ENGENDERED PRAGMATISM

by

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Pragmatism as a political theory develops a critical perspective, a sensitivity to context and situation, and a collaborative and interactive engagement of personal experiences that test theories. Given this focus, however, the subject matter of pragmatism does not engage issues of gender. Pragmatism, nevertheless, can be used as a tool to address and handle feminist concerns. The link between pragmatism and feminism can be made by emphasizing pragmatists' efforts to align rationality with praxis. That is, pragmatism can be analyzed in such a way as to break the traditional link of rationality to masculinity and the link of practical life to femininity. However, in so doing, there remains a residue of unrecognized assumptions and cultural attitudes that makes the link between women's experiences and philosophical praxis difficult to establish and maintain. Thus, while this

dissertation critiques the absence of an analysis of gender within epistemology generally, it also proposes a new theory of knowledge: engendered pragmatism. It is a theory of knowledge as situated, created by gendered individuals within particular communities.

I do not provide a feminist critique of pragmatism in which large parts of pragmatism are altered, replaced or repudiated. I provide a new view of what epistemological problems within the pragmatic tradition entail, not a new interpretation of the problems. Engendered pragmatism does not simply involve a process of highlighting women's experiences where pragmatism can solve the problems of gender issues. As a theory, engendered pragmatism is not simply the application of pragmatism to women's experiences. My claim is that one cannot be a pragmatist without being a feminist.

However, one cannot be a feminist pragmatist without addressing two problems within feminist epistemology. There is a tendency within feminist epistemology to universalize and, simultaneously, to relativize women's experiences. This tendency creates the perception that women's experiences are personal truths. From a pragmatist perspective, the value of a woman's standpoint should not be couched in terms of the issue of truth. Engendered pragmatism, as a theory, encourages feminist epistemologists to use the

plurality of personal experiences as practical tools for a pragmatic conception of knowledge as warrantability, not truth.

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DEDICATION

To my father, Edmund Leo Ross, for instilling in me the love of inquiry; to my mother, Joan Gertrude Appenzeller Ross, for her encouragement; and to my spouse, Ann Bunnenberg, for helping to make our dreams come true.

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CHAPTER I

FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES

Epistemologists address questions concerning the nature of knowledge, such as: What is knowledge? What can be known? How do we acquire knowledge? Can knowledge be taught? How do we know when we have knowledge? Although philosophies have not agreed about the answers to these questions, they have almost all agreed on one point: gender does not matter within epistemology. Traditional empiricists and rationalists, idealists and materialists, realists and anti-realists, foundationalists and relativists, and all manner of other philosophers from Plato to Quine have not addressed epistemological problems in terms of gender and gender differences.

However, feminist philosophies in the last twenty-five years have agreed that gender is central to epistemology. These feminist epistemological studies have focused on the fact that all knowledge involves knowing subjects and all these knowing subjects are gendered subjects. As a result, feminists ask, "Who knows?" in addition to, and in some cases

instead of, for example, "What can we know?" By asking "Who knows?" and "Whose knowledge is it?," feminists force epistemology to include consideration of the significance of gender. As a result, feminist epistemologies add important dimensions to epistemology--and in so doing, transform it.

Feminist epistemological inquiries have resulted in many different, often conflicting, theories and a variety of differing claims about the nature, role, and significance of the knowing subject. For example, first some feminists (feminist empiricists) claim that women have different ways of knowing that differ from men's ways of knowing. They use a scientific intellectual model. Some feminist empiricists claim the differences are due to biological psychological differences. Other feminist empiricists claim the differences are due to cultural differences in that men and women belong to different gendered communities. Second, some feminists (feminist standpoint theorists) work within a different intellectual model--a social science/historical model. They claim that different ways of knowing are culturally based, but not only tied to gendered communities. The differences are specifically tied to economic and political factors. Standpoint theorists re-create the biological model of the category "woman," based on either essential differences or cultural differences in the realm of

reproduction, into a Marxist social-material model of the category "woman" that is historically and materially based. Third, some feminists (feminist postmodernists) claim that knowing has more to do with power than gender.

My leading concern in this dissertation is to explicate standpoint theory and bring it into dialogue with American pragmatism. As a result, I provide a brief historical account of the development of feminist standpoint theory. This effort does not constitute rewriting of the history of feminist theory. The goal is only to depict how feminist epistemology in general arises as an alternative to traditional epistemology and how feminist standpoint theory arises in response to different forms of feminist empiricism. I do not discuss feminist postmodernism, and I discuss feminist empiricism only in this context: I can highlight best the important aspects of feminist standpoint theory that need reconstruction.

All feminist epistemologists take gender seriously and agree that gender must be accounted for. However, they differ in the manner in which their project is undertaken. First, I will specify for both feminist empiricists and feminist standpoint theorists the features that constitute them as different categories. Second, I will provide a brief historical account of the development of these epistemologies. In particular, I will describe feminist empiricism generally as a response to traditional epistemology and explicate

feminist standpoint generally as an alternative to empiricism. Third, since it is difficult to categorize individual theorists, I will focus on individual empiricists and standpoint theorists. Their work will provide a means to draw out implications. The consequences of these implications will be made clear in Chapter III. The implications highlight what is problematic and in need of reconstruction.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section, entitled "Feminist Epistemologies," addresses the general question, "What is feminist about feminist epistemology?" or "How does feminist epistemology differ from traditional nonfeminist epistemology?" That is, I demonstrate that feminist epistemologies have different methodologies, different concerns, and different conclusions than traditional epistemology. Even though I believe, but will not argue here, that other types of feminist epistemologies also fail to fulfill emancipatory ends and adequately address practical problems, I believe that feminist standpoint theory includes and highlights aspects of feminist epistemology more generally that can be and must be revised.

The second section, "Feminist Empiricism," analyzes the rudiments of feminist empiricism. I examine Carol Gilligan's well-known empirical research in psychology. I recognize that feminist empiricists in other fields

and other sorts of feminist empiricists in all fields may be bothered by being categorized with Gilligan, particularly those who question the validity of her research methodology. However, even if her empiricism is flawed, Gilligan clearly uses an empirical method and views herself as an empiricist.[1] Thus, I believe it is adequate to classify her as an empiricist for my purposes.

Gilligan's research purports to be more honest, accurate and objective than previous research. These results leave intact an understanding of science as an enterprise that produces objective truths that somehow correspond to an independent reality. Since inquiries often have left out women's voices, Gilligan, in an effort to eliminate sexist and androcentric biases, uniquely incorporates voices of women and other traditionally marginalized peoples. In doing so, she demands stricter adherence to existing methodological norms of scientific inquiry and foundationalism.

Gilligan's work emphasizes the value of contextual thinking and the emphasis on the person. Though not unique to women, these traits have been interpreted as particularly feminine. Gilligan's work is the most successful of early empiricists' efforts to identify a different and legitimate way of knowing. However, seeking out the woman's voice has tended to reinforce claims of inherent differences between men and women. By suggesting that contextual thinking is a feminine trait, she has been

interpreted as confirming the traditional belief that traits such as these are inherent characteristics of woman's nature. This essentialist claim conflates the feminine with the female and has drawn criticism from many feminists.[2] Although this view is not a definitive interpretation of her work, it is a plausible and consistent interpretation.[3] In spite of this interpretation, her work successfully challenges the adequacy of all prior evidence considered objective and challenges traditional conceptions of rationality.

Also addressed in this section is a description of a second sort of feminist empiricist whose theories have developed in reaction to the essentialist interpretations made of their fellow empiricists' work. Although they self-identify as feminist empiricists, they reject the use of their colleagues' work for essentialist ends. Helen Longino, Nancy Tuana and Lynn Hankinson Nelson work in the field of the philosophy of science, and all agree that it is insufficient to simply add the woman's voice and call the project good science. Doing so subjects the work to criticisms of essentialism in the name of greater objectivity. The addition of the woman's voice is a beginning of a feminist epistemology, but it is incomplete. Fellow empiricists broaden this view. The motivation that drives the scientific endeavors of Longino, Tuana, and Nelson is not to make scientific inquiry more objective in the traditional foundational sense,

but to demand that scientific inquiry achieve greater objectivity by also analyzing the deep metaphysical and normative commitments that guide and influence scientific research. As empiricists, Longino, Tuana, and Nelson locate women's contributions to knowledge in social and political components of our characters and avoid all inferences of inherent nature. They move feminist epistemology concerns away from simply adding the woman's voice and towards a feminist analysis of traditional scientific methodology that determines what is and what is not evidence. Since one of the goals of these feminist empiricists is to avoid accusations of essentialism while also holding on to a more accurate notion of scientific objectivity, they locate knowledge as arising out of communities--i.e., the community of women, not individual women. They seek to criticize the deep assumptions that guide scientific reasoning--e.g., assumptions that data have nearly, or even absolutely, exclusive propriety in scientific inquiry.[4] These feminist empiricists all claim that even scientific knowledge is socially constructed, politically objectified, and gendered. Objectivity in the traditional sense, as value free, must be rejected. With that goes essentialism's claim. The feminist voice is introduced, and that voice is not individual but one tied more directly to communities.

What feminist empiricists all share is the belief that the entrenched metaphysical and normative commitments and assumptions of traditional research are gendered, not gender neutral. And they agree that feminists of all kinds are more likely than nonfeminists to notice sexist and androcentric biases by using conventional scientific epistemological methodologies. They differ in how gender is addressed.

The third section focuses on feminist standpoint theory as an alternative to feminist empiricism. After explaining that the difference in categorization between feminist empiricists and feminist standpoint theorists is due to a difference in intellectual model--that is, a shift from a scientific model to a social science/historical model--I provide a brief history of (1) standpoint theory's efforts as a shift from a woman's voice to a feminist standpoint, (2) the problem of privileging the marginalized standpoint, and (3) the shift to a plurality of feminist standpoints as the "clues" for knowledge claims. The feminist standpoint theorists' response to the essentialist interpretation of the feminist empiricists' work has been to identify a feminist stance that is not identified with the female voice and leaves behind the feminist empiricists' goal of achieving more accurate notions of scientific objectivity. Rather, while concurring with feminist empiricist claims of the link between knowledge and community, the

traditional epistemological tenets reflects a belief that gender issues play a role even in the formulation of these traditional notions.

When gender considerations begin to be a part of the inquiry, we are led further in investigating and setting up a model for subsequent assaults on the more tacit assumptions of value neutrality, faulty inferences, distortion, omission, generalizations, and unwarranted conclusions in all fields, particularly the fields of philosophy, psychology, biology and law. Feminist epistemologists, both men and women, acknowledge that (1) the evidence for epistemological inquiry is more often than not gender biased to the disadvantage of women; and (2) when women's experiences are included in the process of theory formation, the subject of inquiry and evidence shifts. That is, what is taken as the subject of inquiry changes as well as how one sees what the subjects of inquiry are.[5]

Feminist epistemologists challenge the underlying, unstated, and fundamental assumptions that direct the course of inquiry and guide scientific reasoning. They also challenge the inapplicability of classic philosophic categories of thought--e.g., the analytic/synthetic distinction, the context of discovery/context of justification distinction, sense-datum statements, foundationalism, and scientific objectivity. Some feminist epistemologists (empiricists) incorporate the woman's voice in the process

of knowledge acquisition. Other feminist epistemologists (some empiricists as well as all standpoint theorists) incorporate a feminist perspective, yet there is an across-the-board effort to contextualize the modes of thought and the emotional components of reason of both men and women.

In feminist epistemology, when gender is introduced into the epistemological analysis we are led to examine (1) the extent to which knowledge is situated,[6] (2) whether knowers arise out of particular communities or from individuals in communities,[7] (3) the significance of the body to knowledge,[8] (4) the emotive and bodily components of knowledge,[9] and (5) the subjective components of knowledge.[10] Feminist epistemologists argue that the subjects of knowledge have been men,[11] and that what is and what can be known is circumscribed by men in a position to know--that is, men in authority.[12] Thus, feminist epistemologists (feminist postmodernists) also incorporate a sixth dimension: a critique of the mechanisms of power.[13] Consequently, the goals of feminist epistemologists are to incorporate gender as a category of analysis and to reject those parts of traditional epistemology that ignore the knowing subject. The extent to which these projects are argued varies between the two schools. I will show how at least in some cases some of these claims create radical transformations of epistemology.

Although different feminists divide feminist theory into varying categories (e.g., Jean Bethke Elshtain--radical, liberal, Marxist and psychoanalytic;[14] Alison Jaggar--radical, liberal, Marxist, socialist;[15] Josephine Donovan--Freudian, existentialist, Marxist and radical;[16] Rosemary Tong--liberal, Marxist, radical mothering, radical sexuality, psychoanalytic, socialist, essentialist, postmodern),[17] feminist epistemology is more often than not understood in terms of three categories: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernism. First, some feminist empiricists claim that women have ways of knowing that differ from men's ways of knowing and that these differences may be the result of biological and psychological differences that foster the notion of a universal woman's experience. In their efforts to incorporate and authenticate the category "woman" and her experiences, they propose different descriptions of a universal female experience to explain the oppression of all women. For example, in addition to Carol Gilligan's work questioning the nature of male/female differences in psychological theories of gender and morality,[18] Nancy Chodorow develops a theory of how mothering is reproduced by girls' identification with the maternal and boys' identity in contradistinction to their mothers.[19] Dorothy Dinnerstein identifies the differences between men and women as social constructs

created out of a psychological need to believe in these differences.[20] Adrienne Rich focuses on the ability to birth as the source of these differences.[21] And Alice Walker's In Search of Our Mothers' Gardens develops a notion of womanism to focus on race.[22]

Other feminist empiricists claim that describing who women are is intractable given the myriad experiences of women. Thus, defining women's knowledge through the unity of woman's voice is problematic. Feminist empiricists like Helen Longino, Nancy Tuana, and Lynn Hankinson Nelson claim that the knowing subjects' values cannot be separated from facts and gender issues are part of these values even in empirical scientific knowledge claims.[23]

Second, some feminists, especially feminist standpoint theorists, claim that women have different ways of knowing than men because of economic differences. Feminist standpoint theorists attempt to historicize rather than neutralize the category of woman and her experiences, given that there is no unifying category. The shift from empiricism to standpoint theory is the shift from the search for a woman's voice to the search for a feminist perspective. The feminist perspective is made up of a mosaic of experiences that, on an epistemological level, provide clues for a plurality of knowledge claims. Nancy Hartsock uses the term "feminist" rather than "women's

standpoint" to emphasize the need to piece together different interpretations of women's experiences.[24] Catherine MacKinnon points to the need for a "collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of women's collective social experience, as women live through it."[25] Bettina Aptheker calls for an "ordering of women's experience" to create a new way of knowing.[26] Sandra Harding wants to point out that starting from women's lives, not necessarily from their individual experiences, provides grounds for asking better questions.[27] Dorothy Smith situates women historically so as to suggest that a feminist standpoint arises out of a common organization of social relations, not individual experience.[28] Patricia Hill Collins argues for an authentic partial perspective--the subjugated standpoint of black women.[29]

Thirdly, some feminists, especially postmodern feminists, claim that female liberation is dependent on an analysis of power, hierarchy, and gender and not the female experience. Judith Grant suggests that the feminist epistemology cannot be grounded in female experience if we use that experience to interpret female experience.[30] The suggestion is that the language of subject/object be abandoned. Since it is unclear to me what is feminist about feminist postmodernism if we avoid woman as subject and the nature of experience, I do not explore this theory in light of what it can

do for feminist standpoint theory. The underdeveloped theories represented by this short summary reflect the multiplicity of contemporary interpretations of feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theory that occurs without the benefit of generations of hindsight of reflection and criticism.

Feminist Empiricism

I call feminist empiricists those feminists who use and rely on a scientific intellectual model. The goal, at least for the early feminist empiricists of the 1980s, was to establish scientific results that were more objective than the results of scientific study had been to date. Scientific research could not be objective if women's voices and experiences were not included. Objective scientific studies could not be considered good science if they reflected a reliance on the autonomy of reason independent of our emotional and imaginative relationships to other people. Feminist empiricists seek a way to prove the authenticity of both the category "woman" and women's experiences.

Feminist empiricists argue for a notion of rationality that can be understood in terms of an attachment to others. The evidence used to support a notion of reason as embodied lies in the contextualized nature of

all inquiry. Those feminist empiricists who draw this evidence from life-cycle studies draw data from studies of women. This is in contrast to the common standard that (1) excludes a notion of reason as embodied, (2) excludes the emotional components of reason, and (3) analyzes data based almost exclusively on studies of men. In studying women, feminist empiricists ensure that the woman's voice is heard.

Carol Gilligan's work in moral theory distinguishes masculine characteristics that bias moral theory against women, especially since the measure by which data are analyzed is a male standard. She reconceptualizes the nature of an ethical dilemma when she analyzes women's experiences. What constitutes a moral dilemma changes. Gilligan identifies an alternative basis for a moral deliberation. In contrast to the prevailing analysis of moral reasoning based on objectivity, autonomy and independence from others and personal circumstances, Gilligan offers evidence of moral reasoning based on contextual circumstances, interdependence and subjectivity. She offers her study as an example of a valued alternative framework to traditional theories of moral development.

Gilligan's work challenges Lawrence Kohlberg's study that views moral differences between men and women as inherently indicative of a

mapping of superiority and dominance.[31] In essence, his studies show how and why women are less morally mature than men.

As a result of Kohlberg's work and in preparation for her own, Gilligan reviews the work of life-cycle theorists--e.g., Herbert Mead, Jean Piaget, Janet Lever, Erik Erikson, David McClelland, and Matina Horner, all of whom use a scale derived and standardized on the basis of men's observations and interpretations of research data predominantly or exclusively drawn from studies of males. Gilligan identifies the judgments about the characteristics of female behavior in (1) Piaget's and Lever's work--problems with separation, tolerance in females' attitudes toward rules, willingness to make exceptions, reconciliation with innovations, and efforts toward sustaining affective ties rather than elaborating a system of rules to solve disputes; (2) Erikson's work--slower development of a self-identity; and (3) Horner's work--anxiety about competitive achievement. In all these observations, the male behavior is regarded as the norm and female behavior as a deviation from the norm. According to Jean Piaget, the girls are of interest insofar as they are similar to boys, yet problematic and inferior (less moral and less morally mature) insofar as they do not comply with expected practices.

The prevalent view, advanced by Kohlberg, shows transitions from egocentric conceptions of the self through conceptions of self in relation to others in society to a universal ethic conceived independently of other people's expectations, desires and inclinations. Kohlberg's six-tiered scale rarely classifies women beyond the second level (stage three). Kohlberg concludes that women experience a strong interpersonal bias in moral judgment and never get to the level of conceptualizing a universal ethic independent of other people's expectations of them.

Questioning whether women view themselves in this manner, Gilligan studies the moral development of women. She claims that it is logically inconsistent for Piaget to use a sample of men and women but use the male as the standard for both male and female. Gilligan finds that for women the traditional masculine categories of moral reasoning are incomplete. She criticizes Piaget's definition of the evolution of children's consciousness when it is tied to their ability to follow rules. Piaget judges girls' use of rules rather than their understanding of the logic of rules and deems their use inadequate. Gilligan claims that the differences between boys' and girls' levels of compliance with rules are not due to girls' lack of understanding of what rules are; rather, these differences emanate from girls' desire to approach the games played and the problems which ensue

from the existence of different, or unfamiliar, rules. She states, "When one begins instead with women and derives developmental constructs from their lives, then a different conception of development emerges, the expansion and elaboration of which can also be tracked through stages that comprise a developmental sequence."[32] Gilligan maintains that her work is not intended to establish a sex-linked appraisal of moral deliberation. She claims that a different perspective in the nature and structure of moral deliberation arises throughout her samples of women. She found that individuals can define themselves in a context of human relationship rather than by their autonomy from others. When the studies reflect women's lives, autonomy from others becomes the moral dilemma.[33] She explains:

> a shift in orientation denotes a restructuring of moral perception, changing the meaning of moral language and thus the definition of moral conflict and moral action. For example, detachment is considered the hallmark of mature moral thinking within a justice model, signifying the ability to judge dispassionately, to weigh evidence in an evenhanded manner, balancing the claims of others and self. From a care perspective, detachment is the moral problem.[34]

Gilligan characterizes what she feels has been different in women's moral development. She does not claim that only women reason in this manner nor that women do not reason within the justice framework, yet the manifestation of what is unique in women's moral development has the

consequence of depicting the care perspective as a central moral concern. Women's experiences provide the substance for entirely different grounds within moral theory. The care perspective challenges the traditional division between the self and others by positing a notion of care that is not to be understood from within the traditional selfish/altruistic model. "Care" is not considered a form of mercy nor self-denial--i.e., altruism. Mercy and self-denial are expressions of caring within the justice model. Care does not "modulate the strict demands of justice by considering equity or showing forgiveness; or characterize a choice to sacrifice the claims of the self."[35] Rather, care involves a "restructuring of moral perspective," a change from the traditional notion of moral maturity as autonomous reasoning.

The epistemological concerns that adhere to the development of moral theory shift radically when what is taken as evidence of moral capacity shifts. Autonomous reason is not used as the sole criterion of judgment. Epistemological justifications become credentialed with contextual analyses and with personal insights and imagination.

In summary, Gilligan offers the care theory as a "second possible" model of moral development. She does not challenge the foundation of the justice model. She suggests that the neglect of the woman's voice in sociological and scientific research results in bad science--that is, partial

knowledge--because the researchers do not realize that they are not being fully objective when they leave the woman's voice out.[36] If they included the woman's voice, the work would be more objective. Researchers guilty of bad science--e.g., Kohlberg and Piaget--identify male as an exclusive model of human. The male is considered the true form. There is a conflation of the female into the male. Therefore, any differences between men and women are taken as evidence of female inferiority. Male difference is evidence of male superiority, and universal male dominance.[37] Gilligan identifies these assumptions as evidence of masculine bias. Alternatively, she uses her research to show that women possess as much cognitive authority as men.[38]

What makes Gilligan an empiricist is that she sees the value of using women as a standard of inquiry in order to depict an alternative to traditional masculine claims of rationality. But the way her work has been interpreted has caused other feminist empiricists to take a different track. Since her work is considered by some to only question the interpretation of male/female differences and not to question whether there is a difference in the first place, Gilligan's work has been interpreted as accepting nonfeminist interpretations of the female. She is said to represent and valorize those differences.[39]

Other feminist empiricists realize that the theory of the woman's voice can be criticized for positing a universal female identity. In order to avoid a project seeking a unified identity, Helen Longino, Nancy Tuana, and Lynn Hankinson Nelson adhere to the belief that good science begins by incorporating the experiences of women in the database but that this alone is insufficient. What they do in addition to including women in studies is to critique the deep metaphysical assumptions and normative commitments that create the bias in the original studies. As Helen Longino says, "one can't give an a priori specification of confirmation that effectively eliminates the role of value-laden assumptions . . . without eliminating auxiliary hypotheses (assumptions) altogether";[40] "constitutive values conceived as epistemological (i.e., truth seeking) are not adequate to screen out the influence of contextual values in the very structuring of scientific knowledge."[41] Longino's claim demands that feminist empiricists' work must, so to speak, reflect an analysis of the value-laden assumptions in any notion of gendered characteristics. Longino's conjecture is not that all science is value laden, but rather that not all science is value free, or better yet that it is not in the nature of science to be value free.[42] Her call is to incorporate the contextual values (personal, social and cultural) and constitutive values (internal rules that determine acceptable methodologies),

and to recognize the need for a view that establishes the interaction between sex, communities, constructed gender constraints, and science. Although, Longino's work is not in direct response to Gilligan's work, Longino's work is a response to the type of empirical claims Gilligan makes and is interpreted as representing.

