although most of these incidents were

¹The Chinese, even in the nineteenth century, did not have a clear concept of Protestantism and Catholicism. They aimed their hostility at European and American missionaries in general, although they hated the French Catholics most.

²John King Fairbank, E.O. Reischauer and A.M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 234.

³Paul A. Cohen, China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 272-273.

settled locally, fifty did require top-level diplomatic treatment. Two serious incidents, the Tientsin incident, with which this paper is primarily concerned, and the Boxer uprising, drew international attention. The causes of these incidents were many-sided, and their roots can be traced back to the earliest Sino-Western contacts. The consequences were disastrous for both China and the Western powers, and are still being felt.

Cultural Conflict and Resulting Misunderstanding

John King Fairbank suggests that "study of the anti-Christian agitation in late nineteenth-century China offers an insight into the social psychology of the Confucian state" and furnishes "examples of conflict in social institutions and cultural values [between China and Western countries]."⁴ His observation is certainly valid. The basic ideological opposition of the Chinese to Christianity centered primarily around its attack on ancestor-worship and similar customary expressions of Confucian values. Conversely, the missionary prejudice against the Chinese culture and people rested largely on the ground that Confucianism contradicted the values and presuppositions of Western civilization. This cultural conflict and mutual misunderstanding were best expressed in the writings of Chinese intellectuals and Western missionaries from the seventeenth century on.

⁴John King Fairbank, "Patterns Behind the Tientsin Massacre," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, XX (1957), 480, 481.

The earliest work of importance directed against Christianity and other aspects of Western civilization was the P'o Hsieh Chi (An Anthology of Writings Exposing Heterodoxy), dated 1639.⁵ In it one author asserted that the teachings of Buddhism and Taoism supplemented Confucianism by teaching men to serve their rulers loyally and their parents filially, and to revere the gods and to love others; but Christianity would have Chinese emperors abolish all sacrificial rites and Chinese people get rid of all ceremonies pertaining to ancestor-worship. Thus, he argued, Christianity was heterodox and bad.⁶

One of the most widely-known early Ch'ing officials who opposed Christianity was Yang Kuang-hsien (1597-1669). Yang said that, if Christian doctrines were respected, China would be an offshoot of Judea; her ancient rulers and sages would be descendants of the Hebrews--a foreign race--and the Chinese classics and sage teachings would be no more than the remnants of a heterodox religion.⁷ Yang, moreover, saw Christianity as a political menace. He warned that Europeans looked down upon the age-old Chinese social institutions, considered their own teachings superior to those of Confucius, held high positions in the

Chinese capital, roamed through all the provinces, and made careful

⁵Cohen, pp. 21-24. See also Lu Shih-ch'iang, The Anti-Christian Movement in China, 1860-1874 (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1966), pp. 12-13, 53n. 2,3. According to Paul Cohen, this work was compiled in 1640. Lu, however, says that it was in 1639. I here follow Lu's datum.

⁶Cohen, pp. 21-24.

⁷Arthur Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (2 vols.; Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), II, 890.

maps of Chinese military installations. When, Yang continued, Confucian teachings had been degraded and the Europeans knew all about the Chinese topography, China would have little dignity and national security.⁸

The view that missionaries were connected with political aggression was shared by more and more Chinese intellectuals in the nineteenth century, particularly after 1860. In fact, after the second Anglo-French invasion, the intellectuals' primary concern had been that China would be conquered by Christianity. Yin Chow-yung, a scholar at the Hanlin Academy, declared that missionaries were really spies and saboteurs.⁹ In 1862, the gentry in Hunan province warned that India had been annexed, that Japan was also seriously disturbed by Christianity, and that China, which was much richer and larger, would naturally be the next target of the missionaries.¹⁰

Another prominent scholar who objected to Christianity was the historian-geographer from Hunan, Wei Yuan (1794-1865). As a Confucianist, Wei claimed that Christianity had a peculiar double moral standard which forbade a childless man to have a concubine while permitting a

⁸ A History of the Sino-Western Intercourse (Taipei: Chunghua Book Co., 1959), pp. 99-100. Yang's view was typical of the Chinese way of thinking. Until the first part of the nineteenth century, the Chinese people were prohibited from teaching Westerners the Chinese language on the ground that once the Westerners knew the Chinese language, they could learn the teachings of the superior Chinese sages and the Chinese military secrets and, thus, threaten the Chinese national security.

⁹ Lu, p. 20.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 21-22. For a fuller discussion of the Chinese fear, see Lu, pp. 14-26.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 42-43.

rich man to keep countless female slaves.¹¹ This viewpoint was shared by another Confucian scholar, Liang T'ing-nan (1796-1861). Liang remarked that Christianity was incompatible with the traditional values of Chinese culture. Having no descendants in China was considered unfilial, but, Liang said, Jesus did not permit men to keep concubines even if it meant cutting off their family tree. As for the foreign missionaries, they were like Chinese merchants and were governed completely by the profit motive. Hence, Liang concluded, it was quite natural that the Chinese would suspect them.¹²

These and other scholars, moreover, were very much confused by some Christian doctrines, such as dualism, the Last Judgment, and the Resurrection. Liang T'ing-nan once expressed the view that these doctrines were incomprehensible. He asked: "What place, moreover, could possibly be large enough to hold all the spirits awaiting judgment and still enable them to hear the Lord's sentence?"¹³

It is not surprising, therefore, that many nineteenth-century Chinese believed that missionaries practiced witchcraft and that Westerners in general were quite uncivilized. In Wei Yuan's Hai Kuo T'u Chih (An Illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries), first published in 1844, it is recorded that Christian wealth was made by the means of an alchemical process, that the missionaries took out the eyes of dying Chinese and mixed them with lead. It is also reported that

Pope Clement XI twice issued orders prohibiting the Chinese converts from worshipping Heaven and their ancestors. All the Catholic fathers who refused to obey these orders were to be excommunicated.

¹¹ Cohen, p. 39. The deportation of the Catholics from China by K'angsi Emperor. See A History of the Sino-Western Intercourse, pp. 101-102.

¹² Ibid., p. 43.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 42-43.

every one hundred taels of lead could make four taels of silver and that the remaining ninety-six taels could be sold as lead.¹⁴ In the P'i Hsieh Chi Shih (A True Record to Ward Off Evil Doctrines), dated 1861, the author stated that in the West young girls had to spend the night before their marriage with the pastor, that a father could marry his daughter-in-law and a son, his mother, and that Christian congregations sang hymns and then copulated with each other.¹⁵

If the misconceptions of the Chinese about Christian practices and their distrust of missionaries helped cause hostility, the missionaries' prejudices against the Chinese culture and people were no less serious in aggravating the Sino-missionary friction. The missionaries' action and thought were governed by the values and presuppositions of their culture. As early as the seventeenth century, they had looked at the Chinese customs and social values with hostile eyes. The famous rites controversy was a good example of their attitude.¹⁶ In the

¹⁴Wei Yuan, Hai Kuo T'u Chih, quoted in Ch'eng Kung-lu, A History of Modern China (2 vols.; Taipei: Commercial Press, 1960), I, 291-292. The original page is not numbered in Ch'eng's book.

¹⁵Fairbank, "Patterns Behind the Tientsin Massacre," p. 501. Again, this rumor was derived from a typical way of Chinese thinking. In China, it was considered immoral to let women, who were inferior, appear in the public or be with men in a closed room. Some Christian practices, such as confession and baptism, were done in seclusion. Gradually, these practices led to rumors, which spread widely.

¹⁶Pope Clement XI twice issued orders prohibiting the Chinese converts from worshipping heaven and their ancestors. All the Catholic fathers who dared not to obey these orders were to be excommunicated. The unhappy result was the deportation of the Catholics from China by K'angsi Emperor. See A History of the Sino-Western Intercourse, pp. 101-102.

nineteenth century, the missionaries further deepened their hostility toward Chinese culture and government. There were several reasons for this. First, they were not prepared to encounter a different culture; many of them knew "nothing of the Chinese language, . . . never studied the subject of ancestral worship at first hand, and . . . [had] no overmastering scruples of their own."¹⁷ Second, the romantic idealization of China had faded out and, when the authority of the Chinese central government began to decay rapidly and local disorders became more serious, the missionaries were constantly confronted with frustrations and inconveniences. Most important of all, however, was their realization that the pervasive influence of Confucianism, which emphasized the relationships among men instead of those between men and God, was the greatest enemy of their task to save souls. A Confucian scholar said to John Griffith, "I assure you I would rather go to hell with him [Confucius] than with Jesus to heaven."¹⁸ It was frustrating indeed to some missionaries that they baptized only a few Chinese converts after preaching for years in China.¹⁹

¹⁷ Arthur Henderson Smith, China in Convulsion (2 vols.; New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1900), I, 36.

¹⁸ R. Wardlaw Thompson, Griffith John: The Story of Fifty Years in China (London, 1908), letter of Oct. 5, 1856, pp. 59-60. See also Cohen, pp. 79-80.

¹⁹ Lu Shih-ch'iang believes, as do many other Chinese philosophers and historians, that the missionaries have this frustration because the Chinese were basically unreligious. The Chinese, according to Lu, believed that the idea of utopia could be achieved through men's self-reflection and moral practice instead of by religious belief. See Lu, pp. 36-45.

That most Christian missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, took a strong stand against China was understandable. They did not hesitate to claim that Western civilization was superior to that of China; they vigorously opposed and ridiculed the Confucian customs and values. As a matter of fact, they usually viewed the whole Chinese society from a contemptuous and arrogant point of view. Many of them considered China decrepit, depraved, unprogressive, materialistic, superstitious, and beyond the pale of civilization.²⁰ Some Catholic and Protestant missionaries, at the same time, regarded the Chinese people as children who "must be treated as children."²¹ When in June, 1858, violence against foreigners broke out at Tientsin, Samuel Wells Williams, the well-known American Protestant missionary to China, expressed his opinion:

... we shall get nothing important out of the Chinese unless we stand in a menacing attitude before them. They would grant nothing unless fear stimulated their sense of justice, for they are among the most craven of people, cruel and selfish as heathenism can make men, so we must be backed by force if we wish them to listen to reason.²²

Another missionary, J.E. Walker, who spent thirty-seven years at Foochow, summarized his experience in these words:

²⁰ See a brief discussion of the missionaries' attitude toward the Chinese in Cohen, pp. 79-80.

²¹ La Compagnie de Jesus en Chine: Le Kiang-nan en 1869, relation historique et descriptive par les missionnaires (Paris, preface dated 1869), pp. 22-23, quoted in Cohen, p. 81.

²² Frederick Wells Williams, The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1889), p. 268.

The heathen are heathen, prone toward covetousness, lust and deceit. They habitually practice what they know to be wrong; and even those who are disposed to do better, show little love for the right or for their fellow men, but only hate the getting hurt and the getting dirty themselves.²³

It is not surprising that Arthur H. Smith has asserted that the attitude of Protestant and Catholic Christian missionaries toward the Chinese was "a great bar to the spread of the Gospel in China."²⁴

Conflict of Political Prestige and Powers

The misconceptions, mutual misunderstanding, and hostility among the Chinese and missionaries, however, would not have been strong enough to bring about the violent and desperate Chinese anti-missionary activities witnessed in the late nineteenth century had there not been a drastic change in the status of the missionaries in China after 1860. During this period the number of incidents involving the missionaries increased rapidly. As Paul Cohen observes:

If missionaries had not entered the interior [of China] in large numbers after 1860, it is all but certain that antiforeignism would still have been a prominent theme in the writings of China's intellectuals, as it had been to a lesser degree for centuries past. But it is highly unlikely that it would have become the widespread social phenomenon that it did until many years had gone by, and it would have been quite impossible for it to have been manifested in such a violent manner.²⁵

²³ J.E. Walker to Commission I, World Missionary Conference, 1910, August 9, 1909, quoted in Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 18.

²⁴ Smith, I, 36.

²⁵ Cohen, pp. 269-270.

Under the treaties of 1842 and 1844 between China and the Western powers, although the missionaries expanded their activities rapidly, they still labored under severe handicaps. They had no legal right to purchase property or to reside or even to travel outside Hong Kong, Macao, and the five treaty ports. Furthermore, working in the Chinese interior and even on the coast north of Yangtze was dangerous. The treaties of 1858 and the Convention of 1860 following the two Anglo-French invasions, however, changed the status of the missionaries and Chinese converts and made possible a large expansion of the missionary activities of the Catholic and Protestant churches.²⁶ The cities, newly opened to missionaries, provided them with additional centers where they could reside and preach and from which they could expand into surrounding areas. The imperial permission to travel to the interior further facilitated their activities. The missionaries also found it possible to purchase property not only in the treaty ports but in other cities as well. And, perhaps more important than any of these concessions, both missionaries and their Chinese converts were now placed under the aegis of foreign powers such as France, Great Britain, and the United States.²⁷

²⁵ Cohen, pp. 269-270.

²⁶ The treaties of 1858 and of 1860 were signed between China and England and France. Other Western powers also obtained the privileges granted to England and France through the most-favored nation clause.

²⁷ Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), pp. 271-281.

In this newly-created set of circumstances, Christian missionaries became the first foreigners to leave the treaty ports and venture into the Chinese interior. No sooner had this intrusion, as the average Chinese considered it, occurred than the Chinese gentry found that their traditional leading position in Chinese society was first threatened and then undermined by the foreign missionaries who enjoyed special prestige and privileges. This development made the already strained anti-missionary attitudes more tense and helped explain why most of the anti-missionary activities were conducted, directly or indirectly, by the gentry. The gentry class was a special product of Chinese culture. The gentry were educated from childhood in the Confucian traditions and values and considered themselves the upholders of these traditions and values. Whenever Confucianism was under attack, of all the Chinese people, they stood to lose the most. According to Chang Chung-li, they functioned as the mediators between the commoners and local officials; they substituted, to a certain extent, for the Chinese law; they participated in certain ceremonial functions, welfare activities, local arbitrations, and the planning and supervision of public work; they also helped the local government collect taxes. Since the local official was usually not a native of the locality and held office not more than a few years, the gentry's prestige and powers were further strengthened by the fact that they were frequently consulted for advice and assistance, particularly during periods of emergency.²⁸

Press, 1933), pp. 3-70. A good example of the gentry assistance during was the suppression of the Taiping movement. See

²⁸ Stanley Chang Chung-li, The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society (Seattle: University of Washington

As pointed out, the gentry's prestigious position was seriously threatened after 1860 in areas where foreign missionaries lived and operated. Because of the extraterritoriality and other privileges they enjoyed, the missionaries were the only persons who could and did correspond with the local officials and visit them on an equal basis. The missionaries undertook welfare projects which traditionally had been the prerogative of the gentry. Most important, however, was the fact that the missionaries attacked Confucianism. Therefore, the missionaries not only usurped the gentry's traditional role as teachers and as mediators between the commoners and officials, but threatened to destroy the whole basis of their authority. The native converts, although still Chinese subjects, now turned to the more powerful missionary when faced with legal or other problems and rendered their obedience in return for protection.

As a result, not only were the gentry very much offended, but so were the Chinese officials. Most of the officials came directly from the gentry class, and for this reason they were opposed to Christianity. There were, however, three other factors that prompted their hatred. The foremost one was that the officials, by adopting a conciliatory attitude, had to risk the opposition of the gentry, which they could hardly afford. Second, in view of the decay of imperial power the officials did not necessarily obey the central government during

Press, 1955), pp. 3-70. A good example of the gentry assistance during period of emergency was the suppression of the Taiping movement. See Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-century Chinese Regionalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964).

this period of peaceful policy toward Western countries advocated by the T'ungchih authorities.²⁹ Third, the missionaries abused their position, which was particularly galling to the gentry and officials and made a compromise impossible.

As mentioned previously, most missionaries considered their culture superior and despised the Chinese systems and values; they noticed that Confucianism was the greatest enemy of Christianity; and they believed, with justification, that the Chinese government was corrupt and unable to maintain peace and justice. Above all, they revealed a mixture of religious enthusiasm and desire for power. It was but natural that the missionaries tried to acquire more privileges than they were allowed to enjoy in China, in order to break the barrier of Confucianism and to counteract the corrupt government. Some of the missionaries' attitudes towards the Chinese and methods of spreading their gospels are best described in Alexander Michie's The Englishman in China:

The missionaries presented themselves to Chinese view as the instruments of powerful nations bent on the ruin of the empire. They enter the country with a talisman of extraterritoriality; their persons are sacred; the law of the land can not lay hands on them. That is the first stage. The second is, that they seek to extraterritorialize their converts also, whose battle they fight in the provincial courts and in the rustic communes, and so make it of material advantage to people to bear the banner of the Cross. Many missionaries are really zealous in the work of alienating the Chinese from their natural allegiance, and of encouraging them to seek the protection of foreign powers

²⁹ Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), pp. 43-83.

as against native authorities.³⁰

One of the most serious abuses committed by the missionaries was that they interfered in local affairs on behalf of their converts or in order to gain more converts. The missionaries, particularly the Catholics, after 1860, began assisting Chinese in lawsuits, provided that the latter first agreed to become Christians along with their families. According to Wu Chao-kwang, when a lawsuit was involved the missionary frequently appealed at the yamen, demanding, without considering the merits or demerits of the case, a prompt settlement in favor of his protege by threatening to appeal to his national representative in Peking. As a consequence, many Chinese officials openly gave way and settled the case as the missionary demanded.³¹ The French Catholic, Father Faurie, after helping remit the punishment of some Chinese who offended against Christianity, remarked, with much naivete: "It is remarkable that every one of the individuals implicated for flagrantly insulting the Religion, embraces the faith with ardor upon leaving prison."³²

Some missionaries also assumed official ranks, thus appropriating the prestige and impinging upon the integrity of the Chinese

³⁰Alexander Michie, The Englishman in China During the Victorian Era: As Illustrated in the Career of Sir Rutherford Alcock, K.C.B., D.C.L. Many Years Consul and Minister in China and Japan (2 vols.; Taipei: Ch'eng Wen Publishing Co., 1966), II, 233-234.

³¹Wu Chao-kwang, The International Aspects of the Missionary Movement in China (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1930), pp. 193-194.

³²Louis Faurie, "Journal de la mission du Kouy-Tcheou," July 20, 1840, quoted in Cohen, p. 140.

