

THE MALI FEDERATION:
A CASE STUDY OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION

by

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African unity is not for tomorrow,
not even in the form of the United States
of Africa, which I once advocated. Let
us speak only of union, and try to regroup
the Independent African states on the basis
of regional and cultural affinities.

---Léopold Senghor

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Among the forces shaping African nations today there is the simultaneous existence of three distinct types of social and political community¹--traditional society, colonial or colonially-derived structures, and incipient Pan-African organization expressed in regional groupings. These ideas of community reciprocally influence each other, both positively and negatively. They are the products of history and rapid change, of inequal development within the new nations, creating in these societies a curious blend of the old, the imposed and the new.

During Africa's recent colonial past in which France, Great Britain, Belgium and Italy imposed their particular administrative forms on the now independent nations, patterns were established which still plague efforts toward greater African unity. While British territories in tropical Africa were generally administered as individual units, France created two colonial federations: Afrique Occidentale Française (A.O.F.) and Afrique Équatoriale Française (A.E.F.).² It was especially among and within these French territories, which had come to

¹Rupert Emerson, "Nation Building in Africa," in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation Building (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 97.

²A.O.F. included: Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Soudan and Upper Volta; A.E.F. included: Chad, Congo-français, Gabon and Ubangi-Shari. Togo and Cameroun were administered separately as Trust Territories, first under provisions of the League of Nations and later under the United Nations, by France.

depend on each other to a great extent as a result of the two federal administrative structures, that such modern political ideas as "federalism," "unity," and "independence" clashed, once independence for these territories had become a realizable objective.

This study focuses on the theory and practice of political integration of two ex-A.O.F. territories, Senegal and Soudan. The attention will be directed toward their levels of integration within the colonial federation of French West Africa, their political amalgamation within the Mali Federation,¹ its attainment of independence as a single unit in July, 1960, and its subsequent demise in August, 1960 amid charges of "coup d'état" and "neo-colonialist plot." Chapters Two and Three of this study examine the historical background of the A.O.F. and of Senegal and Soudan in particular. Chapter Four focuses on the necessary requisites for integration of two separate, identifiable units into a federation, utilizing the theory or "background conditions" necessary for integration as developed by Professor Karl W. Deutsch.²

Professor Deutsch's study, under the aegis of the Princeton University Center for Research on World Political Institutions, was concerned with the problem of international organization as an approach to the elimination of war. Professor Deutsch and his colleagues addressed themselves to the following question: How can men learn to act together to eliminate war as a social institution? The answer they suggested was: Through the processes of building a wider community in which the

¹April 1, 1959.

²Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), chaps. 4 and 5.

possibility of war is lessened by means of a high degree of institutionalized cooperation. The grouping of two or more previously separate, identifiable political units into a larger unit constitutes such a high degree of cooperation. The Princeton group found that not all such "political communities"¹ are necessarily able to prevent war within the area they cover, but that some of them do eliminate war within their boundaries. Thus the next question was: How do political units integrate? or, What are the conditions necessary for successful integration of two or more political units? For their study, the North Atlantic area was chosen as a geographic focus because it included all major powers of the free world, and was thought to constitute the leading alternative to Western European integration.²

In the course of their study, Deutsch and his colleagues discovered that certain "conditions" had to be fulfilled or be present to assure successful integration. Although Professor Deutsch never explicitly stated that these "conditions" pertained to all political and social integration processes, this idea is implicit in the book. The objective of the present study is to view these "conditions" in a setting other than the North Atlantic area in order to examine their wider applicability and validity.

The first reason underlying the application of Deutsch's "condi-

¹"Political communities" are defined as "social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habit of compliance." Ibid., p. 5.

²This study was conducted before the E.E.C. was created in 1958.

tions" in the setting of the Mali Federation was the existence of apparently favorable conditions and factors necessary for the integration of political communities in the A.O.F. and between Senegal and Soudan such as:

- (1) A history of recent federal colonial structures and patterns
- (2) Apparently close affinities between peoples: racially, culturally, religiously, historically, and linguistically
- (3) Apparent economic similarity of the units
- (4) Apparent geographic similarity of the units: soils, climate, crops and location.

The second reason for choosing this setting concerns additional questions which can be raised concerning "essential background conditions" in the context of newly independent and relatively underdeveloped nations.

The complex diversity of the A.O.F. generally and of Senegal and Soudan in particular has dictated some limitations. The history and institutions of Senegal and Soudan cannot be understood other than in relation to the history of the A.O.F., while the history of the A.O.F. must be understood in relation to French colonial policy in general and to French colonial policy in Africa specifically. The scope of this study necessarily limits it to an examination of Senegal and Soudan. While general A.O.F. developments are briefly examined in Chapters Two and Three, they are sketched in Chapter Four of this study as this is deemed necessary or relevant.

The study is also limited in time. Although integrative and disintegrative forces were undoubtedly at work before 1900, the scope

of the work prevents analysis of earlier developments other than in cursory forms. The terminal date is August 20, 1960, the date on which Senegal declared itself independent from the Mali Federation after an alleged coup d'état on the part of Soudan. Moreover, the time element regarding the short life of the Mali Federation severely limits meaningful analysis of data which could not be obtained for the eighteen months' period.

A final limitation involves the non-availability of many primary source materials. This is particularly true of official government documents, party documents and local newspapers.

In order to examine Deutsch's "conditions" necessary for the integration of two or more political units or entities, it is necessary first to analyze the term "political integration." Numerous authors have written about political integration and their ideas will be of assistance in clarifying this elusive concept.

Philip Jacob and Henri Teune suggest a rather broad definition when they state that "political integration generally implies a relationship of community among people within the same political entity."¹ A second definition of political integration by the same authors explains it to be "...a state of mind or disposition to be cohesive, act together, to be committed to mutual programs...."² The key words here

¹Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), p. 4.

²Ibid., p. 10.

are "relationship" and "state of mind"; they imply that Jacob and Teune see political integration as something static rather than as a dynamic process.

Amitai Etzioni, whose study of integration processes emphasizes the importance of leadership structures and elites, gives the following definition:

A community is established only when it has self-sufficient integrative mechanisms, that is, when the maintenance of its existence and form is provided for by its own processes and not dependent upon external systems or member units. A political community is a community that possesses three kinds of integration: (a) it has an effective control over the means of violence (though it may "delegate" some of this control to member units); (b) it has a center of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and (c) it has the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of the politically aware citizens.¹

Ernst Haas views political integration more specifically as a process when he defines it as "...the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."² Haas' emphasis on elites in the process of political integration is especially relevant, for in this process, particularly as it pertains to African countries, the role played by elites is a crucial element.

Karl Deutsch's and Ernst Haas' definitions of political integra-

¹Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 4.

²Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.

tion largely agree when the former defines it as "...the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a 'long' time dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population."¹ Although this definition does not spell it out, Deutsch later refers quite explicitly to integration as a "dynamic process."²

The definition of political integration as used for the purposes of this study is largely based on Haas' definition and may be phrased as follows:

Political integration is the process whereby political actors in distinct political units are persuaded, and persuade their general public, to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward the new, larger unit whose institutions possess jurisdiction over the pre-existing political units.

Before embarking on a detailed application and analysis of Deutsch's "conditions" within the context of the Mali Federation, it is necessary to list some of his working definitions.

By Sense of Community is meant a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least one main point: common social problems can and must be solved by processes of peaceful change.

Peaceful Change means the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.

A Security Community is a community in which there is a high degree

¹Deutsch, op. cit., p. 5.

²Ibid., p. 70.

of assurance that its members will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes without violence. There are two types of security communities--"amalgamated" and "pluralistic."

Amalgamation refers to the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a larger single unit, with some type of common government. This government may be unitary or federal but has one supreme decision-making center.

The Pluralistic security community retains the legal independence of the separate governments. Its separate governments constitute a security community without being merged; it has separate supreme decision-making centers.

Deutsch states categorically that "where amalgamation occurs without integration, a security community does not exist."¹

The initial concern here involves the question as to what extent some of these ideas are applicable to the Mali Federation. Put another way, to what extent did Senegal and Soudan constitute separate amalgamated security communities and/or a pluralistic security community before April 1959?²

With reference to the concept of "amalgamation," it should be borne in mind that the interior of Senegal and the entire area of Soudan were brought under French control by means of military conquest.³ During

¹Ibid., p. 7.

²The A.O.F. ceased to exist as a result of the creation of the French Community, effective April, 1959.

³Deutsch found that "military conquest appeared to be the least effective among the large number of methods by which amalgamation was pursued in the cases studied (in the North Atlantic area)." Ibid., p. 28.

this process, previously independent or identifiable units in the Western Sudan were eliminated and replaced by larger single units of administration: Senegal and Soudan. Over time their inhabitants began to identify themselves with these new units and accepted their respective colonial governments as the "supreme decision-making centers." Regarding the concept of "security community," France was able to impose a peace on these territories where historically wars of conquest had frequently occurred. That France was able to maintain this peace for well over a half century indicates that there existed a relatively high assurance that the separate administrative, ethnic or tribal units within Senegal and Soudan would not fight each other physically. The fact that they constituted "separate" units is supported by provisions in the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic of 1958 which allowed the creation of autonomous governments in the French African colonies. It may thus be concluded that in Deutsch's terms Senegal and Soudan constituted separate amalgamated security communities in 1959. This observation does not imply that in both territories the process of national unification had been fully completed; the Tuareg uprising against the Mali government in 1962 illustrates this.

Yet we must also ask: Did Senegal and Soudan constitute a "pluralistic" security community before 1959? In order to answer this question one has to consider the following developments. When the territories became an administrative unit under French colonial rule in 1899, administrative amalgamation occurred to a degree. However, this amalgamation did not bring about complete political integration. Over time a pluralistic security community developed between Senegal and Soudan within the context of the A.O.F.; that is to say, a pluralistic

security community gradually developed among all A.O.F. territories. By 1959 there existed a high degree of assurance that the two territories "would not fight each other physically." But, in order for two or more political units to constitute a pluralistic security community, Deutsch found that "the legal independence of separate governments" is retained. In 1959 neither Senegal nor Soudan was legally independent, although they were autonomous units within the French Community. Moreover, their "supreme decision-making center" lay outside the territories, namely with the institutions of the Community in Paris. Allowing for certain differences in terminology, it may be concluded that Senegal and Soudan did indeed constitute a "pluralistic security community" when they decided to amalgamate under the Mali Federation in April, 1959.

If this conclusion is a basic premise, then there are two key questions underlying the examination of various background factors and forces relevant to integrative processes in the A.O.F. prior to 1959. The first question asks to what extent Senegal and Soudan constituted a pluralistic security community, while the second question concerns the implications of this level of integration for their subsequent amalgamation. In the following chapter these questions need to be answered before a detailed application of Deutsch's "conditions" can be made in this study.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND TO THE INTEGRATION PROCESSES

1. The Physical and Human Environment as Underlying Factors of Historical and Economic Developments in the Western Sudan

In the light of a subsequent examination of Deutsch's "conditions," it is necessary to briefly sketch the physical and human setting of the Western Sudan.¹ In order to better understand integrative and disintegrative trends between Senegal and Soudan, this setting becomes relevant in that it conditioned certain common historical developments, economic patterns, as well as cultural and social structures in this part of the African continent.

West Africa can be considered a clearly definable part of the African continent,² separated from North Africa by the Sahara (although political boundaries extend into the desert zone), and by the Cameroon-Bamenda-Adamawa mountains from Western Central Africa. The area constitutes one fifth of Africa and encompasses 50 percent of its peoples.³

¹In the course of this study "Soudan" will be used in abbreviation for Soudan Français; "Sudan" will refer to the geographic region situated between the Sahara in the North and the tropical rain forest in the South; "Mali" will refer initially to the medieval empire of Mali and later to the Mali Federation up to August 20, 1960. After this date it will refer to the Republic of Mali.

²R. J. Harrison Church et al. Africa and the Islands (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 205.

³Ibid.

Most of its rivers flow into a trough through which the Senegal and Niger rivers course, while the coastal rivers are mainly drainage-created, fed by the run-off from the higher inland plateau, and run seaward. The rivers are highly seasonal which severely hampers navigation during the dry season, while seasonal flooding during the rainy season often causes roads to be washed out for weeks at a time. Coastal beaches are sandy and often protected by off-shore sand bars, while other parts of the coast have mangrove swamps, especially at the mouths of the myriad rivers and streams. However, some estuaries are deep and provide naturally sheltered harbors such as Kaolack, Bathurst, Ziguinchor, Bissau and Freetown.¹

Climatologically the area can be roughly divided into two major climate types: 1) south of seven degrees North one finds the Equatorial climate, characterized by frequent rain, high temperatures and often cloudy skies; 2) north of seven degrees North, the Tropical continental climate is found, with a rainy season which diminishes and tends to become less reliable the further north one gets, and with higher temperatures than south of this line because of the lesser cloud cover.

The soils in this part of the African continent are characterized by the widespread occurrence of laterite types, especially in the area where the rainfall is comparatively high, followed by a dry season. It also has extensively sandy soils, especially in the interior trough, lacustrine soils in the inland Niger delta, and alluvial soils along the middle Niger.² A grave problem in terms of soil deterioration is caused by the rapidly retreating forest zone in a southern direction as a result

¹Ibid., p. 210.

²Ibid., p. 212.

of seasonal burning and cattle grazing, creating widespread erosion.

The area of the Western Sudan includes the southern fringes of the Sahara desert (Sahel) and extends from Lake Chad in the East to the Atlantic ocean in the West, bordered in the South by the rapidly retreating rain forest zone. It is generally savannah country with high grass, scattered trees and sandy plains through which occasional rivers flow. The temperatures and the alternating dry and rainy seasons make this country seem inhospitable to the Europeans,¹ but the Africans have used it to their advantage, growing a great variety of crops on its relatively fertile soils and grazing their cattle on the seemingly endless savannah. Cattle raising is practiced quite extensively in the Western Sudan because of the lack of the tsetse fly north of the forest and bush zone.

The fiat land stretching out between the populous rain forest areas of the West Coast and the Arab civilization on the northern fringes of the Sahara has made this area a natural crossroads of trade routes, creating many ancient market places in the interior of the Sudan. This trade centered around slaves, gold and hides flowing to the Islamic North in exchange for salt, cloth and manufactured goods which found their way South along the major trade routes.

The westernmost part of the Sudan--consisting of "Senegambia" and western Portuguese Guinea--differ from the interior only as a result of the maritime influences, expressed generally in lower temperatures (especially along the coast) and a higher percentage of rainfall. Vegetation varies from the grass steppe as far south as Dakar's latitude, dry wood-

¹William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 1-2.

land savannah from Dakar to the Gambia river, and moist woodland savannah in the Casamance region of Senegal. Because of the lack of groundwater, the eastern and northeastern regions of Senegal are virtually devoid of population. By contrast, the dry woodland savannah in the West, where groundwater is almost at surface level, encouraged denser settlement and intensive cultivation.¹

The physical setting of the Western Sudan is thus characterized by a certain degree of similarity in climate soils, crops and general landscape. Its relative flatness of terrain and the existing natural boundaries have contributed to historical as well as cultural unity. Similarities in vegetation, linked with the occurrence of vast, tsetse-free savannah plains influenced the development of widespread cattle herding. In addition, certain similarities in soils and crops, linked with the relative ease of popular migrations, gave a certain uniformity to peasant farming, culture and social organization in the Western Sudan.

The inhabitants of both Senegal and Soudan are largely members of the Negro or Negroid race and are part of the neo-sudanic civilization. Baumann and Westermann divide the area comprising Senegal and Soudan into three main civilization areas (cercles):

1. The West Atlantic cercle: a paleo-negritic and primitive civilization with light paleo-mediterranic and neo-sudanic penetrations. Setting: rain forest and humid plains. Race: black and paleo-negritic with Ethiopian and Eastern cross-breedings.

2. The upper Niger cercle: a neo-sudanic and paleo-mediterranic

¹Mainly groundnuts. See generally the map of "Senegambia" in Harrison Church, op. cit., p. 237.

layer on a paleo-negrivic base. Setting and race: same as above.

3. The Voltaic cercle: the paleo-negrivic civilization predominates but is penetrated by paleo-mediterranic and hunters-of-the-plains civilizations; locally one finds a layer of neo-sudanic peoples (Mossi, Dagomba). Setting: dry plains in the North and humid plains in the South. Race: black with Ethiopian, Eastern and Mediterranean cross-breeds.¹

The major ethnic groups in Senegal include the Wolof, Serer, Lébou, Toucouleur, Fulani (Peulh), Dioula, and Mandingo/Bambara. Of these groups the Wolof--which constitute 35 percent of the total population--and the Lébou are for all practical purposes indistinguishable, the Lébou being the Wolof-speaking inhabitants of the Cape Verde peninsula. The Serer are also very closely related to the Wolof, being considered their "tribal cousins."² The Serer, the Toucouleur and the Fulani are said to be traditionally related; the Toucouleur are the alleged offspring of an ancient mixing between Serers (with whom they have a strong "joking relationship"³) and the Fulani, whose language is quite close to their own.⁴ Most Senegalese tend to use Wolof as a lingua franca today, although Toucouleur is a second language understood by many. The Dioula of the Casamance region

¹Hermann Baumann and Dietrich Westermann, Les Peuples et les Civilisations de l'Afrique (Paris: Payot, 1957), pp. 89-92.

²Michael Crowder, Senegal: A Study in French Assimilation Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 77.

³For an extensive account of this "joking relationship," its importance and functionality, see Henri Labouret, Les Tribus du Rameau Lobi (Paris: Institut d'Ethnologie, 1931).

⁴Joseph Greenberg, "The Languages of Africa," International Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 29,1 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1963), pp. 6-9 and 24-25.

have a strong traditional connection with the Serer, asserting that they are descendants of the same ancestors.¹ This leaves the Mandingo/Bambara as somewhat of a minority group in Senegal. However, they speak a language which is closely related to the one spoken by the Dioula.

The tribal and ethnic identification factor is becoming increasingly irrelevant in modern Senegal. One finds an exceptionally high rate of intertribal marriage in this country, compared with the rest of francophone West Africa. The highest rate occurs in the urban centers among clerks, administrators, employees of commercial firms, and the professional segments of the population.²

Soudan's major ethnic groups include the Malinke, Bambara, Dioula and Khassonke, who all speak variants of the same language. This suggests a close relationship or prolonged contact between these groups. In addition to the above tribes, Soudan contains smaller ethnic groups within its borders, including the Sarakolle, Songhai, Senoufo, Dogon and Fulani, as well as Tuaregs, Moors and Toucouleurs on the Southern fringes of the Sahara.³ Together these groups number approximately 3.8 million, of whom over one third are Moslems and the rest animists and Christians. The Mandingo-speaking peoples⁴ of Soudan have certain

¹Crowder, op. cit., p. 77.

²Ibid., p. 80.

³Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, "Mali" in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 217.

⁴See generally: Viviana Paques, Les Bambara (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France) and Henri Labouret, Paysans d'Afrique Occidentale (Paris: Gallimard, 1941).

common characteristics, while such social institutions as "castes" are found both in Soudan and Senegal.¹

Since in both territories tribes spill across present-day political boundaries, their socio-economic and political institutions must be considered

"...in relation to the history of the adjacent territories--Mauritania, Algeria, Niger, Senegal, Guinea, Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast--inhabited by peoples closely associated, in past history and present culture, with the peoples of Mali. It is only these surviving colonial frontiers that distinguish the Tukolor of Senegal and southern Mauritania, the Tuareg of the Algerian Sahara, the Malinke of Guinea, the Songhai of Niger, the Senufo of the Ivory Coast, and the Bobo of Upper Volta from the same peoples in modern Mali. Moreover, the Malinke, the dominant people of modern Mali... have penetrated as traders into neighboring West African countries from Senegal to modern Ghana, whereas the Fulani, who have played a major part in Mali history, are widely dispersed throughout the whole West African region."²

Generally, the area of the Western Sudan facilitated frequent contacts between the various ethnic and tribal groups that migrated through the region or settled down to become permanent inhabitants. These contacts created a variety of linguistic, social, cultural and economic relationships which reinforced the relative homogeneity of the region and its peoples. History, however, created a number of marked differences among the groups, differences which even today tend to divide rather than to unite them.

¹ Germaine Dieterlen, "Mythe et Organisation Sociale au Soudan Français," Journal de la Société des Africanistes, Vol. 25 (Paris: Société des Africanistes, 1955), pp. 40-41.

