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THE CAUCUSING GROUPS OF THE UNITED NATIONS—

AN EXAMINATION OF THEIR ATTITUDES

TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION

by

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A THESIS

Presented to the Department of Political Science
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

March 1964

APPROVED



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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For their part in the "questionnaire stage" of the dissertation, I wish to express a warm thank you to Donald Truax (Mathematics, University of Oregon), Marshall Goldstein (University of Oregon), and Gary Best (Political Science, Miami University). In the "computing stage," I am particularly thankful to Roy Gladstone (Psychology Department, Oklahoma State University), William Granet (Head of Computing Center, Oklahoma State University), Ronald Haxton (Oklahoma State University), and Walter Cox (Computing Center, Oklahoma State University). For their role in the "criticism stage" I am greatly indebted to Oliver Benson (Political Science, University of Oklahoma), Alex Weilenmann (Political Science, University of Pittsburgh), and Charles P. Schleicher (Political Science, University of Oregon). I owe a special debt to Charles P. Schleicher for his support and guidance throughout my graduate career and to my wife Shirley whose endless hours of typing provide the foundation of this dissertation. Finally, I wish to thank the delegates of the United Nations whose generous cooperation made this project possible.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Justification

This dissertation has two basic purposes: (1) to describe certain attitude patterns toward the United Nations by the delegate members of caucusing groups¹ within the organization and (2) to test a hypothesis concerning these patterns. The descriptive component is intended to supplement political science literature concerning the caucusing groups of the United Nations. Although Thomas Hovet, Jr. has made a study of the voting records of caucusing groups in his book Bloc Politics in the United Nations, no one, so far, has attempted to ascertain attitudinal differences between the groups.²

It is apparent that attitudes are not the only important set of variables in the (present or future) behavior patterns at the United

¹The term caucusing group will be formally defined in Chapter II, along with a description of the membership of each of the groups.

²See Thomas Hovet, Jr.'s Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960) for a discussion of the importance of caucusing group activity in the United Nations. It will not be the task of this dissertation to further substantiate this position. That is, it is taken for granted on the basis of Mr. Hovet's work that the caucusing groups do play an important part in United Nations' activities and, therefore, the attitude patterns that are associated with them may be considered to have pertinence to the understanding of United Nations politics.

Nations. Every discussion, therefore, of the ramification of these patterns must be considered prefaced by the phrase: "to the extent delegate attitudes are pertinent." It is assumed that these attitudes are pertinent. This assumption is made because delegates (1) frequently make decisions without directions from their home governments, (2) supply information to their home governments and hence their personal opinions are probably reflected in this intelligence, and (3) are frequently asked for their advice when home governments compile instructions.¹ Therefore, a presentation of delegate attitudes may facilitate an understanding of the United Nations.

The second and major purpose is to determine whether there is a relationship between the "economic development" of the caucusing groups (based on per capita G.N.P. of the member states) and the attitude patterns of the delegates which comprise them. This hypothesis was suggested by three conditions under which the United Nations operates. These are: (1) the co-existence of essentially "underdeveloped" with

¹The description of past Ambassador Lodge's relationships to the United States Department of State is probably indicative of the role played by many delegates relative to their governments, "Lodge frequently got his instructions changed and 'usually wins his point' in differences with the State Department. 'Sometimes the 'instructions' he gets from Washington are verbatim playbacks of what he wrote himself,' in part because developments 'happen too fast to rely upon specific instructions.'" Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (Elmsford, New York, Row, Peterson and Co., 1960) p. 442.

"developed" nations¹ in the same organization, (2) the recent entry into the United Nations of many "underdeveloped" nations, and (3) the predominance in the General Assembly of "underdeveloped" states.² These conditions are perhaps related to a differentiation of the attitude patterns in the United Nations along essentially economic lines. That is, the conditions referred to above might lead one to expect certain kinds of attitudes to be associated with the "developed"

¹For the purpose of the dissertation "underdeveloped" means a situation of low per capita G.N.P. and "developed" a situation of high per capita G.N.P. (relatively speaking). Thus the term is used in a purely economic rather than some other sense such as "cultural."

Of the original 51 members, the per capita G.N.P. figures of 17 lie above an arbitrary cut-off point of \$450. This gives a ratio of "developed" to "underdeveloped" of roughly one to three. Of the 110 members in December of 1962, 25 have per capita G.N.P. figures of over \$450--a ratio of roughly one to five. Thus, although the number of "developed" countries has increased in the organization, they have decreased significantly in proportion to the total membership. The calculations made here are derived from estimates made by J. P. Hayes of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and are also used in the calculation of the "economic development" of the caucusing groups in Chapter II (see Appendix for figures for countries).

²In a sense the "underdeveloped" or "less developed" nations have always been in a position to dominate the General Assembly because of the rule of one vote for one state. In fact, however, it is frequently asserted that the United States has been the dominant force in the General Assembly until recently because of its ability to mobilize the votes of the Latin American and the European groups. See for example, Vernon B. Aspaturian's article, "Metamorphosis of the United Nations," in the Yale Review, XLVI (Summer 1957) p. 552, where the idea is developed that the first phase of the organization was marked by the pre-eminent position of the Security Council. The rise in the importance of the General Assembly marks the second phase and, according to Aspaturian, was coupled with predominant United States influence. However, the third phase, that which followed from the mass admission of underdeveloped countries in the 1955-1957 period, has led to a decline of U.S. influence in the Assembly and the rise of what may be referred to as "the anti-colonial majority."

states and other attitudes to be associated with the "underdeveloped" states. Because caucusing groups, in the main, are either composed primarily of "developed" states or "underdeveloped" states,¹ it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that there will be an association between "developed" caucusing groups and certain attitude patterns, and "underdeveloped" caucusing groups and other patterns. Because of the importance of caucusing group activity within the United Nations, this differentiation of attitudes, if it is shown to exist, could have significant ramifications for the future development of the organization.

Data Collection

All of the data analyzed in this dissertation are based on the responses to the questionnaire found in the Appendix. Actually, two questionnaires were used because some alterations in answer format occurred in the process of data collection. The reasons for this al-

¹Some caucusing groups are essentially mixtures of both highly developed and underdeveloped groups. This is particularly the case in respect to the Commonwealth and partially the case in respect to the Soviet group. It would be expected, therefore, that the answer pattern of such groups would lie normally somewhere between the developed groupings and the underdeveloped groupings. This will be shown to be essentially the case in respect to the Commonwealth grouping. However, due to the fact that the Soviet Union has a very high military capability which makes up, at least in part, for its lack of high per capita gross national product, and because it is normally assumed that the Soviet Union is dominant within the Soviet grouping, its pattern might very well take on more of the characteristics of the developed groups than is the case with the Commonwealth. It will be seen that in many cases this is essentially so and, therefore, the correlation of economic development with the attitude patterns in question are somewhat lower than would be the case had the Soviet group had a higher per capita G.N.P.

teration will be discussed in the main body of the dissertation.

In response to a mailed appeal, 42 delegates returned questionnaires and, therefore, all of the answers in connection with these questionnaires are, of course, in the delegate's own handwriting. Nineteen questionnaires were filled out by myself during interviews with those delegates who preferred not to fill out a questionnaire except in my presence. These questionnaires, of course, are in my handwriting. It can be assumed, however, that the answers are exactly those that would have been given by the delegate had he filled it out in his own handwriting because the interview consisted, in the main, of reading the questionnaire to the delegate and then simply checking the appropriate answer space provided. The exceptions to this lie in those cases where delegates gave additional information above and beyond that required by the questionnaire and which I recorded in marginal spaces on the questionnaire. This latter information, however, has not formed a basis for anything more than additional footnote information because of its essentially non-comparable nature. The delegates were promised continually throughout the data-collection process that no single delegate's responses or a single country's response pattern would ever appear in print. That is, it was promised that the analysis of all response patterns would proceed on the caucusing group level. The purpose of this promise was, of course, to elicit a freer response pattern on the part of the delegate than might have been the case if his response patterns could be known.

It was the original intention to collect data from all of the delegates in the United Nations, above the rank of Attache, who have participated in caucusing group activity. It soon became apparent, because of a low rate of return, that this was highly unrealistic. After the first three weeks of data collection, therefore, the major focus of attention became that of obtaining at least one response from each national delegation involved in caucusing group activity. The responding delegates were then asked to test their own degree of representativeness. (In view of the extreme difficulty in obtaining more than one response from any national delegation.) All of the delegates who returned the estimate (47 returned them) maintained that it was either probable or highly probable that had their colleagues filled out the questionnaire their response patterns would have been the same as their own. Thus the representative nature of a delegate's response depends upon the validity of his own assessment of his representativeness rather than on any sort of statistical device based upon random sample.¹ Even without this positive answer

¹It is apparent that each questionnaire will have a different degree of minimum representativeness, that is, representativeness not based on opinion, depending upon the number of delegates within the delegation. Because the delegation sizes vary greatly, it is apparent that the claim to representativeness must be viewed with greater caution as one moves towards the larger delegations. Thus, when a delegate is a member of a delegation of only two members and he asserts that he is representative of the entire delegation, we know for certain that he is representative of at least half of the delegation and we will not have to accept on authority that he is actually representative of the remaining half of the delegation. In the case of a large delegation such as the Russian, however, an assertion of representativeness means that we know for certain only a very

on the part of the delegates as to their representativeness, however, it would be reasonable to assume that the patterns are representative in that most national delegations, of course, utilize a rather extensive screening process which results in personnel with rather similar outlooks.

Methodology

To facilitate the hypothesis testing component of the dissertation, the concepts of economic development, answer variables, answer group variable, ideal variable, and the analytical tool of correlation are used. Each, along with the expectations¹ connected with it will

small fraction of the total delegation's opinion. Because the majority of the delegates which comprise the blocs are imputed to be similar to a minority of the delegates who actually answered the questionnaire, it is apparent that the comparisons which emerge in this dissertation must be interpreted with extreme caution. It should be clear that the exact degree of like-mindedness can only be asserted, not proven, because of the general resistance among delegations to have more than one member of the delegation answer the questionnaire. It should be noted, however, that all of the delegates who were asked casually during the personal interviews in New York, about this problem, asserted that they felt that a single response from each delegation could lead to meaningful comparisons. See Gary Best's unpublished doctoral dissertation, Diplomacy in the United Nations (Northwestern University, 1960) as an example of using one delegate from each delegation to make comparisons.

¹The device of "expectations" is intended to facilitate an explanation of why associations between economic development and attitude patterns exist. They may be considered on a par with "hunches" or "guesses." It follows that a failure for economic development to correlate with answer patterns in the manner expected doesn't necessarily undercut the general hypothesis (that there is an association between economic development and the answer patterns). That is, it is entirely possible that economic development may be related to an answer pattern in a manner opposite to that which is expected. In

be discussed in turn.

Economic Development

The economic development of the groups in question is estimated by the formula $E = G/N$;¹ where E equals economic development, G equals the sum of per capita gross national product of the countries in a group, and N equals the number of countries within the group. The economic development for a group may be considered a rough indication of the average ability of the members within the group to act independently in respect to the United Nations. It is assumed that group members with low economic development, in a sense, "need" the organization more, because of their low capabilities, than group members with high economic development. Also, it is assumed that the highly developed members are in a better position to go directly contrary to the expressed will of the United Nations, because of their usually higher capabilities—military, economic and psychological, compared to the capabilities possessed by the underdeveloped groups.

such cases, the hypothesis will be said to be confirmed and an attempt will be made to explain why expectations were not fulfilled.

¹This formula determines simply average per capita G.N.P. of a group. Other variables are obviously involved in "economic development," as it is commonly understood, but the impossibility of ascertaining with any degree of accuracy these other variables for many of the groups led me to accept this single gauge to base ranking upon. The score of a group, therefore, must be considered a "rough gauge." J. P. Hayes of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was kind enough to supply the figures upon which the calculations were based.

This ability to act independently is assumed to have profound ramifications for attitudes of the groups toward the organization.

Answer Variables and Expectations

The term "answer variables" refers to percentages in provided answer categories obtained by the groups in answering a particular question. For example, if the Latin American group were to respond to a hypothetical question as follows: Highly satisfied 25%, Fairly satisfied 50%, Somewhat dissatisfied 10%, Highly dissatisfied 15%—then each of the percentages would be considered an answer variable. All the questions and provided answers are organized under the chapter headings of: organ perception, organ satisfaction, organ prediction, organizational perceptions, strengthening orientation, and supranational orientation.

Organ perception refers to how the caucusing groups view the major organs of the United Nations—the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat.¹ This examination occurs in Chapter III which is subdivided into: (1) perceptions concerning the relative contribution of the organs to preserving the peace, (2) perceptions concerning important shifts which are occurring between the organs, and (3)

¹Although the International Court of Justice is commonly thought of as a major organ of the United Nations, it was not included in this study because of the limited experience with the Court by the average delegate and because of space limitations in respect to the questionnaire.

perceptions concerning the relative strength balance of the organs.

In respect to the first set of perceptions, it is expected that there will be a tendency for the groupings to stress the importance of the organs with which they are most closely identified. For example, the developed groups should tend to place the Security Council first as a peace preserver while the underdeveloped groups should tend to place the General Assembly first.

In respect to the second set of perceptions, it is expected that the underdeveloped groups will be more ready to see all organs as increasing in importance to a greater extent than the developed groups except the one they are least identified with—the Security Council. This perception is predicted because it is assumed that the underdeveloped groups perceive the organization basically as something that can be used against the developed. That is, they should be more ready to see shifts towards greater importance for organs other than the Security Council.

In respect to the third set of perceptions, it is expected that the underdeveloped groups will have a greater tendency than the developed ones to perceive the organs as being weaker than they should be. Once again, the exception to this may be the Security Council. The reasoning here is the same as guided the expectations in respect to the second set of perceptions. That is, the underdeveloped groups may be more ready to perceive something that is to them basically a "friend", weaker than it should be than something which may be, as it is, perhaps, to the developed groups an "enemy."

Organ satisfaction, which is examined in Chapter IV, refers to the satisfaction of the caucusing groups with the major organs of the United Nations in respect to: (1) general performance; (2) membership; and (3) voting systems.

It is expected that there will be a greater tendency for the underdeveloped groups to express satisfaction with the general performance of the organs of the United Nations, with the exception of the Security Council, than the developed groups. That is, because the General Assembly exercises a supervisory function in respect to the Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, and Secretariat, it is expected that there will be a spillover to them from the assumed greater satisfaction with the General Assembly by the underdeveloped groups. And, because it is assumed that the Security Council is more or less identified with the developed groups, it is expected that the underdeveloped countries will be least satisfied with its performance.

In respect to membership arrangements, the expectations are again contingent upon the organ in consideration. Because of the large power dominance in the Security Council, it is expected that the underdeveloped nations will be less satisfied than the developed ones in respect to this organ. However, in respect to the membership arrangements for the General Assembly, in view of the fact that the logjam preventing admission of new states has been overcome and practically any new state may gain admittance, it is expected that there may be a higher expressed satisfaction level here on the part

of the underdeveloped than the developed. The expectations in respect to the other organs are not as clear and will be discussed under hypothesis testing.

In respect to voting systems, because they universally, with the exception of the Security Council, favor smaller states in a sense of not basing voting power upon a weighted system, it is expected that the delegates from the underdeveloped nations will express more satisfaction with them than will those from the developed ones. In the case of the Security Council, the veto system is expected to be more satisfactory to the developed than the underdeveloped groups.

Organ prediction, examined in Chapter V, refers to predictions by the caucusing groups about the major organs in respect to (1) future relative importance; (2) changes in membership arrangements; and (3) changes in voting systems.

Because of the supposed greater commitment to the organization of the underdeveloped nations, it is expected that they will predict greater future importance for all organs, except the Security Council, more frequently than will the developed ones. The presumed identification of the Security Council with the developed countries, on the other hand, is expected to produce a positive correlation of scores in respect to future importance for this organ and economic development.

Because changes in the organization have thus far tended to diminish the influence of the developed groups, and future changes will probably have similar effects, it is expected that the under-

developed countries will be more prone to predict changes in membership arrangements than the developed. That is, they will generally have a greater tendency to see change as something desirable compared to the developed and this will spill over in the case of membership arrangements.

The same reasoning holds for voting systems. It is expected that predictions that changes are probable in the voting systems will be associated with low economic development.

Organizational perception, which is examined in Chapter VI, refers to the potency the caucusing groups attribute to the UN as a whole in respect to: (1) its past contribution to peace; (2) its ability to preserve the peace without fundamental change; (3) its use in war; and (4) its present effectiveness in great power rivalry.

Because it is felt that the underdeveloped groups tend to perceive the organization as being highly relevant to the question of peace, it is probable that they will have a greater tendency to consider past contributions of the UN to peace to be more significant than will the developed groups.

As it is felt that the underdeveloped groups have a greater tendency to perceive the feasibility and possibility of change in the organization and tend to see it as a device for the control of the actions of the members of the more developed groups, it is expected that the underdeveloped groups will perceive the necessity of change, in order to preserve the peace, to a greater extent than will the developed groups.

If the underdeveloped groups have a greater commitment to the organization, tend to rely on it more than do the developed countries, and perhaps conceive it as having a mediating function in respect to power struggles, it is expected that they will consider the United Nations to have more use in war than will the developed groups. That is, in spite of the fact that it is expected that the underdeveloped groups will perceive a greater need to change the organization to preserve the peace, if war should come, it is felt that they will regard it as a more viable instrument than the developed groups.

Finally, it is expected that the underdeveloped groups will tend to perceive any ineffectiveness in the organization as primarily due to big power rivalry and, therefore, have a greater tendency to see higher effectiveness in the absence of that rivalry than will the developed groups.

Strengthening orientation, examined in Chapter VII, refers to the willingness of the caucusing groups to strengthen the United Nations in respect to: (1) a permanent police force; (2) governmental powers; and (3) arms control.

It is expected, because it is assumed that the underdeveloped countries tend to perceive the organization as a device to further their interests in relationship to the more developed and capable groups, that they will have a greater tendency to want to strengthen the organization than will the developed in such things as creating a permanent police force, giving it governmental-like powers and allowing it to control arms. However, it is also expected that the

idea of a permanent police force will find greatest favor with the underdeveloped countries if it is controlled by the General Assembly or by a changed Security Council. That is, the developed groups will probably favor a permanent police force for the Security Council as it is presently constituted and with its present voting procedures to a greater extent than will the underdeveloped groups.

Supranational orientation, examined in Chapter VIII, refers to attitudes of the caucusing groups towards the questions of: (1) area representation for the Secretariat; (2) the Secretary General's neutrality; (3) contradictions between the United Nations and national interest; and (4) the possibility of the United Nations becoming a world government.

Because movements in the direction of supranationalism could perhaps reduce the threat of the economic developed groups in respect to the underdeveloped groups, it is expected that the underdeveloped groups will have a stronger supranational orientation than will the developed. Specifically, it is expected that they will be less in favor of area representation for the Secretariat, more ready to perceive the Secretary General as being neutral, more ready to perceive contradictions between the United Nations and national interest, and more ready to perceive the possibility of the United Nations becoming a world government than will the developed groups.

Answer Group Variables and Expectations

The term "answer group variables" refers to scores obtained by the caucusing groups in respect to spread, convergence, scatter 4, scatter 2, distance + and distance -. Each is explained below.

Spread¹ refers to the number of categories that a caucusing group uses in answering a group of questions. Normally, most questions have four categorical answers. If a group were to use up all four categories for a group of, say, five questions and if one point were given to the group for each category it used, it is evident that the group would achieve a spread score of 20 and could be ranked with other groups. For example, if the Commonwealth group obtained a score of 19 and the Soviet group obtained a score of 12, the Commonwealth group would be said to be more spread in its answer pattern than the Soviet group.

It is expected that the underdeveloped groups will be more spread than will the developed. The reasons for this lie, it is assumed, in the fact that the underdeveloped groups frequently draw upon more diverse cultural and geographic areas than do the developed.

Convergence² refers to the tendency of a caucusing group to

¹The concept of spread is my own, and its uses, as well as its limitations, will become apparent in the development of the dissertation.

²The concept of convergence was also "invented" for this dissertation. It provides, in addition to the above-mentioned function, a basis for selecting categories to be correlated during the hypothesis testing phase of the dissertation.

agree with the general pattern (all groups together) over a group of questions using preponderant weight analysis (identification of the largest percentage in an answer pattern for both the group and the general pattern and comparing them). That is, if the largest percentage in the general pattern were to occur in the category of highly satisfied and the highest percentage in the answer pattern for the caucusing group were to occur in the category of highly satisfied, then the caucusing group would be said to be in agreement with the general pattern in respect to preponderant weight analysis. On the other hand, if the highest percentage of answers for a caucusing group were to occur in the highly satisfied category and the highest percentage of answers in the general pattern were to occur in the highly dissatisfied category, then the group would be said to be in disagreement with the general pattern. The groups are ranked, with a high score meaning greater convergence, by adding algebraically a +1 for agreement, a -1 for disagreement, and a zero where two categories tie over a number of questions.¹

It is expected that the underdeveloped groups will receive higher convergence scores on the average than will developed groups.

¹For example, consider the following pattern:

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
General pattern	75%	25%
Soviet	50%	50%
Latin American	25%	75%
Arab	60%	40%

In this case the Soviet would receive a 0 because it tied, the Latin American a -1 because it disagreed, and the Arab a +1 because it agreed.

That is, it is expected that the assumed alienation of the developed groups will be expressed in answer patterns which find their preponderant weight at odds with the general delegate pattern more frequently than will the underdeveloped groups.

Scatter 4 refers to a calculation of a caucusing group's average standard deviation over a group of questions. This is found for a single question by the formula: $C_j = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (X_{ij} - \bar{X}_j)^2}$ ¹ where C_j = scatter index for j^{th} question; X_{ij} = answer of i^{th} delegate to j^{th} question; \bar{X}_j = mean answer for j^{th} question; N = total number of delegates of a group.² The final scatter 4 score is determined by

¹This formula is the formula used in statistics to ascertain the standard deviation of a group of scores. The actual calculation was done with a 650 computer using the Oklahoma State University Cor IV deck.

²For example, consider the following score of a hypothetical caucusing group:

Answers	1	2	3	4
	Highly Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Highly Dissatisfied

Delegates	2	2	2	
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$$\bar{X}_j = 12/6 = 2$$

$$\begin{aligned} C_j &= \sqrt{\frac{1}{6} [(1-2)^2 + (1-2)^2 + (2-2)^2 + (3-2)^2 + (3-2)^2]} \\ &= \sqrt{\frac{1}{6} [1 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 1]} \\ &= \sqrt{\frac{1}{6} (4)} \\ &= \sqrt{\frac{2}{3}} \\ &= .81 \end{aligned}$$

It should be noted that the categories of "other and no answer" are not computed in the scatter formulas.

adding the standard deviation over a group of questions and dividing by the number of questions.

It is expected that the highly developed groups will tend to be less scattered (more cohesive) than will the underdeveloped groups. That is, it is predicted that the underdeveloped groups will not only have a tendency to spread out and use more categories than the developed groups, but will also have the answer pattern distributed more evenly throughout these categories. The reasons for this are basically the same as given for the expectation of greater spread for the underdeveloped groups.

Scatter 2 refers to an estimate of the average standard deviation of a caucusing group over a number of questions collapsing both sides of dichotomous answer patterns.¹ The reasons for both measures, scatter 4 and scatter 2, lies in the fact that one of the measures may tend to differentiate between groups, whereas the other does not. That is, the groups may be significantly distinct from one another when all four categories of a question are considered, in terms of scatter, but not significantly differentiated when categories are collapsed.

It is expected, following the same reasoning that was presented

¹This would mean patterns such as highly satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, highly dissatisfied (collapsing to satisfied, dissatisfied) but not patterns such as stronger, weaker, as strong, etc.

in scatter 4, that the underdeveloped groups will be more scattered than will the developed groups.

Distance + refers to an estimate of average answer pattern dissimilarity between a caucusing group and all other groups, including itself, over a group of logically related questions. Answer pattern dissimilarity is found for a single question by the formula:¹

$$(D+) j = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (\chi_{ij} - \chi_{ijk})^2}$$

where (D+) j = the distance of a group from the sum of all groups on the jth question; χ_{ij} = the ith answer of all groups to jth question, and χ_{ijk} = ith answer of kth caucusing group to jth question. The final distance + score is determined by adding the answer pattern dissimilarity scores over a group of questions and dividing by the number of questions.²

¹See Lee J. Cronbach and Goldine C. Gleser's article, "Assessing Similarity Between Profiles," in The Psychological Bulletin, L, no.6 (1953) for a justification of the use of this formula. The formula was incorporated into a program, with the aid of the Oklahoma State University Computing Center, and all calculations were made on a 650 computer. The accuracy and validity of the resulting scores were checked by Walter Cox of the staff of the Oklahoma State University Computing Center.

²For example, consider the following pattern:

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
All groups	25%	75%
Soviet group	<u>23%</u>	<u>77%</u>
subtract	+2	-2
square	4	4
sum	4	4 = 8
square root	8 = 2.8	= D+ for single question

It should be noted that the above example only uses two categories for simplification. The actual distance scores are based on all categories except "other and no answer."

After scores are assigned on the basis of this formula, a large score may be interpreted to mean that the pattern in question is more dissimilar, compared to the answer pattern of all the groups together, than a group having a smaller score.

It is expected that the developed groups, because of their presumed alienation from the organization relative to the underdeveloped groups, will tend to be throughout the dissertation more "dissimilar," or possess higher distance scores over sets of questions than will the underdeveloped groups. In other words, the underdeveloped groups should have distance scores which are low and fairly close together and the developed groups should have distance scores which are high and fairly close together.

Distance (-) refers to an estimate of the average answer pattern dissimilarity between a caucusing group and all other groups, excluding itself, over a group of logically related questions. The same formula, naturally, is applied as in distance (+).

The reasons for both measures, distance (+) and distance (-), lies in the fact that some groups, such as the Afro-Asian, make up a very large part of the answer pattern of "all groups together," used in distance (+) and this might tend to "favor" them in the sense of producing a lower distance score. One measure, therefore, may differentiate between groups while the other may not.

It is expected, however, that the underdeveloped groups will uniformly have lower distance scores than developed groups. That is, even when they are extracted from the general group pattern,

they will be more like the remaining groups, on the average, than will the developed groups.

Ideal Variables and Expectations

"Ideal variable" refers to scores received by the caucusing groups when they are compared to a non-existent ideal type imputed to have certain characteristics. Three different conceptions of ideal type are used in the dissertation: ideal type C, ideal type 50, and ideal type dis.

Ideal type C refers to a model caucusing group with twelve characteristics that the real caucusing groups are calculated to approximate. The examination of this problem will constitute the contents of Chapter II. It is expected that the underdeveloped groups will come closer to the ideal type than will the developed groups. This is because the ideal type is essentially defined in terms of activity and perceptions that are considered "supranational." It is assumed that the underdeveloped are more motivated than are the developed groups because of their low capabilities to effectively utilize the United Nations and that this attempt results in more supranational-like endeavors and perceptions than which occur in the developed groups.

Ideal type 50 refers to a model caucusing group which gives ideal answers over a group of questions which the real caucusing groups may approximate in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII. The numeral 50 refers to the fact that a real caucusing group is placed "inside"

of the ideal type and ranked on the basis of a scoring system when 50 percent or more of its members achieve the ideal answer. The groups are ranked by being assigned a one (1) every time they are placed "inside" the ideal type. These are added up over a group of questions to give the groups a final score.

It is expected that the underdeveloped groups will achieve higher scores than will the developed groups in respect to ideal type 50 because of the assumed tendency of the underdeveloped groups to see the United Nations as more potent, to wish to strengthen it, and to perceive it in more supranational terms than the developed groups.

Ideal type dis refers to the same model caucusing group discussed above in connection with ideal type 50. The difference is that the caucusing groups are ordered in respect to their "distance" from the ideal answer pattern by the use of the formula suggested above under distance \dagger rather than achieving a numerical rating because 50 percent or more of their members give the ideal answer as under ideal type 50. The reason for both measures, ideal type dis and ideal type 50, lies in the fact that one tool may provide a differentiation between the groups while the other may not. That is, it is entirely possible that the underdeveloped groups might achieve the 50 percent cut-off point more frequently than the developed groups, but that their distance from the ideal answer pattern is not significantly different from that of the developed groups.

It is expected, for the reasons referred to in respect to ideal

type 50, that the underdeveloped groups will tend to be less distant from the ideal answer pattern than the developed groups.

Correlation

The degree of correlation between economic development and the other variables is determined in all cases by the formula: $r = \frac{\sum xy}{\sqrt{\sum x^2 \cdot \sum y^2}}$ where r = correlation coefficient and x and y stand for deviations from the means M_x and M_y respectively, or the Product Moment Method. A correlation coefficient derived from the formula simply answers the question of whether two sets of scores (economic and some other) tend to vary together. The actual computations were done by a 650 computer using a Cor IV deck at the Oklahoma State University Computing Center.

It should be noted that categories are collapsed in essentially dichotomous questions before using the formula. The reasons for this should become apparent under hypothesis testing.

Because correlations may have little significance unless sufficient range is present, it is necessary to develop the concept of range. Range is simply the breadth of scores when all groups are considered. For example, if the lowest group received a score of 60 and the highest a score of 100, the range is said to be 40. If, on the other hand, all groups received the same score, it is said that there is no range. It is apparent, therefore, that if on one of the variables there is no range, then it is not possible for economic development to be associated with it. However, because economic development can be associated with a variable at a significant level

(.70) even when the range is exceedingly small, minimum range for each of the variables will be arbitrarily established to make sure that the groups are sufficiently differentiated. That is, even though a correlation may exceed what is normally referred to as a significant level (.70) nevertheless, a correlation will not be considered significant unless the range exceeds a certain amount. For all answer variables 40 is established as the minimum range to assert that a correlation is significant. In the case of answer group and ideal variables all, except distance, must obtain a range of at least one less than their average throughout the dissertation. The minimum range for distance is established at one-half its average range throughout the dissertation. The cut-off point in all cases is established on a basis of what seems reasonable in the sense that the groups are considered reasonably differentiated when the minimum range exists.