The bishops, the spiritual rulers of the broad province, adopt the rank of a Chinese governor, and wear a button on their caps indicative of that fact, traveling in a chair with the number of bearers appropriate to that rank, with outsiders and attendants on foot, an umbrella of honour borne in front, and a cannon to discharge upon their arrival and departure, . . . all this, and much else, is a part of the settled policy of the church, and not an accident of this place or of that.³³

A French bishop, writing in the 1860's, substantiates Smith's charge:

Besides the red parasols consisting of three tiers of shades, the cavalcades and the cannonades, there was added before my palanquin an escort of three little children dressed in red and green, and carrying crowns composed of precious stone. Here, again, I signaled my arrival by setting free several prisoners who were confined for offences against our religion.³⁴

Some missionaries were so notorious that Western diplomats could not help expressing disapproval of their actions. Rev. J.S. Burden wrote:

The opinions of our late Minister on the subject of Missions are well known. Sir Rutherford Alcock seemed to think that Opium and Missions were the two disturbing elements in our intercourse with China, and . . . during his farewell visit to Prince Kung, . . . he made no secret of his view to the Chinese.³⁵

In fact, Kenneth Scott Latourette wrote, "the Church had become a partner in Western imperialism and could not well disavow responsibility for the consequence."³⁶

³³Smith, I, 48.

³⁴Nineteenth Century, XX, 625, quoted in Wu, pp. 192-193.

³⁵The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal (Foochow, 1868-1872; Shanghai, 1874 et seq), IV (March, 1872), 266.

³⁶Latourette, p. 280.

The Chinese Grievances Against the French Catholics

Although the Chinese disliked all foreign missionaries in general, they most hated the French Catholics. The Tientsin case, to be discussed later, offers the best example of the Chinese hatred. France, with less economic interest in China than Great Britain, appointed herself the protector of Roman Catholic missions in order to gain more prestige and political influence and to counter Great Britain in Asia.³⁷ The treaty of 1860 was the substantiation of her ambition. Enjoying political protection, the French missionaries were understandably the most arrogant of all. After 1860, they repeatedly caused trouble in China. In September, 1865, Chang Liang-chih, governor of K'weichow, reported that a French bishop in his province asked him to remove one of his subordinates, because, according to Chang, the latter prohibited the baptism of natives once he found that, when they became converts, they were intolerably arrogant and disobedient.³⁸ In February, 1869, Prince Kung warned that Henri Fontanier, the French consul, so frequently threatened to use gunboats to solve missionary problems that he feared other nations might follow suit.³⁹

³⁷For a brief survey of the origins of the French protectorate over the Catholic missions in China, see H.M. Cole, "Origins of the French Protectorate over Catholic Missions in China," The American Journal of International Law, XXXIV (1940), 473-491.

³⁸Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo (the Beginning and End of the Management of Barbarian Affairs) (Taipei: Kuo Fung Publishing Co., 1965), T'ung-chih Period, chuan 37, pp. 888-890. (Hereafter cited as IWSM). There are many reports describing the French abuses and the Chinese complaints both in IWSM and The Collected Writings of Tseng Kuo-fan. Here I cite only a few examples.

³⁹Ibid., chuan 71, pp. 1651-1652.

The most concrete evidence of Chinese distrust and hatred of French missionaries, however, is to be found in the memorial by Shan P'ao-chen, governor of Kiangsi. In early 1862, Shan, noticing the dangerous aspects of the French Catholic missions, sent some agents to the countryside. They interviewed the natives and reported the result to Shan, who forwarded the memorial to the Tsungli Yamen. One typical part reads as follows:

Question: Why are you people always talking about fighting to death against the French missionaries?

Answer: They took over our orphanage, demanded us to compensate them in silver, and persuaded the converts to occupy our land and stores. And worse, they are still saying they will send gunboats to attack us, . . . Sooner or later we will have no place to retreat. Why shouldn't we fight?

Question: What do your local officials and gentry think about these?

Answer: Officials and gentry always bow when confronting them. Officials ask only for superficial peaceful order. When there is one day of peace, they get one-day salary. Once trouble comes, they will flee without caring about the common people's lives. The gentry are not far different. . . . Only the common people suffer. Now we don't bother to ask them to take care of us. We just do it ourselves.

Question: If someday [the French] gunboats do come, will you really fight them?

Answer: At present, we could die under the suppression of their converts. In the future, we could die when they attack us and rob our land . . . We will die anyway, but we now no longer fear death. They have superior guns . . . If we still have ten or so persons left and kill one of them, it will be good enough.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Ibid., chuan 12, p. 318.

It was all but certain that, in this tense situation, a serious clash between the Chinese and the French missionaries became inevitable. On the afternoon of June 21, 1870, an irritated French consul and a group of infuriated Chinese lit the fuse, and the flame soon spread over the whole city of Tientsin. The result of the disturbance shocked the foreign residents in the Tientsin area, caused sharp differences of opinion among the Chinese officials and intellectuals, and ruined all the hopes of the T'ung-chih Restoration when this modernization movement was underway. It is with these events--the Tientsin incident--that this paper will be concerned in the following chapters.

diplomats for several months. A settlement was not reached until almost two years later, while popular feeling remained bitter much longer. The final effects of the incident were far-reaching.

The Explosion at Tientsin

Tientsin, a treaty port opened to the Powers in 1860, more than any other city in north China was ripe for a Sino-Western conflict. The recent treaty, so humiliating to the Chinese, was negotiated there, and from 1860 to 1861 the British and French had stationed their troops in the city; the French authorities occupied a former imperial villa and housed their consulate in it; and in June, 1869, the French missionaries consecrated the cathedral of Notre Dame des Victories on the site of a destroyed Chinese temple. As H. B. Morse has remarked: "It is not too much to say that, at Tientsin,

the French nation and French . . . missionaries were detected."

Early in 1870, wild rumors began to spread in Tientsin about the French. It was said that children had been kidnapped, that children's corpses had been found thrown out in the fields, and that the

CHAPTER II

THE TIENSIN INCIDENT AND TSENG KUO-FAN'S

MANAGEMENT OF THE CRISIS

The Tientsin incident, which occurred on the afternoon of June 21, 1870, was the culmination of the Chinese grievances against the missionaries, particularly the French. It nearly caused another war and became almost the sole preoccupation of Chinese and French diplomats for several months. A settlement was not reached until

almost two years later, while popular feeling remained bitter much longer. The final effects of the incident were far-reaching.

The Explosion at Tientsin

Tientsin, a treaty port opened to the Powers in 1860, more than any other city in north China was ripe for a Sino-Western conflict. The recent treaty, so humiliating to the Chinese, was negotiated there, and from 1860 to 1863 the British and French had stationed their troops in the city; the French authorities occupied a former imperial villa and housed their consulate in it; and in June, 1869, the French missionaries consecrated the cathedral of Notre Dame des Victories on the site of a destroyed Chinese temple. As H.B.

Morse has remarked: "It is not too much to say that, at Tientsin,

¹*Ibid.*, p. 1866.

the French nation and French . . . missionaries were detested."¹

Early in 1870, wild rumors began to spread in Tientsin about the French. It was said that children had been kidnapped, that children's corpses had been found thrown out in the fields, and that the French missionaries had taken part in these crimes in order to get eyes and hearts to make medicine.² The arrest and execution of kidnapers from time to time, ironically, only widened the circulation of rumors. On June 18, the Tientsin local authorities arrested another kidnapper, Wu Lan-chen. He confessed to have stolen a child and sold it to Wang San, a janitor for several Catholic establishments in Tientsin.³ This revelation brought public indignation to the point of explosion.

The kidnapping rumor, though exaggerated, was not without grounds. During the 1860's, it was believed among the non-Catholic foreign residents in Tientsin that kidnappings had been encouraged by the activities of Catholic sisters. Frederick F. Low, the American minister in China, observed that the Catholic sisters "offered a certain sum per head for all the children placed under their control . . . it being understood that a child, once in their asylum, no parent, relative, or guardian could claim or exercise any control over it." The Catholic orphanages, too, were "in the habit of holding out

¹Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (3 vols.; Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1918), II, 241.

²IWSM, chuan 72, p. 1667. (Relations.)

³Ibid., p. 1668. memorial, see Tsung Kuo-fan, The Collected Writings of Tsung Kuo-fan (Taipei: Chunghua Book Co., 1939), Tsou-kuo, chuan 54, pp. 517-191.

inducements to have children brought to them in the last stage of illness, for the purpose of being baptised in articulo mortis."⁴

Tseng Kuo-fan, governor-general of Chihli Province, and Ch'ung-hou, the Superintendent of Three Northern Ports, presented a joint memorial to the government on June 21 concerning Catholic activities and the Tientsin outbreak. They listed five major reasons for the popular suspicion: (1) the closed Catholic establishments and their dark basements made people suspicious; (2) the Chinese who went to orphanages for medical treatment sometimes refused to return home; (3) the Sisters of Mercy often adopted the Chinese poor and orphans on the verge of death in order to administer extreme unction; (4) the organization of the Sisters of Mercy was too large and had so many quarters that a mother and a son did not have a chance to see each other for a span of a year; (5) the kidnapping rumor that broke out in Tientsin in May and June of 1870, combined with a substantially increasing death rate in the orphanages of the Sisters of Mercy, deepened the suspicion of the populace.⁵

By June 19, rumors were running rampant. The Tientsin prefect Chou Chia-shun, fearful of an outbreak of hostilities, paid a visit to the French consul Henri Fontanier. Chou suggested that, since popular feeling was high, they had better make a joint investigation of

early in the afternoon. However, a quarrel between some converts and

⁴Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1870 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1871), pp. 355-356. (Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations.)

⁵For the original memorial, see Tseng Kuo-fan, The Collected Writings of Tseng Kuo-fan (Taipei: Chunghua Book Co., 1959), Tsou-kao, chuan 54, pp. 917-191.

charges against the French missionaries. Fontanier, according to his own report, though having no difficulty in arguing that the charges against the church were groundless, agreed to the suggestion.⁶ Several hours later, the Tientsin magistrate Liu Chien also called on Fontanier and insisted on an official search at the domicile of the Sisters and of the Lazarist missionaries. After an exchange of hot words, the French consul terminated the interview and appealed directly to Ch'ung-hou.⁷

On the following day, Ch'ung-hou paid another friendly visit to Fontanier. They were joined by Father Claude-Marie Chevrier. It was agreed to investigate jointly the kidnapping testimony of Wu Lan-chen. On June 21, Wu was brought to the Catholic Church where the French refuted his testimony point by point. After the discussion Father Chevrier went to Ch'ung-hou's Yamen. They agreed that all deaths owing to illness in the Catholic establishments should be reported to the Chinese authorities who would check the corpses and, together with the Frenchmen concerned, observe the burial. All the names of those who studied and were raised in the establishment would also be sent to the Chinese authorities so that the latter, when necessary, could make investigations to dispel the popular suspicion.

Ch'ung-hou prepared to draft a proclamation to pacify the people. Early in the afternoon, however, a quarrel between some converts and

⁶Foreign Relations, 1870, pp. 365-366.

⁷Ibid.

⁸IWSM, chuan 72, p. 1668.

bystanders broke out. Rocks quickly followed the verbal threats. Before Ch'ung-hou could order soldiers to disperse the crowds, Fontanier, armed with two pistols, angrily appeared at Ch'ung-hou's yamen. The Chinese superintendent went out to greet the consul, but before he could say a word, the Frenchman began using abusive language. Then Fontanier took out his pistol and fired at Ch'ung-hou. Fortunately, the consul missed the shot. The surprised superintendent, to avoid further confrontation, withdrew inside. Fontanier, however, followed him into the yamen, shouting loudly and destroying some of the cups and articles in the room. Ch'ung-hou, remaining cool, advised the consul not to go out because the people were enraged. The Frenchman answered that he was not afraid of any common Chinese and left. The superintendent sent some men to escort him home. Returning to the consulate, the angry consul encountered the Tientsin magistrate Liu chien. Foolishly, he fired at Liu. He missed but wounded one of the magistrate's attendants.⁹

The crowd, observing Fontanier's foolish attack on Liu, became infuriated and ripped the French consul to pieces, then plundered and set fire to the French consulate, killing every Frenchman they could find. The populace quickly moved to the Orphanage. There they dragged the nuns into the street and stripped them naked so that the populace could ascertain their sex. They then gouged out the women's eyes, cut off their breasts, and burned them alive. A French merchant, *Sinica* (London: Oxford University Press, 1917), p. 557. The fullest account, however, is in M. de Baron de Hubner, *A Rambler Round the World, 1871*. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1878), pp. 533-573.

⁹ *Ibid.*

Chalmers by name, while trying to reach the hospital to offer some protection to the sisters, was met by the Chinese crowd and torn to pieces. His wife met the same fate at night when she was searching for his body. Three Russians, two men and a woman, were mistakenly identified as French and killed too. In all twenty-one foreigners and between thirty and forty Chinese converts were killed. Four American and British chapels were also destroyed, while several other properties were damaged.¹⁰

Tensions After the Tientsin Outbreak

Following the outbreak of violence at Tientsin, there was much unrest throughout China for several months. Rumors and fears among both the Chinese and foreigners ran rampant. Mission churches were either threatened or destroyed in many cities of China, including Chefoo, Tungchow, Chinkiang, Nanking, Shanghai, Wuchang, Fuchow, and Canton. Foreign and native properties were damaged. At Shanghai alone, the value of the British-owned property at stake amounted to 15,000,000 sterling.¹¹ The alarmed foreigners believed that their lives were not safe and that their envoys should withdraw from Peking before it was too late. The resident in the foreign concession in the

¹⁰There are more Western sources than Chinese concerning the incident itself. See The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal, III (Nov. 1870), 150, and Samuel Couling, ed., The Encyclopaedia Sinica (London: Oxford University Press, 1917), p. 557. The fullest account, however, is in M. le Baron de Hubner, A Ramble Round the World, 1871, tr. Lady Herbert (London: Macmillan and Co., 1878), pp. 533-573.

¹¹Morse, II, 247-248.

Tientsin area formed a volunteer guard under the command of the British consul; the mercantile communities armed themselves and patrolled the settlement; the missionaries went on board a merchant steamer in port.¹²

The American missionary, C.A. Stanley, wrote:

Li Hung-chang is on his way here with some 13,000 troops; the van of this army has arrived already . . . the people demand it [war], without a thought of the final settlement. They think they can easily expel or kill the few foreigners in China, especially in the north, and their work is done.¹³

J.L. Nevins, another American missionary, requested on August 29 that

S.A. Holmes, the American vice-consul at Tungchow, obtain a steamer, a gunboat if possible, to remove the American residents from Tungchow.

He wrote:

We have credible grounds for believing that official communications were received here some time back from Tseng Kuo-fan, and from the Governor of the Province [of Shantung], calling upon the authorities and the people to make arrangements for massacring foreigners generally some time this fall.¹⁴

The fear was so great that on September 1 the American missionaries, upon their own request, were removed to Chefoo by the British ships "Barossa" and "Grasshopper."¹⁵

The cry for vengeance among the foreigners was universal. The British merchants also saw the Tientsin incident as a heaven-sent opportunity really to open up China. Accordingly, they vigorously urged their government to seize the occasion of the Tientsin disturbances and

¹² Ibid., pp. 247, 249.

¹³ Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 375.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 385-386.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 386.

press the Chinese government to open more ports for trade.¹⁶ The North China Herald, on August 11, declared:

This sad and execrable massacre of Tientsin is one that concerns all nations having relations with China; and, unless a severe reparation be exacted, everyone will rue the apathy that would permit such atrocities to go unpunished. No money indemnity can satisfy the demand for justice. The lives of all the authorities concerned ought to be forfeited. In particular, Chunghow should suffer death If he is allowed to escape, disaster may be expected for every European in this country.¹⁷

Nor was the feeling for vengeance confined to foreign merchants and other residents in China. It extended to the missionaries as well.

As soon as the incident broke out at Tientsin, Ch'ung-hou expressed a desire to make reparations for the incident, and the English and American missionaries at Tientsin were asked to present their claims for damage done. In reply the English missionaries expressed surprise that,

Prior to the settlement of the more important questions which are still pending, the subject of monetary compensation should be entertained at all. [This is] apart altogether from the fact that we are yet uncertain as to action which will be taken at the present crisis . . . action which it might be as useless as it would be impolitic for us to forestall by consenting to any unsatisfactory condonation of the crimes which have been committed . . .

They also expressed a desire "not to be separated from our suffering

¹⁶ *Foreign Relations*, p. 375.

¹⁶ For the attitude of the British businessmen, see Nathan A. Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office (New York: The King's Crown Press, 1948), pp. 86-97.

¹⁷ North China Herald, August 11, 1870, quoted in Morse, II, 249, 54n.

²² See *HSM*, chuan 73, p. 1686.

French brethren in any settlement of these troubles."¹⁸ The same sentiments were expressed by the American missionary C.A. Stanley, who declared, on July 9, "America has lost no children, but others have, and we should stand by them in demanding a full investigation, impartial justice, and determined punishment of the guilty."¹⁹

After the outbreak at Tientsin, foreign gunboats quickly arrived in north China waters. On June 29, a French gunboat arrived at Taku and fired several threatening shots.²⁰ By August 23, there were five French, one American, and three British ships of war at Tientsin, and two French, one Italian, and three British at Chefoo.²¹

Wild kidnapping rumors continued to spread widely on the Chinese side. In Peking a censor reported on July 14 that in the Chinese city outside the Hatamen a twelve-year-old child, Kao Er-ko, had been kidnapped. The censor reported that on July 7 a stranger touched Kao on the head and bewitched him. After being bewitched, the little child could see only a narrow path before him and followed the kidnapper involuntarily. He was saved by a shopkeeper in Hsing-lung Street. An imperial edict ordered strict precaution.²² The agitation also continued in the Chinese city. Those who had anything to lose, fearing

¹⁸ Foreign Relations, p. 376.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 375.

²⁰ Kuo Ting-i, A Chronological History of Modern China (2 vols.; Taipei, 1963), I, 539.

²¹ Morse, II, 253-254.