² Hodgkin and Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 219.

2. Early History in the Western Sudan as a Factor in Later Political Integration

Early historical developments in the Western Sudan indicate a number of experiences common to Senegal and Soudan. The focus in this section concerns the question as to what extent such shared historical experiences as empire-building and Moslem conquest fostered a spirit of unity between these two territories.

The territory of Soudan seems to have been the heartland of a succession of empires which reached from the coast of Senegal into the area east of Kano, and from deep into the Sahara to the Futa Djallon in Guinea. These states were largely based on trans-Saharan trade in salt and forest products. Salt was a scarce commodity in the area between the Sahara and the densely-populated tropical rain forest. The gradual southward expansion of the desert¹ had forced the inhabitants of the Sudan farther and farther away from the source of this prized preservative. The Saharan salt pans became Berber occupations; the salt was exchanged for such forest zone "commodities" as gold and black slaves to work the salt pans. This constituted the nucleus of the ever growing trans-Saharan trade. The point of contact between North and South was located near the bend of the Niger river, where soon Timbuktu was to rise as a world-renowned trading center. The dimensions of the empires

¹R. H. Forbes, "The Trans-Saharan Conquest," Geographical Review, Vol. 33 (New York: American Geographical Society, April, 1943), pp. 208-209, and Georges Spitz, Sansanding (Paris: Société des Études Géographiques, Maritimes, Coloniales, Impr. Blondin, 1949), p. 21.

which arose on these crossroads of trade were largely determined by the region's geographical features, such as the relatively flat terrain and the conquerors' ability to use horses north of the forest zone where tsetse infestation was negligible.

Eighth century Arab travellers¹ and historians reported that according to Sudanic oral tradition, "white" conquerors ruled the Niger valley between 400 and 700 A.D. after which a black Soninke uprising installed a native dynasty.² This large state is generally known as the Empire of Ghana, whose capital was located somewhere west of the Niger valley, close to the border of present-day Mauritania.

After an eastward shift of trade routes coincided with a more direct rule by Arabs being established over the Berbers, some of the latter settled south of the desert near the Atlantic coast, west of the Ghana Empire, rather than accept Arab domination and orthodox Islam. These Berbers gave their tribal name--Sanjaha or Senegal--to the river along which they settled.

Almoravid Moslem invasions gave a great impetus to the growth of Islam among the inhabitants of the Western Sudan.³ In about 1062, Almoravid Moslems began to move against the Empire of Ghana. Trade was

¹Al Fazarai. Al Bakari of Cordoba described ancient Ghana in the 11th century. See generally, Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, A Short History of Africa (Baltimore: Penguin, 1965), pp. 46-47.

²Donald L. Wiedner, A History of Africa South of the Sahara (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1964), p. 28.

³For a full account of the spread of Islam through the establishments of Moslem empires, see generally, Charles Monteil, Les Empires du Mali (Paris: Larousse, 1952) and Alphone Gouilly, l'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale Française (Paris: Larousse, 1952).

disrupted along the Saharan routes while agriculture failed to recover after the damage done to the crops by the Almoravids and their cattle. Ghana's empire began to break up into its component tribal parts after 1076, when the invaders managed to plunder its capital.¹ The notion of large empires, however, did not die. Control over the tribes in the Niger valley was eventually assumed by a Mande leader, Mansa Sundiata. Under his rule, from 1230 to 1255, the Empire of Mali--already in existence from the eleventh century under a dynasty which had been converted to Islam around 1040²--began to rise in power and influence. Mansa Sundiata seems to have been a nominal convert and his successors (the Keita dynasty) all became Moslems. Mande merchants, Moslems by inclination because of their necessary contacts with the Arab traders, became the prime spreaders of Islam in West Africa. Mali thus became the successor state to Ghana.

By the early 1400's, Mali's power and influence began to wane, Songhai tribesmen, long uncomfortable under the rule of Mali, resented the Mande overlordship and began to undermine the empire centered in Timbuktu. Few Songhai had accepted Islam, but in 1442³ a Moslem coup put a reforming Moslem, Askia, on the Songhai throne. He converted most of his subjects, gained control over the Moslem teachers (Marabouts) and went on a ijihad (holy war) which gave him virtual control over Mali and the Hausa Empire. From 1450 to 1590, Songhai, first under the rule of

¹Wiedner, op. cit., p. 85.

²Hodgkin and Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 219-220.

³Wiedner, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

Sunni Ali and after the Moslem coup under the Askia dynasty, replaced Mali as Mali had replaced Ghana in the Western Sudan. However, in 1591¹ a Moroccan expeditionary force attempted to take away control of the trade routes from Songhai and in doing so defeated its army. The Songhai Empire subsequently disintegrated into its component tribal units, most important of which were the animist Bambara kingdoms of Ségou and Kaarta on the Niger river.²

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a series of new attempts at establishing conqueror empires in this region took place. The first state created under Fulani and later Toucouleur leadership³ was the state of Macina on the Niger river, east of Sansanding, ruled by Shéhu Ahmadou until his death in 1844. This empire was greatly expanded under the rule of Toucouleur al-Hadj Omar Tall. After his death in 1864, the empire was divided among his sons. The Malinke empire of Samory Touré,⁴ established after the death of al-Hadj Omar, was also based on religious conquest. Like Omar, Touré started out in the Futa Djallon in Guinea and fought his way northeastward along the Dioula trade routes. The marked difference was that where Omar had divided his empire into administrative units on an ethnic basis, Touré,

¹Hodgkin and Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 220.

²Paques, op. cit., and Charles Monteil, Les Bambara de Ségou et Kaarta (Paris: Larousse, 1924).

³Gouilly, op. cit., pp. 72-76 and J. Spencer Trimingham, The History of Islam in the Western Sudan (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), Chaps. 2, 3 and 5.

⁴Foltz, op. cit., p. 9.

vaguely inspired by the Ottoman empire in North Africa,¹ divided his conquered territories into administrative districts rather than tribal units. But like Omar, Touré was unable to extend his empire into Senegal even though Toucouleur and Mandingo inhabit Senegal. Foltz finds that this was caused by the fact that the inhabitants of Senegal by that time had been in contact with the French too long to be willing to submit to outside control over their trade.² Contact with the French had been profitable for the Senegalese. Since both these empires were ruled by a Moslem leadership, the impetus to Islam in the general area--both as a result of military conquests as such and military conquests in the name of Allah--was quite considerable in the Western Sudan during the nineteenth century.

Soudan was thus the heartland of the succession of empires in the Western Sudan. Senegal or parts of Senegal were sometimes included in one empire but excluded from the subsequent one. At times, as in the case of Songhai, a small competitor empire existed in Senegal. This Tekrur Empire had been created by Moslem Toucouleur who were later replaced by Wolof, whose leadership the former had converted to Islam.³ Thus both territories can be said to have a history of centralized empires and strong states.

This historically grounded sense of identity, which Professor Ki Zerbo has called...tradition étatique, is reinforced by the continuity of certain types of social institutions, specifically

¹Gouilly, op. cit., p.78.

²Foltz, op. cit., p. 8.

³Ibid., p. 5.

Islamic institutions. Other institutions...are Sudanic rather than Islamic in character, particularly such occupationally specialized groups...which are sometimes referred to as "castes."¹

Along with the tradition of empire-building, one thus finds the development of Islamic conquest. The spread of Islamic tradition is manifested in such common institutions as the hadj, Koranic schools, jihads, ramadan, and the importance of Moslem religious brotherhoods, expressed in "soufism."

Another integrative trend resulting from these various Sudanic empires was the reinforcement of trade links within the Western Sudan. Malinke and Dioula traders became active in a flourishing East-West trade in addition to the North-South trade in the region. When all these factors, beneficial to integrative trends within the Western Sudan, are linked with the previously discussed linguistic, cultural and social ties between the various tribes and regions, one finds that the common heritage of shared history constituted a potentially strong integrative factor.

It was the colonial influence, however, which undermined this network of common experiences and interests to the extent that small differences became overly emphasized. This negative aspect of French colonial rule did not become apparent until the late 1950's, although the foundations for future strife and internal differentiation were laid as early as 1880.

¹Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-speaking West Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 262.

3. The Common Experience of Colonial Subjugation

French penetration and colonial conquest became a unifying as well as a divisive factor in the A.O.F. in general as well as between the subsequently established territorial units. To what extent these influences became politically relevant to integrative trends in the Mali Federation will be examined in this and later sections of this study.

In terms of the history of French penetration into West Africa, Senegal can be considered to constitute the germ from which French expansion in West Africa developed. The earliest settlement was established at St. Louis de Senegal in 1659.¹ This settlement, in which a fort and trading post had been built, together with the island of Gorée, became the focal point of French commercial activity on the African West Coast. Neres writes that "It was used energetically by Faidherbe, whom Napoleon III sent there in 1854, as a base from which to transform, within the space of ten years, a cordon of stagnant and isolated trading-posts into a larger territory, adding a hinterland to the coastal dependencies."² In order to accomplish this task, Faidherbe established relations with chiefs in the interior, drove back the Moors in Mauritania and the Toucouleurs in Upper Senegal, opening up the territory as far inland as the Niger basin. The entire territory became known as Senegal, and it was this same interior region of West Africa which the British were attempting to penetrate from the forest settlements on the Gulf of

¹Philip Neres, French-speaking West Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 12.

²ibid.

Guinea.¹ However, the climate and the diminutive trade made this early colony of Senegal seem one of the most desolate remnants of a former great empire.²

Faidherbe was not stopped by the moans and cries of those who advised him to give up the effort. He pushed eastward until, around 1870, the territory of Senegal extended as far inland as Macina. After his departure from Senegal the push halted, not to be resumed until 1880. During these same years, French explorers Caillié, Mage and Binger set out for the interior of the Sudan from the Guinea Gulf in order to gain control over the hinterland which was thought to give geographical unity to the various possessions.³

In the early 1880's the push into the interior was resumed. It was the result of a dream of Empire born in the minds of many an influential Frenchman. It envisaged a French empire in Africa stretching from Dakar to Dahomey, from Algeria to Conakry and, initially, from Lake Chad to the Nile.⁴ These dreams, which lasted until the Second World War, soon turned into concrete plans and received the backing of French industrialists who perceived a wealth of unlimited tropical resources and raw materials as well as millions of potential customers for products made in France.

¹Ibid., p. 13.

²S. H. Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, Vol. I (London: King and Sons, 1929), pp. 302-306.

³Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, French West Africa (London: Geo. Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 20.

⁴Forbes, op. cit., pp. 208-209.

A military command was established at Kayes in 1881 for Upper Senegal, securing Senegal in the rear and making further advances into the Niger basin possible. This advance proved to be a slow and painful process. In 1883 Bamako was occupied, Ségou was reached in 1891 and a "rapid" advance toward Timbuktu took place during the next two years. In other words, it took the French ten years to conquer and pacify the area between Bamako and Timbuktu--a distance less than 700 kilometers. This illustrates the stiffness of African resistance to French conquest in the general area. The one factor in France's favor during this period of conquest was that those tribes which had been conquered initially by Shéhu Ahmadou, then by al-Hadj Omar and finally by Samory Touré--and who had objected to this imposed rule--once "liberated," saw the French as a lesser of two evils and refused to fight on the side of their African overlords. The entire conquest, lasting from 1881 to 1898, when Samory Touré was captured and the city of Sikasso plundered, cost the peoples of the Western Sudan heavy losses. The French immediately set out to break the power of the dynasties that had opposed their conquest. Powerful chiefs and religious leaders were deposed and replaced by the commandement indigène, mainly composed of canton chiefs from ethnic and tribal groups that had historically opposed their African rulers.

At the end of the period of French conquest, there existed an amalgam of military and civilian administrative systems in French West Africa. In the early 1890's considerable pressures were exerted on the French government from many sides at home to unify and coordinate its African administrative system.¹ These pressures were a result of con-

¹Neres, op. cit., p. 6.

flicting authorities among the various administrators on location in Africa. France decided to create administrative unity in its West Africa possessions (as it had done in Indo China) and a civilian Governor-General was appointed in 1895. In 1899 French West Africa was organized into a federation of colonies and its Governor-General, residing in Dakar, was given authority over the colonies of Senegal, Guinea, Upper Senegal-Niger, Ivory Coast and Dahomey, each of which was to have a civilian Territorial Governor.¹ This ended the Imperialist period and marked the beginning of colonial rule in French West Africa.

In the meantime, France's colonial boundaries had been fixed as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1885. The conference had stipulated that each power in Africa was to give notice to all others as to which territories it considered its own. The outcome was a scramble among the European powers for their "share" of Africa; France's conquest of the Western Sudan was only a small component part. The important fact to remember here is that the boundaries established in Africa were mostly lines drawn along accidentally flowing rivers, by flag-planting commanders of colonial troops, or by diplomatic negotiators. These boundaries did not take into account the ethnic and tribal realities of human settlement, often splitting up tribes or lumping together those that had long histories of mutual hostility. In the light of France's difficult conquest of strong ethnic and political groups, these boundaries served France's purpose of making old tribal alliances impossible or at least extremely difficult, given the fact that the area could be effectively

¹Ibid.

policed.

On the whole, one can say that the A.O.F. had been effectively pacified by 1922. France managed to establish her version of a pax Britannica, assisted in this task by her rejection of indirect rule in favor of direct rule, except on the canton and village levels. The basic unit of administration was a "territory," administered by a Territorial Governor; the next lower level was a cercle (e.g. Niger was subdivided into eighteen cercles), corresponding to the British districts, administered by a Commandant de Cercle, originally a military commander and later a civilian. The next level of administration was a sub-division, administered by a French civilian. Each subdivision was divided into a number of cantons with an African Canton Chief as an administrator in the pay of the French government. (It was earlier stated that these canton chiefs were often brought in from other areas and frequently were not accepted as chiefs by the people they had come to rule.) The lowest administrative unit, in which local chiefs and tribal elders with traditional authority were allowed to function,¹ was the "village," comprising a limited number of lineages or settlements.

The administrative structure in the coastal territory followed a slightly different pattern. France's Code Civil had been promulgated in Senegal in 1833, and according to the declaration then made, every person born free and resident of the colony was to enjoy the rights granted under this law to citizens in France as well as Senegal. The

¹For an excellent account of French administration in the A.O.F., see Robert Delavignette, Freedom and Authority in French West Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1950).

creation of the four Communes de Pleine Exercice (territories under direct administration from Paris) originated from a decision by Louis Phillippe. The four Communes were St. Louis, Gorée, Rufisque and Dakar, whose originaires of both European and African descent were in 1848 given the same adult male suffrage as was introduced in France. Senegal was entitled to send one deputy to the French National Assembly.¹ Abrogated under the Second Empire, it was reintroduced in 1871, only to find the Communes de Pleine Exercice restrictively defined in 1890 to the four cities on the coast. The remainder of Senegal was proclaimed a protectorate whose inhabitants were French "subjects," not French "citizens."

In 1870 the four coastal Communes were given limited self-government; their elected representatives, together with those chosen by the administration--appointed chiefs from the interior--formed the Colonial Council² of Senegal.

Initial French colonial policy was characterized by two concepts: direct rule--a policy which remained in force until the loi-cadre reforms in 1956--and a concept known as "assimilation." The latter concept was more an ideal than a reality. "Assimilation" policy was a direct result of France's perceived mission civilisatrice, which assumed that the greatest benefit the Africans could gain from French rule would be to substitute French culture for their own backward ways. It tried to create black Frenchmen out of Africans.³ This policy provided limited

¹Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 127.

²L. Gray Cowan, Local Government in West Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 49-52.

³Ibid., pp. 36-61.

opportunities for Africans to become French citizens on merits of educational achievement, faithful service in the military and civil service, and so forth. Along with French citizenship came voting rights.

However, there was much opposition to this concept from both French and African groups, and after World War I "assimilation" was replaced by "association," which retained some elements of the traditional authority structure, while at the same time integrating these elements into the French colonial administrative structure.¹ "Assimilation" and "association" were not unqualified blessings to the Africans. The loss of traditional tribal patterns in the A.O.F. and the Africans' subsequent loss of identity with familiar social institutions caused them to look increasingly toward new associational structures. Islam provided one such common rallying ground for the isolated feelings and repressed instincts of the indigenous population. Where Islam had historically often been spread by force, it now became a religion to which people voluntarily, if at times eclectically, turned.² Other associational structures were provided by voluntary organizations and later by political parties.

The French colonial federation of Afrique Occidentale Française was enlarged to include Upper Volta in 1919, Mauritania in 1920 and

¹Foltz, op. cit., p. 11. See also Delavignette, op. cit., for a general treatment of this policy in practice.

²Peter B. Hammond, "Economic Change and Mossi Acculturation," in W. R. Bascom and M. Herskovits (eds.), Continuity and Change in African Cultures (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959) provides interesting insights as to how and why Mossi tribesmen turned toward Islam in the Office du Niger resettlement scheme.

Niger in 1922. A Government Council, composed of all A.O.F. Territorial Governors, the Commissioner for Togo, the Deputy for Senegal, the four members of the Supreme Council of Overseas France (elected by the "citizens" of the A.O.F.) and four members of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce and Municipal Council, advised the Governor-General. Within each colonial territory--except Senegal--an Administrative Council advised the Territorial Governor. Depending on the territory, these council members could be appointed or partially elected from "citizens" as well as "subjects."¹

General economic development of the territories was greatly accelerated with the construction of railroads into the interior. Until 1946 all African "subjects" could be drafted into compulsory labor groups for public works projects (corvée labor); in addition to this, taxes could be paid by means of prestation labor; and finally, military conscript labor was often used. This immense labor pool was used by the French for road and railway construction in the interior of the A.O.F. (and by the more unscrupulous private entrepreneurs for farm and plantation work).

Judicial systems in the A.O.F. were complex and often overlapping. If an African in the bush had committed a crime, this was often referred to the local chief or elders for settlement if the crime had proven to be a minor one. For major crimes, the criminal was turned over to the French colonial authorities to be judged and sentenced according to French law. Moslems who had stepped outside the boundaries of good be-

¹Neres, op. cit., p. 24.

havior according to the Koran could be judged and sentenced by Moslem authorities under the provisions of Koranic law. This was usually the case when minor violations were concerned which the French authorities found too insignificant to prosecute. However, the most humiliating form of justice was the indigénat. Under this system, any French administrator was authorized to be his own judge and jury when he felt that an African had misbehaved. He could use summary justice on the spot, which often amounted to corporeal punishment.

In summary it may be concluded that French colonial administration created administrative unity in the A.O.F. although not all changes were unqualified blessings to the Africans. Often French presence created or accentuated differences where formerly none had existed, or those existing had been insignificant. The "special" status of Senegal within the A.O.F. administrative structure is such a case in point. However, Senegal's unique position was even more underscored on the economic plane. The comparatively early French commercial presence in Senegal and the subsequently higher degree of development of Senegal vis à vis the neighboring territories tended to set this colony apart from the other A.O.F. territories, while making it relatively more dependent on France.

4. The Colonial Economic Structure in the A.O.F.: Unifying and Divisive Trends

It has already been indicated that as a result of centuries of empire-building in the Western Sudan, trade links between the various regions had been created. Most of this trade, however, was "area-

centered" in that little if any of the flow of commodities went beyond West Africa. Another characteristic of this trade was that most of it consisted of goods and foodstuffs that were consumed within the region.

The advent of the Europeans changed the economic profile of the Western Sudan considerably.

1. Since the main impetus of French expansion in Africa had come from French industrialists looking for raw materials and tropical products, the new economy became centered around cash crops and extractive industries.

2. The pattern of trade shifted from an "area-centered" to a metropole-oriented focus, disrupting many old, existing trade links but also establishing new linkages between the territories. An illustration of the metropole-oriented trade pattern is provided by the railroad system created in the A.O.F. in that all railways ran from the hinterland to the coast without ever being linked with each other in the interior.

3. France was anxious to reap the economic benefits from her newly-acquired African colonies, but on the other hand, the French taxpayers appeared reluctant to allow extra expenditures to be made on behalf of the colonial peoples. This condition resulted in the creation of an ingenious plan, conceived to keep the profits coming into France and keeping the French tax revenues at home. At the beginning of the twentieth century France decided that the federated A.O.F. territories should become economically self-sufficient.¹ Under the provisions of this system, each territory paid a certain percentage of its revenues

¹Elliott J. Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54 (1960), pp. 391-405.

into a general budget which was later redistributed according to the needs of each territory. This gave rise to violent anti-federalist sentiment in Senegal in the early 1920's, Senegal being originally the most developed territory in the A.O.F. Later, Senegalese displeasure with federalism disappeared when Dakar's main "industry," public administration, provided immediate and tangible returns to Senegalese budget contributions. However, when the Ivory Coast experienced a pre- and post-Second World War economic boom, it in turn began to show anti-federalist sentiment.