Because it is one of the major purposes of the dissertation to establish whether correlations above the .70 level exist between economic development and various variables, when sufficient range is present, it should be made clear that sufficient range may exist at any level and still produce a significant correlation. That is, the groups may have ranges, on different variables, of 0 to 40, 20-60, 40-80, etc. and, in every case, correlations, at the same level, of economic development with the variables will be assumed to have the same significance. For example, a correlation of .80 is just as significant with a variable which has a range of 0 to 40 as one with

a range of 40-80. It follows that there can be a considerable number of "other and no answer" responses on a number of questions and yet "significant" correlations can be produced on these questions. It is assumed, in these instances, none of the "other and no answer" responses are distributed and none would be distributed (even if the "no answer" respondents answered)¹ in whatever category (Highly satisfied, etc.) is selected out by preponderate weight analysis for correlation.

Chapter Procedure

Except for the first chapter and the conclusion, a standardized procedure will be utilized in each.

First, the caucusing group answer patterns, by the use of tables, will be compared with the general pattern (all delegates together) under a logical division of the chapter.² This is done: (1) to provide descriptive information concerning the patterns in question, (2) to provide a basis for the computation of the ideal and answer group variables, and (3) to provide the criterion for determining which side of dichotomous questions will be correlated with economic development. The tables themselves may be regarded as a presentation

¹They may be, however, in some other category not supplied in the provided answers of the questionnaire.

²Chapters VI, VII, and VIII do not have logical divisions of the type of the earlier chapters but the procedures followed are identical with the earlier chapters except for these divisions, and this explains their inclusion in the general description here.

of the answer variables.

Next, a summation of the comparisons of the groups to the general pattern will be presented. This is done in order to present the highlights of the descriptive components of the dissertation.

After this summation, hypothesis testing in respect to answer variables and then in respect to answer group variables and ideal variables¹ will be examined. In both cases, a table showing the expected correlations and a table showing the actual correlations will be presented to facilitate the analysis. The same procedure, that is, first description, then summation, and then hypothesis testing, will be utilized for each logical division in each chapter. Finally, under Conclusions the ramifications² of the established associations will be discussed.

The final chapter will include a correlation of economic development with the summation of all answer, answer group and ideal scores. Generalizations based upon this testing of the hypothesis, as well as the tests found in the preceding chapters, will form a

¹A table showing the results of the calculations connected with "answer group variables" and "ideal variables" will be presented without comment during hypothesis testing. That is, there is no need to describe the charts, in this instance, because, unlike answer variables, they do not provide the basis for calculations other than those connected with correlation.

²It should be clear that the only relationship that is assumed to be scientifically tested is that between economic development and the various "variables" connected with the dissertation. That is, any reasoning or deductions based upon this relationship is pure conjecture, which could be tested, but is not tested as such in this dissertation.

basis upon which final deductions and conclusions will be based. Also, an attempt will be made in this final chapter to move somewhat from the boundaries of the rigid methodology pursued in this study to the area of "feelings and impressions." These observations will be based, in part, on the marginal notes supplied by the delegates in answering the questionnaire as well as personal contacts and experiences which occurred during the interview phase of data collection.

CHAPTER II

THE CAUCUSING GROUPS

A United Nations caucusing group is defined as an organization of member states which meet with some degree of regularity for the purposes of discussing questions and issues connected with the United Nations in order to facilitate some degree of consensus.¹

The groups which meet this definition (as of March 1962) are the African, Afro-Asian, Arab, Benelux, Commonwealth, Latin American, Scandinavian, Soviet, and Western European caucusing groups.²

The African group consists of Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia,

¹This definition is similar to the one given by Thomas Hovet, Jr., but is different in that Hovet does not emphasize the concept of consensus. That is, he argues that the term caucusing group "may be applied to any group of member states in the assembly which has some degree of formal organization, holds fairly regular meetings and is concerned with substantive issues and related procedural matters before the sessions of the General Assembly." Hovet, p. 31. The question of including consensus as part of the definition of caucusing group arose in connection with interviews of delegates at the United Nations. In other words, the delegates, with whom I discussed Hovet's definition, argued that the purpose of the caucusing group activity, that is, consensus, should be included in the definition. The only exception to this is, perhaps, the Commonwealth group.

²See Chapter II in Hovet for a description of other groups (such as NATO, etc.) to which member states belong. It should be noted that the following countries do not participate in caucusing group activity: Finland, Yugoslavia, China, Austria, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Israel, and the United States. Hovet, p. 32. Also, since Hovet's book was published both Albania and Cuba have ceased to caucus with their respective groups.

³The underlined countries are the ones whose national delegations participated in this study.

Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Leopoldville, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta. (Seventeen respondents, twenty-six member states.)

The Afro-Asian group consists of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Malaya, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Leopoldville, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Upper Volta. (Thirty-four respondents, forty-seven member states.)

The Arab group consists of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen. (Ten respondents, ten member states.)

The Benelux group consists of Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. (No respondents, 3 member states.)

The Commonwealth group consists of Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Malaya, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and the United Kingdom. (Seven respondents, twelve member states.)

The Latin American group consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salva-

dor, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. (Fourteen respondents, nineteen member states.)

The Scandinavian group consists of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. (Four respondents, four member states.)

The Soviet group consists of Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.¹ (Five respondents, eight member states.)

The Western European group consists of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. (Seven respondents, ten member states.)

From the above listing it is apparent that many nations belong to more than one caucusing group. Where this is the case the respondent is assumed to represent the national delegation in all the caucusing groups of which he is a member. Thus, it is possible for a single questionnaire to be used in the analysis of up to three blocs. This was considered legitimate in that the questions were not formulated in such a way that a differing response could be ex-

¹Although Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic are considered separate national delegations to the United Nations and, therefore, are considered separate members of the Soviet group, in fact, because Byelorussia and Ukraine are republics within the U.S.S.R., these delegations may be considered part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's delegation. Therefore, in a real sense, all but one of the national delegations of the Soviet group are represented in this study.

pected depending upon whether the respondent considered himself an Arab or an African, etc.¹

Also, it should be noted that in several caucusing groups a number of national delegations (those not underlined) did not take part in the survey. In the main, with the exception of the Benelux and certain members of the Commonwealth group, these missing members are very new members of the United Nations who felt incapable, at the time, of completing the questionnaire. Thus, the conclusions, generalizations, and predictions made in this dissertation obviously have relevance only to those national delegations which actually participated in the study.

An Ideal Caucusing Group

The construction here of an ideal caucusing group, which may be viewed as a kind of supranational party prototype,² is solely for the purpose of ordering and making intelligible the data collected concerning caucusing group activity in connection with this dissertation. No claim is made that the elements included in this ideal type necessarily exhaust all the elements relevant to caucusing group

¹The exception to this statement lies with those questions which are concerned with the caucusing group activity itself. In these cases, the delegates with multiple membership were asked to provide information only about the caucusing group specified in an introductory letter.

²The criteria for the ideal caucusing group were selected in such a way so that it was assumed that an actual caucusing group possessing these characteristics would be engaging in more supranational type activities than a group that did not possess these characteristics.

activity nor is there any claim that it would have any particular general use outside of this dissertation.

With these limitations in mind, an ideal caucusing group may be defined as one which meets frequently, has fairly long meetings, has formal meetings, has voting at least "sometimes," has an agenda, and discusses at least several important issues. Further, 50 percent¹ or more of its members attend meetings and feel that: the meetings have either some or a considerable impact upon their national governments' instructions to them, the decisions which emerge from the meetings should be binding upon the member delegates, it is probable that the caucusing group meetings will have more impact on home government policy in the future, it is probable that the group will vote more as a unit in the future, and it is probable that the caucusing groups have helped the United Nations in its charter functions.

The ranking of the actual groups is done by placing a group "inside" the ideal type when its members, or required number of

¹50 per cent will be used as a cut-off point at a number of places in the dissertation and will be said to constitute a "majority" where there is not a 50-50 tie between categories. That is, in a distribution of 50 per cent yes, 25 per cent no, and 25 per cent doubtful a group is said to have a majority in the yes category. This is done because small groups would have to obtain such large percentages to obtain "actual" majorities in such instances. For example, the Scandinavian group would have to achieve 75 per cent in the yes category. In that on a number of questions large groups do not go very far beyond the 50 per cent mark, this device overcomes this "prejudice" towards the smaller groups.

members, where percentages are involved, choose the ideal answers (denoted by underlining) to the following questions: (1) How often does your caucusing group meet? Daily, Three or four times a week, Weekly, Bi-monthly, Monthly, Other; (2) How long are your caucusing group meetings? Less than one hour, One hour to two hours, More than two hours; (3) How formal are your caucusing group meetings? Highly formal, Fairly formal, Somewhat informal, Highly informal; (4) How often are votes taken in your caucusing sessions? Often, Sometimes, Infrequently, Never; (5) How is the agenda for the caucusing session arrived at? Committee, Other (Specify) (Any answer denoting this existence of an agenda placed the group "inside" the ideal type here); (6) What is the range of issues discussed at the normal caucusing session? General spectrum of U.N. issues, Several important issues, A few issues, A single issue; (7) Do all or most members regularly attend your caucusing sessions? Yes, No; (8) To what extent do you feel your caucusing group meetings have impact upon your national government's instruction to you? Considerable, Some, Hardly any, None; (9) Do you think it would be desirable to eventually have the decisions which emerge from the caucusing group meeting to be binding upon the member delegates? Highly desirable, Desirable, Undesirable, Highly undesirable; (10) In respect to home government policy, do you feel that the caucusing group is likely to have more impact in the future? Highly probable, Probable, Improbable, Highly improbable; (11) Do you feel it is likely your caucusing group will tend to vote more as a unit in the future? Highly probable, Probable,

Improbable, Highly improbable; (12) Do you feel that the formation of caucusing groups have generally helped the United Nations in terms of its charter functions? Highly probable, Probable, Improbable, Highly improbable.

Frequency of Meetings¹

The Arab, African, and Afro-Asian caucusing groups meet the requirements specified in the ideal type in respect to frequency of meetings. Although the delegates describe the groups as usually meeting "when necessary" or "as need arises," sometimes the meetings may go as high as three to four times a week, a frequency not mentioned by any of the other groups.

The Latin American and Scandinavian caucusing groups still meet the requirements specified in the ideal type but their highest described frequency seems to be weekly. At other times they are described as meeting "infrequently" or "occasionally."

The European, Soviet, and Commonwealth seem to fall outside of the specification referred to in the ideal type; their meetings are generally described as "irregular," "variable," or "infrequent."

Length of Meetings

In respect to length of meetings, all of the caucusing groups

¹Most delegates in all blocs when asked concerning the frequency of their caucusing group's meetings replied "when the need arises" or "when necessary." Thus the ordering which will follow is based upon those delegates within each bloc who were kind enough to elucidate more completely on this particular question.

except perhaps the Soviet, seem to meet the requirement put forth in the ideal type. That is, the delegates in all but the Soviet described their meetings as lasting up to and sometimes exceeding two hours. In the Soviet group four of the members described the meetings as lasting less than one hour while one described them as lasting from one-half to more than two hours.

Formality of Meetings

None of the caucusing groups meet the ideal type where their members describe their meetings as either fairly or highly formal. The African, Latin American, and Arab groups come closest in this respect with their members evenly split between describing their group meetings as fairly formal or somewhat informal.

The Afro-Asian group seems to rank next to the three above-mentioned groups in that a majority of its members described its meetings as somewhat informal although a sizeable minority of the members described them as highly informal.

The European, Soviet, Scandinavian, and Commonwealth groups are clearly outside of the ideal caucusing group with a majority of the members in each case describing the meetings as highly informal.

Voting

None of the caucusing groups meet the criterion specified in the ideal type in which voting is described as occurring at least "sometimes." The Latin American, Afro-Asian, and Arab groups come closest to the ideal type in that voting apparently occurs "infre-

quently." The African, European, Soviet, Scandinavian, and Commonwealth groups fall outside the ideal type in that their members maintain voting never occurs in their sessions.

Agenda

All of the groups meet the requirements of the ideal type except the Soviet, Scandinavian, and Commonwealth. For the groups having an agenda, there does not seem to be any standard way of arriving at it. In the case of the African and Afro-Asian groups, it is left to an agenda committee or is suggested by the delegation which requests the meeting. In the case of the European group, the co-chairman of the meetings draws it up. In the Latin American group the members who ask for the meeting also propose the agenda. The Arab group leaves it up to a rotating monthly chairmanship.

Range of Issues

In respect to the range of issues, the Latin American, Afro-Asian, and Arab groups meet the criterion put forth in the ideal type. In all of the other caucusing groups, "a few issues" seem to be the normal order of business although occasionally "several important issues" apparently are discussed in both the African and the Soviet groups.

Attendance

All of the caucusing groups are described as having full attendance and, therefore, meet the criterion put forth in the ideal type.

The only group in which there is apparently some degree of non-attendance is the African group which is explained by some delegates as being a result of a fissioning of African states into the "Brazzaville" and "Casablanca" groups.¹

Caucusing Group Activity Impact on National Government²

TABLE 1 - By percentages³

All Delegates				
Consid.	Some	Hardly Any	None	Other-No A. ⁴
18	48	7	11	16

¹That is, members of either the western oriented Brazzaville group or the Marxist oriented Casablanca group sometimes refuse to attend meetings because of the policy position taken by their opposite. Neither the Brazzaville nor the Casablanca groups may be considered caucusing groups in that both their meetings or activities are essentially extra-U.N.

²Here and throughout the remainder of the dissertation, chapter subheadings will serve the function of providing titles for tables. It is felt that this is both legitimate and necessary to avoid the excessive redundancy which would occur should highly similar table titles be placed immediately below chapter subheadings. It should also be noted that the practice of placing tables immediately below chapter subheadings, that is, without introduction, is practiced consistently, in this type of situation, throughout the dissertation and is done also for the purpose of avoiding redundancy. The general introduction at the beginning of each chapter, it is felt, makes it clear why the tables are where they are and what they refer to.

³The base for this table and all subsequent tables is as follows: All Delegates N = 61; African N = 17; Afro-Asian N = 34; Arab N = 10; Commonwealth N = 7; European N = 7; Latin American N = 14; Scandinavian N = 4; Soviet N = 5.

⁴The "Other-No A." column indicates a collapsing of the "other" and "no answer" categories.

TABLE 1--Continued

By Caucusing Groups

	Consid.	Some	Hardly Any	None	Other-No A.
African	12	35	6	12	35
Afro-As.	15	47	6	6	26
Arab	20	40	..	10	30
Comm.	..	29	14	14	43
Europe.	14	43	29	14	..
Lat.Am.	36	64
Scand.	25	25	50
Soviet	80	20

All of the groups, except the African, Soviet, and Commonwealth, have a sufficient number of delegates who feel the caucusing groups have either "some" or a "considerable" degree of impact on their national governments to be placed inside of the ideal type. Thus, 100 per cent (36 + 64) of the Latin American, 62 per cent (15 + 47) of the Afro-Asian, 60 per cent (20 + 40) of the Arab, 57 per cent (14 + 43) of the European, and 50 per cent (25 + 25) of the Scandinavian group answered in an affirmative fashion when asked if they felt that the caucusing group activity had impact on their national government's instructions to them. The African group comes very close to the ideal type with 47 per cent (12 + 35) of their delegates answering in the above indicated fashion, but both the Commonwealth and the Soviet group seem to be clearly outside of the ideal type. That is, only 29 percent of the Commonwealth group felt that the caucusing group activity had impact on their national government's instructions, whereas none of the Soviet group expressed this feeling. The divergency of the Commonwealth and Soviet groups is also apparent when compared to the United Nations as a whole where 66 per

cent (18 + 48) of the delegates answered affirmatively to the above-mentioned question. The considerable divergency of the Latin American group (100 per cent) in the opposite direction may also be noted. That is, all of the other groups within the ideal type classification hover between 50 and 62 per cent.

Binding Nature of Caucusing
Group Decisions

TABLE 2 - By Percentages

All Delegates					
	Highly Desirable	Desirable	Undesir.	Highly Undesir.	No A.
	2	21	51	7	19
By Caucusing Groups					
	Highly Desirable	Desirable	Undesir.	Highly Undesir.	No A.
African	..	35	35	..	30
Afro-As.	..	24	47	..	29
Arab	..	30	20	..	50
Comm.	100
Europe.	72	28	..
Lat.Am.	7	36	57
Scand.	50	50	..
Soviet	20	40	40

None of the caucusing groups meet the requirement of the ideal type in respect to this question. However, considerable differences do seem to exist within the groups in respect to the percentages of those who feel that it would be desirable to have caucusing group decisions to have a "binding character" as against those who feel it would not. Thus, 43 per cent (7 + 36) of the Latin American, 35 per cent of

the African, 30 per cent of the Arab, and 24 per cent of the Afro-Asian groups expressed a favorable response in respect to the idea of binding decisions. On the other hand, 100 per cent of the Commonwealth, European (72 + 28), and Scandinavian (50 + 50), and 60 per cent (20 + 40) of the Soviet group found the concept of "binding decisions" as "undesirable." In summary, although none of the groups meet the requirements specified in the ideal type, three groups, the African, Afro-Asian, and Arab, and one group in particular, the Latin American, seem far closer to this type than do the remainder.

More Caucusing Group Impact on
National Government in Future

TABLE 3 - By Percentages

	All Delegates		
	Probable	Improbable	Other-No A.
	26	31	43
	By Caucusing Groups		
	Probable	Improbable	Other-No A.
African	29	12	59
Afro-As.	29	24	47
Arab	20	20	60
Comm.	29	29	42
Europe.	14	57	29
Lat.Am.	36	21	43
Scand.	..	75	25
Soviet	..	80	20

Again, none of the caucusing groups come up to the percentage indicated in the ideal type. Again, however, differences do exist between the groups and their proximity to the ideal type. Thus, the

Latin American with 36 per cent, the Commonwealth, African, and Afro-Asian with 29 per cent, the Arab with 20 per cent, and the European with 14 per cent stand in contrast with the Scandinavian and Soviet groups in which none of the delegates argued it was probable that the caucusing groups would have "more impact" on national government policy in the future. It should be noted, however, that a high percentage and, in some cases, a very high percentage of delegates in each group refused to answer the question. (The lowest percentage of "no answer" was 20 per cent for the Soviet bloc and the highest percentage was 59 per cent for the African bloc.) If the groups are compared with the United Nations in general, then the Commonwealth, Afro-Asian, and Latin American percentages seem to come closest to this pattern, whereas the Scandinavian and Soviet groups seem to exhibit a fair degree of divergency.

Caucusing Group will Vote
More as a Unit in the Future

TABLE 4 - By Percentages

	All Delegates		
	Probable	Improbable	Other-No A.
	31	31	38
	By Caucusing Groups		
	Probable	Improbable	Other-No A.
African	47	18	35
Afro-As.	44	21	25
Arab	60	10	30
Comm.	14	57	29

TABLE 4--Continued

	Probable	Improbable	Other-No A.
Europe.	..	86	14
Lat.Am.	36	29	35
Scand.	..	75	25
Soviet	..	20	80

Only one caucusing group, the Arab with 60 per cent asserting that it is "probable," meets the requirements set forth in the ideal type. However, one group, the African, comes very close to the ideal and two groups, the Afro-Asian and Latin American come reasonably close. The Commonwealth is the only other group with a percentage in the probable category (14 per cent) and the remaining groups are without delegates who assert it is probable their group will vote more as a unit in the future. Two groups, the European (86 per cent) and the Scandinavian (75 per cent), are very close in respect to the percentages of delegates who assert that it is "improbable," while the Soviet group has 20 per cent in the "improbable" category and a very high percentage of other-no answer (80 per cent). When all of the groups are compared with the United Nations in general, the considerable degree of divergency of the European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups in one direction and the Arab group in the other direction should be noted.

Caucusing Groups Help the United Nations

TABLE 5 - By Percentages

All Delegates				
	Highly Prob.	Prob.	Improb.	Other-No A.
	2	59	15	24
By Caucusing Groups				
	Highly Prob.	Prob.	Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	65	6	29
Afro-As.	..	62	9	29
Arab	..	70	..	30
Comm.	..	57	14	29
Europe.	..	29	29	42
Lat.Am.	..	79	14	7
Scand.	..	25	50	25
Soviet	20	40	20	20

Six caucusing groups, the Latin American, Arab, African, Afro-Asian, Soviet, and Commonwealth meet the requirements set forth in the ideal type. When all the groups are compared to the United Nations in general, then a degree of divergency of the European and Scandinavian groups in one direction and the Latin American group in the other can be noted.

Ranking

If the caucusing groups are assigned a relative position within each criterion of the ideal type and each relative position is assigned a number, with one representing the closest approximation to the criterion and all other numbers representing degrees of deviation from this criterion, then the members may be summed up for all twelve criteria to indicate the relative standing of each caucusing group

in respect to the ideal type.¹ Using this scheme, a numerical value of twelve would represent the closest approximation to the ideal type² and all other numbers above twelve would represent deviations from the ideal type. When the numbers are summed up in the fashion indicated, the following pattern emerges:

TABLE 6
IDEAL TYPE RANKING

Caucusing Groups	Points
African	24
Afro-As.	23
Arab	19
Comm.	42
Europe.	44
Lat.Am.	17
Scand.	46
Soviet	44

The Latin American group is in first place with 17 points (only 5 points divergency from maximum closeness), the Arab group stands second with 19 points (7 points divergency), the Afro-Asian group stands

¹Although "50 per cent or more," where percentages are used, has been a convenient cut-off point to place a caucusing group "within" the ideal type in the above verbal analysis, the groups here will be ordered in respect to their approximation to 100 per cent where percentages are involved. Thus, if a group achieved 75 per cent, and this was the highest percentage in that criterion, it would receive a rank of "1." The next lowest percentage would achieve a rank of "2" and so on. Where percentages are not involved, the groups receive a rank number suggested by the verbal analysis. Thus, under "Formality of Meetings," the African, Latin American, and Arab groups receive "1," the Afro-Asian group "2" and so on.

²That is, a group which obtained a score of 12 would be closer to the ideal, compared to all of the other groups for all 12 criteria.

third with 23 points (11 points divergency), the African stands fourth with 24 points (12 points divergency), the Commonwealth stands fifth with 42 points (30 points divergency), the European and Soviet groups tie for sixth and seventh place with 44 points each (32 points divergency), and the Scandinavian group stands eighth with 46 points (34 points divergency).

Thus, we find the Latin American and Arab groups stand fairly close to the ideal type, the Afro-Asian and African groups somewhat further away, while the Commonwealth, European, Soviet, and Scandinavian all grouped together a considerable "distance" from the ideal type.

Hypothesis Testing

Before ideal type C can be related to economic development, it is apparent that the ranking of the caucusing groups based on the formula found in the Introduction, E equals G/N , must be computed for the groups.¹

¹The information used to compute the economic development of the groups in question are derived from the estimates of J. T. Hayes, connected with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and are subject to all of the limitations contained in Mr. Hayes' memorandum found in the Appendix. Mr. Hayes' estimates, in this case, were a God-send in that much to the surprise of this researcher, it is practically impossible to get gross national product figures of recent origin for the majority of the states of the world from ordinary resources.

The following table shows the results:

TABLE 7
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RANKING

Caucusing Groups	Average Per Capita GNP (U.S. \$)
African	91
Afro-As.	115
Arab	143
Comm.	408
Europe.	987
Lat.Am.	253
Scand.	1060
Soviet	528

The Scandinavian achieves first place with a score of 1060, the European second with a score of 987, the Soviet third with a score of 528¹, the Commonwealth fourth with a score of 408, the Latin American fifth with a score of 253, the Arab sixth with a score of 143, the Afro-Asian seventh with a score of 115, and the African eighth with a score of 91.

¹Unfortunately, the Soviet group's score in this respect is less than it might have been for a greater substantiation of the hypothesis of this dissertation. That is, the Soviet group's pattern is generally much more like that of Europe and Scandinavia than it is to the group to which it is closest in respect to economic development, the Commonwealth group. In other words, it is surmised that the correlations would have been higher had the economic development of the Soviet group been higher. Perhaps the frequent similarity between the Soviet group's pattern and that of Europe and Scandinavia may be explained by the fact that the major and dominant actor within the group, the U.S.S.R., enjoys the kind of high capability that the economic indices is supposed to roughly estimate. That is, the Soviet Union is in a much better position than many states which have about the same per capita gross national product not to "need" the organization in view of its outstanding military capabilities.

It will be remembered from the Introduction that it was expected that the underdeveloped groups should more closely approximate ideal type C (have lower scores) than the developed groups because of the presumed necessity for them to successfully manipulate the United Nations' environment to control the developed groups. Therefore, there should be a positive correlation between economic development scores and ideal type C scores. This proves to be the case at the .83 level. Therefore, the hypothesis can be considered confirmed in respect to ideal type C.

Conclusions

If it is assumed that the higher scores of the developed groups are related to their presumed greater capability, that is, they have less "need" for such activity because of their generally high capabilities, compared to the other groups, then it could be hypothesized that increases in the economic development of "underdeveloped" groups may reduce their supranational activities and attitudes. It is apparent that the concept of "cause and effect" is exceedingly ambiguous and hard to establish in such relationships and there actually may be no "causal relationship" between high economic development and "distance" from the ideal type. However, with these limitations in mind, it could be argued that the data in question tends to support the idea that rising economic capabilities generally may act as a force to inhibit supranational behavior as defined in ideal type C.

CHAPTER III

PERCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES

In order to determine whether "perceptual" differences exist between the caucusing groups, the delegates who took part in the survey were asked to: (1) rank the major organs of the United Nations in terms of their importance for preserving the peace (using a numbering system running from one to five with one for the most important, two for the second most important, etc.), (2) estimate present shifting importance of the organs, and (3) evaluate the strength of each organ relative to the other organs. The table which follows shows the results in respect to the first question concerning ranking.

Relative Importance of United Nations Organs for Preserving the Peace--All Delegates¹

TABLE 8 - By Percentages

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	S.C. & G.A. Equal in 1st Rank	Other-No.A.	Total
S.C.	39	36	..	5	2	5	13	100
G.A.	36	41	3	..	2	5	13	100
ECOSOC	3	3	26	31	7	..	30	100
TRUST.	8	16	39	..	37	100
SECT.	5	7	38	10	10	..	30	100

¹The category of Security Council and General Assembly equal is

When all of the delegates are considered, none of the organs received a clear majority in respect to being first in importance for preserving the peace. By plurality, reading down the columns, the Security Council wins first place (39 per cent), the General Assembly second place (41 per cent), the Secretariat third place (38 per cent), the Economic and Social Council fourth place (31 per cent), and the Trusteeship Council fifth place (39 per cent).

Several factors should be noted concerning the above ranking. First, we may note the extreme closeness of the assigned position of the Security Council and the General Assembly in respect to the first position. Thus, while the Security Council achieves first position, it just barely does so compared to the General Assembly, although none of the other organs seriously compete with it for this position. Secondly, the same thing can be said for the General Assembly in respect to the second position. Thus, while it achieves the highest percentage for second position, nosing out the Security Council by five percentage points, no other organ exhibits serious competition for this position. Thirdly, while the Secretariat "wins" third position, the Economic and Social Council also has a sizeable percentage in this category, although none of the other organs has a competing percentage. Fourthly, although the Economic and Social Council obtains a plurality in the fourth position, it is a low plurality (31

not a category that was part of the provided answers in the questionnaire and is included in the above chart for informational purposes.

per cent) and the Trusteeship Council and Secretariat also have points in this category (16 and 10 per cent respectively). Fifthly, none of the other organs seem to seriously compete with the plurality of the Trusteeship Council for fifth position.

Finally, it can be seen that none of the organs escape the fifth place classification and that there is an increasing percentage of "other and no answer" responses as one moves away from the ranking of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Security Council Ranking for
Preserving Peace by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 9 - By Percentages

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	S.C. & G.A. Equal in 1st Rank	Other-No.A.
African	35	41	..	6	6	..	12
Afro-As.	35	38	..	6	3	..	18
Arab	40	50	..	10
Comm.	57	14	29
Europe.	43	29	28	..
Lat.Am.	50	36	..	7	..	7	..
Scand.	25	50	25	..
Soviet	40	40	20

The first point evident in the above table is that the plurality (39 per cent) of the general pattern stands in contrast to the majorities¹ for some of the caucusing groups. Thus, the Commonwealth (57 per cent) and the Latin American (50 per cent) give the Security

¹The term majority, here, as explained earlier, refers to 50 per cent or more of a group.

Council first importance in respect to preserving the peace. Also, a majority of the Arab (50 per cent) and Scandinavian (50 per cent) give the Security Council second place, while a majority of the African group give it second place or lower, and the Afro-Asian group comes very close in this respect (47 per cent).

If the agreement or disagreement of the groups with the plurality achieved by the Security Council in the general pattern of all delegates (1st place) is considered (preponderant weight analysis), then the Commonwealth, Latin, and European groups are in "agreement," the Soviet group "needs" one percentage point to achieve agreement,¹ and the African, Afro-Asian, Arab, and Scandinavian are in "disagreement." The paramount feature in the patterns, however, seems to be, with the exception of the Commonwealth, that the groups split rather evenly with respect to assigning the Security Council first or second place.

Finally, it may be noted that all of the fourth and fifth place assignments of the Security Council come from caucusing groups which are essentially comprised of so-called underdeveloped nations, that is, African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab groups.

¹That is, in terms of percentage analysis the Soviet group needs one point. In "reality," of course, the Soviet groups needs one delegate (20 per cent) to "achieve" agreement. The above style is used simply to indicate that there has been a "tie" and that a group will be scored differently than had it either "agreed" or "disagreed."

General Assembly Ranking for
Preserving Peace by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 10 - By Percentages

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	S.C. & G.A. Equal in 1st Rank	Other-No A.
African	41	41	..	6	12
Afro-As.	38	38	3	..	3	..	18
Arab	60	40
Comm.	14	57	29
Europe.	29	43	28	..
Lat.Am.	36	50	..	7	..	7	..
Scand.	50	25	25	..
Soviet	40	40	20

Again the achievement of "majorities" by several of the groups may be contrasted to the plurality in the general pattern. If the groups are compared with the general pattern (2nd place) then, again, the Commonwealth, Latin American, and European groups are in "agreement" and all other groups are in "disagreement." However, one percentage point more in the second category for the African, Afro-Asian, and Soviet groups would also place them in the agreement category. Thus, only the Arab and Scandinavian groups seem to be generally out of phase with the general United Nations pattern with 60 per cent of the Arab group placing the General Assembly in first position and 50 per cent of the Scandinavian. As was the case with the Security Council, however, the fairly even splitting of the groups, with the exception of the Commonwealth, in respect to placing the General Assembly in either first or second position is apparent.