²² See IWSM, chuan 73, p. 1686.

reprisals from the Europeans, hastily left the town. The merchants turned all the money they had into goods; for thieves carry off money more easily than heavy goods.²³

The Chinese government officials, for their part, were equally frightened, for they believed that a war with the French was imminent. They were also afraid that other foreign powers would either join with the French or, at the least, encourage war in order to make further gains at the expense of the Chinese. Although most of the Chinese officials and generals were pessimistic, believing that China had little chance to win the war, they still favored positive military preparations. They believed that preparedness was necessary in order either to fight or negotiate.²⁴

In response to the emergency at Tientsin, these officials presented various plans to the throne for China's defense. On June 29, eight days after the incident, Prince Ch'un suggested that the government order military mobilization in Chihli province and other coastal areas.²⁵ About a month later, the Khorchin Prince po-yen-no-mo-hu presented his cavalry preparation to the government. In his memorial, the Prince suggested that cavalry be sent from Mongolia, Kirin, and

²³Hubner, p. 560.

²⁴The Chinese defeatism appears throughout IWSM, chuan 72-77. Many of the Chinese generals and officials, among whom Tseng Kuo-fan was typical, argued that China should not start the fighting because she could not win. However, they considered military preparations as a mean to avoid hostilities.

²⁵IWSM, chuan 72, p. 1674.

Heilungkiang to Kupeikuo in northwest China under the guise of defending the Moslem rebels but, in actuality, to provide for an urgently needed military strength in north China.²⁶ Early in August, Li Hung-chang, governor-general of Hukwang, presented his defense plan for both Peking and Shensi Province. He also urged that the government call retired generals, such as Liu Min-chuan and Yuan Pao-heng, back into service.²⁷ Tseng Kuo-fan echoed the same opinion. He suggested that the imperial court give special awards to Liu Min-chuan, an outstanding general, and Pen Yu-lin, a naval strategist, to urge them to come out and serve the country in the crisis.²⁸ On August 11, in his memorial to the throne, Ting Jih-ch'ang, governor of Kiangsu, suggested that, since Tientsin and Peking were too close, the government send Li Hung-chang to the south. Then, if war should start, Li could attack the foreigners' rear at Shanghai and draw their attention away from the capital.²⁹ Two weeks later, Ting again asked that the government order the governor of Kwangsi to investigate the possibility of alliance with Annam which France had annexed and whose people hated the Frenchmen.³⁰ At the same time, Li Han-chang, governor of Chekiang, and Kuo P'o-yin, governor of Hupei, presented their joint memorial for defense against the French. All the foreigners looked alike, they stated, and if war

²⁶ Ibid., chuan 73, p. 1697.

²⁷ Ibid., chuan 74, pp. 1706-1709.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 1719-1720.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 1712-1715.

³⁰ Ibid., chuan 75, p. 1730.

should start, the Chinese would have no way to defend themselves because they could not distinguish the French from other foreigners.³¹

Therefore, Li and Kuo urged the government to meet with representatives of the United States and Great Britain secretly in order to work out a distinction between French and other Westerners.³¹

The Chinese government, upon the advice of these officials, mobilized troops, called retired generals back into active service, and worked out detailed plans for the defense of the whole country. Although China did not wish to stir up the suspicion and fear of the foreigners, she took great pains to have the military measures complete in order to be ready for the possibility of war.³²

The Cry of the Diehard Chinese Conservatives

The Tientsin incident, besides furnishing a dramatic climax to the anti-foreign activity in the late 1860's and stimulating more distrust and hatred between the Chinese and foreigners, also provided a chance for the diehard Chinese conservatives to advocate their traditional approach to the Sino-Western conflict. They believed that a government not only could not ignore popular opinion but in fact could

³¹ Ibid., chuan 74, pp. 1721-1722.

³² Though cautious and conciliatory, the Chinese court approved most of the memorials presented. For instance, it ordered Liu Min-chuan, Li Hung-chang, Kuo Sung-lin, and others, to go to Chihli; see IWSM, chuan 74, pp. 1708-1709. Upon the request of Ting Jih-ch'ang, the court commanded Su Wen-fung, governor of Kwangsi, to investigate the possibility of alliance with Annam; see ibid., chuan 75, pp. 75, 1730. In response, Su made detailed report of Annam's topography and political situation; see ibid., chuan 80, pp. 1842-1846.

reply on it as a decisive source of strength.³³ Prince Ch'un, the younger brother of Prince Kung, in his memorial presented on June 29, requested that the Emperor take a strong stand and resist the foreigners' demands. He suggested that the Tientsin populace not be punished but be soothed, for the strength of a nation rested on the morale and support of her people. The Prince, furthermore, urged that the Tientsin local officials not be carelessly transferred or dismissed because of their popular support. The populace killed the barbarian chief because he fired at Ch'ung-hou. It was fortunate for the country, Prince Ch'un claimed, that common people had determined to protect their official at the risk of their own lives.³⁴

The themes in Prince Ch'un's memorial were echoed by a sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat, Sung Chih. He felt that the throne had put too much blame on the common people, and he worried that they would be alienated. The people, Sung stated, had always been able to live peacefully with those foreign countries which concentrated on trade, but they always had trouble with France which stressed religion. If China prepared her defenses properly and took a strong stand, Sung asserted, she would have no trouble in getting

³³This is one of the important Confucian ideas. To quote Mencius: "Ke and Chow's losing the empire arose from their losing the people, and to lose the people means to lose their hearts. There is a way to get the empire:--get the people, and the empire is got. There is a way to get the people:--get their hearts, and the people are got." See The Four Books, tr. James Legge (Taipei: Wen Yuan Book Co., 1965), p. 165.

³⁴IWSM, chuan 72, pp. 1673-1674.

her own way. If, however, she pursued a policy of accommodation, the indignation of the people would be hard to control, and it would be France and her missionaries who would suffer most in the end.³⁵

On July 19, Kuan-wen, a Grand Secretary, and others presented a memorial on behalf of a clerk in the Grand Secretariat, Li Ju-sung. In his memorial, Li stated that if the government should oppose the barbarians, the people would gain confidence in the government and control the barbarians. If they conciliated the barbarians, the government would lose popular support and would have no way to govern the people or to control the barbarians. In Tientsin, Li continued, the people acted like children protecting their parents when the local officials were in danger. Since the people's morale was very high, there was a great chance to review the whole policy towards the barbarians. Li claimed that although at this stage China was not able to kill all the foreigners or destroy their settlement in the capital, the government certainly should sever relations with France as a sign of punishment. As to sending a mission of apology to France and to paying indemnities to the foreign countries, Li argued, such a policy would not only hurt the Chinese dignity but destroy the national polity. Patriotic ministers, he concluded, would never consider such humiliations.³⁶

Two days after Li's memorial was presented, Ch'ang-jun, a censor in charge of the Honan circuit, expressed his opinion on the Tientsin

³⁵ Ibid., chuan 73, pp. 1682-1684.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 1686-1688.

affair. Ch'ang argued that the biggest problem in China's foreign relations was the corrupting influence of the French missionaries and their heterodox doctrines. The harmful effects of this influence were not only felt by the Chinese but by those foreign countries whose chief concern was commercial profit. Trade between China and the foreign countries, he believed, had been impeded because the Chinese transferred their suspicion of the missionary to the merchant. He suggested that the throne instruct Tseng Kuo-fan and the Tsungli Yamen, together with the foreign powers, to negotiate with France. The joint conference should explain to the French that, because of the difficulties involved in enforcing the treaty article on missions, the article should be abrogated, all the churches in China should be destroyed, and all missionaries should be sent home immediately.³⁷

Tseng Kuo-fan's Management of
the Tientsin Case

Two days after the outbreak at Tientsin, Tseng Kuo-fan, then governor-general of Chihli, was commanded to go to Tientsin to settle the case quickly and justly.³⁸ Against the background of the intense military mobilization of both China and Western powers and anti-foreign atmosphere and his own anti-foreign leanings, Tseng's impartial management of the case was "a remarkable testimony to both his ability as a

³⁷ Ibid., p. 1689.

³⁸ Ibid., chuan 72, p. 1668. Tseng's official residence was at Paoting.

⁴¹ INSH, chuan 73, pp. 1690-1691.

statesman and his courage as a man."³⁹ Tseng, already old and ill, wrote in his last will before leaving for Tientsin that foreigners were vicious and not predictable. He was ready, he wrote, to sacrifice himself for his country.⁴⁰

Upon arriving at Tientsin, Tseng made his basic policies clear. He declared that hostilities were to be avoided at all costs.⁴¹ Meanwhile, the French were to be isolated by settling all Russian, British, and American claims at once; then the French claims would be settled. Finally, the native populace would have to be pacified.⁴²

On July 23, Tseng presented his famous report to the imperial court on his investigation of the case and of the general situation. He declared that his investigation had revealed no firm evidence to support the charges against the Tientsin missionaries. He requested that the court expose the entire fabrication to the empire in order to pacify the foreigners and to dispel the suspicions of the people.⁴³ In a supplementary memorial presented on the same day, Tseng reported

³⁹ Cohen, p. 237.

⁴⁰ Tseng Kuo-fan, The Collected Writings of Tseng Kuo-fan, Tsa-chu, pp. 93-95.

⁴¹ Ibid., Tsou-kaio, pp. 922-923.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 917-919. The policy of isolating the French, however, was never carried out. Tseng pursued the conciliatory policy largely because he thought that a peaceful policy toward the barbarians would benefit the Chinese. He noted that the imperial court's strong and inflexible attitude since the 1840's had brought China humiliation. Furthermore, Tseng stated, to accommodate barbarians from a distance was the Chinese sage teaching. See Chiang Hsing-te, The Life and Career of Tseng Kuo-fan, pp. 106-107.

⁴³ IWSM, chuan 73, pp. 1690-1691.

that Rochechouart, the French representative, had threatened hostilities if the Tientsin prefect and magistrate and the unruly brigadier general, Ch'en Kuo-jui, were not immediately executed. Most foreigners believed that Ch'en was the major instigator of the incident. Tseng felt that the role of the two local officials in precipitating the incident was not clear; therefore, such severe punishment was not warranted. Nevertheless, because of Rochechouart's insistence and because these two officials had indeed been unable to prevent the incident, he requested that they be dismissed from their posts and be brought before the Board of Punishment for trial. Tseng suggested that, since Ch'en was then in Peking, the Tsungli Yamen interrogate him as to his role in the Tientsin incident.⁴⁴

The Chinese government, contrary to many foreigners' charges, also took a conciliatory attitude in handling the crisis. Orders were issued to the local officials throughout the empire to protect the foreign missionaries. At the same time, the government promised an indemnity to the French Catholics and ordered Ch'ung-hou to France on a mission of apology.⁴⁵ Therefore, when Tseng Kuo-fan presented his memorials, they immediately met with overwhelming approval. An edict issued by the court to the Grand Secretariat commented that, since the rumors about the Catholics had been proved false, in the future people should no longer be suspicious of Catholic missionaries.⁴⁶ Another

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 1691-1692.

⁴⁵Ibid., chuan 72, pp. 1676, 1672.

⁴⁶Ibid., chuan 73, p. 1692.

edict dismissed the Tientsin prefect and magistrate from their posts and ordered them to be tried.⁴⁷ A third edict, sanctioning Tseng's general policy, revealed the government's conciliatory policy and determination to ward off hostilities.⁴⁸

At the same time as the Chinese court expressed its desire to avoid hostilities, it also advocated that a firm stand be taken towards the foreigners whom it considered basically cunning by nature. China's most urgent task was to complete her defense measures and be prepared for possible war.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, Tseng was being pressured from all sides to reach a settlement. The French continued to threaten the Taku port with their gunboats, demanding that the two local officials, Chou and Liu, and Ch'en Kuo-jui be executed.⁵⁰ The other foreign powers complained that China was delaying a settlement. Tseng and other officials issued repeated proclamations, but failed to quiet the Tientsin populace. On July 24, illness forced Tseng to bed. The government, therefore, commanded Ting Jih-ch'ang to go to Tientsin immediately to help Tseng manage the case.⁵¹

The pressure of the diehard conservative elements on Tseng proved equally as strong as the foreign pressures. In late August,

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 1692-1693.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 1692.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 1695.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 1697-1700.

Hu Yu-yun, a Board of Rites junior metropolitan censor, claimed that Tseng Kuo-fan's management of the case was not pacifying the Chinese or the foreigners. The problem, Hu believed, was that Tseng failed to deal properly with the two Chinese kidnapers, Wang San and Wu Lan-chen. He said that, according to Tseng's own testimony, Wang had originally admitted to the kidnapping but later had retracted his confession. Neither the natives nor the foreigners had the least idea as to what Wang had confessed or what he had retracted; thus, no one could set his mind at rest. The foreigners would suspect that Tseng was shielding the Chinese, while the latter would suspect that he was ingratiating the foreigners. Hu, therefore, suggested that these two kidnapers be forwarded to the capital for trial by the high officials there.⁵² Hu may have hoped to simplify the actual problems involved in the management of the Tientsin case and therefore put Tseng in a still worse situation.⁵³

A few days after Hu Yu-yun's memorial was presented, Yuan Pao-heng, an expositor of the Hanlin Academy, made five proposals to the Emperor. Yuan, like Prince Ch'un before him, strongly urged that the morale of the populace not be suppressed but be encouraged and consolidated. He stated that what the barbarians feared most was the unified mind of the people like that of the Chinese. He believed that the common people were the most reliable weapon that China could use to

⁵² Ibid., chuan 75, pp. 1726-1727.

⁵³ Cohen, p. 240. pp. 1730-1731.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 1733.

control the barbarians. As evidence of the people's power, Yuan noted that whenever mission churches were destroyed or Chinese converts were killed, the foreigners never dared to confront the populace directly. Instead, they went to the officials asking them to suppress the populace. Yuan worried that those handling the Tientsin case were not only overly cautious and indulged the barbarians to excess, but were too busy to care about the popular opinion. Once the spirit of the people suffered disunity, Yuan warned, their sense of purpose would be divided and the foreigners would become more arrogant and dangerous. Should the government then wish to rely upon the common people again, Yuan concluded, it would find that the morale of the people could no longer be aroused.⁵⁴

As Yuan was presenting his memorial, efforts were already being made to arrest and try those who were involved in the Tientsin case. On August 26 Tseng Kuo-fan reported that thirty-seven persons had been apprehended and that rewards were being offered for information concerning other suspects. In his memorial Tseng suggested that the principals in the case be sentenced to capital punishment and the accessories to exile.⁵⁵ Obviously, Yuan Pao-heng's strong advocacy of arousing the morale of the Tientsin populace directly conflicted with Tseng's policies of conciliation. Moreover, Yuan's proposal symbolized the continuing opposition of the diehard elements to a conciliatory attitude towards the foreigners.

⁵⁴ IWSM, chuan 75, pp. 1730-1731.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 1733.

The gentry and the common people, at the same time, also voiced their objection to Tseng's policies. The gentry in Peking planned to strip Tseng of his membership in the association of Hunan fellow provincials.⁵⁶ In Hunan, Tseng's honorary tablets were torn down and burned. Many people, both in the north and in the south, called him a traitor.⁵⁷

In view of all these bitter feelings against Tseng, it is remarkable that the Ch'ing court insisted upon a conciliatory settlement. When Tseng, on September 10, reported that evidence could lead to the warrant of capital punishment to seven or eight persons, the throne, overruling the objections of Li Hung-chang, decided that a still larger number of executions would have to take place if the foreigners were to be pacified at all.⁵⁸ The throne also accepted the recommendation of the Board of Punishments, sentencing the two Tientsin officials to lifelong exile to Heilungkiang.⁵⁹

When Tseng was ready to assume his new post as governor-general of Nanking, he went to Peking and was given a hearing before the Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi. An interesting part of their conversations reads as follows.

⁵⁶Lu, p. 199.

⁵⁷Hsiao I-shan, A History of the Ch'ing Dynasty (5 vols.; Taipei: Commercial Press, 1960), III, 695.

⁵⁸IWSM, chuan 76, pp. 1752, 1756, 1757.

⁵⁹Ibid., chuan 77, p. 1774.

Tzu Hsi: Have the ringleaders in the massacre of foreigners been executed yet?

Tseng: Not yet

Tzu Hsi: What date has Li Hung-chang fixed for the executions?

Tseng: On the day of my departure, he sent me word that he expected to dispose of them yesterday.

Tzu Hsi: Have the Tientsin populace calmed down?

Tseng: Yes, things are now quite settled and orderly.

Tzu Hsi: What made the Prefect and Magistrate run away to Shun-Te after the massacre?

Tseng: When first removed from their posts, they knew not what sentence would be decreed against them, so they boldly and shamelessly ran away from the city.⁶⁰

The Empress, well known for her strong anti-foreign attitudes, did not show any bitter feeling against foreigners in this conversation. Generally, the attitude of the Chinese government in the Tientsin case was conciliatory and greatly helped to ward off hostilities.

Tseng Kuo-fan's Removal from the
Governor-Generalship of Chihli

Despite the court's conciliatory attitude, there was stormy opposition against Tseng's management of the Tientsin case. This put the Chinese court in an embarrassing position. Only several years before Tseng had helped put down the Taiping rebels. He was a national hero,

⁶³ Ibid., p. 1780, tr. in Cohen, p. 242.

⁶⁰ J.O.P. Bland and E. Backhouse, China Under the Empress Dowager, Being the History of the Life and Times of Tzu-hsi (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1911), p. 77.

and he was generally recognized as one of the ablest officials in the empire. To remove him required great cause. To leave him in Chihli, however, ran the risk of angering the common people and officials at various levels. ⁶⁰ Meanwhile, the foreign powers continued to press Tseng to hand over the two Tientsin officials and settle the case quickly. When Tseng failed to meet their demands, the Powers heightened their pressure. On August 4, the Belgian representative, a T'Kint de Rodenbeke, demanded that the Chinese suspects be turned over to the foreign envoys for trial. ⁶¹ In early August, Rochechouart threatened to go to Peking and negotiate with the imperial court directly. ⁶² Tseng, also under severe attack by the Chinese conservatives, became an embittered and sick man. As early as July, he wrote Li Hung-chang that he felt "conscience-stricken within and in opposition to public opinion without." ⁶³ Tseng also reported to the throne that, since the two Tientsin officials were ill and not seriously guilty, he had let them go home to see their doctors and rest. ⁶⁴ Later, trying to soothe his conscience, he pleaded with the government for leniency in the punishment of these two officials. ⁶⁵

⁶¹Kuo, I, 541-542.

⁶²IWSM, chuan 74, p. 1705.

⁶³Ibid., p. 1760, tr. in Cohen, p. 242.

⁶⁴Ibid., chuan 75, p. 1733.

⁶⁵Ibid., chuan 76, pp. 1765-1767.