Unlike the more radical shift that took place in philosophy of science in the last forty years, during which philosophers and other theorists have revised the tenets of empiricism,[43] Longino, Tuana, and Nelson claim that their work in the last ten to fifteen years adds an important dimension to already existing feminist discourses.[44] They focus not on sex-linked characteristics but on the dynamics of gender and oppression, both in theory and in methodology of research. Longino states:

> In focusing on accountability and choice, this conception of feminist science differs from those that proceed from the assumption of a congruence between certain models of natural processes and women's inherent modes of understanding. I am arguing instead for the deliberate and active choice of an interpretive model and for the legitimacy of basing that choice on political considerations. . . .[45]

Gilligan's work is attacked as not having a focus in the political implications of gender. Longino makes it clear in this quote that politics are a necessary consideration of epistemology. Longino, like Tuana and Nelson, claims that one can make value commitments and still do good science--if

gendered considerations are recognized as arising out of the deep political and social normative commitments made from being members of particular communities and they are addressed and handled as such. The goal is not to establish a more objective science by adding women's voices without also saying that gender remains a significant issue in the inquiry's methodology. Gender can be understood as epistemologically significant to the research methodology, though not decisive in all cases. So, whereas an empiricist such as Gilligan only explains the biases in terms of sex differences, empiricists like Longino, Tuana, and Nelson explain biases in terms of gendered, social and political considerations.

To these feminist empiricists, the addition of feminist experiences is the necessary, albeit insufficient, condition of greater objectivity. Nancy Tuana emphasizes the necessity of removing the boundary between science and values. By recognizing the influence that political and social commitments have on the conception of research projects, Tuana claims that (1) the objectivity of scientific methodology, though still possible, cannot be gender neutral; and (2) objectivity requires different methods of inquiry to depict this.[46] Empiricists all hold on to a notion of objectivity, but address the significance of gender in different ways. They hold to an inseparability of the subjective and objective components of knowledge.

Tuana claims that our values are inexorably enmeshed in our scientific commitments. Sex-linked differences do not address how biases enter into scientific commitments. Consequently, Tuana dismisses the connection between human nature and sex-linked characteristics and emphasizes a connection between human nature and one's environment. In so doing, Tuana socially and politically contextualizes the nature of reasoning and the relationship between oneself and others. In her article "Re-Fusing Nature/Nurture," Tuana rejects the two traditional tenets of the essentialist link between nature and genes: (1) that human nature is the result of distinct operations of genes and environment, and (2) that traits of organisms are the result of simply adding biological factors and environmental factors together in various proportions. She claims that the interaction between genes (nature) and environment (nurture) is not additive but dynamic and nonlinear.[47] Tuana states, "Contrary to previous theories genotype does not determine a set of characteristics or potentials (a human nature), but specifies patterns of reaction of a developing organism to the environment it encounters."[48] Based on the premise that genes act as potentials for expression and that genes are not maps, Tuana concludes that in large part human nature expresses itself as a response to one's

community. Tuana rejects the science/politics dichotomy and acknowledges the epistemological import of subjective components of knowledge.

In her book Who Knows: From Quine to Feminist Empiricism, Nelson expands on these issues. The first question she poses is, how can feminist empiricists claim that gender of the scientist is relevant to doing good science at the same time they claim that gender is epistemologically irrelevant? That is, how can something like Gilligan's work imply that women conducting research on women do a better job of recognizing sexist biases and at the same time imply that the gendered nature of the bias is epistemologically irrelevant? Gilligan claims that gender is significant insofar as, and because, Kohlberg left out one sex. But, when both sexes are represented in her studies, gender is no longer significant. As long as women are included, there will be no bias. Yet, to Nelson, as well as to Longino and Tuana, bias is due to factors relating in an important way directly to gender differences, not only in regards to whether the woman's voice has been left out.

As an empiricist, Nelson's resolution of this issue is to claim that gendered issues, and not necessarily the sex of the researcher, are of primary epistemological significance. In this way, it is not necessary to focus on whether the biases are sex linked. It is problematic to claim that differences

are only sex linked, because important questions remain unanswered. Nelson explains:

> Currently, it makes a difference to one's observations, appraisals of theories, and one's own theorizing, if one recognizes androcentric and sexist assumptions, categories, or questions and if one questions the inevitability of male dominance and/or the universality of hierarchical dominance relationships. In short, it makes a difference if one is working from a feminist perspective [as opposed to a working from a woman's voice]. . . .[49]

A feminist empiricist cannot simply require the inclusion of the woman's voice. She or he requires a feminist perspective that takes issue with social and political gendered appraisals, not just biological/sexual facts. Thus, one's gender is inseparable from one's research, whereas one's sex could be entirely separable in some instances. Gender is a significant factor; sex is not always a significant factor.[50] Because our experiences as men and women differ in various ways, membership in such "sub-communities" is an important epistemological variable, though not decisive.[51]

The second question Nelson asks is, "How can feminist empiricists maintain a separation of science and values at the same time they claim that objectivity is value-laden and not neutral?"[52] That is, how can Gilligan's work imply that the objectivity of the justice model is really a masculine view and then imply that research can be done in such a way as to make it

more objective by simply adding women's experiences to this model? Gilligan's conclusions could have been interpreted as indicating this position.

In summary, it is necessary to be a feminist and it is not sufficient to be a woman adding a woman's voice in order to eliminate gender bias. The field over which one theorizes is established by means of assumptions coordinated by the relationship of an individual in a particular community. This fact makes or implies substantive claims that then constrain reasoning and shape the content of inquiry. By using powerful social, political, and epistemological tools to substantiate the contextual modes of thought and emotional components of reason not otherwise considered grounds for knowledge, feminist empiricists provide a justification for women, as a community, to be agents of knowledge. Hypotheses have to be re-evaluated and revised in light of the new empirical research provided by different women's different experiences and different voices. This data can be used to substantiate that the differences between men and women are due in large part to their social and political situations.

Feminist Standpoint Theory

Feminist standpoint theorists recognize that different theories of knowledge cannot be grounded in a universal female identity, whether a woman's voice or a multiplicity of women's voices. The scientific model is too narrow. It restricts empirical evidence to an interpretation of a unified female experience, though as Judith Grant suggests, "The advantage of finding a universal female experience is that it provides some grounding for feminist critiques of 'male' ways of being and organizing the world."[53] However, this benefit does not make epistemological progress directly.

Feminist standpoint theory talks about women's experiences in historicized ways. What makes a feminist standpoint theorist a feminist standpoint theorist is the use of and reliance on a social science/historical/ scientific eclectic model, rather than a scientific model, to explain women's oppression and epistemological contributions. In linking feminism to historical materialism, feminist standpoint theorists historicize and de-essentialize the concepts of male and female while still tracking women's experiences. They can talk about women's plural experiences grounded in male domination.

An epistemologist is a feminist standpoint theorist if she or he believes that truth is linked to particular standpoints. Truth as a notion is retained by linking it to justice in a Marxian way. "The truth is that which is most clearly connected to real liberation for the most people."[54] A true theory of knowledge is implicated in a political project. The feminist standpoint emerges as an epistemological extension of a feminist perspective. A major tenet of standpoint theorists' claims is that women and other marginalized groups of people are in a better position than dominant men to recognize and analyze epistemological biases as the sources of women's oppression. This claim rests on our observation of the conditions under which women reason and the sources of epistemological oppression. Harding states,

> The starting point of feminist standpoint theory . . . is that in societies stratified by race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, or some other such politics shaping the very structure of a society, the activities of those at the top both organize and set limits on what persons who perform such activities can understand about themselves and the world around them.[55]

Since women are on the bottom of the hierarchical structure of knowledge creation, some men who are on top organize and set limits on what women can understand about themselves and the world around them. The feminist standpoint is established by a unique identity. It is an effort to avoid an

understanding of oppression and different ways of knowing based on an additive account of women's voices; the standpoint theorist does not base oppression and different ways of knowing on the sum of cumulative oppressions. Rather, the feminist standpoint's source of knowledge claims is drawn from unique identities of those both inside and outside the borders of oppressed groups. As aforementioned, this unique identity is woven together from different women's experiences. According to Sandra Harding, "It cannot be that women's experiences in themselves or the things that women say provide reliable grounds for knowledge claims."[56] Different experiences create a mosaic that can be transformed into different knowledges as truth.

Feminist standpoint theorists start with women's everyday lives and other marginalized groups. They start with a feminist standpoint of those lives. Feminist standpoint theorists regard the addition of the woman's voice to scientific research and methodology as an insufficient condition to eliminate biases against women in particular. However, standpoint theorists' elimination of bias is not accomplished by strictly adhering to conventional norms of inquiry. Conventional norms of inquiry only require that the database be representative of the population over which the consequences are prescribed. Broadening the database to include those that have been left

out--i.e., women--is not enough. Given the nature and source of the value-laden aspects of traditional scientific methodology, empiricists' stricter adherence to conventional norms of objectivity only addresses the symptoms of the bias and not the causes.[57]

Consequently, none of the feminist standpoint theorists believe that simply advancing women as researchers, or placing them in positions of authority, and beginning longitudinal research studies on women[58] will eliminate bias. In publicly addressing issues of women's health, child-care, incest, and sexual harassment, and in taking a stand against the exclusion and marginalization of women in public, political, educational and business relations, we must also address the immoral, exploitive, oppressive, hostile and discriminatory aspects of gender bias.

Issues of women's health, comparable worth, affirmative action, sexual abuse, sexual harassment, and the feminization of poverty are not solved simply by putting women in positions of authority, thereby providing a woman's voice. Adding the woman's voice does not guarantee change in the masculinistic standards--i.e., science as usual. Science as usual presents us with masculine beliefs, ideals and facts based on male studies and judgments reached in relation to male concerns in regards to women's bodies. For example, consequences of doing science as usual include (1) a

lack of longitudinal studies on women and heart disease; (2) a paucity of AIDS research on women and children; and (3) stagnation of advancements in breast cancer diagnosis and treatment, which are essentially the same as they were ten years ago. The gendered assumptions, respectively, that have precluded research in these areas are as follows: (1) the cause and course of heart disease is the same for women as it is for men, (2) AIDS is a gay and male disease, and (3) early detection of breast cancer does not change the mortality rate of its victims. These gendered assumptions all fail to legitimize the historical components and value interests that are shared in our scientific community--for example, (1) women's hormones affect the course and pattern of heart disease, (2) women and children are contracting AIDS at an increasingly alarming rate and are more susceptible to the disease than men, and (3) not knowing that one has breast or cervical cancer is worse than knowing. The consequences of not recognizing these sexist assumptions lead to the following limited scientific questions: (1) For what group of people is it easiest to set up control groups in order to study the long-term effects of heart disease?, (2) What is the course of the AIDS epidemic in terms of male sexuality?, and (3) Are total mastectomies (like total hysterectomies) easier and more profitable to perform than research for

earlier detection and prevention of breast and cervical cancer? Each of these questions reveals the narrow boundaries of sexist scientific research projects.

Sandra Harding requires the use of criteria in addition to the woman's voice. Due to more research for and on women, the problems, language, theory, concepts, and methods of research shift to reflect questions feminists, not just women, ask in regards to breast cancer, AIDS, and heart disease. These questions may include: (1) What is the cause and course of heart disease after menopause and over age 75, when the majority of the population is female?; (2) What technologies can be developed to detect sexually transmitted diseases in women?; and (3) Why is the variety of diagnostic procedures for breast cancer so limited, but a new test for prostate cancer is now available?

In highlighting these issues as problematic, feminist standpoint theorists claim that these issues are less distorted when analyzed from a feminist standpoint than when they are analyzed from a nonfeminist standpoint or individual women's voices.

For example, Sandra Harding may ask, why is philosophical inquiry typically a nonfemale activity? The association of men with philosophy represents an identity of men, not women, with reason. Asking this question addresses the unspoken assumption that men reason and women do

other things. Strategically, these feminist standpoint questions conceive a form of resistance to the unexamined assumptions and pose different criteria for analysis. By focusing on what is not asked, we begin to identify different problems. Feminist standpoint theorists can transform a patriarchal conception of reason and theory formation by focusing on what has not been asked.

Harding claims that the feminist standpoint enables different questions to be asked, ones that can be answered not by looking at individual women's lives but at a kind of objective reality of women's lives. The questions that are asked arise out of feminist standpoint theorists' challenge to the fundamental and patriarchal conception of reason and theory formation. The traditional philosophical categories that have practical social and political consequences in everyday life--e.g., theory/practice, reason/emotion, universal/particular, mind/body, abstract/concrete, public/private, objective/subjective, and mind/body are analyzed in regards to the gendered components associated with each of these dualities.[59] That is, practice, emotion, particular, concrete, private, subjective, and body are female identified. Theory, reason, universal, mind, abstract, public, objective and the mind are male identified. The underlying epistemological assumptions of the dominance of the male attributes and the subordination

of the female attributes are constantly linked to gender.[60] How we should question these linkages and what our alternatives are is dealt with directly in Chapters III and IV. I want to return to the significance of the different intellectual model from which feminist standpoint theory derives.

Feminist standpoint theorists maintain that negative epistemological associations made regarding women are determined by the economic conditions of women's subordination.[61] Feminist standpoint theory emphasizes contextual thinking.[62] But in spite of the fact that the contexts in which women are oppressed differ, they are oppressed in almost every culture in the world. This forms the basis of standpoint theory. Standpoint theorists maintain that gender analyses may reflect a specifically feminist way of conceptualizing very abstract interactive relationships in biology, anthropology, and psychology that do not make the same kind of distinctions between objectivity and subjectivity that some feminist empiricists make.[63]

The self-reflective social science model calls for more adequate, self-reflective epistemological questions that not only take the social and political construction of gender into account, but specifically take into account the social and political construction of women's subjugated

experiences. This call is grounded in the belief that women's experiences systematically differ from men's.

Feminist standpoint theory arises out of a social science model based on a version of Marxist political economy, a dialectical historical materialism--a paradigm taken as a feminist reappropriation of Lukacs' Marxism.[64] The Marxist epistemology of class struggle is a view that can politically engage theory and research from the perspective of the social experience of the subjugated sex/gender. Feminists guided by Marxist theory, Nancy Hartsock claims, can explain themselves through their experiences as the potentially superior agents of knowledge. That is, feminist scholars argue that, by analogy, women take on the role of the slave in the Hegelian master/slave dialectic; therefore, women have a better perspective of both their lives and the lives of men just as the slave has a better perspective of both her life and the life of her master. The slave, as a matter of survival, must reproduce and satisfy all the master's needs and in so doing preserves her own life. Slaves, as the class of producers, produce the material-life conditions for the master and reproduce their own subordination by satisfying the needs of the master.

Hartsock claims that the legitimate grounds for knowledge are thus socially and politically situated from the perspective of the marginalized,

oppressed and subordinate.[65] Given their subordination (women are expected to satisfy the needs of men), women may be superior knowers since their perspective couples their survival with the satisfaction of men's survival, and is thus a more accurate, authentic and ultimately truer picture of social relations with men. Women's experiences, being marginalized, provide the justification for the status of ideal knower. Men's views, when used to define relations among themselves, others, and nature, are like the Marxist bourgeois, who hide from the politically imposed nature of social relations. They see these relations as natural and not socially constructed. By analogy, the inference is that as a result of the political, social and economic adaptations that enslave them, women provide better grounds for knowledge than men do.[66]

This is not to say that all standpoint theory is explicitly or implicitly Marxist. What is Marxist about standpoint theory is its efforts to de-essentialize "woman" by showing that women change in relation to a material process and its effort to re-create the category "woman" into a socio-material category. Not all standpoint theorists are Marxist in the sense that women as a class are socially created vis-à-vis their positions in the (re)production process. The analogy does not work completely. Not all women (re)produce, women's class interests don't represent universal

interests, and a female perspective of truth is no more authentic than anyone else's. However, standpoint theory at the very least shares its methodology with Marxism: both historicize the subject, thereby demonstrating that truth is partial.

I have indicated that the unique characteristic of feminist standpoint theory as a feminist epistemology is its intellectual model. The implications of the shift from a scientific model to a political/economic/historical eclectic model are to allow an accounting of a feminist experience or feminist experiences without suffering from the subjectivist criticisms that can be aimed at some elements of empiricism for relying on experience alone to ground epistemological claims. An epistemologist is a feminist standpoint theorist if he or she maintains a notion of truth linked to justice, where a true theory of knowledge is implicated in a political project. I turn now to Sandra Harding's work as representative of this effort. Her effort to hold on to individual women's lives and an objective feminist standpoint while espousing a new feminist science project is intriguing.

Sandra Harding's work uses this social science model to formulate the beginnings of a new model for feminist science. It is one in which women have a hand in coordinating the socially legitimate knowledge and political power associated with it.[67] Harding begins to formulate how the scientific

problematic, the scientific language, the scientific concepts, the scientific theories, and the scientific methods are gender laden.[68]

She begins by rejecting all static notions of an objective method that frame the scientific problematic, scientific language, scientific concepts, scientific theory, and the scientific method as value neutral. In this respect, Harding's views parallel those of Longino, Tuana, and Nelson. Along with these philosophers, Harding claims that objectivity in the physical sciences has been operationalized to "identify and eliminate only those social values and interests that differ among the researchers and critics who are regarded by the scientific community as competent to make such judgments."[69]

Harding maintains that the traditional notion of the neutrality of the physical sciences (and therefore their appeal to true knowledge)--a notion that partially, or completely, isolates the physical sciences from the input of psychology, morality and politics--is misleading and should be avoided. Rather, since the physical sciences are ineluctably related to psychology, morality and politics (and therefore not neutral--but, paradoxically, not entirely nonobjective, in Harding's view), she proposes a "process" interpretation of science.[70] The process interpretation allows for plural possibilities of theory formation in which the gender bias in scientific research becomes more obvious when, as a part of practicing science, there

is a critical examination of historical values and interests that have camouflaged cultural bias. The traditional scientific notion, Harding claims,

> Is advanced by the conventional belief that the truly scientific part of knowledge-seeking--the part controlled by methods of research--is only in the context of justification. The context of discovery, where problems are identified as appropriate for scientific investigation, hypotheses are formulated, key concepts are defined--this part of the scientific process is thought to be unexaminable within science by rational methods. . . . Untouched by these careful methods are those values and interests entrenched in the very statement of what problem is to be researched and in the concepts favored in the hypotheses that are to be tested.[71]

Her implicit rejection of the traditional notion makes room for an alternative that examines the context of discovery. She argues against relying on the assumption that a coherent theory is a desirable end. Rather, we should take as the standard of fidelity the parameters of dissonance.[72] We should examine what is not typically examined and evaluate how these exclusions shape and form what is examined in each other's theories. This claim, one that comes from Harding's earlier work, frames the basis of her argument against foundationalism and a correspondence notion of truth that occur in nonfeminist science and some elements of feminist empiricism. Harding extends feminist concerns beyond an empiricist model because she believes she can incorporate a more adequate notion of truth and objectivity.

Harding makes it difficult to be a feminist and an empiricist, because she challenges the very context in which empiricist data is collected. Harding's intention in establishing a successor science project is to develop an alternative scientific framework that does not patch together pieces of other androcentric discourses such as feminist empiricism and traditional scientific methodologies. Although these frameworks make the woman's voice audible, they fail to engage further problematic issues in gender relations. Harding challenges herself and other feminist standpoint theorists to accomplish the formation of a feminist successor science project without relying on any one construction of the female experience. Harding does not want to focus on what is epistemologically similar and different about women's oppressions. She wants to focus on the different manners in which women are and can be liberated.

Having attempted to clarify the value and advantages of feminist or plural feminist standpoints, I want to suggest at this point--and will go on to prove in Chapter III--that the formulation of a plural feminist standpoint does not avoid certain implications that are not unique to traditional epistemology or feminist empiricism. One issue raised by the implications and use of feminist standpoint theory revolves around the nature of woman as a category that constitutes what is feminist about a feminist standpoint.

Harding raises this issue when she wonders if standpoint theory assumes a female universality when it identifies itself as "feminist."[73] The other issue that emerges when one looks towards using feminist standpoint theory in practice is, how does a pluralist nature of feminist standpoints relate to issues of knowledge when those plural standpoints work as the ground for "feminist" ways of knowing but are all different? How do we maneuver among different knowledge claims?

The implications of these issues are problematic for feminist standpoint theory as an epistemology. One implication is that feminist standpoint theory offers a universal product of what feminist knowledge eventually entails, and that harkens back to problems of objectivity. The other implication is that feminist standpoint theory offers us a plurality of feminist standpoints that can be used in the formulation of plural feminist knowledges, and that harkens back to problems of relativism.

Feminists in addition to Sandra Harding raise these issues. The claim of epistemic authority of a feminist standpoint causes concerns to Mary Hawkesworth. Hawkesworth claims that positing a particular community as constituting a superior standpoint undermines the claim that feminist epistemology champions a plurality of truths.[74] Hawkesworth claims that positing a homogeneous experience or a system of oppression that is

common to all women, as a community, that is considered privileged based on their heightened insights into the nature of reality and a superior access to truth, denies the diversity of oppressive experiences individual women relate.[75] She emphasizes the internal inconsistency in the following statement:

> In the absence of such a homogeneous women's experience, standpoint epistemologies must either develop complicated explanations of why some women see the truth while others do not, a strategy that threatens to undermine the very notion of a "women's standpoint," or collapse into a trivial and potentially contradictory pluralism that conceives of truth as simply the sum of all women's partial and incompatible views.[76]

In suggesting that feminist standpoint theory needs to be "sufficiently sophisticated to account for the complexity and for the political dimensions of diverse cognitive practices,"[77] Hawkesworth suggests that cognitive authority stems not from privilege but from the ability to demonstrate the deficiencies of alternative explanations.[78]

Susan Heckman is concerned as well. She asserts that in universalizing a feminist standpoint, standpoint theorists ignore the diversity of women's standpoints by race and class. She states,

> in attempting to present the women's perspective, these theorists perpetuate the monolithic universalizing tendencies of the Enlightenment thought. To argue for a single, unitary woman's perspective is to forget that women, like men, are

> always found in particular situations with varying social and historical contexts.[79]

Heckman suggests that the benefit of advocating for a feminist standpoint analysis of gender in research lies not in assigning gender to standpoints, but in fostering the study of the effects of assuming gendered assignments. That is, instead of saying, "This is a feminist standpoint," standpoint theorists should ask, "What about this standpoint is comprised of gendered considerations?" Heckman calls for the feminist standpoint theorist to contextualize her own claims and look at the effects of assuming gendered assignments.

Lastly, Judith Grant objects to the feminist standpoint theorist who uses "experience" generally as the basis of a feminist epistemology. Grant's claim is that it is too difficult to operationalize the idea of women's experience: "experiential epistemology rests upon a category--Woman--whose attributes and experiences in terms of theory must be imputed to her, and are not self-evident."[80]

> If experience is to be used as the basis for feminist epistemology it must be refined. To speak of unmediated experience as the basis for theory is nearly a contradiction in terms. Theories are based on reflection. Experience simply exists. It is therefore important to point out that feminist theory is missing a crucial step--an evaluation of the interpretation of experience.[81]

Grant suggests that the feminist standpoint theorist should re-evaluate what she means by "experience." Whether feminist standpoint theorists succeed at doing so is unclear.

In regards to the implication of relativism, Donna Haraway explains that the relativity problem and the universalization problem relate:

> Relativism is the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of objectivity; both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and partial perspective; both make it impossible to see well. Relativism and totalization are both "god tricks" promising vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully, common myths in rhetoric surrounding Science. But it is precisely in the politics and epistemology of partial perspectives that the possibility of sustained, rational, objective inquiry rests.[82]

The relativity problem Harding, for example, grapples with in feminist standpoint theory is not a direct result of the theory's ties to Marx and Hegel. In the model of dialectic explained earlier, the subjugated standpoint of the proletariat and the slave is a universal standpoint; it is a prototype standpoint based theoretically on the typical experience of the slave and the proletariat as a class of individuals, in general. This model suffers from the problem of universalization if it suffers from either of the two problems. When feminist standpoint theory appropriates the model of dialectic and applies it to women's individual experiences, the multiple and disguised dimension of the class of slave/proletariat is disclosed and the

plurality of different women's experience as subjugated standpoints comes into focus. The relativity problem is a result of the appropriation of the dialectical model when it is applied to the plurality of woman's experiences. It is by granting epistemic superiority to each feminist standpoint that the danger of relativized truths becomes evident. Thus, standpoint theorists have the problem of competing truths that is not present in the universal Marxist model.