Economic and Social Council Ranking
for Preserving Peace by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 11 - By Percentages

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Other-No A.
African	6	6	18	35	12	23
Afro-As.	3	6	21	32	6	32
Arab	30	40	10	20
Comm.	43	..	57
Europe.	43	43	..	14
Lat.Am.	7	29	43	14	..	7
Scand.	75	25
Soviet	40	60

The general agreement of all groups, with the exception of the European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups, with the plurality achieved in fourth position by the Economic and Social Council in the general pattern is evident. The single clear majority achieved within the table is by the Scandinavian group whose ranking of the Economic and Social Council in third place is at odds with the general pattern. The only groups which have any delegates which place the Economic and Social Council in first or second place are nations with the so-called underdeveloped category or the African, Afro-Asian, and Latin American groups. With the exception of the Soviet and Commonwealth groups, the considerable splitting between two categories, the third and the fourth, found also in the general United Nations pattern, is in evidence.

Trusteeship Council Ranking for
Preserving Peace by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 12 - By Percentages

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Other-No A.
African	18	24	29	29
Afro-As.	15	18	29	38
Arab	30	10	30	30
Comm.	43	57
Europe.	14	43	43
Lat.Am.	21	71	8
Scand.	25	25	50
Soviet	20	80

The general agreement of all the groups, with the exception of the Arab, Scandinavian, and Soviet, where one percentage point needs to be added to achieve agreement, with the general delegate pattern (5th place) is apparent. However, the only group which achieves a majority within the fifth ranking is the Latin American group. The fact that the Arab, African, and Afro-Asian groups are the only groups that place the Trusteeship Council in the third ranking and that the Commonwealth and Soviet groups are the only groups which have no percentage points in the fourth ranking may be noted. Also, the sizeable percentages, with the exception of the Latin American group, of "other-no answer" responses on this question, culminating in 80 per cent for the Soviet group, is apparent.

Secretariat Ranking for Preserving
Peace by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 13 - By Percentages

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Other-No A.
African	12	..	41	18	12	17
Afro-As.	9	6	29	9	12	35
Arab	..	10	30	10	30	20
Comm.	43	57
Europe.	..	14	43	43
Lat.Am.	..	7	57	14	14	8
Scand.	..	25	25	50
Soviet	40	20	..	40

It can be seen that there is general agreement, with the exception of the Arab and Scandinavian groups in which case one percentage point needs to be added, of the groups with the third place plurality achieved in the general pattern. The only group achieving 50 per cent or more in this category, however, is the Latin American group. The only groups placing the Secretariat in first position are the African and Afro-Asian groups while the only groups to give it a fifth place ranking are the African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab groups.

Summation Based Upon Preponderate Weight Analysis

TABLE 14

PERCEIVED RANK ORDER OF ORGANS¹

	<u>African</u>	<u>Afro-As.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Europe.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
S.C.	2nd(p)	2nd(p)	2nd(m)	1st(m)	1st(p)	1st(m)	2nd(m)	tie(^{1st} / _{2nd})
G.A.	tie(^{1st} / _{2nd})	tie(^{1st} / _{2nd})	1st(m)	2nd(m)	2nd(p)	2nd(m)	1st(m)	tie(^{1st} / _{2nd})
SECT.	3rd(p)	3rd(p)	tie(^{3rd} / _{5th})	3rd(p)	3rd(p)	3rd(m)	tie(^{2nd} / _{3rd})	3rd(p)
ECOSOC	4th(p)	4th(p)	4th(p)	4th(p)	tie(^{3rd} / _{4th})	3rd(p)	3rd(p)	3rd(p)
TRUST.	5th(p)	5th(p)	5th(p)	5th(p)	5th(p)	5th(m)	tie(^{4th} / _{5th})	5th(p)

¹The notation for this chart is as follows: the numerals 1 through 5 indicate the rank achieved by the organ in question; p equals plurality and m equals 50 per cent or more when there is no tie.

It is apparent that there is no clear ordering of the organs in respect to their ability to preserve the peace, either between or within the groups. The Latin American group perhaps comes closest to consistency in that it achieves a majority for each ranking, with the exception of the Economic and Social Council. Between groups there seems to be considerable agreement on the Secretariat and Trusteeship Council rankings. However, these rankings in the main are based on pluralities rather than majorities. The two organs with the greatest frequency of "majority" ranking, that is, the Security Council and General Assembly, are also the organs in which there is the most disagreement between groups. Even here, however, there is a considerable amount of tying and ranking by plurality.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

It should be remembered from the introduction that the major purpose of the dissertation is to test the hypothesis that the economic development scores of the groups are correlated with the various variable scores generated by the data. The tables which follow allow one to compare the expected strength (always .70 or more) and direction of correlations with the results in respect to ranking. See the footnotes below for an explanation of notation. Hereafter expectation and result tables will be presented without introduction.

TABLE 15

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR RANKING—ANSWER VARIABLES¹

	S.C. (1st)	G.A. (2nd)	SECT. (3rd)	ECOSOC (4th)	TRUST. (5th)
Correlation with econ. dev.	+	+	?	?	?

TABLE 16

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR RANKING —ANSWER VARIABLES²

	S.C. (1st)	G.A. (2nd)	SECT. (3rd)	ECOSOC (4th)	TRUST. (5th)
	(25-57r) 32r	(25-57r) 32r	(25-57r) 32r	(0-43r) 43r	(20-71r) 51r
Correlation with econ. dev.	-.25	-.39	-.16	-.32	-.10

¹The notation for this table is as follows: + means positive correlation; - means negative correlation; and ? indicates that there was no firm set of expectations for this variable. The numerals 1 through 5 indicate the ranking achieved by the organ in question under preponderant weight analysis. For example, it was expected that there would be a positive correlation between economic development scores and the scores ranking the Security Council in first place. The ? in the case of the Secretariat, Economic and Social Council, and Trusteeship Council may be explained by the fact that it becomes increasingly difficult to have expectations beyond the second ranking because the accumulation of percentage points in any particular ranking are dependent upon the tendency to rank the organs in question in any of the other categories. The positive association in respect to the Security Council and General Assembly are explained above.

²The notation for the above table is as follows: the numerals 1 through 5 refer to the ranking achieved by the organ in preponderant weight analysis. The two numbers separated by a dash, followed by an r indicate the limits of the range for the variable in question. The number just below this followed by an r refers to the actual amount of range. In respect to ranking the Security Council first, the caucusing groups were spread out from a low of 25 per cent in one group to a high of 57 per cent in another group. In other words, all of the remaining delegations fall between these two figures. It should be recalled that every variable in respect to answer variables

The economic development of the caucusing groups of the United Nations does not seem to be related to the tendency to give a high or low score in respect to preserving the peace to the major organs of the United Nations using a scale running from 1 to 5. It is evident that even if the scores of economic development were strongly associated with the scores in respect to ranking for the Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretariat, we would still have to conclude that this was not significant.¹ The other two organs, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council, do have enough range so that if correlations of .70 or above were present, we would have to conclude that the association was significant. The Economic and Social Council does have a slight negative correlation which is interpreted to mean that caucusing groups with lower economic development are slightly more inclined to have higher support within the group in respect to placing the Economic and Social Council in the fourth category than the developed groups. The placement of the Trusteeship Council in fifth place is practically unrelated to economic development.

must have a range of at least 40 before any correlation with it and economic development is considered significant. That is, if there is a lack of range or only a small amount of range it means that the groups are clustered together and that they are not really differentiated significantly in respect to the variable in question. The number with a decimal point in front of it refers to the extent of correlation and the minus or plus sign refers to the direction of correlation.

¹That is, their range is below 40 and, therefore, no association between them and economic development can be considered significant.

This finding is essentially contrary to that which was expected. That is, for the Security Council, at least, it was assumed that there would be considerable difference between the economically developed and the economically underdeveloped groups and that this difference would be related to economic development. This expectation was based upon the fact that the rise of the General Assembly as an organ in competition with the Security Council in the maintenance of the peace has been in part coincidental with the influx of underdeveloped nations into the United Nations. That is, it was supposed that these new nations might tend to see the General Assembly as holding the first position to a great enough extent to cause a significant positive correlation because of their withdrawal of support from the Security Council in respect to ranking it first when compared to the developed groups. The expectations of a positive correlation in respect to the General Assembly was based on the same reasoning. That is, it was supposed that the tendency of the underdeveloped to place the General Assembly in the first position would undercut their scores in respect to second place rating, thereby causing a positive correlation between scores in the second place rating and economic development. It will be noted, however, that the negative correlation across the board means that there is a slight tendency for the percentage in each category to go higher as the economic development of the group goes lower.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Group Variables

The table which follows indicates the answer group scores of the

groups over all the questions concerned with ranking, using the answer group formulas and devices found in the Introduction. Hereafter, this type of table as well as the "expectation" and "result" tables which follow will be presented without introduction.

TABLE 17

ANSWER GROUP VARIABLE SCORES FOR RANKING

	Scat (4) ¹	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
African	11	19	+2	10	11
Afro-As.	10	24	+2	7	10
Arab	8	15	-1	17	19
Comm.	2	10	+5	25	27
Europe.	5	12	+4	15	16
Lat.Am.	8	17	+5	18	21
Scand.	5	12	-3	28	29
Soviet	3	9	0	18	19

TABLE 18

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR RANKING—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES²

	Scat (4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
Correlation with econ. dev.	-	-	-	+	+

¹For convenience, decimal points are dispensed with (through multiplication by 10) in the case of scatter (4) and scatter (2) scores. Thus, an actual score of 1.1 reads 11 in the above table and .8 reads as 8, etc.

²The notation here is exactly the same as that which occurred in the case of answer variables, that is, a + means an expectation of positive correlation, a - an expectation of negative correlation, and a ? a lack of expectation. For example, in the above chart, economic development is expected to correlate negatively with scatter (4).

TABLE 19

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR RANKING—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES¹

	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
	(2-11r)	(9-24r)	(-3 to +5r)	(7-28r)	(10-29r)
	9r	15r	8r	21r	19r
	4av,3min	5av,4min	4av,3min	28av,14min	26av,13min
Correlation with econ. dev.	-.60	-.62	-.24	+.58	+.52

The correlation is in the right direction for all variables but not strong enough for any variables to allow the hypothesis to be confirmed. The range in connection with scatter 4 and spread, however, is sufficiently great to allow substantial confirmation² in respect

¹The following notation is used in respect to the above chart: the figure with the decimal point refers to the extent of correlation and the minus or plus sign refers to the direction of correlation. The two figures separated by a dash, followed by an r refer to the limits of range for the variable in question. For example, in the case of scatter 4, the lowest group got a score of 2 and the highest group received a score of 11. The number followed by r refers to the amount of range. The numeral followed by av refers to the average range for this variable throughout the entire dissertation. The numeral followed by min refers to the minimum range that is considered significant in respect to this variable. That is, as explained earlier, one less than the average range for the variables of scatter 2, scatter 4, spread, and convergence is arbitrarily set as the cut-off point concerning significance. In the case of dis + and dis -, one-half of the average range was arbitrarily set as the cut-off point. Thus, in the above case, dis + has sufficient range because it exceeds 14 points. That is, 28 minus 7 equals 21, or 7 more than the minimum. As in the case of answer variables, if answer group variables drop below their minimum, the groups are assumed not to be significantly differentiated.

²The term, substantial confirmation, can be considered synonymous with "close to confirmation." That is, the range is considered great enough in such a case so that the correlation in question is considered to have some significance, even though it does not reach the .70 level.

to the variables. Thus, the economically well-developed groups tend to be more cohesive and less spread than the underdeveloped groups in respect to the perceptions concerning the relative ability of the organs to preserve the peace but economic development is not significantly related to the variables of convergence, distance + and distance -.¹

Importance Shifts

Whereas the purpose of the above analysis was to compare the groups in respect to the relative importance of the organs in maintaining the peace, the purpose of the analysis in this section will be to compare the groups in respect to their perceptions of the changing overall importance of the organs. The delegates were asked, "Do you feel that each of the following organs is presently increasing or decreasing in importance relative to the other organs?" The delegates were then provided with a list of the five major organs with the answer spaces of "Increasing," "Decreasing," and "Remaining the same" beside each organ.

¹It should be noted that this is one of two times in the dissertation that economic development does not have a significant correlation with distance + and distance -. Also, it should be noted that the range for distance + and distance -, in respect to this group of questions, is considerably less than is the case for other sets of questions. In other words, pattern dissimilarity, whether measured against the general pattern, including the group or excluding the group, is less in respect to organ ranking than in other sets of questions.

Importance Shifts—All Delegates

TABLE 20 - By Percentages

	Increasing ¹	Decreasing	Same	No A.	Total
S.C.	25	30	41	4	100
G.A.	84	2	11	3	100
ECOSOC	56	2	36	6	100
TRUST.	18	61	15	6	100
SECT.	54	10	28	8	100

A plurality of the delegates feel that the Security Council is remaining the same while a majority feel that the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and the Secretariat are increasing and the Trusteeship Council is decreasing in importance.

The "majorities" which were missing on the question of relative importance for preserving the peace seem, with the exception of the Security Council, to be evident here.

Shifts in Security Council Importance
by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 21 - By Percentages

	Increasing	Decreasing	Same	No A.
African	35	18	41	6
Afro-As.	24	32	41	3
Arab	20	30	50	..
Comm.	28	72
Europe.	..	43	57	..
Lat.Am.	29	29	36	6
Scand.	..	50	50	..
Soviet	60	..	20	20

¹It can be seen that the delegates had a tendency to stress increasing over the other two categories in spite of the fact that the

All of the caucusing groups, with the exception of the Scandinavian, Commonwealth, and Soviet, are in agreement with the general United Nations pattern (remaining the same) and with practically the same percentage of plurality. It should be noted that the Scandinavian group only needs one percentage point to place it in the agreement column and therefore, the two groups with the most divergence from the preponderant weight in the general pattern are the Commonwealth and Soviet groups. However, their perceptions in respect to increasing or decreasing are almost completely at odds with one another. That is, 72 per cent of the Commonwealth group feels that the Security Council is decreasing in importance, whereas 60 per cent of the Soviet group feels that the Security Council is increasing in importance. The rather general splitting into "thirds" of the African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab groups stand in contrast to the pattern exhibited by the Commonwealth, European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups which, in each case, have at least one category of zero percentage. Also, the only majorities, with the exception of the Arab group, are found in these latter groups.

question asked for a relative comparison. That is, they apparently interpreted the question in an "absolute" sense instead of a relative one.

Shifts in General Assembly
Importance by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 22 - By Percentages

	Increasing	Decreasing	Same	No A.
African	76	..	18	6
Afro-As.	82	..	15	3
Arab	90	..	10	..
Comm.	86	14
Europe.	86	..	14	..
Lat.Am.	86	..	7	7
Scand.	75	..	25	..
Soviet	100

It is apparent that all of the caucusing groups agree with the majority percentage expressed in the general United Nations pattern (increasing). Furthermore, all of the groups agree with practically the same percentage as the general United Nations pattern, with the exception of the Soviet group, which achieves 100 per cent in the increasing category. Thus, each group seems to be a kind of miniature United Nations in respect to the division of opinion within the group concerning this question. The only slightly divergent group in respect to the general pattern perspective seems to be the Commonwealth in which 14 per cent of the group asserted that the General Assembly is presently decreasing while none of the delegates in any of the other groups expressed this opinion.

Shifts in Economic and Social Council
Importance by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 23 - By Percentages

	Increasing	Decreasing	Same	No A.
African	65	..	24	11
Afro-As.	62	..	29	9
Arab	70	..	30	..
Comm.	43	14	14	29
Europe.	28	..	72	..
Lat.Am.	57	..*	36	7
Scand.	25	..	75	..
Soviet	60	..	40	..

All of the caucusing groups, with the exception of the European and Scandinavian, agree with the general pattern (increasing). Although the Commonwealth only achieved a plurality in the increasing column, all of the other groups achieve a majority in this category. The disagreeing groups, the European and Scandinavian, achieve majorities in the remaining the same category. The only group which has any percentage points in the decreasing category is, as was the case with the General Assembly, the Commonwealth group (14 per cent). It can be noted, finally, that the division of percentages for the agreeing groups are all very close to the percentages expressed in the general United Nations pattern.

Shifts in Trusteeship Council
Importance by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 24 - By Percentages

	Increasing	Decreasing	Same	No A.
African	35	41	12	12
Afro-As.	29	47	15	9
Arab	20	60	20	..
Comm.	29	43	14	14
Europe.	..	100
Lat.Am.	..	70	21	9
Scand.	..	100
Soviet	20	80

All of the groups agree with the majority percentage expressed in the general United Nations pattern (decreasing). However, the Commonwealth, African, and Afro-Asian only achieve plurality in the decreasing category, while the European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups considerably exceed the majority percentage expressed in the general pattern. The percentages of the Commonwealth (29 per cent), African (35 per cent), Afro-Asian (29 per cent), Arab (20 per cent), and Soviet (20 per cent) who feel that the Trusteeship Council is increasing presently may be compared with the lack of response in this category in the Latin American, Scandinavian, and European groups. Thus, strangely enough, although a plurality or majority in each group feels that the Trusteeship Council is currently declining in importance, the most popular second answer, with the exception of the Latin American group and those groups which obtain 100 per cent, is increasing rather than remaining the same.

Shifts in Secretariat Importance
by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 25 - By Percentages

	Increasing	Decreasing	Same	Other-No A.
African	53	..	41	6
Afro-As.	62	3	32	3
Arab	60	..	40	..
Comm.	42	29	29	..
Europe.	14	57	14	15
Lat.Am.	64	..	21	15
Scand.	25	50	25	..
Soviet	40	..	40	20

The Commonwealth, African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, Arab, and Soviet (if one percentage point is added in the Soviet's increasing column) agree with the general delegate pattern (increasing) while the European and Scandinavian groups disagree with it. All of these agreeing groups, with the exception of the Commonwealth which achieves a plurality, achieve a majority percentage. The disagreeing groups (European and Scandinavian), on the other hand, achieved majorities in the decreasing column. With the exception of the disagreeing groups and the Commonwealth, the most popular second answer for all groups is remaining the same. It might be noted that although the Commonwealth group is within the agreeing category, it is the only agreeing group with a sizeable percentage of the delegates perceiving of the Secretariat as presently decreasing. Thus the 10 per cent "decrease" percentage which is achieved in the general pattern is almost wholly concentrated within the two disagreeing groups, the European and Scandinavian, and one agreeing group, the Commonwealth.

Generally speaking, the percentage within remaining the same is fairly close to the percentage expressed in the general United Nations pattern.

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 26¹

ORGANS PERCEIVED AS INCREASING, DECREASING, OR
REMAINING THE SAME IN RESPECT TO IMPORTANCE

	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Af.</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Eur.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
S.C.	D(m)	S(p)	S(p)	S(p)	S(m)	S(m)	tie(^S _D)	I(m)
G.A.	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)
SECT.	I(p)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	D(m)	D(m)	I(p)
ECOSOC	I(p)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	S(m)	S(m)	I(m)
TRUST.	D(p)	D(p)	D(p)	D(m)	D(m)	D(m)	D(m)	D(m)

It is evident that with the exception of the Trusteeship Council and Security Council, increasing is the most popular answer between groups. As there is a greater consistency between groups on this question than with ranking, there also seems to be greater agreement within groups. Although there is a fair sprinkle of pluralities, majorities now seem to be dominant and here one could hypothesize that there is a clearer conception within groups as to the present changing importance of the organs than to their relative ranking. The European and Scandinavian groups seem to be the major

¹The notation for the above chart is as follows: D = decreasing, S = remaining the same, I = increasing, m = majority, and p = plurality.

dissenters in respect to the idea that the Secretariat and the Economic and Social Council are presently increasing. Thus, both groups presently see the Economic and Social Council as remaining the same, whereas all other groups see it as increasing, and see the Secretariat as decreasing, whereas all other groups see it as increasing. The General Assembly stands out with the Trusteeship Council as the two organs upon which all groups agree.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

TABLE 26

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING
SHIFTING IMPORTANCE—ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.C. (S)	G.A. (I)	ECOSOC (I)	TRUST. (D)	SECT. (I)
Correlation with econ. dev.	+	-	-	+	-

TABLE 27

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING
SHIFTING IMPORTANCE—ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.C. (S)	G.A. (I)	ECOSOC (I)	TRUST. (D)	SECT. (I)
	(0-60r) 60r	(75-100r) 25r	(25-70r) 45r	(41-100r) 59r	(14-64r) 50r
Correlation with econ. dev.	+.24	-.089	-.92	+.88	-.93

The hypothesis in respect to the Security Council and General Assembly is unconfirmed, while the hypothesis in respect to the Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, and Secretariat is

confirmed.

In the case of the Security Council, it was expected that the underdeveloped groups would have a greater tendency to see the Security Council decreasing than the developed groups and, therefore, draw percentage points from the remaining the same category. It can be seen that the correlation expressed is in the right direction to confirm that hypothesis, but simply lacks strength.

It was expected that the underdeveloped groups would have a greater tendency to see the General Assembly as increasing in importance in relation to the developed groups. Therefore, a negative correlation between economic development and the increasing importance category with the General Assembly was predicted. The negative correlation expressed in this case, however, is insignificant. Further, it is apparent that even if a correlation at the .70 level did exist, it could not be considered to confirm the hypothesis with the range in question.

The strong negative correlation of the economic development with the category of increasing for the Economic and Social Council is in line with what was expected, and seems to be reflective of the tendency for the underdeveloped groups to see the organization in more positive terms than the developed.

The positive association of higher scores in respect to the category of decreasing in connection with the Trusteeship Council with higher scores in respect to economic development also is in line with expectations. That is, it is assumed that the underdeveloped groups

should be less predisposed to see the Trusteeship Council declining than the developed groups.

The negative association in respect to the category of increasing in respect to the Secretariat, again, could be expected if it is assumed that the underdeveloped caucusing groups are more positively oriented towards the United Nations in terms of their perceptions than the more developed groups. Perhaps, in part, this very strong correlation may be explained by the death of Dag Hammarskjold and the transference of the Secretary-General's position from an area of high development to an area of low development. That is, the tendency of the underdeveloped groups to perceive the Secretariat as increasing in importance to a greater degree than the developed may be related to the fact that they identify with U Thant and consider him one of their own.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Group Variables

TABLE 28

ANSWER GROUP VARIABLE SCORES FOR PERCEPTIONS
CONCERNING SHIFTING IMPORTANCE

	Scat (4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
African	9	12	+5	15	18
Afro-As.	8	13	+5	8	12
Arab	8	12	+5	10	11
Comm.	7	13	+3	24	26
Europe.	5	10	+1	38	42
Lat.Am.	8	11	+5	12	14
Scand.	6	10	0	40	42
Soviet	7	9	+2	25	26

TABLE 29

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING
SHIFTING IMPORTANCE—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat (4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
Correlation with econ. dev.	-	-	-	+	+

TABLE 30

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING
SHIFTING IMPORTANCE—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat (4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
	(5-9r) 4r	(9-13r) 4r	(0-5r) 5r	(8-40r) 32r	(12-42r) 30r
	4av,3min	5av,4min	4av,3min	28av,14min	26av,13min
Correlation with econ. dev.	-93	-67	-96	+97	+96

The hypothesis is confirmed above the .70 level in every case except spread. However, due to the fact that the amount of correlation is very close to .70 and that the range exceeds the minimum, the hypothesis in the case of spread may be considered substantially confirmed.

The very strong correlation in respect to Scatter 4 is in the direction that was expected. That is, the underdeveloped groups tend to be more scattered in their answer patterns than the developed groups. Therefore, in respect to the question of the shifting importance of the organs, the developed groups may be said to be more cohesive on the average.

The correlation in respect to spread is also in the direction that was expected. That is, the underdeveloped groups tended to use

more categories in answering this particular set of questions than the developed groups.

The correlation of economic development with convergence is also in the direction that was expected. That is, the tendency to disagree with the location of the preponderant weight in the general delegate pattern is strongly related to high economic development.

Economic development is also related to both distance functions in the direction that was expected. In this case, both correlations are exceedingly high and thus one would be able to predict, knowing the range in each case, economic development almost perfectly from the distance score. It is to be noted that the removal of each group from the pattern established by all other groups, as is done under Dis -, does not significantly affect the strength of this very high positive correlation. In other words, the association of pattern dissimilarity with the developed caucusing groups is not reduced significantly on this group of questions, even though each group separately is not considered part of the general pattern when comparisons are made under Dis -.

Evaluation of Strength

To give another indication of their perception of the various organs in the United Nations, the delegates were asked to "evaluate the strength of each organ relative to the other organs" using the following categories: stronger than it should be, weaker than it should be, as strong as it should be. In other words, do the delegates tend to see the organization as essentially "balanced" or is

there a tendency to see the organization as "imbalanced" and if this is the case, what sort of differences are exhibited between caucusing groups.

Evaluation of Strength—All Delegates

TABLE 30 - By Percentages

	Stronger	Weaker	As Strong	Other-No A.
S.C.	16	38	30	16
G.A.	21	18	48	13
ECOSOC	11	23	52	14
TRUST.	10	18	52	20
SECT.	11	11	61	17

As can be seen, the category of weaker than it should be achieves a plurality in connection with the Security Council and as strong as it should be achieves a plurality with the General Assembly, a majority with the Economic and Social Council, a majority with the Trusteeship Council, and a majority with the Secretariat. It might be noted that the second most popular answer in respect to the Security Council is as strong as it should be, whereas the second most popular answer in respect to the General Assembly is stronger than it should be. If the two figures are combined in each case, then it may be asserted that a majority of the delegates (68 per cent) feel that the Security Council is either weaker than it should be or as strong as it should be and that a majority of the delegates (69 per cent) feel that the General Assembly is stronger than it should be or as strong as it should be.

Evaluation of the Strength of the
Security Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 31 - By Percentages

	Stronger	Weaker	As Strong	No A.
African	24	29	35	12
Afro-As.	24	29	26	21
Arab	10	50	10	30
Comm.	..	57	29	14
Europe.	..	43	43	14
Lat.Am.	14	57	21	8
Scand.	..	25	75	..
Soviet	..	40	40	20

The Commonwealth, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab groups agree with the general pattern (weaker than it should be), the European and Soviet groups require 1 per cent added to their categories to achieve agreement and the African and Scandinavian groups disagree with the general pattern. Three of the four agreeing groups achieve majorities (Arab, Latin American, and Commonwealth) in the weaker than it should be category, whereas one group, the Afro-Asian, achieves a plurality in this category. One of the disagreeing groups (African) achieves a plurality in the as strong as it should be category while the other (Scandinavian) achieves a majority in this category.¹ It should be noted that the only caucusing group which had delegates which feel that the Security Council is stronger than

¹If it is seen as desirable to extend the definition of agreement to the two categories which it is necessary to combine in the general pattern to achieve a majority (weaker than it should be and as strong as it should be), then all of the groups could be seen as being in "agreement."

it should be are the groups composed of the "underdeveloped" nations, or the African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab groups. Or, to put it another way, the Commonwealth, European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups exhaust their percentages in the two categories of weaker than it should be and as strong as it should be.

Evaluation of the Strength of the
General Assembly by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 32 - By Percentages

	Stronger	Weaker	As Strong	No A.
African	24	24	41	11
Afro-As.	24	12	50	14
Arab	20	20	40	20
Comm.	14	14	57	15
Europe.	29	29	29	13
Lat.Am.	14	21	57	8
Scand.	..	50	50	..
Soviet	20	40	20	20

The Commonwealth, African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab groups are in agreement with the general delegate pattern (as strong as it should be), the European and Scandinavian groups need 1 per cent added to their score in this category to achieve agreement, and the Soviet group is in disagreement with the general pattern. Although only a plurality was achieved in the as strong as it should be category in the general pattern,¹ majorities are achieved in this

¹In the general pattern, stronger than it should be was the second most popular answer given. This is also the case for the Afro-Asian group and would be true for the Commonwealth, African, Arab, European, and Soviet groups if one percentage point in each case is added to their score in this category. However, this is not true

category by the Commonwealth, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Scandinavian groups.

Evaluation of the Strength of the Economic and Social Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 33 - By Percentages

	Stronger	Weaker	As Strong	No A.
African	18	24	46	12
Afro-As.	18	21	47	14
Arab	..	30	50	20
Comm.	100	..
Europe.	86	14
Lat.Am.	..	36	57	7
Scand.	100	..
Soviet	20	40	20	20

All of the caucusing groups meet the definition of agreement in respect to the general pattern (as strong as it should be), with the exception of the Soviet group. However, whereas in the general pattern the as strong as it should be was the most popular category, achieving 52 per cent, three of the caucusing groups (Commonwealth, European, and Scandinavian) greatly exceed this percentage to achieve 100, 86, and 100 per cent respectively. The other groups in agreement (African, Afro-Asian, and Latin American) come very close to

for the Latin and Scandinavian groups in which the second most popular answer occurs in the weaker than it should be category. Therefore, although the Soviet group is in disagreement in respect to its most popular answer, it is in agreement in respect to its second most popular answer, whereas, although the Latin American and Scandinavian groups are in agreement in respect to their most popular answer, they "disagree" in respect to their second most popular answer.

the percentage expressed in the general pattern. The disagreeing group (Soviet) achieves a plurality in the weaker than it should be category, which is, incidentally, the second most popular category in the general pattern. This is also the second choice of the agreeing underdeveloped groups. Thus, although the Commonwealth, European, and Scandinavian groups achieve their place in the agreement classification, they have no delegates who pick the second most popular category in the general pattern, whereas the Soviet group which does not achieve "agreement" does have a sizeable portion of its delegation choosing the second most popular general pattern category.