Fortunately for the Chinese court, and perhaps for Tseng Kuo-fan too, an unexpected incident in the south ended the embarrassing situation. On August 22, the governor-general of Nanking, Ma Hsin-i, was assassinated by an ex-Taiping man, Chang Wen-hsiang. A week later, the government ordered Tseng to assume his old post as Nanking governor-general with the honorary mission of investigating Ma's assassination and maintaining peace and order in Kiangsu province. On the same day, the government appointed Li Hung-chang as governor-general of Chihli, ordering him to Tientsin to manage the Tientsin case.⁶⁶

The quick decision revealed that the Chinese court had been, under the pressure of popular opinion and had been waiting for an opportunity to remove Tseng Kuo-fan.⁶⁷ On September 20 Li Hung-chang arrived at Tientsin and the management of the Tientsin case entered another phase.

At the time Ma Hsin-i was assassinated, the negotiation between the Chinese and the French had been underway for more than two months. Although Tseng Kuo-fan was conciliatory, the French determined to show their military force in order to achieve full and immediate satisfaction. The appearance of the French gunboats off the coast near Tientsin threw the Chinese court into a panic. Tseng was ill and apparently unable to reach a satisfactory settlement. At this time, it became

⁶⁶ Ibid., chuan 75, pp. 1741-1742.

⁶⁷ See Hummel, I, 556, and Hsiao I-shan, III, 696.

¹ The Governor-Generalship of Chihli was regarded as the most important and prestigious provincial post in the empire.

CHAPTER III

LI HUNG-CHANG AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT
OF THE TIENTSIN CASE

The assassination of Ma Hsin-i is significant in Chinese history, for this event directly affected the careers of two eminent statesmen of the day, Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang. Tseng remained in Nanking for two years and died in 1872. By settling the Tientsin case quickly, Li reached great heights of reputation and influence, and thereafter he dominated Chinese domestic and foreign affairs for twenty-five years.¹

Li Hung-chang's Transfer to Chihli

At the time Ma Hsin-i was assassinated, the negotiation between the Chinese and the French had been underway for more than two months. Although Tseng Kuo-fan was conciliatory, the French determined to show their military force in order to achieve full and immediate satisfaction. The appearance of the French gunboats off the coast near Tientsin threw the Chinese court into a panic. Tseng was ill and apparently unable to reach a satisfactory settlement. At this time, it became clear that he had to be replaced with a new negotiator in order to break the deadlock.

¹The Governor-Generalship of Chihli was regarded as the most important and prestigious provincial post in the empire.

Li Hung-chang in many respects was an ideal successor to Tseng Kuo-fan. Li, comparatively speaking, was more friendly toward the foreigners.² In his early years, he had displayed ignorance and hatred toward the foreigners. He, and many of his compatriots of the time, referred to the foreigners as "foreign devils."³ But gradually he revised his judgment. In 1865, he wrote: "It is not best for a man to pronounce hurried judgments upon matters to which he has not given diligent and continuing examination I cannot assert truthfully that they [Westerners] have played greater tricks on me than my own countrymen."⁴ Receiving word from Peking in late August, 1870, that he was appointed as Governor-General of Chihli, Li wrote:

. . . in the Province of Chihli there are just now the worst elements in the empire so far as the treatment of foreigners is concerned, and I am happy to know that the Throne believes my hand strong enough to cope with these ruffians In spite of all our dislikes, if we truly have the best interests of China at heart, we will no longer oppose the coming of the foreigners, whether he be trader, missionary, or tourist; for he is bound to come anyway, even if he must ride behind a bayonet, or sit upon the big gun of a warship. And it is just as well, much better in fact, that all our people come to realization of this.⁵

Li, moreover, was also regarded highly by the Westerners in China in his time. He had won high respect among his foreign colleagues

²Tseng Kuo-fan had been severely criticized by the foreigners for his manner of settling the Yangchow anti-missionary case in 1868.

³William Francis Mannix, ed., Memoirs of Li Hung-chang (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913), pp. 13-14.

⁴Ibid., p. 23.

⁵Ibid., pp. 25-26.

because of his associations with General Charles George Gordon and Admirals Sir James Hope and August Leopold Protet in Shanghai, his adoption of Western armaments for his armies, his proposal for teaching mathematics and the sciences at the Tung Wen College, and his long-time friendly, though stiff, negotiations with Western diplomats. His recent victories over the Niens had further heightened his prestige. Indeed, most of the Westerners in China regarded him as a progressive statesman, amicable diplomat, and vigorous military leader. The American consul in Tientsin reported that Li was "by all degrees of comparison the ablest and most progressive statesman in the Empire."⁶

There were probably two reasons for Li's appointment. It was one means to assure the French and other Westerners that a relatively progressive and tolerant official would safeguard their treaty rights and seek quick settlement of the Tientsin case. The most important reason why Li was appointed to replace Tseng, however, was that the Chinese central government needed his military support. From the beginning, Li's specialties were foreign affairs and the army. He had also long been considered as a principal trouble-shooter of the empire. Hence, his transfer to Chihli indicated that the Ch'ing court urgently needed his military forces as well as his experience in foreign affairs. Because his Huai Army proved so effective in fighting the Taipings and the Niens, the court hoped that it could now be used for the defense of

⁶Despatches from United States Consuls in Tientsin, August 12, 1879, quoted in Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Regionalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 131.

the capital area. Ever since 1864, the court had frequently depended upon the Huai Army to put down rebellions. In calling the Huai Army to Chihli, the government was merely asking for the services of one of its best forces.⁷

As early as July 26, the imperial court already ordered Li, who was then fighting the Moslem rebels in Shensi, to move his force to Chihli and join the twenty-eight battalions of the Huai Army there. On August 29, when Li and an army of about 25,000 soldiers arrived at the border of Chihli, he was appointed the governor-general of the province.⁸

The arrival of Li Hung-chang and his troops on the border of Chihli possibly made the French accept Tseng Kuo-fan's settlement more readily. The French had considered the Tientsin case as an opportunity to exact concessions from the Chinese with little risk. However, the appearance of the Huai Army, well equipped and prepared to fight, caused the French to reconsider their situation in China. They were already engaged in a war with Prussia; therefore they could ill afford to have another war with China. Thus, the arrival of Li and his army at Chihli and the quick settlement of the Tientsin case gave the Chinese court

⁷ Kwang-ching Liu, "Li Hung-chang in Chihli: The Emergence of a Policy, 1870-1875," in Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphy, Mary C. Wright, eds., Approaches to Modern Chinese History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 71.

⁸ Li Hung-chang, The Collected Writings of Li Hung-chang (Shanghai, 1921), Tsou-kaio, chuan 16, pp. 34, 48, 50. *Social and Economic Quarterly*, VIII (October, 1935), No. 3, 633-647. Because of the Franco-Prussian War and the French hypercritical manner, Ch'ung-hou was not able to leave France in early 1871.

reason for satisfaction in choosing Tseng's successor.⁹

The Conclusion of the Case

The price that the Chinese ultimately paid for the Tientsin incident was a stiff one. The Tientsin prefect and magistrate, as mentioned before, were sentenced to lifelong exile to Heilungkiang in northern Manchuria. Eighteen Chinese were beheaded and another twenty-five were sentenced to hard labor on the frontier.¹⁰ For foreign lives lost, China paid an indemnity of 250,000 taels of silver to France, and 30,000 to Russia.¹¹ For property damages, she paid 210,000 taels to France, 4,785 to the United States, and 2,500 to Great Britain.¹² And finally, on October 25, 1870, Ch'ung-hou left Peking for France on an official mission of apology.¹³

The final settlement of the Tientsin case might well have been stiffer if other events had not occurred. Rocheschouart adhered to his

⁹ Even before Li appeared at Tientsin, the French had agreed to Tseng's proposals in substance. They had dropped the demand that Ch'en Kuo-ji be executed. Nevertheless, the fact that Li and his troops were approaching Chihli caused Tseng's proposals to be accepted more easily. See also Spector, p. 130.

¹⁰ IWSM, chuan 77, pp. 1774-1775.

¹¹ Ibid., chuan 77, pp. 1788-1789, and chuan 81, p. 1862.

¹² Ibid., chuan 77, pp. 1788-1789. Li Hung-chang reported the final payment on May 30, 1871, almost a year after the incident.

¹³ The original documents concerning the Ch'ung-hou mission are in IWSM. For a brief account of the mission see Knight Biggerstaff, "The Ch'ung-hou Mission to France, 1870-1871," Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly, VIII (October, 1935), No. 3, 633-647. Because of the Franco-Prussian War and the French hypercritical manner, Ch'ung-hou was not able to leave France in early 1872.

belligerent approach throughout the negotiation of the summer of 1870. Fortunately for the Chinese, a war between China and France did not break out when tension was high in July and August in 1870. When the news of the outbreak at Tientsin reached Europe on July 25, the Franco-Prussian War had already begun. China thus narrowly escaped the danger of another military humiliation.¹⁴

Early Historical Interpretations
of the Incident

The Tientsin incident can be understood better by examining what Chinese and Western historians have said about it. The Chinese thought the Tientsin case had been settled, but the Westerners were not at all satisfied. They never accepted the settlement as adequate reparation for the wrong committed or as providing enough security against its repetition. Henri Cordier, the French historian, said in 1901 of the Tientsin case: "The sad maxim, might makes right, should be applied in all its rigour in China; otherwise, let us quit, bag and baggage."¹⁵

Alexander Michie, the English commentator, regretted that "the Chinese government narrowly escaped a signal retribution for its continued guerilla warfare against foreigners as represented by the missionary vanguard."¹⁶ The foreign residents in China in general thought that

¹⁴ Michie, II, 244.

¹⁵ Henri Cordier, Historie des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, 1860-1902 (3 vols.; Paris, 1901-1902), I, 300, quoted in Morse, II, 259.

¹⁶ Michie, II, 244.

"it remains to be seen . . . how France will view the settlement, when she again has leisure to turn her attention to the east."¹⁷ The most hostile view, however, was presented in 1900 by a distinguished American missionary and one-time president of the Tung Wen College in Peking, W.A.P. Martin:

If, in 1870, the French chargé, declining the offer of money and heads, had waited until he could have a fleet of gun-boats in the Peiho, if then the whole suburb where the riot occurred had been laid in ashes, and the ground confiscated for a French concession, the [Chinese] government would have taken care that there should not be a second riot.¹⁸

The Westerners' attitudes towards the Chinese were hostile, and their judgments of the Tientsin case reflected their Sinophobia. They had no real grounds for their charges against the Chinese. According to the Westerners, the causes of the outbreak at Tientsin were Chinese stupidity, superstition, and hostility. The whole incident was deliberately planned, they said, and was the work of an organized band aiming at expelling from China all the foreigners, not just the French.¹⁹ It

¹⁷ North China Herald, January 25, 1871, quoted in Morse, II, 259.

¹⁸ William Alexander Parsons Martin, A Cycle of Cathay or China, South and North, with Personal Reminiscences (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1900), p. 455. A "sympathetic" viewpoint was expressed by the American missionary, Samuel Wells Williams. After the case was settled, Williams said: "What a pest France is in this world! she never learns to treat others justly, nor is she content to mind her own affairs, while the mass of people are almost as ignorant as heathen, and quite as superstitious. She has made more wars, more trouble, more tyranny, more persecution, than any other Christian (so-called) nation. They are a strange mixture; I'm glad I wasn't born one--or a Chinaman either." See Frederick Wells Williams, p. 387.

¹⁹ Michie, II, 239-240; The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal, January, 1871, p. 211; Hubner, pp. 545-573.

was especially instigated and directed by the Tientsin prefect and magistrate and by Ch'en Kuo-jui.²⁰ After the mob outbreak, they continued, the Chinese officials did not make the least effort to avert hostility.²¹ Those Westerners who resided on the coast of China placed most of the blame on Ch'ung-hou. They alleged that the incident could have been prevented had he properly exercised his authority.²² As to the execution of the Chinese ringleaders, the Westerners believed that it was carried out in order to satisfy the vengeful wrath of foreigners. They thought those who were beheaded were really innocent victims.²³

The conspiracy thesis of the Westerners was only partly true. The local officials, indeed, could be blamed for not taking any serious measures to avert the trouble. This was understandable, for the local officials, as discussed before, greatly hated the missionaries. They not only had the most direct contact with the latter, but also were closest to the common people. When popular feelings ran high in the incident, these officials dared not act. To suppress the people's outrages was to risk popular condemnation. Furthermore, it was highly probable that the local officials, at least indirectly, gave the mob encouragement by their indifference to the disturbances.

²⁰The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal, III (November, 1870), 151-153.

²¹Ibid., January, 1871, p. 210. See also Couling, pp. 556-557.

²²See Michie, II, 241-242.

²³The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal (January, 1871), p. 212.

The Ch'en Kuo-ju case was most controversial. Although the French demanded that Ch'en be beheaded, Prince Ch'un supported him vigorously, saving him from the disgrace of being tried at Tientsin.²⁴ Ch'en was well known both for his bravery and for his cruelty. As a soldier, however, he lacked self-control. He had frequently offended his superiors. On one occasion he attacked Liu Min-chuan's troops in order to obtain their modern rifles for his own army. Another time he threatened to kill his adopted son. He had also attacked his former patron. Because of his actions Ch'en had been punished several times and been degraded. Among the Westerners, Ch'en was known for his hatred of foreigners. Even prior to the Tientsin incident, he had been involved in anti-missionary agitation. In May, 1870, the missionaries in Nanking charged he was the main instigator of the anti-missionary outbreak there.²⁵ In June, Ch'en went to Tientsin before proceeding to Peking. The incident occurred when he was staying there. In view of Ch'en's past conduct, it is hard to believe that he was entirely innocent.²⁶

The Westerners' belief that the outbreak was aimed against all foreigners had no justification. Suspicions against the French Catholics caused the incident, and most of the foreign victims were French. Although three Russians were killed, three others escaped injury at the hands of the Chinese. They were walking in the street on the night

²⁴ IWSM, chuan 73, pp. 1694-1695.

²⁵ Cohen, p. 245.

²⁶ See Hummel, I, 89-90.

of the incident when they were met by some armed men. Upon being questioned, they proved their Russian nationality and were allowed to proceed.²⁷

The charge against Ch'ung-hou was equally groundless. At the time of the Tientsin incident, Tseng Kuo-fan was the governor-general of Chihli province. Traditionally, the officer who held this post, the highest in the regular provincial hierarchy, was responsible for defense and general administration of the province. The superintendent was only responsible for diplomacy. He enforced the treaty terms, guaranteed the safety of the Westerners, and handled all matters concerning foreign customs. He was also responsible for the defense of the northern ports. Ch'ung-hou had held his post as superintendent for some time before Tseng arrived in Chihli, and had very much impressed the foreigners with his power and prestige.²⁸ When Tseng became the governor-general of Chihli in 1869, he used his personal following and great prestige drastically to reduce Ch'ung-hou's position. Ch'ung-hou's position was so altered that Alexander Michie reported:

... although he [Ch'ung-hou] was a man in authority, it was only as superintendent of trade, having no control whatever over the hierarchy of territorial officials, who were under the orders of viceroy, Tseng Kuo-fan. . . . it is not probable that Chunghou could move a corporal's guard in Tientsin, and his position was such that the local authorities and their myrmidons looked with the keenest jealousy on any departure of the superintendent of trade from the strict line of his own functions. He dared not, in fact, move a finger

²⁷Hubner, p. 558.

²⁸Spector, pp. 130-131.

against officers who owed allegiance to the viceroy.²⁹

When the Tientsin incident broke out, Tseng Kuo-fan was ill at Paoting. Ch'ung-hou, although at Tientsin, was powerless. Because of this situation the mob could not be controlled. Aware of his powerless position, Ch'ung-hou suggested that the imperial court order Tseng to proceed to Tientsin immediately to settle the case.

In view of all the evidence discussed above, it is difficult to conclude that the Tientsin incident was a deliberate conspiracy. Although some Chinese officials joined forces with the commoners, they attacked the missionaries because they shared the people's anti-missionary feelings, not because they plotted the incident. As George F. Edward, the American minister, observed: "The massacre may have been premeditated in certain quarters, and have been precipitated in consequence of the efforts of badly-disposed persons, but [it] was not preconcerted in a general way."³⁰

The executions, as the Westerners rightly charged, were considered by the Chinese authorities as necessary to appease foreigners' feelings. In early August, 1870, Ting Jih-ch'ang had suggested that in such a serious case at least forty to fifty persons should be punished, either by execution or by exile.³¹ On August 19, 1870, the Chinese court decided that since it had refused the demand to administer capital

²⁹ Michie, II, 242.

³⁰ Foreign Relations, 1871, p. 192.

³¹ IWSM, chuan 75, p. 1729.

punishment of the two local officials, it would have to order the execution of approximately as many Chinese as there were foreigners who had been killed.³²

Recent Historical Interpretations

The Chinese Communist historians have a completely different point of view about the Tientsin "church case" than do earlier Western historians. Their Marxist-oriented interpretation serves well the political purposes of their government. According to the Communists, the broad masses of China in the nineteenth century had already observed how the Western imperialists used missions and missionaries as the vanguard of aggression. In the past hundred years, they say, Catholic and Protestant churches in China were the bastions of the aggressors, while Western governments served to back them up.³³

Western aggression, the Communist historians declare, was demonstrated by the series of church cases in the late nineteenth century,

³²Ibid., chuan 76, pp. 1756-1757.

