dc.contributor.author |
Davis, Kent F. |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2014-05-22T21:35:41Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2014-05-22T21:35:41Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2014-05-13 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
15 Or. Rev. Int'l. L. 167 (2013) |
en_US |
dc.identifier.issn |
1543-9860 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/17860 |
|
dc.description |
38 pages |
en_US |
dc.description.abstract |
Following the financial collapse of 2008, both China and the United States implemented stimulus plans to minimize adverse market performance. Arguably the vertically integrated institutional structure of China produced a timely and homogenous plan that stimulated market performance. Conversely, the decentralized institutional structure of the United States produced a plan that was delinquent, discordant, and inefficacious. In other words, China’s stimulus plan had a closer fit between means and ends. |
en_US |
dc.language.iso |
en_US |
en_US |
dc.publisher |
University of Oregon School of Law |
en_US |
dc.rights |
All Rights Reserved. |
en_US |
dc.title |
The Costs of Freedom: New Institutional Comparison of China’s and the U.S.’s Responses to the Financial Collapse |
en_US |
dc.type |
Article |
en_US |