The implied problems of universalization and relativity remain as issues within standpoint theory. My suggestion to mitigate these problems is not to try to solve them, but rather to undermine the dichotomy. As a human construct, one that is mistakenly and habitually relied on as a historical conceptual mechanism, the universal/relativity dichotomy has outlived its usefulness. In other words, the universal/relativity dichotomy is not a metaphysical or an epistemological problem in the traditional sense of the words. The problem of truth that I identify in standpoint theory needs to be addressed differently. The value of women's standpoints is to be evaluated not in terms of their truth, but in terms of their warrantability.

Chapter II provides an epistemological account of experience depicted within the American pragmatist tradition of John Dewey. Dewey's theory of experience speaks to the need for a feminist notion of experience based

not on truth but on warrantability. The pragmatic notion (of experience) is one which, as John Smith says, "understands experience not only as material for knowledge but as the medium through which the individual person lives and develops."[83] In accommodating a notion of personal experience, Dewey's pragmatic account can accommodate a gendered analysis of experience as well. By examining Dewey's logic as a theory of inquiry, we begin to understand how feminist pragmatists can reconstruct knowledge and avoid both universalizing and relativizing tendencies.

Notes

[1]She says,

> the failure of a woman to fit existing models of human growth may point to a problem in the representation, a limitation in the conception of the human condition, an omission of certain truths about life. The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but theme. Its association with women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily through women's voices that I trace its development. But the association is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and female voices are presented here to highlight a distinction between two modes of thought and to focus a problem of interpretation rather than to present a generalization about either sex. (italics mine)

Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 2. Membership in any category is likely to be controversial since there may be no one characteristic that all members share. In light of this fact and in light of the fact that the estimate of Gilligan's work has changed radically over the last ten years, she could be labeled something else. However, I label her as a feminist empiricist because (1) she draws on the personal testimony of the everyday lives of individual women, (2) she adheres to a scientific model of inquiry that relies on a notion of truth as knowledge (see my emphasis in above quote), and (3) she uses her interviews to test the validity of existing theory.

[2]See Judy Auerbach et al., "Commentary on Gilligan's In a Different Voice," Feminist Studies 11, no. 1, (1985): 155.

[3]See Virginia Held, "Feminism and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 111-28; and Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 154-77.

[4]See Helen Longino, "Can There Be a Feminist Science?," Hypatia 2, no. 3 (1987): 56.

[5]See Ruth Bleier, Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology and Its Theories on Women (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1984); and Ruth Hubbard, M. S. Henifin, and B. Fried, Biological Women--The Convenient Myth (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1982).

[6]Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledge: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 575-99.

[7]Lynn Hankinson Nelson, "Epistemological Communities," in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. Linda Alcott and Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge, 1993), 121-60.

[8]Hilary Rose, "Hand, Brain and Heart: A Feminist Epistemology for the Natural Sciences," Signs 9, no. 11 (1983): 72-90.

[9]Dorothy Smith, The Everyday World As Problematic (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987); Lorraine Code, What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1991).

[10]Ruth Hubbard, "Science Facts and Feminism," Hypatia 3, no. 1 (1988): 5-17; Maria Lugones, "Have I Got a Theory for You! Feminist Imperialism, and the Demand for the Woman's Voice," Women's Studies International Forum 6 (1983): 573-81; Lorraine Code, "Is the Sex of the Knower Epistemologically Significant?," Metaphilosophy 12 (1981): 267-76; Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Kantor, Another Voice (New York: Doubleday, 1975); Janet Radcliffe Richards, The Skeptical Feminist (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).

[11]See Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: Male and Female in Western Philosophy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

[12]See Kathryn Pine Addelson, "The Man of Professional Wisdom," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics,

Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Reidel, 1983), 165-86.

[13]Irene Diamond, Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988).

[14]Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).

[15]Alison Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983).

[16]Josephine Donovan, Feminist Theory (New York: Unger, 1985).

[17]Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

[18]Gilligan, In a Different Voice.

[19]Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 3, 7.

[20]Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur (New York: Harper & Row, 1983).

[21]Adrienne Rich, Of Women Born: Motherhood As Experience and Institution (New York: Norton, 1976).

[22]Alice Walker, In Search of Our Mothers' Gardens (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1983).

[23]Helen Longino, "Can There Be a Feminist Science?"; Nancy Tuana, "The Radical Future of Feminist Empiricism," Hypatia 7, no. 1 (1992): 100-114; Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).

[24]Nancy Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power (Boston: Longman, 1983), 232.

[25]Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 83, quoted in Judith Grant, Fundamental Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1973), 101.

[26]See Zellah Eisenstein, Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979).

[27]Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[28]Dorothy Smith, "A Sociology for Women," in The Prism of Sex: Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Julie A. Sherman and Evelyn Torton Beck (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979).

[29]Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment (Cambridge, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

[30]Grant, Fundamental Feminism.

[31]Lawrence Kohlberg, Collected Papers on Moral Development and Moral Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Education Research Foundation, 1971).

[32]Carol Gilligan, "Women's Place in Men's Life Cycles," in Feminism and Methodology, ed. Sandra Harding (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 68.

[33]Lawrence Kohlberg responds to Gilligan in "Synopses and Detailed Replies to Critics," chap. in The Psychology of Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984).

Some people disagree with Gilligan's challenge of autonomy. See Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "The Importance of Autonomy," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 129-38; Diana T. Meyers, "The Socialized Individual and Individual Autonomy: An Intersection Between Philosophy and

Psychology," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 139-53; and Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 154-77.

Others disagree with her findings of gender differences. See George Sher, "Other Voices, Other Rooms? Women's Psychology and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 178-89; Marilyn Friedman, "Care and Context in Moral Reasoning," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 190-204; and Jonathan E. Adler, "Moral Development and the Personal Point of View," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 205-34.

In addition to the above mentioned specific responses, an entire journal volume is specially devoted to a critique of Gilligan's work. See Genevieve Lloyd et al., Special Issue, Social Research 50, no. 3 (1983): 487-695.

[34]Carol Gilligan, "Moral Orientation and Moral Development," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 31.

[35]Ibid., 24.

[36]Also, see Millman and Kantor; and Richards.

[37]For a discussion of a linguistic analysis of this assumption, see Janice Moulton, "The Myth of the Neutral Man," in Feminism and Philosophy, ed. Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston, and Jane English (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977), 124-37.

For a philosophical and psychological analysis of the superiority of the masculine, see Susan Bordo, "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought," in Sex and Scientific Inquiry, ed. Sandra Harding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 247-64.

For a sociological study of this issue, see Barbara Erhenreich and Deirdre English, For Her Own Good (New York: Anchor Press, 1978).

For an analysis of male difference as evidence of male superiority in

regards to race issues, see Angela Davis, "Sick and Tired of Being Sick and Tired: The Politics of Black Women's Health," chap. in Women, Culture and Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1990).

For a practical example of why this issue needs recognition, see Ronnie Ross, "Women and Coronary Disease: A Matter of Heart," Oregonian, 9 August 1993, 1(D).

[38]Gilligan's kind of analysis is static. That is, the woman's voice is not dependent upon nor is seen as a response to the justice model. Rather, the woman's voice develops independently of the justice model. An analysis that I would consider nonstatic--or, rather, dynamic--is one that emphasizes a complex interdependence. If Gilligan's analyses were conducted within this mode, her claims would reflect an understanding that the care perspective arises because of a complex interdependency with the justice model. See Evelyn Fox Keller on "static" and "dynamic" systems of analysis in Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 129-38.

[39]For an overview of how empiricist work has evolved from the "woman's voice" to the "feminist voice," in anthropological research, see Louise Lampere, "The Struggle to Reshape Our Thinking About Gender," in The Impact of Feminist Research in the Academy, ed. Christie Farnham (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 11-33. In summary, Sherry Ortner's work describes three waves of anthropological research, with each wave depicting the role of women differently. The first wave of anthropological research depicts only the role of women cross-culturally without analysis. The second wave, found in Karen Sacks', Michelle Rosaldo's and Jane Collier's work, emphasizes not just the role of women but the variation of roles in relation to men. The third wave, found in Jane Collier's and Sylvia Yanagisako's work, presents a postmodern critique of anthropological theory. I would call Gilligan's work the "first wave" of feminist psychology since she introduces us to the necessity of the woman's voice in research.

Supplemental reading in the evolutionary progression in this field (that is beginning to emerge in philosophy and philosophy of science) can be found in Frances E. Mascia-Lees, Patricia Sharpe, and Colleen Ballerino Cohen, eds., "The Postmodernist Turn in Anthropology: Cautions from a Feminist Perspective," Signs 15, no. 1 (1989): 7-33; Judith Stacey, "Can There Be a Feminist Ethnography?," Women's Studies International Forum

11, no. 1 (1988): 21-27; and M. Z. Rosaldo, "The Use and Abuse of Anthropology: Reflections of Feminism and Cross-Cultural Understanding," Signs 5, no. 3 (1980): 389-417.

[40]Longino, "Can There Be a Feminist Science?," 55, 60.

[41]Ibid., 56.

[42]Ibid.

[43]For example, Tuana suggests:

> there has been a shift from sense datum statements to statements about physical objects; there has been an acceptance of the value-ladenness of facts thereby denying or at least problematizing the observational/theoretical distinction; there has been a rejection of the foundationalism of traditional empiricism; there is a problematizing of meaning by abandoning the analytic/synthetic distinction; there have been arguments against any sharp distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. There has been an acknowledgement of the interconnections of beliefs leading to a theory of holism as well as the problematizing of the nature of scientific objectivity.

See Nancy Tuana, "The Values of Science: Empiricism from a Feminist Perspective," Synthese (forthcoming).

[44]"Like Kuhn and Lakatos," Tuana explains,

> feminist theorists are investigating the complexity of the relationships between scientists' background assumptions and their practice of science. Like Feyerabend and Hansen, we are questioning a sharp division between objectivity and subjectivity as we begin to understand the importance of the subjective components of knowing. And like Dewey, we have begun to question the view of the individual as the agent of knowledge.

Ibid.

[45]Longino, "Can There Be a Feminist Science?," 61.

[46]Nancy Tuana, "Feminist Empiricism," 108.

[47]To Gilligan, the relationship between genes and the environment is additive--that is, when women are added the relationship is complete, fixed. To Tuana, the relationship does not stop there.

[48]Nancy Tuana, "Re-Fusing Nature/Nurture," in Hypatia Reborn: Essays in Feminist Philosophy, ed. Azizah Y. Al-Hibri and Margaret A. Simons (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), 82.

[49]Nelson, Who Knows, 224.

[50]It is difficult to see that women have been oppressed, exploited and dominated from a sexist perspective. Feminists (both men and women) are more likely than sexist men and women to raise questions about whether the research methodology and findings that incorporate the cognitive authority of objectivity as detachment are sexist. For a further discussion, see Code, "Sex of the Knower."

[51]However, it is interesting that there seems to be a connection to being a woman--i.e., it may be no coincidence that far more feminists are female than male. See Tuana, "Feminist Empiricism," 108.

[52]Nelson, Who Knows, 29-37. Alan Soble also addresses this question in "Feminist Epistemology and Women Scientists," Metaphilosophy 13, nos. 3 and 4 (1983): 291-307.

[53]Grant, Fundamental Feminism, 91.

[54]Ibid., 111.

[55]Sandra Harding, "Rethinking Feminist Epistemology: What Is Strong Objectivity?," in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. Linda Alcott and Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge, 1993), 54.

[56]Harding, Whose Science?, 123.

[57]For example, some feminist empiricists also claim that in studies of intimacy patterns between parents and children, the male voice has been excluded. This only shows a shift in bias, not an elimination of bias.

[58]Up until now, male-only longitudinal studies have been done, and the results have been interpolated as applicable to women. The claim is that it is too difficult to do studies on women and control the complexity of female hormonal systems, yet in the face of an explicit identification of difference between sexes, researchers find it acceptable to interpolate that what is particular to males is plausible for females.

[59]My thanks to Nancy Tuana for pointing out that Evelyn Fox Keller, a feminist empiricist, makes these distinctions prior to Harding's work.

[60]Expectations are constantly linked to women's perceived sense of inferiority. For example, Linda Alcoff highlights three human traits most often attributed to women: passivity, sentimentality and subjectiveness. Alcoff identifies what these attributions have come to mean. Women's passivity is taken to refer to their peacefulness, women's sentimentality is taken to refer to their proclivity to nurture, and women's subjectiveness is taken to refer to their advanced self-awareness. These sexist political and social categorizations serve only to reinforce the domination of men over women. See Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, "Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory," Signs 13, no. 3 (1988): 407.

[61]See Harding, Whose Science?

[62]Other nonfeminists--e.g., Dewey--emphasize contextual thinking as well, although Dewey does not use it to emancipate subjugated knowledges.

[63]Harding is referring to "spontaneous feminist empiricists" with this comment and may not be referring to the work of Longino, Tuana and Nelson. See Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 32.

[64]See Frederic Jameson, "History and Class Consciousness As an Unfinished Project," Rethinking Marxism 1, no. 1 (1988): 49-72; and Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone

(Boston: MIT Press, 1968).

[65]See Nancy Hartsock, "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism," in Feminism and Methodology, ed. Sandra Harding (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 157-80.

[66]Also, see works of contemporary Marxist feminists Margaret Benston, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation," Monthly Review 21, no. 4 (1969): 13-27; Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, "Women and the Subversion of Community," chap. in The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community (Bristol, England: Falling Wall Press, 1972); Nancy Holmstrom, "A Marxist Theory of Women's Nature," Ethics 94, no. 3 (1984): 456-73; Ann Foreman, Femininity As Alienation: Women and the Family in Marxism and Psychoanalysis (London: Pluto Press, 1977); Eli Zaretsky, "Socialism and Feminism, Part I: Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life," Socialist Revolution 3, nos. 1 and 2 (1973): 69-125; Eli Zaretsky, "Socialism and Feminism, Part III: Socialist Politics and the Family," Socialist Revolution 4, no. 1 (1974): 83-98; and Jane Flax, "Do Feminists Need Marxism?," in Building Feminist Theory: Essays from "Quest," a Feminist Quarterly, ed. Charlotte Bunch et al. (New York: Longman, 1981), 174-85.

[67]Sandra Harding, "The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory," in Sex and Scientific Inquiry, ed. Sandra Harding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 295.

[68]She relies on the pragmatism of W. V. O. Quine, who prompts the view that facts cannot be separated from their meanings. She also relies on Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, vol. 2, no. 2, of International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 52, a work positing that paradigmatic theories in particular areas of inquiry eventually wear out as fruitful guides to research. Harding also relies on Merrill Hintikka and Jaako Hintikka's argument that the metaphysical units of a branch of logic called "formal semantics" correspond to masculine but not feminine ways of individuating objects. Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Reidel, 1983), xiv.

[69]Harding, Whose Science?, 143.

[70]The extent to which Tuana, Nelson and Longino avoid the nature/ nurture dichotomy and emphasize the social and political components of our scientific commitments is the extent to which these empiricists stand on common ground with the standpoint theorists.

[71]Harding, Whose Science?, 143-44.

[72]Harding, "Analytical Categories," 288.

[73]Harding, Whose Science?, 175.

[74]Mary E. Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth," Signs 14, no. 3 (1989): 545.

[75]The universality of the standpoint claim and the ensuant internal contradictions have alienated some women entirely from the feminist movement. Women such as Portland, Oregon, free-lance journalist and amateur boxer Rene Denfeld suggest that this line of thinking leads to the belief that women are and always will be helpless victims of men. Rene Denfeld, The New Victorians: A Young Woman's Challenge to the Old Feminist Order (New York: Warner Books: 1995).

[76]Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known", 546. Also, see John Chandler, "Feminism and Epistemology," Metaphilosophy 21, no. 4 (1990): 367-81.

[77]Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known," 553.

[78]Ibid., 557.

[79]Susan Heckman, Gender and Knowledge Elements of a Postmodern Feminism (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), 128.

[80]Judith Grant, "I Feel Therefore I am: A Critique of Female Experience As the Basis for a Feminist Epistemology," Women and Politics 7, no. 3 (1987): 112.

[81]Ibid., 113.

[82]Haraway, "Situated Knowledge," 584.

[83]John E. Smith, "The Reconception of Experience in Peirce, James and Dewey," The Monist 68 (October 1985): 554. Also, see Marjorie Miller, "Feminism and Pragmatism: On the Arrival of a Ministry of Disturbance, a Regulated Source of Annoyance; a Destroyer of Routine; An Underminer of Complacency," The Monist 75, no. 4 (1992): 445-57.

CHAPTER II

PRAGMATIC EPISTEMOLOGY

Feminist philosophers are not the first to articulate a thoroughgoing critique of classical epistemology. Pragmatists critique some of the same issues--i.e., the search for certainty, absolute truth, and objective knowledge as well as the methods used to further these inquiries. However, in rejecting these projects, pragmatists retain classical philosophical vocabulary as long as words such as "truth," "objectivity," "knowledge" and "belief" are given pragmatic meanings. The linguistic changes that the pragmatists make reflect an effort to reconstruct classical concerns and engage in different projects.

The pragmatist's critiques involve asking different questions in order to avoid the classic dilemmas. Their concern is not with acquiring knowledge and not with investigating the objects of knowledge, but with the nature of inquiry and the instability of knowledge. They do not concern themselves with questions regarding the content of knowledge--e.g., "How do we gain knowledge?" They do ask questions such as, "How does

intelligent inquiry engage us as active agents that leads to greater understanding?" They engage different issues--i.e., those that relate to the nature of truth, the relation between common sense and science, the nature of logical inquiry, and the relation between experience and knowledge--in order to avoid misguided classic inquiries.

The difference in emphasis between the pragmatist epistemologists and classical philosophers reflects a different underlying metaphysical perspective. The metaphysical differences form not only the basis for a critique of the methods of classical empiricism and rationalism, but also, in response, form the basis for an alternative epistemology. Thus, pragmatism can first be understood as what it is not and, then, what it is.

Metaphysically, Locke and Berkeley--classical British and Scottish empiricists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively--posit an unchanging, detached, universal state of existence. The emphasis is on teleological explanations, explanations that discuss first causes or antecedent conditions that determine outcomes. Because the pragmatists are critical of a metaphysics that looks at first principles independently of lived experience, pragmatists generally claim existence as a unity of different and related parts rather than an evaluation of those parts separately collected. Objective truths emerge during a process of inquiry rather than being

discovered through reflection. What we experience in everyday life is an irreducible pluralism, not identities and similarities of objects. Pragmatic metaphysics presents a dynamic conception of the nature of existence.

Based on this different metaphysical foundation, pragmatic epistemology secures knowledge and understanding as a cognitive (mental) function and as a pragmatic function that are both biologically and psychologically based. Inquiry is understood in relation to adaptive behavior. Pragmatists assert that a close coordination between reflection and everyday lived experience and knowledge is a matter of engaging in some kind of conduct, not of accumulating antecedently given sense data. Pragmatists focus on the individual's everyday experience by attributing to the individual mind a pragmatic dimension, not only an epistemological side. There is an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose. Philosophy, for the pragmatists, is an analysis of purpose rather than an analysis of thinking.

What the pragmatists require is that universal considerations about life in general need to be tied back to particular lives. Philosophical abstractions that have been removed from concrete existence have to be provided with meaning. They must relate to experience by way of an experiential epistemology. Knowledge is a functional state tied to desires and interests.

Objective states of knowledge stand in relation to our experiences, not independent of the interests of a subject.

Pragmatists discuss theory in terms of its purpose and function rather than in terms of its validity. Reality is understood in connection with the consequences of holding certain beliefs and with the differences holding those beliefs make in our lives in the future. Meaning is determined in the process of learning how various conditions function in relation to each other. Thought is necessarily tied to human conduct and the fulfillment of certain aims.

Two of the leading pragmatists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Charles S. Peirce and William James, critique classical methodology with these concerns in mind. John Dewey presents a similar analysis, yet in his 1925 work Experience and Nature, he describes pragmatism as "empiricism pushed to its legitimate conclusions,"[1] and in so doing, leaves the goals of classical empiricism completely behind. He introduces epistemology as a form of "instrumentalism" rather than "empiricism." And Richard Rorty, in his 1979 work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, also claims to leave the "epistemology industry" behind him.[2] All of these pragmatists, in their own ways, reject old methods for new projects and processes.

This chapter is not a summary of all pragmatism, nor even a summary of all of Dewey's works, but rather an effort to highlight only certain aspects of Dewey's pragmatic epistemology that (1) show the differences between Dewey and the tradition and (2) provide a useful basis for an exchange and mutual enrichment of pragmatism and feminist standpoint theory.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is an exposition of three aspects of Charles S. Peirce's pragmatic epistemology, since it forms the basis of American pragmatism. It acts as a response to and an adaptation of the classical epistemological theories--the representational theory of knowledge and the spectator theory of mind. Three issues will be discussed briefly: experimental fallibilism, the clarity of ideas and its relation to meaning and inference; and the way we come to fix belief.

The second section of this chapter is an exposition of William James' epistemology as it concerns two issues in response to Peirce's work. James takes Peirce's pragmatic principles and applies them to concrete cases within philosophy. He uses Peirce's theory of meaning, in terms of the relationship between inference and action, and develops a pragmatic theory of truth.

James turns "knowing" from a unique cognitive faculty into one of many things that humans do.

The third section of this chapter involves a more extensive development of Dewey's pragmatism. Dewey's pragmatism differs from traditional epistemology because its focus is on the following four issues:

1. It is an epistemology that is antifoundational and critical of any quest for certainty.

2. It formulates a "logic of inquiry" that is an adaptation of Peirce's pragmatic theory of meaning.

3. It substitutes warrantability for truth as an adaptation of James' pragmatic theory of truth.

4. It is an epistemology that emerges out of practice where theory is always tested in practice.

The third section further addresses the evolution of American pragmatism in the latter half of the twentieth century, thirty to forty years after Dewey's death, in the work of Richard Rorty. I do not discuss Rorty's work for its own sake here. I point out certain themes in Rorty's work for two reasons. One is to show the postmodern direction pragmatism has taken in contemporary society and its negative implications for practice. The other is

to sharpen points made earlier in the section--i.e., Dewey's reconstruction of philosophy as opposed to Rorty's redescription.

The fourth section of this chapter is a summary of the development of pragmatism. We see it formed as a move away from questions of origin toward questions of experimentation, and away from the need to evaluate the mind as discreet and isolated events and toward a view of the mind as a generative series of events, each of which relate to what went on before and anticipate events to come. Pragmatism takes shape with the infusion of everyday life into philosophy through logical inquiry, through the progression of empirical experience towards psychology of particular lives, and through its humanism.

Having laid out groundwork for pragmatic epistemology in this chapter, and feminist epistemology in the first chapter, I then begin to engage the feminist and the pragmatist with each other in Chapters III and IV. Dewey's pragmatic insight that "an experience" is only a tool for further inquiry and that knowing is eventual rather than immediate has significant and positive ramifications for a feminist theory.

Charles Peirce's Experimental Epistemology

Charles S. Peirce's pragmatism is a form of empiricism that, unlike classical empiricism, uses the instability of individual experiences as a basis for the hypothesis that what is real is our direct, unmediated experience. Unlike classical empiricism, Peirce claims our direct, unmediated experiences are real, not illusory. The use of direct, unmediated experience forces the classical empiricist to focus not only on theories of mind, but also on the actual testing of these theories as hypotheses.

Peirce focuses on a tension inherent in the seventeenth-century reflective tradition from Europe. For example, he is critical of the classical metaphysical impulse that holds knowledge as the testimony of reflective inquiry--i.e., Locke's belief that the properties of objects perceived are properties of perception, which assumes that perception itself constitutes these qualities.[3] More specifically, the seventeenth-century reflective tradition that holds knowledge as the result of reflective inquiry is encountered in either of two philosophical frameworks. One is the spectator theory of mind. The other is the representational theory of knowledge.