³³Hsieh Hsing-yao, "How Did Imperialism Use Religion for Aggression on China?" Jen-min jih-pao (Peking), April 13, 1951, tr. in Current Background, No. 68, April 18, 1951 (American Consulate General, Hong Kong), p. 4. Li Shih-yueh, another Communist historian, says that Western imperialism first sent missionaries to poison the Chinese, then merchants to exploit the Chinese, and finally gunboats to colonize all China. See Li Shih-yueh, "The Movement Against the Foreign Religion During the Thirty Years Prior to the War of 1894," Historical Research, VI (1958), 1-15. Although bitter and cynical, there is some truth to certain of their charges against the missionaries. Nevertheless, the American and British governments did not intend to give special support to missionary activities in China in the 1860's. See Harold J. Bass, "The Policy of the American State Department Toward Missionaries in the Far East," Washington State College Research Studies, V (1937), 179-190.

of which the Tientsin church case was the most serious. In this incident, Chinese anger erupted when the French consul prevented the people from entering the French church to investigate the alleged murders and other atrocities. The consul was beaten to death because he fired at the angry masses. But Chinese officials also were to blame. Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, in handling the crisis, ignored the opposition of Chinese patriots and betrayed their country. By sacrificing the people in order to fall in with the imperialists, Tseng and Li established the noxious precedent of using severe punishments to suppress the movement of the patriotic people. The Manchu court fully approved Tseng and Li's policy.³⁴

In Chinese Communist historiography the Tientsin incident also marks an important historical turning point. Before the incident, in the Communist historians' view, the members of the ruling feudal landlord class, the officials, and the gentry served as the leaders in the struggle against the Western imperialists. They opposed the missionaries, according to the Communists, for several reasons. First, the missionaries represented a flagrant attack on the scholar-gentry's monopoly of political power and social prestige. Second, the tenets of Christianity contradicted the feudal tradition and feudal conventions and customs of China. With the Tientsin church case, however, leadership in the struggle shifted into the hands of the toiling propertyless masses because the upper class could no longer be trusted. Now the

³⁴ See Li Shih-yueh, p. 7. *Kelao I-shan*.

people's struggle was not only directed against the foreign aggressor, but also against the treacherous Ch'ing ruling class.³⁵ This new trend culminated in the Boxers' patriotic movement in 1900. Although thirty years apart, these two great anti-imperialist movements bore close relationship as cause and effect.³⁶

Chinese Nationalist historians, on the other hand, present a rather conservative interpretation of the Tientsin incident. Most of them attribute the Tientsin incident solely to Western aggressiveness. Nevertheless, some of them do note the factor of Chinese ignorance and hostilities. Although the Nationalist historians' studies are not particularly noteworthy, at least one element of their interpretations deserves discussion: They underestimate Li Hung-chang's contribution to the settlement of the Tientsin case.³⁷

In order to understand this tendency, a word about the background of Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang is necessary. Tseng was known for his honesty and rectitude. His diary shows his sternness and austerity. No easy self-satisfaction was possible for him. Tseng believed men must understand their role in the world and devote their entire lives to playing that role better. The only way to achieve these goals was through hard work, self-knowledge, and self-discipline. Wisdom could

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

³⁶ Hsieh, p. 4. For a fuller discussion of the Communist interpretation of the Western religious aggression, see also Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1952), Chapter II.

³⁷ Prominent among them is Hsiao 'I-shan.

be obtained only through one's own efforts. Tseng himself lived by these principles but was never satisfied and constantly criticized himself for laxness. Tseng was also a most filial and patriotic person. His insistence upon returning to Hunan to mourn for his mother at a critical point in his military career indicated that his devotion to the Confucian ethic surpassed his political and military ambition. He was rightly given most credit for helping to put down the Taiping rebels. By suppressing the Taipings, he not only saved the Ch'ing dynasty but also Chinese civilization. He was a harsh disciplinarian of his soldiers and subordinates, but he also took good care of them and won their confidence and respect.

Li Hung-chang's thinking and personal conduct, on the other hand, were less based on Confucian ethics. He did not pay so much attention to self-discipline and self-reflection. He was also corruptible. He made use of Tseng's ideas and methods and was greatly influenced by his adviser, the Confucian theorist Feng Kuei-fen. After Feng's death, however, he chose different advisers and drifted away from Confucian orthodoxy. In any comparison, Tseng might be regarded as an exponent of Chinese conservatism, while Li was an outstanding diplomat and military general.³⁸

³⁸For the life and thought of Tseng Kuo-fan, see Chiang Hsing-te, The Life and Career of Tseng Kuo-fan (Shanghai, 1939); Ho I-k'un, A Critical Biography of Tseng Kuo-fan (Shanghai, 1937); Hsiao I-shan, A Biography of Tseng Kuo-fan (Taipei, 1959). For Li Hung-chang's thinking and personal conduct, see William Francis Mannix, ed., Memoirs of Li Hung-chang (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913); J.O.P. Bland, Li Hung-chang (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1917).

Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader, has chosen Tseng Kuo-fan as his model. Ever since Chiang ceased to regard the Kuomintang as a vanguard of the revolution and began to consider the party as an instrument for restoring order, he has sought to propagate the values of the traditional Confucian society. To Chiang and his colleagues, Confucianism is effective for ensuring social stability and popular discipline. They believe that the Confucian order had held together because certain criteria of behavior had been established by precept and example so effectively that deviation from them was almost impossible. It is most important, in the Kuomintang view, to revive the habit of behaving in accordance with these fixed and unquestioned rules. Once these rules were accepted, the opposition to Kuomintang control would presumably end.

Tseng's thinking and behavior fit into Chiang's ideologies perfectly. Ever since he came to power, Chiang has asked his generals to study Tseng's maxims and The Four Books. He has also stressed that Tseng's behavior was an outstanding example of loyalty and filial piety.³⁹

The Kuomintang cult of Tseng Kuo-fan together with the strong influence of Confucianism certainly has some impact on Nationalist historiography. One example of this impact is the Nationalist historians' overestimation of Tseng's role in the Tientsin incident. Another result is that they underestimate the role Li Hung-chang played in the

³⁹ See Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (New York: Atheneum, 1966), Chapter XII.

incident.⁴⁰

Among Western historians, the Tientsin incident has been more fully explored.⁴¹ Kenneth S. Latourette's A History of Christian Missions in China (1929) and H.B. Morse's The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (1918) are outstanding older works, but the former's focus was on the missionary side, while the latter never completely escaped the typically superior tone of the treaty-port critic of Chinese behavior.⁴² John K. Fairbank's "Patterns Behind the Tientsin Massacre" is an exploratory study primarily concerned with understanding the role played by Christian missions in Chinese history.⁴³ Though in many ways inspiring, the article rests on some unwarranted assumptions. Fairbank declares that "the pattern of agitation at Yangchow was repeated so widely in other cases that one may justifiably assume that some sort of organized, intercommunicating effort underlay them."⁴⁴ Later, he even goes so far as to say that "evidences

⁴⁰There are exceptions. For instance, Li Ting-i speaks highly of Li Hung-chang. See Li Ting-i, A History of Modern China (Taipei, 1953).

⁴¹The first article ever written about the Tientsin incident, however, is by the Japanese historian, Nomura Masamitsu, "The Tientsin Missionary Case," Shirin, XX (1935), 67-99. The article is primarily based on the Chinese document IWSM and is largely narrative.

⁴²Kenneth S. Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929); Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (3 vols.; Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1918).

⁴³John King Fairbank, "Patterns Behind the Tientsin Massacre," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, XX (1957), 480-511.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 499.

from other parts of the empire in 1868-1870 . . . suggest that . . . there was widely organized effort to expel missionaries from China, or, on a broader hypothesis, to create trouble for the 'pro-foreign' regime in power." Fairbank "proves" his hypothesis merely by quoting what the Western missionaries and laymen had "believed."⁴⁵ But their views were both biased and unreliable, as demonstrated above.

Another point made by Fairbank is that the Chinese became stubborn and intentionally delayed their settlement of the Tientsin case when they were informed of the news of the Franco-Prussian War.⁴⁶ Evidence, however, shows that Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang paid little attention to the war in Europe and virtually made no use of the occasion to the advantage of the Chinese. Tseng wrote Prince Kung some time after August 9 that he had heard the news of the Franco-Prussian War for some time. But, he continued, if China was just in handling the case, all the rumors could be ignored.⁴⁷ Tseng's indifferent attitude toward the war was understandable. As a Confucian scholar, he constantly said that the Chinese sages taught people that if they were righteous and impartial, they should have nothing to fear. On September 20, after he was appointed as governor-general of Nanking, Tseng

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 503.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 510.

⁴⁷ Wang Wen-chieh, A Study of the Religious Persecutions in Modern Chinese History (Foochow: Fukien Christian University, 1947), pp. 87-88. Wang quotes Tseng's letter at length. Tseng, in his letter, had mentioned that he received Prince Kung's letter which was dated August 9. Tseng was informed of the Franco-Prussian War on August 4, about a week before he wrote Prince Kung.

still worried that the French might be enraged since there were only seven or eight persons who deserved capital punishment.⁴⁸

Nor did Li Hung-chang take advantage of the war in Europe. Instead, he expressed apprehension about European intentions. He wrote on August 17, 1870:

Again the date for the execution of the criminals . . . has been postponed, this time also upon request of the Russian Minister. Yet the Foreign Office is constantly hearing that in Paris and St. Petersburg the Governments are impatient with the delay in bringing these outrages to punishment. What does all this mean? Are Russia and France looking for some excuse to make war upon China?⁴⁹

Even as late as October, 1871, Li still was so worried about the possibility of the French bringing troops to China that he could not possibly think of provoking the French by delaying a settlement.⁵⁰

So far, the best study of the Sino-missionary friction and the Tientsin case is that written by Paul A. Cohen.⁵¹ He traces the Chinese anti-Christian tradition back to the early seventeenth century; he uses extensively the Chinese, French, and English sources; and he discusses several serious incidents in the 1860's as case studies. In general,

⁴⁸ IWSM, chuan 76, p. 1760.

⁴⁹ Mannix, p. 32.

⁵⁰ Li Hung-chang, Han-Kao, chuan 11, p. 21.

⁵¹ Paul A. Cohen, China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

his argument is sound and his evidence is convincing.⁵² But there are shortcomings in his work. He deals with the missionary abuses too briefly. He discusses the incident itself and the opposition of the Chinese conservatives to the conciliatory settlement at length, while leaving out other aspects of the incident. A full account of missionary activities and the Chinese responses to them still remains to be made. This thesis is an attempt to fill some of the gaps. It intends to present a more balanced discussion of the Sino-missionary friction, to clear up some misinterpretations, and to provide some new insights into the significance and aftermath of the incident, particularly for the United States and China.

Fact that Secretary of State Hamilton Fish sent him only a few instructions, mostly approving what Low had already done, indicates that the latter was very much independent and responsible for America's China policy during this period.

While conducting his China policy, Minister Low pursued very much the same policy as did some of his predecessors. He made efforts to preserve an open door policy and China's territorial integrity by supporting the Chinese central government and cooperating with other powers. Hence, it is necessary briefly to investigate some of the characteristics of the United States China policy up to 1870 in order to understand more clearly Sino-American relations during the Tientsin crisis.

⁵²Lu Shih-ch'iang, in his The Anti-Christian Movement in China, 1860-1874 (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1966), uses more local gazettes and archives in the Academia Sinica to show the causes of the Sino-missionary friction. Lu, who refutes some of Cohen's theses, argues more metaphysically than Cohen does. than ten small items of news concerning the incident in total in the New York Times.

United States Policy in China Prior
to the Tientsin Incident

CHAPTER IV

THE UNITED STATES AND THE TIENTSIN INCIDENT

For the American government and people the Tientsin incident was a trivial event. It drew little attention from the United States Department of State, and the American public was not adequately informed of the incident.¹ Frederick F. Low, then American minister to China, was almost solely responsible for the Sino-American negotiations during the crisis. The fact that Secretary of State Hamilton Fish sent him only a few instructions, mostly approving what Low had already done, indicates that the latter was very much independent and responsible for America's China policy during this period.

While conducting his China policy, Minister Low pursued very much the same policy as did some of his predecessors. He made efforts to preserve an open door policy and China's territorial integrity by supporting the Chinese central government and cooperating with other powers. Hence, it is necessary briefly to investigate some of the characteristics of the United States China policy up to 1870 in order to understand more clearly Sino-American relations during the Tientsin crisis.

¹A brief report of the incident appeared in the New York Times on July 7, 1870. There are no more than ten small items of news concerning the incident in total in the New York Times.

United States Policy in China Prior
to the Tientsin Incident

The successive American diplomats to China from after the signing of the Treaty of Wanghia to 1870 took the initiative in the gradual development of a China policy because the State Department had no set policy toward China. They were given a comparatively free hand. There was, except for the late 1850's, little intervention from the Department of State.

American policy during this period, however, showed little direction or continuity. Different commissioners and ministers had different and conflicting proposals for a proper policy toward China.² The American diplomatic service in China was also largely inadequate. Only two of these diplomats, Peter Parker and Anson Burlingame, served in China as long as two years.³ Except for Peter Parker and Samuel Wells Williams, they had no knowledge of China before their appointments. Therefore, because of ignorance and transient residence, they could hardly formulate a workable China policy for the American government.

²The names of the American diplomats to China and the time of their service are as follows: Alexander H. Everett (1845-1847), John W. Davis (1848-1850), Humphrey Marshall (1852-1853), Robert M. McLane (1853-1854), Peter Parker (1855-1857), William B. Reed (1857-1858), John E. Ward (1858-1860), Anson Burlingame (1861-1867), Samuel Wells Williams (1867-1868), J. Ross Browne (1868-1869), Samuel Wells Williams (1869-1870). James Biddle served as acting commissioner when Everett was sick from June 1845 to April 1846, and Peter Parker was given six interim appointments as chargé d'affaires during this period.

³Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to China, Japan, and Korea in the Nineteenth Century (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), pp. 705-706.

Owing to circumstances the proposals of the American representatives to China gradually centered upon a common principle. In later years this common principle became known as the Open Door doctrine-- the territorial integrity of China and equal commercial privileges for all Western nations. The United States would oppose any nation that wished to dominate China alone. The open door principle formed the general basis of the United States policy toward China throughout the late nineteenth century.⁴

The Treaty of Wanghia of 1844 initiated official diplomatic relations between China and the United States. Under this treaty Alexander H. Everett became the first American commissioner to China. During the period of his service in China, Sino-British relations became tense over the Canton city question. In April 1847, Everett wrote the State Department that if Britain should annex China, the balance of power among Western nations would be upset and American commerce in China would be jeopardized. Hence, the three Western powers, the United States, France, and Russia, should prevent the Chinese empire from being swallowed up by Britain or even from coming more immediately under her influence.⁵ Everett's despatch was really the first Open Door note drafted by an American diplomat. It appeared half a century earlier than John Hay's. Because of Everett's sudden

⁴This is one of Tyler Dennett's most important arguments in his works.

⁵Te-kong Tong, United States Diplomacy in China, 1844-1860 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 82-97.

death in June 1847, he did not have a chance to carry out his policy. Nevertheless, most of his successors pursued more or less the same policy as did Everett, that is, to promote China's stability and Sino-American commercial intercourse.

Among Everett's immediate successors, John W. Davis decided first to back his action with warships to enforce the American claims against the Chinese government, but later he stated that he was not entirely convinced of the justice of this action. Humphrey Marshall preferred to negotiate singlehandedly with the Chinese central government. He also opposed the Taiping rebellion for he thought that a prolonged civil war would drain China's resource, jeopardize foreign commerce, and make China easy prey for British and Russian imperialism. He was strongly opposed to British and Russian highhanded methods towards the Chinese.⁶

Robert M. McLane and Peter Parker, however, had different views than Marshall. McLane was in favor of limited armed collaboration with England and France during the Taiping rebellion, though his purpose was to maintain China's stability. As a missionary diplomat whose professional interest was parallel to that of the British, Peter Parker from the very beginning had favored close cooperation with the British and had constantly kept in close contact with their diplomats. He also

⁶For Davis's diplomacy, see Tong, pp. 98-107; for Humphrey Marshall's, see Chester A. Bain, "Commodore Matthew Perry, Humphrey Marshall, and the Taiping Rebellion," Far Eastern Quarterly, X, No. 3 (May, 1951), 258-270.

several times urged military expeditions to force China to come to terms with the West.⁷

When William B. Reed became minister to China in 1857, he reversed Parker's belligerent attitude. Reed chose the policy of peaceful cooperation with England and France. During the second Anglo-French expedition, John E. Ward declined the request from England and France to join their forces and was so friendly toward the Chinese that the latter sought his good office for a mediation.⁸ Anson Burlingame, who served as minister in China for seven years, hoped to establish a hands-off policy and to leave China to work out her own adjustments to the impact of the West. He also sought British and French cooperation to safeguard the commercial interests of the United States.⁹

The policy of peaceful cooperation with other Western powers was followed by Samuel Wells Williams and J. Ross Browne. Williams, like Peter Parker, was a missionary, but he preferred a policy of cooperation rather than armed intervention. Browne supported the cooperative policy, but he also thought of foreign tutelage. He asserted that the foreign assistance and guidance were necessary for China's progress

⁷ Tong, pp. 36-37, 90, 94, 115-116, 174, 193, 284-285.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 255-282.

⁹ Foster Rhea Dulles, China and America: The Story of Their Relations since 1784 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 64-67.

and stability.¹⁰

Thus, it is clear that the major trend of the United States policy toward China during this period was to uphold China's territorial integrity and promote the commercial interests of the United States. The only serious departure from this open door policy was that of Peter Parker, whose influence, however, was limited.

During its formation, the open door principle encountered serious resistance from American missionaries and merchants and suffered constant setbacks. The aggressiveness of the American missionaries in their attempts to force the opening of China is notable. It was completely in accordance with what had been the prevailing spirit in missionary circles from the beginning. The missionary was more impatient than the merchant for greater liberty to do work under treaty protection.¹¹ Through their representatives in the United States they could claim an audience at Washington. They also often appealed to millions of church members through the Christian periodicals, which were widely read and presumably influenced public opinion.¹²

However, the United States government did not intend to extend its domination in China through pretended aid to missionaries or even

¹⁰Paul Hibbert Clyde, "The China Policy of J. Ross Browne, American Minister at Peking, 1868-1869," The Pacific Historical Review, I (September, 1932), 312-323.

¹¹Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 563.

¹²Benjamin H. Williams, "The Politics of Missionary Work in China," Current History, XXIII (October, 1925), 71.

to give them much aid.¹³ Generally speaking, the attitude of the State Department as represented by its diplomats to China was to support the missionaries' claims to rights in the treaty ports, but it refused to be responsible even for their protection if they meddled in the internal affairs of China.¹⁴

Thus, the core of the policy of the American State Department in regard to missionary work in China throughout the nineteenth century was formulated for its citizens as such, and not around missionaries or any other class. Benjamin H. Williams sums up the policy: "It cannot be said that the Government of the United States has shown partiality for missionaries as against other citizens, or that it has shown any inclination to single them out for special protection."¹⁵

The policy of equal treatment for the missionary was not achieved by force, but by impressing upon Chinese officials that religious intolerance was entirely in contradiction to Western civilization and might lead to grave consequences. Except for a few incidents concerning missionaries which occurred at times of great unrest in China, the Department of State worked through the central government of China. The United States learned that the proper method of settling incidents was to hold Peking responsible and require the central government to

¹³Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁴Harold J. Bass, "The Policy of the American State Department Toward Missionaries in the Far East," Washington State College Research Studies, V (1937), 180.