Evaluation of the Strength of the
Trusteeship Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 34 - By Percentages

	Stronger	Weaker	As Strong	Other-No A.
African	29	29	24	18
Afro-As.	18	21	41	20
Arab	10	20	40	30
Comm.	..	29	57	14
Europe.	72	28
Lat.Am.	..	21	71	8
Scand.	75	25
Soviet	..	20	60	20

All of the caucusing groups, with the exception of the African, are in agreement with the general pattern (as strong as it should be). However, whereas a majority was achieved in the overall pattern (52 per cent), only a plurality is achieved by the Arab and Afro-Asian groups. The second most popular answer in the general pattern

(weaker than it should be) is picked by the disagreeing group (African) if one percentage point is added to its percentage in this category. Generally speaking, the "developed groups" exceed the percentage achieved in the general pattern's most popular category (as strong as it should be) and the "underdeveloped," with the exception of the Latin American group, have somewhat lower percentages. Finally, it can be noted that the only groups with delegates picking the stronger than it should be category are the African, Afro-Asian, and Arab groups.

Evaluation of the Strength of the Secretariat by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 35 - By Percentages

	Stronger	Weaker	As Strong	Other-No A.
African	18	6	65	11
Afro-As.	15	6	62	17
Arab	..	10	70	20
Comm.	86	14
Europe.	..	14	57	29
Lat.Am.	14	14	64	8
Scand.	..	25	50	25
Soviet	..	40	40	20

All of the caucusing groups, with the exception of the Soviet, are in agreement with the as strong as it should be category chosen in the general pattern and all exhibit a majority percentage in this respect. Although the Soviet group does not obtain a majority in this category, one percentage point added to its percentage gives it a plurality.

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 36

ORGANS PERCEIVED AS WEAKER, STRONGER, OR AS STRONG AS SHOULD BE¹

	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Af.</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Europe.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
S.C.	W(m)	As S(p)	W(p)	W(m)	W(m)	tie(_{As} ^W S)	As S(m)	tie(_{As} ^W S)
G.A.	As S(m)	As S(p)	As S(m)	As S(m)	As S(p)	tie(_{As} ^W S)	tie(_{As} ^W S)	W(p)
ECOSOC	As S(m)	As S(p)	As S(m)	As S(m)	As S(m)	As S(m)	As S(m)	W(p)
TRUST.	As S(m)	W(p)	As S(p)	As S(m)	As S(p)	As S(m)	As S(m)	As S(m)
SECT.	As S(m)	As S(m)	As S(m)	As S(m)	As S(m)	As S(m)	As S(m)	tie(_{As} ^W S)

¹The following notation is used in the above chart: W equals weaker than it should be; As S equals as strong as it should be; m equals majority; and p equals plurality.

It was assumed that the answer pattern which emerged on the set of questions in respect to relative strength would give some clues as to whether the delegates see the organization as essentially balanced or imbalanced. With the exception of the Security Council, one would have to conclude that the organization is perceived as essentially balanced. The one exception to this, perhaps, is the Soviet group in which both the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council were seen as weaker than they should be by a plurality of the bloc. Certainly the Security Council stands out as the organ which is weaker than it should be relative to the other organs for most blocs. One thing that is notable is the fact that none of the preponderant weights within the groups see any of the organs as stronger than they should be. That is, for example, although the Soviet group tends to see the organization as most imbalanced, its remedy, presumably, would be to strengthen certain organs rather than to weaken others to achieve this balance. It is evident, however, that in many cases the winning category was established by a plurality and hence there is considerable fractionalization within groups. For example, there are sizeable percentages of the Afro-Asian, African, Latin American, and Arab groups which see the Security Council as stronger than it should be.

Hypothesis Testing Answer Variables

TABLE 37

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING
RELATIVE STRENGTH—ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.C. (W)	G.A. (As S)	ECOSOC (As S)	TRUST. (As S)	SECT. (As S)
Correlation with econ. dev.	+	+	+	+	+

TABLE 38

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING
RELATIVE STRENGTH—ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.C. (W)	G.A. (As S)	ECOSOC (As S)	TRUST. (As S)	SECT. (As S)
	(25-57r) 32r	(20-57r) 37r	(20-100r) 80r	(24-75r) 51r	(40-86r) 46r
Correlation with econ. dev.	-.20	-.25	+.59	+.78	-.45

It was expected, because of the presumed association of the Security Council with the developed caucusing groups that there would be a positive correlation between the category weaker than it should be and economic development. It can readily be seen that this is not the case and that there is actually a slight negative correlation evident. In any case, however, even if the correlation had gone above the .70 level, it would not have been considered significant because the range in this case is lower than 40.¹

¹The category of weaker than it should be does correlate, however, at the .91 level positively with the ranking of the Security Council in first place. Still, however, in spite of the fact that

It was expected that there would be a positive correlation between economic development and the as strong as it should be category in respect to the General Assembly. That is, it was felt that the underdeveloped groups would use more points in the weaker than it should be category than the developed groups and thus leave the developed groups with a positive correlation. The case here is similar to that with the Security Council. The correlation which does exist is in the wrong direction and even if it was in the right direction and possessing enough strength it would not be considered significant due to the lack of range in this category.

The same reasoning which applied in the case of the General Assembly was assumed to apply in the case of the Economic and Social Council. That is, it was expected that economic development would correlate positively with the as strong as it should be category. A positive correlation does exist and the range is great enough so that if the correlation were stronger, the hypothesis would be considered confirmed. This is a case where one would have to say that the hypothesis was close to confirmation.¹

The range of the as strong as it should be category of the Trusteeship Council is great enough so that the positive correlation of

this is a very high correlation, it is not considered significant because of the lack of range in both cases.

¹The as strong as it should be category itself, however, is strongly correlated with the increasing category. This correlation is probably best seen as a result of the relationship of economic development to both variables.

.78 with economic development confirms the hypothesis. It was expected that there would be a positive correlation because of the reasons referred to in the case of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. That is, that there should be a general tendency of the underdeveloped groups to view the organs as weaker than they should be.¹

It was expected that the underdeveloped groups, because of their presumed greater commitment to the organization, would pick weaker than it should be for the Secretariat more frequently than the developed groups, and hence, a positive correlation was expected with as strong as it should be.² The negative correlation that does exist, therefore, is contrary to expectations but, in any case, the hypothesis is unconfirmed because the correlation lacks strength.

¹In other words, the underdeveloped groups should use up points in the weaker than it should be category that the developed groups do not. This should leave a positive correlation between economic development and the as strong as it should be category. In fact, however, referring back to the percentage chart, the African, Afro-Asian, and Arab groups exhaust points both in the weaker than it should be and the stronger than it should be categories.

Also, it may be noted that the as strong as it should be category is correlated positively at the .80 level with the increasing category and this, as was the similar case with the Economic and Social Council, may be explained by the association of economic development to both variables.

²The negative correlation which does exist here does not seem to be explained by an association of the as strong as it should be variable with any of the other variables that might have bearing on this attitude, at least at a significant level.

Hypothesis Testing Answer Group Variables

TABLE 39

ANSWER GROUP VARIABLE SCORES FOR PERCEPTIONS
CONCERNING RELATIVE STRENGTH

	Scat (4)	Spread	Converg	Dis †	Dis -
African	8	15	+1	15	17
Afro-As.	8	15	+5	10	16
Arab	6	13	+5	13	14
Comm.	4	9	+5	26	28
Europe.	3	11	+3	25	27
Lat.Am.	6	13	+5	17	19
Scand.	3	8	+2	39	40
Soviet	6	12	-1	30	32

TABLE 40

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING
RELATIVE STRENGTH—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat (4)	Spread	Converg	Dis †	Dis -
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	-	-	+	+

TABLE 41

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING
RELATIVE STRENGTH—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat (4)	Spread	Converg	Dis †	Dis -
	(3-8r) 5r	(9-15r) 6r	(-1 to +5r) 6r	(10-39r) 29r	(16-40r) 24r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	4av,3min -.87	5av,4min -.78	4av,3min -.31	28av,14min +.85	26av,13min +.85

The correlations are strong enough and the range great enough so that the hypothesis is confirmed in all cases except convergence.

Also, the correlation is in the direction that was expected in all cases. That is, the developed groups tend to be more cohesive, less spread out, in terms of number of categories used, and more distant than the underdeveloped groups. It should be noted that as in the case of perceptions concerning the increasing or decreasing importance of the organ, that a comparison of each group with the general pattern produces the same strong positive correlation of economic development and distance regardless of whether the group is taken out of the general pattern before the comparison is made. Finally, even though the correlation is not strong enough to confirm the hypothesis of a relationship between economic development and convergence on these questions, nevertheless, an examination of the answer group variables scores shows that none of the so-called underdeveloped groups, except the African group, have any divergence on this question. That is, except for the African group, they all have perfect scores of +5 in respect to convergence.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to ascertain whether perceptual differences exist between caucusing groups and these differences, in turn, were related to economic development.

In the case of ranking, the apparent association of the underdeveloped with certain organs and the association of the developed with other organs has not given rise to distinct sets of perceptions.

If these perceptual differences had been shown to exist, then it could have been argued that they might have stood as a kind of communications barrier between the developed and the underdeveloped. As it stands, however, a single underdeveloped group has as much chance to disagree with an underdeveloped group as a developed group in terms of its level of enthusiasm for ranking a particular organ in a particular category. However, due to the fact that the underdeveloped tend to be more scattered and spread than the developed, it could be hypothesized that they are subject to more cross pressure¹ on any particular ranking and, therefore, perhaps will have less tendency than the developed to remain static in respect to their patterns.

In respect to increasing and decreasing importance, the groups are not differentiated in respect to the major organs, but they are on the minor. Thus, any disputes concerning an extension of the roles of these organs related to these perceptions, it could be hypothesized, will fall on essentially economic rather than ideological lines. Also, it seems fair to conclude that communications between the developed and the underdeveloped groups, in respect to these organs, may be operating under a perceptual handicap in the sense that the groups tend to see things differently. It can be further hypoth-

¹The term "cross pressure" is used in a relative sense and refers to a situation where a delegate experiencing high cross pressure is more likely than a delegate not as subject to cross pressure to encounter views different from his own within his own caucusing group. This exposure is presumed to create a situation where it is more likely that he will change his mind than a delegate not subject to such pressure. Spread may be considered an indication of the scope of such cross pressure and scatter an indication of its intensity.

esized that the underdeveloped groups are systems of essentially greater cross pressure than are the developed groups in that a delegate within a developed group is not as likely to encounter perceptions different from his own as a delegate in one of the underdeveloped groups. Finally, because the underdeveloped patterns tend to be more like the total United Nations pattern, that is, in a sense, any particular underdeveloped caucusing group tends to exhibit the characteristics of a miniature United Nations to a greater extent than a developed group, a delegate from an underdeveloped group should feel a greater sense of familiarity with the patterns established in the United Nations at large. That is, in a sense, the United Nations is his own group writ large in respect to the perceptions of the increasing or decreasing importance of the organs.

In the case of stronger and weaker perceptions, the Trusteeship Council is the only one that the developed tend to see differently than the underdeveloped. However, because this organ is obviously exhausting its functions and heading for extinction, one could hypothesize there is no serious perceptual barrier between the economically developed and underdeveloped groups, in terms of the way which they structure the organs as either stronger or weaker than they should be. Again, however, as in increasing and decreasing perceptions, a delegate from an underdeveloped group is more likely to feel cross pressure than a delegate from a developed group. Hence, one could predict that such perceptual patterns will perhaps be less stable for the underdeveloped than the patterns associated with the

developed groups. However, due to the fact that any single underdeveloped group pattern is more likely to be similar to the United Nations as a whole than any developed group, there is a probability that delegates from underdeveloped groups will feel more familiarity with the situation and patterns which develop in the United Nations as a whole and perhaps be more sensitive to the range of perceptions than delegates from developed groups.

CHAPTER IV

SATISFACTION DIFFERENCES

The differing attitudes of the caucusing groups in respect to satisfaction with the organs of the United Nations are analyzed under three major headings: general performance, membership methods, and voting systems. These headings provide the logical divisions of the chapter. In each case, four answer spaces were provided in the questionnaire: highly satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, and highly dissatisfied. In the case of the general performance, the delegates were asked, "What is your degree of satisfaction with the general performance of the following organs?" and were provided with a list of the organs with the answer spaces indicated above.

General Performance Satisfaction--All Delegates

TABLE 42 - By Percentages¹

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	Other-No A.
S.C.	..	26	57	10	7
G.A.	13	57	13	7	10
ECOSOC	15	66	10	..	9
TRUST.	11	59	13	5	12
SECT.	16	59	15	..	10

¹In the above chart, H.S. equals highly satisfied, F.S. equals fairly satisfied, S.D. equals somewhat dissatisfied, H.D. equals highly dissatisfied, Other means some other answer, and No A. means no answer.

As can be seen from the above table, a majority is obtained for each organ in one of the categories. In fact, a majority of delegates express a fair degree of satisfaction with all the organs except the Security Council, with which a majority express some dissatisfaction. The highest percentage for the highly satisfied category (16 per cent) occurs in respect to the Secretariat although the Economic and Social Council is a close second with 15 per cent. The highest percentage expressed in the highly dissatisfied column is 10 per cent and occurs in respect to the Security Council. The most popular second answer for all organs, except the Trusteeship Council, is the highly satisfied column. Thus, if both of the satisfaction columns are combined and both of the dissatisfaction columns are combined, the Security Council stands in marked contrast to the remaining organs. That is, only 26 per cent of the delegates occur on the satisfaction side of the dichotomy for the Security Council, whereas for every other organ the figure is 70 per cent or more.

Satisfaction Differences in Respect to the Security Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 43 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	Other-No A.
African	..	41	47	6	6
Afro-As.	..	26	56	12	6
Arab	..	10	70	20	..
Comm.	..	14	57	14	15
Europe.	86	14	..
Lat.Am.	..	43	36	7	14
Scand.	100
Soviet	..	20	80

It is apparent that all of the caucusing groups, with the exception of the Latin American, agree with the general United Nations pattern (somewhat dissatisfied).¹ Furthermore, all, except the African group which obtains a plurality, achieve a majority within this category. However, it will be noted that several groups considerably exceed the percentage found in the general pattern. This is the case with the European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups. The disagreeing group (Latin American) achieves a plurality in the fairly satisfied column.²

¹A follow up question designed to probe for clues as to the source of dissatisfaction with the Security Council revealed that a majority of delegates in both the general pattern and the groups explain previous poor performance primarily in terms of great power rivalry rather than charter provisions. The following pattern emerged when the delegates assessed the "blame" for previous poor performance.

TABLE 44 - By Percentages

REASONS FOR POOR PERFORMANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL

	Charter	Great Power Rivalry	Other-No A.
General Pattern	7	66	27
African	6	71	23
Afro-As.	9	68	23
Arab	..	80	20
Comm.	..	86	14
Europe.	14	72	14
Lat.Am.	..	57	43
Scand.	25	75	..
Soviet	..	60	40

²The fairly satisfied column was the second most popular column in the general pattern and the fact that the African group exceeds all other groups, except the Latin American, and almost matches the Latin American group in this column can be noted.

Satisfaction Differences in Respect to the
General Assembly by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 45 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	Other-No A.
African	29	59	12
Afro-As.	15	68	3	6	8
Arab	10	80	..	10	..
Comm.	..	43	14	14	29
Europe.	..	14	57	29	..
Lat.Am.	21	57	7	..	15
Scand.	..	25	75
Soviet	..	60	20	..	20

All of the groups, with the exception of the European and Scandinavian, agree with the general pattern (fairly satisfied).¹ All of the agreeing groups achieve a majority, with the exception of the Commonwealth group which obtains a plurality. Both of the disagreeing

¹A follow up question to determine whether "dissatisfied" delegates would prefer either increasing or decreasing the General Assembly "power" vis-a-vis other organs showed the following results (in terms of percents of all delegates):

TABLE 46 - By Percentages

VIEW TOWARDS INCREASING OR DECREASING THE
POWER OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

	Increasing	Decreasing	Other-No A.
General Pattern	30	8	62
African	35	6	59
Afro-As.	35	3	62
Arab	40	..	60
Comm.	14	14	72
Europe.	14	14	72
Lat.Am.	29	7	64
Scand.	25	..	75
Soviet	20	..	80

groups achieve a majority in the somewhat dissatisfied column. The only countries to achieve percentages in the highly satisfied category are the African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab, with the African obtaining a high of 29 per cent. The only groups to obtain a percentage in the highly dissatisfied column are the Commonwealth, Afro-Asian, Arab, and European groups, with the European group obtaining a high of 29 per cent in this category. Thus, only the "underdeveloped" groups achieve percentages in the highly satisfied column, although they share with the "developed" percentages in the highly dissatisfied column.

Satisfaction Differences in Respect to the
Economic and Social Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 47 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	Other-No A.
African	18	71	11
Afro-As.	18	68	6	..	8
Arab	10	90
Comm.	14	57	29
Europe.	..	86	14
Lat.Am.	21	57	7	..	15
Scand.	..	75	25
Soviet	..	40	40	..	20

All of the groups, with the exception of the Soviet group which needs one percentage point added to achieve a plurality, achieve a majority in the column consistent with the general pattern (fairly satisfied). The Arab group obtains a high in this category of 90 per cent, whereas the European group runs a close second with 86 per cent. The remaining groups come close to the percentage expressed in the

general pattern. All of the underdeveloped groups have percentages in the highly satisfied column, with the Latin American group achieving a high of 21 per cent, whereas none of the developed groups achieve percentages in this category and their second most popular answer lies in the somewhat dissatisfied column.¹

Satisfaction Differences in Respect to the Trusteeship Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 49 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	Other-No A.
African	12	53	12	6	17
Afro-As.	12	65	9	3	11
Arab	10	70	..	10	10
Comm.	14	43	..	14	29
Europe.	14	72	..	14	..
Lat.Am.	14	50	21	..	15
Scand.	25	75
Soviet	..	20	40	20	20

¹A follow up question which asked: "Do you favor strengthening and giving more autonomy to the Economic and Social Council relative to the General Assembly?" showed the following results (using the answer categories of strongly favor, favor, do not favor, and strongly do not favor):

TABLE 48 - By Percentages

VIEW TOWARDS GIVING MORE AUTONOMY TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

	S.Fav.	Fav.	Not Fav.	S.Not Fav.	Other-No A.
General Pattern	..	33	43	..	24
African	..	24	47	..	29
Afro-As.	..	32	47	..	21
Arab	..	50	40	..	10
Comm.	..	14	72	..	14
Europe.	..	14	43	..	43
Lat.Am.	..	36	29	..	35
Scand.	..	75	25
Soviet	..	60	40

All of the groups are in agreement with the general pattern (fairly satisfied) except the Soviet group which obtains a plurality in somewhat dissatisfied category. All of the agreeing groups achieve a majority in the fairly satisfied category, with the exception of the Commonwealth which achieved a plurality. It can be seen that although somewhat dissatisfied is the second most popular category in the general pattern, the second most popular category in caucusing group analysis for all of the agreeing groups, with the exception of the Latin American, is highly satisfied. However, all of the groups, with the exception of the Latin American and Scandinavian groups, achieve some percentage points in the highly dissatisfied column.

Satisfaction Differences in Respect to the Secretariat by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 50 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	Other-No A.
African	24	59	6	..	11
Afro-As.	18	62	12	..	8
Arab	10	70	20
Comm.	29	29	14	..	28
Europe.	14	86
Lat.Am.	21	57	7	..	15
Scand.	25	75
Soviet	..	20	60	..	20

All of the groups, with the exception of the Commonwealth which needs one percentage point to achieve plurality, and the Soviet group, agree with the percentage expressed in the general pattern (fairly

satisfied).¹ All of the agreeing groups achieve a majority in the appropriate category. The disagreeing group (Soviet) achieves a majority in the somewhat dissatisfied column. The second most popular category for all of the agreeing groups, with the exception of the Arab, also agrees with the general pattern (highly satisfied). It might be noted that although the Commonwealth needs one per cent added to achieve a plurality in its fairly satisfied category, it has a higher percentage within the highly satisfied column (29 per cent) than any other group. All of the agreeing groups, with the exception of the European and Scandinavian, exhibit some percentage points in the somewhat dissatisfied column with a high of 20 per cent for the Arab group.

¹A follow up question, "If you had to rate the Secretary-General's office in respect to its initiative in power disputes, how would you rank it?" intended to probe for causes of dissatisfaction showed the following results (with provided answers of too active, not active enough, and just active enough):

TABLE 51 - By Percentages

VIEW CONCERNING SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE
IN POWER DISPUTES

	Too Act.	Not Act.	Just Act.	Other-No A.
General Pattern	10	11	59	20
African	6	6	65	23
Afro-As.	6	15	65	14
Arab	..	20	60	20
Comm.	43	14	43	..
Europe.	14	..	43	43
Lat.Am.	7	7	64	22
Scand.	75	25
Soviet	40	20	20	20

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 52

SATISFACTION WITH GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF ORGANS

	<u>Af.</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Eur.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
S.C.	SD(p)	SD(p)	SD(m)	SD(m)	SD(p)	FS(p)	SD(m)	SD(m)
G.A.	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(p)	SD(m)	FS(m)	SD(m)	FS(m)
ECOSOC	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	tie ^(FS) _(SD)
TRUST.	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(p)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	SD(p)
SECT.	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	tie ^(HS) _(FS)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	SD(m)

The first thing evident is that the attitudes in almost all cases are achieved by a majority. By far the most popular answer, with the exception of the Security Council, is fairly satisfied. The only group to give fairly satisfied to the Security Council is the Latin American group. Thus, with the exception of this group, there is a high degree of agreement between groups in respect to dissatisfaction with previous performance of the Security Council. The most dissatisfied groups appear to be the European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups. The most satisfied group appears to be the Latin American which does not express dissatisfaction with any of the organs. It should be noted, however, although the Soviet group appears to be the most frequently dissatisfied, its dissatisfaction pattern is different from that of the European and Scandinavian groups in that it is fairly satisfied with the General Assembly, whereas both the European and Scandinavian groups are somewhat dissatisfied with the performance

of this organ.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

TABLE 53

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR GENERAL PERFORMANCE
SATISFACTION—ANSWER VARIABLES¹

	S.C. (D)	G.A. (S)	ECOSOC (S)	TRUST. (S)	SECT. (S)
Correlation with econ.dev.	-	-	-	?	?

¹The expected negative association in the case of the Security Council lies in the reasoning that the underdeveloped groups would have a tendency to find greater dissatisfaction with the organs with which they are assumed not to be identified. The negative association in the case of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council are based on the concept of positive attachment of the underdeveloped to the organization, especially in the case of these two organs, compared to the developed groups. The ambiguity in respect to the Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat may be explained by the conflicting forces which may be important factors in the degree of satisfaction expressed by the groups for these organs. In the case of the Trusteeship Council, neither the developed nor the underdeveloped dominate the organ because of the membership arrangements which stress balance between colonial and non-colonial powers and, although the Trusteeship Council is generally considered to have done a good job by many of the delegates of the underdeveloped groups with whom I talked to, nevertheless, the fact that the Trusteeship Council has been associated only with a minority of non-self-governing territories, has been a source of dissatisfaction. In the case of the Secretariat, the acquisition of the Secretary-General's position by a South-East Asian could perhaps be considered a factor which would cause a differential between the groups. However, the activism of the Secretariat in the Congo situation has been unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of several underdeveloped states.

TABLE 54

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR GENERAL PERFORMANCE
SATISFACTION—ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.C. (D)	G.A. (S)	ECOSOC (S)	TRUST. (S)	SECT. (S)
	(43-100r) 57r	(14-90r) 76r	(40-100r) 60r	(20-100r) 80r	(20-100r) 80r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	+ .72	-.94	-.28	+ .33	+ .26

The hypothesis, in respect to an association between economic development and attitudes, is confirmed in respect to the Security Council, but the correlation is in a direction opposite to that which was expected. That is, it was felt that the underdeveloped groups would have a higher degree of dissatisfaction than the developed groups with the Security Council because of the identity of the developed with the Council. Perhaps this positive correlation can be explained in part by a sense of frustration connected with Security Council impotence felt by those most closely identified with it.

The hypothesis is confirmed in respect to the General Assembly and in the direction that was expected. Furthermore, the wide range in respect to the General Assembly, along with the very high negative correlation makes it possible to practically predict the score of one variable from the score of the other. That is, the higher the degree of satisfaction of a group with the General Assembly, the lower its economic development is likely to be. This supports the hypothesis of identification of the underdeveloped with this organ.

It was expected that the underdeveloped groups would express

more satisfaction with the Economic and Social Council than the developed groups and, although there is a slight negative correlation in the right direction, it is not nearly high enough to consider the hypothesis confirmed.

Neither the Trusteeship Council nor the Secretariat have correlations high enough to consider the hypothesis confirmed. Both have considerable range so that confirmation would have been possible. The lack of directional expectations, in both cases, is explained in the footnote concerning notation.

Hypothesis Testing Answer Group Variables

TABLE 55

ANSWER GROUP VARIABLE SCORES FOR GENERAL
PERFORMANCE SATISFACTION

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
African	2	6	14	+5	12	15
Afro-As.	4	6	17	+5	6	9
Arab	3	6	14	+5	21	23
Comm.	3	7	14	+4	20	21
Europe.	2	6	12	+3	36	39
Lat.Am.	4	6	15	+3	14	17
Scand.	2	4	9	+3	39	40
Soviet	5	5	11	0	41	43

TABLE 56

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR GENERAL PERFORMANCE
SATISFACTION—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	-	-	-	+	+

TABLE 57

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR GENERAL PERFORMANCE
SATISFACTION—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
	(2-5r) 3r	(4-7r) 3r	(9-17r) 8r	(0-5r) 5r	(6-41r) 35r	(9-43r) 34r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	3av,2min -38	4av,3min -56	5av,4min -82	4av,3min -49	28av,14min +83	26av,13min +83

The correlations in each case are in the direction that was expected and each variable has sufficient range so that correlations above the .70 level could be considered significant. However, only spread, distance +, and distance - are correlated above the .70 level. Thus, the economically developed groups tend to be less spread out in their answer patterns and more "distant" than the underdeveloped groups. Convergence and scatter differences, on the other hand, do not fall on economic lines. It might be noted, however, that the underdeveloped (Afro-Asian, Arab, and African) are the only groups with perfect convergence (+5).

Satisfaction with Membership Methods

In order to compare the caucusing groups in respect to their satisfaction with the "methods" of determining the membership of the United Nations' organs, the delegates were asked the following question: "What is your degree of satisfaction with the present methods of determining the membership of the following organs?" The organs were then listed with the four degrees of satisfaction indicated in

the introduction. No attempt here was made to separate the charter provisions concerning membership and the gentlemen's agreements which have arisen in respect to certain organs.¹ Follow up questions later in the questionnaire were designed to pinpoint more accurately the source of dissatisfaction when expressed.

Satisfaction Differences with Membership--All Delegates

TABLE 58 — By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	Other-No A.
S.C.	5	23	46	20	6
G.A.	25	48	15	5	7
ECOSOC	8	49	31	5	7
TRUST.	5	61	18	3	13
SECT.	3	51	31	3	12

It can be seen that a plurality is achieved in the somewhat dissatisfied column for the Security Council and a plurality or majority in the fairly satisfied column for all other organs. The second most popular answer after the plurality (46 per cent) achieved in somewhat dissatisfied by the Security Council is fairly satisfied (23 per cent) but very close to it is highly dissatisfied (20 per cent). Thus, if the somewhat dissatisfied and highly dissatisfied columns are added for the Security Council, a majority of the members

¹That is, the gentlemen's agreements which allocate seats on various organs on the basis of geographic considerations have been just as important or perhaps more important than charter provisions in determining who obtains seats on the organs and hence could be a significant source of dissatisfaction.

(66 per cent) fall on the dissatisfied side of the dichotomy. The addition of the first and second most popular answers for the other two plurality organs, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, give them a majority on the satisfied side of the dichotomy.

Satisfaction with the Membership Methods
of the Security Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 59 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	No A.
African	6	18	41	24	11
Afro-As.	3	18	47	24	8
Arab	..	30	50	20	..
Comm.	14	14	57	14	1
Europe.	14	14	43	29	..
Lat.Am.	7	43	36	7	7
Scand.	50	50	..
Soviet	..	20	60	20	..

All of the caucusing groups agree with the general pattern (somewhat dissatisfied), except the Latin American group which achieved a plurality in the fairly satisfied column. The African, Afro-Asian, and European groups achieved patterns almost identical to the general pattern of the United Nations in that each achieved a plurality in the somewhat dissatisfied column and a percentage between 24 per cent and 29 per cent in the highly dissatisfied column. The other agreeing groups each achieve majorities in the somewhat dissatisfied column, and with the exception of the Scandinavian group, vary between 14 to 20 per cent in the highly dissatisfied

column.¹ Thus, with the exception of the Latin American group, each of the caucusing groups exhibit an obvious consistency with the general pattern. If the percentage points under highly satisfied are added to the points found in fairly satisfied for the Latin American group, then it actually achieves a "majority" in the satisfaction side of the dichotomy in contrast to the other groups

¹A follow up question, "If you are dissatisfied with the present membership arrangements of the Security Council, how would you change them?" gave the following pattern:

TABLE 60 - By Percentages

VIEWS TOWARDS CHANGING THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

	Add More Warsaw Powers	Balance Warsaw & NATO Powers	Enlarge on Geog. Basis	Balance Warsaw, NATO, & Non- aligned Powers	Give Add. Represent- ation to Warsaw & Non- aligned Powers	Other- No A.
General Pattern	3	..	11	16	8	62
African	6	..	6	35	..	53
Afro-As.	3	..	6	24	9	58
Arab	10	20	20	50
Comm.	14	..	86
Europe.	29	71
Lat.Am.	7	7	7	79
Scand.	50	50
Soviet	20	20	20	40

Satisfaction with the Membership Methods
of the General Assembly by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 61 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	Other-No A.
African	41	41	6	..	12
Afro-As.	26	53	12	..	9
Arab	30	50	10	..	10
Comm.	..	100
Europe.	..	57	14	14	15
Lat.Am.	36	43	14	..	7
Scand.	..	50	..	25	25
Soviet	20	..	40	40	..