The spectator theory of mind presents the mind as an empty container whose main function is the recording of data. Individuals passively record

those experiences that fill the mind. Experience refers to the qualities of objects as they are perceived by the faculties of the mind. It is described in terms of the shared similarities and identities of qualities in each and every object in the world. And, concurrently, those qualities of objects correspond to ideas we have of them in our minds. Thus, the spectator theory of knowledge rests on the assumption that humans are passive knowers, who, to varying degrees, record observations of experience that go on independently of the faculty of the body or mind. Knowledge is equated with the experience of the recording of qualities of objects.

The representational theory of knowledge presents the idea that those things we immediately perceive and have first impressions of--i.e., the qualities of objects--are not real.[4] The qualities of objects are interpretations of what is real. The real objects and their qualities are distorted by the imperfect recordings made by our senses and faculty of mind. The doctrine proposes that reality lies apart from the distortions of human experience. That is, our perceptions and sensations, which include both the cognitive and sensorial faculties of the mind and body, represent likenesses of things more real. Reality, in the representational theory of knowledge, is an objective state of being, untainted by subjective interpretations. True knowledge is exclusively objective; it is elusive; it is rarely, if ever,

acquired. Thus, where the spectator theory assumes a correspondence of knowledge between our observations of objects and the world, the representational theory does not even posit this minimal relationship.

Both schools of thought take the instability of our encounters with the qualities of experiences and objects as the foundation for discussing why our five senses are untrustworthy. The traditional empiricists use this skepticism as evidence for a hypothesis in which truth necessarily lies beyond human life. In other words, both the representational theory of knowledge and the spectator theory of mind posit reflection of, or correspondence to, something other than what is directly and immediately experienced. The aim of traditional empiricism is to determine how qualities of objects are conveyed from the objects themselves to the ideas in our mind and how the mind records those independently experienced qualities as representations of something more real. There is no recognition given to the interactive relationship between the body with a mind and what is experienced--i.e., that the qualities of objects that we experience are in relation to selective interests within a particular theoretical and lived context.

Peirce's pragmatism, on the other hand, can be viewed as a philosophical adaptation of the reflective tradition. He asserts that philosophical concepts should be discussed within the realm of experience

rather than in the domain of the a priori. For example, in his 1868 work "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," Peirce lays out several issues which serve as the basis of his criticisms of classical empiricism and rationalism.[5] In this work, he suggests that Descartes' metaphysical assumptions are misguided. He claims that skepticism, which posits the first step of inquiry as universal doubt, involves blatant self-deception since it doubts what is most apparent--our prejudices. Cartesianism's notion of individual consciousness as the determinant of truth only does so by positing truth as a form of consensus, which leaves no room for real doubt.

Having laid out the insufficiency of an intuitive cognitive access to reality, Peirce suggests that philosophical scrutiny should be conducted via experimentation, not argument. In the 1878 essay "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," Peirce presents pragmatism as a theory of meaning. In discussing how we assign meaning to inference, Peirce suggests that meanings are dependent upon action. He claims that the meanings we ascribe to activities and objects are due to the particular expectations and intentions we have of them, not a priori notions we have of them: "our beliefs are really rules for action . . . [that] to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance."[6] And, thus, the ascribed meanings present our beliefs and

expectations. We grant meaning to things or concepts in terms of the conceivable, sensible effects they provide in the world.

The logic of the relationship between meaning and action is itself a display of Peirce's desire to equate the meaning of an object with its relationship to other objects--that is, in terms of its behavior rather than of its inherent qualities. Behavior is considered the essence of assigning inferences with meaning. The meaning of an object is the complete set of laws regarding its behavior under any condition. How we "fix our beliefs" is based upon a whole set of conditionals. For example, beliefs are not simply ideas we hold on to. "The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise."[7] It is in this manner that meanings are first clarified.

One can expect from what I have said thus far that Peirce's pragmatism is not advanced by theoretical concerns alone. Because some theories do not work well in practice, we need to inquire into whether the assignment of meaning and inference works in the world. We undergo a process of inquiry in which what we believe is applied to the world. In the 1877 work "Fixation of Belief," Peirce adopts a method of scientific inquiry as the best way to test beliefs. That is, he suggests that when we enter into

an investigation, we must use the best procedure we have and then refine it as we go along. Although we could adopt any other method of inquiry--e.g., intuition or received opinion--science offers the approach that encompasses a process of experimentation with which we can refine the investigation as necessary.

Science, to Peirce, takes place in all cases where the methods of investigation employed are experimental. Thus, as we do experiments in physics, so can we do them in philosophy. We do not quantify in philosophy as we do in physics, yet beliefs can be tested scientifically by contrasting them to everyday experience. Peirce's specific aim is to show how meanings, and thus beliefs, evolve through a refining process in inquiry. For example, very simply, we test the belief that ten pounds of feathers will fall more slowly than ten pounds of lead. We learn this to not be so and thus provide a working meaning for what ten pounds is and does in various forms. Thus, the meaning we ascribe is in direct relation to the activity we undertake. In this way, theory is bound to action because through action the application of meaning is possible.

We begin experimentation when the meanings are clarified. Then, by testing our ideas, we come to stabilize them. The importance of experimentation is that testing, itself, is a self-corrective process. Our

fallibilism, a vital aspect of epistemology as a human endeavor, ensures that any belief we fix is subject to further rational criticism. It is open to public scrutiny.

In summary, Peirce establishes a new criterion for inquiry. Like feminist epistemologists, Peirce undermines modern philosophy on its own terms. Truth and falsity are not what assist in the determination of the clarity and distinctness of ideas, as they are for Descartes. Clarity, for Peirce, is determined in terms of whether ideas make sense in practice--that is, whether they are clear or not clear in terms of their conceivable, sensible effects in the world. The norms of inquiry, and not the origins of our claims, determine whether our claims are true. This aspect of Peirce's epistemology has important implications for feminist standpoint theory, in that, as with different standpoints, it is not their origins--i.e., that women experience them--but what role they play subject to further inquiry in a social context that is significant. This point will be illustrated further in Chapter III. We cannot assess the truth of an idea until after we assess first its clarity, and then its meaning. The first step is a helpful way of viewing the relationship between meaning and action in such a way as ideas are viewed as anything but mental or private.

Secondarily, Peirce offers a theory of meaning as a way of understanding that ideas, in coordination with varieties of circumstances, actually emerge out of shared conduct. This is how ideas become fixed. Then they are subjects for further inquiry. Evaluating whether ideas can work in the world is how truth can be determined, and all that science does. Peirce provides Dewey with the insight that ideas make sense if they work in practice. Dewey will go on to say that the ideas not only make sense, but that the ideas are warranted as possible solutions to particular everyday problems. Peirce's work convinces Dewey that ideas are not knowledge per se, but can be transformed into knowledge through a logic of inquiry that emerges out of shared conduct.

William James' Pragmatic Theory of Truth

Peirce shows us some of the internal problems in philosophy and also provides us with the tools for reconstructing philosophy in such a way as to address traditional philosophical problems: pragmatically. William James adopts this project by taking Peirce's theory of meaning and applying it to philosophical questions concerning truth and reality. James provides a pragmatic meaning to philosophy. He takes Peirce's pragmatic theory--that what an idea is, is understood in terms of its conceivable sensible effects in

the world--and applies it to concrete cases. Again, as with the works of Charles Peirce, this will not be an overview of all of William James' work, but rather will focus on a distinct part of his epistemology that lays the groundwork for those aspects of Dewey's thought that I want to emphasize.

Given his emphasis on particular experience rather than life in general, James claims that his approach is a form of "radical empiricism." Metaphysically, classic empiricism emphasizes the discontinuities of experience by isolating qualities of experience, but James, like Peirce, coordinates the continuities and discontinuities as mutually dependent and interdependent.[8] The universe "up to a certain point is still plastic" and "[is] in the process of becoming" rather than being already constructed and determined.[9] When we analyze sensations as a part of personal consciousness, we find that there is an irreducible pluralism; people perceive reality differently. There is no objective reality that would render individual perceptions unreal, or a perception more real, although a perception may be more true. For example, if a person standing one hundred feet from a river sees what appears to be a log floating in the water, while a person standing at the water's edge can tell that the floating object is actually a crocodile, then both perceptions are real (no one is more real), even though only the second person's perception is true. Both perceptions are "real" in the sense

of being what the people actually perceive. The perceptions are, in Charlene Haddock Seigfried's understanding of James,

> given in experience and yet human intervention is needed to bring them to fulfillment. . . . We do not simply know by mentally selecting specific objects and relations out of the flux of experience. We interact with experience to bring out those objects and relations.[10]

By leaving out all abstractions or universals, James admits that what is true is only that which has been experienced.

Epistemologically, the real nature of thought, as "a stream of consciousness," therefore precludes notions of pure experience. James explains his biological theory of consciousness in the 1890 essay "The Stream of Thought," from The Principles of Psychology. In this work, he introduces the new theory that consciousness is not a bulk of isolated events, but rather a continuous activity: "Every brain state is partly determined by the nature of its entire past succession."[11] The consequence of linking consciousness to the body is that knowing becomes one of many biological activities that humans undergo.

In positing such a drastic difference in the nature of existence and consciousness, however, James can no longer maintain that radical empiricism is just a methodological adaptation of classical epistemology. He adopts Peirce's reconstructive tools and puts forth pragmatism as a

theory of truth, writing about truth and knowledge in a way that incorporates psychological and biological components of human existence as well.

James takes Peirce's notion of ideas as conceivable sensible effects in the world and concerns himself with the actual sensible effects they have in the world. Ideas become beliefs. That is to say, when Peirce talks about meaning, he is talking about ideas, but, when James talks about meaning, he is talking about beliefs. In doing so, James poses a type of subjective question. In some sense he takes ideas as personal beliefs, since meaning is shared, given the social nature of language. He takes our shared understanding of belief and asks what practical meaning it has for the individual now. This inquiry relates to the experiences a person actually has, not what could follow. In this way James avoids making belief private, but keeps it, nevertheless, personal. "Belief" becomes "my belief" or "your belief," and the two may differ.

James employs Peirce's strategy of clarifying and fixing ideas through experimentation to see how ideas as beliefs actually function in a person's life. When James asks what it means for a belief to be true, he asks in psychological terms--i.e., in terms of the belief's satisfaction. He claims that the value of a belief is not simply in the reporting, but in determining

what it might lead to. Truth is good, but more importantly, what is psychologically and biologically good is when the purpose with which we act is reached. Since adaptive behavior forms the basis of belief, new truths emerge as a consequence of an individual's satisfaction, and truth shifts as it is open to public scrutiny. In his 1907 essay "What Pragmatism Means," James writes: "new truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity."[12] For James, then, pragmatism, as a philosophy, determines future action based on personal truths (individual experience).

True beliefs become the only direct means of determining ends. Beliefs are just one means of reaching certain desired results. Purpose reflects the relation to a specific set of circumstances. For example, when subjected to the test of experience, religious experiences remain valid truths in the absence of all proof.[13] James suggests that our selective interests accompany what we take as evidence of belief, and thus, what we accept as true. We have the right to choose our beliefs.[14] Correspondingly, Peirce might say that we choose our ideas. James' pragmatism allows a mediation between science and theology. Further on in "What Pragmatism Means," he says:

> If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged.[15]

Truth, for James, is modified by prospective observations, experiences and desired results. Since truths are always tested by other observations and experiences, epistemologically truths are "hypothetical and provisional." Notions of inherent similarities or essential differences are left behind. The relationship between the knower and the known is determined as the practical consequence of these tests. Since the knower chooses the circumstances that determine the relationship to the known, the differences in the qualities of experience are, for James, purposive.

Truth itself is a relation, a matter of empirical and subjective choosing, not simply a process of verification. Facts are true only when they are consequences of experience, so knowledge is prospective, not simply reflective. Reasoning and thinking are processes of reconstructing truth rather than uncovering it. Thus, philosophy is a self-reflective corrective process. To this end, the incorporation of an individual's subjective attitude works in the service of pragmatism. Peirce criticizes James, however, because he fears that James' claim of truth as subjective leads to a claim that truth is arbitrary.

In summary, James takes Peirce's demand that philosophical theory be tied to praxis and creates a pragmatic theory of truth. He coordinates beliefs with lived experience. Since consciousness is the constant progression of prior beliefs and anticipations, truth changes along with what we are experiencing currently. Since truth is determined by the degree of satisfaction, truth takes on subjective qualities.

James begins a project that Dewey clarifies. The subjective constituents of knowledge are highlighted in Dewey's epistemology, but they only form the beginning of an inquiry. Subjective truths are not to be mistaken as a knowledge event which is the end of inquiry. Both James and Dewey focus on the importance of individual experience, but they differ as to its location on the continuum of knowledge creation. In the following section, I show how individual truths can only be the subject matter of further scrutiny, not the subject matter of knowledge.

John Dewey's Instrumental Knowledge

John Dewey's work encompasses several disciplines, both academic and professional. His political work on democracy spans discussion of the Civil War to World War II, which coincidentally also covers the length of his long life (1859-1952). His work on metaphysics, epistemology and

aesthetics has revolutionized what philosophy studies. His comprehensive work on ethics elaborates upon some of Aristotle's beliefs about how a well-run democratic state operates. And, Dewey's theories on education, emphasizing the coordination of academic life with practical life, have helped to form the foundation of the American educational system. Even though many of the topics in the thirty-seven volumes of his collected works overlap, my focus is on his epistemology. I will emphasize three issues: logical inquiry, the substitution of warranted assertion for truth, and the way in which theory emerges from practice.

As does Peirce and James, John Dewey discusses the topic of a theory of meaning. However, he does not raise it in terms of the development of a theory of truth as James does. Dewey uses Peirce's theory of meaning--that is, the relationship between inference and action--to relate philosophical inquiry to social and political issues. In order that we may conduct our lives in a manner coordinating philosophy with culture, Dewey determines, first and foremost, that our practical experiences inform intelligent inquiry and thus theory. He discusses knowledge in terms of its relationship to activity, rather than in terms of its validity apart from experience. For instance, Dewey couches classical philosophical problems--e.g., the body/mind problem, the problem of the external world, the problem of other

minds, the Kantian synthetic a priori, the Platonic problem of appearance and reality, etc.--as problems of men, not problems of philosophy.[16] As he says, "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men."[17] Doing philosophy is contiguous with the reconstruction of society and culture. We begin to do both philosophy and the reconstruction of culture when we understand the relationship between life and logic.

Peirce begins the move in epistemology away from theories of mind to theories of the habits and the psychology of everyday practical experiences. Dewey thinks Peirce is successful in shifting logic from a "static epistemology" to a form of logic that reflects existential dimensions. Classic logicians are not concerned with the existential matters with which individual experience is concerned.[18] Due to Peirce's influence, Dewey claims that logic does not determine the role of scientific inquiry--everyday experience provides a logic for a controlled process of inquiry. Since our beliefs are continually and consistently being tested, theory emerges from practice.

> The strongest warranted assertion is the hardest of hard fact, but with neither the determinacy nor the warranty, nor the hardness, nor even the factuality itself ranging beyond the

> reach of inquiry--for what is "hard fact" at "one" time is not assuredly "hard" for "all" time.[19]

And continual practice (testing) functionally re-creates theory.

Dewey locates philosophy in a context where our intellectual concerns emerge from our biological environment, not from formal logic and reason alone.[20] Since reading James' 1890 work The Principles of Psychology, Dewey seems to coordinate pragmatic epistemology along both biological and anthropological lines. What Dewey likes about James' work is that James turns knowing into just one of many things that humans do. The rational nature of live creatures evolves given the consequences of past practice. Human nature is expressed as the evolution of past memories and future anticipations. Dewey extends James' findings and asserts that the generic traits of existence--e.g., contingency, uncertainty, precariousness, and changeability--should be understood as qualities of our cognitive faculties. For example, Dewey contends that

> Every experience in its direct occurrence is an interaction of environing conditions and an organism. As such it contains in a fused union some what experienced and some processes of experiencing. In its identity with a life-function, it is temporally and spatially more extensive and more internally complex than is a single thing like a stone, or a single quality like red.[21]

As a result of this emphasis, Dewey's work is considered a "naturalized epistemology." Beliefs are intelligently guided and tested along with "the sum total of impulses, habits, emotions, needs, and discoveries which forecast what is desirable and undesirable in future possibilities and which contrive ingenuously on behalf of imagined good."[22] Dewey asserts that physical feelings are qualities of life forms and mental thoughts are qualitatively different feelings with only objective differences.[23]

In presenting knowledge as a human activity, a reflective activity, a purposeful activity, and a temporal and spatial activity that is historically and culturally located within American traditions,[24] Dewey's pragmatism is a new philosophy. In Experience and Nature (1925), Dewey explains pragmatism as a form of instrumentalism, since truth, to Dewey, is a pragmatic method for determining action.

Pragmatism evolves from Peirce's theory of meaning to James' theory of truth to Dewey's instrumentalism. To elaborate on this evolution, we need to examine specific parts of Dewey's Logic: A Theory of Inquiry. A premise of the logic is that logical forms change during inquiry. An item under scrutiny is not a rigid element of thought. It presents itself functionally as part of our logical, selective and intelligent process.

On the other hand, though Dewey does not classify himself as a realist, he does admit to the logical truth of a property of an event.[25] Occurrences exist independently of our observations. However, this is a matter of common sense, not metaphysics.

> At all events, I can not imagine that one who says that such things as hammers, looms, chemical processes, like dyeing, reduction of ores, when used as means, are marked by properties of fitness and efficacy (and the opposite) rather than by the properties of truth-falsity, will be thought to be saying anything that is not commonplace.[26]

Dewey does not concede that truth is a property of the ideas and judgments we make about occurrences. For example, noises exist whether I hear them or not, and the truth of their existence does not depend upon the verification of my judgment of them. Verification is not necessary for truth. Yet, a true judgment about what the noise "is" does depend upon verification. "Events do not 'truly' happen though true judgments about their happening can be made as long as these events leave effects against which our judgments could be tested."[27] The sense of truth about what people disagree on is "the content of a judgment not the reference of that content."[28] Dewey admits the existence of antecedent truths, but antecedent truths are not constituted by the content of judgments.[29]

Clearly, Peirce and James influence Dewey's thought. He adapts several of their ideas to form his own theories. However, there are several aspects in which Dewey's work differs from both Peirce's and James'. First, experimentation, to Dewey, is what we do in every action we perform. To Dewey, knowing involves conduct--i.e., intelligent conduct. "We distort our experience as lived if we think that the paradigm for all experience is knowing."[30] Dewey's aim is to take Peirce's theory of experimental inquiry out into the community. Dewey's philosophy exhibits Peirce's ideal that a self-critical community of inquirers has important consequences for education, social reconstruction and a revitalization of democracy.[31] In effect, Dewey's adaptations of Peirce's thought marks its extension into areas that are of particular concern to Dewey himself.

Second, although Dewey suggests that our environment presents biological patterns, it does not reflect internally related parts that necessitate each other, as can be inferred from James' Principles of Psychology. The order and regularity we sense in everyday experience reflects familiar activities and meanings. Regularities in nature function by intelligent inquiry, not by design. We imaginatively construct new possibilities and reconstruct our experiences given these regularities.[32]

Third, unlike James, Dewey distinguishes between "truth" as inferential and "fact" as observational data. Dewey clarifies that the subjective nature of truth is not relativistic when it is based on observational data. The inferential component requires us to identify a source for our beliefs--that is, when contextualized beliefs are not arbitrary.

There is a clear difference between arbitrary truth and personal truth.[33]

> Now the moment the complicity of the personal factor in our philosophic valuations is recognized, is recognized fully, frankly and generally, that moment a new era of philosophy will begin. We shall have to discover the personal factors that now influence us unconsciously, and begin to accept a new and moral responsibility for them, a responsibility for judging and testing them by their consequences.[34]

Dewey claims, as does James, that truths can be subjective. We must subjectively act in accordance with a belief in order to test it. The subjective element does not render the belief arbitrary. Rather, the subjective element identifies a firm locus of attention. By admitting the subjective elements of an objective stance, we hold a personal and moral sense of responsibility for the consequences of the theories put into practice. Once they are moral, they are no longer arbitrary. James' notion of subjectivity highlights the important nature of the personal in the process of

testing beliefs. Dewey grounds James' personal belief as "a warning to locate and define it so as to accept responsibility for it."[35]

However, truths are not the end of inquiry for Dewey, in which case we would have trouble mediating among them. Truths are relativistic if they are not guided by a controlled inquiry. "So as long as we ignore this [subjective] factor, its deeds will be largely evil, not because it is evil, but because, flourishing in the dark, it is without responsibility and without check."[36] Controlled inquiry entails working within a particular, acknowledged context and choice. Truths reflect selective choice within a particular historical context. Dewey explains,

> The purport of thinking, scientific and philosophic, is not to eliminate choice but to render it less arbitrary and more significant. It loses its arbitrary character when its quality and consequences are such as to commend themselves to the reflection of others. . . . [O]thers can repeat the course of the experience; it is an experiment to be tried, not an automatic safety device.[37]

Truths are subjective and purposive, as James suggests. Because of the possibility of confusion regarding the status of truth, Dewey substitutes "warranted assertion" for truth. By doing so, he avoids both the mistaken notion of truth as objectively universal and as subjectively relative. Exactly what Dewey means by "warranted assertion" will be taken up shortly.

Fourth, James holds truth as a form of propositional data and uses it as knowledge to direct future action. James' theory of truth is helpful in creating the notion that philosophy can use concepts as basic ideas for future encounters, rather than as the basis for a more accurate representation of what has been. Propositional data do not constitute knowledge for Dewey, however. To Dewey, propositional data, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for knowledge.[38] Knowledge is comprised of the consequences of actions, as well as the data that comprise the circumstances. Dewey takes James' functional notion of truth and makes it the initial step of his logic of inquiry. Individual truths can be transformed into knowledge under certain conditions but themselves are not knowledge-producing events. Dewey gives James' theory a constructive and creative function.[39]

Although some central concerns develop within Dewey's pragmatism in response to Peirce's and James' work, Dewey proposes several new directions for pragmatism. Truth and falsity are not to be found in the success or failure of the effects of believing, but in the conditions and operations of inquiry that warrant a believing.[40] The circumstances in which beliefs arise become the instruments by which beliefs have adequate grounds for acceptance. Dewey's instrumental notion of truth is defined as

intelligence inherent in, or possessed by, all biological creatures within particular contexts.[41]

Dewey does not think that pragmatism is primarily a method that incidentally provides an account of ideas and their truth as well as reality. As John Stuhr suggests, Dewey views pragmatism as forging a light link between truth and method:

> Selective interest, the concerns or attitude of a subject, is not the subject matter of reflection but rather determines or selects the actual subject matter of reflection . . . . [P]hilosophy of experience arises from within experience itself, from selective interests within a background.[42]

The method of pragmatism is directly linked to the context in which selective interests function. Selective interests play a vital role in creating particular perspectives, priorities, plans and purposes.

When Dewey states, "Immediate empiricism postulates that things--anything, everything, in the ordinary or nontechnical use of the term 'thing'--are what they are experienced as,"[43] he attributes our knowledge of real things, inasmuch as they serve a human purpose, to a selective and subjective purpose. The context of a situation reflects that purpose.