¹⁵Benjamin H. Williams, p. 73.

bring pressure on the local officials.¹⁶ There were not many occasions when force was used to protect missionaries and bring about suitable indemnification when they suffered property losses. Before resorting to a show of force, the American ministers would almost invariably repeat representations to the Chinese government. In fact, the State Department had sometimes discouraged missionaries to make claims through diplomatic channels, in order to avoid "the appearance that the [United States] official establishments in China exist largely to sustain efforts for the propagation of religion."¹⁷ Thus, the missionary was not able to challenge the main trend of United States policy in China. The history of American diplomacy in China during the nineteenth century was a gradual triumph of the open door principle. When Secretary of State John Hay in September, 1899, officially announced the Open Door doctrine, he was merely continuing the basic policy which his predecessors had quietly formulated over half a century earlier.¹⁸

The China Policy of Frederick F. Low

Frederick F. Low, the American minister to China from 1869 to 1874, pursued much the same policy toward China as did the other diplomats. Nevertheless, he was much more sympathetic toward China and analytical of the Chinese situation than were his predecessors. In a

¹⁶Bass, p. 189.

¹⁷Quoted in Benjamin H. Williams, p. 74. The original source is not cited.

note which he sent to Secretary Fish on January 10, 1871, Low clearly summarized his China policy. The China which Low observed was not a completely superstitious and barbarous country. China had some remarkable characteristics and her decadence was fairly recent. Accordingly, America's China policy should be one of patience and sympathetic understanding instead of military conquest.

The Chinese, Low said, were superior to many "Pagan nations" in mental capacity, industry, and administrative power. Their ability to master difficult studies, such as the Chinese classics, demonstrated a capacity of acquiring knowledge that compared favorably with any other people. The Chinese merchants, Low continued, competed successfully with foreigners in all branches of trade; and the peasants were industrious, frugal, and painstaking, and were noted for their docility and love of order.¹⁹

However, according to Low, the Chinese empire had apparently been decaying since the reign of the Emperor Chien Lung. Corruption and inefficiency were prevalent. The central government was slow and vacillating; and the treaty rights were constantly violated by the provincial authorities and the people. Low worried that this unhappy situation would exhaust the patience of the powers and that pressure from the mercantile class and missionaries for additional concessions would sooner or later cause a rupture which would end in a foreign war.²⁰

¹⁹ Foreign Relations, 1871, p. 85.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 82-83, 84-85.

Freder All these difficulties stood in the way of the maintenance of peace and good relationship between natives and foreigners. There was also the mutual misunderstanding between two different civilizations. Low maintained that most foreign residents in China mistakenly underestimated the value of Chinese intellect and civilization. Most foreigners made little, if any, distinction between Chinese civilization and barbarism. In the opinions of these foreigners, Low observed, the Chinese were an inferior race, whose rights, privileges, or prejudices were too apt to be disregarded when gain was hindered. The Chinese seemed to stand in the way of the onward march of what they were pleased to call their "superior civilization." Low also charged that these foreigners were too prone to exhibit by acts, if not by words, their belief in the doctrine that "a Chinaman has no rights that a white man is bound to respect."²¹

On the other hand, Low stated, the Chinese had their prejudices too. The great mass of the Chinese people had never seen a foreigner in their lifetime. They had been taught that the people of other countries were a distinct and separate species, fierce, cruel, rapacious, capable of committing any outrage and crime, and ready to practice any device for purpose of gain.²²

In view of the serious internal rebellions in China and conflicts between China and foreign nations, it is surprising that

²¹ Ibid., pp. 85-86.

²² Ibid., p. 85.

Frederick Low, unlike many other foreigners, firmly opposed armed intervention. Low reported that the proponents of force asserted that all foreigners were residing in China through the influence of force exerted in former years. It was their opinion, therefore, that nothing but force would in the future break down the barriers of ignorance and superstition. Low, however, disagreed. He reasoned that the use of force would eventually overthrow the Chinese government and bring more trouble, rather than more open ports and privileges, for the foreign powers:

If the present government be overthrown, what then . . . No foreign government . . . would undertake to conquer China and hold it as a dependency, nor would such a course be tamely acquiesced in by the other treaty nations, if attempted. To divide and parcel out the territory among the Western nations would be impracticable, for there would be some--the United States among the number-- . . . that would seriously object to any such scheme on the part of others China must be governed by the Chinese.²³

Theoretically, Low was not opposed to an internal revolution aided by foreign powers to overthrow the Chinese government if a better and more enlightened leadership could be found. However, he was pessimistic about such a chance. He asserted:

If there were men to be found in the non-official class of intelligence, breadth of mind, vigor of thought and courage, capable of and willing to do better it might perhaps be policy for foreign nations, both in their own interests and for the future welfare of the Chinese, to favor the bringing of this new life into government by aiding in the overthrow of the present effete dynasty There are none to be found who would be likely to do better, or even as well, as the present officials.²⁴

²³ Ibid., p. 86.

²⁴ Ibid.

Hence, to Low there were no alternatives but to support the Chinese central government and bring enlightenment to the Chinese officials through the patient help of the foreign diplomats in China. It was true that in China the progress in knowledge had been slow, but, Low argued, the position in which the Chinese officials were placed should be taken into consideration. There were always foreign nations demanding further concessions, oftentimes with threats of force. On the other hand, China was a nation of ignorance, superstition, and arrogance that would not only prevent future progress but also undo that of the past. To reform and improve the situation in China by peaceful means, Low held, would require many years of forbearance on the part of foreign powers.²⁵ The Chinese central government had to be strengthened and the Chinese officials had to be taught by the wise, judicious, and energetic action of foreign governments through their diplomatic representatives in Peking.²⁶

Foreign nations in their intercourse with the Chinese government and people, Low suggested, should pursue a just and firm course, but at the same time be prepared to exercise patience and forbearance. They should insist on the due fulfillment of treaty engagements, and be prepared to offer protection to their citizens, whenever the Chinese government was either unable or unwilling to perform its duties.²⁷

²⁵ Ibid., p. 84.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 86-87.

Since the situation in China was chaotic, it was Low's opinion that the system of extraterritoriality was necessary for the protection of foreign residents in China. Nevertheless, Low said, the system was such an anomaly in international intercourse and was so difficult to carry out honestly and in good faith that it would be wise for foreign powers not to ask or accept any extension of its practice. The extraterritorial practice was a necessary protection for foreigners in China and no more.²⁸

While practicing their treaty rights and privileges with vigor and firmness without unnecessary menace, Low urged, foreign nations should make every effort to increase China's social and commercial intercourse as fast as she could make its power effective. This increase should be rendered safe and to the mutual advantage of both parties. If a state of peace should continue, Low concluded, this would be the only prudent and practicable course in which to introduce change and reform.²⁹

While conducting his China policy, Frederick Low was constantly pressured by missionaries for more concessions and more privileges. Low firmly resisted such pressure. He criticized missionary reasoning, writing:

²⁸ Despatches from United States Ministers to China (Washington: The National Archives), XXIX, No. 40 (hereafter cited as China Despatches).

²⁹ Foreign Relations, 1871, pp. 86-87.

They [the missionaries] believe that . . . force is absolutely necessary to break down the barriers of ignorance, conceit, and superstition, and that the use of arms to compel submission is only adding an auxiliary force to reason to accomplish the great work of the Master. The arguments against such a theory are so obvious that it is not necessary to repeat them here.³⁰

On the other hand, Low was willing to offer the missionaries moral aid and support whenever and wherever they could gain the goodwill of the Chinese people. The missionaries, Low said, should understand distinctly the limit of their legal right, beyond which their safety had to depend upon the good faith and friendship of the Chinese. Furthermore, Low argued, the cause the missionaries were laboring to promote would not lose anything by the practice of patience, conciliation, and forbearance.³¹

From the beginning, Low's opinion was "clear and decided that missionaries have no right to reside permanently away from the open ports." Nevertheless, in regard to the missionaries already in the interior of China, he said, "a retrograde movement on the part of the missionaries would be impolitic now, hence I shall do what I can to keep them where they are in safety." As American minister to China, his policy was "to secure to all our citizens, irrespective of their calling or profession, every right which an honest construction of the treaties and the well-settled principles of public law would warrant, at the same time doing what [he] could to promote a better understanding

³⁰ Ibid., p. 84.

³¹ China Despatches, XXIX, No. 40.

between the Chinese government and those of the West."³²

Frederick F. Low and the Tientsin Incident

Throughout the Tientsin incident, Frederick Low retained his analytical and critical manner towards the events. He did not avoid direct language to criticize either the French chargé or the practices of Catholic and Protestant missionaries. His policy was peacefully to cooperate with the other foreign nations and to help the Chinese central government to settle the case quickly and justly so that a war could be avoided. At the same time he also sought to protect American residents in China in accordance with the treaty privileges granted to them.

In his report to the Department of State, Low observed that one of the great underlying causes of the tragic event was the unwise and illegal actions of the Roman Catholic missionaries, and, to a lesser extent, the Protestant missionaries. The Roman Catholics, to a great extent, had the countenance and support of the French government. In addition to their right of residence as bishops and priests, Low stated, the Roman Catholics assumed a semi-official position which placed them on an equal status with the Chinese local officials. They also claimed the right to protect their native converts from persecution, and, thus, removed this class from the control of their local officials.³³

Low found that foreigners in China generally believed that the incident was not a sudden local riot but a well-planned plot to

³² Foreign Relations, 1873, I, 118-119, 203.

³³ China Despatches, XXIX, No. 40.

exterminate the foreign residents in China. However, Low claimed that he was not prepared to accept this view unless ample evidence could be produced.³⁴ He reported on August 24, 1870: "My opinion from the first has been that the disturbance was local, confined to Tientsin and its vicinity."³⁵

Low firmly believed that the Chinese court and high officials sincerely desired to settle the case quickly. When Tseng Kuo-fan was ordered to Tientsin to investigate the whole affair, Low reported on July 27, 1870: ". . . he will, I think, duly appreciate the obligations imposed upon him to search out and punish the guilty, and in good faith, try to devise measures to prevent a recurrence of such outrages in the future."³⁶ The Chinese proclamations preventing the spread of wild rumors and punishing criminals convinced Low and satisfied him.³⁷

Low was opposed to the harsh attitudes of the French chargé and other foreigners toward the Chinese owing to his consistent sympathetic attitude toward the Chinese and his belief that they were anxious to go to extremes to avoid hostilities. He informed Hamilton Fish on August 22, 1870, that he was surprised to learn that the French chargé had demanded the decapitation of the two local Tientsin officials.³⁸

³⁴ Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 364.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 384.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 364.

³⁷ All the Chinese proclamations were forwarded to Low and appeared in the Foreign Relations of 1870 and 1871.

³⁸ Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 377.

He had little regard for Rochechouart: "He is ambitious and unscrupulous . . . His actions are controlled entirely by passion, prejudice and personal ambitions."³⁹ Two days later, Low further reported on the foreigners and their press:

All sorts of measures of retaliation have been proposed; scarcely any proposing anything less than the opening up, by force, of the whole empire to foreign intercourse; and from that up to the decapitation of all government officials, the overthrow of the present government, and placing the country under a foreign protectorate.⁴⁰

Low asserted that these measures were "extravagant, unreasonable, and in most cases impracticable."⁴¹ He was equally critical of the missionary thinking. He reported on August 18, 1870:

Both the American and English missionaries appear to be impressed with the belief that they are somewhat specially charged with diplomatic functions by their governments, in addition to their self-imposed task of taking care of the spiritual welfare of the Chinese; and, according to their diplomatic judgment, a war between France and China must first take place before it is proper to adjust any claims for property destroyed in the late riot at Tientsin.⁴²

According to Low, the foreign powers should take a just stand to avoid a war and ask China to work out a reasonable solution. Low himself was doing everything possible to achieve this end. On July 27, 1870, he reported:

I shall be very careful not to complicate myself in this affair; but whatever good offices I can render in the way of honorable and peaceful settlement, without compromising

³⁹ China Despatches, XXVII, unnumbered, private and confidential.

⁴⁰ Foreign Relations, 1870, pp. 378-379.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., p. 371.

myself or the Government of the United States, I shall willingly and gladly do it.⁴³

In the same note Low reported that he and other representatives of the treaty powers had advised China to send a special mission to France to make apology. This action, Low said, was intended to soften all Rochechouart's belligerent attitude.⁴⁴

At the same time, Low was not quite sure of China's ability to settle the case quickly and restore order. He believed that the Chinese government needed the constant advice and aid of the foreign representatives in China to point out the proper steps to take.⁴⁵ The delay of the settlement of the incident worried him.⁴⁶ Hence, when the Chinese court decided to send Ch'ung-hou to France to make apology, Low wrote: "The decree appointing Chunghow . . . appears to be a step in the right direction. It evinces a disposition to conform their international intercourse to the forms and usages of Western nations."⁴⁷ He was equally pleased when he was informed that the Russian minister requested leniency for the two Chinese suspects in the killing of the Russian nationals. Low maintained:

It would serve as a precedent in the future, should similar cases occur, and would impress the Chinese with this truth: that a given number of executions will not meet the demands

⁴³ China Despatches, XXVII, unnumbered, private and confidential.

⁴⁴ Ibid. Joint note was addressed by the United States, North German Federation, Belgium, Spain, France, Russia, and Great Britain. For the English text, see Foreign Relations, 1870, pp. 357-358.

⁴⁵ Foreign Relations, 1870, pp. 357-358. For the Chinese translation, see Historical Materials on Missionary Cases in the Late Ch'ing, ⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 364.

⁴⁷ Ibid. Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 364.

of justice unless the guilt of those accused be proven. The leniency shown by the Russian government ought to teach both Chinese officials and people that foreign nations desire the punishment of the guilty only which should be meted out according to the measure of their guilt.⁴⁸

Another duty which Low thought important was to see that all the American residents in China were allowed to enjoy all the rights and privileges which the treaties granted to them. The protection of American citizens was based upon Low's assumption that the Chinese were not capable of rendering such protection. When the news of the incident reached Peking, Frederick Low, together with six other foreign representatives, addressed a joint note to the Chinese government. The note reasserted to the Chinese officials their responsibilities and induced them to adopt measures promptly to restore peace and order. This step, Low held, was important for the safety of foreigners in Peking and Tientsin.⁴⁹ Besides the joint note, Low, on July 21, 1870, also wrote the admiral commanding the United States Asiatic squadron informing him of the importance of having some force in the north China waters.⁵⁰

As soon as the incident occurred, Low promptly asked the American missionaries to present a claim for the damages done to them. In

⁴⁸ Ibid., 1871, p. 152.

⁴⁹ The joint note was addressed by the United States, North German Federation, Belgium, Spain, France, Russia, and Great Britain. For the English text, see Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 359; for the Chinese translation, see Historical Materials on Missionary Cases in the Late Ch'ing, I (Peiping: National Museum, 1937), 35-36a.

⁵⁰ Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 365.

September, 1870, when the American missionaries were frightened and moved from Tungchow to Chefoo, Low wrote a strong note to Prince Kung on September 13, requesting the Prince to punish the guilty quickly and restrict the emanation of rumors.⁵¹

To Low it was equally important that all the foreign powers in China should peacefully cooperate with each other to protect their citizens. Hence, when the Franco-Prussian War broke out in Europe, both Hamilton Fish and Low thought that the United States should remain neutral and urge the French and Prussian governments not to fight in the China waters so that it would be easier for the powers jointly to protect their residents there. Accordingly, on November 1, Fish wrote John L. Motley, American minister to London, asking him to make such a request to the French and Prussian governments. The request was immediately agreed to by both governments.⁵²

It is worth noting that in conducting American diplomacy in the Tientsin incident, Frederick Low invariably took the initiative. The request that the European powers not fight in the China waters was an exception, as Low naturally did not participate directly. In most of the cases, Hamilton Fish merely acknowledged receiving Low's reports; in others, he "fully approved" what Low had already done. This was largely because Fish was neither familiar with nor interested in Chinese affairs. A typical instruction from Fish to Low reads as follows:

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 392-394.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 396-398. See also Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (10 vols.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), VII, 152-153, 154-155.

I am not sufficiently familiar with the facts relating to the grievances which France has suffered in the recent sanguinary disturbances in China to form a judgment upon the course of the Minister, but I have great confidence in your discretion and prudence and your ability so to adapt yourself to emergencies as they arise, as to best promote the cause of peace and tranquility.⁵³

The Tientsin incident was finally concluded. Frederick Low's judgment again showed his critical attitude toward the French and sympathy for the Chinese. He believed that the Chinese had done their best as regards the punishment of the guilty and the restoration of peace and order. As to the payments for American damages, Low stated that these had been made to his "entire satisfaction."⁵⁴ The Chinese had paid the French government approximately four hundred per cent of the actual value of French property damaged at Tientsin. To this Low made the following comment:

The claim was made, I do not know nor have I inquired; but I only repeat in a very mild form the statement made to me by the resident Roman Catholic Bishop of Peking when I say that, the Tientsin riot was a good financial operation for the representative of France.⁵⁵

After the final settlement of the Tientsin case, Sino-French relations remained at the high point of tension for nearly two years. It is not surprising, therefore, to read Low's concluding judgment of the whole affair:

. . . it seems clear that nothing has been gained by attempting to force the Chinese Government to negotiate in

⁵³ Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of States, China 1801-1906 (Washington: The National Archives, 1946), II, No. 77.

⁵⁴ Foreign Relations, 1871, p. 75.

⁵⁵ China Despatches, XXIX, No. 135.

France; on the contrary it must be conceded I think, that the action of the French Government in insisting on the discussion and settling of questions other than the particular one that the Envoy was sent to arrange has proved a most signal and damaging failure.⁵⁶

In a broad sense, Low's diplomacy was a continuation of that of most of his predecessors in previous decades. He made every effort to maintain China's independence and to promote America's interests in China. While many of his predecessors were opposed to British and Russian imperialism in China in the 1850's and 1860's, Low denounced French high-handed methods toward the Chinese in the Tientsin incident. Like many of his predecessors, Low also sought the cooperation of other powers in order to avoid a Sino-foreign war and protect foreign interests in China.