4. A further result of the new tax burden imposed on the African population caused many a marginal farmer to be forced to sell his labor on the open market in order to pay his taxes. The overall outcome of these changed conditions was that an increased migrant farm labor force boosted the cash crop output while the plight of the subsistence farmer resulted in a massive move to the city and increased urbanization in coastal towns.

However, the phenomenon of seasonal migration in the Western Sudan was not entirely new, although the colonial situation gave a strong boost to an already existing tradition. Oral tradition and accounts of sixteenth century European travellers in Africa indicate that historically the Sudanese agricultural worker had habitually searched for markets and profits which could not be found in his area of origin. The direction of this search was generally patterned from the interior toward the coastal areas. This search for profits occasioned mass migrations. Ethnic charts show that the inhabitants of the Sudanese hinterland traditionally exercised a certain pressure on the inhabitants of the coastal

territories. (This holds true for the Malinke, the Dioula, the Soussou, the Kouranko, the Kono and the Vai.) In recent times this drive has not manifested itself in occupations of fertile lands, but in a form of collaboration with the original inhabitants.¹ It manifests itself in the annual seasonal migrations of the inhabitants of the Western Sudan to work in the peanut harvests in "Senegambia," the cocoa plantations of the Ivory Coast and Ghana, and more recently yet, toward the industrializing coastal cities. The Guinea Coast territories in return have become heavily dependent on this migratory labor force from the interior.² Guinea has traditionally exported some seasonal labor to the Ivory Coast and Senegal, while Senegal and Dahomey exported clerks and civil servants throughout the A.O.F. The Ivory Coast depends most heavily on seasonal foreign labor (30 to 60 percent of its total salaried labor force) while Senegal takes second place (13 percent). Foltz finds that these patterns of labor migration are instrumental in reinforcing the trade links between the various territories of the interior and the periphery.³

The implications of this widespread cross-national migration in terms of favorable conditions for closer integration seem apparent to the casual observer. (The increased contact between peoples from neighboring territories is recognized by Deutsch as a "condition" essential for political amalgamation.) However, this migrant labor force did not constitute part of the politically relevant elites in the A.O.F. at the

¹Labouret, Paysans..., pp. 222-223.

²Foltz, op. cit., pp. 43, 47.

³Ibid., pp. 46-47.

time of the amalgamation between Senegal and Soudan, since migrant labor was not organized, was largely illiterate and consequently a-political in terms of national issues.

Over time the economies of Senegal and Soudan began to develop along complementary lines, especially since the opening of the Dakar-Niger railroad and the East-West highway.¹ Both countries were mainly agricultural, while Senegal was beginning to develop some industries in the Dakar and St. Louis areas at the time of the Mali Federation.

Soudan's major export crops were cotton and rice (grown in the Office du Niger agricultural scheme), peanuts and cattle. It was largely self-sufficient in the production of foodstuffs for domestic consumption. Its diversified agricultural output could be gradually increased by irrigation and better communications. Although it could maintain its economic pace without a great deal of aid, large-scale, rapid expansion would have required massive aid. There were few foreign investments in Soudan, and plantations were largely non-existent. Peasant farming of the subsistence level was still the rule while trade was mainly in the hands of small-time Dioula/Mande traders. Over the years the Soudanese had begun to attach particular importance to the development of the rural economy and to cooperative efforts, having little concern for attracting foreign capital. In addition to agriculture, Soudanese cattle products figured prominently in the general economic profile of the territory. It exported cattle on the hoof, meat and hides to Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast,

¹"The Economy of Mali (Pts. 1 and 2)," West Africa, Nos. 2213 and 2214 (London: Oct. 31 and Nov. 7, 1959), pp. 913, 939.

Upper Volta and Ghana. This trade was expected to increase considerably once communication networks could be improved and expanded.

Senegal's main crop was peanuts. By 1959 it had become the world's largest producer of this staple. France guaranteed markets and extended price supports for this crop once the world-market peanut prices declined. However, Senegal's economic pride and joy was the city of Dakar with its administrative offices, its warehouses, its port facilities and its airport. Most of these had been designed on a scale to serve not only Senegal, but also the hinterland of the Sudan.¹ The infant industries in the Dakar and St. Louis areas caused the Senegalese to be relatively more concerned than the Soudanese about attracting private investment capital to insure continued industrial expansion. Compared with Soudan, Senegal had an abundant labor supply, a higher percentage of trained African personnel, and extensive transport facilities. Drawbacks in the Senegalese economy consisted of a limited supply of natural resources and an over-dependency on a single cash crop, on French-supplied markets and on price supports.

It may thus be concluded that closer integration between Senegal and Soudan would be beneficial to both territories, given the land-locked location of Soudan, the port of Dakar, and the Dakar-Niger railroad. A further conclusion that might be drawn from the preceding economic comparison is that while Senegal could only continue to prosper under the continued good-will from France, Soudan was able to act more independently with regard to either Senegal or France without thereby committing

¹Ibid., p. 913.

economic suicide.

5. Political Elites: A.O.F., Soudan, Senegal

In connection with the phenomenon of seasonal migration described in the previous section, the allegation was made that although these migrants constituted a potentially positive factor in terms of further political integration between A.O.F. territories, in reality they were politically of little relevance. Mass participation in the political processes in Africa is limited, and although voter participation and registration are sometimes impressive, this does not mean that the electorate at large is correspondingly relevant in political decision-making. Few issues are meaningfully debated or perceived by the general public due to low literacy rates, limited mass communications media, "provincialism," and comparatively low levels of national integration. The implication of this condition is that a limited political elite is disproportionately important in the decision-making process. The composition of this elite is discussed in the following section.

During the "assimilation" phase of French colonial administration, the French largely bypassed the traditional chiefs, ignored the African peasant, but followed a different policy toward a small group of chosen few--the élites or évolués.¹ Initially the colonial administration selected promising youths for instruction in the French language, public administration and legal techniques from the cooperating traditional ruling families and chefs médaillés. The French hoped that upon com-

¹Thompson and Adloff, op. cit., pp. 24, 28.

pletion of their training, these youths would assume administrative functions in the A.O.F. as well as subordinate positions in the professions and commerce. Even though educational opportunities were very limited compared with British West African colonies, 71,000 students were enrolled in some sort of school in the A.O.F. by 1938.¹ These schools were predominantly located in the urban areas of Senegal, Dahomey and the Ivory Coast. Very few Africans attended universities in France before World War II.² The economic privileges given to this group included exemptions from taxation, corvée labor, and military service. Socially these African elites and their children lived on terms of virtual equality with their French colleagues.

Perhaps the most famous school in the A.O.F. was l'École Normale William Ponty in Dakar, which trained African teachers, civil servants and "assistant doctors." Ponty became the primary training ground of a new Africa elite class. All top cadres of the African colonial civil servants were graduates of Ponty, with the result that their common educational experience contributed to the formation of often life-long ties throughout the A.O.F. Alumni associations of Ponty graduates, along with lycée "old boys clubs" such as the Association des Anciens Élèves de Terrasson de Fougères,³ soon became the forums for unofficial political discussion and for the development of political leaders in every A.O.F.

¹Foltz, op. cit., p. 20.

²During the year 1929-1930 only two French West Africans were registered in French universities; in 1950 there were 165 and in 1955 there were 684, with an additional 200 students taking university level courses in Dakar. Ibid., p. 70.

³Hodgkin and Morgentau, op. cit., p. 229.

territory. In addition to alumni associations, the secondary school graduates also formed cultural societies and associations in the urban centers, such as the Foyer du Soudan and the Foyer France-Sénégal. Other educated groups published newspapers or were active in theatrical efforts. Most of these groups became the nuclei for territorial political parties, once political activity became a legal reality outside of the four Communes of Senegal.

A sizeable segment of the African colonial elite thus consisted of civil servants who had won for themselves a coveted place in the upper and middle African social strata of the A.O.F. Since they were trained by the state, free of charge, most of the upper primary and secondary school graduates had to work for the colonial government, at least for some period of time after their graduation. Most of them were assigned to the lower ranks of the civil service, while the Ponty graduates were usually able to rise to intermediary levels. Few openings at Ponty and difficult entrance examinations meant that territories with more and better primary schools were disproportionately represented, as was the case with Senegal and Dahomey. "Citizens" of Senegal moreover, had access to the Lycée Faidherbe in St. Louis and later, in 1940, the Lycée van Vollenhoven in Dakar. In the rest of the A.O.F. there were no lycées until 1945 when Bamako's Terrasson de Fougères was upgraded to a lycée. Gradually each territory obtained such a secondary school.¹

It did not take long, however, before differences and hard feelings developed between the "citizen" and the "subject" civil servants.

¹Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

During the 1930's pressures for better promotion systems began to build among the "subject" civil servants. It had become clear that their "citizen" confrères were always favored, and the "subjects" began to realize that assimilation possibilities for them were severely hampered when achieved citizenship cases remained limited to three or four cases annually. These pressures mounted considerably when, during the Popular Front days of the pre-World War II Léon Blum government, eager young Communists and Socialists took teaching and civil servant jobs in the A.O.F. Ideas of human equality spread more rapidly as a result of this influx, while at this time the first rudimentary trade unions among teachers were permitted by the new, liberalized colonial administration. But it took until the 1946 loi-Lamine-Guèye before differences between "citizens" and "subjects" were largely eliminated.

The young African intellectuals and civil servants thus became the reservoir from which the post-war and pre-independence political leadership emerged.

Another important segment of politically relevant elites consisted of Moslem religious leaders, called 'Marabouts' by the French. The Marabouts were given many privileges during French colonial rule in the A.O.F. and prospered accordingly. In exchange for privileged treatment they kept their followers in check by encouraging them to behave according to French wishes and dictates. The two main religious sects in Senegal and Soudan were, and still are, the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya; the Mourides brotherhood of the Qadiriyya is numerically weaker but politically stronger in Senegal, while the Tijaniyya are politically and

numerically dominant in Soudan.¹ Since, especially among the Mourides, the followers believe that their entrance into heaven depends on following the dictates of their leaders, the Marabouts, over time, came to represent considerable political authority. Their authority in Senegal was further enhanced by their extensive holdings of peanut lands, which gave them a large measure of economic power and control. However, there was often internal strife and factionalism between the Marabouts over matters of personal prestige and succession. The disputes became rather easily politicized as a result of the large following which the leaders could command and often mobilized to emphasize their personal interests.

The early history of Islam in the Western Sudan already has been discussed. It was observed that Soudan and Guinea became the heartland of the large Moslem empires in the 19th century. Soudanese cities such as Dienné, Gao and Timbuktu were veritable centers of urban Islamic culture, but also the center of a certain puritan tradition, preoccupied with morals, honor and strict religious ideologies.² The old ruling families of former dynasties, the Tall, the Keita, the Touré, the Dia and the Diallo also survived within these Moslem political structures. When the French penetrated into the Soudan, many enemies of these ruling families welcomed them, including the Fulani families of Macina as well as some of the Bambara and Minianka groups. Ruth Schachter Morgenthau observed that the French policy of excluding the traditional dynastic

¹Gouilly, op. cit., pp. 85-125; Foltz, op. cit., 114-115; Kenneth Robinson, "Senegal: The Elections to the Territorial Assembly, March 1957," in Kenneth Robinson and W. J. M. Mackenzie (eds.), Five Elections In Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 285-287.

²Paques, op. cit., p. 111.

families from the commandement indigène probably strengthened their position as an opposition group and prepared their way for political rebirth once the drive for independence began in Soudan.¹

The third element in the A.O.F. elite structure, the traditional chiefs, should be mentioned here, although their influence, compared to those under the British system of indirect rule cum native administration, was relatively small. In the major cities of the A.O.F. and along the main trade and communication routes, traditional chiefs were subjected to the European administration, which largely destroyed their political influences and power bases. However, in remote areas chiefdoms were largely undisturbed, especially if their areas of control were well-administered.² At other times the policy of leaving chiefdoms intact was merely expedient on the part of the French when confronted with the extreme dispersion and fragmentation of the various groups and settlements.³ The end result was that after a period of time there developed a noticeable difference between those Africans who had come under direct control of the commandement indigène and those who had remained under their traditional chiefs. Soon after political parties were allowed in the A.O.F. this condition found its expression in different party affili-

¹Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 268.

²The prime example in the A.O.F. were the Mossi Kingdoms of the Upper Volta, where the Moro Naba of Ouagadougou was the recognized central authority for the Mossi tribesmen in the various kingdoms. See generally, Elliot P. Skinner, The Mossi of the Upper Volta (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

³Delavignette, op. cit., p. 73.

ations and ideological outlooks of these two groups.¹ Where chiefs until recently did play an important role was usually on the local rather than on the territorial or national level.

In Senegal, as a result of comparatively longer exposure to French administration, trade, and culture, the traditional chiefs became "extinct" earlier than elsewhere in the A.O.F. They were replaced by leaders whose authority was no longer ascribed but achieved as a result of their education. This soon blurred the lines of chiefly succession. However, some chiefly families retained their wealth and authority by becoming Marabouts and lived from the tribute paid to them by their followers. Ethnic groups in Senegal were over time replaced by "clans," consisting of persons from widely different backgrounds living in a certain area, who attached themselves to a patron or influential leader. These "clans" represented a variety of interests such as trader or farming interests, religious brotherhoods, or castes.²

In the context of political elites, the final group which merits mention is the military veterans. Male A.O.F. inhabitants were drafted into military service quite early in the colonial era. Often used for labor projects, these units helped the French administrators keep the peace in the colonial federation. And since honorable military service was one of the paths leading to French citizenship, many Africans volun-

¹Among the better known chiefs in Soudan was Chief Fili Dabo Sissoko, who was sent to the 1944 Brazzaville Conference of Colonial administrators, to represent chiefly interests in the A.O.F.; later he became the founder and leader of the Soudanese PSP. Foltz, op. cit., p. 120.

²Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 126.

teered for the colonial Tirailleurs Sénégalais¹ during both world wars. They fought valiantly in the trenches of the Marne and later in Indo China. Upon returning home they formed veterans organizations and were generally reluctant to follow the lead of local chiefs. Their influence was largely a modernizing one, limited to the local level. Their observations of how others lived in comparison to their own lives in local villages heightened their discontent with the colonial situation--especially since they had fought "to save democracy" and had learned about the Declarations of the Rights of Man.²

Not all elite groups mentioned above were of equal importance in all territories of the A.O.F. It may be generalized, however, that the Ponty- and lycée-graduate civil servants, teachers, and intellectuals constituted the core of the modernizing elites. Initially the chiefs retained much political power in such territories as Soudan, Niger and Upper Volta, but once mass-based political parties became dominant in all ex-A.O.F. territories, the conservative, traditionalist-led parties ceased to exist.

6. Administrative Federation and Interterritorial Parties in the A.O.F. Under Colonial Rule.

A descriptive analysis of political developments in the A.O.F. prior to 1959 is necessary for an understanding of the political climate immediately prior to the advent of the Mali Federation. This section

¹173,000 served in World War I.

²Compare the role of the veterans of Ghana: David E. Apter, Ghana in Transition (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 164-165.

examines (1) French administration of the A.O.F. territories and (2) the growth and nature of political parties in the post-World War II era.

In 1895 the first Governor General was appointed to St. Louis to administer France's West African possessions. In 1905 the colonial federation became an administrative unit and an A.O.F. constitution was promulgated. The hinterland, originally known as Haut-Sénégal-Niger, changed name to French Soudan, its capital being established at Bamako on the Niger River. Mauritania was administered from St. Louis, while the Niger Military District became a distinct unit--the territory of Niger--in 1922. During the following decades territorial borders were often subject to change, such as the creation of Upper Volta in 1919, the division of this territory in 1932 between Soudan and Ivory Coast, and finally its reestablishment in 1947. Decrees and legislation of 1904 and 1925 established the basic foundations of French colonial government in the A.O.F., placing territorial Lieutenant-Governors for each colony under the supreme authority of the Governor-General in Dakar.

The earliest instance of African Political activity in the A.O.F. can be pinpointed to the four Communes of Western Senegal, where in 1848 the originaires were given the same adult male suffrage as was introduced in France at that time. The 1848 French constitution provided for the election of twelve colonial deputies to the French National Assembly, of which one was from Senegal. This provision was abrogated under the Second Empire but reintroduced in 1871. Intermittent attempts to deprive the originaires of their rights to representation remained largely unsuccessful, attested by the election in 1914 of the African deputy, Blaise Diagne, to represent Senegal in Paris.

Other than in the Senegalese Communes, the Third Republic did not offer the A.O.F. indigenous population any significant opportunity to participate in politics, even though it began to create a potential nationalist elite through the medium of education. Nascent political parties did develop in Senegal between 1914 and 1940. First, there were the backers of deputy Blaise Diagne, who called themselves "Diagnistes" (1914-1934), while the "clan" of opponents to Diagne, including Lamine Guèye and Galandou Diouf, was known as the Parti de l'Opposition. When Diagne died in 1934, the opposition split into two camps. Diouf successfully contested a by-election and his followers began to call themselves "Dioufistes" (1934-1940). Guèye, on the other hand, became the leaders of a party of Socialist radicals (Parti Socialiste Sénégalais) who unsuccessfully challenged Diouf in the 1934 by-election. The party finally died out in 1945.¹ In addition, the pre-World War II Popular Front Government of Léon Blum gave impetus to increasing numbers of voluntary organizations of a covertly political nature for which left-leaning French administrators and school teachers provided leadership and guidance throughout the A.O.F.

In 1938 the majority of the Parti Socialiste Sénégalais decided to merge with the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO). This decision proved to be politically lucrative when the influential patron of the rich, peanut-growing Kaolack "clan" joined this party.² Soon SFIO members were elected to the Colonial Council and slowly became

¹Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 131-132 and 423.

²ibid., p. 133.

the politically controlling segment in a number of municipalities in Senegal.

After the outbreak of the Second World War, the Vichy government banned all suspect organizations throughout the A.O.F., including all representative bodies in Senegal. However, most political activities in French West Africa continued again when the Free French took over the colonial administration in 1943. After France's liberation in 1944, various African Groupes d'Études Communistes (GEC) with branches in all major A.O.F. cities, soon reestablished contacts between African political elites and the French Left.

A struggle for political power in French Africa between the post-war SFIO and GEC leaders took shape in various territories. In Senegal the SFIO under the guidance of "citizen" Lamine Guèye won this contest and adopted the name Bloc Africain. The growing popularity of the idea of African Unity inspired the Bloc to attempt to gain control throughout the A.O.F., but poor organization caused this effort to misfire. In the rest of the A.O.F. territories, GEC became the politically dominant group. These groups built interterritorial ties through the creation in 1946 of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA).¹

Pursuant to the newly-adopted constitution of the Fourth Republic (1946),² other A.O.F. territories were extended the rights which Senegal had enjoyed since before the war. Each territory was allowed to create

¹Ibid., pp. 134-137.

²In accordance with decisions reached at the Brazzaville conference of colonial administrators in 1944, French West Africa sent five delegates to the two constituent conventions in Paris in 1945 and 1946.

a Territorial Assembly with limited budgeting and taxation powers. (All executive power remained in the hands of the governors and their councils.) Furthermore, all "subjects" were given the right to vote and each territory was allowed to elect two or three delegates to the French National Assembly. African Territorial Assemblies elected representatives to the Council of the Republic and councillors to the Assembly of the French Union¹ from their own membership. These developments not only increased African participation in French representative institutions, they became bases from which the political elites operated in the following decade.