If we fail to recognize the role of context within a pragmatic method, we also fail as philosophers:

> I should venture to assert that the most pervasive fallacy of philosophic thinking goes back to neglect of context. . . . Neglect of specific acknowledgement of it [context] is, then, too readily converted into its virtual denial . . . . Thinking is always thinking, but philosophic thinking is, upon the whole, at the extreme end of the scale of distance from the active urgency of concrete situations. It is because of this fact that neglect of context is the besetting fallacy of philosophical thought.[44]

Our experiences not only arise from within a particular context, but also they determine the context in which solutions become possible: "There is no thinking which does not present itself on a background of tradition."[45] The context in which thought and action occur is directly related to the individual's environment and what he or she will present as a solution to a particular problem. Since human nature has cultural, historical, and biological components, the environment in which selective interests emerge is culture. "The aspect of context which I have called 'interest' is known in philosophical terminology as the 'subjective.' To be 'objective' in thinking is to have a certain sort of selective interest operative."[46] To suggest, for example, that wars are inevitable is to fail to recognize certain operative selective interests.[47]

Dewey distinguishes his theory of pragmatism from James' pragmatic theory of truth. Dewey rejects and moves beyond truth as a goal of epistemology. To Dewey truth lies in the conditions and operations that

warrant choice. Actions are considered intelligent choices--creative, new, indeterminate--when they are directed toward the broadening of future possibilities that are funded by past choices and habit. Solutions to problems do not represent the Truth, but rather intelligent choice and action.

True belief and knowledge cannot form the basis of intelligent inquiry. The reverse is so. Dewey avoids using the words "belief" and "knowledge." His claim is that beliefs do not only entail mental states. Dewey uses the words "warranted assertability," meaning a position in which an individual holds a relationship to particular environmental contexts. "Knowledge" is not something independent of inquiry, a property that is usually discovered to belong to the consequence of an inquiry. Warranted belief "is free from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it involves reference to inquiry as that which warrants assertion."[48]

Since inquiry is a "matter of functions and habits, of active adjustments and readjustments of coordinations and activities, rather than of states of consciousness,"[49] inquiry is the "means of attaining the goal of knowledge as warranted assertion, not instances or examples of knowledge."[50] To Dewey, pragmatism is a form of instrumentalism--ideas that are instruments of intelligent action and whose truth is determined by their usefulness. Warranted assertion is the determination of whether a

hypothesis works or not. A theory works, if "the relevant occurrences . . . are those existential consequences which, in virtue of operations existentially performed, satisfy (meet, fulfill) conditions set by occurrences that constitute a problem."[51] Thus, epistemology, to Dewey, is the consideration of the political and social function of knowledge.

As such, Dewey's instrumentalism makes a vital contribution to feminist standpoint theory. If the subjective nature of different standpoints in feminist standpoint theory can be taken as indicative of instruments of intelligent action--not truths--then feminist standpoint theory avoids criticism of objectivism and relativism.

To characterize Dewey's logic, I will use several examples. Intelligent inquiry takes place in response to a problematic situation, an indeterminate situation that obstructs ongoing experience. An indeterminate situation is one in which a previous habit of action has not brought about the anticipated result. Taking a very simple example first: If my car does not start, it is an indeterminate situation. I expected it to start and it does not start. The background of an indeterminate situation is made up of those conditions that support it: (1) I need and want my car; (2) the car does not start.

Inquiry begins with certain circumstances upon which I reflect. This inquiry involves two operations. There is the observational operation that brings the conditions into relief: the car will not start, and my desire for it to start. Second, the conceptual operation initiates the new observation that the problem could be in a part of the car. This operation yields factual information that the battery is dead, the starter is broken or I have a broken timing belt. These are hypotheses, not solutions. I test the battery first because I cannot remember when I last replaced it. It works. I then test the starter because I have had to replace this part before. It works. I test the timing belt last because I have never understood the function of this part. The solution is to replace the timing belt. This example is quite rudimentary, but it demonstrates how Dewey's conception of warranted assertion encompasses not only the logical components of experimentation and the coordination of experience and reflection, but also an interactive dimension between the car and my past habits of action. Each hypothesis is tested, not for its truth, but for its warrantability in light of my selective interests in different parts of the car.

If the hypotheses move a problematic indeterminate situation towards an unproblematic determinate situation, the hypotheses may be warranted and thus assertable. Hypotheses simply present a relationship between

selective interests and the particular conditions that raise those interests. To assert a claim is the condition under which an inquiry ends. An hypothesis is warranted when an end in view serves a particular function; e.g., getting a new timing belt serves my need for a functioning car.

Dewey's logic of inquiry is, as R. W. Sleeper suggests, "a needed system of orderly discourse, not . . . a system of self-evident truths characterized by logical necessity."[52] The benefit of testing a hypothesis is not to find out if the hypothesis is true or false, but to find out what kind of action should be taken.

Another and more complex indeterminate situation can be seen in the employment setting. I was told by a male colleague that he and other male philosophers are having problems finding jobs because female philosophers are being given priority in hiring settings. Viewing these circumstances pragmatically, a previous habit of action has not brought about the anticipated result. An indeterminate situation has occurred. Jobs in philosophy are harder to acquire. The issue is whether the problem arises because women are seeking and being sought for positions in philosophy. Without pragmatic inquiry, it can be concluded that women are the problem, since when there was no problem women were not present. Pragmatically, the issue is broadened to consider changing economic conditions as a

contender for the source of the problem, not women. The claim that the increasing presence of women in philosophy is the problem is unwarranted.

The observational operation shows that economic conditions and low priorities for funding in higher education exist nationally. The conceptual operation demonstrates sexist preconceptions that women should not enter the field of philosophy and the sexist notions that women should not compete with or influence men's job placement. What this example shows is that sexual differences are the byproduct of other factors in our society, not a problem in and of themselves.

The mark of a successful inquiry, Dewey tells us, depends upon defining what the problematic situation is. Defining the problem positions the solution.

> [I]nquiry begins in an indeterminate situation, and not only begins in it but is controlled by its specific qualitative nature.[53] Inquiry, as the set of operations by which the situation is resolved (settled, or rendered determinate) has to discover and formulate the conditions that describe the problem in hand. For they are the conditions to be "satisfied" and the determinants of "success."[54]

Specifically, in reference to the above example, if the source of the problem is the presence of women, women will continue to be excluded and marginalized in the field of philosophy. If the source of the problem is

defined as economic, the solution will not necessarily entail excluding women.

Moving from an indeterminate situation and defining the problematic situation to a determinate situation does not involve coming up with solutions, though. Remember, the method of inquiry involves the articulation of the conditions of the problem to the extent that these conditions point in the direction of possible solutions which are simply different sets of conditions. Thus, solutions involve the creation of new conditions. Satisfying solutions fulfill new intentions.

To anticipate a solution to the problem of job placement in philosophy, one needs to accommodate a conditional--i.e., the intention of incorporating qualified women into the field. And, since a "satisfactory" solution for Dewey has nothing to do with preference, men's entitlement is not assumed, but also determined by a particular set of conditions.[55] The indeterminacy in the employment problem and how the facts are given meaning is, for Dewey, simply "between purpose, plan and its own execution, fulfillment; between a map of a course constructed for the sake of guiding behavior and the result attained in acting upon the indication of the map."[56] So, the solution to the employment problem depends on what the purpose and intention is for hiring men and women in philosophy and

whether the consequences reflect what the problem is. The warrantability (or effectiveness) is dependent upon the purpose of the hypothesis--to avert or foster sexism; the conditions in which the hypothesis arises--economic and educational conditions; and the conditions from which certain consequences emanate--to have or not to have female professors of philosophy.

True belief provides only an element that begins pragmatic inquiry. It represents propositions of data, but lacks the articulation of the conditions under which the data arise. Dewey holds knowledge not as the consequence of a process of the propositional formulation of data, but as a continuity of active inquiry into human experience. Propositions of data are not "cases of knowledge."[57] Data is affirmed, not asserted. They are instruments, the operational agencies by which beliefs are reached as ends-in-view. Pragmatically, the guiding principles of reality, truth, and knowledge are the "possibilities of action" yet unrealized.[58]

In summary, Dewey's pragmatism ties logic to biological as well as cognitive functions. Meaning must be instrumental--that is, leading to action. Dewey's pragmatic epistemology demonstrates knowledge as only the temporary end of inquiry. If we are to regard our actions as emerging out of a particular set of circumstances, as a response to our environment

and as means to giving rise to further action, we must consider whether our conscious intentions come into harmony with the effected consequences of our actions.

Dewey's political epistemology incorporates a critique of methodology that facilitates the recognition of the relationship between the problems of mind and the problems of men and women in society: "There is a natural bridge that joins the gap between existence and essence; namely communication, language, discourse. . . . Meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behavior, and secondarily a property of objects."[59] Problems are articulated in such a way as to indicate their emergence within a particular context, as well as to determine how they are delineated by particular biases and interests.

Knowing, for Dewey, involves direct manipulation of objects and situations, both consciously and unconsciously. Providing meaning in life involves a process of inquiry by way of asking different questions, taking standpoints as being within particular contexts and taking standpoints as components of further inquiry. Philosophy is edifying, not systematic; it is therapeutic and constructive. How something is experienced is a matter of who is experiencing it and from what standpoint someone is having the

experience. Experiencing does not constitute knowing. It constitutes the beginning of logical inquiry.

As we move beyond Dewey's life, we can see how Richard Rorty provides us with a version of pragmatism as it emerges in the late twentieth century wrought with confused and competing loyalties. On one hand, Rorty claims that Dewey is one of the three most important philosophers of our century. He heralds much of Dewey's efforts to get rid of the search for certainty, epitomized by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century epistemology. Dewey helps us overcome the "neo-Kantian urge" that "claim[s] that assertions and actions must only cohere with other assertions and actions but 'correspond' to something apart from what people are saying and doing."[60] Rorty respects Dewey for trying to close down the epistemology industry by keeping alive the suggestion that "even when we have justified true belief about everything we want to know, we may have no more than conformity to the norms of the day."[61]

Although Rorty is as antifoundational, anticertainty and antimethod as Dewey, Rorty, on the other hand, suggests that Dewey's shift to naturalism seems to reconstruct only another form of epistemology. Rorty views Dewey's logic of inquiry, which posits the interaction of biological components of experience (i.e., the generic traits of existence), as simply

new categories of cognitive functions. And, in so doing, Rorty claims that Dewey reinstantiates the classical metaphysical urge to combine existence and value that Dewey claims he avoids.[62] Yet, in my opinion, Dewey's Generic Traits of Existence relate to concrete situations in life, not metaphysical experiences. "The entire conversation, while short, is given to showing that the sense and point of recognition of generic traits lies in their application in the conduct of life; that is, in their moral bearing."[63] Our knowledge of these traits help us identify the moral components of responsibility in everyday experience, not metaphysical components.

Unfortunately, Rorty believes that Dewey should be viewed only historically, as having been one of the first to make the initial effort to move away from metaphysics in philosophy. Rorty states, "Dewey is just the philosopher one might want to reread if one were turning from Kant to Hegel, from a 'metaphysics of experience' to a study of cultural development."[64] Dewey is Rorty's stepping stone towards a complete redescription of philosophy, one in which a study of cultural development depends not on inquiry but on conversation. The redescription does not include generic traits of existence or a naturalism that describes the fundamental moral nature of humans. In its place, Rorty provides a linguistic turn to pragmatism. Dewey uses the vocabulary of experience,

whereas Rorty uses the vocabulary of language. If the point of philosophy for Dewey is criticism, the point of philosophy for Rorty is conversation. He states, "Language is a more suitable notion than experience for saying the holistic and anti-foundationalist things which James and Dewey had wanted to say."[65] Moreover,

> I think the ability to see through the notion of "method" was one unexpected byproduct of the linguistification of philosophy. That development put us on the road to seeing that what made a difference to scientific progress was the development of particular vocabularies rather than of general "methods." In particular, philosophy of science under the influence of Kuhn has been coming around to the view that progress occurs in science not because people develop better methods, but just because they hit upon a jargon in which to describe some particular phenomenon.[66]

In Rorty's view, we need to realize that we shall never have a language, either scientific or philosophical, which does not make reference to the situation we are in at the moment.[67] To Rorty, philosophy cannot be criticism.

However, Rorty's redescription of philosophy leaves no room for experimentation. Rorty's pragmatism is storytelling, a reorganization or redescription using pre-existing linguistic resources, not testing, as I described Dewey's experimental pragmatic testing of hypotheses. Storytellers who recount events conceivably perform activities they find

interesting regardless of social and human need and without a sense of moral responsibility. Stories can be told simply because someone wants listeners. Stories don't provide possible solutions to problems.

As pragmatism takes Rorty's linguistic turn, it ends up as another standpoint or redescribed by a different voice. The process of redescribing does not address the problem of objectivity and subjectivity of voices and standpoints. Empiricism is concerned with redescribing the objective, the universal. Standpoint theory is concerned with redescribing the subjective. A more general critique is necessary.

> To assume that, because from the standpoint of the knowledge experience things are what they are known to be, therefore, metaphysically, absolutely, without qualification, everything in its reality (as distinct from its "appearance," or phenomenal occurrence) is what a knower would find it to be, is from the immediatist's standpoint, if not the root of all philosophical evil, at least one of its main roots. For this leaves out of account what the knowledge standpoint is itself experienced as.[68]

Dewey provides the necessary critique of the subject/object dichotomy of modern philosophy and presents a notion of objectivity as something hammered out in the course of human history, not something independent of the subject of activity.[69] We achieve objectivity in a very limited sense by analyzing the conditions upon which experiences depend and look at their consequences.[70] Truth, objective natures, and standards are relative, but this

is not to say that they are without criteria for judging better or worse arguments. Rorty's stories and linguistic standpoint lack criteria for change.

Redescription does not provide us with a logic of verification. Dewey incorporates a logic of inquiry based on generic traits of existence that simply sort out the rational from the irrational. Rorty seems to think that any sorting out of the better from the worse, the rational from the irrational, leads us back to foundationalism and the search for an ahistorical perspective.[71]

Rorty does not provide criteria for why certain stories are told and others not, or how they are told. And as such, there is no criterion for testing whether they work in the world. R. W. Sleeper, quoting Robert Frost, suggests that Rorty's pragmatism is "like playing tennis with the net down"--that is, trying to play the game without any rules at all.[72] And, Robert Westbrook says, "Rorty argues for cultural criticism that flies entirely by the seat of its pants."[73] Rorty deconstructs philosophy in such a way as to fail to guide action.

Dewey suggests that the criterion for how stories are told and which stories are told is the condition which brings them about and what their anticipated consequences are. "They [events] are more than mere occurrences; they have implications. . . ."[74] He further explains that

knowing is one mode of experiencing and that our job as philosophers is to find out what sort of an experience knowing is; that is, we must find out how things are experienced when they are experienced as known things. Dewey's instrumentalism is an attempt to integrate among human concerns--to integrate the private experience with the shared, and therefore public, experience. Human inquiry and practice is a way of coping and hoping in the face of constrained and confronted individual and cultural human existence. Pragmatism provides guidelines for moral and practical change as a way of life in all aspects of one's life. Rorty's pragmatist philosophy prescribes morality as a means only for public life. He argues for a liberal utopia in which there is both a private sphere reserved for elite ironists like himself to create the self they wish, "even if that be a cruel, antidemocratic self," and a public life confined to the task of preventing cruelty. For Rorty, a distinction must be made between self-realization and the social good. However, to Dewey, the two are conjoined. Self-creation and justice can be brought together at the level of theory. Private fulfillment and solidarity are the same.[75] Rorty's personal self is not an extension of the community in the way that Dewey's individual is.[76] We are a feature of the context of our own thought within a historical perspective.[77] What we claim to know is dependent upon the context of doing. When we do not

specifically acknowledge voices and storytelling as contextualized and constitutive of the relationship of the individual to his or her culture, we revert to dogma, avoid novelty and exception, and generate intolerance.

The implications of a contextual nature of experience are manifold. Knowledge is released from a principled position and becomes part and parcel of a response to a community as a whole with varying interests and purposes. Truths are possibilities, not stories, standpoints or voices.

Summary

Dewey's naturalized epistemology incorporates elements of social and political concerns. Theory and practice are united by regarding the individual as moving from a posture as cognitive spectator and passive analyst to a stance as anthropological participant and social activist. Dewey maintains a distinction between how we have knowledge (create theory) and how we experience life (effect practice). He is concerned with the individual's cumulative process of intellectual growth, which encompasses the coordination of ideas and habits.

For Dewey, objects of knowledge continue to be unpredictable, although he does not sacrifice knowledge to practice by describing the potential function of intelligence. He reinforces the possibilities of

knowledge by claiming that meanings are the "funded outcomes" of certain operations--i.e., having particular functions.

James coordinates belief with action, although his point is to enforce a more explicit moral accountability onto the decisions we make and the beliefs we hold. Beliefs must be held in order for testing and modification as needed. Propositional data for Dewey, however, are not sufficient to make a case of belief or knowledge. Inferential and observational elements are required to satisfy the conditions that must be satisfied, although this does not establish something final and complete.

There must be an analysis of the antecedent conditions not previously observed, although these alone are not to be considered objects of knowledge.[78] We are led to future considerations of future facts yet to come. James' moral components, as well as some of the components of feminist standpoint theory, are not sufficient to lead us from the subjective to an instrumental theory of inquiry where contextual considerations are the means for further inquiry.

Dewey is critical of pragmatism as a different method for establishing truth. Dewey secures truth as an ongoing, transformative activity that leads to knowledge as intellectual growth by way of selective judgment. Experience is a subjective tool for the transformation of knowledge. Dewey

uses a notion of subjectivity as the core of a thicker dimension of experience.[79] Warranted assertions are the temporary ends of inquiry.

Ideas are intelligent when removed from the immediate facts and become relevant to a fuller range of conduct. Experience encompasses not only logical relations, but chaotic relations, unpredictable relations, and aesthetic relations. Dewey's instrumentalism is the basis for moral education, not only scientific education. We learn to evaluate conflicting facts, values, and opinions and change our views and theories when it is demanded by the consequences of our actions. Our efforts to resolve problematic situations require us to evaluate the context in which such problems arise as well as what our desired results are.

Dewey, in positing the importance of context within his theory of inquiry, establishes philosophy as an ongoing process of self-reflection and self-analysis. Through self-reflection and self-analysis, we move into an analysis of ourselves in relation to others.

Rorty's rejection of inquiry risks abandoning a profitable process of the transformation of knowledge. He risks proposing solutions which reflect only his own interests without realizing what it is they do. When Dewey says that selective interest is inevitable, he also says that unless we acknowledge selective interest--i.e., the element of choice in our

observations (our biases)--we will not be able to determine whether certain interpretations are warranted or not. "Deception comes only when the presence and operation of choice is concealed, disguised."[80] In focusing on experience as the means for further inquiry, in ways that Rorty dismisses, we are led towards a reconstruction of culture in which the interests of women and other marginalized groups are furthered. Subjective experiences are tools for intelligent action, not truth.

Notes

[1]John Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953 (hereinafter cited as LW), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-90), 2:11.

[2]Although other pragmatists, such as George Herbert Mead, George Santayana, Josiah Royce, Chauncey Wright, Alfred North Whitehead, W. E. B. Du Bois, and C. I. Lewis, are part of the tradition, they will not be discussed here. They do not express the main philosophical points that I wish to emphasize. And although other leading contemporary pragmatists, such as Thelma Lavine, James Campbell, John Stuhr, Sandra Rosenthal, James Gouinlock, John Lachs, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Raymond D. Boisvert, Peter Manicus, Igor Sidorov, H. S. Thayer, Thomas Alexander, Larry Hickman, R. W. Sleeper, Bruce Wilshire and John McDermott, share this orientation, I will refer to Peirce, James, Dewey and Rorty in order to lay the historical and epistemological foundation on which I am focusing.

[3]For an extremely insightful critique of traditional empiricism's duality between appearance and reality, see P. M. S. Hacker, Appearance and Reality (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987). For example, from a traditional empiricist point of view, the color of a pair of pants hanging on a clothing rack in a retail store is fixed even though they may appear one color in the store under artificial light and another color outside of the store in natural light. The true color of the pants does not depend upon the lighting. The difference in color that I may perceive is due to imperfections in my visual faculty and its recordings in my mind. That I perceive different colors is simply a matter of my eyes deceiving me. Unfortunately, due to the imperfection of visual perceptions, I cannot know what color the pants really are. On the other hand, from a pragmatist's point of view, the pants are really one color under artificial lighting conditions and really are a different color in natural light. There is no deception involved. The color of the pants changes under different lighting conditions, and I set up those conditions which will bring about the desired result.

[4]Plato's allegory of the cave is an example that depicts the assumption which forms the basis of the representational theory of

knowledge.

[5]Charles S. Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868): 140-41. Peirce's claims in this article also lay the groundwork for other pragmatists' criticisms. What follows is not an overview of Peirce's entire life's work. I only suggest a distinct pragmatic epistemology which paves the way for other work in pragmatism.

[6]William James, "What Pragmatism Means," in Classical American Philosophy, ed. John Stuhr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 136.

[7]Charles Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," in Classical American Philosophy, ed. John Stuhr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 36.

[8]See William James, "A World of Pure Experience," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1, no. 20 (1904): 533-43.

[9]Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," LW 2:3-21.

[10]Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Chaos and Context: A Study in William James (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1978), 90, 96.

[11]William James, "Stream of Thought," in Classical American Philosophy, ed. John Stuhr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 112.

[12]William James, "What Pragmatism Means," 139.

[13]See William James, "The Will to Believe," in The Works of William James--The Will to Believe, ed. Frederick Burkhardt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 13-33.

[14]Even without evidence, a belief in God is warranted. The consequence of not believing is part of the relation James incorporates between belief and circumstance. This stands in contrast to the work of W. K. Clifford, who holds that true belief is justified in direct proportion to

the weight of the evidence. See William K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, ed. John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (New York: Macmillan Co., 1988), 145-50.

[15]William James, "What Pragmatism Means," 141.

[16]See Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, LW 2:3.

[17]Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," in John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924 (hereinafter cited as MW), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976-83), 10:46.

[18]Dewey, Art As Experience, LW 10:219.

[19]Dewey, Knowing and the Known, LW 16:87.

[20]The modal logic of the logical positivists fails since emotions cannot adequately be put into notation. Dewey's logic of inquiry succeeds by avoiding the need for formal notation.

[21]John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1951), 544. The emphasis in this quotation is Dewey's.

[22]Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," MW 10:48.

[23]Dewey, "Nature, Life and Body-Mind," LW 1:198.

[24]See John Stuhr, ed., Classical American Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 320-37.

[25]See John B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 135.

[26]Dewey, "Propositions, Warranted Assertability and Truth," LW 14:176.

[27]Ibid., 14:135.

[28]Dewey, "A Short Catechism Concerning Truth," MW 6:6-7.

[29]For a further discussion on this issue, see Dewey, "Immediate Knowledge: Understanding and Inference," LW 12:142-160, particularly page 156.

[30]This is Richard Bernstein's remark in regards to Dewey's theory of inquiry. See Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 204.

[31]Ibid., 201.

[32]Ibid., 213. Again, this is Richard Bernstein's interpretation of Dewey on this point.

[33]Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," LW 2:10. Dewey makes a more comprehensive expression of this view in Art As Experience, LW 10.

[34]Dewey, "What Pragmatism Means by Practical," MW 4:113.

[35]Also, see ibid., 4:113-14.

[36]Ibid., 4:114.

[37]Dewey, "Experience and Philosophical Method," LW 1:35.

[38]Dewey, "Propositions, Warranted Assertability and Truth," LW 14:174.

[39]Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," LW 2:7.

[40]Dewey, "Propositions, Warranted Assertability and Truth," LW 14:182.

[41]James Gouinlock, "Introduction," in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), 2:xiv.

[42]John Stuhr, Classical American Philosophy, 329.

[43]Dewey, "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," MW 3:158.

[44]Dewey, Context and Thought, LW 6:5-6, 17.

[45]Ibid., 6:12.

[46]Ibid., 6:11, 14-15.