All of the groups agree with the general pattern (fairly satisfied), with the exception of the Soviet group. The plurality of 48 per cent found in the general pattern is very close to the percentages of all the groups which agree, except the Commonwealth which achieves 100 per cent. The second most popular column in the general pattern of highly satisfied (20 per cent) is fairly close to the percentages achieved in this column by the agreeing African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab groups. The other two agreeing groups, European and Scandinavian, exhaust their remaining percentage points in either the somewhat dissatisfied, highly dissatisfied, or the Other-No A. category. In the case of the Soviet group, if one percentage point is added either in the somewhat dissatisfied or the highly dissatisfied column, the Soviet group achieves a plurality in that column. Thus, 80 per cent of the Soviet group falls within the dissatisfied half of the dichotomy. It might be noted that even though the Soviet group is the only group which disagrees with the general pattern, it

appears closer to the European and Scandinavian groups than to the other groups.

Satisfaction with the Membership Methods
of the Economic and Social Council by
Caucusing Groups

TABLE 62 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	Other-No A.
African	12	47	29	6	6
Afro-As.	9	47	32	6	6
Arab	10	50	40
Comm.	..	43	43	14	..
Europe.	..	57	14	14	15
Lat.Am.	14	50	29	..	7
Scand.	..	50	25	25	..
Soviet	..	60	40

All of the groups agree with the general pattern (fairly satisfied), with the exception of the Commonwealth group which needs one percentage point added to achieve a plurality. Although, in the general pattern the addition of the highly satisfied column and the fairly satisfied column gave a majority in the satisfied side of the dichotomy, nevertheless, a sizeable percentage also fell in the dissatisfied side of the dichotomy (36 per cent). This is true for all the groups concerned. In fact, the second most popular answer for all groups is the somewhat dissatisfied column. It might be noted that the African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab are the only groups which obtain any percentage points in the highly satisfied column and that the Commonwealth, European, Scandinavian, and Soviet

groups are completely lacking percentage points in this category.¹

Satisfaction with the Membership Methods
of the Trusteeship Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 63 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	No A.
African	6	47	18	12	17
Afro-As.	9	56	15	6	14
Arab	30	30	10	20	10
Comm.	..	86	14
Europe.	..	86	14
Lat.Am.	..	64	29	..	7
Scand.	75	..	25
Soviet	..	40	40	..	20

All groups, with the exception of the Arab, Soviet, and Scandinavian, agree with the general pattern (fairly satisfied). The Arab and Soviet groups each need one point added to fairly satisfied

¹It might be noted that although the Scandinavian group agrees with the formal definition of agreement set forth in this dissertation, half of its members fall in the dissatisfied side of the dichotomy.

to achieve plurality agreements.¹ All of the agreeing groups achieve a majority, with the exception of the African group. If the percentages found in the highly satisfied category are added to the percentage points found in the fairly satisfied category for the Arab and African groups, then they achieve a majority on the satisfied side of the dichotomy. The other plurality group, the Soviet, has no points in the highly satisfied column and therefore, a majority of its percentage points lay outside of the satisfied side of the dichotomy. The disagreeing group, the Scandinavian, achieves 75 per cent in the somewhat dissatisfied column.²

¹A follow up question, "If you are dissatisfied with the membership arrangements of the Trusteeship Council, how would you change them?" gave the following results:

TABLE 64 - By Percentages

VIEWS TOWARDS CHANGING THE TRUSTEESHIP
COUNCIL'S MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

	Create Maj. of Trust Powers	Create Maj. of Non-trust Powers	Eliminate all Non-trust Powers	Other-No A.
General Pattern	..	11	5	84
African	..	24	6	70
Afro-As.	..	18	3	79
Arab	..	20	..	80
Comm.	100
Europe.	100
Lat.Am.	..	7	7	86
Scand.	100
Soviet	100

²The second most popular answer in the general pattern was somewhat dissatisfied (31 per cent) and this is consistent with the second most popular choice of the African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Soviet groups.

Satisfaction with the Membership Methods
of the Secretariat by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 65 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	No A.
African	6	59	24	..	11
Afro-As.	6	53	29	3	9
Arab	..	60	30	..	10
Comm.	..	43	57
Europe.	14	72	14
Lat.Am.	7	43	29	7	14
Scand.	25	50	25
Soviet	..	40	60

All of the groups, except the Commonwealth and Soviet, are in agreement with the general pattern (fairly satisfied). The African, Afro-Asian, Arab, European, and Scandinavian groups achieve majorities in the fairly satisfied column, while the Latin American group achieved a plurality. The two disagreeing groups both achieved majorities in the somewhat dissatisfied column. In the general pattern, the second most popular category was the somewhat dissatisfied category and this is consistent with the pattern of all of the agreeing groups, with the exception of the European and Scandinavian groups. For them, one percentage point needs to be added in this category to make it the second most popular.¹

¹It might be noted that the second most popular choice of the disagreeing groups is fairly satisfied and because the percentages are large, their actual degree of disagreement with the general pattern does appear great.

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 66

SATISFACTION WITH MEMBERSHIP METHODS OF ORGANS

	<u>African</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Europe.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
S.C.	SD(p)	SD(p)	SD(m)	SD(m)	SD(p)	FS(p)	Tie ^(SD) _(HD)	SD(m)
G.A.	Tie ^(HS) _(FS)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(p)	FS(m)	Tie ^(SD) _(HD)
ECOSOC	FS(p)	FS(p)	FS(m)	Tie ^(FS) _(SD)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)
TRUST.	FS(p)	FS(m)	Tie ^(HS) _(FS)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	SD(m)	Tie ^(FS) _(SD)
SECT.	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	SD(m)	FS(m)	FS(p)	FS(m)	SD(m)

Again, with the exception of the Latin group, the Security Council stands out as the organ upon which most dissatisfaction is focused. With the exception of this organ, fairly satisfied seems to be the most popular answer; however, there is a considerable increase in the number of pluralities and ties compared to the questions concerning general performance satisfaction. Again, the group most frequently dissatisfied appears to be the Soviet group and the only organ with which it is fairly satisfied is the Economic and Social Council. Finally, the Latin American group stands out once again as the only group with fairly satisfied for all of the organs.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

TABLE 67

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP
SATISFACTION—ANSWER VARIABLES¹

Correla- tion with econ.dev.	S.C. (D)	G.A. (S)	ECOSOC (S)	TRUST. (S)	SECT. (S)
	-	-	-	?	+

¹The negative correlation in respect to economic development and dissatisfaction with the Security Council was based on the assumption that the old membership arrangements no longer reflect the new situation. That is, they tend to favor Latin America and Europe vis a vis, Africa and Asia. The negative association in the case of the General Assembly was based on the assumption that the relaxation of great power veto over the entrance of new members might cause a spill-over of general satisfaction, by the underdeveloped groups, into this category. The same basic reasoning applied in the case of the Economic and Social Council, although perhaps the outdated gentlemen's agreements in respect to this organ could provide a source of dissatisfaction for the underdeveloped groups. The ambiguity in connection with the Trusteeship Council lies in the fact that the arrange-

TABLE 68

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR MEMBERSHIP
SATISFACTION--ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.C. (D)	G.A. (S)	ECOSOC (S)	TRUST. (S)	SECT. (S)
	(43-100r)	(20-100r)	(43-64r)	(0-86r)	(40-86r)
Correla- tion with	57r	80r	21r	86r	46r
econ.dev.	+ .60	- .54	- .37	- .33	+ .53

The hypothesis is unconfirmed with all organs in respect to membership satisfaction. The Security Council comes close to confirmation, but the correlation is opposite that which was expected. That is, it was felt that the underdeveloped groups should express a higher degree of dissatisfaction with this organ than should the developed groups. This positive correlation may be considered, perhaps, a kind of spill-over of the developed groups' general dissatisfaction with this organ. The other organs are correlated in the direction that was expected.

ments provide for a perfect balance between trusteeship and non-trusteeship powers and there seems little reason to believe that either the developed or the underdeveloped should be more satisfied with these arrangements. The positive correlation in the case of the Secretariat was based on the assumption that the tendency to staff more frequently from developed areas than underdeveloped areas might provide a source of dissatisfaction for the underdeveloped. It might be noted, however, that a developed group, the Soviet, has protested the staffing arrangements of the Secretariat by claiming that its group has been unrepresented and this seems to be reflected in the Soviet delegates' responses where 60 per cent expressed dissatisfaction with the arrangements.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Group Variables

TABLE 69

ANSWER GROUP VARIABLE SCORES FOR MEMBERSHIP SATISFACTION

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converge	Dis +	Dis -
African	5	7	18	+5	10	13
Afro-As.	5	7	19	+5	3	5
Arab	5	8	15	+4	15	17
Comm.	3	4	11	-2	31	33
Europe.	4	6	14	+5	25	27
Lat.Am.	5	7	16	+3	16	19
Scand.	3	6	12	+3	28	29
Soviet	5	7	12	0	33	35

TABLE 70

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP
SATISFACTION—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converge	Dis +	Dis -
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	-	-	-	+	+

TABLE 71

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR MEMBERSHIP SATISFACTION—
ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converge	Dis +	Dis -
	(3-5r) 2r	(4-8r) 4r	(11-19r) 8r	(-2 to -5r) 7r	(3-28r) 25r	(5-35r) 30r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	3av,2min -67	4av,3min -41	5av,4min -63	4av,3min -92	28av,14min +67	26av,13min +65

The correlations are in the direction that was expected in each case but are high enough only in the case of convergence to allow the confirmation of the hypothesis. The range is great enough in

the case of distance + and distance - to allow the hypothesis to be "substantially confirmed," but is not high enough for Scatter 2. Thus, the developed groups tend to be significantly more divergent and distant on the question of membership satisfaction than the underdeveloped groups, but economic development scores are not associated significantly with Spread, Scatter 2, or Scatter 4 scores.¹

Satisfactions with Voting Systems

To ascertain the differences between the groups in respect to satisfactions with voting systems, the delegates were asked: "How satisfied are you with the voting systems of the following organs?" They were then supplied with a list of the organs and the four satisfaction categories referred to in the introduction.

Satisfaction with Voting Systems—All Delegates

TABLE 72 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	No A.
S.C.	8	36	30	20	6
G.A.	30	52	13	2	3
ECOSOC	26	57	8	2	7
TRUST.	23	56	11	..	10

¹The failure of the association of Spread to economic development may be explained by the fact that Europe obtains a higher score than would be expected and the Commonwealth a much lower score than would be expected, on the basis of their economic development. As is normally the case, however, the most underdeveloped groups, the Afro-Asian, African, and Arab, have high scores in respect to Spread.

It can be seen that majorities are obtained for all organs in the fairly satisfied column, with the exception of the Security Council which achieves a plurality. Although a plurality is achieved by the Security Council in the fairly satisfied category, the addition of the highly dissatisfied and somewhat dissatisfied percentages gives a majority¹ on the dissatisfied side of the dichotomy and this factor will have to be taken into account in the analysis that follows. That is, agreement for the Security Council will have to be defined differently than for the other organs. Agreement for the Security Council will be defined as a situation in which the addition of the somewhat dissatisfied and highly dissatisfied columns for the caucusing groups produces either a plurality or a majority on the dissatisfied side of the dichotomy.²

¹The term majority, here, is defined as 50 per cent or more for the reasons explained earlier.

²The reasons for this should be obvious. That is, it is assumed that a majority on one side of the dichotomy is more significant than a plurality in a single category on the other side. The problem has never arisen before because previously the plurality in a single category has always been on the same side as the majority which is achieved on one side of the dichotomy when both sides are summed up.

Satisfaction with the Voting System of
the Security Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 73 - By Percentages

	H.S.		F.S.	(Sum)	S.D.		H.D.	(Sum)	No A.
African	12	+	29	= 41	29	+	18	= 47	12
Afro-As.	6	+	32	= 38	26	+	24	= 50	12
Arab	..	+	30	= 30	40	+	20	= 60	10
Comm.	..	+	57	= 57	14	+	14	= 28	15
Europe.	14	+	43	= 57	43	+	..	= 43	..
Lat.Am.	..	+	29	= 29	42	+	29	= 71	..
Scand.	..	+	50	= 50	50	+	..	= 50	..
Soviet	40	+	60	= 100	..	+	..	=

Using this new definition of agreement, the African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab groups agree with the general pattern while the Commonwealth, European, and Soviet groups disagree and the Scandinavian group needs one percentage point added in the somewhat dissatisfied column to achieve agreement. The considerable fractionalization within the groups in respect to the dichotomy is clearly evident for all the groups, except the Soviet which finds all its percentage points on the satisfied side.

Satisfaction with the Voting System of
the General Assembly by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 74 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	No A.
African	53	35	12
Afro-As.	38	44	12	..	6
Arab	20	60	10	..	10
Comm.	14	72	..	14	..
Europe.	..	57	29	14	..
Lat.Am.	21	64	14	..	1
Scand.	..	75	25
Soviet	40	60

Returning to the original definition of agreement, all of the groups agree with the general pattern (fairly satisfied), with the exception of the African group. Majorities are obtained by the agreeing groups in the fairly satisfied column consistent with the majority obtained in the general pattern, except for the Afro-Asian group which obtains a plurality in this category. The disagreeing group, the African, achieves a majority (53 per cent) in the highly satisfied category which is the second most popular category picked in the general pattern. In fact, the second most popular choice for all of the agreeing groups is the highly satisfied column, with the exception of the European and Scandinavian groups who choose the somewhat dissatisfied category.¹

¹A follow up question, "If you are dissatisfied with the present voting procedure of the General Assembly, how would you change it?" gave the following results:

TABLE 75

VIEWES TOWARDS CHANGING THE VOTING PROCEDURES
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

	Create a Weighted Voting System Favoring Large Powers	Eliminate Two- thirds Require- ment for Import- tant Questions	Other- No A.
General Pattern	11	5	84
African	6	12	82
Afro-As.	6	6	88
Arab	..	10	90
Comm.	14	..	84
Europe.	29	..	71
Lat.Am.	21	..	79
Scand.	100
Soviet	20

Satisfaction with the Voting System of the
Economic and Social Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 76 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	No A.
African	35	47	6	..	12
Afro-As.	29	50	9	..	12
Arab	20	70	10
Comm.	14	57	..	14	15
Europe.	14	57	14	14	1
Lat.Am.	21	71	7	..	1
Scand.	..	100
Soviet	40	60

All of the caucusing groups agree with the general pattern (fairly satisfied).¹ Not only do most of the groups express a per-

¹A follow up question, "If you are dissatisfied with the present voting arrangements of the Economic and Social Council, how would you change them?" yielded the following:

TABLE 77 - By Percentages

VIEWS TOWARDS CHANGING THE VOTING ARRANGEMENTS
OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

	Create Weighted Voting System Favoring Large Powers	Create Veto For Large Powers	Have Decision By More Than Simple Majority	Other- No A.
General Pattern	8	2	2	88
African	6	..	6	88
Afro-As.	6	..	3	91
Arab	100
Comm.	14	86
Europe.	14	86
Lat.Am.	14	86
Scand.	100
Soviet	..	20	..	80

centage which is close to the majority percentage found in the fairly satisfied column in the general pattern, but all the groups express a percentage in the highly satisfied column, with the exception of the Scandinavian group, which is close to the percentage expressed in this second most popular category in the general pattern.

Satisfaction with the Voting System of
the Trusteeship Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 78 - By Percentages

	H.S.	F.S.	S.D.	H.D.	No A.
African	29	41	12	..	18
Afro-As.	26	44	12	..	18
Arab	20	40	10	..	30
Comm.	14	72	14
Europe.	14	72	14
Lat.Am.	14	72	14
Scand.	..	100
Soviet	40	60

All of the groups agree with the general pattern (fairly satisfied). Furthermore, all of the groups, with the exception of the Scandinavian, achieve percentages in the second most popular category (highly satisfied) which are close to the percentage achieved in the general pattern (23 per cent). The Commonwealth, Latin American, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups achieve agreement with majorities, while the African, Afro-Asian, and Arab groups achieve pluralities. The Commonwealth, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups are the only groups which fail to achieve at least some percentage points in

the somewhat dissatisfied column.¹

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 80

SATISFACTION WITH VOTING SYSTEMS OF ORGANS

	<u>African</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Europe.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
S.C.	D(p)	D(p)	D(p)	S(m)	S(p)	D(p)	Tie(^S / _D)	S(m)
G.A.	HS(m)	FS(p)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)
ECOSOC	FS(p)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)
TRUST.	FS(p)	FS(p)	FS(p)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)	FS(m)

¹A follow up question, "If you are dissatisfied with the voting arrangements of the Trusteeship Council, how would you change them?" gave the following pattern:

TABLE 79 - By Percentages

VIEWS TOWARDS CHANGING THE VOTING ARRANGEMENTS
OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

	Create Weighted System Favoring Large Powers	Give Trust Administering Powers a Veto	Other-No A.
General Pattern	3	3	94
African	..	6	94
Afro-As.	3	3	94
Arab	100
Comm.	100
Europe.	100
Lat.Am.	7	7	86
Scand.	100
Soviet	100

Again, with the exception of the Security Council, the most popular answer appears to be fairly satisfied. The only groups which are satisfied with the voting system of the Security Council are the Commonwealth, European, and Soviet groups. A kind of reversal seems to occur between groups as to who is the most frequently satisfied or dissatisfied when compared to the general performance summation. Thus, the European, Soviet, and Scandinavian groups, which were the most dissatisfied in respect to general performance, have now become, in respect to voting systems, along with the Commonwealth group, the most satisfied.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

TABLE 81

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR VOTING SATISFACTION¹
ANSWER VARIABLES

Correla- tion with econ.dev.	S.C. (D)	G.A. (S)	ECOSOC (S)	TRUST. (S)
	-	-	-	-

¹The negative correlation across the board was based on the assumption that the underdeveloped would tend to be dissatisfied with the voting arrangement of the Security Council because of the great power preference in the form of the veto, but satisfied with all the rest of the organs because of the stress on the equality of voting rights regardless of the size of the state.

TABLE 82
CORRELATION RESULTS FOR VOTING SATISFACTION--
ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.D. (D)	G.A. (S)	ECOSOC (S)	TRUST. (S)
	(0-72r)	(57-100r)	(71-100r)	(60-100r)
Correlation tion with econ.dev.	72r -.22	43r -.55	29r +.11	40r +.73

Economic development is not significantly related to voting satisfaction with any of the organs, except the Trusteeship Council. The range for this organ just meets the requirements set forth in the introduction. The positive correlation may be explained, in part, by the fact that its voting system could perhaps be considered to "favor" the developed groups in that a majority system, coupled with its membership arrangements, precludes against the possibility of non-colonial powers dominating this organ. That is, in this organ, in contrast to the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly, the underdeveloped do not possess an automatic majority.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Group Variables

TABLE 83
ANSWER GROUP VARIABLE SCORES FOR VOTING SATISFACTION

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
African	3	7	12	+4	17	21
Afro-As.	4	8	13	+4	10	15
Arab	3	6	11	+4	14	15
Comm.	3	8	11	+2	24	26
Europe.	5	8	13	+2	25	27
Lat.Am.	4	7	12	+4	17	20
Scand.	3	3	6	+3	43	45
Soviet	0	5	8	+2	27	28

TABLE 84

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR VOTING SATISFACTION—
ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	-	-	-	+	+

TABLE 85

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR VOTING SATISFACTION—
ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
	(0-5r) 5r	(3-8r) 5r	(6-13r) 7r	(2-4r) 2r	(10-43r) 33r	(15-45r) 30r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	3av,2min +.078	4av,3min -44	5av,4min -51	4av,3min -66	28av,14min +86	26av,13min +85

The correlation is in the direction expected in every case except Scatter 2. However, due to the fact that .078 is an exceedingly weak correlation, it may be disregarded as insignificant. The correlation in respect to convergence comes very close to the .70 level, but the lack of range in this case precludes against considering this negative correlation as significant. The only variables that have sufficient range and a strong enough correlation to allow confirmation of the hypothesis are Distance + and Distance -. Therefore, the developed groups tend to be more distant from the general pattern than the underdeveloped groups on the question of voting satisfaction, but economic development scores are not related significantly to convergence, spread, and scatter scores.

Conclusions

If it is assumed that a degree of dissatisfaction may be related to an impulse to change a situation or organ, then it might be hypothesized that the developed groups, because of their higher degree of dissatisfaction with the Security Council, will perhaps feel a greater impulse to make changes in the situation than will the underdeveloped groups. However, it is apparent that the direction of change would be intimately related to the type of support. Probably the developed groups would prefer, if they could change the situation to decrease their dissatisfaction, that the Security Council be made more viable, vis-à-vis the General Assembly, without necessarily reducing the developed areas' dominance of this organ. Also, the fact that a majority of each group (see Table 44) blame big power rivalry rather than charter provisions for previous poor performance by the Security Council probably will have bearing on the direction of any change which may occur.

The association of greater satisfaction in respect to the General Assembly with the underdeveloped may be a reflection of their sense of control over the situation. It would be reasonable to hypothesize that this satisfaction may lead to a continuation of attempts to satisfy their political demands through the United Nations structure instead of outside of it. On the other hand, the developed groups higher dissatisfaction with the Security Council and lower satisfaction with the General Assembly may perhaps act as an impulse to channel their demands through devices other than the United Nations.

The fact that the underdeveloped caucusing group patterns tend, to a much greater extent than the developed, to be miniature models of the United Nations pattern as a whole, in respect to satisfaction, again allows one to hypothesize that the delegate from underdeveloped groups is perhaps better prepared for the diversity of opinion within the entire United Nations than a delegate from a developed group. Also, because greater spread is associated with underdeveloped groups, the delegate from an underdeveloped group can be expected to be subject to greater cross-pressure than a delegate in a developed group. Hence, one might predict greater pattern instability for the underdeveloped groups because of this.

The failure of economic development scores to correlate with satisfaction scores in respect to membership arrangements may mean that any resistances or impulses, that are related to satisfaction or dissatisfaction with these arrangements within the groups, will not fall on economic lines. However, because of the indicated association of convergence, and the "substantial" association with Distance + and - scores with economic development scores, more "underdeveloped" delegates should feel familiarity with the general United Nations attitude pattern than delegates from developed groups.

The Trusteeship Council is the only organ where economic development is significantly related to the degree of voting satisfaction. However, because of the reasons already stated regarding the declining importance of the Trusteeship Council, one could hypothesize that suggestions in respect to changes in voting arrangements for

all of the organs should not meet resistance on basically economic lines. Again, however, a delegate from an underdeveloped group should have a greater cognizance from caucusing group activity than a "developed" delegate of the general United Nations pattern because underdeveloped groups tend to be less "distant" than the developed on this question.

Finally, it may be observed by reference to Tables 75, 77, and 79 that there seems to be little general support in respect to such schemes as weighted voting or extension of the veto system, etc.

CHAPTER V

PREDICTION DIFFERENCES

The descriptive component of this chapter is divided into three sections analyzing the caucusing groups' predictions concerning the major United Nations organs in respect to: (1) shifting importance; (2) membership arrangements; and (3) changes in the voting procedures.

In connection with "shifting importance," the delegates were asked: "In the future, do you predict the following organs will become more important or less important relative to the other organs of the United Nations?" and the provided answers were: more important, less important, and remaining the same.

Predictions on Shifting Importance--All Delegates

TABLE 86 - By Percentages

	More ¹	Less	Same	Other--No A.
S.C.	34	16	41	9
G.A.	72	2	21	5
ECOSOC	66	2	23	9
TRUST.	8	75	3	14
SECT.	43	10	31	16

¹Again, apparently, the delegates had a tendency to interpret this type of question in an absolute rather than relative sense as evidenced by their tendency to pick more important over the other categories.

Based on the above table: the Security Council achieves a plurality under remaining the same (41 per cent) with a very close second of more important (34 per cent), the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council achieve majorities under more important, the Trusteeship Council achieves a majority under less important, and the Secretariat achieves a plurality under more important (43 per cent) with a second most popular choice of remaining the same (31 per cent).

Predictions on Shifting Importance of the Security Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 87 - By Percentages

	More	Less	Same	Other-No A.
African	47	18	24	11
Afro-As.	29	21	44	6
Arab	30	30	40	..
Comm.	29	..	57	14
Europe.	..	14	72	14
Lat.Am.	50	14	29	7
Scand.	..	25	50	25
Soviet	80	20

Using preponderant weight analysis: the Commonwealth, European, and Scandinavian groups agree with the general pattern (remaining the same) with a majority, the Afro-Asian and Arab groups agree with a plurality, the African group disagrees with a plurality under more important (47 per cent), and the Latin American and Soviet groups disagree with a majority under more important. The agreeing groups, with the exception of the European and Scandinavian groups, have a

second most popular choice which is consistent with the second most popular choice found in the general pattern, that is, more important. The second most popular choice for the European and Scandinavian groups, on the other hand, fall into the category of less important. Finally, all of the disagreeing groups have their preponderant weight in the category which is second most popular in the general pattern, that is, under the more important category.

Predictions on Shifting Importance of
the General Assembly by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 88 - By Percentages

	More	Less	Same	Other No A.
African	53	..	35	12
Afro-As.	68	..	26	6
Arab	80	..	20	..
Comm.	43	14	29	14
Europe.	72	14	14	..
Lat.Am.	79	..	14	7
Scand.	100
Soviet	80	..	20	..

All of the caucusing groups obtain a majority, with the exception of the Commonwealth which obtains a plurality, in the more important category, and thus, all the groups are in agreement with the general pattern. Furthermore, all of the groups, with the exception of the Scandinavian which exhausts its percentage points with the more important category, have as a second most popular category remaining the same which is also in agreement with the general pattern established above.

Predictions on Shifting Importance of the
Economic and Social Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 89 - By Percentages

	More	Less	Same	Other No A.
African	76	..	12	12
Afro-As.	82	..	9	9
Arab	90	..	10	..
Comm.	57	..	29	14
Europe.	29	..	57	14
Lat.Am.	50	7	36	7
Scand.	25	..	50	25
Soviet	60	..	20	20

All of the groups achieve a majority in the more important category which agrees with the majority achieved in the general pattern, with the exception of the European and Scandinavian groups which achieve majorities in the remaining the same category. All of the agreeing groups have as their second most popular category remaining the same which is consistent with the second most popular category to be found in the general pattern. The two disagreeing groups, on the other hand, have as their second most popular category more important which is, of course, the category in which the preponderant weight is found in the general pattern. It should be noted that with the exception of the Latin American group, none of the groups have delegates which feel that the Economic and Social Council will become less important in the future.

Predictions on Shifting Importance of the
Trusteeship Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 90 - By Percentages

	More	Less	Same	Other--No A.
African	18	47	12	23
Afro-As.	15	65	6	14
Arab	20	60	..	20
Comm.	..	57	14	29
Europe.	..	72	..	28
Lat.Am.	..	93	..	7
Scand.	..	75	..	25
Soviet	..	100

All of the caucusing groups agree with the general pattern (less important). Furthermore, all of the groups achieve a majority under the less important category which is consistent with the majority achieved in the general pattern, with the exception of the African group which achieves a plurality. The second most popular choice in the general pattern (more important) is the second most popular choice for the African, Arab, and Afro-Asian groups, while the second most popular choice for the Commonwealth is remaining the same. None of the other groups exhibit a second most popular choice because they exhaust their percentage points in the categories of less important or other and no answer.

Predictions on Shifting Importance of
the Secretariat by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 91 - By Percentages

	More	Less	Same	Other-No A.
African	47	12	29	12
Afro-As.	38	12	35	15
Arab	30	20	30	20
Comm.	14	..	72	14
Europe.	29	14	29	28
Lat.Am.	64	7	21	8
Scand.	50	..	25	25
Soviet	40	..	40	20

The African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Scandinavian groups agree with the general pattern (more important), while the Arab, European, and Soviet groups need one percentage point added in the more important category to achieve agreement. The Commonwealth group disagrees with the general pattern with a majority in the re-remaining the same category. The Latin American and Scandinavian groups achieve majorities in the more important category, while the other two agreeing groups, the African and Afro-Asian groups, achieve pluralities in this category consistent with the plurality found in the general pattern. The second most popular choice for all of the agreeing groups, including those which need one percentage point added to achieve agreement, is the remaining the same category which is consistent with the second most popular choice of the general pattern.

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 92

PREDICTIONS CONCERNING CHANGES IN IMPORTANCE OF ORGANS¹

	<u>Af.</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Europe.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
S.C.	M(p)	S(p)	S(p)	S(m)	S(m)	M(m)	S(m)	M(m)
G.A.	M(m)	M(m)	M(m)	M(m)	M(m)	M(m)	M(m)	M(m)
ECOSOC	M(m)	M(m)	M(m)	M(m)	S(m)	M(m)	S(m)	M(m)
TRUST.	L(p)	L(m)	L(m)	L(m)	L(m)	L(m)	L(m)	L(m)
SECT.	M(p)	M(p)	Tie(^M _S)	S(m)	Tie(^M _S)	M(m)	M(m)	Tie(^M _S)

With the exception of the African, Latin American, and Soviet groups which expect the Security Council to become more important in the future, the groups predict that the Security Council will remain the same in importance relative to the other organs. There is complete agreement between the groups that the General Assembly will become more important and that the Trusteeship Council will become less important. With the exception of the European and Scandinavian groups, the Economic and Social Council is expected to become more important. The Secretariat seems to share with the Security Council a degree of ambiguity both between groups and within groups although the most popular answer between groups is also more important. It should be noted that with the exception of the Trusteeship Council

¹In the above chart, S equals remaining the same, M equals more important, L equals less important, m equals majority, and p equals plurality.

whose loss of importance is clearly understandable,¹ that none of the other organs are predicted by any of the caucusing groups to become less important relative to the other organs in the future.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

TABLE 93

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING
IMPORTANCE—ANSWER VARIABLES²

	S.C. (S)	G.A. (M)	ECOSOC (M)	TRUST. (L)	SECT. (M)
Correlation with econ.dev.	-	-	-	+	-

TABLE 94

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING
IMPORTANCE—ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.C. (S)	G.A. (M)	ECOSOC (M)	TRUST. (L)	SECT. (M)
	(0-80r)	(43-100r)	(25-90r)	(47-100r)	(14-64r)
	80r	57r	65r	53r	50r
Correlation with econ.dev.	+.38	+.48	-.91	+.31	-.54

The hypothesis is confirmed only in respect to the Economic and

¹That is, the Trusteeship Council is rapidly running out of trusteeship areas as they gain their independence.