While numerous local and interterritorial parties developed shortly after 1946, only the RDA succeeded in creating an effective interterritorial organizational structure. In the French National Assembly various deputies from A.O.F. territories formed a loose voting bloc known as the Indépendents d'Outre-mer (IOM) but this grouping did not find its expression in an interterritorial party in Africa. Although numerous attempts to make the IOM into a competing interterritorial party were undertaken, poor organization caused these efforts to misfire. Subsequent attempts by non-RDA groups in French West Africa to create an interterritorial party finally culminated in the establishment of the Parti du Regroupement Africains (PRA) at a July, 1958 conference in Cotonou (Dahomey). But before this could be accomplished, a considerable amount of water had flowed over the political dams in the French territories. However, the main point at issue here is that increased African participation in colonial and French political institutions and parties was conducive to

¹Foltz, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

close cooperation between political elites from the various A.O.F. territories. Initially the dividing line between these African leaders was drawn as a direct result of the respective Socialist and communist "roots" which the leaders and their parties had in the immediate post-war era. Except for the Senegalese Lamine Guèye, none of the Africans elected as deputies for the French National Assembly had any previous connections with French political parties, and from the first elections the deputies aligned themselves with the three major French political parties. Lamine Guèye and his protégé Léopold Senghor, along with the Guinean Yacine Diallo, became apparentés of the SFIO. Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Sourou Migan Apithy (Dahomey) and Chief Fili Dabo Sissoko (Soudan) aligned themselves with the Communists. The mass parties which came to dominate the political scene in Senegal and Soudan reflect these fundamental differences in party origins, while their respective ideological outlooks are also a function of the way in which the parties gained dominance in these territories.

In Senegal an important split occurred between Guèye and Senghor in 1948 when Senghor left the Bloc Africain to form the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS) together with Mamadou Dia, a Moslem school teacher from the rich peanut-growing area of the Sidi-Saloum. In 1951 the BDS was strong enough to oust Lamine Guèye from his seat in the French National Assembly and successfully challenged the Socialists' control in Senegalese politics. After these initial successes, the two politicians continued their efforts to make the BDS a truly mass party. In order to widen their base of support, they took a calculated risk in 1956 by welcoming into the party a large group of young Senegalese radicals and placing

them in key party positions. They knew that the BDS "old guard" ("clan" leaders and Moslem dignitaries) would initially object, but they also counted on Senghor's popular appeal to prevent their exodus from the party. Further plans included a fusion with the Senegalese RDA branch, the Union Démocratique Sénégalaise (UDS). The closing months of 1956 saw the unification of the BDS and the UDS under the new name of Bloc Populaire Sénégalais (BPS) which won smashing victories in the March 1957 Territorial Assembly elections.¹ In the meantime, Lamine Guèye's Socialists had continued to deteriorate in political strength. And since unity by fusion was Senghor's primary objective at that time, it was only a matter of time before the Socialists would join the BPS. Spearheaded by a group of Socialist "young turks" in 1957, unity between the BPS and the Socialists became a reality in 1958 with the creation of yet another fusion party, the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS). It became the Senegalese territorial section of the newly created interterritorial PRA. But Senghor and Dia, unhappy with the PRA's Cotonou resolution calling for immediate independence, soon became faced with internal opposition by young radicals "true to the spirit of Cotonou." These elements organized and by September 1958, left the UPS and founded their own party, the PRA-Sénégal.²

Although the political origins of the UPS lay with the Socialist movement, its ideology and party structure had to remain flexible during the processes of fusion. It had to appeal to a wide electorate of various

¹Robinson, op. cit.,

²Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 158-165.

backgrounds, and as a result of this need for mass appeal among the large numbers of literates, the UPS had enemies on the right (Marabouts) as well as the left (PRA-Sénégal), although its ideological base was vaguely Marxist and Socialist.¹

The political history of the Union Soudanaise differed considerably from that of the UPS. Soudan's first political organizations were created by the few Africans fortunate enough to have been educated in French-run schools, and by those involved in trade. The size of the educated elite within Soudan remained small because many of the ethnic groups, spilling over into the richer neighboring territories, sent their sons to school in Senegal, Guinea and the Ivory Coast. Foremost among this small group of elites was Mamadou Konaté, a Ponty graduate of 1919 who had returned home after the completion of his schooling. During his years in politics, Konaté influenced and inspired many of his contemporaries in the A.O.F. among whom are counted Félix Houphout-Boigny and Modibo Keita. A pre-war leader of the Foyer du Soudan, Konaté was also instrumental in organizing the first teachers' union in Soudan, together with Ouezzin Coulibaly of the Voltaic region. Most Soudanese members of the Foyer and of the teachers' union were "subjects" trying to unite in an effort to agitate against forced labor, the indigénat, and against the fact that "subjects" had no voting rights. Under the leadership of Konaté these elements organized the Parti Démocratique Soudanais (PDS) in opposition to Chief Fili Dabo Sissoko's conservative Parti Progressiste Soudanais (PPS or PSP).

¹Léopold S. Senghor, On African Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1964), and Mamadou Dia, The African Nations and World Solidarity (New York: Praeger, 1961).

At the RDA founding congress at Bamako in 1946, these Soudanese parties both sent delegates. During the conference they decided to unite into a single parti, the Union Soudanaise, as a territorial affiliate of the RDA (US-RDA). However, Sissoko soon took his followers out of the US-RDA and revived his PSP.¹ It immediately rose to the level of dominant party, partially as a result of backing received from the many traditional chiefs who had remained in power under the commandement indigène in Soudan. The years between 1947 and 1956, however, evidenced a gradual decline in PSP strength coinciding with a corresponding rise in US-RDA influence and power. When in 1946 all "subjects" in the French colonies gained the right to vote under the loi-Lamine-Guèye, they rallied behind the banner of the US.

In 1950 the RDA under the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Mamadou Konaté broke its links with the Communist Party (Gabriel d'Arboussier) and a general crack-down on Communists throughout the A.O.F. and A.E.F. was carried out by the colonial administration in the wake of this split. Modibo Keita, the favorite pupil of Konaté, was accused of being an unrepenting Communist and was banned to the Sahel region of Soudan and forbidden to take part in political activities for two years. But despite this handicap he was elected vice-president of the Soudan Territorial Assembly in 1952, and was allowed to return to Bamako. A year later he was elected to the Assembly of the French Union as well as being elected mayor of Bamako during the same election. He spent the years from 1956 to 1958 working inside the interterritorial RDA as a personal

¹Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 272-276.

protégé of Houphouët-Boigny. When Konaté died in 1957, Keita replaced him as the leader of the Union Soudanaise.

Under Boigny's guidance he helped implement the 1956 loi-cadre (outline law)¹ in the A.O.F. This law sought to bring about administrative decentralization in French Africa and to develop territorial autonomy. It was thought that the Africans had to be trained for some sort of autonomy, and this training could best be carried out in the spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence by men familiar with the needs and problems of the native populations.

By 1956 the US versus PSP struggle had polarized along ideological lines. The PSP was perceived as being a colonialist party, made up of conservative chiefs and Marabouts who had personally benefitted from French colonial rule and who preferred colonial rule to continue unchanged. The US-RDA, on the other hand, was viewed as a radical party with strong ideological roots in Marxism, universalism, and as a party with a militant program focussed on independence and anti-colonialism. The contest between the PSP and the US for control over the political institutions in Soudan was long and difficult. The ultimate victory of

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- ¹This loi cadre contained the following provisions:
- a. It granted new legislative powers in specific spheres (soil conservation, internal trade) to the Territorial Assemblies;
 - b. It abolished the system of separate electoral rolls for "citizens" and former "subjects";
 - c. It established universal adult suffrage on a common roll in all elections;
 - d. The powers of the Territorial Governors were reduced and Government Councils were to be established in each territory. These executives, elected by the Territorial Assemblies, were predominantly African;
 - e. The French Territorial Governors were to remain in control of state services, to possess certain reserved powers and to preside over the Governmental Councils. Neres, op. cit., p. 69 and Foltz, op. cit., pp. 73-75.

the US was largely due to its better organization, its mobilization capability and its strict party discipline. However, it was not until 1959 that the US could claim dominant status in Soudan.

With the introduction of the loi-cadre, two distinct schools of thought on the future political structure of the A.O.F. began to emerge throughout the colonial federation as well. Senegal's Senghor and Dia opposed the "decentralizing" aspects of the new law on the grounds that it would ultimately lead to the "balkanization" of the A.O.F. and of Africa as a whole. Within the RDA it created a schism which came out into the open at the 1957 RDA party congress in Bamako. The conference centered around the distinct themes of "unity" and "federation," "individual association" and "independence."¹ Houphouet-Boigny, uncomfortable under the Ivory Coast's heavy financial burden of supporting its poor A.O.F. neighbors, advocated territorial autonomy within a federal French-African community. He was openly challenged by the "young turks" from the RDA sections in Guinea and Soudan, who stressed the need for preserving the federation's unity in order to facilitate the rapid advent of full independence. They felt that it was preferable for the A.O.F. to speak with one voice when presenting demands for further independence to France.²

Such were the integrative and divisive political trends in the A.O.F., and in Soudan and Senegal in particular, upon the advent of Charles de Gaulle in France. On May 13, 1958 the French army in Algeria

¹Foltz, op. cit., pp. 22-23 and 81-83.

²Neres, op. cit., p. 72.

revolted; de Gaulle staged a "coup by default," and prospects for political unity in French Africa disappeared along with the Fourth Republic.

7. The Significance and the Implications of the 1958 Constitutional Referendum

The most significant event to take place in French West Africa between the promulgation of the loi-cadre in 1956 and the creation of the Mali Federation in 1959, was the 1958 Referendum for the Fifth Republic's Constitution, creating the French Community. A separate section dealing with events leading up to the Referendum and its implications for political unity in the A.O.F. is necessary in order to see the founding of the Mali Federation in full perspective.

Because de Gaulle distrusted the French National Assembly, he entrusted the drawing of a new constitution to a special committee, hand-picked by him, under the direction of Michel Debré. Two days after the close of the PRA founding conference in Cotonou (July 25-26, 1958) de Gaulle called the first meeting of the Constitutional Consultative Committee. This body included three Africans: Senghor and Guèye of the Senegalese UPS=PRA, and Gabriel Lisette of the Chad RDA section. Houphouet-Boigny, a Minister of State in the first de Gaulle cabinet, participated in an ex-officio capacity. Since Houphouet-Boigny worked closely with Debré on the drafting of the Community's constitution, it appears that the provisions pertaining to Africa were largely in accord with many of his personal views on the future relations between France and Africa.¹ Both Boigny and Debré were opposed to African federalism,

¹Foltz, op. cit., p. 106.

each, however, for different reasons.

De Gaulle's Community envisaged increased autonomy for colonial territories which would be members of the Community, presided over by the President of France.¹ Each territory was to elect its own Prime Minister, replacing the Territorial Governors. This resulted in the fact that whereas formerly disputes between political leaders from different territories had remained limited to the party level, these disputes now became national concerns between the respective territories.

The Bamako conference of 1957 had shown the schism inside the RDA over "federalism" versus "independence." Between September 1957 and September 1958, Houphouet-Boigny had been able to smoothe over the differences within the party. The political line-up in the A.O.F. at the time of de Gaulle's Referendum on the Community (during which each territory had the option of voting "Yes" for association with France in the French Community, or "no," indicating the choice for immediate independence, cutting all ties with France) was as follows:²

In Guinea, the trade union (UGTAN) leadership and the youth and student movements' leadership put pressure on Sékou Touré to opt for independence and to use his Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG) in obtaining this independence by voting "No" in the forthcoming Referendum. Touré had opposed Houphouet-Boigny at Bamako in 1957 and needed little

¹See generally, French Constitution, 1958, Title XII, and Stanley H. Hoffmann, "The French Constitution of 1958; The Final Text and its Prospects," American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 2 (June, 1959), pp. 344-347.

²See generally, Immanuel Wallerstein, "How Seven West African States Were Born," Africa Report, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Feb., 1961), pp. 3,4, 7,12 and 15.

convincing that his point of view was correct, especially after his confrontation with de Gaulle at Conakry in August 1958 when Touré told de Gaulle that he preferred "poverty in liberty over richness in slavery." Touré hoped that independence would be obtained in association with the other A.O.F. territories. If not, Guinea seemed to be prepared to isolate herself temporarily from the rest of the A.O.F. for the sake of African unity. It could then form the nucleus of a union based on a larger degree of relinquishing of national sovereignty in the interest of the Pan-African ideal (the Union of African States).

The death of Voltaic RDA leader Ouezzin Coulibaly a month prior to the September Referendum, had created a power struggle within the RDA in Upper Volta between Maurice Yaméogo and Joseph Ouédraogo. After the Referendum it was rumored that Coulibaly probably would have voted "No" and thereby joining Touré. There is no evidence which supports this allegation. He probably would have voted "Yes" to preserve RDA unity.

The decision of Niger's Djibo Bakary, the PRA leader in this territory, to vote "No" had rather widespread repercussions. Why he called for a "No" vote can be traced back to the stormy PRA founding congress in Cotonou the preceding July. There, Abdoulaye Ly of the Senegalese UPS's left wing and Djibo Bakary of the Niger Sawaba (both territorial PRA sections) had whipped up great enthusiasm behind the demand for immediate independence. (Thus the RDA dissidents were grouped around Touré, while the PRA dissidents lined up behind Bakary.) Moreover, Niger had a strong RDA opposition which was closely attached to Houphouët-Boigny. If the Sawaba backed down from its demands for immediate independence in a union with France, this would have been tantamount to

handing over political control in Niger to the RDA. It appears that Bakary did not have much of a choice. Shortly before the Referendum, France sent in troops from the Sahara to "help maintain order." These troops received the enthusiastic backing of French administrators in Niger as well as from the conservative Hausa chiefs. Against such odds the Sawaba forces did not stand a chance. Bakary and Touré later charged that the French troops helped falsify the election in favor of the Community. Again, there is little evidence that this actually occurred, but in the light of earlier French falsifications of elections in Guinea for which evidence does exist, these allegations may be accepted as being true.

Soudan appears to have been the "key" territory in the 1958 Referendum. Soudan's RDA leadership would have preferred a "No" vote but it realized that such a vote could be dangerous. The PSP was on the wane, but a "No" vote might give them an issue on which to ride back into power. Moreover, Moslem leaders who had prospered under French protection, supported by French administrators and conservative chiefs, were united in their support for de Gaulle. After considerable argument within the US-RDA and a nearly successful revolt of the junior cadres, the party leadership decided to forego the pleasure of having their right to independence immediately recognized, and decided on a "Yes" vote. In the light of what happened in Niger, this may have been a wise decision, since French troops could easily have been brought into Soudan from the Sahara.

In Dahomey the local parties were too divided and French influence was too strong to make a "No" vote a realistic alternative, while Mauri-

tania was too dependent on France in terms of financial, political and military support in its dispute with Morocco, to say "No" to the de Gaulle Constitution.

Senegal provides another interesting tableau of factional and personal interests. On his 1958 tour through Africa, de Gaulle had learned his lesson of Conakry and had subsequently modified his stand and language in Dakar sufficiently to avoid an open break with Senghor. Some of the UPS leaders seemed to have favored a "No" vote while Senghor was personally opposed to Houphouet-Boigny, who admittedly had the Community more or less tailored for him and his personal interests. However, as in Soudan, the powerful Marabouts solidly backed de Gaulle, and their ability to command votes among the Senegalese up-country peasants was not to be underestimated. In addition, powerful Lébou elements in the Four Communes threatened to secede from Senegal if the country voted the Constitution down. Finally, French authorities and commercial interests in Dakar were busy on their own account to press for a "Yes" vote. Senghor was clearly outmaneuvered and outnumbered; he was enough of a politician to realize the strength of his opponents. And since Senghor had a long-standing record of working for decolonization in a manner which would not involve an open break with France, his "Yes" vote was really not that much out of character. The outcome of the Referendum in the A.O.F. was as follows: Ivory Coast, 99% Yes; Upper Volta, 99% Yes; Dahomey, 98% Yes; Senegal, 97% Yes; Soudan, 97% Yes; Mauritania, 94% Yes; Guinea, 5% Yes, and Niger, 78% Yes.¹

¹Foltz, op. cit., p. 95.

The Referendum is important in the context of this study in that it brought party fissures in both the RDA and PRA clearly into the open, it closed the door on any federal scheme including all A.O.F. territories, and finally, it placed the specter of "balkanization" of French West Africa squarely in front of the African politicians. "Independence" and "unity" had been the main issues in the campaign prior to the Referendum, and the final stands taken by the various parties were often not so much a clear stand on the issues as such as they were dictated by tactical considerations within the individual territories. Thus the Referendum may be seen as one of the main causal factors for the creation of the Mali Federation.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MALI FEDERATION: A SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS

In this chapter a brief history is given of the Mali Federation, including the main events leading to its eventual demise in August, 1960. The material presented here is mainly descriptive, while an analysis of the various key developments and their implications for integration or disintegration will be reserved for the chapter dealing with the application of Deutsch's "conditions." Additional details pertinent to the individual "conditions" as applied to the Mali Federation will also be introduced in a later chapter.

The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic contained the following provisions:

The Overseas Territories may retain their status within the Republic. If they express the desire to do so by a decision of their Territorial Assemblies taken within the time limit set in the first paragraph of Article 91, they shall become Overseas Departments of the Republic or member States of the Community, either in groups or as single units.¹

The French Constitution thus expressly allowed for the creation of primary federations within the French Community. However, one of the central ideas inherent in the structure of the French Community was the continued indefinite dependence of the colonies on France.

Houphouet-Boigny who had helped draft the new Constitution, was the foremost proponent of the French Community in the A.O.F. Léopold Senghor

¹Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, promulgated October 4, 1958, Art. 76 (italics added).

had been quite ambiguous about it until radical elements within his own territory, advocating immediate independence, had forced him to take a pro-Community stand. Soudan's Keita had advocated the idea of a Community¹ in 1957 but had conceived of it in terms of an inseparable part of a whole concept of which ultimate independence for all of the A.O.F. was the other component. Guinea's Sékou Touré, although recognizing the importance of continued cooperation with France as an economic necessity, was willing to postpone independence but unwilling to forego it completely by becoming part of a larger political unit which could never become fully controlled by Africans.

From December 29 to 30, 1958, a meeting was held in Bamako by delegates from Soudan, Senegal, Upper Volta, and Dahomey to discuss the question of a "primary federation" in order to avoid "balkanization of the A.O.F."² After only seven hours of debate the delegates agreed to create such a federation and a Constitution was subsequently drawn up. The leaders of this conference were clearly Léopold Senghor and Mobido Keita. A federation on the territorial level was thus launched. But the Senegalese and Soudanese leaders did not stop there; in March 1959, Senghor and Keita, disregarding or discounting fundamental ideological differences decided to carry the idea of a federation into the realm of their respective political parties as well. They created a new inter-territorial party, the Parti de la Fédération Africaine (PFA) of which the UPS and the US would be the territorial branches. It was furthermore

¹Neres, op. cit., p. 79.

²Africa Special Report, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Feb., 1959), pp. 2-4.

designed to accomodate other PRA and "federalist" RDA factions in Upper Volta and Dahomey.¹

Although the new French Constitution allowed for such federations, France did not support this movement toward a larger political unit. The reason behind France's attitude was that de Gaulle viewed those politicians who most strongly advocated "unity" in Africa to be those who also pushed hardest for independence. Initial French repudiation of the idea of independence (in the light of her embroilments in Algeria at that time) led to French suspicion as to the real goal of "unity."²

The Constitution of the new federation--to be called Mali, a name suggested by Senghor in an attempt to appeal to the sense of history of the Voltaic and Soudanese delegates--was drawn up by a Constituent Assembly of the four original federating territories.

The Federation was opposed by Guinea, which saw it as a "French neo-colonialist plot" to encircle and isolate Guinea from her neighbors. It was also opposed by Félix Houphouet-Boigny who saw it as a challenge to his primacy in French West African politics. France supported him because she wanted to back a loyal friend in a rich territory, and because France saw Senghor and Keita as personal opponents of Boigny. Finally, it was opposed by Niger whose new leadership owed its rise to power after the Referendum to de Gaulle and Houphouet-Boigny; by Upper Volta, where Yaméogo and his regime were soon bribed and pressured by the Ivory Coast's leadership to step out of the federation; and by Da-

¹Ibid, (Feb. 1959), pp. 5-6 and Léopold S. Senghor, Congrès Constitutif du PFA (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1959).

²Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of Independence (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 111.

homey, where France threatened to pull out of financing the improvement of the deep-water port at Cotonou.