[47]Dewey tells us:

> War does not exist because man has combative instincts, but because social conditions and forces had led, almost forced, these "instincts" into this channel. . . . Pugnacity and fear are native elements of human nature. But so are pity and sympathy. . . . The main point, however, is that whatever the sociological causes, they are affairs of tradition, custom, and institutional organization, and these factors belong among the changeable manifestations of human nature, not among the unchangeable elements. . . . Certain basic needs and emotions are permanent. But they are capable of finding expression in ways that are radically different from the ways in which they now currently operate. . . . It is for these reasons that I say that those who hold that proposals for social change, even of rather a profound character, are impossible and utopian because of the fixity of human nature, confuse the resistance to change that comes from acquired habits with that which comes from original human nature. . . . Civilization itself is the product of altered human nature. . . . The assertion that a proposed change is impossible because of the fixed constitution of human nature diverts attention from the question of whether or not a change is desirable and from the other question of how it shall be brought about. It throws the question into the arena of blind emotion and brute force. In the end, it encourages those who think that great changes can be produced offhand and by the use of sheer violence.

Dewey, "Does Human Nature Change?," LW 13:286-93.

[48]Dewey, "The Problem of Logical Subject Matter," LW 12:16.

[49]Dewey, "A Short Catechism Concerning Truth," MW 6:3-5.

[50]Dewey, "Propositions, Warranted Assertability, and Truth," LW 14:181.

[51]Ibid., LW 14:183.

[52]R. W. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 141.

[53]Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, LW 12:109.

[54]Dewey, "Propositions, Warranted Assertability and Truth," LW 14:181.

[55]In Experience and Nature (originally published in 1925), Dewey's first formal effort to express this naturalistic view, he explains how individuals are discriminating creatures and manifest "aesthetic" satisfaction by their "preparatory or anticipatory and fulfilling or consummatory" actions. Dewey, "Nature, Life and Body-Mind," LW 1:197. Aesthetic satisfaction is instrumental in determining warrantability by bringing into question what may be warranted. "The fact that something is desired only raises the question of its desirability; it does not settle it." Dewey, "The Construction of the Good," LW 4:208. By understanding the notion of satisfaction, we can understand how it reinforces the continuation of further preparatory or anticipatory activities in the process of the logical determination of warranted assertions. See Dewey, "Nature, Life and Body-Mind," LW 1:197. Dewey expands and particularizes this view in Art As Experience, LW 10.

[56]Dewey, "The Control of Ideas by Facts," MW 4:84.

[57]Dewey, "Propositions, Warranted Assertability, and Truth," LW 14:174.

[58]Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," LW 2:12.

[59]Dewey, "Nature, Communication and Meaning," LW 1:132-33, 145-51.

[60]Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 179.

[61]Ibid., 367.

[62]Carlin Romano, "Naughty, Naughty: Richard Rorty Makes Philosophers Squirm," Voice Literary Supplement 56 (1987): 14, points out that Rorty uses Dewey as an imaginary playmate and thus attributes to him not what is in Dewey's work, but what Rorty would find objectionable anywhere.

Also, see James Campbell, "Rorty's Use of Dewey," Southern Journal of Philosophy 22, no. 2 (1984): 175-87. Campbell carefully identifies five themes Rorty and Dewey share and several other themes which they do not share. Campbell's position is that Rorty does appeal to themes Dewey has developed in his theory of experience.

[63]Dewey, "Experience and Existence--A Comment," LW 16:388.

[64]Richard Rorty, "Dewey's Metaphysics," in New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Steven M. Cahn (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977), 53.

[65]Richard Rorty, "Comments on Sleeper and Edel," Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society 21, no. 1 (1985): 40.

[66]Ibid., 41.

[67]Rorty, "Dewey's Metaphysics," 43.

[68]Dewey, "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," MW 3:160.

[69]See Richard Bernstein, "Philosophy in the Conversation of Mankind," Review of Metaphysics 33, no. 4 (1980): 762.

[70]Dewey, "The Objectivism-Subjectivism of Modern Philosophy," LW 14:195.

[71]See Bernstein, "Conversation of Mankind," 768.

[72]See R. W. Sleeper, "Rorty's Pragmatism: Afloat in Neurath's Boat, But Why Adrift?," Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society 21, no. 1 (1985): 14.

[73]See Westbrook.

[74]Dewey, "Nature, Communication and Meaning," LW 1:138.

[75]See Westbrook, 539-42.

[76]The coordination of the individual as an extension of the community and vice versa comes out of Dewey's acquaintanceship with Herbert Mead's work at the University of Michigan and University of Chicago. For example, see Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, ed., with an Introduction, by Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

[77]Dewey, Context and Thought, LW 6:6-7.

[78]For a further discussion on the difference between "objects of knowledge" and "warranted conclusions," see H. S. Thayer, "Objects of Knowledge," in Philosophy and the Reconstruction of Culture: Pragmatic Essays After Dewey, ed. John Stuhr (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993), 187-201.

[79]This is not to suggest that experience does not also encompass an objective dimension, but notions of subjectivity and objectivity become functional distinctions, not inherent value distinctions.

[80]Dewey, "Experience and Philosophic Method," LW 1:34.

CHAPTER III

A PRAGMATIST CRITIQUE OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

In encompassing a thoroughgoing critique of classical epistemology, both pragmatists and feminist epistemologists generally do three things: they contextualize knowledge claims, enforce a critical analysis of underlying assumptions and preconceptions, and require the use of personal experience to test hypotheses and develop theories out of individual experiences. They share these points of view due to a shared metaphysics of plural existences.

Objects in and of themselves are understood as particulars in relation to other particulars rather than as abstractions or objects in general. Ontologically, experience, as a component of Reality, is not considered more or less real. Objects do not refer to "all trees" or "a tree," but "this tree and that tree." Therefore, objective reality is understood as functionally objective; that is, it refers to particular subjects. Dewey, for example, explains the objective nature of the Generic Traits of Experience only in regards to a particular subject's ends-in-view. The "detached observer," to a

feminist epistemologist, reflects only a picture of a particular knower's angle of vision. The "objective" becomes merely a reflection of the knower's own severance from the world and his or her own perspective.

Given these shared metaphysical features, we see common bases to the pragmatist and the feminist epistemologies. Generally, feminist epistemology and pragmatic instrumentalism exemplify an "embodied rationality"--that is, rationality as emergent, not static. Rationality is not based on the cleverness of an isolated Cogito, but on self-reflection and connectedness. There is a shared effort to deal with what is directly experienced (i.e., feelings and relations) and a denial of what has never been experienced (i.e., abstractions). Placing experience prior to cognition is an attempt to draw out the disembodied knowers and force them to go face to face with the reality of being in relation to something. There is a shared understanding of communal problem solving instead of rationally forced conclusions. Specifically, the cultural problems are capable of statement as problems so that inquiry into gender can enter as a factor into their resolutions.

As indicated, pragmatists and feminist theorists share criticisms of the tenets of classical philosophy; however, the point at which they part company is also noteworthy. Pragmatic criticism undercuts some of the

assumptions that give rise to parts of feminist standpoint theory that then lead to undesirable implications. Generally, the search for a feminist epistemology is to prove the authenticity of both the category "woman" and all her experiences. The issue for feminist standpoint theory is how to talk about woman as a unity of different women. The effort has been to find some grounding for a feminist epistemology in truth to authenticate these experiences (standpoints). However, if feminist standpoint theorists assume that a feminist epistemology rests on forcing us to either accept or deny a feminist standpoint, we are led to misidentify these standpoints (experiences) as knowing experiences. This strategy mistakes a standpoint for a knowledge event. Given this strategy, the standpoint theorists must adequately present a feminist standpoint that represents the category "woman." This effort leads to the undesirable problem of universalism. Alternatively, the effort to posit a plurality of standpoints in order to account for the variation of women's standpoints (experiences) leads to the undesirable problem of relativism. Consequently, feminist standpoint theory does not avoid the universalism/relativism problem. However, feminist standpoint theory does not avoid the problem because it fails to find a solution but because of the assumption (that we must accept or deny a

feminist standpoint) that gives rise to the dilemma in the first place. Judith Grant puts the focus in a different way:

> As an epistemology it [standpoint theory] begins from what it seeks to explain and operates from the false assumption that its task is completed. As such, it searches in vain for an epistemology before the subject is constituted. It searches in vain for a theory of knowledge before we are quite sure who the knower is and what we, as feminists, mean by knowledge.[1]

Until the notion of experience is reconfigured, the standpoint theorist appears constrained by an either/or choice between universalism and relativism.

On the other hand, the strengths of feminist standpoint theory are numerous. The ahistorical version of the woman's voice is reconfigured into a political/economic/sociological feminist stance. The advantage of this move is that the standpoint is not constituted by the sum of individual voices, which avoids the problem of various voices vying for a position where their knowledge counts more than others'. Secondly, the shift to an eclectic historical/political model presents an effort to unify a notion of what all women share. The feminist standpoint creates a unique female identity as the ground from which knowledge can arise. What pragmatism as a theory offers feminist standpoint theory is a way to avoid the universalism/relativism problem, because there is no solution to it.

Pragmatism as a theory provides good reasons to reject the assumption that we have to accept or deny feminist standpoint(s). The point of pragmatism is that the process of inquiry transforms rather than accepts or denies experience. Pragmatists avoid the universalism/relativism dichotomy because they provide an epistemology that is not grounded in truth while it maintains the strengths of feminist standpoint theory.

Pragmatists avoid the unity problem that involves a reduction of the characteristics attributed to a particular sex by rejecting a notion of objectivity that is unlinked to a functional use. Furthermore, pragmatists avoid the relativity problem when they reject the notion that one's subjective standpoint is not more true relative to the standpoint of another. Consequently, not all individual experiences are knowledge-producing events for that person. Pragmatically, it is possible to have and understand an experience without knowing its cause and without knowing what other people who have that experience feel like. Such a case is not a knowledge event.

Pragmatism offers a more radical view that avoids the dualism of unity and relativity by avoiding truth as a criterion and interjecting warrantability. In doing so, pragmatists develop an epistemological strategy for change that avoids a metaphysical notion of objectivity. Consequently,

the dualism acts as a pattern "for use in the reorganization of the actual scene," not a fixed theoretical construct.[2] The dualism can be understood pragmatically as a "cooperative interaction of two distinguishable sets of conditions, so that although knowledge of them in their distinction is required in order that their interaction may be brought under intentional guidance," they are not isolated from certain outcomes.[3]

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section involves the pragmatist critique of essentialism. This reinforces the criticism that standpoint theorists make, but it does more. It begins to undercut the assumption in feminist standpoint theory that leads us toward the tendency to universalize women's standpoints.

The second section is a more direct pragmatic critique of the standpoint theory. Pragmatism and feminism have similar things to say about the importance of subjectivity, but offer different critiques of its use. In positing a plural and subjective dimension to experience, Harding struggles with a subjective notion of objectivity when discussing women as a class. Objectivity is understood as a plurality of relative subjectivities. Subjectivities work in the service of objectivity. The consequence of conflating the subjective with the objective in this manner is that subjective standpoint can become erroneously identified with objective knowledge.

Each feminist standpoint can be viewed as grounding knowledge (though not knowledge in itself). The plurality begins to reflect the possibility of different knowledge events, not a unified feminist knowledge. Feminist standpoint theory correctly identifies the plurality of experience (and the differences of, and within, women's experiences), but then incorrectly misidentifies these experiences (standpoints) as antecedents to inquiry rather than as products of inquiry. Thus, strategies for change rest only on power politics. Pragmatists offer the standpoint theorist the ability to avoid problematic notions of objectivity and subjectivity as a pursuit of truth by determining the meaning and the warrantability of different claims and unlinking truth from knowledge.

The third section depicts the general nature of a theory of feminist pragmatism. The goal is to show how the pragmatist's focus on action and a functional notion of objectivity and subjectivity derives for feminist epistemology a notion of experience that bypasses the traditional problems of truth. The fourth section is a summary.

Pragmatism's Critique of Essentialism

Gilligan identifies peculiarly feminine traits of moral reasoning, and, in so doing, she provides the grounds for an alternative view of moral

reasoning. Gilligan contrasts those attitudes which are contextual, subjective and interdependent (i.e., components of the care model of moral reasoning) against those which are objective, independent and autonomous (i.e., components of the justice model of moral reasoning). In addition, she claims both positions can be held concurrently. For example, if a women decides to have an abortion because she cannot provide for a child, she can hold this view independently from whether the fetus has a right to life. The attitudes address entirely different valuations of experience.

Gilligan, in an important sense, moves us away from the classical singular model of rationality. She accomplishes this by empirically using the personal experiences of women to test reality. Gilligan seeks out what is missing--the woman's voice--but in so doing she tends to reinforce difference. Using pragmatic language, we could erroneously interpret these distinctions as "ideal objects" of women's natures rather than functional gendered "patterns for use." She has been interpreted as delineating the models of moral deliberation along gendered lines instead of using the different moral evaluations to explain the gendered distinctions we make. That is, she has been criticized for highlighting the woman's voice primarily and particular circumstances only secondarily.

Whether she intends to or not, Gilligan seems to be operating within the Enlightenment discourse by seeking a "more complete picture" of moral reasoning. Gilligan's model shores up a foundation for epistemology by accepting a notion of truth that supports a better representation of an underlying reality. Regarding women who find themselves in similar situations and who share experiences that are systematically different from men's experiences, there is no way to analyze why they share these insights that develop values appropriate to those insights.[4] Gilligan's model needs to link insight to expectations, beliefs, and values. Whether or not the criticisms aimed at her work are warranted, I would like to hypothesize that if they are, certain implications follow. I am less concerned with determining the nature of Gilligan's work and more interested in drawing out implications as pragmatic tools for my analysis of similar issues in feminist standpoint theory.

If the justification of an alternative model is based on phenomena that are given as "true" prior to an investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to them, we fall victim to what Dewey calls "the fallacy of antecedent conditions"--i.e., false beliefs, apart from a context of expectations, beliefs and values.[5] We presume something other than what the evidence shows.

In "The Problem of Truth," Dewey clarifies his own rejection of this approach. When we rely on antecedent conditions for justification, he says,

> we are forced back upon the common-sense of correspondence or agreement: truth is the agreement, by way of proposition, of the constitutive parts of the proposition with the constitutive parts of the objects that furnish its subject-matter. This definition, however, has its own troubles. The definition seems so conclusive, so satisfactory, just because it assumes all there is at issue. It assumes that we have already got truth, or that some propositions do surely agree. The moment we subject this assumption to the least suspicion, behold we are in a dilemma. To be sure, a statement is true if it states things as they "really are," but how are they "really"? The difficulty belonging to the "truly" of the proposition is just shifted to the "really" of the thing, plus the difficulty of enclosing the "really" within the net of a proposition, when the attempt at such enclosure seems to be the cause of error and falsity. To tell whether a proposition reflects a thing as it really is, we seem to require a third medium in which the original proposition and its object are surveyed together, are compared and their agreement or disagreement seen. Now this is either itself a proposition or it is not. If it is a proposition, it claims to be true or to agree with its object; this object is beyond itself, and hence another proposition is required for its comparison, and so on ad infinitum.[6]

The only way we can avoid the infinite regress is to avoid a search for origins, and that requires analyzing empirical evidence in light of our selective interests, not antecedent phenomena.

Any objective notion of reality that is based on innate characteristics of human nature (antecedent phenomena) is problematic to Dewey.[7] Experiences are not more real than one another, although they can be more

true simply by comparison.[8] When we conflate "real" with "true" experiences, we engage ourselves in a search for certainty. The importance of Gilligan's work must focus on the consequences of adopting either moral model.[9]

Any effort to substantiate a correspondence between experience and truth poses an accuracy problem. What could experience represent other than its sensible, conceivable and actual effects in the world? How would the gap be bridged? Dichotomies such as care/justice and truth/experience become stagnant terms when looked at as independent terms. They lose their capacity as generating conditions for inquiry. "In the theory of inquiry, such distinctions must be understood prospectively, as factors conditioning the accomplishment of inquiry."[10] Otherwise, unfortunately, we are left with the view that the "concept of truth is [as] something created in the leap between data and theory and as grounded not in rationality but in power."

Alternatively, the validity of a condition--i.e., a belief--is established by its functional or instrumental use and what ends we hope to establish. So, the warrantability, as opposed to the justification of either the care model or justice model of moral deliberation, depends on what different

values it forces us to consider, not its gendered nature. Those values provide the context needed to evaluate the value of a woman's voice.

Empirical data is only "the first point that presents itself," Dewey says. "The first point which presents itself is that the object of knowledge is eventual; that is, it is an outcome of directed experimental operations, instead of something in sufficient existence before the act of knowing."[11] Dewey's pragmatic view precludes the possibility that Gilligan's empirical data exist antecedent to the context of variously held values. R. W. Sleeper puts it another way. He says, "Just as there are no facts with intrinsic meaning, so there are no values with intrinsic worth."[12] That is to say that facts and values necessarily merge at the level of empiricism, and just what the values are needs to be flushed out by those doing the research after Gilligan.

There is another problem that arises as a consequence of the criticisms aimed at Gilligan. The problem arises if one were to interpret that women's experiences are in better relation to truth than men's experiences. The problem is that this poses simply a reversal of epistemic authority. This only exchanges one gender loyalty for another. The problem of truth as knowledge is not resolved.

Pragmatically, the evidence that women's experience brings to bear is provisional, as is the evidence men's experience brings to bear. This evidence should be considered as components of working hypotheses for some future state of affairs. Women's experiences and standpoints should be considered ends-in-view--ones in which their merit is evaluated in terms of the different values they produce in society, not by the extent to which they rival men's truth and knowledge.[13]

As a close examination of Dewey's work reveals, nowhere does he explicitly discuss the nature of women's experiences in terms of their contributions to the transformation of knowledge. However, he does say that the experiences expressed by women are more honest.[14] Yet, in so saying, he does not suggest that the experiences of women reflect a more accurate representation of antecedent conditions of reality. In claiming that women's experiences are more honest, he indicates that what women express may in many cases directly reflect the circumstances they find themselves in--in contrast to men, whose expressions may not. In other words, women's experiences may warrant truths simply on the basis that they invoke new values under different conditions. Women's experiences are not more true merely because women have voiced them; they may be found true as women test prevailing social and political habits and customs.

In summary, my claim is that the implications of Gilligan's critics are untenable. The criticisms mistakenly focus on identifying and validating inherent traits of human nature rather than identifying the conditions under which gender assignments are made.

The other consequence implied by adhering to a correspondence theory of truth is that empirical data can be claimed to be truer in virtue of the context of discovery. Pragmatically, however, these expressions are not true simply because they are declared by women. The woman's voice does not represent facts independently of the values that evoke them. The woman's voice is the "problematic material for construction--for creation if you will--of values."[15]

Pragmatically, Dewey's empiricism does not take form as a search for certainty. When meaning has "possible significance in some actual case" we gain warranted knowledge."[16]

Pragmatic Critique of Feminist Standpoint Theory

In an effort to identify perspectives that have been submerged by dominant perspectives, feminist standpoint theorists attempt to broaden the scope of what counts as empirical evidence and what its meaning is. More often than not, objective evidence is normed by men's interests and

concerns, and in turn their interpretation of the interests and concerns of women. Moreover, the objective evidence is used to present problems men want answered. When this issue is not acknowledged and addressed, the results are always to the disadvantage of women. The feminist standpoint provides grounds for epistemic authority by identifying the unique position of women because they have one foot in the male world and one foot in the female world and in effect can produce nondogmatic accounts of the world.

Nevertheless, Harding recognizes and grapples with the problem of universalizing a feminist standpoint that is implied by referring to a standpoint as a feminist standpoint. Although Harding argues that women cannot be metaphysically objectified, she wants an account of feminist standpoint as a unity. On the other hand, Harding also focuses on the tension formed by positing a plurality of feminist standpoints. The tension of subjective knowledge vs. objective knowledge is still apparent in feminist standpoint theory. On one hand, Harding is supportive of a notion of subjectivity because it appears to be the only condition under which women's voices and feminist standpoints can be heard at all.[17] On the other hand, she states that she is unwilling to "just say no" to objectivity.[18] She insists, "The notion of objectivity is useful in providing a way to think about the gap we want between how any individual or group wants the world to

be and how in fact it is."[19] This dualism, as in the universalism/relativism dualism, is forced on epistemologists whenever certain assumptions about experience and the act of knowing are made. The subject/object dualism rests on the assumption that the act of knowing is the place where inquiry begins. Harding does not save feminist standpoint theory from either horn of the object/subject dichotomy: (1) universalizing and therefore objectifying feminist standpoints in virtue of their origin in women's lives so as to provide an advantage for women in general and (2) relativizing standpoints on the plurality of subjective grounds from which knowledge emerges. One consequence of this dilemma, and one that Harding recognizes and tries to avoid, is that each standpoint can be taken as a knowledge-producing event.

Donna Haraway depicts the dilemma in a different way:

> Relativism is the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of objectivity; both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and partial perspective; both make it impossible to see well. Relativism and totalization are both "god tricks" promising vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully. . . .[20]

Haraway, also a standpoint theorist, recognizes the implications of these issues and, along with Harding, tries to readjust standpoint theory. Haraway

claims, "Feminist accountability requires a knowledge tuned to resonance, not to dichotomy."[21]

While wanting to avoid accusations like those against Gilligan's articulation of the unity of the woman's voice and the similar ensuing implication of the feminist standpoint, Harding avoids the objective truth claims. For example, she insists that truth does not depend on the degree of subordination that one experiences. That is, the standpoint of a black lesbian is not more true than the standpoint of a white heterosexual woman because the black lesbian is more oppressed than the white heterosexual woman. The extent of oppression provides grounds for fair and equal consideration, not grounds for truth. Yet, what I found troubling is the lack of a criterion for establishing the warrantability of either or both black lesbian or white heterosexual women's claims. Harding's notion that subjectivity serves objectivity is unstable.

Harding helps us reject the value-neutral stance of traditional scientific methodology, and in its place she instills a critical examination of historical values and interests that are shared within the scientific community--those values so vested as not to show up as biased.

Specifically, in Chapter I, I historically sketch the central tenets of feminist standpoint theory as a feminist epistemology--that is, as a response

to traditional epistemology generally, and as a response specifically to feminist empiricism. Having also derived the analytic components of feminist standpoint theory in contrast to both traditional epistemology and other forms of feminist epistemology, I focus on the work of Sandra Harding, since she is a recognized authority in feminist epistemology. Although Harding suggests that the selection of either feminist empiricism or feminist standpoint theory as a theoretical strategy is based on their appeal to different audiences,[22] what appeals to Harding is to conduct a feminist strategy where it is not now being incorporated.

This is a fine goal, but what I suggest is that she has not adequately addressed feminist standpoint theory's latent problems in order to make it particularly appealing to new and old audiences. My suggestion is not that the problems of relativism and universalization are somehow inherent to the theory itself, but rather that the problems that stem from this position can be unfortunate implications of feminist standpoint theory's use. As Ralph Sleeper says, "implications [are] simply the abstract form of the causal relation that turns up when signs are found to be significant, that is, when a causal relation between sign and object is suggested" (italics mine).[23] Unfortunately, just as contemporary traditionally minded empiricists have used Gilligan's work to evidence and confirm strongly held beliefs of

biological determinism, so could modern traditionally minded standpoint theorists use a feminist standpoint in ways that identify a weakness due to its relativistic and objectivistic implications. Thus, my point is that although Harding, in my view, is one of the very few feminist epistemologists who both admits to and wrestles with these dangers, they are not yet adequately solved even in her work. I will argue for this point shortly. However, what I would like to say first is that I am not one to shoot the messenger; Harding is not to be faulted for drawing our attention to the potential problems of relativism and objectivity and their relation to feminist standpoint theory. Rather, I applaud her honesty. However, given that these problems are not solved to date (because there is no solution), I propose that the pragmatic method of inquiry may be feminist standpoint theory's most viable alternative to avoid stepping on the bridge over troubled waters. What follows is my argument that Harding does not adequately guard feminist standpoint theory from these dangers, since, if I can invoke the bridge metaphor once more, Harding speaks from a place already on the bridge, with each escape being either relativism or an unworkable notion of objectivity. A consequence of being stuck on the bridge is that women's experiences can and are mistakenly being taken as

reliable grounds for knowledge claims. Even though Harding rebuts this claim,[24] this is one unfortunate and possible inference.