Low's diplomacy was based upon sympathetic understanding and critical analysis. Though he lacked knowledge of China prior to his appointment, Low was an extremely able and careful observer. He had voluminous correspondence with Secretary Fish and kept the State Department informed of his progress in the negotiations. His critical analysis of specific events was indeed remarkable. Paul Clyde rightly asserts that "rarely, if ever, has the United States been more fortunate [than] in the selection of . . . Frederick F. Low [as the minister to China]." ⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Ibid., XXXI, No. 135.

⁵⁷ Paul Hibbert Clyde, "Frederick F. Low and the Tientsin Massacre," The Pacific Historical Review, II (1933), 100.

CHAPTER V

REPERCUSSIONS OF THE TIENSIN INCIDENT

The settlement of the Tientsin case did not solve the missionary question which had seriously affected Sino-Western diplomacy for many years. Rather, the incident proved to be a tragedy for both China and the Western powers. It symbolized the end of the T'ung-chih Restoration. A proposal of the Tsungli Yamen inspired by the incident and aimed at regulating the missionary activities also failed because of the opposition of the Western powers. However, the Tientsin incident unexpectedly brought Li Hung-chang to the highest levels of power. And for the next twenty-five years, Li proved himself to be the greatest statesman of late nineteenth-century China.¹

The End of the T'ung-chih Restoration

The 1860's in modern Chinese history is noted for the mighty T'ung-chih Restoration. This movement was based upon the realization that foreign encroachments and domestic rebellions would eventually

¹The incident has some other far-reaching influences which will not be discussed here. For instance, the Ch'ung-hou apology mission to France had a great, if not decisive, influence on the Chinese government for the establishment of the permanent legations abroad. See Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 171.

destroy the Chinese empire.² As a consequence, starting in 1861 when the reign of T'ung-chih began, the Chinese government launched various important reforms and innovations. The Restoration movement was an attempt to build and revitalize a Confucian state that would be capable of responding effectively to the impact of the modern West.³

The Western powers welcomed China's new policy. They thought that their interests and those of the Chinese rested on advancing China's dignity, independence, peace, stability, and prosperity. Thus, Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia, pursued a moderate cooperative policy toward China.⁴

The British government thought that the China trade was not sufficiently important to justify costly wars and the risk of empire in China. Britain was prepared to support the Chinese central government against all possible oppositions, including those of foreign merchants and missionaries. Sir Rutherford Alcock, the British minister to China from 1865 to 1869, was the chief architect of the treaty system during this period. He tried to keep a balance between foreign rights and China's legitimate interests, and throughout the Restoration period he

²The Anglo-French seizure of Peking took place in 1860 and the Taiping rebellion reached high tide with the campaign of 1860-1862.

³The only English work in a complete book form dealing with the Restoration is by Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (New York: Atheneum, 1966); Hsiao I-shan, in his voluminous A History of the Ch'ng Dynasty (5 vols.; Taipei: Commercial Press, 1960), has nearly five hundred pages discussing this subject, see Hsiao I-shan, III, 430-905.

⁴See Wright, pp. 21-42.

remained the mainstay of the Cooperative Policy.⁵

In France, there was also a tendency during the Restoration era toward a policy of self-restraint and cooperation with the other powers and China. French supporters of the Cooperative Policy argued that the limited interests of France in China were identical with those of England, that her excessive commitments should be reduced, and that under the French treaty of Tientsin the Catholic missionaries already had ample rights which required no future special support. Although there was vigorous opposition to the French policy of cooperation both in France and by the Catholic missionaries, the French government and its diplomats to China on the whole adhered to it.⁶

In the mid-nineteenth century the Russian military, commercial, and religious institutions operated somewhat independently of the Russian minister in Peking. Russia continued to expand her territory and seek exclusive privileges in China through force and fraud, but the Russian minister in Peking appeared to have upheld the Cooperative Policy of his diplomatic colleagues.⁷

Secretary of State William H. Seward and Minister Anson Burlingame were from the outset convinced that the Restoration meant progress. They thought that the powers had to be careful to avoid any action that might enable the anti-foreign party to discredit the

⁵Pelcovits, Introduction and Part I.

⁶Wright, pp. 33-34.

⁷Ibid., pp. 34-36.

Ch'ing government.⁸ For this reason, the United States government, like the British, disavowed gunboat diplomacy. J. Ross Browne, American minister to China from 1868 to 1869, thought of foreign tutelage, but his main purpose was to maintain China's stability.⁹ At the same time, the State Department continued to avoid the use of force or pressure and apparently remained satisfied that the Chinese government, if given sufficient time and freedom of action, would itself formulate policies friendly to all the foreign powers.¹⁰

The Cooperative Policy coincided with a period of international peace and safety. There was no serious Sino-foreign conflict for about ten years from after the Anglo-French invasion in 1860 to mid-1870. Although some local anti-missionary disturbances occurred in the decade, the Western nations usually took a moderate stand in the settlement of the cases.¹¹ Indeed, the prospect of the Restoration looked so bright that both the Chinese and Western officials involved in the Cooperative Policy hoped that China could gradually adjust to the outside world without further disaster.

Unfortunately, the Tientsin incident ruined all the hopes of the settlement was not reached. The case was settled only when the Chinese

⁸ Foreign Relations, 1863, II, 837; Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, Chapter XXII.

⁹ Paul Hibbert Clyde, "The China Policy of J. Ross Browne, American Minister at Peking, 1868-1869," The Pacific Historical Review, I (1932), 312-323.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Paul Cohen has a complete list of the incidents involving missionaries in the 1860's, see Cohen, Appendix I.

Restoration movement. It was clear from the beginning that the domestic program of the T'ung-chih Restoration would fail unless the gentry and literati were encouraged to lead a Confucian revival in their localities and that the new foreign policy would fail if this Confucian revival led to excessive xenophobia. This required a very delicate balance. The Tientsin incident demonstrated that the Chinese gentry and literati and the masses could not respond effectively to the new situation. The diehard conservatives, who were the majority among the Chinese, thought that the populace had at last risen in their might and that no foreign intruders could withstand their righteous indignation. This was the ancient Confucian idea that all governments depended upon popular support. Some Chinese hoped that the people now would make it possible for the Ch'ing government to expel all the Western barbarians.

The Western powers, at the same time, abandoned the attitudes of the Cooperative Policy and renewed gunboat diplomacy. They summoned large fleets of war vessels to Chinese waters. The French, in particular, presented harsh demands and threatened total war if a satisfactory settlement was not reached. The case was settled only when the Chinese humiliated themselves.

The Tientsin incident left Sino-Western relations embittered by resentment and fear. As demonstrated before, Westerners were not satisfied with the Chinese management and remained angry and afraid for a long time. The same can be said of the Chinese side. On August 24, 1870, Frederick Low reported:

Fans are being manufactured and sold in Tientsin having coarsely engraved views of the burning buildings and the murdering of the people in the streets upon them. Fans to the Chinese are what illustrated papers are to the people of the United States . . . There is undoubtedly greater unanimity of opinion there in favor of the rioters. I shall not be surprised to hear of similar outbreaks elsewhere . . .¹²

When the French chargé demanded the decapitation of Ch'en Kuo-jui, the Tientsin masses presented Ch'en an "Umbrella of Ten Thousand Names" showing their sympathy and respect. After Ch'en died a year later, the populace erected an honorary tablet for him in his home-town.¹³

Not surprisingly, the bitter feeling between the Chinese and Westerners caused more and more disturbances in later years. Alexander Michie reports: ". . . the evils complained of have gone on increasing and accumulating year by year, outrages and massacres following each other without interruption, and the exacerbation of feeling between foreign missionaries and the Chinese population going on with accelerated speed."¹⁴ One example occurred in October 1871. Wen Yu, governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang, and Wang Kai-tai, governor of Fukien, reported that in the province of Kwangtung criminals tried to kidnap people with poison. Such rumors spread widely. The people in Fukien and Chekiang were frightened and believed that foreigners were

¹²Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 380; see also Hubner, pp. 560-561. The Frenchman, who spent eight days in Tientsin sixteen days after the incident, personally possessed two fans of this kind.

¹³IWSM, chuan 75, pp. 1736-1738; Fang Hao, A Diplomatic History of Modern China (Taipei, 1955), I, 112.

¹⁴Michie, II, 248.

involved in the crime. As a consequence, foreign consuls protested vigorously because, according to them, the Chinese alleged that the Tientsin incident inspired foreigners to practice kidnapping. Wen and Wang further reported that only after they took extraordinary methods were they able to restore order.¹⁵

The incident also served as an instrument for France to secure further concessions from China. In September 1872, the French representative requested that he present his credentials directly in Peking instead of to the Tsungli Yamen. The French told Li Hung-chang that if he was refused he would reopen the Tientsin case.¹⁶

Sino-Western relations became tense again after the incident, for the Cooperative Policy could not be revived because of the bitter feelings. Furthermore, the Tientsin incident revealed the irreconcilable nature of Chinese and Western aims and attitudes, and it destroyed the effort of China to build and revitalize a Confucian state that would be capable of responding effectively to the impact of the modern West. As John King Fairbank has remarked: "The incident at Tientsin . . . undid the work of a decade."¹⁷

Li Hung-chang's Rise to Power

For several years the Ch'ing officials had noted that on many

¹⁵ IWSM, chuan 84, pp. 1931-1932.

¹⁶ Li Hung-chang, Han-Kao, chuan 12, pp. 21, 23.

¹⁷ John King Fairbank, E.O. Reischauer, and A. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation, p. 337.

occasions the governor-general of Chihli and the Superintendent of the Three Northern Ports had handicapped each other in carrying out their separate duties. This had become painfully clear in the Tientsin incident, when conflicting lines of authority prevented Tseng Kuo-fan and Ch'ung-hou from negotiating effectively. The conflict had delayed the settlement of the crisis and almost caused a disastrous war.

As a consequence, when the crisis of the Tientsin case passed, responsible officials began to review the whole situation. On October 10, 1870, Mao Chang-hsi of the Board of Public Works presented a memorial to the throne. Mao stated that the city of Tientsin was vitally important, for it controlled the waterways to the interior of north China. It protected both Peking and Paoting, the provincial capital some ninety miles to the southwest, from outside attack. It also contained a large number of foreigners. He noted that the Superintendency of the Three Northern Ports had been established so as to have a special official responsible for diplomacy and the defense of the port area. Nevertheless, Mao observed, the superintendent had great responsibility but no power to command local officials. Once crisis arose, the superintendent had to consult the governor-general of the province, but communications were not adequate or fast enough effectively to handle the situation. Factionalism could further complicate the situation, as demonstrated by the Tientsin case.¹⁸

Mao asserted that the duties of the superintendent at Tientsin were less arduous than those of the Superintendent of the Five Southern

¹⁸ IWSM, chuan 77, pp. 1777-1778.

Ports. Since the duties of the latter had already been incorporated into the work of the governor-general of Nanking, Mao suggested that the Superintendency of the Three Northern Ports be abolished and that the governor-general of Chihli assume the responsibilities of the office. The governor-general should then be stationed in Tientsin to enable him more conveniently to fulfill his duties than he would from Paoting. Since this would involve additional heavy responsibilities for the governor-general, Mao suggested, the routine affairs should be handled by a new circuit intendant responsible to the governor-general.¹⁹

Mao further suggested that, since the Tientsin incident demonstrated the vulnerability of the Tientsin area, more forts be built and more troops be stationed there. These forts and troops should be under the direct command of the governor-general.²⁰

Mao's proposal was referred to the Tsungli Yamen for comments. On November 12 Prince Kung agreed to all Mao had suggested, but proposed some slight changes. The Prince held that Tientsin was far more important in international affairs than Paoting. Therefore he suggested that the governor-general reside in Tientsin in spring, summer, and early autumn when the Tientsin port was ice-free and move to Paoting when it was ice-bound. Prince Kung also proposed that Li Hung-chang be given the power to decide whether a circuit intendency should be

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 1778.

²⁰ Ibid.

created. Furthermore, since Taku port was important for the national defense, it should be repaired and strengthened and put under Li's charge.²¹

The imperial court immediately accepted all the proposals and ordered Li Hung-chang to present plans for these transfers.²² On November 18, Li sent in his memorial. Besides reaffirming the importance of Mao's proposals, Li also asked for the appointment of a new circuit intendant directly responsible to him.²³

This was undoubtedly one of the most important and far-reaching shifts of power in modern Chinese history. Now Li was not only responsible for the general administration of the metropolitan province, but also for the security of the Tientsin and Peking areas as well, since he commanded a large number of troops at the most important spots in north China. In Tientsin, Li came in contact with the foreigners and was soon regarded as China's leading diplomat. By working in Tientsin, Li shortcircuited the communications between the foreign representatives and the capital and to a great extent intruded himself between the Westerners and the Tsungli Yamen. Since Li was a member of the Yamen from time to time, he was often able to act in its name as well as in his

²¹ Ibid., chuan 78, pp. 1802-1803.

²² Ibid., pp. 1803-1804.

²³ Li Hung-chang, Tsou-Kao, chuan 17, pp. 12a-12b. Stanley Spector's interpretation is surprisingly misleading. He totally neglects the proposals of Mao Chang-hsi and Prince Kung and says that Li, being a shrewd and ambitious politician, suggested all these changes himself. See Spector, pp. 133-139.

capacity as the Superintendent of the Three Northern Ports. Li Chien-nung has concluded: "The Chihli governor-generalship well-nigh became the second court of the Ch'ing dynasty."²⁴

The Tsungli Yamen Proposal of 1871

In July, 1870, as has already been seen, a censor named Ch'ang-jun proposed that the Chinese government negotiate with France in order eventually to abolish the treaty articles on preaching, destroy all the churches throughout China and send all missionaries home. The court asked Tseng Kuo-fan to comment on the proposal. Several days later, Tseng replied that in the previous year he had suggested to Wen-hsiang, the chief assistant to Prince Kung, that Catholic missionaries not be permitted to establish orphanages. Wen-hsiang, however, had pessimistically stated that the orphanages could not be prohibited. Tseng now reasoned that if orphanages could not be prohibited, it would be impossible to prohibit missionary activities.²⁵

On September 20, 1870, Ting Jih-ch'ang, who with Tseng was then managing the Tientsin affair, submitted a memorial on the missionary problem. Ting first of all made a clear distinction between Protestantism and Catholicism. The Protestants were law-abiding and China had little complaint against them. The original intentions of the Catholic missionaries were not bad either, but they failed to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Chinese subjects and took people in

²⁴Li Chien-nung, p. 101.

²⁵IWSM, chuan 73, p. 1701.

on a grand scale, finding power in numbers. Ignorant people involved in lawsuits or having money problems flocked to the religion in order to obtain foreign protection. It was for this reason, according to Ting, that the common people's hatred of missionaries grew deeper day by day. Ting suggested that, in the negotiation for treaty revision,²⁶ China seek an agreement preventing the Catholics from admitting bad subjects or from helping their converts in lawsuits. Ting further suggested that provincial authorities carefully select local officials who would grant appropriate protection to the missionaries but would not be afraid to take issue with them if justice so required.²⁷

Four days after Ting's proposals, Tseng Kuo-fan submitted a specific suggestion for the missionary problem. Tseng observed that China had always enjoyed peaceful relations with those nations engaged in trade. But France had repeatedly caused trouble because of her missionary activities. Similarly, the Chinese had been able to get along amicably with Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, and even Protestantism. Only the Catholic teaching created interminable troubles. Tseng therefore proposed to place all Catholic churches and their charitable institutions under the jurisdiction of local officials. Whenever anyone was received into these institutions or died within them, the local officials should be informed so that they could make the necessary investigation; whenever the kidnapped were brought to the church, their

²⁶The Treaty of Tientsin of 1860 was subject to revision every ten years.

²⁷IWSM, chuan 76, pp. 1762-1763.

families should be given the opportunity to identify and redeem them; and whenever a lawsuit involved Christian and non-Christian subjects, the missionaries should not be allowed to interfere on behalf of their converts.²⁸

The proposals of Ting and Tseng were referred to the Tsungli Yamen. The Yamen reported its deliberations on October 18, agreeing with the proposals. It declared that action would be taken at the first opportunity.²⁹

The opportunity was not long in coming. The explosion at Tientsin had already increased the awareness of the responsible Chinese officials about the seriousness of missionary problems. When the French Treaty of Tientsin was ready to be revised in October, 1870, the Tsungli Yamen made one last attempt to find a workable way to solve the missionary problems once and for all.

On February 9, 1871, Prince Kung sent a circular letter with eight regulations to some foreign powers in China. The letter asserted that the abuses of the foreign missionaries had been excessive. The Roman Catholic religion, in particular, had been a constant source of trouble for the Chinese. Since the missionary problem seriously affected the interests of peace and commerce, and since the settlement of the Tientsin case gave no solution of the long-range problem, it was

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 1766-1767.

²⁹ Ibid., chuan 77, pp. 1783-1784.

urgently necessary to devise a plan to cope with it.³⁰

According to the letter, which contained the Yamen's view, the core of the problem was the missionaries' extraterritorial status. Because of the privileged and extralegal status of the missionaries, the Yamen concluded, even bigger and more terrible disturbances than the one at Tientsin would occur, culminating in an uncontrollable mass uprising. Therefore, in hopes of forestalling such a tragedy, it proposed eight articles for the regulation of missionary activities.

Briefly the regulations were:

1. Catholic orphanages should be completely abolished. If this were deemed inadmissible, they should at least be more publicly operated and proper reports of them should be made to the Chinese government.
2. In order to avoid popular suspicion Chinese women should not be permitted to enter foreign churches, nor should female missionaries be permitted to propagate Christianity in China.
3. All missionaries should be placed under the jurisdiction of the Chinese law and local officials. The Chinese converts should be placed on an equal footing with ordinary people and should not rely on their religion to evade government labor or the payment of taxes and rents. And missionaries should not become involved in any lawsuit on behalf of their converts.
4. The Chinese law should be applied in an equitable manner to both

³⁰Ibid., chuan 82, p. 1880. It was not clear to how many countries the Yamen sent this letter. Prince Kung only said that the circular letter had been sent to "various countries."

Chinese and foreigners who lived in the same area. If missionaries intended to protect converts who were guilty of crimes, they should be either punished or sent home.