However, the creation of the Mali Federation forced Houphouët-Boigny to modify his earlier opposition to all regroupings of former A.O.F. territories. After he had successfully lured Upper Volta and Dahomey away from Mali, he had to meet their economic needs to some extent, especially since economic factors had played a large role in the initial adhesion of these two territories to the Mali Federation. His countermove was the creation of the Conseil de l'Entente, a loosely-structured customs union comprising the Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey. The newly-created French Community thus stood divided: the Mali "federalists" favored a "commonwealth à la française" in which an ultimately independent federation of African states would be loosely associated with France; they were opposed by the group led by Houphouët-Boigny who argued that anyone who did not like the Community's rules should get out.¹

The Mali controversy appears to have reached its height at the St. Louis meeting of the Community's Prime Ministers in September, 1959. The French seemed to have modified their position vis à vis the Mali Federation at that time and gave it recognition as a federated unit. De Gaulle had apparently realized that his initial opposition to Mali had been a tactical error. During the Mali Federation's short life it had become apparent that as far as the Sudanese were concerned, the federation--as a nucleus of African unity--would be a guarantee for independence. Senegal saw the federation as a bargaining tool for ultimate independence,

¹"Community or Commonwealth?" The Economist, Vol. CXCII, No. 6047 (July 18, 1959), p. 141.

but an independence which would continue close ties with the mother country. With Togo, Cameroun and Nigeria all scheduled to receive independence in 1960, the idea could no longer be ignored. France had perceived the reality of African politics in giving recognition to Mali. At the St. Louis meeting, Mali's bid for independence was given a hearing by France. But not until December, 1959 did de Gaulle formally commit himself to Mali's independence. This change of heart was influenced by two considerations directly pertinent to Africa: 1) the long border Mali had with Algeria, in the light of French involvements there and the US-RDA's and PRA-Sénégal's open sympathies for the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); 2) the rapid pace of decolonization elsewhere in Africa. De Gaulle promised to enter into negotiations with Mali which would lead to its ultimate independence--tentatively set for July 20, 1960--within the Community.¹

Meanwhile, differences of opinion had, predictably, developed inside the Mali Federation.² With independence now firmly assured, some of the Federation's raison d'être was lost. There also developed differences in opinion as to what the independent Mali Federation should look like.

1. Senegal wanted it to retain its federal character, arguing that this structure might make it easier for other African nations (the

¹This was in apparent violation of Art. 86 of the Fifth Republic's Constitution. On June 4, 1960, a Constitutional Law was passed in France stating that "A member State of the Community may also, by way of agreement, become independent without thereby ceasing to belong to the Community." Morgenthau, op. cit., Appendix II, p. 390.

²Le Monde (Aug. 23, 1960), pp. 1, 3, 5, "Les Origines de la Crise."

Entente powers and Guinea) to enter at some future date, while they most certainly would not enter a unified state and give up all sovereignty right away. In addition, Senegal had been annoyed about

- a) the great influx of Soudanese into Dakar where the federal administration was located, taking jobs away from the Senegalese;
- b) Soudan's feet-dragging in promised economic reforms while Senegal footed most of the bill;
- c) perceived Soudanese schemes on Senegal's riches in demands for nationalization of all industries;
- d) the fact that Soudan opposed the Senegalese suggestion that independence be given to Senegal and Soudan separately rather than to Mali.

2. Soudan, in conformity with its political ideology, wanted to make the Mali Federation into a unitary state under the leadership of the Union Soudanaise, according to historical dictates.

3. Finally, in the light of the forthcoming election for the independent Federation, there developed a dispute over jobs in the Federal government and as to ministerial appointments and presidential candidatures.

Although the following sequence of events has been variously interpreted,¹ the main outlines of developments may be drawn as follows: When the date for Mali's independence had been agreed upon (following negotiations in Paris) in December, 1959, Houphouet-Boigny felt that de Gaulle

¹Foltz, op. cit., pp. 166-184; Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 298-300, 314; William J. Foltz, "Senegal" in Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 27; Hodgkin and Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 243; Neres, op. cit., pp. 91-92; Wallerstein, "How Seven West African States Were Born," op. cit., pp. 3, 4, 7, 12 and 15.

had "stabbed him in the back" on the issue of independence and on the Community as a whole. The Ivory Coast's Premier had always declared his aversion to a "commonwealth à la française" and he retaliated to France's move on Mali's independence by asking for immediate independence, outside of the Community and without negotiations, for all four Entente states. This stand was much more radical than Mali's negotiated independence. The French attempted to stall, but had to give in to Houphouët-Boigny's demands, and in early August, 1960 the four Entente states gained their independence, only two weeks after Mali received hers.

Conferences of Mali's leadership in Dakar and Bamako, April and May, 1960, had brought to light some of the fundamental ideological, tactical and personal differences between the Senegalese and the Soudanese. When the Entente states became independent, Mali lost its avant-garde status within the ex-A.O.F., which at that time was one of the last strands which held the two disparate Soudanese RDA and Senegalese UPS forces together.

The Soudanese decided to salvage their position and come out ahead by doing so. In their drive for a unitary state and their concentration on getting an acceptable Chief of State, the Soudanese had thrown their support behind Lamine Guèye in an attempt to undermine Senghor's position in his own party. They preferred to support Guèye, whom they thought they could somehow "control," rather than support the strong-willed "federalist" Senghor. On August 19, 1960, Lamine Guèye, President of the Senegalese Legislative Assembly, reported via Radio Mali (Dakar) that the UPS, of which he had become the Political Director, had decided to present the candidature of Léopold Senghor for the presidency of the

Mali Federation. Elections were to be held on August 27. When Modibo Keita was thus assured that Guèye's candidacy would have no support, he tried to gain control over the Malian troops in Dakar. Unfortunately for him, the troops turned out to be mostly Senegalese.

On August 20, Keita, seeing that the time for drastic action had arrived, cancelled Mamadou Dia's Defense and External Security powers in his capacity as federal Prime Minister, and called for a federation-wide state of emergency. Immediately thereafter, Senegalese troops took over the Radio Mali station to prevent further broadcast of the message. The Senegalese National Assembly met in an emergency session and voted to withdraw from the Mali Federation;¹ then proclaimed a state of emergency for Senegal. Soon afterward, Keita and his Soudanese entourage were placed under house arrest by Senegalese troops, subsequently released from arrest (August 22), put on board an eastbound train and shipped off to Bamako.

Thus was the inglorious ending of the Mali Federation.

¹In violation of the federal Constitution which required such a vote to be followed by a referendum.

CHAPTER FOUR

LEVELS OF INTEGRATION IN THE MALI FEDERATION, 1959-1960

This chapter is organized around a number of "essential conditions" necessary for integration--or in Deutsch's terms: the creation of "amalgamated security communities." Since the definition of "amalgamated security community" as used in the present study is the one given by Professor Deutsch,¹ it is appropriate at this time to examine Deutsch's "conditions" as applied to the Mali Federation. The present chapter in its component sub-sections focuses on the extent to which Deutsch's "conditions" are relevant or were fulfilled by the Mali Federation.

The Princeton group found in its study of nations in the North Atlantic area that the following "conditions" were necessary prerequisites for the successful amalgamation of two or more political units into a security community:

1. Compatibility of major values
2. Mutual responsiveness
3. Distinctive way of life
4. Core area of strength
5. Superior economic growth

¹"Amalgamation" refers to the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a larger single unit with some type of common government. This government may be unitary or federal but has one supreme decision-making center. A "security community" is a community in which there is a high degree of assurance that its members will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes without violence.

6. Expectations of joint economic rewards
7. A wide range of communication and transaction
8. Broadening of elites
9. Unbroken links of social communication
10. Greater mobility of persons

In the present chapter each subsection deals with one of these "conditions" as it applies to the Mali Federation.

1. Compatibility of Major Values

For successful integration of two or more previously separate political units, Deutsch's study found that a compatibility of "main" values, held at least by the major political elites¹ in the respective units, was essential for both pluralistic and amalgamated security communities. Deutsch suggests five general categories of investigation under this heading: political/ideological, economic, religious, judicial, and common heritage or civilization.² He emphasizes examination of values which seem to be of major importance in the domestic politics of the respective units.

In the political realm, Deutsch suggests that compatibility of "basic political ideology" is a crucial factor in the process of determining the prospects of future integration.³ By "basic political ideology"

¹Deutsch uses the term "relevant strata" without defining what he means. However, he does indicate throughout the book that this term includes at least the main political leaders. Deutsch, op. cit., p. 123.

²Ibid., pp. 124-129.

³Ibid., p. 124.

Deutsch means such broad concepts as "constitutionalism" and "democracy," and "rule of law."

Perhaps France's main contribution to the basic political ideology in Senegal and Soudan results from the effects of French education, the legacy of the rule of law in the A.O.F. and, democratic principles in more recent political institutions in which Africans participated. However, it should be borne in mind that these French concepts were superimposed upon rather advanced indigenous political systems resulting from a history of empire building in the animistic as well as the Islamic tradition.

If the political leaders of Senegal and Soudan can be taken at their word, they were basically committed to furthering "democratic" principles, even if these were expressed in terms of "guided democracy," "democratic centralism," or "African socialism" with strong humanistic overtones. However, it has earlier been shown that ideologically Soudan had over time become more rigidly Marxist and socialist in outlook, program, and party structure, the Union Soudanaise having become, by 1959, the dominant party in Soudan. Senegal, on the other hand, had a recent political history of continuous fusion of parties and ideologies while Senghor and Dia worked feverishly to widen their political base of support. Ideologically, the UPS had to remain flexible at this stage, although generally committed to the principles of guided democracy and African Socialism.¹

By adopting Coleman and Rosberg's classificatory scheme, the

¹Senghor, On African Socialism and Dia, The African Nations and World Solidarity, op. cit.

dominant Senegalese and Soudanese political parties at the time of the Mali Federation may be compared in the following manner:

COLEMAN/ROSBERG SCHEME¹ APPLIED TO UPS AND US-RDA

Differentiating factor	Senegalese UPS	Soudanese US-RDA
<p>I. <u>Ideology</u></p> <p>A. Degree of ideological preoccupation, declamation, and nationalization.</p> <p>B. Scope, depth and tempo of modernization objectives.</p> <p>C. Degree of insistence upon and commitment to conservation of African nationalist objectives.</p> <p>1. Neutralism</p> <p>2. Pan-African Unity</p> <p>3. Tempo and degree of decolonization and "Africanization"</p>	<p>Limited Preoccupation</p> <p>Adaptive; aggregative of a tolerated but controlled pluralism</p> <p>Pragmatic; formally neutralist but tolerant regarding continual unbalanced dependence on West</p> <p>Pragmatic, functional, cooperation</p> <p>Pragmatic</p>	<p>Heavy Preoccupation; constant and compulsive</p> <p>Revolutionary, transformative, anti-traditional</p> <p>"Positive neutralism"</p> <p>Political unification</p> <p>Immediate and total</p>
<p>II. <u>Popular Participation</u></p> <p>A. Degree of political mobilization and expected popular commitment</p> <p>B. Mode of individual participation</p>	<p>Partial/intermittent</p> <p>Direct and indirect</p>	<p>High/constant</p> <p>Direct only between individual and party-state</p>

¹Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 5.

COLEMAN/ROSBERG SCHEME--Continued


Differentiating factor	Senegalese UPS	Soudanese US-RDA
III. Organizational Aspects		
A. Degree of intraparty hierarchism, centralism, and discipline	Variable; hierarchical and centralized by tolerated and controlled pluralism	High; monolithic, concentration; conformity; sanction severe
B. Degree of associational monopoly and fusion	Variable; looser relationship	High/total monopoly and fusion
C. Degree of party-government assimilation	Limited assimilation	Total assimilation

The Coleman and Rosberg classificatory scheme applied to the US-RDA and the UPS reveals the differences between these two parties. Although some of these differences were only of degree of intensity, other differences were basic, such as their respective approaches to economic development, their conceptualizations of the Mali Federation, and their allowance of divergent views in the respective parties. Generally this scheme adequately reflects the historical development of the two parties. The UPS rose to power through fusion, and their approach to party ideology was eclectic and pragmatic. The US-RDA, on the other hand, had developed into the dominant mass party from small and humble beginnings. It had experienced an "uphill fight" which necessitated strict adherence to party doctrine and strategy. Whatever fusion occurred in Soudan had been only on US-RDA terms.


Further differences between in UPS and the US-RDA become apparent from a comparison of the respective party organizational structures. Both parties reveal a tendency toward "democratic centralism" although this is more pronounced in the US-RDA structure than in the UPS. The party structures correlate with the parties' relative emphases on popular participation, unity, cooperation, ideological purity, and assimilation of voluntary

organizations.

UPS PARTY STRUCTURE¹



¹Source, Foltz, "Senegal," *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

US-RDA PARTY STRUCTURE¹

¹Source, Hodgkin, Morgenthau, "Mali," op cit., pp. 246-247.

Before arriving at any conclusions regarding political compatibility between the Senegalese and the Soudanese political leaders, it should be borne in mind that in both countries the nature of political loyalty played an important part. In Soudan, the ideology of the US-RDA dictated that party members at all times give unflinching support to the party leadership; the leaders, in turn, required such loyalty from the rank and file. In Senegal the UPS party members also were loyal to the party leadership, but it was much more inspired by Senghor's personal magnetism than was the case in Soudan. The UPS leadership required a much less rigid loyalty from the rank and file, and as long as dissent within the party remained within limits, dissenters were tolerated. This relatively high degree of support given to the party leaders in both countries allowed them a great deal of flexibility in determining strategies and tactics.¹

In the US-RDA everything was politicized because the party and the government had become one, while the party had already embarked on a program to make the Soudanese people and the Union Soudanaise one and the same. As the party leadership saw it, every individual's life was the business of the party and therefore, all aspects of life were politicized.² Adherence to the dictates of Marxism-Leninism, meant that the party leadership was the only body capable of interpreting and translating the as-

¹Lucian W. Pye, "Non-Western Political Processes," International Politics and Foreign Policy, James N. Rosenau, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 288.

²Political mobilization of the masses in Soudan was facilitated by the traditional social organization among the Mandingo/Bambara expressed in age grades and working brigades of the ton, a concept that was missing among the dominant ethnic groups in Senegal. Paques, op. cit., pp. 61-67.

pirations of the Soudanese peoples. Strict discipline was enforced along the lines of "democratic centralism," which found its expression in party structure. According to official US-RDA ideology, politics was rational and logical if controlled by the party leadership.

The Soudanese political bosses conceived the future Mali Federation as a unitary state. The federation could not be left to mere agreements between political actors, but the people were to be organized to effect it. At the same time, a "federation" was only a means to the ultimate end--"independence." These two issues were seen as so much a part of each other that the US leadership did not conceive of them as being separate concepts.¹

Senegalese politicians, on the other hand, were much more flexible and less dogmatic. Traditionally the political process was characterized by the prevalence of cliques--the "clans"--with highly personalized leadership. Even though, by 1959, the UPS had been able to incorporate most dominant "clans" within its party confines, cleavages within the party were still deep, particularly the struggle between the old Socialists and the ex-BDS members.² In addition, "clan" groups still retained considerable control over local party activities, and continued to employ political patronage, graft and strong-arm-tactics for leverage. Party unity, therefore, did not exist as effectively as in Soudan, but it should be kept in mind that Léopold Senghor did not actively seek it since a certain amount of diversity was thought to be a natural and advantageous quality.

¹Foltz, op. cit., pp. 121-132.

²Ibid., p. 139.

Senghor further felt that "decentralization" was the only way to "ward off the tyranny of the state."¹

Whereas in Soudan the main emphasis was on politics, in Senegal the primacy of economics was stressed. Mamadou Dia, the noted Senegalese Marxian economist stated:

To imagine subjects for political agitation is always easy..., we cannot indefinitely divert the attention of the masses from their condition and postpone sine die the moment of reckoning. We will watch especially for a radical transformation of the economic relations with developed countries, a necessary condition for real development and consequently for real independence.²

Finally, there remains the matter of the "personality" of the leadership. "Personality" was more important in Senegal than in Soudan at the time of the Mali Federation. This factor had historical as well as more recent roots. Senghor had become the spokesman for the newly enfranchised "subjects" of the interior after 1946. He had fought for the interests of the peasants and when Senghor's party rose to power, ousting Lamine Guèye in the process, they flocked around their hero. Senghor, in addition to having a certain amount of popularity among the masses, also had gained the respect of many for his educational accomplishments. His trump card, however, was personal magnetism. His ability to enrapture mass audiences is illustrated by a reporter from the magazine West Africa who wrote: "I have seen him still a vast audience with a slight move of his hand and then keep them in rapt attention as he promised them absolutely nothing."³ However, a conscious "cult of the

¹Senghor, op. cit., p. 13.

²Dia, op. cit., pp. 41-42 (italics added).

³West Africa, No. 2256 (Aug. 26, 1960), p. 967.

personality," did not develop in Senegal.

In Soudan, on the other hand, there was more of an emphasis on the collective aspects of the political leadership, although Modibo Keita was very much the primus inter pares among his colleagues. As in Senegal, this had historical roots, even though in Keita's case, the origins lay further back than in Senghor's. Historically the Keita have belonged to the top level of Soudanese nobility, being the decendants of the five brothers of Soundiata. Political bonds often served to strengthen historical family alliances, so that the sixteen families of Traoré, Koné, Kamara (Doumbia), Kourouma, Mogasouba, Dansouba, Dagnogo, Diara, Danté, Dougomo, Sogoré, Diallo, Diakité, Sidbé, and Sangaré, were traditional allies of the Keita and recognized the latter's primacy.¹

Politically, therefore, we find below the surface of apparent similarities a number of key differences pertaining to ideology, leadership, party organization and political mobilization.

At the founding of the Parti de la Fédération Africaine, (PFA), accomplished under the leadership of Senghor and Keita, these vital differences were perceived as having secondary relevance compared with the ideals of "federation" and "African unity." The decision by Senghor to unite with the US-RDA was, besides ideologically fitting at that time, politically expedient as far as the UPS was concerned. After 1958 the UPS had begun to stagnate as a result of slow "Africanization" of the

¹See generally, Germaine Dieterlen, "Mythe et Organisation Sociale au Soudan Français," Journal de la Société des Africanistes, Vol. 25 (Paris, 1955), pp. 40, 41. In addition to these families, the five predominant Marabout families of Bérété, Touré, Haydara, Fofana, and Sayanogo also belonged to the upper nobility, still, however, outranked by the Keita.

civil service, party patronage and nepotism in government, and an unpopular campaign against some powerful "clan" leaders. Fear of isolation and uncertainty about their political future prompted the UPS leadership into a tactical alliance with the US-RDA.¹

On the Soudanese side of the coin, the US was also in an isolated position after the 1958 referendum. Its RDA ally, the PDG, had opted for independence outside of the Community while the other RDA forces rallied behind Houphouet-Boigny's "anti-federalism." At home, the PSP was still a force to be reckoned with, drawing its support from powerful Marabouts² and chiefs.

Apparent political compatibility was achieved at the PFA founding congress at Bamako in March of 1959. While the PFA represented federation on the party level, the Mali Federation constituted its administrative counterpart, and

Because they (both) were controlled by the two territorial parties there was nothing to stop a quarrel started in one institutional setting from spilling over into all others. Furthermore, because the decisions taken involved ultimately the policies of a very few political leaders, any dispute in any organizational setting would be forced up to the top for settlement. Since the settlement of any serious disputes at the summit directly involved the prestige and reputation of the top politicians, escalation of a minor dispute into a major interterritorial crisis was highly possible.³

Thus a major handicap was built into the entire structure and the system was highly unstable.

Compatibility in the political realm was a reality only as long as

¹Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 164.

²The Cadi of Timbuktu, among others.

³Foltz, op. cit., pp. 163-164.

the political leaders in Senegal and Soudan perceived the other's outlook to be congruent with their own. As long as political differences remained minor or irrelevant in the context of the Federation, the PFA and Mali were stable. Unfortunately, the differences became relevant all too soon. When each side attempted to impose its philosophy and tactics on the other and the leaders began to question each others' motives, political compatibility was lost. Compromise was possible under the proper conditions; once these conditions changed, compromise was impossible under the prevailing leadership structures in which political "brokers" were conspicuous by their absence.

