dc.contributor.author |
Davies, Ronald B. |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Liebman, Benjamin H., 1971- |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2004-11-09 |
|
dc.date.available |
2004-11-09 |
|
dc.date.issued |
2003-11 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/261 |
|
dc.description |
21 p. |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
It is well established that the threat of antidumping duties can help sustain collusion between a foreign firm and its domestic counterpart. However, when the foreign firm is a multinational, its subsidiary will fight against a new duty, potentially making this threat hollow and collusion less likely. We show that the multinational may therefore choose to submit to a tariff even under collusion since evidence indicates that duties are more difficult to remove than initiate. In this way, it is possible to obtain a greater degree of commitment, although it comes at a cost. Nevertheless, we show that this can be a more profitable strategy than those previously explored. In fact, we find several cases where subsidiaries of multinational firms have indeed filed for protection from their own parents. |
en |
dc.format.extent |
205422 bytes |
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dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
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dc.language.iso |
en_US |
|
dc.publisher |
University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics |
en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2003-36 |
|
dc.subject |
Antidumping |
en |
dc.subject |
Collusion |
en |
dc.subject |
Foreign direct investment |
en |
dc.title |
Self-Protection: Antidumping Duties, Collusion and FDI |
en |
dc.type |
Working Paper |
en |