²The above expectations are predicated on the assumption that the underdeveloped groups are more likely than the developed groups to see the organs of the United Nations, with the exception of the Security Council, as becoming more important, and less likely than the developed groups to perceive them as becoming less important. The negative correlation in respect to the Security Council remaining the same is based on the assumption referred to before concerning the lack of identification between underdeveloped groups and this organ.

Social Council and range is sufficient in this case to consider the high correlation significant. This may be explained by the fact that the underdeveloped groups may tend to perceive the Economic and Social Council as a device to further their interests to a significantly greater extent than the developed groups.

The positive correlation in respect to the Security Council is out of line with expectations in that it was felt that the developed groups would have a greater tendency to perceive future importance for this organ, whereas the underdeveloped groups would have a greater tendency to perceive it as remaining in a kind of static condition.

The positive correlation in respect to the General Assembly is also out of line with the expectations in that it was felt that the underdeveloped groups would have a greater tendency to predict greater importance for the organ with which it is assumed they are most closely identified with.

The positive correlation in respect to the Trusteeship Council is in line with expectations in that it was felt that underdeveloped groups would have less tendency than developed groups to perceive any organs decreasing their functions due to their greater commitment to the organization.

The negative correlation in respect to the Secretariat is in line with expectations, and may be related to the fact that a "representative" of the underdeveloped groups now holds the post of Secretary-General.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Group Variables

TABLE 94

ANSWER GROUP VARIABLE SCORES FOR PREDICTIONS
CONCERNING FUTURE IMPORTANCE

	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
African	8	13	+3	16	20
Afro-As.	8	13	+5	8	12
Arab	7	12	+4	16	17
Comm.	8	11	+3	26	29
Europe.	6	11	+2	28	30
Lat.Am.	7	11	+3	22	26
Scand.	5	8	+3	32	33
Soviet	5	8	+2	26	27

TABLE 95

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING
FUTURE IMPORTANCE—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	-	-	+	+

TABLE 96

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING
FUTURE IMPORTANCE—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
	(5-8r) 3r	(8-13r) 5r	(2-5r) 3r	(8-32r) 24r	(12-33r) 21r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	4av,3min -76	5av,4min -71	4av,3min -59	28av,14min +85	26av,13min +81

The correlation in each case is in the direction expected and the hypothesis is confirmed in all cases except convergence. Thus,

the developed groups tend to be more cohesive, less spread, and more distant than the underdeveloped groups on the questions concerning the future importance of the organs. It should be noted, however, although the correlation connected with scatter is considered significant, it has the minimum range allowable for this category. The remainder of the variables exceed their minimum range but the range here is not as great for most variables as it has been for other questions.

Predictions Concerning Changes in Membership Arrangements

In order to assess differences between caucusing groups, the delegates were asked the following question: "Do you predict any important changes in the membership arrangements for the following organs in the next five years?" The delegates were provided with the answer spaces of yes and no for the first forty-two questionnaires, and highly probable, probable, improbable, and highly improbable on the remaining nineteen questionnaires. The reason for the change in the answer format came about due to complaints by some delegates that the yes and no character of the questionnaire in respect to certain questions was too restrictive. In order to handle both groups of data under the same analytical categories, it was decided to combine yes answers with probable and no answers with improbable. Thus, the headings utilized in the following analysis will be highly probable, probable and yes (referred to as probable in the verbal analysis), improbable and no (referred to as improbable in

the verbal analysis), and highly improbable.

Predictions Concerning Changes in Membership
Arrangements—All Delegates

TABLE 97 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
S.C.	..	56	34	..	10
G.A.	..	34	57	..	9
ECOSOC	..	54	31	2	13
TRUST.	..	41	38	2	19
SECT.	2	48	36	2	12

As can be seen from the above chart, a majority of the delegates in the case of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council felt that changes in membership arrangements were probable, a plurality of members felt they were probable in the case of the Trusteeship Council¹ and the Secretariat, and a majority of the members felt that it was improbable that there would be changes in the membership arrangements of the General Assembly.

¹It should be noted in respect to the Trusteeship Council that the plurality established is a bare 3 per cent and, therefore, the preponderant weight analysis which has been followed in this dissertation will have to be interpreted with the utmost caution in respect to this organ.

Predictions Concerning Changes in Membership
Arrangements of the Security Council
by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 98 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	71	12	..	17
Afro-As.	..	59	26	..	15
Arab	..	50	40	..	10
Comm.	..	43	29	..	28
Europe.	..	57	43
Lat.Am.	..	50	50
Scand.	..	75	25
Soviet	..	40	40	..	20

All of the groups, with the exception of the Latin and Soviet which need one percentage point added to their figure in the probable column to achieve agreement, agree with the pattern established in the general pattern (probable). Furthermore, all of the agreeing groups, with the exception of the Commonwealth, which achieves a plurality, achieve a majority in respect to this category. The balance of opinion in most groups seems to be very close to the balance expressed in the general pattern.

Predictions Concerning Changes in Membership
Arrangements in the General Assembly
by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 99 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	29	53	..	18
Afro-As.	..	35	50	..	15
Arab	..	20	70	..	10
Comm.	..	29	43	..	28
Europe.	..	28	72
Lat.Am.	..	36	64
Scand.	100
Soviet	..	40	60

All of the groups agree with the general pattern (improbable). Furthermore, all groups achieve a majority in the improbable category, consistent with the majority achieved in the general pattern, except the Commonwealth group which achieved a plurality.

Predictions Concerning Changes in Membership Arrangements in the Economic and Social Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 100 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	65	18	..	17
Afro-As.	..	62	18	..	20
Arab	..	70	20	..	10
Comm.	..	43	14	..	43
Europe.	..	28	72
Lat.Am.	..	43	50	7	..
Scand.	..	25	75
Soviet	..	60	20	..	20

Five of the groups, the Commonwealth, African, Afro-Asian, Arab, and Soviet, agree with the general pattern (probable), while three, the Latin American, European, and Scandinavian, disagree. All of the agreeing groups achieve majorities, with the exception of the Commonwealth group which achieves a plurality. The three disagreeing groups all achieve majorities in the improbable category.

Predictions Concerning Changes in Membership
Arrangements of the Trusteeship Council
by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 101 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	35	29	..	36
Afro-As.	..	38	35	..	27
Arab	..	40	30	..	30
Comm.	..	29	29	..	42
Europe.	..	57	43
Lat.Am.	..	43	43	7	7
Scand.	..	50	50
Soviet	..	40	20	..	40

The African, Afro-Asian, Arab, European, and Soviet groups agree with the general pattern (probable), while the Commonwealth, Latin American, and Scandinavian groups need one percentage point added in the probable category to achieve agreement. All of the agreeing groups achieve a plurality in the probable category, consistent with the plurality achieved in the general pattern, with the exception of the European group which achieves a majority. The remarkable similarity between the groups in respect to the division of opinion is evident.

Predictions Concerning Changes in Membership
Arrangements in the Secretariat by
Caucusing Groups

TABLE 102 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	47	35	..	18
Afro-As.	..	56	29	..	15
Arab	..	50	40	..	10
Comm.	..	43	29	..	28
Europe.	..	29	57	..	14
Lat.Am.	..	36	50	7	7
Scand.	75	..	25
Soviet	..	20	60	..	20

The Commonwealth, African, Afro-Asian, and Arab groups agree with the general pattern (probable), while the Latin American, European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups disagree. The Afro-Asian and Arab groups achieve majorities in the probable category, while the Commonwealth and African groups achieve pluralities, consistent with the plurality achieved in the general pattern. The disagreeing groups all achieve majorities in the improbable category.

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 103

PREDICTIONS CONCERNING CHANGES IN MEMBERSHIP
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ORGANS¹

	<u>Af.</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Eur.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
S.C.	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(p)	P(m)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)	P(m)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)
G.A.	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(p)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)
ECOSOC	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(p)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	P(m)
TRUST.	P(m)	P(p)	P(p)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)	P(m)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)	P(p)
SECT.	P(p)	P(m)	P(m)	P(p)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)

The first thing evident is the high agreement between groups on the probability that changes will occur in respect to membership arrangements in respect to the Security Council.² Also, the General Assembly stands out as the organ in which a majority of the members of all groups, except the Commonwealth in which a plurality thinks so, do not expect changes in respect to the membership arrangements. Hence there seems to be a high order of agreement between groups in respect to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

¹In the above chart, P equals probable and yes, I equals improbable and no, m equals majority, and p equals plurality.

²In that there was a wide degree of dissatisfaction with the membership arrangements of the Security Council, it could be argued that if this probability becomes an actuality, then it may alleviate some of the dissatisfaction associated with this organ. However, in view of the fact that most groups both are dissatisfied and expect change, one could reasonably predict a degree of frustration to occur concerning this organ if the desired changes do not occur.

With the exception of the Latin American, European, and Scandinavian groups, changes are also expected in respect to the Economic and Social Council in spite of the fact that there was no dissatisfaction expressed by the groups concerning membership arrangements of this organ.

There is also considerable agreement between the groups concerning the possibility of change in respect to the Trusteeship Council, although it is most natural in view of the fact that trusteeship nations which are not members of the Security Council are automatically dropped from the Trusteeship Council when their period of trusteeship is ended.

The groups seem evenly split on the question of whether changes will occur in respect to the Secretariat with the Latin American,¹ Scandinavian, European, and Soviet groups picking improbable.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

TABLE 104

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING CHANGES IN MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS--ANSWER VARIABLES²

Correla- tion with econ.dev.	S.C. (P)	G.A. (I)	ECOSOC (P)	TRUST. (P)	SECT. (P)
-	-	+	-	-	-

¹It seems that the group that was most satisfied with all of the present arrangements for the organs is also the group that is most frequently in the improbable category, that is, the Latin American group.

²The above expectations are based on the assumption that the underdeveloped groups are more likely to perceive the United Nations in dynamic terms than the developed groups, and, therefore, more likely to see the probability of change in the membership arrangements.

TABLE 105

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING CHANGES
IN MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS—ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.C. (P)	G.A. (I)	ECOSOC (P)	TRUST. (P)	SECT. (P)
	(40-75r)	(43-100r)	(25-70r)	(29-57r)	(0-56r)
Correla- tion with	35r	57r	45r	28r	56r
econ.dev.	+08	+70	-.39	+.74	-.85

The hypothesis is confirmed in the case of the General Assembly and the Secretariat. The lack of range in the case of the Trusteeship Council precludes considering the correlation significant.

The correlation in the case of the General Assembly is in line with what was expected and may be explained by the fact that the developed groups perhaps have a tendency to perceive the organization in more static terms than do the underdeveloped ones. That is, they are less likely to predict changes in respect to the organization than the underdeveloped groups. The correlation in respect to the Secretariat is also in line with what was expected, that is, the association of the underdeveloped groups with the idea of change.

Although the positive correlation in respect to the Security Council is out of line with that which was expected, the exceedingly small degree of correlation in this case, coupled with the lack of sufficient range, makes no further comment necessary.

The correlation in the case of the Economic and Social Council is in line with expectations and may be explained by the same reasons that applied in the case of the General Assembly and the Secretariat.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Group Variables

TABLE 106

ANSWER GROUP VARIABLE SCORES FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING
CHANGES IN MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
African	5	5	10	+5	11	13
Afro-As.	5	5	10	+5	9	13
Arab	5	5	10	+5	11	12
Comm.	5	5	10	+4	14	15
Europe.	5	5	10	+1	24	26
Lat.Am.	5	6	13	-1	16	19
Scand.	3	3	9	0	41	43
Soviet	4	5	9	+2	20	21

TABLE 107

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING CHANGES
IN MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	-	-	-	+	+

TABLE 108

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING CHANGES IN
MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
	(3-5r) 2r	(3-6r) 3r	(9-13r) 4r	(-1 to +5r) 6r	(9-41r) 32r	(12-43r) 31r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	3av,2min -64	4av,3min -62	5av,4min -37	4av,3min -64	28av,14min +90	26av,13min +89

The correlation in each case is in the direction expected; however, the correlation is high enough only in respect to distance +

and distance - to allow confirmation of the general hypothesis. Three other variables, scatter 2, scatter 4, and convergence come close to the .70 level, but the minimum range in respect to scatter 2 and scatter 4 precludes against assuming that the hypothesis is substantially confirmed. The fact that the range of convergence exceeds the minimum allows one to impute substantial confirmation in this case. Thus, high economic development is associated with a tendency to "diverge" and to be "distant," in contrast to the underdeveloped groups, on questions concerning membership changes.

Voting Predictions

In order to ascertain differences between groups, forty-two delegates were asked the question: "Do you predict any significant changes to occur in respect to the voting procedures of the following organs in the next five years?" and were provided with a list of the organs with yes and no check spaces besides each organ. The remaining nineteen delegates were asked the same question but were provided with the highly probable, probable, improbable, and highly improbable answer spaces for the reasons explained elsewhere. Hence, once again, to keep the categories of analysis similar for all delegates, the yes answers were combined with probable and no answers were combined with improbable.¹

¹Again the probable and yes category will be referred to as probable and the improbable and no category as improbable in the verbal analysis.

Predictions Concerning Voting Procedures--All Delegates

TABLE 109 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
S.C.	..	21	67	..	12
G.A.	..	11	77	3	9
ECOSOC	..	11	77	2	10
TRUST.	..	10	74	2	14

It can be seen from the above chart that a majority of delegates considered it improbable that significant changes would occur in respect to voting procedures for any of the organs. The highest percentage obtained in the probable category is 21 per cent, and this occurs in respect to the Security Council, whereas the probable category for all the other organs hovers at around the 10 per cent figure.

Predictions Concerning the Voting Procedures
of the Security Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 110 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	35	41	..	24
Afro-As.	..	29	56	..	15
Arab	..	20	70	..	10
Comm.	..	14	72	..	14
Europe.	..	14	72	..	14
Lat.Am.	..	14	86
Scand.	..	25	50	..	25
Soviet	80	..	20

A majority in all of the groups agree with the general pattern, with the exception of the African group which agrees by a plurality. Furthermore, all of the groups, with the exception of the Soviet

group, have percentages in the probable column which are fairly close to the 21 per cent achieved in the general pattern. The exception to this is perhaps the African group which achieves a 35 per cent figure in the probable category.

Predictions Concerning Voting Procedures
in the General Assembly by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 111 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	12	65	..	23
Afro-As.	..	18	65	..	17
Arab	..	20	70	..	10
Comm.	72	14	14
Europe.	100
Lat.Am.	93	7	..
Scand.	100
Soviet	..	20	80

Again, all of the caucusing groups agree with the general pattern (improbable) and all agree with majority figures which are consistent with the majority figure obtained in the general pattern. The only groups which obtained any percentage whatsoever in the probable category are the African, Afro-Asian, Arab, and Soviet groups.

Predictions Concerning Voting Procedures in the
Economic and Social Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 112 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	18	59	..	23
Afro-As.	..	18	65	..	17
Arab	..	10	80	..	10
Comm.	86	..	14
Europe.	100
Lat.Am.	93	7	..
Scand.	100
Soviet	..	20	80

Again, there is agreement among all caucusing groups with the general pattern and all achieve a majority in the improbable category, consistent with the majority obtained in the general pattern. Also, once again, the only groups to obtain any percentages in the probable category are the African, Afro-Asian, Arab, and Soviet groups.

Predictions Concerning Voting Procedures in the Trusteeship Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 113 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	12	59	..	29
Afro-As.	..	15	65	..	20
Arab	..	10	70	..	20
Comm.	86	..	14
Europe.	100
Lat.Am.	..	7	79	7	7
Scand.	100
Soviet	80	..	20

A majority in all of the caucusing groups agree with the general pattern (improbable). The only groups to obtain any percentages in the probable category are the African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab groups.

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 114

PREDICTIONS CONCERNING CHANGES IN VOTING
SYSTEMS FOR THE ORGANS

	<u>Af.</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Eur.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
S.C.	I(p)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)
G.A.	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)
ECOSOC	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)
TRUST.	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)

As can readily be seen, the preponderant weight of all groups feel that changes are improbable in the voting systems of the organs.² Further, with the exception of the African group in respect to the Security Council, "majorities" are obtained in each case.

¹In the above chart, I equals improbable, m equals majority, and p equals plurality.

²Thus, the groups in which dissatisfaction was expressed concerning the voting system of the Security Council, the African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Arab, agree that change is improbable in the next five years. In this case, therefore, the groups are predicting, in effect, that the source of their dissatisfaction will continue and this recognition may perhaps reduce a sense of frustration compared to a situation where the groups feel dissatisfaction and expect alterations to occur if no actual alterations are assumed to occur in either case.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

TABLE 115

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING
VOTING SYSTEMS—ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.C. (I)	G.A. (I)	ECOSOC (I)	TRUST. (I)
Correla- tion with econ.dev..	+	+	+	+

TABLE 116

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING
VOTING SYSTEMS—ANSWER VARIABLES

	S.C. (I)	G.A. (I)	ECOSOC (I)	TRUST. (I)
	(41-86r)	(65-100r)	(59-100r)	(59-100r)
	45r	35r	41r	41r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	+0.34	+0.76	+0.72	+0.94

The hypothesis is confirmed for the organs other than the Security Council and the General Assembly. The lack of sufficient range in the case of the General Assembly makes its correlation above .70 insignificant by the standards set forth in this dissertation. The direction of correlation for all organs is in line with expectations in that it was felt that the developed groups would be less likely to perceive changes as being probable than would the developed groups.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Group Variables

TABLE 117

ANSWER GROUP VARIABLE SCORES FOR
PREDICTIONS CONCERNING VOTING SYSTEMS

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
African	5	5	8	+4	16	20
Afro-As.	4	5	8	+4	11	16
Arab	4	4	8	+4	6	8
Comm.	1	2	6	+4	15	16
Europe.	1	1	5	+4	24	26
Lat.Am.	2	4	9	+4	20	23
Scand.	1	1	5	+4	24	26
Soviet	2	2	6	+4	16	17

TABLE 118

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING
VOTING SYSTEMS—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	-	-	-	+	+

TABLE 119

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR PREDICTIONS CONCERNING
VOTING SYSTEMS—ANSWER GROUP VARIABLES

	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Spread	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
	(1-5r) 4r	(1-5r) 4r	(5-9r) 4r	(+4 to +4r) Or	(6-24r) 18r	(8-26r) 18r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	3av,2min -79	4av,3min -92	5av,4min -88	4av,3min 0	28av,14min +78	28av,13min +68

The correlation in every case is in the direction expected, except in the case of convergence where the groups are not differentiated.

The hypothesis is confirmed for all remaining variables. The confirmation, however, in the case of distance - is "substantial" in view of the fact that the correlation does not quite reach the .70 level. Thus, the developed groups tend to be more cohesive, regardless of whether two categories or four categories are computed, less spread and more distant than the underdeveloped groups in respect to predictions concerning changes of the voting procedures of the organs. It can be noted, however, that range comes close to the minimum for distance + and distance - and is at the minimum in the case of spread.

Conclusions

If it is assumed that there is a relationship between disappointment and frustration and the failure of expectations to materialize, then it may be hypothesized that more delegates (as a ratio to all delegates within a group) from the underdeveloped groups, should the Economic and Social Council fail to become more important relative to the other organs, will be frustrated or disappointed than will delegates from developed groups. On the other hand, should the Economic and Social Council become more important relative to the other organs, and a sense of satisfaction is related to fulfillment of expectations, it may be hypothesized that more delegates from underdeveloped groups will be satisfied than will delegates from the developed groups. In turn, this frustration or satisfaction, it could be hypothesized, may condition the delegates' perspectives not only towards this organ, but the entire organization. In the case of the remaining organs, such responses to changes should be more or less

randomly distributed between the developed and the underdeveloped groups. Once again, however, a delegate from an underdeveloped group should be subjected to more diverse expectations in the normal course of the caucusing group activity than the delegate from a developed group and hence, it could be hypothesized, will be subjected to more cross-pressure which may create the possibility of greater pattern instability for the underdeveloped groups. Also, the greater similarity of the underdeveloped patterns with the general pattern should provide the delegate from an underdeveloped group a better opportunity to understand and pick up a feeling for, through his caucusing group activity, the expectations in general which may exist in the United Nations.

Alterations in the membership arrangements of the General Assembly should prove to be more frustrating or perhaps surprising to a higher ratio of delegates in developed groups than in underdeveloped groups. On the other hand, the failure for changes to occur should produce frustration or disappointment in more "developed" delegates in the case of the Trusteeship Council and in more "underdeveloped" delegates in the case of the Secretariat. It may also be hypothesized that such frustrations or disappointments or surprises to the extent that they develop, because of the changes in membership arrangements of particular organs, may in turn induce further feelings about the organization as a whole. The failure of expectations to materialize in the case of the Trusteeship Council will probably be much less consequential than in the case of the other two

organs for reasons specified elsewhere. Again, it may be hypothesized that the delegate from an underdeveloped group is in a much better position than one from a developed group for ascertaining from his caucusing group experience the balance of expectations for the United Nations in general. That is, he should be less surprised, than the delegate from the developed caucusing group, on the basis of his experience, with the balance of opinion outside his own group.

It could be predicted, following the reasoning presented above, that more delegates from developed areas will experience a sense of disappointment, frustration, or perhaps surprise than will the delegates from underdeveloped groups if voting changes should occur in the case of the Economic and Social Council or the Trusteeship Council. This frustration or disappointment or surprise, in turn, could affect the delegates' perspectives towards these organs as well as the entire organization. The expectation pattern for the underdeveloped, however, once again, it could be hypothesized, may perhaps be less stable because of the association of spread and scatter with the underdeveloped compared to the developed groups. That is, the patterns as they are measured now could, on the basis of these associations, be expected to persist over time to a greater extent for the developed groups. Again, however, the "underdeveloped" delegate is in a better position to perceive and understand the total distribution of expectations within the United Nations than the delegate from a developed group, from his caucusing group activity, because of the association of greater distance with developed groups.

CHAPTER VI

ORGANIZATIONAL POTENCY

Whereas in Chapter III the questions related to strength and potency were designed to compare the caucusing groups in respect to their perceptions of the individual organs, the purpose of this chapter is to compare the views of the groups as to the organization as a whole. The questions asked were: "Do you believe that the United Nations has made significant contributions to world peace?" "Do you believe that permanent world peace is possible at the present state system with no changes in the United Nations structure or function?" "Do you feel that the United Nations would be of any particular use if large scale war were to break out among the major powers?" and, "Do you feel that the United Nations is as effective as it can be given the present state of great power rivalry?" The answers provided for forty-two of the delegates were: yes, no, doubtful, and don't know¹ and for the remaining nineteen: highly probable, probable, improbable, and highly improbable. The reason for the change in answer format is the same as that which was given earlier for other questions.

As before, some of the delegates objected to the yes, no char-

¹"Don't know" responses naturally were placed in the other-no answer category in the analysis that follows.

acter of the answers. So that common categories could be used once again, yes answers were collapsed with probable, while no and doubtful answers were collapsed with improbable.¹

The answer group variables of ideal 50 and ideal dis. referred to in the Introduction, will be utilized in this chapter. In the case of ideal type 50, an ideal caucusing group having the highest possible score is one which achieves a majority on the probable side of the dichotomy for each question enumerated above. In the case of ideal dis. a high score means that the caucusing group in question is "farther" from the ideal type than a group with a lower score.

Organizational Potency--All Delegates

TABLE 120- By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.--No- Doubtful	H.Im- prob.	Other- No A.
U.N. contribute to peace	15	75	2	..	8
Peace with no change in U.N.	..	34	49	..	17
U.N. use in war	5	23	61	2	9
Effective as can be in great power rivalry	..	48	48	..	4

Majority figures in the general pattern are only achieved in respect to two questions. That is, 61 per cent of the delegates feel

¹Similar to before, in the verbal analysis, probable and yes will be referred to as probable and improbable-no-doubtful as improbable.

that it is improbable that the United Nations will be of use if war breaks out among the major powers, and 75 per cent feel it is probable (15 per cent highly probable) that the United Nations has made significant contributions to world peace. A plurality (49 per cent) feel that it is improbable that peace can be permanent without changes in United Nations structure or function, while the delegates were evenly split (48 per cent) on the question of whether the United Nations was as effective as it can be given the present state of great power rivalry. It is apparent that preponderant weight analysis can proceed in the normal fashion in respect to all of the questions but the last. In this case, a new definition of disagreement must be devised. For this question, disagreement will be defined as a divergency of more than 12 per cent from the percentage in the general pattern in either the probable or improbable category by a caucusing group.¹

¹The cut-off point of 12 per cent is used in this case because most groups fall within this range. That is, to cut it off at say 10 per cent would have created an essentially "artificial" distinction.

Perceptions of Past United Nations
Contributions to Peace by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 121 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.-No- Doubtful	H.Improb.	Other- No A.
African	6	76	18
Afro-As.	6	85	9
Arab	..	90	10
Comm.	..	86	14
Europe.	29	57	14
Lat.Am.	21	64	15
Scand.	25	75
Soviet	40	60

All of the groups agree with the general pattern (probable). In fact, many groups are close to the 90 per cent figure obtained in the general pattern on the probable side of the dichotomy. The only groups which obtained any percentage whatsoever in the improbable category are the Commonwealth and European groups.

Perceptions of the Possibility of Permanent
Peace with no Changes in the United Nations
Structure or Function by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 122 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.-No- Doubtful	H.Improb.	Other- No A.
African	..	29	53	..	18
Afro-As.	..	21	65	..	14
Arab	..	20	60	..	20
Comm.	..	29	57	..	14
Europe.	..	72	14	..	14
Lat.Am.	..	36	43	..	21
Scand.	..	75	25
Soviet	..	80	20

All of the groups, with the exception of the European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups agree with the general pattern (improbable). Whereas the preponderant weight was a plurality in the general pattern, a majority is achieved by all of the agreeing groups, with the exception of the Latin American. The disagreeing groups, European, Scandinavian, and the Soviet, all achieve majorities in the probable category.

Perceptions of the United Nations' Probable Use in War Between the Major Powers by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 123 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.-No-Doubtful	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	6	12	53	..	29
Afro-As.	3	21	59	..	17
Arab	..	20	70	..	10
Comm.	..	14	86
Europe.	86	14	..
Lat.Am.	..	50	50
Scand.	75	25	..
Soviet	40	..	60

All of the groups agree with the general pattern (improbable), except the Latin American which needs one percentage point added to achieve agreement. All of the agreeing groups achieve majorities consistent with the majority achieved in the general pattern. One striking feature of the above pattern is that neither the European nor Scandinavian groups achieve any percentage points in the probable side of the dichotomy.

Perceived Possibility of Greater Effectiveness
of the United Nations Given the Present State
of Great Power Rivalry by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 124 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.-No- Doubtful	H.Improb.	Other- No A.
African	..	47	41	..	12
Afro-As.	..	50	44	..	6
Arab	..	40	60
Comm.	..	72	28
Europe.	..	43	57
Lat.Am.	..	43	50	..	7
Scand.	..	50	50
Soviet	..	40	60

Following the special definition of agreement set forth in the Introduction for this question, all of the groups, except the Commonwealth, agree with the general pattern. That is, they do not diverge on either side of the dichotomy by more than 12 per cent from the percentage in the general pattern.¹ The Commonwealth group achieves 72 per cent in the probable category.

¹For example, the Arab group has a score of 40 in the probable category and 60 in the improbable category. Therefore, 40 (Arab - probable) subtracted from 48 (general pattern - probable) equals 8 and 60 (Arab - improbable) subtracted from 48 (general pattern - improbable) equals -12 which places both sides of the dichotomy for the Arab group within the range specified in the Introduction.

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 125

VIEWS TOWARDS ORGANIZATIONAL POTENCY BY GROUPS¹

	<u>Af.</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Eur.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
U.N. contribute to peace	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)
Peace with no change in U.N.	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	P(m)	I(p)	P(m)	P(m)
U.N. use in war	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	I(m)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)	I(m)	I(m)
Effective as can be in great power rivalry	P(p)	P(m)	I(m)	P(m)	I(m)	I(m)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)	I(m)

With the exception of the European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups, it seems to be agreed between groups that the organization must change if world peace is to be preserved in spite of the fact that it has made significant contributions to world peace in the past. In the eventuality of actual war, however, there seems to be a large degree of agreement between groups that it would be of little use. With the exception of the Commonwealth, African, and Afro-Asian groups, there also seems to be considerable agreement between groups that the organization is not operating, at the present, with maximum effectiveness. It may be noted that the European, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups, in spite of the fact that they were among the most

¹In the above chart, P equals probable and yes, I equals improbable-no-doubtful, m equals majority, and p equals plurality.

frequently dissatisfied with the organs of the United Nations, nevertheless, in contrast to the remaining groups, feel that the organization is potent enough, at present, to preserve the peace without making significant changes. Finally, it should be remembered that most groups expected considerable changes in respect to the organization, particularly in respect to membership arrangements, and hence one would need not be driven to complete pessimism on the basis of these answer patterns.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

TABLE 126

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS¹ FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
POTENCY—ANSWER VARIABLES

	U.N. contrib. to peace (P)	Peace with no change in U.N. (I)	U.N. use in war (I)	Effect, as can be in great power rivalry (P)
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	-	+	+

¹The negative correlation in respect to the United Nations contribution to peace was based on the assumption that the underdeveloped groups would have a tendency to stress the United Nations as an important element in peace to a greater extent than the developed groups.

The negative correlation in respect to the possibility of preserving peace without changing the United Nations was based on the assumption that the developed groups, because it is assumed that they generally consider the organization less potent than the underdeveloped groups, would perceive structural alterations in the organization as being more irrelevant to peace than the underdeveloped groups.

The positive correlation in respect to the United Nations use in war is based on the same set of assumptions, that is, it is assumed that the developed groups consider the United Nations less relevant to war or peace than the underdeveloped groups and, therefore, they should have a positive association with the category of improbable concerning its actual use in war.