In the religious realm there was apparent compatibility. In Senegal the Moslem population comprises approximately 79 percent of the population while in Soudan the percentage is approximately 63 percent. Islam has been a strong force in this area since trade between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa became of sizeable proportions. The spread of Islamic influences throughout the region of the Western Sudan was accompanied by strife among the contending Moslem groups whereby theological differences justified or rationalized political ambitions.¹ The main Moslem sects in the general area are the Qadiriyya, the Tijaniyya and the Sanusiyya. Changes within Islam were continuous, and it appears that if Islam had any divisive influence, they would more likely than not have occurred within the religion itself rather than on the basis of one territory versus another. The fact that both Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya sects are found in Senegal as well as Soudan, tended to make Islam more

¹Meiville Herskovits, The Human Factor in Changing Africa (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962), pp. 189-192.

of a unifying rather than a divisive force, in that divisions within the religion ran across political boundaries.

The percentage of Christians in Senegal is five percent, while Soudan's share is one percent of the total population. Christians are divided between Protestants and Catholics with the latter largely predominant as a result of large-scale Catholic missionary activity in French Africa. The large numerical domination of the Moslems, compared with the Christian minority, creates little friction on either side.

The approximate percentage of animists in Senegal constitutes 16 percent of the total, while Soudan's animists make up 36 percent. Most of the animists have a history of successful opposition to Islamic and Christian proselytizing efforts, but there seems to be little friction between the animists on the one hand, and Moslems and Christians on the other.¹

In sum, then, it may be concluded that as far as religion is concerned, Senegal and Soudan rated high as compared with what was needed for successful integration in the historical cases studied by Professor

¹When we abstract certain principles out of the many religions of Africa, we find that these religions do not differ either from Islam or Christianity to an extent that would preclude a measure of accommodation under contact. The categories in which are grouped the supernatural forces most African societies conceive as exercising control over the universe, illustrate the areas of compatibility. This fourfold division comprises, first, a Great God with subsidiary beings to whom executive powers have been delegated; then the collective powers of the antecedent generations, often manifested in worship of the ancestors; thirdly, destiny as it relates to problems which can be clarified by divination; and finally, magic. None of these is foreign to Islam, while only the third is entirely absent from formal, though not popular, Christianity. The second element, having to do with ancestral spirits, is less immediately apparent in Protestant belief than in Catholic, but it is implicit in both." Ibid., p. 178.

Deutsch and his colleagues.

In his analysis of economic compatibility of countries in the North Atlantic area, Deutsch examined such concepts as "socialism" contrasted with "free enterprise."¹ Historically, Senegal and Soudan have lain on the crossroads of East-West as well as North-South trade in West Africa, and the development of a highly mobile and influential small-trader segment of the economy ("Dioula") is one of the most outstanding economic characteristics of the general area of the Western Sudan. This trader element was founded on the notion of free enterprise and has been continuously opposed to nationalization and government guidance and control.²

In Soudan, with its primary emphasis on politics, economics was relegated to a position of secondary importance, much along the same line as Kwame Nkrumah's: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things will accrue unto you." However, economics, like the people, could prove to be disruptive if it were not brought under political control: "...we try to domesticate it, to fit it into a political perspective, by removing its empirical and anarchical character."³

Free enterprise economics in Soudan was perceived as highly detrimental to the Africans and as being in the interest only of capitalists and French trading companies. However, being Marxist, the US leadership

¹Deutsch, op. cit., p. 124.

²Victor E. Dubois, "The Decline of the Guinea Revolution," Part I and II, American University Field Staff Reports, West Africa Series, Vol. VIII, No. 7 and 8 (Guinea), (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1965).

³Essor editorial (October 23, 1959), as quoted in Foltz, op. cit., p. 128.

did not and could not ignore the importance of economics as such. They believed that politics and economics were bound up in one package, but were convinced that economic decisions had to be first and foremost political decisions. They denied the possibility of economic development by economic means alone, and were convinced that in order for economic development to take place, the entire social structure of Soudan had to be changed. In part, this attitude reflected the colonial heritage of the relatively poor Soudan in which French investments had been minimal, mainly concentrated in the Office du Niger--which had not been an unqualified success. The Soudanese US-RDA leaders failed to accept the economic reality that investment funds flow to those areas where profits can be found and where development is comparatively more advanced. Capitalism and free enterprise had not done much for Soudan, ergo the system was bad.

In Senegal, by contrast, although the economic philosophies of both Senghor and Dia were admittedly Marxist, the basic approach to economics was decidedly different from Soudan's. Senghor's Marxism was tempered by humanistic influences of Teilhard de Chardin, and his opposition to capitalism was a result of his aversion to its de-humanizing effects on society:

In a capitalist society, mercantile relations gradually replace human relations; consciousness tends in its form of thought and feeling to empty itself from the inside. Its manifestation-- religion, ethics, art, and literature--lose their real, autonomous character as they are invaded by the "ghostly realities" of the economy. Homo sapiens becomes homo oeconomicus and represents the status of the animal.¹

¹Senghor, op. cit., p. 35.

Primacy of economics was recognized by both Senghor and Dia. Politics, instead of being the controlling factor of the economy, was seen by the UPS leadership as a danger. Mamadou Dia argued for the removal of all "political traits" from economics.¹ This was hardly a Marxist position. But Dia rationalized that "The road to real African independence, constructed on the solid rock of a strong economy" lay not in a neutralist position but rather "in large (economic) regroupings that permit the concentration of poles, centers and axes of (economic) development."² In the light of such fundamental differences in outlook, compatibility in terms of economic values did not exist between Soudan and Senegal.

From the scant information available, it would seem that there was compatibility in judicial values, stemming in part from the common background of French, Koranic and traditional legal norms. This judicial compatibility between Soudan and Senegal is in part due to this very diversity of legal systems and philosophies. This diversity ran across political boundaries rather than being limited to one or the other territory.³

Finally, compatibility of values relating to common heritage and civilization proved to be a rather complex category to analyze and to apply to the Mali Federation. Thus Deutsch's terms have been redefined

¹Mamadou Dia, as quoted by Foltz, op. cit., p. 143.

²Dia, op. cit., p. 85 (*italics added*).

³Foreign Area Studies Division, Special Operation Research Office, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Senegal (Washington: A.G.O., 1963), pp. 439-443.

to include such features as "style," "national character," "stereotypes," and "perception by Senegalese and Soudanese of each other and of themselves."

Initially, there existed a high level of confidence on the part of the leadership that similarities in civilization and culture would constitute a strong integrative factor. Senghor expressed this feeling in 1959 when he remarked:

We have made a good start in Mali by uniting populations whose natural characteristics--climate, soil, blood, language and customs, art and literature--are similar. Senegal and Sudan [sic] constitute, what is more, a rather homogeneous and relatively rich economic unit. In old French West Africa, these two alone furnished almost half the revenue of the entire territory. With the best harbor (Dakar), the most powerful industrial set-up, and a market of 17 million customers, we have important advantages.¹

In Senegal, time had eliminated many divisive linguistic, tribal and social structures since the advent of the French.² Delavignette³ noted the lack of tribalism and the homogeneity of the Senegalese peoples, and accounted for this phenomenon partially by emphasizing the status that the Senegalese felt they had by virtue of being inhabitants of the "advanced" and "developed" territory of Senegal. This feeling was further reinforced by the fact that many Senegalese were employed as civil servants throughout the A.O.F. Senegal's special position under French colonial rule, and the closer integration of rural and urban segments of

¹ Senghor, op. cit., p. 14.

² The relationship between the main Senegalese ethnic and linguistic groups have already been alluded to in Chap. 2, as was the high incidence of intertribal marriage.

³ Delavignette, op. cit., p. 53.

Senegalese political life¹ resulted in a Senegalese national character quite different from the Soudanese.

Foltz² characterized the Senegalese as the samba linguère, the bon vivant of West Africa, given to a generally showy behavior, delight in phraseology and bombast, accompanied by a haughty and self-indulgent character, yearning for public recognition and praise by griots or followers, and a natural tendency to lend a carnival atmosphere to any public gathering or meeting.³ These characteristics have to a certain extent been carried over into politics, reinforcing the position of individual leaders (patrons), able to command a group of personal followers ("clan"). The continued power of the "clans" and their leaders caused the political leaders of the parties not to challenge the "clans" openly. In addition, the Senegalese throughout the A.O.F. and even in France had a certain amount of notoriety for mismanagement in administration, graft, nepotism and corruption. The Soudanese, moreover, perceived their Senegalese neighbors to be overly cultured, overly Frenchified, corrupt, and generally non-African. They blamed the Senegalese for being "soft" and for having "sold out" to the French. These sentiments, although apparently latent among the Soudanese, did not become politically or socially relevant until the final stages of the Mali Federation and after its break-up.

The Soudanese, too, had developed a strong feeling of national

¹Paul Mercier, "La Vie Politique dans les Centres Urbains du Sénégal," Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, Vol. 26 (Paris, July-Dec., 1959), p. 60.

²Foltz, op. cit., pp. 137-138.

³This tendency is amply illustrated in the motion picture, Grand Magal à Touba (New York: FACSEA, Society for French-American Cultural Services).

identity, were proud of their heritage of empire-building, and of their historic role in the Western Sudan. They were a proud people hardened by a hostile physical environment, ascetic, with a strong penchant for pure dogma and simplicity of style. From Foltz's personal observations of the Soudanese, and from observations by Africans, he characterized them in the following terms: "honest," "frank," "simple," "constant," "loyal," and sometimes "outspoken," "stubborn," and generally as bon paysan.¹ The Senegalese, sensitive to their own stereotypes as perceived by the Soudanese, saw the latter as "rude," "uncultured," "country bumpkins," and "people who came in out of the sands." Soudan's people lived in a poor territory, had to fight for their existence, and had a great "hunger" for many things which Senegal had and they did not have. The first months of the Mali Federation were marked by a methodical conquest" by the Soudanese of the richer cité of Senegal, and of posts which were available to the Soudanese in the newly-created federal ministries and bureaus. Social differentiation was reinforced in Dakar by the fact that each territory used a different lingua franca. Even though most functionaries were able to communicate in French, among each other the Senegalese spoke Wolof while the Soudanese spoke Bambara, which caused many a disgruntled Senegalese to remark that "All of a sudden you had to speak Bambara to get anything done in the administrative building."² In the light of this increased ethnic and social differentiation, it is interesting to note that after the break-up of the Mali Federation,

¹Foltz, op. cit., p. 122.

²Ibid., p. 168.

each side blamed the other's leadership of possessing these stereotyped qualities while absolving the general public of guilt in this respect.¹

Overshadowed by these perceived contrasts in national culture, civilization and character, any real similarities in traditional civilization and culture, common history, common and comparable "caste" systems, and a common heritage of French colonial rule, were overlooked or neglected. Initially there were widespread efforts by the Federation's leaders consciously to play down the differences and provide a new focus of loyalty--the Federation. However, when on the leadership level differences became more pronounced, it did not take long for latent feelings about "difference" to become salient. As in the case of the political and economic values, one has to look again to the compatibilities of values as perceived and expressed by the political leaders. Had both sides wanted to compromise, compatibility in values pertaining to culture and civilization might have been a reality. Once mutual trust and the spirit of cooperation broke down, these differences in values took on proportions of major importance, thereby hastening the demise of the Mali Federation.

Senghor's confident assessment of the Federation in 1959 was drastically changed in 1961, a year after the break-up of the Mali Federation: "The fact remains that I was wrong, we were mistaken in regard to both the men and the Federation...we forgot to analyze and understand

¹Ministère de l'Information, de la Presse, et de la Radiodiffusion, République du Sénégal, Livre Blanc sur le Coup d'État Manqué (Dakar: G.I.A., 1960); and Union Soudanaise, Congrès Extraordinaire de l'Union Soudanaise-RDA, le 22 Septembre, 1960 (Koulouba, Mali, 1960), esp. pp. 33-34, and "la trahison des dirigeants Sénégalais," p. 44.

the sociological differences...differences which the colonial administration had reinforced."¹

In sum, the level of compatibility of major values between Senegal and Soudan was high enough for the two countries to constitute a pluralistic security community in the colonial A.O.F. Federation but too low for an amalgamated community in the Mali Federation. Especially in terms of political and economic values, the initially perceived compatibility was soon lost once these differences became relevant factors within the Mali Federation.

2. Mutual Responsiveness

Professor Deutsch's study suggests that a "sense of community" is much more than simply an attachment to any number of similar or identical values. It involves matters of "mutual sympathy, trust, and consideration," and a degree of "mutual responsiveness to the needs of the units involved in the prospective integration, leading to appropriate political and economic action."² It was found that without "responsiveness" successful integration is unlikely. Deutsch found that "constant communication"--the transmission of messages, personal contacts, exchange of ideas, goods and services-- is a necessary ingredient of "mutual responsiveness,"³ whereas an excessive delay in social, political and economic reforms constitutes a dysfunctional factor in furthering attempts to

¹Senghor, op. cit., p. 5.

²Deutsch, op. cit., p. 129.

³Ibid., p. 130.

integration. Under the heading of "personal communication," Senegal and Soudan had a relatively high degree of communication before the Mali Federation was founded; the creation of the Federation increased it.

Since the A.O.F. had been organized on a federal basis for such a long time, there had been a high level of communication between the politically relevant elites. The Grand Conseil of the federated colonies allowed the representatives from the individual territories to work together, exchange ideas, as well as mix socially on official and unofficial occasions. On a slightly lower level, the Senegalese had formed the bulk of the African recruits for the French Armed Forces maintained in Africa. They had been stationed outside their country of origin. The same can be said for the soldiers from the other territories, although to a lesser degree. Colonial administrators and officials at the lower levels were increasingly Africanized as the numbers of évolués grew. These officials were often rotated from one territory to another and thereby came into contact with greater numbers of the politically relevant elites from other countries.

Dakar is the only port of any size in French West Africa which has good harbor facilities, the others all being hampered by coastal sand banks. Commerce and shipping for the A.O.F. centered mainly in Dakar, where merchants from other territories met and had worked together. The fact that the Dakar-Niger Railroad was Soudan's only outlet to the sea made contact between Senegalese and Soudanese merchants more pronounced and frequent.

Labor leaders, in the past divided into various unions which were basically metropole-based, had been united under the aegis of the Pan-

African movement, into U.G.T.A.N. (Union Générale des Travailleurs de l'Afrique Noire). This was an inter-territorial group of workers whose base was in the A.O.F. Its main creating force had been Guinea's Sékou Touré, who had been able to achieve internal unity by getting all the member unions to break with the internationals--I.C.F.T.U. and W.F.T.U.

From the above examples it becomes readily apparent that there existed a considerable amount of personal communication between the politically relevant elites, not only between Soudan and Senegal but also between those from the other territories comprising the A.O.F.

Upon the advent of the Mali Federation, the federal government, realizing the importance of mutual responsiveness in terms of the general public, embarked on a conscious program for increasing communications between the units. Increased communication was thought to be instrumental in creating new loyalties. Thus in 1959 the Mali Federation Ministry of Information began to publish Le Mali, a well-written, well-illustrated monthly publication containing editorials and political analyses, in order to create a favorable climate for the Mali Federation. In addition, Radio Mali was created in 1959. A 100 kw. transmitter was bought and these facilities represented the strongest radio station in the Federation. It gave prominence to programs featuring Malian statesmen, thereby emphasizing its role as a prestige station. This was an obvious effort to get the population to think in terms of "Mali" rather than "Senegal" or "Soudan." Programs were mostly in French, although some were in English and Portuguese in an effort to gain audiences in neighboring Sierra Leone, Ghana, Portuguese Guinea and Cabo Verde. No programs were in vernacular since Radio Dakar and Radio Bamako featured those.

In the colonial setting of the A.O.F. Senegal and Soudan had developed a certain responsiveness to each other's economic needs. However, from the figures and statistics which follow, it is clear that "responsiveness" was mainly on the part of Senegal. However, this situation was also a reflection of colonial history and the traditional role of importance played by Dakar in the A.O.F.

TERRITORIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
TO FEDERAL BUDGET¹
1954

	Total net, m. of Francs CFA	Per capita, Francs CFA
Soudan	530	15
Senegal	10,240	4,590

INTERTERRITORIAL AND FOREIGN TRADE²
1956
(m. Francs CFA)

Exporters	Importers		Importers (excluding transit trade)	
	Soudan	Senegal	Soudan	Senegal
Soudan	---	5,586	---	1,196
Senegal	17,229	---	6,968	---

¹Source: Berg, op. cit., p. 403.

²Source: Foltz, op. cit., p. 34. It will be remembered that import/export duties contributed to a large extent to the federal budget.

INCOME AND TAXATION IN A.O.F.¹
1951

	Gross Territorial Income (m. Francs CFA)	Taxes		Percent Income taken by Taxes
		Direct (m. Francs CFA)	Indirect (m. Francs CFA)	
Soudan	20,572	1,003	1,452	11.9 %
Senegal	37,580	1,894	6,664	22.7 %
Total A.O.F.	161,751	6,519	19,231	16.0 %

The above tables suggest that Senegal contributed disproportionately to the federal A.O.F. budget in comparison with Soudan, so that Senegalese incomes often supported Soudanese expenditures. This shows at least a certain level of mutual responsiveness in the economic field.

In all fairness it should be pointed out that Senegal's relatively higher contribution to the federal A.O.F. budget was partially made possible as a result of increased revenues in Dakar from transshipments to and from Soudan on the Dakar-Niger railway, as well as from higher incomes in Senegal resulting from Senegalese civil servants working throughout the A.O.F., including Soudan.

Once the Mali Federation was formed, however, Soudan increasingly became aware of the fact that investments in the federation tended to be concentrated in the well-developed areas, thus making richer areas richer and poorer areas poorer--relatively speaking at any rate. Clearly, firms and individuals with capital to invest were more likely to move toward regions that had an adequate economic infrastructure such as roads, railways, harbors, schools and technical institutions to train skilled and

¹Source: Thompson and Adloff, *op. cit.*, p. 289. The above figures were the only ones which could be obtained for both territories together. A comparison over time might have shown the continued one-sided flow of money and goods from Senegal to Soudan.

productive labor forces, hospitals to treat their workers and power stations to provide energy. A later comparison in the chapter dealing with "core areas of development" will show that Senegal won out in every instance. The fact that the two territories, though federated, retained a high degree of autonomy and self-rule¹ made it possible for Senegal to benefit more from its comparatively higher level of development without necessarily passing on a large share of the "profits" to its partner in the federation. When at the Dakar conference of the Mali planning and economic development executives in April, 1960 the Soudanese demanded the nationalization of the industries in the Dakar region, the Senegalese became afraid that they would lose control over their growing industrial complex.² This development coincided with an increasing Soudanese emphasis on their view of independent Mali's structure as a unitary state.

Once the mutual trust that had originally prevailed between Soudanese and Senegalese elites had been replaced by mutual suspicion, responsiveness and predictability as well as the ability to act in accordance with these predictions, disappeared. Given the fact that the politically

¹West Africa (Jan. 31, 1959), p. 99. The Constitution of the Mali Federation provided for a rather weak central government with all residual powers remaining in the hands of the member states. The Federal Executive was responsible to the Federal Assembly and dealt with common finance and common economic and social services. At the time of the birth of the Mali Federation, Senegal had already done a great deal of economic planning and had set up a planning machinery which was more advanced, more effective and more elaborate than Soudan's (West Africa, Oct. 31, 1959, p. 13). Senghor had outlined a development plan for Mali as a whole (Senghor, op. cit., pp. 53-63.), but at the Dakar conference of April, 1960, the Senegalese accused the Soudanese of not living up to their share of the development burden.

²Ernest Milcent, Le Monde (Paris, Aug. 23, 1960), pp. 1, 3.

relevant strata of both societies were small as compared with those studied by Deutsch, this responsiveness--and subsequent lack of responsiveness--concerned a very small number of people. When ultimately these few leaders were unwilling and unable to respond adequately, the political community found no sympathetic responses from the masses to sustain "we-feelings" during the crisis among the leadership. In addition, the time element is of some importance. Not only had Senegal and Soudan a very short history of national identity, but the very fact that the Mali Federation lasted for only eighteen months precludes any prediction concerning long-term possibilities for integration projected into the future.

As a final point within the general context of "mutual responsiveness," Karl Deutsch found that one of the most significant aspects of "...responsiveness was found to lie in the disintegrative effect when a once strong or privileged...group failed to adjust psychologically and politically to its loss of dominance that came from changed conditions."¹ In Senegal this failure on the part of the leadership and some of the elites to adjust to the presence of Soudanese in Dakar ultimately caused friction. This increased awareness of ethnic and linguistic differentiation on both sides. The situation further worsened when the US-RDA leadership began to support a dissident UPS faction,² and became untenable when Keita and his entourage mounted their pressure for a unitary state. In such a state the Soudanese would have dominated by sheer strength of numbers (3,636,000 to 2,181,000).