5. The French missionaries should have proper passports specifying the province and prefecture where they intended to go. They should not be permitted to go to places where rebels were active or where military operations were being carried out.
6. The character of converts should be carefully investigated. No people who had ever committed any crimes should be converted. All the native places, and the professions of the converts, should be reported to the Chinese authorities.
7. Missionaries should not use official seals or pose as officials. Instead, they should faithfully follow the Chinese customs and habits when interviewing local officials, as did the Chinese literati.
8. Missionaries should not be allowed to designate any building as formerly confiscated church property. Moreover, before property transactions or the erection of the buildings, missionaries should consult the local authorities to make sure that there was no conflict with Chinese geomantic notions.³¹

The Tsungli Yamen concluded by professing ignorance as to whether the missionaries would be willing to accept the regulations. If they would not, the Yamen had only one suggestion: that they do their work elsewhere, but not in China. In any case, the Yamen was at pains to

³¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1871, pp. 107-110. Low's reply was approved by the Secretary of State, J.C.B. Davis, and President Grant.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1882-1885; the English text is in *Foreign Relations*, 1871, pp. 99-107.

point out that the proposals were not to prohibit missionary activities but only to constitute a means to avert further disaster before it was too late.

The American and British replies were communicated to the Chinese government in March and June, 1871 respectively. Frederick Low, in the reply of March 20, pointed out that, since the complaint was almost solely against the actions of Roman Catholics, the regulations really did not concern the United States. He refrained from judging the actions of Roman Catholics, and he emphasized the determination of his country to maintain extraterritoriality; but he disclaimed any rights over the Chinese citizens. Criticizing the whole proposal point by point, Low said that number one did not concern the United States since the Protestants did not have any orphanages; number two, which aimed to restrict the activity of women, was unreasonable; numbers three and four were unnecessary because Chinese Christians were already under the jurisdiction of their own government and regulations forbidding the interference of missionaries already existed; number six was of little necessity if officials would do their duty; and numbers seven and eight were superfluous because the United States was prepared to restrain missionaries who overstepped their rights.³²

The British reply was more critical. The Foreign Office regarded the regulations as "cumbrous and impractical" and felt that the treaties

³²The text of Lord Granville's reply is in *Foreign Relations*, 1871, pp. 107-110. Low's reply is in *The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal*, IV (February 1871), pp. 153-156.

³²*Foreign Relations*, 1871, pp. 107-110. Low's reply was approved by the acting Secretary of State, J.C.B. Davis, and President Grant. See *ibid.*, pp. 153-156.

³³Horse, II, 160.

already afforded sufficient remedy for what was "the gist of the accusations brought forward," namely, the assumption by missionaries of a protective jurisdiction over Chinese converts. Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, went on to criticize the eight regulations. Like Frederick Low, Granville said that the first one did not apply to the British missionaries. The second would be in violation of religious freedom. Concerning the third and fourth, the Foreign Secretary claimed that the British government could not allow the claim that the missionaries residing in China had to conform to the laws and customs of China to pass unchallenged; the sixth was open to objection; the seventh called for no special observation; and the eighth did not apply to British missionaries.³³

The French government was the most critical of all. Since the Chinese proposals were obviously directed at the French Catholics and the French protectorate, Rochechouart's reply was delayed until he had received instructions from home and was not communicated until November. He rejected outright all of the regulations and questioned if they had been seriously intended by the Chinese government.³⁴ At the same time when Ch'ung-hou was in Paris on his apology mission, President Thiers told him that France could not accept any of these regulations.³⁵

Realizing that the proposals were mostly aimed at them, the

³³The text of Lord Granville's reply is in Foreign Relations, 1871, pp. 156-158, and The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal, IV (February, 1872), 251-252.

³⁴Cohen, p. 256.

³⁵Morse, II, 260.

Catholic missionaries bitterly attacked the regulations. The most detailed and authoritative refutation was a pamphlet written in 1872 by the French missionary, Felix Gennevoise. He rejected these regulations as tyrannical and ridiculous. He also sought to refute the charges on the missionary's interference in lawsuits and assumption of official titles.³⁶

The proposals generally did not excite the same strenuous opposition from the Protestants as from the Catholics. Although there were some bitter denunciations, a number of Protestants called for self-reflection and the exercise of self-restraint. Griffith John remarked: "These demands strike at the very root of Christian missions in China, and they will, if complied with, close every church, chapel, and school in the land."³⁷ Boomerang said that "these eight rules are quite sufficient to inaugurate a persecution."³⁸ L.N. Wheeler, however, was more understanding: "It must be admitted that certain charges directly made or implied in this official communication are not wholly without foundation in fact."³⁹ Another Protestant, whose initials were W.M., wrote:

³⁶Gennevoise's pamphlet is summarized in Cohen, pp. 257-259. He regards it as "a veritable masterpiece of harsh and uncompromising invective."

³⁷The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal, IV (November, 1871), 149.

³⁸Ibid., p. 165.

³⁹Ibid., p. 148.

⁴¹Samuel Wells Williams, II, 706.

This is no undue assumption of authority, and there is no summary execution of what is proposed in the several articles of the despatch, but the writers of it simply state the difficulties they labour under in regard to the Missionary part, and request the careful consideration of what seems to them proper in the circumstances.⁴⁰

Besides the fact that the regulations were directly aimed at the Catholics, it should be noted that prejudice against the Catholic missionary enterprise also helped explain the more moderate stand of the Protestants.

Thus, the Tientsin case came to a tragic end. Its significance and repercussions went far beyond what the indemnity and the number of victims could have suggested. After examining the history of this period, Samuel Wells Williams observed:

In short, the whole history of the riot--its causes, growth, culmination, results, and repression--combine as many of the serious obstacles in the way of harmonizing Chinese and European civilizations as anything which ever occurred."⁴¹

This statement certainly applies to both the incident itself and the Tsungli Yamen proposals, for all these things clearly revealed the conflicting Chinese and Western concepts of men, society, and freedom of religion. Each side acted according to its own traditional values and each side considered the other party unreasonable and unintelligible. Any attempt to solve the missionary question could never be achieved as long as the two different civilizations did not understand each other.

Tsung-mau, Local Government of the Ch'ing Period (Taipei, 1963), pp. 113-116.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 158.

⁴¹ Samuel Wells Williams, II, 706.

Long after the Tientsin incident, the missionary question continued to plague relations between China and the West. The people who witnessed the incident felt badly affected, and the hatred of foreigners among them grew deeper day by day. Thereafter numerous minor incidents involving missionaries occurred. Thirty years later Empress Dowager ordered all provincial authorities to "burn down all foreign churches and kill all foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians."⁴² The Chinese Communist historian, Hsieh Hsing-yao, asserts that the repercussions of the Tientsin incident culminated in the Boxer uprising in 1900.⁴³ In a broad sense, this statement is no exaggeration.

Semis, Samuel Flagg, ed. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. 10 vols. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1919.

Biggarstaff, Knight. "The Ch'ung Hsu Mission to France, 1870-1871," Market Social and Economic Quarterly, VIII, No. 3 (October, 1935), 313-317.

Bland, J.O.F. Li Hung-chang. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917.

_____, and E. Backhouse. China Under the Empress Dowager, Being the History of the Life and Times of Tzu-hsi. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1911.

Chang, Chung-ii. The Chinese Country: Studies on Their Role in the Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955.

_____, and Stanley Spector, eds. Guide to the Memorials of Seven Leading Officials of Nineteenth-Century China. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955.

⁴²Fu Tsung-mou, Local Government of the Ch'ing Period (Taipei, 1963), pp. 113-114.

⁴³Hsieh, pp. 4-5.
Clyde, F. "The China Policy of J. Ross Browne, American Minister at Peking, 1868-1869," The Pacific Historical Review, I (September, 1932), 312-323.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Source Materials in English

- Angell, J.B. "The Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and China," Journal of Social Science, XVII (1883), 24-36.
- Bain, Chester A. "Commodore Matthew Perry, Humphrey Marshall, and the Taiping Rebellion," Far Eastern Quarterly, X, No. 3 (May, 1951), 258-270.
- Bass, Harold J. "The Policy of the American State Department Toward Missionaries in the Far East," Washington State College Research Studies, V (1937), 179-190.
- _____. "The Policy of the American State Department Toward Missionaries in the Far East." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington State College, 1937.
- Bemis, Samuel Flagg, ed. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. 10 vols. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.
- Biggerstaff, Knight. "The Ch'ung Hou Mission to France, 1870-1871," Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly, VIII, No. 3 (October, 1935), 633-647.
- Bland, J.O.P. Li Hung-chang. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917.
- _____. and E. Backhouse. China Under the Empress Dowager, Being the History of the Life and Times of Tzu-hsi. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1911.
- Chang, Chung-li. The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in the Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955.
- _____. and Stanley Spector, eds. Guide to the Memorials of Seven Leading Officials of Nineteenth-Century China. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955.
- The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal. Foochow, 1868-1872; Shanghai, 1874 et seq.
- Clyde, Paul Hibbert. "The China Policy of J. Ross Browne, American Minister at Peking, 1868-1869," The Pacific Historical Review, I (September, 1932), 312-323.

- _____. "Frederick F. Low and the Tientsin Massacre," The Pacific Historical Review, II (1933), 100-108.
- _____. United States Policy Toward China: Diplomatic and Public Documents, 1839-1939. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1940.
- Cohen, Paul A. China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Cole, H.M. "Origins of the French Protectorate over Catholic Missions in China," The American Journal of International Law, XXXIV (1940), 473-491.
- Couling, Samuel, ed. The Encyclopedia Sinica. London: Oxford University Press, 1917.
- Dennett, Tyler. Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to China, Japan, and Korea in the Nineteenth Century. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922.
- _____. "How Old Is American Policy in the Far East?" Pacific Review, II (1921), 463-474.
- _____. "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," The American Historical Review, XXVIII (October, 1922), 45-62.
- Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1801-1906. Washington, D.C.: The National Archives.
- Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906, China. Washington, D.C.: The National Archives.
- Dulles, Foster Rhea. China and America: The Story of Their Relations since 1784. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946.
- Fairbank, John King. "Patterns Behind the Tientsin Massacre," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, XX (1957), 480-511.
- _____, E.O. Reischauer and Albert Craig. East Asia: The Modern Transformation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965.
- Folsom, Kenneth E. Friends, Guests and Colleagues: The Mu-Fu System in the Late Ch'ing Period. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968.
- Foster, John W. American Diplomacy in the Orient. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1903.

- Hsiao, Kung-chuan. Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960.
- Hsieh, Hsing-yao. "How Did Imperialism Use Religion for Aggression on China?" Jen-Min Jih-Pao, Peking, April 13, 1951, tr. in Current Background, No. 68, April 18, 1951 (American Consulate General, Hong Kong).
- Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Hu, Sheng. Imperialism and Chinese Politics. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955.
- Hubner, M. Le Baron de. A Ramble Round the World, 1871. Translated by Lady Herbert. London: Macmillan and Co., 1878.
- Hummel, Arthur, ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period. 2 vols. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944.
- Latourette, Kenneth Scott. A History of Christian Missions in China. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929.
- Li, Chien-nung. The Political History of China, 1840-1928. Translated by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966.
- Littell, John B. "Missionaries and Politics in China--the Taiping Rebellion," Political Science Quarterly, XLIII (December, 1928), 566-599.
- Liu, Kwang-ching. "Li Hung-chang in Chihli: The Emergence of a Policy, 1870-1875," in Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphy and Mary C. Wright, eds. Approaches to Modern Chinese History. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967, pp. 68-104.
- Ludwig, Albert Philip. "Li Hung chang and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1870-1885." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1936.
- MacGillirray, D., ed. A Century of Protestant Missions in China. Shanghai: The American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1907.
- MacNair, H.F. Modern Chinese History, Selected Readings. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1923.

- Malloy, William M., comp. Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements Between the United States and Other Powers, 1776-1909. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910.
- Mannix, William Francis, ed. Memoirs of Li Hung-chang. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913.
- Martin, William Alexander Parsons. A Cycle of Cathay, or China, South and North, with Personal Reminiscences. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1900.
- Masland, John W. "Missionary Influence upon American Far Eastern Policy," The Pacific Historical Review, X (September, 1941), 279-297.
- Michie, Alexander. The Englishman in China During the Victorian Era: As Illustrated in the Career of Sir Rutherford Alcock, K.C.B., D.C.L., Many Years Consul and Minister in China and Japan. 2 vols. Taipei: Ch'eng Wen Publishing Company, 1966.
- Morse, Hosea Ballou. The International Relations of the Chinese Empire. 3 vols. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1918.
- The New York Times, 1870-1871
- Pan, Stephen C.Y. "The First Treaty Between the United States and China," Chinese Social and Political Science Review, XXI (1937), 155-189.
- Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1863-1872. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- Pelcovits, Nathan A. Old China Hands and the Foreign Office. New York: The King's Crown Press, 1948.
- Pitchard, Earl H. "The Origins of the Most-Favored-Nation and the Open Door Policies in China," Far Eastern Quarterly, I, No. 2 (February, 1942), 161-172.
- Smith, Arthur Henderson. China in Convulsion. 2 vols. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1901.
- Spector, Stanley. Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Regionalism. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.
- Swisher, Earl. China's Management of the American Barbarians: A Study of Sino-American Relations, 1841-1861, with Documents. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.

- Teng, Ssu-yu and J.K. Fairbank, eds. China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923. New York: Atheneum, 1967.
- Thompson, R. Wardlaw. Griffith John: The Story of Fifty Years in China. London: Religious Tract Society, 1908.
- Tong, Te-kong. United States Diplomacy in China, 1844-1860. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.
- Tsiang, Ting-fu. "The Extension of Equal Commercial Privileges to Other Nations Than the British after the Treaty of Nanking," Chinese Social and Political Science Review, XV (October, 1931), 422-444.
- Vinacke, Harold M. A History of the Far East in Modern Times. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.
- Williams, Benjamin H. "The Politics of Missionary Work in China," Current History, XXIII (October, 1925), 71-76.
- Williams, Frederick Wells. The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, LL.D., Missionary, Diplomatist, Sinologue. New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1889.
- Williams, Samuel Wells. The Middle Kingdom: A Survey of the Geography, Government, Literature, Social Life, Arts, and History of the Chinese Empire and Its Inhabitants. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900.
- Wright, Mary C. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967.
- Wu, Chao-kwang. The International Aspects of the Missionary Movement in China. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1930.
- Kuo, Ting-i. Source Materials in Chinese and Japanese 2 vols. Taipei, 1953.
- The Beginning and End of the Management of Barbarian Affairs. Taipei: Kuo Fung Publishing Company, 1965.
- Cheng, Ho-sheng. Comparative Tables of Sino-Western Historical Dates in Modern Times. Taipei: Commercial Press, 1966.
- Ch'eng, Kung-lu. A History of Modern China. 2 vols. Taipei: Commercial Press, 1960.
- Chiang, Hsing-te. The Life and Career of Tseng Kuo-fan. Shanghai, 1939.

- Chiang, Ting-fu. Selected Documents of the Modern Chinese Diplomatic History. 2 vols. Taipei: Commercial Press, 1957.
- Chu, Shih-chia. Selected Documents of the History of American Aggression on China in the Nineteenth Century. Peking: Chung Hua Book Company, 1959.
- Ch'uan, Han-sheng. "Criticisms of Western Culture Voiced During the Late Ming and Early Ch'ing," in Li Ting-i, et al., eds. Collection of Essays on Modern Chinese History. 1st Ser., II. Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Co., 1956, pp. 227-235.
- Compendium of Ch'ing Essays on Statecraft. Taipei: Kuo Fung Publishing Company, 1965.
- Fang, Hao. A Diplomatic History of Modern China. Vol. I. Taipei, 1955.
- Fu, Tsung-mou. Local Government of the Ch'ing Period. Taipei, 1963.
- Historical Materials on Missionary Cases in the Late Ch'ing. Vol. I. Peiping: National Museum, 1937.
- Historical Records of the Ch'ing Emperors. Taipei, 1966.
- A History of Sino-Western Intercourse. Taipei: Chung Hua Book Company, 1959.
- Ho, I-k'un. A Critical Biography of Tseng Kuo-fan. Shanghai, 1937.
- Hsiao, I-shan. A History of the Ch'ing Dynasty. 5 vols. Taipei: Commercial Press, 1960.
- _____. A Biography of Tseng Kuo-fan. Taipei, 1959.
- Huang, Ta-shao. A History of Modern China. 3 vols. Taipei: The Great China Book Co., 1959.
- Kuo, Ting-i. A Chronological History of Modern China. 2 vols. Taipei, 1963.
- Lee, En-han. "Anti-Christianity Thought in the Hsien-Feng Period (1851-1861) of the Ch'ing Dynasty," Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, VI (September, 1967), 44-70.
- Li, Hung-chang. The Collected Writings of Li Hung-chang. Shanghai, 1921.
- Li, Shih-yao. "The Movement Against the Foreign Religion During the Thirty Years Prior to the War of 1894," Historical Research, VI (1958), 1-15.

- Li, Ting-i. A History of Modern China. Taipei, 1953.
- Liu, Ta-nien. A History of American Aggression on China. Peking, 1962.
- Lu, Shih-ch'iang. The Anti-Christian Movement in China, 1860-1874. Taipei: Commercial Press, 1966.
- Nomura, Masamitsu. "The Tientsin Missionary Case," Shirin, XX (1935), 67-99.
- Shang, Ju-chi. A History of American Aggression on China. 2 vols. Peking, 1962.
- Tao, Chiu-yin. Selected Documents of American Aggression on China. Shanghai, 1962.
- Treaties in the Early and Middle Ch'ing Period. Taipei, 1964.
- Treaties in the Late Ch'ing Period. Taipei, 1964
- Tseng, Kuo-fan. The Collected Writings of Tseng Kuo-fan. Taipei: Chunghua Book Co., 1959.
- Tso, Tsung-tang. The Collected Writings of Tso Tsung-tang. Taipei, 1964.
- Wang, Chih-ch'un. A Brief Record of Maritime Defense. 2 chuans. T'ung Wen Kuan, 1880.
- Wang, Wen-chieh. A Study of the Religious Persecutions in Modern Chinese History. Foochow: Fukien Christian University, 1947.
- Wu, Chun-ju. Three Aggressive Policies of Imperialism in China. Shanghai, 1929.

Typed by

Mary L. Armes

Multilithed by

Pluid Printing Parlour