The positive correlation expected in the case of present United Nations effectiveness, in the face of great power rivalry, was based on the assumption that, although the underdeveloped groups might

TABLE 127

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
POTENCY—ANSWER VARIABLES

	U.N. contrib. to peace (P)	Peace with no change in U.N. (I)	U.N. use in war (I)	Effect. as can be in great power rivalry (P)
	(82-100r) 18r	(14-65r) 51r	(29-86r) 57r	(40-72r) 32r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	+ .45	- .84	+ .64	- .01

The hypothesis is confirmed only in the case of the question concerning the probability of peace without changing the organization. The strong negative correlation is in line with expectations in that it was felt that the underdeveloped groups would have a greater tendency to perceive the need of structural alterations in order that the United Nations can perform its peace preserving functions more adequately. Or, to put it another way, the developed groups have a greater tendency than do the underdeveloped ones to express the opinion that peace is possible regardless of modification in the United Nations.

The correlation in respect to past United Nations contributions toward peace is out of line with that which was expected. The very small degree of range on this question, however, makes the correlation in question insignificant.

consider the organization useful in the past and useful in the case of war, it was assumed that they would feel that the chief impediment to greater present effectiveness lies in the antagonisms between developed groups.

The correlation direction in respect to the usability of the United Nations in war is in line with expectations. That is, it was felt that the developed groups would consider it a much less viable instrument in times of crisis than the underdeveloped groups. Because of the closeness to the .70 level and the presence of more than adequate range, the hypothesis is considered substantially confirmed.

The negative correlation in respect to the effectiveness of the United Nations in the face of great power rivalry is out of line with expectations. That is, it was felt that the underdeveloped groups would perceive the possibility of much greater effectiveness in the present situation than the developed groups. However, the lack of range on this question, along with the exceedingly weak nature of the correlation, makes no further comment necessary.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Group and Ideal Variables

TABLE 128

ANSWER GROUP AND IDEAL VARIABLE SCORES FOR ORGANIZATIONAL POTENCY

	Ideal 50	Ideal Dis	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
African	2	68	4	5	+4	7	9
Afro-As.	2	69	4	5	+4	9	14
Arab	1	75	4	4	+4	14	16
Comm.	2	68	5	5	+2	20	22
Europe.	2	69	3	5	+2	32	34
Lat.Am.	2	59	4	5	+3	16	19
Scand.	2	62	3	5	+2	25	26
Soviet	2	50	4	6	+2	36	38

TABLE 129

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL POTENCY—ANSWER GROUP AND IDEAL VARIABLES¹

	Ideal 50	Ideal Dis	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	+	-	-	-	+	+

¹The ideal expectations were based on the belief that the underdeveloped should have higher ideal 50 scores but lower ideal dis scores than the developed for the reasons explained in the Introduction. The expectations for the other variables remain the same as before.

TABLE 130

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL POTENCY—ANSWER GROUP AND IDEAL VARIABLES

	Ideal 50	Ideal Dis	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
	(1-2r) 1r	(50-75r) 25r	(3-5r) 2r	(4-6r) 2r	(2-4r) 2r	(7-36r) 29r	(9-38r) 29r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	2av,1min	31av,16min	3av,2min	4av,3min	4av,3min	28av,14min	26av,13min
	-.31	+.25	-.68	+.26	-.81	+.76	+.74

The correlations in question are in the right direction for all variables, except scatter 4 and ideal 50. The lack of range for these variables, however, makes the already small correlations in question insignificant.

The correlations in the case of convergence, distance + and distance - are high enough to consider the hypothesis confirmed.

The correlation in the case of scatter 2, although very close to .70, is not associated with the above minimums range, therefore, the hypothesis will not be considered substantially confirmed.

Thus, the economically well developed groups tend to be more "divergent" and "distant" in respect to questions connected with potency perceptions than the underdeveloped groups, but economic development scores are not associated significantly with either the ideal or scatter variables.

Conclusions

Because the underdeveloped groups have a greater tendency to perceive the improbability of peace without changes in the organization, it may be hypothesized, to the extent that they have a commitment to peace, that they will be more receptive to any changes in the organization which are designed to reduce the possibility of war. In case of major war, however, assuming the organization still exists, it might be predicted that there will be less tendency for the developed groups to attempt to use the United Nations to ameliorate the conflict than the underdeveloped groups. That is, regardless of the

picture which is usually painted of the results of a nuclear war, the underdeveloped have a greater tendency to perceive the usefulness in this situation for the United Nations than the developed and, therefore, may be ready to act upon this expectation. Finally, it may be hypothesized that the delegates in underdeveloped groups are in a better position to be sensitive to the overall perceptions in the United Nations in respect to potency, than are delegates from the developed ones, because of the greater likelihood that their causing group pattern will take on the general characteristics of the United Nations pattern as a whole.

CHAPTER VII

STRENGTHENING ORIENTATION

In this chapter differences between the caucusing groups in respect to their tendency to wish to strengthen the United Nations is examined. It was felt general questions such as, "Would you desire a stronger United Nations?" would be perhaps too nebulous for the type of comparisons desired. Therefore, most of the questions used to differentiate between the caucusing groups in respect to their strengthening orientation refer, with one exception, to strengthening or giving more power to particular organs.

The questions asked were: "Would you favor the creation of a police force to be under the control of the Security Council as presently constituted with voting procedures remaining the same?" "Would you favor a police force under the Security Council if its present composition and voting procedures were changed?" "Would you favor the creation of a police force under the control of the General Assembly with its present membership and voting procedures?" "Would you favor the creation of a police force under the control of the General Assembly if its membership or voting procedures were altered?" "Do you feel that the Trusteeship Council should govern directly the territories under question instead of the trusteeship nations?" "Do you favor placing all or most non-self-governing territories under the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council?" and, "Would you favor

the eventual control by the United Nations of all armaments capable of being used in modern war?"

The answers provided in the first forty-two questionnaires followed either a yes-no or a favor-do not favor scheme, while in the remaining nineteen questionnaires the strongly favor, favor, etc. scheme was used. The reason for the change in provided answers is the same here as it was in the previous chapters. This time, "yes" and "no" responses are collapsed with the favor and do not favor categories. When such collapsing occurs, the category will be referred to simply as either favor or do not favor in the verbal analysis.

As in Chapter VI, the answer group variables of ideal 50 and ideal dis are used. This time, ideal 50 is defined so that a group with maximum strengthening orientation obtains a majority on the favor side of the dichotomy on each question.

Strengthening Orientation—All Delegates

TABLE 131 - By Percentages

	S.Fav.	Fav.	Do Not Fav.	Other-No A.
Police force-S.C.-same	..	36	39	25
Police force-S.C.-diff.	..	67	8	25
Police force-G.A.-same	2	33	38	27
Police force-G.A.-diff.	..	30	20	50
Trust. gov. directly	..	25	43	32
All non-self-gov. under Trust.	..	49	30	21
U.N. control all arms	3	62	11	24

In terms of preponderant weight analysis, the delegates favor: a police force for the Security Council or General Assembly with

different membership arrangements and voting procedures, placing all non-self-governing territories under the Trusteeship Council, placing all armaments capable of initiating war under United Nations control; but do not favor: a police force under the Security Council or General Assembly with the same membership arrangements and voting procedures, or the idea that the Trusteeship Council should govern trust territories directly.

It can be seen that majorities are obtained only in two instances: in the favor category for the question concerning the possibility of the United Nations controlling arms and in the favor category in the question concerning creation of a police force under the Security Council if its present voting procedures and composition were changed. The preponderant weight in all other categories is a plurality, although a majority is almost obtained in the favor category (49 per cent) for the question of putting all non-self-governing territories under the Trusteeship Council. The lowest plurality (30 per cent) occurs for the question of having a police force for the General Assembly if its voting procedures and composition are changed.

Attitudes Towards a Police Force for the
Security Council with the Same Voting
Procedures and Composition by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 132 - By Percentages

	S.Fav.	Fav.	Do Not Fav.	Other-No A.
African	..	30	35	35
Afro-As.	..	35	35	30
Arab	..	30	40	30
Comm.	..	72	28	..
Europe.	..	43	57	..
Lat.Am.	..	29	36	35
Scand.	..	50	50	..
Soviet	..	40	60	..

All of the groups, with the exception of the Commonwealth, Afro-Asian, and Scandinavian, agree with the plurality achieved in the do not favor category in the general pattern. The Afro-Asian and the Scandinavian groups need one percentage point added to this category to achieve agreement. Three of the agreeing groups, the African, Latin American, and Arab, achieve pluralities which are consistent with that achieved in the general pattern. Two of the agreeing groups, the European and Soviet, achieve majorities. The disagreeing group, the Commonwealth, achieves a majority in the favor category.

Attitudes Towards a Police Force for the
Security Council with Different Voting
Procedures and Composition by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 133 - By Percentages

	S.Fav.	Fav.	Do Not Favor	Other-No A.
African	..	59	6	35
Afro-As.	..	68	3	29
Arab	..	70	10	20
Comm.	..	57	14	29
Europe.	..	43	29	28
Lat.Am.	..	71	7	22
Scand.	75	25
Soviet	..	80	20	..

All of the groups, with the exception of the Scandinavian group, agree with the majority achieved in the favor category in the general pattern. Furthermore, all of the agreeing groups achieve a majority in this category, with the exception of the European group which achieves a plurality. The disagreeing group, Scandinavian, achieves a majority in the do not favor category.

Attitudes Towards a Police Force for the
General Assembly with the Same Voting
Procedures and Composition by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 134 - By Percentages

	S.Fav.	Fav.	Do Not Favor	Other-No A.
African	6	35	29	30
Afro-As.	3	35	29	33
Arab	..	50	20	30
Comm.	..	14	72	14
Europe.	..	57	29	14
Lat.Am.	..	29	43	28
Scand.	..	100
Soviet	80	20

The Commonwealth, Latin American, and Soviet groups agree with the general pattern (do not favor). Both the Commonwealth and the Soviet groups achieve majorities, while the Latin group achieves a plurality consistent with the plurality achieved in the general pattern. The African, Afro-Asian, Arab, European, and Scandinavian groups all disagree with the general pattern. The Arab, European, and Scandinavian groups achieve majorities in the favor category, while the African and Afro-Asian groups achieve pluralities.

Attitudes Towards a Police Force for the
General Assembly with Different Voting
Procedures and Composition by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 135 - By Percentages

	S.Fav.	Fav.	Do Not Fav.	Other-No A.
African	..	24	12	64
Afro-As.	..	35	9	56
Arab	..	30	10	60
Comm.	..	14	57	29
Europe.	..	43	29	28
Lat.Am.	..	14	21	65
Scand.	..	75	..	25
Soviet	..	20	60	20

The African, Afro-Asian, Arab, European, and Scandinavian groups agree with the general pattern (favor). The African, Afro-Asian, and European groups achieve pluralities, consistent with the plurality achieved in the general pattern, while the Scandinavian group achieves a majority. Except for the Scandinavian group, and perhaps the European group, the exceptionally high percentage of other-no answer responses is apparent. Apparently either the delegates were extremely

reluctant to come out in favor of a police force for the General Assembly without specifications as to what the differences to composition and voting procedures would be, or the question may be considered a "political" one in which the delegates were extremely hesitant to commit themselves. The disagreeing groups, that is, the Commonwealth, Latin American, and Soviet, also exhibit some reluctance to answer the question, although this is much more evident for the Latin American than for either the Commonwealth or Soviet groups. In fact, both the Commonwealth and Soviet groups achieve majorities in the do not favor category while the Latin American group achieves the lowest plurality yet recorded (21 per cent).

Attitudes Towards the Trusteeship Council
Governing Directly, by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 136 - By Percentages

	S.Fav.	Fav.& Yes	Do Not Fav.& No	Other-No A.
African	..	35	29	36
Afro-As.	..	32	32	36
Arab	..	50	20	30
Comm.	..	14	57	29
Europe.	..	43	43	14
Lat.Am.	..	29	57	14
Scand.	..	50	..	50
Soviet	60	40

The Commonwealth, Latin American, European, and Soviet groups agree with the general pattern, while the Afro-Asian group needs one percentage point added in the do not favor category to achieve agreement. The Commonwealth, Latin American, and Soviet groups achieve majorities, while the European group achieves a plurality consistent

with the plurality achieved in the general pattern. The African, Arab, and Scandinavian groups disagree with the general pattern with the Scandinavian and Arab groups achieving majorities in the favor category and the African group achieving a plurality. It should be noted that the significance of the disagreement of the African group must be questioned in view of the few percentage points by which it achieves a plurality in the favor category.

Attitudes Toward Placing Non-Self-Governing Territories Under the Trusteeship Council by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 137 - By Percentages

	S.Fav.	Fav.& Yes	Do Not Fav.& No	Other-No A.
African	..	47	35	18
Afro-As.	..	59	21	20
Arab	..	60	10	30
Comm.	..	57	43	..
Europe.	..	14	43	43
Lat.Am.	..	50	43	7
Scand.	..	25	50	25
Soviet	..	20	40	40

All of the groups, with the exception of the European, Scandinavian, and Soviet, agree with the general pattern (favor). Furthermore, all of the agreeing groups, with the exception of the African group, achieve majorities. Of the disagreeing groups, two, the Soviet and European, achieved pluralities in the do not favor category while the Scandinavian achieves a majority in this category. It should be noted that the percentages in the do not favor category of two of the agreeing groups are fairly high, that is, the Commonwealth

and Latin American groups both have 43 per cent in this category.

Attitudes Towards the Control of Armaments
by the United Nations by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 138 - By Percentages

	S.Fav.	Fav.& Yes	Do Not Fav.& No	Other-No A.
African	..	71	6	23
Afro-As.	..	76	3	21
Arab	..	70	..	30
Comm.	..	72	14	14
Europe.	..	43	29	28
Lat.Am.	.7	43	21	29
Scand.	..	75	25	..
Soviet	20	40	20	20

All of the groups agree with the general pattern (favor). If the strongly favor and favor categories are added together, all groups achieve a majority on the favor side of the dichotomy, with the exception of the European group.

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 139

STRENGTHENING ORIENTATION BY GROUPS¹

	<u>Af.</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Europe.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
Pol.For.- S.C.same	NF(p)	Tie($\frac{NF}{F}$)	NF(p)	F(m)	NF(m)	NF(p)	Tie($\frac{NF}{F}$)	NF(m)
Pol.For.- S.C.diff.	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)	F(p)	F(m)	NF(m)	F(m)
Pol.For.- G.A.same	F(p)	F(p)	F(m)	NF(m)	F(m)	NF(p)	F(m)	NF(m)
Pol.For.- G.A.diff.	F(p)	F(p)	F(p)	NF(m)	F(p)	NF(p)	F(m)	NF(m)
Trust. gov. direct	F(p)	Tie($\frac{NF}{F}$)	F(m)	NF(m)	Tie($\frac{NF}{F}$)	NF(m)	F(m)	NF(m)
All areas un- der Trust.	F(p)	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)	NF(p)	F(m)	NF(m)	NF(p)
U.N. control all arms	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)	F(p)	F(p)	F(m)	F(p)

¹In the above chart, F equals favor, NF equals do not favor or do not favor and no, m equals majority, and p equals plurality.

There seems to be considerable agreement between groups that it would be desirable to change the Security Council in respect to membership and voting methods prior to its acquisition of a permanent police force. The only group that would not favor a police force under the Security Council even with changed membership and voting methods is the Scandinavian group.

There seems to be surprising strength between groups, with the exception of the Soviet, Latin American, and Commonwealth groups, for a police force under the General Assembly as it is presently constituted. Even, however, if the General Assembly were changed in respect to composition and voting procedures, in a way presumably favorable to the respondent, the Commonwealth, Latin American, and Soviet groups still would not favor such an idea.

There is considerable disagreement between groups on the question of whether the Trusteeship Council should govern trust territories directly. Actually this question, in view of recent history, is rapidly becoming academic in view of the expected demise of the Trusteeship Council. In spite of the fact that most of the groups apparently expect the Trusteeship Council to disappear eventually, and many do not wish the organ to govern directly, there seems to be considerable support, with the exception of the European, Scandinavian, and Soviet¹ groups, for the idea of placing all non-self-

¹It may be noted that the Soviet group which stood out in depicting the organization as weaker than it should be, nevertheless does not stand out with anything like consistent strengthening orientation.

governing trust territories under it.

Finally, there is complete agreement between groups on the desirability of placing all arms capable of initiating war under the control of the United Nations.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

TABLE 140

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING ORIENTATION--ANSWER VARIABLES¹

	Pol.For.- S.C. same (NF)	Pol.For.- S.C.diff. (F)	Pol.For.- G.A. same (NF)	Pol.For.- G.A.diff. (F)	Trust.gov. direct (NF)	All areas under Trust. (F)	U.N.control all arms (F)
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	-	+	-	+	-	-

TABLE 141

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR STRENGTHENING ORIENTATION--ANSWER VARIABLES

	Pol.For.- S.C. same (NF)	Pol.For.- S.C.diff. (F)	Pol.For.- G.A. same (NF)	Pol.For.- G.A.diff. (F)	Trust.gov. direct (NF)	All areas under Trust. (F)	U.N.control all arms (F)
	(29-60r)	(0-80r)	(0-80r)	(14-75r)	(0-60r)	(14-60r)	(43-76r)
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	31r +.69	80r -.75	80r -.21	61r +.69	60r -.22	46r -.82	33r -.32

¹The above expectations were based on the assumption that the underdeveloped groups, with the exception of the question concerning the Security Council with its present membership and voting procedures, would tend to pick favor because of their presumed greater commitment to the organization. The negative correlation in respect to the Security Council, with the same membership arrangements and voting procedures, was based on the assumption that the underdeveloped are not identified with this organ.

The hypothesis is confirmed in respect to the question concerning a police force for the Security Council with different membership and voting procedures and for the question concerning putting all non-trusteeship territories under the control of the Trusteeship Council. The range is great enough in respect to the question concerning a police force for the General Assembly with different voting and membership arrangements so that the hypothesis may be considered substantially confirmed.

The negative correlation in respect to the question of a police force for the Security Council with different arrangements is in line with expectations. It may be explained by the fact that the underdeveloped, because of their low capabilities, perhaps feel a greater commitment toward making the organization a viable deterrent in respect to military aggression.

The strong negative correlation in respect to the question of placing non-self-governing territories under the Trusteeship Council is also in line with expectations. This is perhaps related to a tendency of the underdeveloped groups to give the organization more functions and power.

The positive correlation in respect to the question of a police force for the General Assembly with different voting procedures and membership arrangements is at odds with expectations. That is, why should the developed groups want to strengthen an organ which is associated or identified with the underdeveloped groups? Perhaps the explanation in this case lies in the wording of the question.

That is, the question suggested that there would be changes in voting or membership arrangements and it is possible that alterations, particularly in the present voting system, may have been considered potentially detrimental to the interests of the underdeveloped groups. That is, the present system doesn't differentiate between nations in terms of their military power or economic strength as a new system might. Perhaps they prefer control over the General Assembly through the present voting system and would rather keep this "power" even at the cost of arrangements that would strengthen the General Assembly.

The positive correlation for the question of a police force for the Security Council with the same voting and membership arrangements, is also out of line with expectations. It was assumed that the developed groups would more readily favor such a suggestion than the underdeveloped groups because of the lack of identification of the underdeveloped groups with this organ. The lack of range, however, precludes against assuming that the correlation is significant.

The negative correlation in respect to the question of a police force for the General Assembly with the same voting arrangements and membership arrangements is in line with expectations. It was assumed that the developed groups would be less favorable to this idea because of their assumed lack of identification with the General Assembly compared to the underdeveloped groups.

The slight negative correlation in the do not favor category in respect to the idea of having the Trusteeship Council govern directly

is also out of line with expectations. It was assumed that the underdeveloped groups would be more favorable to the idea of increasing the power of this organ through direct rule than the developed groups.

The negative correlation in respect to the idea of the United Nations controlling world armaments is in line with expectations. It was felt that the underdeveloped groups would be more predisposed to view this sort of arrangement as desirable, because of their presumed greater commitment to the organization compared to the developed. The lack of range, however, makes the correlation in this category insignificant. That is, the groups are not significantly differentiated on this question.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Group
and Ideal Variables

TABLE 142

ANSWER GROUP AND IDEAL VARIABLE SCORES
FOR STRENGTHENING ORIENTATION

	Ideal 50	Ideal Dis	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
African	2	61	4	5	+3	8	10
Afro-As.	3	55	4	4	+3	9	14
Arab	5	52	4	4	+3	15	17
Comm.	4	71	4	4	+3	25	27
Europe.	1	76	4	4	+3	26	28
Lat.Am.	2	70	5	5	+5	14	16
Scand.	5	51	2	2	-2	33	34
Soviet	2	85	3	4	+3	34	36

TABLE 143

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING ORIENTATION—ANSWER GROUP AND IDEAL VARIABLES

	Ideal 50	Ideal Dis	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
Correlation with econ.dev.	-	+	-	-	-	+	+

TABLE 144

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR STRENGTHENING ORIENTATION—ANSWER GROUP AND IDEAL VARIABLES

	Ideal 50	Ideal Dis	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
	(1-5r) 4r	(51-85r) 34r	(2-5r) 3r	(2-5r) 3r	(-2 to +5r) 7r	(8-34r) 26r	(10-36r) 26r
Correlation with econ.dev.	2av, 1min -78	31av, 16min +19	3av, 2min -62	4av, 3min -71	4av, 3min -63	28av, 14min +81	26av, 13min +80

The correlation in all cases is in the direction expected. The correlations in the case of ideal 50, scatter 4 and both distances are high enough to confirm the hypothesis. Range is great enough in the case of scatter 2 and in convergence to allow substantial confirmation of the hypothesis.

Thus, the highly developed groups tend to have low scores in respect to ideal 50,¹ are more cohesive, divergent, and distant than the underdeveloped groups in respect to the questions concerned with strengthening orientation.

Conclusions

On the basis of the above associations, proposals for a police force for the Security Council, with the same voting procedures and membership arrangements, should meet with about the same resistance from the developed groups as the underdeveloped. However, if changes are made in the Security Council membership arrangements and voting procedures, then one may predict greater support of a police force for the Security Council from the underdeveloped groups. Proposals for a police force for the General Assembly as it now exists should meet with equal resistance from both sets of groups, but proposals

¹The lack of a significant correlation in respect to ideal dis but its presence in respect to ideal 50, means that underdeveloped groups tend to achieve the 50 per cent mark in respect to an ideal answer pattern more frequently than the developed, but that when the percentages are considered, in respect to the distance from the ideal type, they are not related significantly to economic development.

for a police force with changed membership arrangements and voting procedures should find higher support from the developed groups than the underdeveloped. Finally, proposals for placing additional territories under the Trusteeship Council should meet with greater support from the underdeveloped groups than the developed.

Because of the greater cross-pressure within the underdeveloped groups, however, the orientation of these groups should prove to be less stable than the developed. Finally, delegates from underdeveloped groups should have a greater awareness of the "strengthening orientation" of the United Nations in general, on the basis of caucusing groups experience than the developed. They may also feel more "at home" with the general pattern because of the tendency for their "preponderant weight" to coincide more frequently than the developed with the preponderant weight of the general pattern.

CHAPTER VIII

SUPRANATIONAL ORIENTATION

The questions used as a basis of differentiation between groups in this chapter are: "Do you feel that the United Nations may provide the basis of eventual world government?" "Do you believe that the United Nations could be far more successful if nations did not pursue their national interest so vigorously?" "Do you feel that it is possible for the Secretary-General to be neutral in conflicts between major power blocs?" and "Do you favor or disfavor the method of area representation in respect to the Secretary-General's staff?"¹

This time a group is placed "inside" of ideal 50 when it achieves a majority on the probable side of the dichotomy in respect to questions one, two, and three; and on the do not favor side of the dichotomy in respect to question four.

¹The first forty-two questionnaires used the yes-no or favor-disfavor answer schemes, while the remaining nineteen used the highly probable, probable, etc. answer scheme for questions one, two, and three, and the strongly favor, favor, etc. scheme for question four. The headings and verbal analysis usage, resulting from this change in the questionnaire, is consistent here with previous chapters.

Supranational Orientation--All Delegates

TABLE 145 -- By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.-No-Doubtful	H.Impr.	Other-No A.
U.N. provide basis for world gov.	..	25	54	2	19
Natl. interest vs. U.N.	5	71	11	..	13
Sec.-Gen. can be neutral	5	72	11	..	12
Area rep. for Sec.-Gen. staff	2(S.Fav)	67(Fav.)	15(No Fav.)	..	16

The majority of the delegates feel that: it is improbable that the United Nations will provide the basis for a world government, it is probable that there is a conflict between national interest and the success of the United Nations, and that it is probable the Secretary-General can be neutral in a conflict between major power blocs. Finally, a majority favor area representation in respect to the Secretary-General's staff.

Attitudes Towards the United Nations as a Basis for World Government by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 146 -- By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.-No-Doubtful	H.Improb.	Other-No A.
African	..	24	47	..	29
Afro-As.	..	29	44	..	27
Arab	..	50	30	..	20
Comm.	..	14	29	..	57
Europe.	..	28	72
Lat.Am.	..	21	57	..	22
Scand.	..	50	50
Soviet	80	20	..

The Commonwealth, African, Afro-Asian, Latin American, European, and Soviet groups agree with the general pattern (improbable). The Scandinavian group needs one percentage point added to the improbable category to achieve agreement while the Arab group disagrees with the general pattern achieving a majority in the probable category. Three of the agreeing groups achieve pluralities in the improbable category, the Commonwealth, African, and Afro-Asian, and three obtain majorities, the Latin American, European, and Soviet. It should be noted that in respect to the Commonwealth group, the plurality achieved is a rather low percentage (29 per cent)

Attitudes Towards an Assumed Conflict Between National Interest and the Interest of the United Nations by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 147 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.-No-Doubtful	H.Imprb.	Other-No A.
African	6	71	6	..	17
Afro-As.	6	76	6	..	12
Arab	..	90	10
Comm.	..	43	43	..	14
Europe.	..	57	14	..	29
Lat.Am.	7	79	7	..	7
Scand.	..	50	50
Soviet	..	40	40	..	20

All of the groups, except the Commonwealth, Scandinavian, and Soviet, agree with the general pattern (probable). The Commonwealth, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups each need one percentage point added in the probable category to achieve agreement. All of the agreeing

groups achieve a majority consistent with the majority achieved in the general pattern.

Attitudes Towards the Possibility of
the Secretary-General Remaining
Neutral by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 148 - By Percentages

	H.Prob.	Prob.& Yes	Improb.& No	H.Imprb.	Other-No A.
African	..	65	12	..	23
Afro-As.	6	71	9	..	14
Arab	..	80	20
Comm.	29	57	14
Europe.	14	57	29
Lat.Am.	..	86	14
Scand.	25	50	25
Soviet	..	60	40

All of the groups agree with the general pattern. Furthermore, all of the groups achieve majorities in the probable side of the dichotomy consistent with the majority achieved in the general pattern. The Latin American and Arab groups, however, are the only ones lacking percentage points in the improbable category.

Attitudes Towards Area Representation
in Respect to the Secretary-General's
Staff by Caucusing Groups

TABLE 149 - By Percentages

	S.Fav.	Fav.	Do Not Fav.	Other-No A.
African	6	71	6	17
Afro-As.	3	71	6	20
Arab	..	80	..	20
Comm.	..	86	14	..
Europe.	..	72	28	..
Lat.Am.	..	57	21	22
Scand.	..	75	25	..
Soviet	..	60	40	..

All of the groups agree with the general pattern. Majorities are established in each case on the favor side of the dichotomy, consistent with the majority obtained in the general pattern. The Arab group is the only one which does not achieve at least some percentage points in the do not favor category.

Summation Based on Preponderant Weight Analysis

TABLE 150

SUPRANATIONAL ORIENTATION BY GROUPS¹

	<u>Af.</u>	<u>Af.-As.</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Comm.</u>	<u>Eur.</u>	<u>Lat.Am.</u>	<u>Scand.</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
U.N. provide basis for world gov.	I(p)	I(p)	P(m)	I(p)	I(m)	I(m)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)	I(m)
Natl. interest vs. U.N.	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)	P(m)	P(m)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)	Tie($\frac{P}{I}$)
Sec.-Gen. can be neutral	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)	P(m)
Area rep. for Sec.-Gen. staff	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)	F(m)

¹In the above chart, I equals improbable-no-doubtful, P equals probable and yes, F equals favor, p equals plurality, and m equals majority.

In the previous chapter it was noted that there is considerable intergroup agreement that the organization must change to get peace. Here, we may note that there is a considerable degree of agreement between groups that any sort of changes in the organization probably will not lead to world government. The only exception to this is the Arab group. Also, with the exception of the Commonwealth, Scandinavian, and Soviet groups, the organization is seen as something opposed to national interest rather than as a champion thereof. Thus, the organization apparently may be depicted, as viewed by the delegates, in terms of preponderant weight analysis, as something beyond an instrument of national interest, but one, even if it is changed, that will stop short of becoming a world government.

Although all of the groups agree that the Secretary-General can theoretically be neutral in conflicts between power blocs,¹ apparently this belief is not strong enough to overcome a desire for an area restriction in respect to the selection of his staff. Thus the delegates are prepared to hedge the concept of theoretic neutrality with a device that is apparently predicated on the assumption that the Secretary-General may not be neutral. However, there is another possibility basically unrelated to this presumed fear of "partiality"

¹The contradiction between the Soviet group's expressed preponderant weight and the Soviet Union's position on the possibility of the Secretary-General's neutrality may be noted here. The Soviet Union's major argument for changing the Secretariat to a "Troika" form has been that the Secretary-General cannot be neutral. Apparently this position has not had great impact on the delegate members of the Soviet group.

on the part of the Secretary-General. That is, the Secretariat is essentially a job-creating agency and it may be that the pattern expressed here simply may be a reflection of a desire to insure equal job opportunities.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Variables

TABLE 151

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR SUPRANATIONAL
ORIENTATION—ANSWER VARIABLES¹

Correla- tion with econ.dev.	U.N.provide basis for world gov. (I)	Natl.int. vs. U.N. (P)	Sec.-Gen. can be neutral (P)	Area rep. for Sec.- Gen.staff (F)
	+	-	-	+

¹The above expectations are based on the assumption that the underdeveloped groups should be more supranational in their outlook because of the assumed usability of the organization by these groups to act as a counter-balance to the greater capabilities of the developed states. The only correlations which are perhaps not obvious are the ones concerning national interest and area representation. In the case of national interest, it was reasoned that a respondent's answer could be classified as less supranational if he tended to see no conflicts between national interest and the organization. That is, if he tended to see the organization as simply a flexible instrument of the national interest of states. In the case of area representation it was felt a supranationally oriented respondent would tend to look upon area representation as a sop to nationalism in the sense that such a principle, in contrast to a principle of pure "merit," could stand in the way of the effectiveness of the organization.