¹Deutsch, op. cit., p. 131.

²Livre Blanc..., p. 8; Foltz, op. cit., pp. 174-177.

It was at this point that the UPS leadership decided to discontinue participation in the Mali Federation, especially since there existed fairly solid evidence that Keita was planning a coup once the Senegalese would move to end the federation.¹ The Senegalese preferred to destroy the federation rather than face the chance of becoming a "once strong or privileged group" within their own territory.

3. Distinctive Way of Life

Somewhat different from the need for a set of compatible major values is another but closely related "condition." Deutsch found that "quite a network" of minor values had to be accented over the area under consideration before integration could take place. It is this network of minor values which he calls "way of life." For this way of life to be distinctive (from other areas), there has to be a wide array of socially and politically institutionalized values that are different from those that existed in the separate units during the recent past. Deutsch observed: "It seemed to us that the successful transfer from one political unit to a new and larger political community has occurred only where a wide range of other political and social habits were also in a state of change."² The indicators that Deutsch used in this context are: economic (per capita income), social welfare services, individual liberties, civil rights, governmental responsibility for high employment levels, social legislation, widespread acceptance of labor unions, shifts toward open

¹Livre Blanc..., see generally the documents pertaining to the Colonel Soumaré episode.

²Deutsch, op. cit., p. 133.

interest group politics, and increases in effective political mass participation.¹

The problem encountered in applying this "condition" to the Mali Federation is caused by the fact that Deutsch never specified what he meant by "recent past." And this is especially bothersome in a context where the time element is of crucial importance. Within the past fifty or sixty years a number of massive changes had occurred in Soudan and Senegal; but these had occurred in the neighboring territories as well. In the past twenty years, important changes had taken place in French Africa: the loi-Lamine-Guèye of 1946, the loi-cadre of 1956, and the Community Constitution Referendum in 1958. The time element becomes especially important if one attempts to find indicators of a "new, distinctive way of life" in Soudan and Senegal since the founding of the Mali Federation. The time period 1959-1960 is too short to provide a meaningful span in time in which such indicators might be found.

Thus one conclusion may be that there was nothing distinctive about Senegal and Soudan in terms of a "way of life" which was not also present in the other A.O.F., and even A.E.F., territories. Had, on the other hand, an effective ex-A.O.F. federation been established, its common heritage as a colonial administrative unit with interterritorial party structures and leadership ties, might have given it a number of identifiable distinctive characteristics which set it apart from other territories in West Africa or in French Africa. Still, however, there would have been the problem of the time element to overcome. Foltz, moreover, observed

¹Ibid., pp. 133-137.

that "Many Africans interested in political regrouping find that they are able to talk meaningfully only in terms of the largest grouping--all of Africa, the one unit that would indeed be distinctive."¹ But there exist divergent views in opposition to this rather sweeping observation which point out that regional regroupings are equally considered as either a step toward or part of a later form of broader African unity.²

4. Core Areas of Strength

Karl Deutsch writes that an essential precondition for the development of integrative capabilities in an amalgamated political community is the development of "core areas of strength."³ These core areas are "advanced" areas of comparatively intense transactions around which integration has developed. Deutsch defines "advanced" in economic, political and administrative terms, without any implication of superiority in moral or aesthetic values.⁴ The author further explains that core area capability not only necessitates the capability to act, but also the capability to respond to the needs of the other areas or units.

According to Green and Fair, Dakar and Bamako formed the only two "islands of development" in the Mali Federation at the time of its found-

¹Foltz, op. cit., p. 100.

²For example, L.P. Green and T.J.D. Fair, Development in Africa: A Study in Regional Analysis with Special Reference to South Africa (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1962).

³Deutsch, op. cit., p. 138.

⁴Ibid.

ing.¹

In these core areas of strength, in addition to economic development, one also finds a comparatively higher degree of what Deutsch has elsewhere² referred to as "social mobilization." This is defined as: "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."³ This process can be divided into two distinct aspects: (1) uprooting and (2) induction of the uprooted into new, stable patterns of group membership. Deutsch then uses nine indicators in determining to what extent social mobilization is taking place:

¹Green and Fair, *op. cit.*, p. 31:

WEST AFRICAN ISLANDS OF DEVELOPMENT

Islands of Development	Urban Node or Nodes	Status
"Senegambia"	Dakar	Major
Rep. of Guinea, Sierra Leone, Western Liberia	Freetown	Minor
Ivory Coast, Southern Ghana	Abidjan/Accra	Major
Northern Nigeria	Kano/Jos	Minor
Southern Nigeria	Ibadan/Lagos	Major
Middle Niger Basin	Bamako	Minor

²Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *Comparative Politics*, Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds. (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 582-603.

³*Ibid.*, p. 583.

- (1) percentage of literates
- (2) percentage of mass media
- (3) percentage of urban residence
- (4) percentage of non-agricultural jobs held
- (5) increase in voter participation
- (6) exposure to "facts of modern life"
- (7) changes in residence
- (8) net national product
- (9) preoccupation with affairs of increasing geographical scope.¹

In the following tables "school enrollment ratio" and "public expenditure on education" are used as data on "literates." Under the headings of "business profile" and "measures of economic development" are ranged such indicators as pertain to "urban residence," "nonagricultural jobs held," and "exposure to facts of modern life." These figures generally support Green and Fair's contention that both Dakar and Bamako constituted "nodes of development," with Dakar as the main "core area."

SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO²

Territory	Year	1st Level (5-14 yrs)	2nd Level (15-19 yrs)	3rd Level (university) (actual number)
Soudan	1957	4 per 100	1 per 100	---
Senegal	1957	13 per 100	2 per 100	1398 (in 1960)

¹ Ibid., pp. 583, 587, 588.

² UNESCO Facts and Figures Relating to Education, Culture and Mass Communications (Paris: UNESCO, Impr. Chaix, 1962), pp. 23-24, 53.

PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION¹

Territory	Year	Currency	Total	Per Inhabitant
Soudan	1958	Million Francs	2.759	746
Senegal	1958	Million Francs	2.977	1.729

DAILY NEWSPAPERS²

Territory	Year	Total Number	Est. Circul. (in thousands)	Per 100 Inhabitants
Soudan	1959	3	2.6	1
Senegal	1959	1	20	8

NON-DAILY NEWSPAPERS³

Territory	Year	Total Number	Est. Circul (in thousands)	Per 1000 Inhabitants
Soudan	1957	4	1.7	0.5
Senegal	1957	7	79	35

¹Ibid., p. 73.²Ibid., p. 118.³Ibid., p. 124.

RADIO RECEIVERS¹

Territory	Number of Receiver Sets (thousands)			Total Receivers Per 1000 Inhabitants--1959
	1957	1958	1959	
Soudan	--	--	7.3	1.8
Senegal	100	100	125	48

BUSINESS PROFILE²

Territory	Public Investment Through FIDES (1947-1957) in mill. Francs CFA	No. of Private Firms (head-quarters site)	Increase in Capitalization of Private Firms (1947-1956) in mill. Francs CFA
Soudan	12,586	77	178
Senegal	22,300	1,267	20,661

MEASURES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT³ (I)

Territory	African Pop. (millions)	Non-African Population	% of Pop. in Urban Centers over 2000	Pop. Density per km. ²	Africans in Non-agric. Jobs
Soudan	3.636	7,382	9.2	3	16,300
Senegal	2.181	48,593	36.5	11.4	52,400

¹Ibid.²Foltz, *op. cit.*, p. 41.³Ibid., p. 40.

MEASURES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (II)

Territory	Electricity Production in 100 kw/h	Nr. Inhabit. Per Car	% of Children in School	Number of Banks	Nr. Gov't Employees
Soudan	8,238	650	7	7	7,855
Senegal	91,567	225	23.7	14	15,055

VOTER PARTICIPATION¹

Territory	Year	Registered	Voting
Soudan	1945	3,243	2,578
	1956	1,075,640	438,502
Senegal	1945	44,292	26,695
	1956	835,035	457,014

URBAN POPULATION OF MAJOR TOWNS, 1955/1956²

Territory	Town	Total Population (in thousands)
Soudan	Bamako	62.9
	Kayes	19.6
Senegal	Dakar	234.8
	St. Louis	37.1
	Rufisque	39.8
	Kaolack	48.4
	Thiès	42.1

¹Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, pp. 396-397.

²*Ibid.*, p. 42.

From the above statistics it may be concluded that Dakar was the major "core area" in the Mali Federation. By comparing economic and mobilization indicators, one is struck by the overwhelming preponderance in favor of Senegal. However, Deutsch maintains that a "balance of power" did not have to be maintained. He argued that instead, the development of a strong "core area" or nucleus seemed to promote integration, provided the "core area" had certain capabilities: (1) a capability to act and (2) a capacity to respond. Economically, the ci te of Senegal was capable of both. It was only when the leadership came to loggerheads that the political capability was lost. A clearer statement on Deutsch's part as to the different aspects of "capability" might have been advisable in terms of allowing for a more meaningful application of this "condition" as it is worded.

With respect to Dakar, it may generally be concluded that, contrary to Deutsch's contention, this core area became dysfunctional to the integrative process in Mali.¹ This occurred when the Soudanese tried to force the federation into a unitary state and in the process nationalize Dakar's industries. The Senegalese appeared to be unwilling to share the benefits of Dakar to such an extent.

5. Superior Economic Growth

A further "condition" that was found to be essential for integration

¹ There are other indications that "core areas" in federations or economic unions in or between developing nations may be potentially dysfunctional to integrative processes: Katanga in the Congo, Singapore in the Federation of Malaysia, Nairobi in the EACSO, and Gabon in the ex-A.E.F.

of an amalgamated security community was the presence of "superior economic growth" as measured against the past of the area integrated. According to Deutsch, this did not have to be present in all participating units prior to integration, but it was found to be necessary in the core area. Prolonged economic decline or stagnation, on the other hand, was found to be a disintegrative factor.¹

During the post-war years there occurred a remarkable surge in economic development throughout the A.O.F. as post-war needs for tropical raw materials rose. Growth was centered mainly in the French territories of Ivory Coast, Guinea and Senegal, as a result of private investment and the French government-directed FIDES (Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Sociale). The fact that Senegal benefitted more from this investment than did Soudan, has already been established. Superior economic growth was thus present in the core area of Senegal prior to integration and continued after integration.

However, since the core area became a disintegrative factor rather than an integrative factor once the federation had been established, "superior economic growth and expectations of stronger ties and gains on part of at least some of the participating units"² became a disintegrative factor as well. Soudan expected at least some stronger ties and gains, but didn't get them soon enough, nor apparently to the degree it had come to expect.

The fact that only one of the two participating units had experi-

¹Deutsch, Political Community..., p. 139.

²Ibid., pp. 49, 51.

enced relatively more growth than the other one undermines Deutsch's observation that superior economic growth did not have to be present in all participating units. This development contributed to the federation's failure rather than to its success.

6. Widespread Expectations of Joint Economic Rewards

Professor Deutsch and his colleagues found that "widespread expectations of joint economic rewards" for the participating units were necessary for successful integration of an amalgamated security community.¹ The initial problem in applying this condition anywhere is the vagueness of the word "widespread." There are no indicators in the texts of what Deutsch considers "widespread." The present writer takes it to include at least all politically relevant strata of society and even certain elements in what has been termed "the masses."

To what extent the general public perceived the federation to be economically rewarding, in the light of the "elite-mass gap,"² was impossible to assess. It is difficult to believe, however, that among the more informed segments of society generally, people were unaware of the economic relationship of landlocked Sudan and its access routes, and Senegal with its harbor, transport facilities, and industrial infrastructure.

¹Ibid., p. 144.

²"The gap is between those living in a modern world and participating in the crucial decisions of the political arena and those living essentially as did their ancestors, bereft...in some cases, of even a minimal sense of identity with the political structures and the people animating them." Foltz, "Building the Newest Nations," in Deutsch and Foltz, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

Indicators point out that the political leadership of both Senegal and Soudan expected some joint economic rewards.¹ Furthermore, common sense suggests that given the relatively underdeveloped nature of both Senegal and Soudan at the time of the Mali Federation, the two countries would not have federated had they not expected this union to be economically rewarding. It should be restated here, however, that in view of the different emphasis which each country's leadership laid on how economic development should occur (i.e., Senegal emphasized economic means while Soudan stressed the political aspects), the approach to economic development and thus the expectations of joint economic rewards were perceived differently.

Other than an awareness among the leadership of the participating units concerning joint expectations of economic rewards, it seems that the 'widespread' expectation for the participating units in the Mali Federation was below that which was seen as necessary for integration in Deutsch's case studies of economically and politically more advanced areas.

7. A Wide Range of Communication and Transaction

It was found that in the successful cases of integration studied by Deutsch, a 'wide range of communication and transaction between the units involved'² was necessary. The indices which Deutsch perceived as significant of this wide range of communication were mail flow and trade.

¹For example Mamadou Dia states that "thus, because of mutual development that obviously will be more fruitful than the promises of parallel development, the economic future (1960) appears, not in isolation, but in a common perspective." Dia, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

²Deutsch, Political Community..., p. 144.

The choice of these indicators was prompted by the fact that they could be measured over time. The implications were that mail flow and trade would be greater between the units to be amalgamated than between these units and others. In addition, Deutsch found the existence of a wide range of different functions, together with organizations to carry them out, to be a necessary condition within the context of communication and transaction.¹

By using Foltz's table of computed Relative Acceptance of Trade in the A.O.F. territories in 1956² as a basic reference, it was found that trade between Senegal and Soudan (2.79 on the scale) was only surpassed by trade between Soudan and Mauritania (5.89), while otherwise it ranked highest in comparison with trade with other territories in the A.O.F. Furthermore, both territories were in the Franc zone and linked to France through the same umbrella-type investment-cum-development organization (FIDES). They were both represented in the colonial Grand Conseil, were members of the same interterritorial political groupings, were both "brothers in Islam," had a recent history of interterritorial seasonal migration of some proportion, and finally, they were linked by "Dioula" trade patterns cutting across their respective national boundaries.

These apparently favorable "links of communication and transaction" were largely neutralized by two factors. First, these same links existed

¹Examples of such functions and organizations might be: postal service, transportation networks, police service, tax collection service, as well as churches, labor unions, political parties and so forth.

²Foltz, Mali Federation..., p. 43.

between all A.O.F. territories, while the Soudan-Senegal links were not sufficiently stronger or different to warrant conclusions to the effect that Senegal and Soudan constituted "natural" partners in a two-nation federation. Secondly, given the wide "elite-mass gap," these links of mutual communication and transaction were not sufficiently politically relevant to constitute a significantly positive factor, capable of sustaining continued integration once the channels of communication between Senegalese and Soudanese leaders became disturbed. Thus, although the range of communication and transaction was relatively high, it was not widespread enough.

Deutsch himself suggests that further research is needed in this area to determine how "dense" this communication and transaction flow should be. Furthermore, in the study of integration among newly emerging and developing nations, this "condition" may be of relatively little importance due to a general lack of education, low literacy rates, pre-occupation with personal and local affairs, and the lack of a certain minimum level of empathy among the general public.

8. Broadening of the Political, Social and Economic Elites

In comparison with the previous "condition," Professor Deutsch found that a more clearcut conclusion was indicated by his findings concerning the broadening of elites. For an amalgamated community to be successful it was necessary that immediately prior to, and following amalgamation, the broadening of the political, social and economic elites should take place--both as to recruitment from more of the social strata

and as to the maintenance of continuing connections with those strata.¹ He qualified this observation by stating that these generalizations did not necessarily apply to all countries in the North Atlantic area. He further remarked that if the elites were broadened beyond a point where overwhelming mass consent was needed for all major decisions made, it would hinder amalgamation in that it might be more difficult to obtain than before.²

The previously noted rise in educational opportunities throughout the A.O.F. and the subsequent employment of these students in the colonial civil service, contributed much to a fairly rapid increase in social mobility within the general context of "social mobilization." Crowder and Mercier observed that ethnic backgrounds became less and less important in the urban centers of Senegal,³ while Senghor observed that relevant to Soudan, "...as early as the Middle Ages, as early as the era of the Great Empires--Ghana, Mali, Songhai--they (Soudanese) had rejected tribalism by transcending racial and religious quarrels."⁴

At the same time it should be noted that traditional "castes" continued to exist within the social fabric of both Senegal and Soudan. Recruitment from the lower castes⁵ remained at a minimum level, although these caste backgrounds tended to be less relevant in the urban centers.

¹Deutsch, Political Community..., p. 148.

²Ibid., p. 149.

³Crowder, op. cit., p. 80; Mercier, op. cit., pp. 57-60.

⁴Senghor, op. cit., p. 34.

⁵Griots, blacksmiths, leatherworkers.

VOTER REGISTRATION (R) AND PARTICIPATION (V)
IN SIX ELECTIONS¹

Election	Senegal		Soudan	
	R	V	R	V
October, 1945	44,292	26,695	3,243	2,578
June, 1946	46,985	32,753	3,484	2,148
November, 1946	192,861	130,691	160,464	95,243
June, 1951	665,280	316,166	916,944	340,207
January, 1956	835,035	457,014	1,075,640	438,502
March, 1957	1,063,946	54.6%	2,090,048	33.9%

An increase in voter registration and voter participation does not necessarily lead to a corresponding increase in the broadening of the political elites. Moreover, in considering voter participation, Foltz sounds a relevant warning: "...issues cannot be meaningfully debated within the populace at large (in Africa), and votes tend to become mere approving plebiscites."²

Recent historical developments in Senegal indicated a gradual broadening of the UPS base of support through numerous fusions by which most strata of the population, including the most influential "clans," were taken into the party. The original BDS-BPS-UPS leadership, however, continued to constitute the leadership of each new, broadened party. The nucleus of this leadership consisted of Senghor, Dia, Thiam Doudou and later Lamine Guèye. Many of these fusions were entered into for the

¹Source: Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, pp. 396-397.

²Foltz, "Building the Newest Nations," p. 119.

purpose of perpetuating this same elite in power. Soudan offered much the same picture, especially after 1958 when the US-RDA became the unchallengeable party in this territory. Even though the leadership was more collective than in Senegal, it was nevertheless the Keita, the Troaré, Aw Mamadou and Ba Ousmane who continued to constitute the leadership by virtue of being considered the "vanguard of the revolution," "the interpreters for the people."¹

Finally there is this general consideration: Would the Mali Federation have become more stable, had the recruitment and broadening of the political elites included those elements hostile to the Soudanese and Senegalese leadership (i.e. the PSS, the PRS, the PRA-Sénégal, and the PAI) and in some cases, to the very ideas of "federation" and "independence?"

Illustrative of the continued limited elite pattern in the Mali Federation is the membership of the Malian cabinet, announced by Modibo Keita (Prime Minister) on April 5, 1959:

Deputy Prime Minister	- Mamadou Dia (Senegal)
Finance	- Thiam Doudou (Senegal)
Economic Affairs	- Thiam Doudou (Senegal)
Planning	- Thiam Doudou (Senegal)
Justice	- Boudacar Guèye (Senegal)
Public Works	- Aw Mamadou (Soudan)
Transport	- Aw Mamadou (Soudan)

¹For lack of any substantive data on economic and social elites, the analysis of elites must remain limited to the political elites only.

Communications	- Aw Mamadou (Soudan)
Education and Health	- Fofana Abdoulaye (Senegal)
Labor and Civil Service	- Ba Ousmane (Soudan)
Information	- Tidjani Traoré (Soudan) ¹

Léopold Senghor was elected President of the Federal Assembly, while Senegal sent in addition to Senghor, the following delegated to this body: Lamine Guèye, André Guillabert, Ibrahim Diallo, Boissier Palun, Georges Larché, Issa Kane, and Ous Kane.²

9. Unbroken Links of Social Communication

The presence of "unbroken links of social communication between the political units concerned"³ was found by Deutsch and his colleagues to be another essential condition for amalgamation. They suggested that these "links" provide the channels of communication necessary in an integrated society. They are, unfortunately, not too precise as to what or whom could provide these links. They do suggest churches, business groups, students, labor organizations, political parties, and central institutions as possible links that might be investigated.

In the context of the Mali Federation, the federal governmental institutions, as well as the existence of cross-national labor unions and interterritorial political parties, can be examined to see to what extent they provided "links of social communication" between the political units.