I have already demonstrated that if critics of standpoint theory label it relativistic, the basis of this criticism is that women's individual experiences are standpoints (a claim I repudiate) and as such each woman's experience, as affirmed by her, is a knowledge claim. On the other hand, if feminist standpoint theory falls to criticism of universalization, the basis of this criticism is that a woman's standpoint is shared by all women in virtue of being women and thus exhibits epistemic superiority as an objective knowledge event.

My argument in regards to Harding's efforts to avoid both critiques and their ensuing implications is drawn from her most recent work, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Harding addresses the following issue: "Has feminist standpoint theory really abandoned objectivity and embraced relativism? Or alternatively, has it remained too firmly entrenched in a destructive objectivism that is increasingly criticized from many quarters?"[25] Her response to this issue premises, first, that the eight features which feminist standpoint theory generally contributes to feminist theory "should be understood not as competing but as complementary ways to describe these resources."[26] In other words, she claims to refute relativism by

suggesting that different standpoints do not vie for truth. Second, she contends, "these standpoint approaches enable one to appropriate and redefine objectivity."[27] Here, she claims to replace a traditional notion of objectivity as value neutral.

Her premises establish feminist standpoint theorists' efforts (1) "to avoid authority of their disciplinary canons on the grounds that such authority has the effect of stifling the voices of marginalized groups";[28] and (2) demonstrate that feminists are "continually revising the way they bring women's voices and the perspectives of women's lives to knowledge-seeking, and they are full of conflicts between the claims made by different groups of feminists."[29] In reaching an intermediate conclusion, she states that therefore

> greater objectivity . . . can be and has been claimed to result from grounding research in women's lives . . . a feminist standpoint epistemology requires strengthened standards of objectivity. The standpoint epistemologies call for the recognition of a historical or sociological or cultural relativism--but not for a judgmental or epistemological relativism.[30]

All this is well and good and shares, at least by reference if not in substance, Dewey's reliance on historical standards rather than metaphysical standards. What Harding's argument lacks, though, is a premise describing <u>how</u> "a critical evaluation to determine which social situations tend to

generate the most objective knowledge claims"[31] is to work in practice! Her argument is incomplete. She makes the invalid inference that feminist standpoint theorists, like herself, can succeed in positing what she calls a "strong objectivity."

Simply denying the conflicts between claims made by different groups of feminists, denying the authority of disciplinary canons, and concluding that the result is a legitimate form of cultural relativism fail to deliver the goods; i.e., this does not constitute a sound conclusion that standpoints do not compete and that standpoint approaches have redefined objectivity. By analogy, such a proof would be like saying three times over, with conviction, while pointing a finger at one's spouse, "I divorce you," "I divorce you," "I divorce you." In this case, the marriage will not dissolve, nor will evidence of judgmental relativism or its "mirror-linked twin" objectivity disappear. Harding recognizes that if her argument suffers from anything, it is circularity: "but if so, it is at least not viciously circular."[32] I think it is incomplete. What is missing is the instrumental tool to make the transaction occur.

Pragmatism provides the criterion that feminist standpoint theory lacks. The tool that does the work is not simply "historical consideration" which is, as Harding says, established by individual interpretation, but

flexible historical standards that are always on the verge of, or in preparation for, change itself. These standards are historically prospective, not historically retrospective; that is, the assumptions that (1) knowledge is truth and (2) inquiry begins with truth have to be abandoned.

What Harding has done is to distinguish her form of strong objectivity from what she calls "weak objectivity"--i.e., traditional objectivism that "construes value neutrality too broadly . . . [by requiring] the elimination of all social values and interests. . . ."[33] Alternatively, strong objectivity requires a "scientific account of the relationships between the historically located belief and maximally objective belief."[34] The problem is less with Harding's efforts to avoid epistemological relativism and weak objectivity specifically and more generally with her conclusion that "strong objectivity standards are more rational and more effective at producing maximally objective results" (italics mine).[35] This statement firmly situates her still within the modernist dichotomy.

Without undercutting the dichotomy more completely, I am afraid that feminist standpoint theory is subject to the criticism that relativized women's experiences and/or feminist standpoints act as truth claims and, consequently, knowledge events.

If we think of truth pragmatically as just "a name for an experienced relation among the things of experience," personal experiences can be understood as shared consequences, not private realities.[36] Standpoint theorists can, as Dewey would, regard shared meanings as shared consequences, not only what we have in common in virtue of being female. Additionally, as Charlene Haddock Seigfried says, "By looking at gender as a process and not as an accomplished fact, women and men are better served by learning what the effects of assuming certain values has both on their sense of their gender and on their interaction with other aspects of self and world."[37]

Pragmatically, a feminist successor science project is warranted when the value of feminist standpoints is understood in terms of the particular circumstances that they create, not because they present presumably true standpoints. Feminist standpoints are true, but they are no more true than sexist standpoints. Gayatri Spivak's standpoint is no more true than Phyllis Schafly's. The reason pragmatists have for rejecting the link between standpoints and truth as well as the assumption that inquiry begins with truth is that we want to have the ability to say that some standpoints are warranted and some are not.

If we want to work from within a feminist standpoint theory, we have to use a different, independent epistemology that avoids these problems. Dewey explains how a flexible epistemology works:

> The strongest warranted assertion is the hardest of hard fact, but with neither the determinacy nor the warranty, nor the hardness, nor even the factuality itself ranging beyond the reach of inquiry--for what is "hard fact" at "one" time is not assuredly "hard" for "all" time.[38]

Dewey's reconfiguration of experience and the pragmatic transaction of knowledge provide the needed account. Pragmatically, feminist standpoints are at best limiting notions, and in practice what we must do is distinguish between warranted and unwarranted claims. The renunciation of male privilege will come from the warrantability of alternative feminist standpoints, not from an appeal to true standpoints.

A standpoint is not a knowledge claim. In order for Harding to save feminist standpoint theory from lapsing into such a classical view--i.e., that empirical evidence is knowledge passively received--we must recognize that experience must be pragmatically tested as primarily only a hypothesis. This will allow feminist standpoint theory to bypass the theoretical apparatus that is vulnerable to accusations of universalism and/or relativism. To Dewey, knowledge is mediated and eventual, the outcome of a critical process of inquiry. An experience (a standpoint) is something we can have,

but an experience simply sets the conditions for the controlled inquiry which issues knowledge. As John Smith says, "According to Dewey, were experience [standpoints] ipso facto knowledge the dimension of having, which he tended to identify with the esthetic, would be done away with and experience would become one with science."[39] We must impose a critical dimension upon feminist standpoint theory. If feminist standpoint theory is to be a philosophical form of criticism, as I claim it can be, then Harding's formulation must include a self-critical dimension of feminist standpoints:

> philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive position among various modes of criticism in it generality; a criticism of criticisms, as it were. Criticism is discriminating judgment, careful appraisal, and judgement is appropriately termed criticism wherever the subject-matter of discrimination concerns goods or values. . . . First and immature experience is content simply to enjoy. But . . . innocence does not last.[40]

Feminist standpoint theory cannot only pose new questions. We must have a different project. It is not the case that feminist standpoint theorists are uncritical. We are simply not critical in a pragmatic sense that avoids the assumptions that leave us trying to solve dualisms such as unity/relativity and subject/object. If all our desires were satisfied naturally and without effort, thinking would have no practical value. It would be pragmatically useless.[41] Standpoints should be considered as Dewey considers an "experience": as evidence for further inquiry.

As Judith Grant suggests, "feminism cannot simultaneously be the lens through which experiences are interpreted, and also find its grounding in those experiences. That is, the feminist interpretive lens cannot be grounded in women's point of view."[42] The self-critical dimension that pragmatism requires is to hold propositions as provisional, not ready made. This would enable, for example, a feminist standpoint to be (1) what Harding sees it as ("an objective perspective from women's lives that gives legitimacy to women's knowledge")[43] and (2) a provisional proposition that is warranted as knowledge in terms of what consequences are implied by its use. Thus, feminist epistemology need not identify the subject who knows by gender or any other identifying quality, and knowledge is understood as what turns up as significant in relation to specific subjects' interests.

Overall, Sandra Harding's work successfully begins a pragmatist feminist epistemology. She socializes objectivity. She pursues her analyses with a pragmatic understanding that every epistemological problem is "someone's problem" and that every problem is the result of individuals' experiences of what is relevant evidence. She knows that epistemology cannot be grounded in experience, in and of itself. Thus, she tries to preserve some notion of objectivity that is patterned on experience. This is the feminist standpoint.

Harding does more than recognize the woman's voice. She situates problems in women's lives from a feminist point of view. That is, she provides the context in which the problem arises as a problem. By bringing into high relief conditions previously obscure, she modifies prior existential situations and relegates to the background other aspects that were at the outset conspicuous.[44] Yet, Harding's project is not yet complete. We must figure out how and which feminist standpoint can be used as a possible solution. She successfully provides us with two out of the three elements of Dewey's process of inquiry. She offers the pragmatic "Antecedent Conditions of Inquiry"--i.e., women's voices. That is, she is concerned, as Dewey says, that "the way in which the problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; what data are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures."[45] Secondly, she also formulates the "Institution of the Problem" by focusing it in the interpretation of women's experiences by men. She knows, as Dewey tells us, "the peculiar qualities of what pervades the given materials, constituting them a situation, is not just uncertainty at large; it is a unique doubtfulness which makes that situation to be just and only the situation that it is."[46] We have yet to fully articulate the third stage of inquiry--"Anticipation of Possible Solutions."

As Dewey requires, "ideas [standpoints] are anticipated consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are exhausted under and in respect to observed conditions."[47]

Feminist standpoint theorists must also critically evaluate the values from which a particular standpoint arises and look forward towards the possibilities of what particular standpoints offer. We must provide the criteria of the emphasis, selection and arrangement of these values. Feminist standpoint theory must delineate the problem in such a way that existential material may be provided with which to test the ideas that represent possible modes of solution.[48] If feminist standpoints can be considered the tools of further inquiry, not the data of truth claims, or unique perspectives, then we have removed ourselves from the horns of the objectivism/relativism dilemma.

In summary, feminist standpoint theory dislodges the classical search for objective certainty when one looks only at individual lives. However, in doing so, the notion of standpoint creates a tension when the standpoint is identified as feminist. The standpoint theorist replaces the search for objective certainty with relativized standpoints. But in so doing, the standpoint theorist moves from the objective horn of the dichotomy to the subjective horn. We recognize that move as problematic. What remains

problematic is our inability to identify what is epistemologically significant for us as women as a way of mediating among different standpoints.

Pragmatically, feminist standpoints provide newly invented tools. The plurality of standpoints is warranted as means, as tools, for further inquiry. Experiences as true claims bring about the end of inquiry. Yet, knowledge is eventual, not immediate. When we use a standpoint as a tool for further epistemological analysis, rather than as the justification of the truth of women's individual experiences, we can avoid a pre-established notion of objective evidence and subjective evidence as grounds for knowledge claims. When we take gender as a unit of analysis pragmatically, we not only incorporate a variety of different voices, we not only ask new questions from a feminist point of view; we create new projects.

A Pattern of Inquiry for Pragmatist Feminism

In an effort to undercut the object/subject dichotomy, pragmatist feminist Charlene Haddock Seigfried suggests, "values are categorized as relative to context but not relativistic, as applying to more situations than those in which they initially arose without falling into a false universalism, and as being objectively identifiable despite their origins in the uniqueness

of each subject within a shared community."[49] For example, when we ascribe a woman's orientation to particular circumstances primarily and to gender secondarily, we focus on the fact that a particular pattern of reasoning, found disproportionately in women, is indicative of having discovered only a successful set of circumstances for producing that trait, not a fixed nature. If we identify why some women do not exhibit the characteristics of the care model of moral deliberation, we can eliminate whatever has contributed to the negative associations of care to femininity and justice to masculinity.[50] Those circumstances bring into existence a new state of affairs in which the situation that provoked thought is reconstituted.[51] Pragmatically, feminist standpoints reconstitute the means to other ends. They are (1) indicative of certain conditions under which the particular standpoints arise and (2) must point to consequences that are wrought from their expression. Standpoints are warranted, Dewey would say, to the extent that they are evaluated as means: "The proposition in which any object adapted as an end-in-view is stateable (or explicitly stated) is warranted in just the degree to which existing conditions have been surveyed and appraised in their capacity as means."[52] Feminist standpoints are tools for a pattern of further inquiry; they are neither the ends of inquiry (the knowledge events), nor do they preclude the need for inquiry. Without

this understanding, we, as Susan Heckman points out, perpetuate the monolithic universalizing tendencies of the Enlightenment thought. When we argue for a single, unitary woman's perspective we seem to forget that women, like men, are always found in particular situations with varying social and historical contents.[53] What we should be studying is the effects of assuming gendered assignments. We need to consider the beneficial use of feminist standpoints by asking, first, what are the circumstances standpoints highlight in the indeterminate situation that emerge as problematic? This is the manner in which feminist standpoints are used to begin a process of inquiry. Second, what are the consequences that are wrought from standpoints that can act as possible solutions? This is the manner in which we study the effects of assuming gender assignments. Consequently, truths are only the temporary end of inquiry. The subject/object and universalism/relativism dualisms are avoided when feminist standpoint theory's assumptions about women's experience, and what the act of knowing entails, are rejected.

When we view feminist standpoints as funding knowledge, then we will have the tool for "knowing how."[54] Subjective experience provides us with subject matter with which to know how to respond in new situations. In sexual harassment cases, the warrantability of the victim's claims of

unwanted sexual advances is not due to the fact that the victim, if it is a woman, has a different perspective from a man because she is a woman, although that may be true.[55] Its warrantability is due to the fact that a subjective standard is proving more workable in many cases.[56]

An experience of sexual harassment provides the subject matter of the conditions under which the experience arises (the context of the indeterminate situation) and thus helps us understand what sexual harassment entails (funds knowledge). A subjective standard provided by the victim's voice is helpful in determining the context for inquiring into the nature of sexual harassment. We can anticipate at this point that there are two working assumptions: (1) we must avoid a search for a purely objective standard, independent of a subject; and (2) we must admit that a purely subjective standard does not provide us with the elements for a generalized hypothesis. We can move on to a standard that determines warrantability of a claim by analyzing how we assign values to different experiences.

In order to provide a theory that can be used as an emancipatory basis for women, we must provide a theory that stands in a reciprocal relation to actual inquiries and, as Dewey says,

> is, accordingly, not one instituted in the dark or at large. It is checked and controlled by knowledge of the kinds of inquiry that have and that have not worked; methods which, as was pointed out earlier, can be so compared as to yield reasoned or rational conclusions. For, through comparison-contrast, we ascertain how and why certain means and agencies have provided warrantable assertable conclusions, while others have not and cannot do so in the sense in which "cannot" expresses an intrinsic incompatibility between means used and consequences attained.[57]

It is impossible to establish an objectivist stance, and establishing a subjectivist stance is insufficient for transforming knowledge. We must provide an analysis of the conditions which give rise to subjective (feminist) standpoints and an analysis of the consequences they invoke in order to create a new method of inquiry. Dewey also reminds us that the more the facts of the case come to light in consequence of being subjected to observation, the clearer and more pertinent become the conceptions of the way the problem constituted by these facts is to be dealt with.[58] That is to say that feminist standpoints emerge in the formation of the problem and this requires different solutions.

Feminist standpoints reveal ideas that need further consideration. We can move beyond the objective/subjective dichotomy by both rejecting objectivity that is not rooted in action and rejecting subjectivity without further inquiry as to what it offers in practice. When we deal with issues

pragmatically, ways of dealing with problems of comparable worth, affirmative action, and sexual harassment come about for the first time. Instead of maintaining a standard normed by faith in the objective, but expressed through the use of power, we create a pattern of inquiry in which logical laws and rules are derived from actual inquiries. Our pattern of inquiry originates in operations of inquiry.[59] As John Stuhr says, "Put philosophically, our epistemology must derive from our metaphysics. Put more plainly, our theories must derive from our actions."[60] Women's experiences are considered relevant not because women reason differently or uniquely, but because they bring to light new actions with which to create theory.

Summary

As of yet, feminist epistemologists appear forced to take either of two inadequate positions. Either feminist knowledge can assume to be based on the unique qualities that women share in virtue of being women or it is assumed to be based on individual experience taken as true in virtue of the experiences being personal. The first is concerned with universal claims. The second is concerned with relativistic claims. However, if we view feminist epistemology to date as not providing the data of new empirical

truths about women, but rather that the expression of different women's standpoints provides us with those conditions that give rise to those experiences, the benefit of feminist standpoint theory is that cooperative engagement will produce a new set of values that is neither predominantly representative of any one feminist standpoint.

Feminist reasoning, thus far, provides the means for effecting the change of conditions, but by itself cannot effect it. The substitution of a feminine strategy for a masculine strategy--even if the problems offered are entirely new and different, as they are proving to be--does not provide a sustainable strategy for addressing the continual competition of differing personal experience either between men and women or among women themselves. On the other hand, feminist standpoint theory seems to still lack the "capacity," by itself, "of resolving the given situation" involving a multiplicity of claims.

Feminist standpoint experiences can be considered a first step towards scientific inquiry--the Peircian fixation of belief. Then, however, we have to test the ideas that emerge from the experiences to see if they work. Without inquiry, there can be no new knowledge. Yet, the impact of inquiry is not to put the experience to the Jamesian test of subjective truth, but rather to put it to the test of its warrantability. As a Deweyian "end-in-

view," the feminist standpoint should be used as a tool for further possible ends. Personal experience must be used in a process of experimentation since it is tied to judgments and interests. It should not be used in a process of verification where experience is viewed as isolated data.

Dewey's strategy of determining warrantability avoids the need for feminists to use standpoints as political filibusters. The significance of the views that arise out of feminist standpoints is that they are as means to other ends. They present the manner in which effective action can take place.

The pragmatist feminist remains consistent with the goals of feminist epistemology: to claim that gender does matter in epistemology, to allow for the qualities women share, to allow marginalized voices to be heard, to assert that experience in and of itself cannot be the grounds for knowledge, and to allow for possibilities of different ways of knowing. In addition, the feminist pragmatist uses pragmatic patterns of inquiry against a background of women's experiences. In doing so, we observe and experiment how different parts of the solutions do or do not work in practice. Yet, the pragmatist feminist is careful in her placement of gender in epistemology. The pragmatist must be alerted that the placement of gender in the indeterminate situation may determine a problem situation differently. Gender as a category of analysis illuminates feminist standpoints with which

we can begin an investigation towards solving gender problems. The feminist pragmatist avoids confusing the role of gender in experience and in experienced problems with the role of gender in knowledge. Knowledge does arise from some standpoint (gender, class, etc.), but standpoints do not emerge, following inquiry, as knowledge. And, as I show in the next chapter, the feminist pragmatist shows that gender works seriously not only in the indeterminate situation as the pragmatist expects but also is at work in the formation of the problem. Feminist pragmatists may disagree about what it is that is problematic.

Notes

[1]Grant, Fundamental Feminism, 103-4.

[2]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, MW 14:39.

[3]John Dewey, The Problems of Men (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1946), 321.

[4]Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "Pragmatism, Feminism and Sensitivity to Context," in Who Cares? Theory Research and Education Implication of the Ethic of Care, ed. Mary M. Brabeck (New York: Praeger, 1989), 65-66.

[5]This fallacy is discussed in detail in Chapter IV.

[6]Dewey, "The Problem of Truth," MW 6:34.

[7]See Annette Baier, "What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?," Nous 19 (1985): 53-61. Baier poses separate spheres of influence for justice and care. The benefits of using the care model are in the private sector (the home), and the benefits of using the justice model are in the public sector (the market economy). This interpretation of Gilligan's works reflects traditional views of separate spheres of influence for men and women.

Unfortunately, this modern interpretation of separate spheres reinforces hierarchical models of power. For example, separate spheres of influence were used in legal decisions during the late 1800s to justify keeping women out of business and law practices. In an 1873 federal court case, Justice Bradley wrote the following opinion upholding the precedent which blocked married women's eligibility in Illinois to obtain a state license to practice law:

> [The] civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.

Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (16 Wall.). Essentialist notions of character rather than communal notions of character justified this manner of prejudice. It is with this in mind that Lynn Hankinson Nelson, among others, argues for the implausibility of the solipsistic knower of foundationalist epistemology and for the community as the agent of knowledge.

[8]For example, neither a cat nor a picture of a cat is more real than the other. However, the cat is truly a cat and the picture is not. Moreover, the "true" cat depends on the circumstances and the ensuant consequences of needing or wanting the cat, for example, rather than a picture of a cat. Truth is, at most, a provisional and working hypothesis.

[9]Alan Soble's view is that women only need political power in order to create truth. See Soble, 302-3. I am suggesting something more subtle.

[10]Albert Balz, "A Letter to Mr. Dewey Concerning John Dewey's Doctrine of Possibility," in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980-91), 16:424.

[11]Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action, LW 4:136-37.

[12]Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism, 181.

[13]In cases where feminist empiricists attribute caring to every aspect of women's socially constructed life, there is a reduction of the social construction of gender to natural processes. This reduction serves only to exacerbate the negative associations of care with women.

[14]Dewey letter to Klyce, 15 July 1915, noted in Jo Ann Boydston, "John Dewey and the New Feminism," Teacher's College Record 76 (1975): 446.

[15]Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value," LW 14:66.

[16]Dewey, "Propositions, Warranted Assertability and Truths," LW 14:169.

[17]Harding, Whose Science?, 155.

[18]Ibid., 160.

[19]Ibid., 161.

[20]Haraway, "Situated Knowledge," 584.

[21]Ibid., 588.

[22]Empiricism appeals to people who want to "stress the continuities between conventional justifications of scientific research and feminist ones . . . understood by natural and social sciences," and feminist standpoint theory appeals to people who want to stress "the continuities between broad social formations and characteristic patterns of belief . . . appreciated by historians, political theorists, sociologists of knowledge." Harding, Whose Science?, 136-37.

[23]Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism, 150.

[24]Harding, Whose Science?, 123.

[25]Ibid., 138.

[26]Ibid., 133.

[27]Ibid., 134.

[28]Ibid., 141.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid., 142.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Ibid., 144.

[34]Ibid., 142.

[35]Ibid., 159.

[36]Dewey, "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," MW 3:126.

[37]Seigfried, "Pragmatism, Feminism," 71.

[38]Dewey, Knowing and the Known, LW 16:87.

[39]John E. Smith, "Reconception of Experience," 551.

[40]Dewey, "Existence, Value and Criticism," LW 1:298.

[41]From conversation with John Stuhr.

[42]Grant, Fundamental Feminism, 101.

[43]Harding, Whose Science?, 167.

[44]Dewey, "The Pattern of Inquiry," LW 12:121.

[45]Ibid., 12:112.

[46]Ibid., 12:109.

[47]Ibid., 12:113.

[48]Ibid., 12:121.

[49]Seigfried, "Pragmatism, Feminism," 76.

[50]Ibid., 67.

[51]Sidney Hook, "Introduction," in John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), 2:xvii.

[52]Dewey, "The Theory of Valuation," LW 13:213.

[53]Heckman, Gender and Knowledge Elements, 128.

[54]For example, as John E. Smith says, "knowing how" or being "experienced" in dealing with horses, one is not experienced because we have had several occasions to perceive the quality of horses, but because we come to understand how to interpret signals from horses and how to respond to horses in different situations. Knowing how involves not only facts of handling horses. Knowing how involves not only the facts of feminist standpoints. Knowing how incorporates the knowing how into a response to different situations. John E. Smith, "Reconception of Experience," 552.

[55]See Ellison v. Brady, 923 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), in which the reasonable woman standard was allowed due to the different conceptions of sexual advances which women may hold. I discuss this further in Chapter V.

[56]See Eileen Blackwood, "The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law and the Case for Subjectivity," Vermont Law Review 16 (1992): 1005. She argues for the applicability of the subjective standard whether the victim is male or female.