TABLE 152

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR SUPRANATIONAL
ORIENTATION—ANSWER VARIABLES

	U.N. provide basis for world gov. (I)	Natl.int. vs. U.N. (P)	Sec.-Gen. can be neutral (P)	Area rep. for Sec.- Gen.staff (F)
	(29-100r)	(40-90r)	(60-86r)	(60-86r)
	71r	50r	26r	26r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	+ .38	- .66	- .18	- .62

The hypothesis is unconfirmed for all questions connected with supranational orientation.

The range for the question of the national interest as being antagonistic to the United Nations, however, is sufficient to allow substantial confirmation. The correlation here is in line with what was expected. There seems to be a greater tendency on the part of the underdeveloped groups compared to the developed to see the United Nations as something more than a device of national interest. Specifically, it ties in with the idea that the underdeveloped nations may perceive the organization's dominant role as the curbing of the national interest of many of the more energetic developed states.

The positive correlations in respect to the improbability of the United Nations becoming a world government is in line with expectations. It was assumed that the underdeveloped groups would have a greater tendency than the developed groups to view the organization on the road to eventual world government.

The negative correlation in respect to the idea that it is pos-

sible for the Secretary-General to be neutral in power conflicts is also in line with expectations. This ties in with the idea that the organization somehow goes beyond a reflection of national interest. However, the exceedingly low correlation in this respect, coupled with the lack of range on this question, reduces the association in question to insignificance.

The negative correlation in respect to the idea of area representation is out of line with expectations. It was felt that the underdeveloped groups would be more favorable to the idea of staff selection on the basis of merit, rather than geography, because of their supposed greater commitment to the organization. The lack of range for this question, however, allows one to conclude that the correlation figure in question is not significant. That is, all groups are closely clustered together on this question.¹

¹The clustering here may come about for essentially different reasons. The developed groups may support area representation because it more or less insures against national partiality in a presumably supranational body whereas the underdeveloped may support area representation simply because they want to get an equal share of the jobs available.

Hypothesis Testing for Answer Group and Ideal Variables

TABLE 153

ANSWER GROUP AND IDEAL VARIABLE SCORES
FOR SUPRANATIONAL ORIENTATION

	Ideal 50	Ideal Dis	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
African	2	69	4	4	+4	6	7
Afro-As.	2	64	4	4	+4	5	8
Arab	3	54	1	1	+3	21	23
Comm.	1	76	5	5	+3	28	30
Europe.	2	72	5	5	+4	20	21
Lat.Am.	2	58	4	4	+4	14	17
Scand.	3	53	4	4	+2	24	25
Soviet	1	89	4	5	+3	38	40

TABLE 154

CORRELATION EXPECTATIONS FOR SUPRANATIONAL ORIENTATION—
ANSWER GROUP AND IDEAL VARIABLES

	Ideal 50	Ideal Dis	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	-	+	-	-	-	+	+

TABLE 155

CORRELATION RESULTS FOR SUPRANATIONAL ORIENTATION—
ANSWER GROUP AND IDEAL VARIABLES

	Ideal 50	Ideal Dis	Scat(2)	Scat(4)	Converg	Dis +	Dis -
	(1-3r) 2r	(53-89r) 36r	(1-5r) 4r	(1-5r) 4r	(2-4r) 2r	(5-38r) 33r	(8-40r) 32r
Correla- tion with econ.dev.	2av,1min +13	31av,16min +46	3av,2min +41	4av,2min +42	4av,3min -47	28av,14min +48	26av,13min +44

The direction of correlation is compatible with expectations for ideal dis, convergence, distance + and distance -. The degree of correlation, however, in all cases, is insignificant. It is apparent that the ideal 50 correlation is even less significant than the others. The hypothesis, therefore, is unconfirmed for all variables. In other words, economic development scores are not correlated with answer group variable scores on the question of supranational orientation for the caucusing groups at a significant level.

Conclusions

Because of their association with the idea that the United Nations is somehow antagonistic to national interest, delegates from underdeveloped groups, it may be hypothesized, may have some degree of difficulty in communicating with delegates from developed groups on what constitutes a negative act on the part of the state in respect to the organization. That is, delegates from developed groups should have less tendency to perceive the traditional behavior of states as being antagonistic to the aims and purposes of the United Nations. This may perhaps lead to a greater condemnation of traditional behavior by delegates from underdeveloped groups than from the delegates from developed groups. On the other hand, the groups should be essentially undifferentiated in terms of the stability of their answer pattern due to the failure of scatter to associate with economic development. Further, the caucusing group experience should provide no greater awareness of the pattern in general (in respect

to supranational orientation) for a delegate from an underdeveloped group, compared to a delegate from a developed group, because of the lack of correlation between distance scores and economic development scores.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

This dissertation had two major purposes: (1) to describe certain attitude patterns held by the delegate members of the caucusing groups of the United Nations, and (2) to test a hypothesis that these patterns are related to the group's "economic development" defined as average per capita gross national product.

The descriptive component, designed to fill a "gap" in political science literature, yielded a number of observations and showed various patterns emerge depending on the type of question asked. For example, the questions concerning the ranking of the organs, as to their importance for preserving the peace, showed the groups disagreeing, fractionalized, and "winning" categories, using preponderant weight analysis, by pluralities. On the other hand, the questions concerning the probability of changes in the voting systems showed a high order of agreement between groups, in the sense of picking the same side of the answer dichotomy, as well as "winning" categories by majorities.

The hypothesis testing component was suggested by the observation that developed states, perhaps, have less "need" for the organization than the underdeveloped ones, and that the underdeveloped states have come to "dominate" the United Nations, with the exception

of the Security Council. The architects of the organization, of course, were essentially developed states and it is possible that this apparent shifting tide in the direction of "domination" by the underdeveloped states might create a basically negative orientation of the developed toward it. It was felt, therefore, if attitudinal differences were found to fall on economic lines that one could make comments on the above "observation" as well as make modest predictions as to the future of the organization.

The concepts and tools around which the analysis took place were perceptions, satisfaction, prediction, organizational potency, strengthening orientation, supranational orientation, and the "ideal" and "answer group variables" of ideal C, ideal 50, ideal dis, scatter 4, scatter 2, spread, convergence, distance + and distance -.

Ideal C

The problem of relating the groups to an ideal type, which was assumed to embody "supranational" characteristics, constituted most of the second chapter. It was found that the degree of economic development was related, at a moderately high level (.83), with the "scores" of the groups in respect to ideal type C in the direction that was expected. On the basis of this relationship, it was predicted that rising economic development for the groups may tend to

inhibit "supranational" attitudes and activities.¹

Perceptions

In respect to ranking the organs, a device which it was assumed would provide a key for perceptual differences, the differences which did exist were not related to the degree of economic development. In the case of the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretariat, the groups lacked range. This was at odds with expectations in that it was felt that the large power dominance in the Security Council and the underdeveloped countries' dominance of the General Assembly should provide a basis for differentiation on economic lines at least for these organs.

The hypothesis fared considerably better in respect to perceptions concerning the changing importance of the organs. The hypothesis was confirmed in respect to the "minor" organs, that is, the Secretariat, Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. The underdeveloped groups, as expected, had a greater tendency, than the developed, to see the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat increasing in importance and less tendency to see the Trusteeship Council decreasing in importance. The groups were not

¹It might be noted that it may be the "economic distance," between the developed and the underdeveloped groups, that is related to the differentiation in scores, but, on the other hand, it may be the absolute level of economic development which "determines" the scores. In either case, if the underdeveloped becomes more "developed" relative to the developed states they may shed some of their supranational attitudes and activities as defined in ideal type C.

significantly differentiated (lack of range) in respect to the General Assembly. The range was sufficient in the case of the Security Council but the perceptions in this case were unrelated to economic development.

The hypothesis in respect to the relative strength balance of the organs fared little better than it did in the case of ranking. Only the perceptions concerning the Trusteeship Council fell on essentially economic lines. The developed had a greater tendency than the underdeveloped to perceive it as strong as it should be.

On the basis of the above, it may be concluded that even though the interests of the underdeveloped and the developed countries may be fairly divergent in respect to the organization, this has not greatly affected their perceptions of the major organs. It is only in respect to the changing importance of the "minor" organs that there seems to be something approaching a "perceptual barrier."

Satisfaction

The patterns in respect to general satisfaction seemed to reverse the pattern that occurred in respect to perceptions. That is, the groups' attitude patterns toward the Security Council and General Assembly tended to fall along economic lines and differences in respect to "minor" organs were not associated with economic development. The underdeveloped tended to be less dissatisfied with the Security Council and more satisfied with the General Assembly than the developed nations.

Once the focus of attention moved away from general satisfaction

into the areas of satisfaction with membership arrangements and voting systems, the differences which existed between the groups did not fall along economic lines except for voting satisfaction concerning the Trusteeship Council. In that case, the developed tended to be more satisfied with the present system than the underdeveloped.

It could be concluded that the only organs that should be affected by the "satisfaction differences" are the Security Council and General Assembly. Particularly, the marked differentiation between the groups (range 14-90) in respect to satisfaction with the General Assembly, along with the strong negative correlation (.94), may prove to be very important in respect to the tendency of the states to channel their demands through this organ. It would not be surprising on the basis of this correlation, coupled with the fact that the developed were the most dissatisfied with the Security Council, to see an increasing tendency for the developed to attempt to use extra-United Nations devices to satisfy their political demands.

Predictions

With the exception of the Economic and Social Council, frustrations or satisfactions related to predictions of shifting importance should not fall on essentially economic lines. The high negative correlation (-.93) of economic development with scores in the more important category for the Economic and Social Council, however, indicates there may be attempts by the underdeveloped to transmit this expectation into a reality.

In respect to prediction of membership changes the hypothesis was confirmed for the General Assembly and the Secretariat. The underdeveloped tended to predict less frequently that it is improbable that the General Assembly will change and more frequently that it is probable that the Secretariat will change than the developed.

The hypothesis was also confirmed in respect to predictions of voting changes for the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council. The underdeveloped tended to predict less frequently that it is improbable that the voting systems for these organs will change than the developed.

Because the "developed" expectations tend to be conservative, in the sense of not expecting change, it is possible to the extent that they act on this expectation and inhibit change, that the underdeveloped groups may react to this by becoming less positively oriented towards the organization. Representatives of the developed groups, it would seem, are in an excellent position because of their position on the Security Council, to prevent structural alterations that would be necessary for new membership and voting arrangements.

Organizational Potency and Ideal Variables

The answer patterns of the groups in respect to two of the questions concerning organizational potency were related significantly to economic development. That is, delegates from underdeveloped countries had a greater tendency than those from the developed to feel that the organization, in its present form, is incapable of

of preserving the peace, and yet, also had a greater tendency than those from the developed to perceive usefulness for the organization in the eventuality of war between the major powers. This might tend to indicate that the underdeveloped groups will push harder than the developed ones for the changes which they consider relevant to the problem of war during peace and make greater efforts than the developed to actually use the organization should war occur. Over all of the questions, however, the group patterns failed to be associated with economic development in respect to ideal 50 or ideal dis.

Strengthening Orientation and Ideal Variables

In respect to the questions designed to probe strengthening orientation, the answer patterns fell on essentially economic lines for the question of a police force for the Security Council with different membership arrangements and voting system, a police force for the General Assembly with different voting arrangements and membership arrangements, and the question of putting all non-trusteeship territories under the Trusteeship Council. The correlations in question were in line with expectations in that the underdeveloped exhibited a greater tendency than the developed to wish to "strengthen" except for the question of a police force for the General Assembly. Here the positive correlation may be related to the fact that the underdeveloped are basically satisfied with the membership arrangements and voting procedures of this organ and, therefore, desire a police force for it less than the developed if this means tampering

with these arrangements. When all of the questions were considered it was found that scores in respect to ideal 50 were related to economic development in the direction that was expected. The strengthening orientation of the underdeveloped is probably related to the greater satisfaction and more positive expectations that they have exhibited elsewhere. It may be concluded that efforts to strengthen the organization will probably find less resistance coming from the underdeveloped groups.

Supranational Orientation and Ideal Variables

In respect to questions designed to probe supranational orientation of the groups, only one question produced patterns which fell on essentially economic lines. This was the question which was designed to probe a tendency to see a contradiction between national interest and the United Nations. The underdeveloped groups, as expected, have a greater tendency than the developed to feel that inhibitions of national interest would make the organization more successful. The failure of ideal 50 and ideal dis scores to correlate with economic development scores, however, leads to the conclusion that the supranational orientation of the groups, defined by these questions, does not fall along essentially economic lines. This seems somewhat peculiar in that it seems reasonable to expect a strengthening orientation to go along with a supranational orientation.

Answer Group Variables

The confirmation of the hypothesis in respect to answer group variables seems considerably stronger than in the case of answer variables. That is, the patterns of answers over groups of related questions seems more frequently to fall along economic lines than on individual questions. Distance + and distance -, in particular, followed economic lines with failure occurring only in two sets of questions. Scatter 4, spread, and convergence also, over many sets of questions, were related at a significant level with economic development. In many places, these associations seem to indicate that the underdeveloped patterns should prove more unstable than the developed patterns. On the other hand, it was almost uniformly argued that the underdeveloped caucusing group patterns may provide valuable experience for the "underdeveloped" delegate as to what to expect in respect to the general United Nations pattern. Further, the repeated pattern dissimilarity of the developed groups may be perhaps interpreted to be an indication of their alienation or "differentness" as compared to the underdeveloped.

Summation of Data

As suggested in the introduction another mode of analysis which is possible with the data is to sum up all the scores throughout the dissertation for the variables to determine whether they are associated with economic development. It is possible that this kind of

analysis may show general trends and tendencies which are "missed" when the focus is smaller. The table which follows shows the results:

TABLE 156

CORRELATION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH
SUMMATION OF ANSWER, ANSWER GROUP
AND IDEAL VARIABLES¹

Increasing in importance	-88
Weaker than it should be	-23
General satisfaction	-43
Membership satisfaction	-44
Voting satisfaction	+31
Predict more important probable	-67
Predict changes in membership probable	-82
Predict changes in voting probable	-68
Scatter 4	-92
Scatter 2	-77
Spread	-78
Convergence	-77
Distance +	+88
Distance -	+84
Ideal 50	+11
Ideal dis	+49

As can be seen, economic development is associated significantly with ten of the sixteen summations. In every case of significant correlation, it is in the direction predicted in the Introduction under the discussion of expectations.

There seems to be a general tendency for the underdeveloped groups to pick the category of increasing in respect to importance

¹It should be noted that not all answer variables out of a related group are correlated in this table, rather, only the categories which seemed to be of greatest interest. For example, increasing in importance is run but not remaining the same or decreasing in importance.

and probable in respect to predictions of: changes in importance (substantially confirmed), changes in membership arrangements (substantially confirmed), and changes in voting arrangements (substantially confirmed); compared to the developed groups. This seems to suggest the hypothesis that it may be more in the area of expectations rather than in the area of perceptions and satisfactions that differentiations occur along economic lines.

The results in respect to the answer group variables are predictable from previous correlations. There seems to be a general tendency for the delegates from developed countries to have less scatter and spread than those from the underdeveloped ones, but for the underdeveloped representatives to converge (preponderant weight agreement) and possess higher answer pattern similarity with the general pattern than the developed groups.

Significance

The above findings seem to indicate that although economic development does not explain all of the attitude patterns that were collected in this study, nevertheless, it would be quite erroneous to perceive these patterns as completely random. Also, it would be quite erroneous to assume that the associations that were found are necessarily permanent relationships. It is entirely possible that these patterns may simply be a reflection of a short-run phase, the outcome of which may be entirely new patterns unrelated to economic development. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that "conditions" in the next few years may act as a stimulus so that attitude

patterns will increasingly become related to economic development. Already, evidence of a bipolarization process along economic lines seems apparent in the case of the Commonwealth with the group threatened with annihilation due to the movement of Britain towards the more capable states of western Europe and away from the less capable states of Africa and Asia. Also, this dissertation seems to indicate that the Soviet group's attitude patterns are much closer to those of Europe and Scandinavia than they are to the Arab or Afro-Asian groups. If this can be considered part of a trend whose ultimate results are bipolarization along economic lines coupled with negativism on the part of the developed, then this could have unfavorable consequences for the future of the United Nations. Certainly the chief architects of the organization have been the developed and alienation from it, which is suggested, although not proven by this study, could reduce its effectiveness.

Concluding Comments

As stated in the Introduction, an effort will be made here to move from the rather rigid methodology pursued in the bulk of the dissertation to the area of "feelings and impressions" as a result of the dissertation experience.

The first of these "impressions" concerns the use of delegates as source data for research.

The majority of delegates, contacted during the interview phase of data collection, appeared to be competent and very aware of the

"need" for research in this area. Some, for example, requested copies of any printed material based on this study. On the other hand, a few delegates equally as competent seem to feel that such projects were too "abstract and academic." In any case, there does not appear to be a built in general prejudice against such projects or a barrier to such projects because of limited competence for the majority of delegates. However, this observation may simply be a reflection of the fact that those who made themselves available for interview tended to be more positive to research projects of this type and perhaps more intellectually perceptive than those that did not.

This is not to say that it is easy to solicit data from United Nations delegates. Quite the contrary, the initial efforts to elicit response through the mail proved to be very frustrating. This is perhaps related to the fact that, although the delegates appear very perceptive and able to answer questions when time is available, they are also extremely busy. Business seems to permeate all aspects of United Nations operations. One delegate could only squeeze time during a taxi ride from his delegation to the United Nations building. That is, the original appointment period had to be cut short because "something of great importance arose." Other delegates had to cancel appointments, at the last moment, for similar reasons. Naturally, in these cases, the delegate's duties came first.

Another "problem" revealed itself through personal contact with the delegates. Although I am fairly certain that the majority of delegates gave "honest" replies, some, I felt, attempted to "please"

or give "correct" replies. This problem seems to be particularly acute for some members of the Soviet group.

The second set of impressions concerned the delegates in terms of philosophic orientation. In the main, the delegates impressed me as "idealists" rather than "realists." That is, they tended to think in terms of moral values, humanitarian concerns, and progress rather than in terms of "power" and manipulation to further special interests. One, for example, spoke of a need to change the "spirit" of statesmen to gain the ideals of the charter. Again, however, this may be related to an attempt to put on their "best face" for the interviewer.

The third set of impressions concerns the delegates' commitment to the organization as a whole. In general, it seemed quite high. The delegates were generally, of course, also committed to their respective groups. Some expressed the fear, however, that "caucusing group thinking if carried too far" could be, perhaps, detrimental to the organization as a whole. That is, they seemed to be torn between the two values, group and organization, and to feel that in the final analysis they may be contradictory. Associated with this seemed to be a tendency for some to stress the "solidarity" of groups other than their own and to question the desirability of this "solidarity." Thus, a Scandinavian delegate informed me, with apparent pride, that his own group is very "loose" in contrast to the Afro-Asian group. On the other hand, a Latin delegate informed me, again with apparent pride, that his own group was very "loose" in contrast to the "cohesive" Scandinavian group. Another delegate informed me that

although the Soviet group members are so close as to constitute a "bloc," they ignore each other at the United Nations building to avoid this impression. All of this seems to indicate that for many delegates the organizations "interest" should take priority over either group or national interest.¹ One delegate, for example, spoke of the development of an "international person" with "broadened horizons and outlook" and apparently willingly included himself in this category.

Finally, there are certain impressions concerning the United Nations as an operating institution. There seems to be a certain "style" connected with the organization not unlike that connected with the British Foreign Office. Lord Strang has commented, "there is something called 'the Foreign Office manner,' a blend of exclusiveness with an air of superiority."² This comment does not seem to be completely out-of-place as a partial description of the atmosphere at the United Nations. In addition, one is met with an array of shuffling crowds, gleaming fixtures, chauffeured limousines, very attractive escort girls, Hollywood-type touched-up giant photographs (of ambassadors only) and rampant "selling" (in the form of a "bookstore" specializing in United Nations products). What consequence, if any, all of this has for "charter functions"--one can only surmise.

¹It should be remembered, however, that over 60 per cent of all delegates feel that caucusing group activity has, in fact, helped the United Nations in its charter functions.

²Lord Strang, Home and Abroad (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), p. 310.

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APPENDIX

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CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Facts Concerning This Questionnaire

- 1. It is to be used for strictly academic purposes.
- 2. You may ignore any questions you prefer not to answer.
- 3. All "answers" are considered purely "opinion" not "official position."
- 4. You may answer only as much of the questionnaire as you feel you have time for.

Your country _____ Your caucusing bloc _____

Your rank _____ Your length of service at U.N. _____

1. Do you feel that each of the following United Nations organs is presently increasing or decreasing in importance relative to the other organs?

<u>Security Council.</u>	Increasing _____	Decreasing _____	Remaining the same _____
<u>General Assembly.</u>	Increasing _____	Decreasing _____	Remaining the same _____
<u>Economic and Social Council.</u>	Increasing _____	Decreasing _____	Remaining the same _____
<u>Trusteeship Council</u>	Increasing _____	Decreasing _____	Remaining the same _____
<u>Secretariat.</u>	Increasing _____	Decreasing _____	Remaining the same _____

2. If you had to evaluate the strength of each organ relative to the other organs in the following categories, which would you choose?

<u>Security Council.</u>	Stronger than it should be _____	Weaker than it should be _____	As strong as it should be _____
<u>General Assembly.</u>	Stronger than it should be _____	Weaker than it should be _____	As strong as it should be _____
<u>Economic and Social Council.</u>	Stronger than it should be _____	Weaker than it should be _____	As strong as it should be _____
<u>Trusteeship Council.</u>	Stronger than it should be _____	Weaker than it should be _____	As strong as it should be _____
<u>Secretariat.</u>	Stronger than it should be _____	Weaker than it should be _____	As strong as it should be _____

3. What is your degree of satisfaction with the general performance of the following organs?

<u>Security Council.</u>	Highly satisfied _____	Fairly satisfied _____	Somewhat dissatisfied _____	Highly dissatisfied _____
<u>General Assembly.</u>	Highly satisfied _____	Fairly satisfied _____	Somewhat dissatisfied _____	Highly dissatisfied _____
<u>Economic and Social Council.</u>	Highly satisfied _____	Fairly satisfied _____	Somewhat dissatisfied _____	Highly dissatisfied _____
<u>Trusteeship Council.</u>	Highly satisfied _____	Fairly satisfied _____	Somewhat dissatisfied _____	Highly dissatisfied _____
<u>Secretariat.</u>	Highly satisfied _____	Fairly satisfied _____	Somewhat dissatisfied _____	Highly dissatisfied _____

9. If you had to rank the following organs in terms of their importance for preserving the peace, how would you rank them? (Make 1 for the most important, 2 for the second most important, 3 for the third most important, etc.)

- Security Council
- General Assembly
- Economic and Social Council
- Trusteeship Council
- Secretariat

10. How often does your caucusing group meet?

- Daily
- Three or four times a week
- Weekly
- Bi-monthly
- Monthly
- Other (Specify) _____

11. Does your caucusing group meet regularly on a fixed time table? Yes No

12. How long are your caucusing group meetings?

- Less than one hour
- One hour to two hours
- More than two hours

13. How formal are your caucusing group meetings?

- Highly formal
- Fairly formal
- Somewhat informal
- Highly informal

14. To what extent do you feel your caucusing group meetings have impact upon your national government's instructions to you?

- Considerable
- Some
- Hardly any
- None

15. Do you think it would be desirable to eventually have the decisions which emerge from the caucusing group meetings to be binding upon the member delegates? Highly desirable Desirable Undesirable Highly undesirable

16. How often are votes taken in your caucusing sessions?

- Often Sometimes Infrequently Never

17. How is the agenda for the caucusing session arrived at?

- Committee
- Other (Specify) _____

18. What is the range of issues discussed at the normal caucusing session?

- General spectrum of U. N. issues
- Several important issues
- A few issues
- A single issue

19. In respect to home government policy, do you feel that the caucusing group is likely to have more impact in the future?

- Highly probable Probable
- Improbable Highly Improbable

20. Do you feel it is likely your caucusing group will tend to vote more as a unit in the future?

- Highly probable Probable
- Improbable Highly Improbable

21. Do you feel that the United Nations may provide the basis of eventual world government?

- Highly probable Probable
- Improbable Highly improbable

33. If you are dissatisfied with the present voting procedure of the General Assembly, how would you change it?
 _____ Create a weighted voting procedure (give more votes to larger powers)
 _____ Eliminate the two-thirds requirement for important questions.
 _____ Other (Specify) _____

34. If you are dissatisfied with the present voting arrangements of the Economic and Social Council, how would you change them?
 _____ Weighted voting (favoring the large powers)
 _____ Create a veto power for the great powers.
 _____ Have decisions made by more than a simple majority.
 _____ Other (Specify) _____

35. Do you favor strengthening and giving more autonomy to the Economic and Social Council relative to the General Assembly?
 Strongly favor _____ Favor _____
 Do not favor _____ Strongly do not favor _____

36. If you are dissatisfied with the membership arrangements of the Trusteeship Council, how would you change them?
 _____ Create a majority of trust administering powers.
 _____ Create a majority of non-trust administering powers.
 _____ Eliminate all non-trust administering powers.
 _____ Other (Specify) _____

37. If you are dissatisfied with the voting arrangements of the Trusteeship Council, how would you change them?
 _____ Create a weighted procedure (large power preferences).
 _____ Give the trust administering powers the veto.
 _____ Other (Specify) _____

38. Do you favor placing all or most non-self-governing territories under the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council?
 Strongly favor _____ Favor _____
 Do not favor _____ Strongly do not favor _____

39. Do you feel that the Trusteeship Council should govern directly the territories under question instead of the trusteeship nation?
 Strongly favor _____ Favor _____
 Do not favor _____ Strongly do not favor _____

40. Do you feel that it is possible for the Secretary General to be neutral in conflicts between the major power blocs?
 Highly probable _____ Probable _____
 Improbable _____ Highly improbable _____

41. Do you favor or disfavor the method of area representation in respect to the Secretary General's staff?
 Strongly favor _____ Favor _____
 Do not favor _____ Strongly do not favor _____

42. Do you feel that the formation of caucusing groups have generally helped the United Nations in terms of its charter functions?
 Highly probable _____ Probable _____
 Improbable _____ Highly improbable _____

43. Do all or most members regularly attend your caucusing sessions? Yes _____ No _____

44. If you agreed that the Security Council has not performed as well as it has in the past, what would you blame this on?
 _____ Charter provisions.
 _____ Big power rivalry.
 _____ Other (Specify) _____

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Thomas M. Noone, Jr.

DATE: January 7, 1963

FROM: J.P. Hayes *JPH*SUBJECT: Requested Information on Per Capita
and Total GNP

I enclose herewith the figures which you requested on per capita and total GNP of a wide range of countries. These figures apply nominally to the years 1958 to 1960, average. They are the sort of figures that one obtains by converting estimates in local currencies by means of the going exchange rate. However, the recipient should be warned that an attempt has been made to adjust many of the figures to make allowance for an impression of the under- or over-valuation of their exchange rates. What has been done in practice is to rank countries according to the best possible impression of relative per capita GNP. Total GNP figures have then been obtained by multiplying per capita GNP by population.

The man who is requesting the figures is no doubt aware of the work done by Gilbert and Kravis at OEEC on "real" GNP comparisons. The photostat handwritten table enclosed shows conjectures about how the Gilbert and Kravis type comparisons would extend down the income scale.

All these are my own personal estimates, and are not to be regarded as in any way an official document of the Bank.

If the man wants other figures as a check, I would refer him to Usui and Hagen, World Income, 1957 (Center for International Studies, MIT).

PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT FIGURES FOR
COUNTRIES OF PARTICIPATING DELEGATIONS

African Group

Country	Per Capita GNP (U.S. \$)
Ethiopia	55
Ghana	160
Guinea	110
Liberia	110
Libya	100
Morocco	130
Sudan	75
Tunisia	175
United Arab Republic	110
Chad	50
Congo-Brazzaville	60
Gabon	90
Mauritania	100
Nigeria	80
Niger	60
Somalia	55
Upper Volta	60

Afro-Asian Group

Afghanistan	75
Burma	100
Cambodia	75
Ceylon	105
Ethiopia	55
Ghana	160
Guinea	110
India	70
Iran	110
Iraq	160
Japan	410
Jordan	90
Lebanon	340
Liberia	110
Libya	100

Afro-Asian Group (Cont.)

Country	Per Capita GNP (U.S. \$)
Morocco	130
Nepal	45
Pakistan	65
Philippines	120
Saudi Arabia	170
Sudan	75
Thailand	110
Tunisia	175
Turkey	220
United Arab Republic	110
Yemen	80
Chad	50
Congo-Brazzaville	60
Gabon	90
Mauritania	100
Niger	60
Nigeria	80
Somalia	55
Upper Volta	60

Arab Group

Iraq	160
Jordan	90
Lebanon	340
Libya	100
Morocco	130
Saudi Arabia	170
Sudan	75
Tunisia	175
United Arab Republic	110
Yemen	80

Commonwealth Group

Ceylon	105
Ghana	160
India	70
New Zealand	1,270
Nigeria	80
Pakistan	65
United Kingdom	1,110

Latin American Group

Country	Per Capita GNP (U.S. \$)
Argentina	480
Bolivia	105
Brazil	165
Chile	345
Costa Rica	380
Ecuador	130
Guatemala	185
Haiti	95
Honduras	160
Mexico	320
Nicaragua	205
Panama	350
Paraguay	105
Venezuela	530

Scandinavian Group

Denmark	1,130
Iceland	800
Norway	1,040
Sweden	1,270

Soviet Group

Czechoslovakia	700
Hungary	500
Poland	460
Romania	360
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic	620

Western European Group

France	960
Great Britain	1,110
Italy	600
Denmark	1,130
Iceland	800
Norway	1,040
Sweden	1,270