¹New York Times (New York, April 6, 1959), p. 10:4.

²Le Monde, April 5-6, 1959, p. 3:1. Names of the Soudanese delegates to the Federal Assembly could not be located.

³Deutsch, Political Community..., p. 150.

The Federation's Constitution¹ drawn up during the meeting of the constituent assembly of the four original federating territories (Senegal, Soudan, Upper Volta, and Dahomey), provided for a rather weak central government with all residual powers remaining in the hands of the member states. The Constitution stated that the executive power of the Federation would rest with the Federal Prime Minister and his cabinet. The P.M. had to be elected by an absolute majority of the Federal Assembly. The cabinet was to consist of at least two ministers from each state, while the P.M. had the right to choose his cabinet from within or without the Federal Assembly. He was to control the federal administration and the federal police.

The government was responsible to the Federal Assembly and would concern itself with common financial, economic, and social services and could, if France agreed, seek representation in all international organizations. Any state wishing to leave the Federation could do so only after a resolution of its respective legislative Assembly and confirmed by a national referendum.

The Federal Assembly was elected for a five year term and consisted of twelve deputies from each territory (later revised to twenty each, after Dahomey and Upper Volta chose not to join the Mali Federation). The member territories could elect their representatives in whatever way they chose. The Assembly--which was to hold at least two ordinary sessions annually--could only legislate on three matters: Human Rights, Cultural Solidarity, and Economic and Financial affairs, concerning the federated territories

¹West Africa, Jan. 31, 1959, p. 99.

in common. Bills could be introduced by both the Federal Government and by private members.

Within the context of the French Community, which Senegal and Soudan had joined, the members agreed to have certain matters regulated by the Community's Executive Council and Senate.¹ Since the leadership of Senegal and Soudan were members of both the Federation's governmental institutions and the Community's governmental institutions, we may conclude that unbroken links of communication existed at this level. Again, the inherent problem is found in the fact that this leadership was small and largely responsible only to itself.

On the level of cross-national labor unions, Guinea's Sékou Touré had been instrumental in 1955 in leading the Senegalese and Guinean labor unions out of their foreign affiliations² and into the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique (CGTA). The idea of an African trade union spread rapidly through all of French Africa, and in 1956 a representative conference at Cotonou (Dahomey) decided to launch a unified Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire (UGTAN). Soon UGTAN began to play an active role in the A.O.F. by pressing for immediate independence. After the 1958 Referendum in which Guinea alone chose independence outside of the French Community, UGTAN territorial sections were soon suppressed by state-sponsored rival trade unions. By 1959 Guinea alone held up the banner of UGTAN, only to be joined by the Republic of Mali once the Federa-

¹Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, Articles 78, 80, 82 and 83.

²The International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICTU), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and the French CGT, Force Ouvrière, and the CFTC.

tion had collapsed. Thus we find that after an initial period of unbroken links of communication between Senegal and Soudan, this channel was disrupted as a result of separatist developments after the 1958 referendum.

With reference to communications links within cross-national parties, we saw earlier that although interterritorial parties had branches in both Senegal and Soudan, the UPS and its predecessor parties had belonged initially to the IOM and only since 1958 to the PRA. The Soudanese US-RDA had since 1946 belonged to the RDA, becoming an openly dissident section in 1958. In 1959 the UPS and US-RDA decided to form the interterritorial PFA, but this was found to constitute a "marriage of convenience" rather than a fully integrated cross-national party. Communication among PFA leaders had existed only for a short time, largely coinciding with the duration of the Mali Federation since the party's leadership also constituted the administrative and executive echelons of the Federation.

Here again, the limited character of the political elites plays havoc with a meaningful application of Deutsch's "condition" pertaining to "unbroken links of social communication between the political units concerned."¹ It seems that in some cases horizontal communication links existed until shortly before and even during the Mali Federation. The problem encountered here was the lack of evidence regarding vertical channels, especially vertical feed-back patterns.

¹Other categories of organizations and institutions suggested by Deutsch, such as churches, business groups, and student movements or exchanges, could not be studied relative to this "condition" due to a lack of general data available regarding such groups.

10. Greater Mobility of Persons Among the Main Units

The final condition which Deutsch suggests in terms of benefit to amalgamation concerns "greater mobility of persons among the main units (at least in the politically relevant strata)."¹ Deutsch is not sure as to the essential necessity of this condition, finding that the North Atlantic area was so far from reaching full-scale mobility of persons that he rated this condition of negligible significance.

Mobility of traders, civil servants, military and seasonal laborers has been examined in greater detail elsewhere. The fact that Deutsch's findings did not warrant any definite conclusions as to this condition's essential nature, added to the fact that these categories of mobile segments of society did not generally constitute the politically relevant strata, have prompted the decision to exclude this final condition from consideration.

11. The Relative Merits of a Functional Approach to Amalgamation

It is perhaps worthwhile in closing to introduce the concept of functionalism in the light of the above observations and in the light of the rather negative and unsatisfactory conclusions reached in applying these "conditions" to the Mali Federation.

Soudan and Senegal had a relatively high degree of "compatibility of major values" only in the areas of religion, common civilization and justice. Mutual responsiveness initially existed, if only among the politically relevant elites, but was not widespread enough nor firmly enough

¹Deutsch, Political Community..., p. 151.

established to weather the crisis of confidence at the top. Finally a sufficiently distinctive "way of life" to set them off clearly from neighboring territories in the A.O.F. did not exist in Senegal and Soudan. Still, expecting some vaguely defined gains, the territorial leaders agreed to unite their parties, join their territories, and to a certain extent pool their resources. Given the fact that a certain amount of tactical politics did enter into this decision, we can ask the question with Professor Deutsch: "Does merging of one or more governmental functions among two or more political units promote progress toward later over-all amalgamation of their governments?"¹ In view of the fact that the federal government of Mali had few real powers, since the effective power in each country was vested mainly in its territorial executive and legislature, we can regard the establishment of the Mali Federation as an attempt at functional amalgamation.

Deutsch cites examples of a number of functional arrangements in which participating units delegated some of their governmental functions, not to a joint authority, but to one or more other units, in which functionalism was seen as having a beneficial effect in terms of furthering integration.² His conclusion is that the relative benefits depend on "the importance of this particular function or institution in the domestic politics of the participating units," but that generally functionalism has been overrated.³

¹Ibid., p. 79.

²Ibid., p. 80.

³Ibid., p. 81.

The functional approach taken by the leadership of Mali concentrated on a limited joint authority. With the benefit of hindsight, one can say that this was "obviously" the wrong approach; they should have started on a lower level of functional amalgamation. However, had a break-down in confidence and responsiveness in the leadership not occurred, it is very conceivable that such a functional approach as was taken in this case was exactly the right one. This writer's sentiments regarding functional amalgamation in the process of integration are rather ambivalent. A similar ambiguity is found in Deutsch's statement that "perhaps the most that can be said for functionalism as an approach to integration is that it seems less hazardous than any sudden attempt at over-all amalgamation."¹

In conclusion, then, of the nine conditions which Deutsch indicated as being essential for integration (amalgamation) in the North Atlantic area, only three were found to have a high level of fulfillment in the case of Soudan and Senegal prior to integration: mutual responsiveness, a core area of strength, and superior economic growth on the part of at least one of the units to be amalgamated. Four conditions were found to have a low fulfillment level compared to what Deutsch found necessary for integration in his case studies, namely, compatibility of (some) main values, a distinctive way of life, a wide range of communication, and unbroken links of social communication. Finally the development of core areas, superior economic growth, and expectations of joint economic rewards, although they were present, were found to constitute a disintegrative rather than an integrative influence.

¹Ibid., p. 82.

In the light of the above and with the benefit of hindsight, one is tempted to conclude that since most of Deutsch's key conditions were not fulfilled or had too low a level of fulfillment, the Mali Federation could only have failed.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The fact that the Mali Federation failed or the reasons why it failed are no longer the main concern at this point. What should be emphasized here is that some of Deutsch's "conditions" used in his case studies in the North Atlantic area were found difficult to apply or proved to be largely irrelevant when applied to the Mali Federation. The main question then becomes: To what extent do the Princeton group's "conditions" fall short of being an effective tool in attempting to measure or predict the degree of integration between two or more political units in a different historical and politico-economic setting?

Judging from the results of the preceding analysis and application of Deutsch's "conditions" it appears that political integration in countries like Senegal and Soudan necessitates different requirements from those necessary in what may be termed "the Western World."

It is contended here that the main explanatory indicators of these different requirements are to be found in what has earlier been referred to as the "elite-mass gap." In attempting to define what this gap is and what its implications are, the following factors have to be considered.¹

¹In the following discussion this writer has heavily relied on the observations expressed by Professor I. William Zartman in his book International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), especially pp. 47, 49, 52, 53, 65, 69, 73, and 76.

The ruling political elites in West Africa¹ generally live by the myth that they act in the name of the people. Upon independence they became the symbol of the new nation which, in turn, became a causal factor in the generally institutionalized charismatic structure of politics in these nations. The personal ties between the various elite groups in the ex-A.O.F. territories caused politics to become overly personalized once these countries became autonomous. A corollary of this development was that personal interests began to be expressed in terms of national interest, while frequent "summit meetings" further served to enhance the personal prestige of the political leadership. On the domestic plane it often meant that policies which added to the welfare of the nation, might also work to keep this elite in power and, conversely, policies that kept the government in power might also be in the national interest.

Subnational groups played a relatively small part in relations between political units, while mass voluntary organizations were almost irrelevant in the decision-making process. In the party structures, the political bureau acted only to ratify decisions already made at the top, while the party's role below the level of the politbureau remained largely one of recruitment, education, and mobilization. The press, as a result of parochialism and low literacy rates, remained largely a communications medium limited to the elites. Public opinion on national and international

¹Within a general African context of elite behavior, it may prove fruitful to explore the customary authority patterns in traditional tribal society rather than attempting to relate modern elite behavior solely to any compulsion inherent in the process of political development. See generally: Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 358 (Philadelphia: A.A.P.S.S., March, 1965), pp. 60-62.

matters had no means of expressing itself on a large-scale basis. This weakness of public opinion, linked with the ability of a few leaders to arouse mass support by means of broad ideological slogans, made politics and political decision-making a highly elitist affair.

A second explanatory indicator of different requirements for integration of "non-Western" political units, may be found in the time element. Deutsch recognized its importance early in his study of integrative processes in the North Atlantic area. However, the Princeton group's study focussed on nations which by and large had completed their processes of national integration and which had been autonomous for a century or more. History has shown that "major transformations in loyalties and attachments are complex and long-term phenomena."¹ Mali and Soudan, on the other hand, had not yet completed their processes of national integration and had only been autonomous for one year when they decided to form a primary federation. Although both territories had a fifty-year history of existence as integral parts within a colonial federation, the fact that they had practically no history as identifiable national units, makes the "time" factor of crucial importance in this specific attempt at political integration. The often referred-to successful integration of Western Togo with Ghana and the British section of the Cameroons with French Cameroun does not detract from this general observation in that only parts of territories were integrated into neighboring units. Had, for instance, all of Togo been integrated into Ghana, integration might not have been so successful.

¹Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 691.

In the light of the above observations it appears safe to conclude that in attempting to posit "conditions" for successful integration of newly independent and developing nations, a much greater emphasis should be placed on a much smaller elite than Deutsch did in his case studies of the North Atlantic area. Relative to the time element, one conclusion that may be drawn is that there tends to exist a primacy of "independence" over "unity." Guinea's preference for independence in 1958 and the break-up of the Mali Federation seem to bear this out. The need for independence to be gained as a necessary precondition before integration can occur, may then be a logical corollary.

If we assume the validity of the conclusions reached concerning the implications of the "elite-mass gap," there occurs the "problem of the linkages." The analysis and application of Deutsch's "conditions" in the context of the Mali Federation shows that, due to the various linkages between the "conditions," when one "condition" cannot be meaningfully applied because of the small political elite groups, subsequent "conditions" also become irrelevant. For instance, it was shown that a lack of "compatibility of major values" among the political elites caused pre-existing "mutual responsiveness" to decline once these major values became politically relevant within the Mali Federation. Furthermore, the limited character of these elites made already existing "wide ranges of mutual transactions," "links of social communication," and "greater mobility of persons" appear to be rather irrelevant since those strata of society most actively taking part in these processes were insignificant in political decision-making.

Finally, there is the problem found in the application of the "core

area" concept to the Mali Federation. The analysis showed that although a strong core area of development existed in Senegal, this area became dysfunctional to the process of political integration. There appears to be a connection between this development and the previously noted primacy of "independence" over "unity." Coleman and Rosberg observed that "the transfer of power from a colonial regime to a locally based regime has intensified the parochial...basis of already existing groups, or has activated latent parochialism...."¹ This development then seems to have been the underlying basis for the Senegalese reaction to Soudanese demands in 1960 for nationalization of the Dākār industries as part of the Soudanese drive for a unitary state.

Without attempting to establish any classification in order of their importance, the following points might be further examined in conjunction with an application of Deutsch's "conditions" in a non-Western setting.

1. With reference to the unique structure and power of the political leadership in newly emerging nations, the following factors seem salient in subsequent research:

- a. personality
- b. relative power positions of the top leaders in the general area
- c. mutual ties among the leadership of the units to be amalgamated
- d. compatibility of major values in terms of equal emphasis on these values
- e. identically perceived benefits and rewards of subsequent union

¹Ibid., p. 689.

- f. the "prestige" factor in political integration
- g. relationships between leaders and masses
- h. the character and structure of mutual responsiveness in terms of political and economic capabilities of the units
- i. perceptions of external threats or challenges

2. With reference to the importance of economic development in newly emerging nations, the following factors merit further research:

- a. the correlation between the distribution of "core areas of strength" with the number of the units to be amalgamated and their relative levels of development
- b. the perceived and actual economic benefits derived from political integration of two or more units, linked with their economic and political capabilities to adequately respond to each other's needs.

Since indicators are that Deutsch's theory tends to be 1) culture-bound and 2) appropriate only for politically more mature and economically developed nations, the above factors and relationships are important in further studies toward a more inclusive theory of political integration. The unique position of the political leadership in new nations, operating in an environment where "political brokers" such as a more or less independent bureaucracy are lacking, necessitates a greater emphasis on leadership structures and interrelationships. The elements of nationalism (anti-imperialism, selfishness, ego-centrism and self-assertion) expressed by a small elite, cannot be ignored within the general context of political integration.

Moreover, the heavy emphasis placed by these nations' leaders on

economic growth and development relates Deutsch's "conditions" and indicators directly with the political relationships among the ruling elites. A further analysis of these various linkages may prove to be fruitful in subsequent studies of political integration among newly independent and developing nations.

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APPENDIX I


AREA AND POPULATION, A.O.F., 1958¹

Territory	Area (in thousands square km.)	Europeans (in thousands)	Africans (in thousands)	Total (in thousands)
A.O.F. Total	4,634	88.2	18,982	19,070
Senegal	197	48.6	2,270	2,319
Soudan	1,204	7.4	3,701	3,708
Guinea	246	9.5	2,482	2,491
Ivory Coast	322	11.6	2,471	2,483
Dahomey	116	2.8	1,710	1,713
Niger	1,189	3.0	2,412	2,415
Mauritania	1,086	1.6	614	615
Upper Volta	274	3.7	3,322	3,326

¹Source: Outre-mer, 1958, as quoted in Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-speaking West Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 400.

APPENDIX II

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUDANESE POLITICAL PARTIES¹



¹Sources: William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965); Morgenthau, op. cit., and Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, "Mali" in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964).

<u>Interterritorial Party</u>	<u>Soudanese Section or Affiliate</u>
SFIO	PSP
MSA	PSP
RDA	US
PFA	US
PRA	PRS
RPF	RPF

Soudanese Parties


- US - Union Soudanaise (Soudanese Union)
- PSP - Parti Soudanais Progressiste (Soudanese Progressive Party)
- PRS - Parti du Regroupement Soudanais (Soudanese Regroupment Party)
- PRS - Parti du Rassemblement Soudanais (Dicko) (Soudanese Assembly Party)

Interterritorial Parties

- RDA - Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (African Democratic Assembly)
- PRA - Parti du Rassemblement Africain (African Assembly Party)
- IOM - Indépendents d'Outre-Mer (Overseas Independents)
- PFA - Parti de la Fédération Africaine (African Federation Party)
- RPF - Rassemblement du Peuple Français (French Peoples Party)

APPENDIX III

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF SENEGALESE POLITICAL PARTIES¹



¹Sources: Foltz, *op. cit.*; Morgenthau, *op. cit.*; Philip Neres, *French-Speaking West Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), and Michael Crowder, *Senegal: A Study in French Assimilation Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

<u>Interterritorial Party</u>	<u>Senegalese Section or Affiliate</u>
SFIO	Bloc Africain
RDA	UDS
RDA	MPS
IOM	BDS
PRA	UPS
PRA	PRA-Sénégal*
PFA	UPS*
Communists	PAI

*The PRA-Sénégal and the UPS have no interterritorial party affiliations at present.

Senegalese Parties

- PSS - Parti Socialiste Sénégalaise (Senegalese Socialist Party)
- SFIO - Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (French Section of the Workers International)
- BDS - Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (Democratic Senegalese Bloc)
- BPS - Bloc Populaire Sénégalais (Popular Senegalese Bloc)
- UPS - Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (Progressive Senegalese Union)
- UDS - Union Démocratique Sénégalaise (Democratic Senegalese Union)
- MPS - Mouvement Populaire Sénégalais (Popular Senegalese Movement)
- PAI - Parti Africain de l'Indépendance (African Independence Party)
- PSS - Parti de Solidarité Sénégalais (Senegalese Solidarity Party)
- BMS - Bloc des Masses Sénégalais (Bloc of the Senegalese Masses)

Interterritorial Parties

- RDA - Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (African Democratic Assembly)
- IOM - Indépendants d'Outre-Mer (Overseas²Independents)
- PRA - Parti du Rassemblement Africain (African Grouping Party)
- PFA - Parti de la Fédération Africaine (African Federation Party)

APPENDIX IV

SOCIAL BACKGROUND: MALI
1947-1952 TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLY¹

<u>Total</u>	28	<u>Ethnic Origin</u>	
<u>Average Age</u>	49	Sarakolle	5
<u>Religion</u>		Fulani	5
(1) Moslem	27	Bambara	4
(2) Animist	1	Malinke	3
<u>Party</u>		Songhai	2
PSP	22	Dogon	1
US	5	Toucouleur	1
Independent	1	Unknown	7
<u>Profession</u>		<u>Ethnic Status</u>	
Chef de Canton	8	Chiefly family	10
Gov't Clerk	8	Maraboutic family	2
Teacher	6	Commoner	9
Buss. Clerk	3	Unknown	7
African Doctor	2		
Trader	1		
<u>Education</u>			
Ponty	10		
EPS Terrasson	5		
EPS Katibougou	1		
Primary	6		
Unknown	6		

¹Source: Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 404.

APPENDIX V

SOCIAL BACKGROUND: SENEGAL
BDS EXECUTIVE, 1956¹

<u>Total</u>	85	M.D.	1
<u>Average Age</u>	40	Veterinary Nurse	1
		None	1
<u>Religion</u>		<u>Ethnic Origin</u>	
Moslem	68	Wolof	33
Catholic	17	Mulatto	6
		Lébou	9
<u>Education</u>		European	2
University	10	Toucouleur	14
Lycée	3	Serer	7
Ponty	27	Mandiaka	1
Upper Primary	12	Dioula	6
Lower Primary	17	Fulani	4
Literate	6	Port. Creole	1
Illiterate	2	Unknown	2
Vocational	2		
Unknown	4	<u>Pre-1946 Status</u>	
Europeans	2	Subject	4
		Citizen	23
<u>Profession</u>		Unknown	27
Trader	7		
Teacher	26	<u>Ethnic Status</u>	
Lawyer	4	Mulatto/European	8
Gov't Clerk	16	Chiefly Family	5
Buss. Clerk	4	Griot	5
European Buss.	2	Leatherworker	1
Crop Inspector	3	Jeweller	2
Professor	3	Maraboutic Family	0
African Doctor	4	Unknown	35
Railroad Empl.	6	Citizen "bourgeois"	5
Pharmacist	2		
Nurse	1		
Bailiff	1		
Veterinary Off.	1		
Co-op Director	1		
Printer	1		

¹Source: Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 408.

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