[57]Dewey, "The Pattern of Inquiry," LW 12:108.

[58]Ibid., 12:113.

[59]Dewey, "The Problem of Logical Subject Matter," LW 12:11.

[60]From conversation with John Stuhr.

CHAPTER IV

TOWARDS A FEMINIST PRAGMATISM

The pragmatist critique in Chapter III is an analysis of how feminist standpoint theorists confuse the point where inquiry begins with the point where it ends. Pragmatically, feminist standpoints mark the beginning of new inquiry, not the end of inquiry. Feminist standpoints mark particular contexts in which problematic situations arise in need of further inquiry.

On the other hand, a feminist pragmatist critique of pragmatism entails the claim that pragmatists fail to ask questions--e.g., Who's problematic situation is it?, Why is it a problematic situation?, and What is the purpose of raising the situation as problematic?--as a part of the process of logical inquiry. Consequently, although, pragmatism can account for the subjective standpoint, it does not specify whose experience it is at an early point in inquiry. This chapter, although not a thoroughgoing feminist critique of pragmatism, suggests that pragmatism as a theory should provide a method for articulating how problematic situations arise from specific contextualized indeterminate situations. Using Dewey's logic, his method of

inquiry, I show that pragmatism must account for specific subjective contexts, not context in general. Lynn Hankinson Nelson makes this point when she suggests,

> Individual theories neither develop nor face experience in isolation; that the evidence available, relevant, and appropriate includes theories, assumptions, projects, and values of a broad reach including politics; and that the evidence (when interesting) is neither arbitrary nor unable to be evaluated.[1]

Pragmatists must focus on what the specific evidence entails, and they must do so in order to remain consistent with their purpose of aligning rationality with praxis. As a way of establishing the specificity of the context, a feminist analysis is helpful. The coordination of a feminist standpoint with the pragmatic process results in what I call the feminist pragmatist project.

The feminist pragmatist's critique of pragmatism does not offer a new interpretation of problems, but rather a new view of what the problems entail. Therefore, I do not provide a critique of pragmatism in which large parts of pragmatism are altered, replaced or disposed of. The ontological component of Dewey's pragmatism (that what is, is what is experienced), the epistemological component (knowledge as transformed experience), and the experimental element (intelligence is socially emergent) are all three maintained.

In summary, feminist pragmatism as a theory incorporates three claims. First, there is a rejection of the feminist standpoint as having epistemic superiority, although it may be true. The feminist pragmatist claims that because feminist standpoints present individual concerns, they form beginning points for inquiry. Second, any problematic situation itself arises for a particular purpose, by someone or a group of someones and for particular reasons. It arises within a particular context of the indeterminate circumstance. The feminist pragmatist focuses on the need to specify a context at a point in Dewey's logic between the indeterminate circumstance and the problematic situation that is absent in classical pragmatism. The feminist pragmatist does so by asking whose problem it is, why it is a problem, and what purpose it serves in arising as a problem. The nonfeminist pragmatist fails to emphasize the context in which the indeterminate circumstance transforms into a determinate one in the logical process of inquiry. Who?, Why?, and What for? are questions that nonfeminist pragmatists can account for but never ask. Thus, they fail to do the full work of pragmatism. This fault is an act of omission, not commission. Third, there is a break in the traditional link of rationality to masculinity. Feminist pragmatists realign rationality with praxis by using feminist interpretations of experience.

Pragmatism as a political and epistemological theory does not focus on a particular issue, but can address and handle a variety of social and political issues. It provides a methodology of handling whatever the issue is. That is, within pragmatism gender might or should matter. Yet, within feminist pragmatism, it does matter. The feminist pragmatist claims that one cannot have a reconstructive philosophy that attempts to relate philosophy with culture--i.e., theory with practice--without addressing the gendered context of the inquiry.

The feminist pragmatist claims that the relationship between theory and practice is not simply a process of highlighting the points at which pragmatism can solve the problem of gender issues. Although issues of sex roles are one of the many social and political issues that can be addressed and handled by pragmatic thought, feminist pragmatism as a theory is not simply the application of pragmatism to women's experiences. The absence of feminist pragmatists in philosophy that Charlene Haddock Seigfried notes is not simply due to the fact that philosophical pragmatists and academic institutions operationally left out women.[2]

Frankly, feminist pragmatism, as a theory, does not claim that in practice gender should simply be brought to the forefront of political and social points of the day. Neither does it claim that feminist pragmatism is a

new theory. Feminist pragmatists do claim that one cannot be a pragmatist without being a feminist--one who focuses on whose problem it is that arises out of indeterminate circumstances as a problem.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section advances a feminist pragmatist analysis of the cause of women's oppression. It shows not only that pragmatism can address and handle gender issues; it also shows that pragmatism must refer to the specific contextual nature of the indeterminate situation during the process of logical inquiry.

My analysis shows a tacit acceptance of traditional philosophical dichotomies that have implications specifically for women. The incorporation of the traditional dichotomies constitutes the grounds for the presumed inferiority of women's rationality. I use Dewey's critique of the uselessness of the classical philosophical dichotomies because it reflects sympathetically what a feminist analysis shows. His analysis alters the perceptual field of knowledge, as a feminist analysis does, and thus, in theory, obstructs the subordination of women.

The second section continues my analysis of the philosophical causes of women's oppression by focusing on Dewey's critique of what he identifies as the "fallacy of antecedent conditions" within classical philosophy. I fashion a genealogy (drawing on some of the historical work

of Jo Ann Boydston and Mary Jo Deegan) that specifies the context of the classical pragmatism that adheres to this fallacy. Thus, even pragmatists create the "accidental institutions" of sexism that eclipse the emergence of feminist pragmatism in the academy. Dewey's critique of the fallacy must be applied to pragmatism itself in order to be consistent with its goals of aligning theory with practice.

The third section depicts the lived experiences of the women who were trained as pragmatists by pragmatists but who failed to identify the specific nature of the social and political context in which they lived and thus were not recognized as leaders in their field of philosophy. Drawing on the work of Charlene Haddock Seigfried, I describe the role of women pragmatists at the beginning of the century and their absence in academic/ intellectual circles. Women students of luminary American pragmatists at the turn of the century were prevented from establishing careers in philosophy.[3] Women eventually used their pragmatic philosophical training as a means of pursuing other social and political interests. Although gender is brought to the forefront of pragmatist thought, specifically in regards to Dewey's debates with the president of the University of Chicago over the issues of co-education, I show that bringing gender to the forefront of thought is not enough to precipitate the formation of a new view within

pragmatism in regards to women. Without an inquiry into the philosophical underpinnings of their own work, as I show in the first and second sections of this chapter, male pragmatists during this time fail to provide a way for women pragmatists to succeed as philosophers. This failure occurs in spite of Dewey's explicit analysis of the components of classical philosophy that limited women's achievements in the field up until that point.

The fourth section encapsulates how Dewey's philosophical critiques of traditional philosophy (1) take us beyond the limitations of feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theory and (2) show us things that pragmatism lets us see. This section summarizes what feminist pragmatism as a theory promotes in practice. Feminist pragmatism avoids the universalism and objectivism that occur in classical pragmatism when it fails to identify its own gendered context. Given the tools of logical inquiry that Dewey offers us, I show the beginning of an emancipatory philosophy for women and men that avoids the critiques of (1) universalism and relativism implied within feminist standpoint theory and (2) the objectivism of nonfeminist pragmatists. We need to keep in mind that feminist pragmatism differs from nonfeminist pragmatism by neither simply adding women's experience to pragmatic theory nor radically amending it. The structure of

inquiry remains the same. The gendered context of inquiry is acknowledged and analyzed.

Despite the institutional facts that prevent pragmatism as a theory from being feminist, it remains fully pragmatic. Feminist pragmatism immerses us in the complexities of the context of pragmatism's own logic.

Classical Philosophical Dichotomies

Pragmatically, the classical philosophical fact/value dichotomy is useless. That is, when we see the link between our desires and the creation of fact, the ontological distinction between facts and values disappears. The dichotomy persists when facts are sought out regardless of experience and values develop independently of fact. However, as a pragmatist, I maintain that facts are derivative of the particular values we hold. We can note how facts arise as a consequence of an evaluation of our desires, affections, hopes, fears, purposes and intentions. The gendered nature of experience, as well as the racial, class and sexual nature of experience, is tied to the facts we create.

When dichotomies such as this one cease to exist, problems in everyday life cease to exist--i.e., biological determinism as a theory of women's human nature becomes defunct. Similar problems are identified as

stemming from alternative sources; i.e., racial, sexual, and class problems reflect scientific, personal and institution discrimination. Other problems are created for the first time--e.g., sexual harassment.[4]

In being among the first to claim that experience tethers fact, Dewey leads us to the conclusion that many, if not all, of classical philosophy's dichotomies are metaphysically useless. Dewey asserts that other philosophical dichotomies--e.g., body/mind, reason/emotion, male/female, object/subject, fact/value--have outlived their usefulness. What this basically means is that the dichotomies have ontological status only to the extent that they have a functional purpose in everyday life experience. As Lynn Nelson suggests, what we have said about them "far exceeds all the evidence that we have or ever will have" to support them.[5] These dichotomies have no pragmatic value prior to experimental application in everyday experience.[6]

From my point of view as a feminist pragmatist, the misguided use of these dichotomies has implications for women's lives particularly. Put differently, the uselessness of the dichotomies can be traced to misleading preconceptions.[7] For example, by avoiding distinction--i.e., reason/emotion--we avoid reason's gendered association with men and emotion's association with women. This form of implicit reductionism diverts attention away from the passionate conditions of reason and the

rational constituents of emotion shared by both men and women. This form of reductionism forces us to focus only on an ontology on the basis of detachment rather than relations. That Dewey did not make this specific analysis is due to the fact that he does not belong to a group whose experience has been systematically distorted and, in effect, cannot reflect to the extent that his experiential understanding is limited.[8] It is important, pragmatically, that one determine the specific political and social context that places constraints on women's epistemological achievements.[9] The identification of women with emotion as opposed to reason--with the subjective as opposed to the objective, with the body as opposed to the mind, with the concrete as opposed to the abstract, with the immature as opposed to the mature--reinforces the correlation of women to practical life and precludes them from any form of meaningful expression in rational life. Furthermore, although Dewey claims that the dichotomies themselves, like human nature, retain no metaphysical and ontological significance, the epistemological damage wrought upon women is noted today in research projects that identify a biological basis of sex differences in cognitive abilities[10] and is noticed in the absence of women in academic philosophy as well as other traditionally male careers. Discarding these dichotomies

frees women specifically to pursue intellectual challenges previously reserved for men.

The Fallacy of Antecedent Conditions

The second area in which feminist pragmatism is helpful in highlighting the specific social and political context from which we engage in logical inquiry, in order to provide an analysis of women's oppression, is found in Dewey's critique of what he calls "the fallacy of antecedent conditions" or the "intellectualist fallacy." The fallacy incorporates the construction of a teleology that identifies means with ends. By subsuming means into ends, we convert a functional consciousness into an antecedent existence, whereby past experience is taken as an indication of objective reality. The fallacy has the effect of relegating conditions in life as evidence of an objective reality. From a feminist pragmatist point of view, such a fallacy is at the root of a theory of biological determinism in regards to the perceived inferiority of women's nature and cognitive abilities. For example, if we use the fact that there is a smaller percentage of women than men who go on to earn and receive doctorates, or that there are fewer women than men with degrees in philosophy who go on to teach philosophy, as evidence of an objective state of character--a weak

disposition and/or inferior cognitive skills--we fall into the intellectualist fallacy. Relying on such a teleology takes the social and political conditions of life as ends rather than means. This causes "institutions of accidental historic origin"[11] to take hold--i.e., sexism that prevents women from entering particular fields and the sexual harassment of women who do persist and enter those fields. The historical accident of women's absence is mistakenly used as objective evidence for discrimination.

The fallacy is adhered to by many individuals in universities and other employment and service settings. It was adhered to at the University of Chicago (the seat of pragmatic thought) at the turn of the century. The fallacy held fast in discussions of whether co-education was a goal of the University. Dewey's involvement in highlighting gender issues is apparent in his discussions of co-education and his efforts to change university policy in regards to admitting women.[12] It became apparent in 1900 that women outnumbered men in the departments of philosophy (which included psychology and pedagogy), history, sociology, Greek, Latin, the modern languages, and English. By 1902, female enrollment grew from 40% of the undergraduate student body to over half. President Harper feared that admitting women on equal terms with men, first initiated for economic reasons, would end in the "effeminizing of the university, discourage men

from attending, and prevent the university from becoming a prestigious research institution."[13]

Dewey is unrelenting in his efforts on behalf of co-education and against segregation. Unlike arguments based on financial considerations contributed by his colleagues, Dewey argues for the equality of women on the basis of a theory of democracy. Dewey disregards arguments that presuppose an innate inferiority of women's reasoning abilities.[14] Society encourages women to develop a caring and cooperative nature and then deems the very characteristics as inadequate when judged for their moral and intellectual maturity. Dewey bases his support of causes that enlarge the freedom of activity for women, in large part, on his acquaintance with Jane Addams, Ella Flagg Young, Alice Chipman Dewey, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman, as well as on his beliefs about democracy. He is greatly influenced by a large number of "essentially sane women, women superior in concrete intelligence to almost any man I know."[15] The capacity of women to acquire new habits and avoid their own perceived sense of inequality becomes a means to achieving freedom.

Co-education "is an intellectual and moral necessity in a democracy."[16] Democracy is a way of life, something to be experienced as these women do, not merely a form of government.[17] He writes, "It is my

belief that woman's political enfranchisement is necessary not only to complete the democratic movement, but that till so completed many present evils which superficial observers attribute to democracy instead of to the inadequate character of our democracy, will persist."[18] "You can't have a real democracy when there is caste and cliques or sets. Women are shut out from the culmination and seal for full citizenship, the outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual grace which is liberty."[19] Addams, Young, Chipman Dewey, and Gilman are examples of how when we look at life as it actually occurs, we can avoid the fallacy of antecedent conditions.

Given Dewey's persistence, he calls for a method of inquiry that requires us to experiment to develop within ourselves changes based on different standpoints. He states, "When women who are not mere students of other persons' philosophy set out to write it, we cannot conceive that it will be the same in viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the standpoint of the different masculine experience of things."[20] The practical evidence of Dewey's reliance on experimentation as an important aspect of growth in a democracy lies in his close association with Jane Addams and her work with the settlement residence Hull House as well as her demographic research of immigrants in the south Chicago area. To Dewey, this work presents the ultimate value of any institution--its human effect.[21] Given the persistence

of this woman in experimenting with her career, she achieves freedom in her life. An experimentation that promotes "personal mental activity, such as observing, collecting and examining evidence" ensures intellectual growth through the coordination of means and ends.[22] Dewey claims, "Freedom or individuality, in short, is not an original possession or gift. It is something to be achieved, to be wrought out.[23]

His collaborations with his wife, Alice Chipman Dewey, principal of the Laboratory School, are also practical expressions of his belief that intellectual growth does not develop independently of the economic, social, political, psychological and educational factors of the human condition. The goal of education in furthering the growth of the individual, as he sees it, parallels his claims that there is no reality independent of experience and no standard of logic independent of inquiry.[24]

> Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, this means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming.[25]

His claim is that co-education is required in a democracy as a means of growth.[26] In this way, Dewey preserves education for women in a

democracy as an activity that we pursue for its own sake. These beliefs extend into nontraditional careers for women as well--e.g., law:

> The only way to find the real balance of division of labor is by experimenting. Take law for example. When you think of it now, you think of it as it is, clearly not a very good place for women. But take your own criticisms of lawyers. If you can give a fair quantitative estimate of how the prevailing type of law and lawyers is due to the absence of women, you can do more than I can, but I should put it well above 50%. In other words, you can't tell how much women in law would humanize the profession, would make it conservative in the human sense. Do you regard business as balanced now, or is desire for pecuniary profit much greater than the element of service? How about politics? Now since these ex-balances coincide with an enforced occupational position of women there is a fair bet there is a connection; anyway, we shan't know and get a free equilibrium until there has been a lot of experimenting.[27]

Dewey insists on a continual formulation of the fundamental habits of action and the continuing renewal of the capacity itself by way of experimentation in order to avoid falling into the fallacy of antecedent conditions.

His faith in experimentation is yet again evident in his critique of psychological differences between men and women. He suggests that individuals who base their arguments for segregation and against co-education on psychological differences between men and women fail to realize that these differences are simply habits of actions. That is to say,

> If we think of a habit simply as a change wrought in the organism, ignoring the fact that this change consists of an ability to effect subsequent changes in the environment, we

> shall be led to think of "adjustment" as a conformity to environment as wax conforms to the seal which impresses it. But . . . habits transform the environment . . . [and] mean formation of intellectual and emotional disposition as well as an increase in ease, economy, and efficiency of action.[28]

By concentrating on differences in human nature as unchangeable, we avoid the important question of whether we want to change. Rather, the differences reflect habits of thought and action derived from environmental conditions--i.e., a lack of control of or ability to use natural conditions as the means to achieve certain ends. In "Is Co-Education Injurious to Girls?," he states,

> Often times those who make the most extreme statements regarding the distinctive, innate traits of women seem to think that it is absolutely necessary for men to lay down the law regarding what traits really are--and what are not--natural to women. . . .[29]

Dewey does not deny that there may be inherent characteristics to human nature. However, he focuses on our ability to direct the expression of our natures in ways that transform our experience away from static categories.[30] He writes,

> In the tone of a good deal of what I have read, you have made a class out of women--as if that could be done without making men as a class also. In other words, you have emotionally in many places taken men as a standard--which is a very silly thing to do. We are either dealing with individuals or with humanity as a "whole," in which case the defects on one side are of course corresponded to by defects on the other. This

> represents not only my theoretical philosophy but my observations.[31]

Further, he denounces double standards of morality: "When a man's moral standing affects his right to vote, it should also affect a woman's--not til then."[32] He asserts that intellectual differences between boys and girls are more distinct individually than they are between sexes. Any difference in mental capacity is due to "arrangement, proportion and emphasis, rather than kind or quality."[33]

Dewey succeeds in weakening arguments that limit women's intellectual growth by characterizing such arguments as a limit on democracy itself. He insists that we focus practically on the social, political and economic conditions that support the disenfranchisement of women.[34]

The limitation of Dewey's pragmatic analysis is a missing component. What is missing is an analysis of the conditions that set up the hurdles that women overcome through social and political experimentation. Dewey's logic of inquiry is structured in such a way that the context in which the hurdles arise as problems is not questioned directly. Bringing the issue of gender within the purview of one's work does not only entail assisting and encouraging women to push through the social, political and psychological barriers that are laid out in front of them. The issue of co-education cannot

be seen as a problem that women bring with them and that pragmatism can solve. The problem arises out of a gendered, contextualized, indeterminate situation that has disadvantages particularly for women. The effects of assuming gender distinctions are the factors that make the problem of who is disadvantaged clear.

It remains unclear whether Dewey himself fully broke the traditional philosophical link of practical life with women and the rational life with men.[35] His acknowledgements were mostly private, appearing in footnotes and introductions, not included in most of the philosophical publications essential for professional recognition. In addition, what is lacking is an intellectual engagement with women in his written work. We have yet to find correspondence with women colleagues which reflect the rich exchange he has with male colleagues--e.g., James Tufts, Bertrand Russell, and Arthur Bentley. Dewey does have one piece in which he takes on Jane Addams' view of democracy. It is in an introduction to her book Peace and Bread in Time of War.[36] There is also evidence in the correspondence between Dewey and Elsie Ripley Sprague that she, while his student and teaching assistant from 1907 to 1927, provided critical suggestions for many of his ideas.[37]

Dewey was one of the few pragmatists who recognized that, as beneficiaries of epistemological traditions that support women's inferior status, men have determined the nature of women's failures and limited successes. The individual experiences of Jane Addams, Alice Chipman Dewey and Lucy Sprague Mitchell serve pragmatically as evidence of a masculine bias. They should serve pragmatically as starting points for further inquiry. Without testing the context in which Dewey wrote and worked, we are left with a form of pragmatism that falls short of the critical step of inquiry: the context for the indeterminate circumstance. The following section provides this context.

Pragmatism and Women

The disparity between women's successful work in philosophy and their underrepresentation in the field professionally presents the classic "problematic situation": the beginning of inquiry. This arises when, given a set of conditions, an unexpected circumstance arises. One expects that equal training results in proportionally equal representation in all fields. This did not happen.

Despite working as Dewey's graduate assistant for twelve courses between 1911 and 1927, possessing an M.A. in philosophy from Columbia,

than as a philosopher.[40] As evidence of this trend, Mary Jo Deegan reports that, in 1920, all the women sociologists in the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago were moved en masse out of sociology and into social work. Personnel and policy changes resulted in a different practice of sociology and social work.[41] The changes were attributed to natural differences.

Seigfried resolves that these women did not see their postgraduate activities as elements of the creation of pragmatic theory. Rather, their work appealed to them for different reasons.

> The enthusiasm and persistency with which women embraced the experimental method outside the confines of the scientific laboratory testifies to the special appeal it had for them as women. . . . This experimental method gave women a powerful tool for escaping the constraints of tradition.[42]

These women qualified their endeavors as efforts to define themselves primarily as full citizens. Mitchell's experience at Berkeley is a good example. "It came as a shock when I realized that most of the faculty thought of women frankly as inferior beings."[43] Consequently, the efforts of these women were "feminis[t] not as theory but as a hard-fought life struggle."[44] Seigfried says that Clapp and Mitchell

> do not seem to have developed a pragmatist version of feminism; instead, they seemed to have developed feminine--perhaps incipiently feminist--versions of pragmatism by

> deliberately bringing politically informed points of view as women to their work in education.[45]

But according to Seigfried's analysis, the paths of these women's lives "were a direct result of a masculinist perspective which dominated both the subject matter of philosophy and the attitudes of philosophy professors."[46]

Neither changing the practical constraints on women's philosophical achievement nor recognizing the sociological and psychological barriers directly addresses why even Clapp, Mitchell and Taft did not develop a form of feminist pragmatism. We need to acknowledge, as Nelson suggests, that "an epistemology is radically interdependent with other knowledge and undertakings and should be pursued as such and that the justification of beliefs and theories (if it occurs) will be on the basis of their coherence with experience rather than by appeal to a current epistemology."[47] The pragmatists of this time failed to see that they still had a foot in traditional modernism. The categories of rationality are not sufficiently challenged simply by the presence of the feminist standpoints of these women. Their standpoints were considered evidence of a difference in personalities rather than evidence of sexism. Their standpoints were understood as private experiences linked as the subjects of the current epistemology rather than

linked as the components of a context that determined a problematic situation.

Dewey's logic, his theory of inquiry, requires the investigation of the conditions which give rise to the unanticipated consequence so as to highlight what circumstances can be altered to effect change. But a pragmatic analysis of this kind only forms a part of an effective argument for women's full citizenship. A feminist pragmatic analysis shows how the standpoints of these women remain stagnant without the understanding of the broader context that reflects masculine concerns and purposes. A feminist pragmatic analysis offers the specific context of sexism that Mitchell experienced at Berkeley. Her experience should serve as the beginning of an inquiry. Pragmatism requires us to engage in this form of self-reflective activity. "The duty of the present is the socializing of intelligence--the realizing of its bearing upon social practice."[48] Dewey begins to focus on a feminist-pragmatist-type project in the following comments:

> you will find that they agree that men are essentially hogs--and that the worst of it is they haven't the slightest idea of the fact, since what they hog are intangible things; in other words, they assume that their work is the really important thing in the world. Till my attention was called to it, I am bound to say I had always assumed that, and I don't think I have ever met a man who didn't practically say to himself, "Why of course it

> is. How funny that anybody should question it." If that is not being a hog, I don't know what is.[49]

We must, as Dewey suggests here, undergo a self-corrective process of the operations we perform and determine that this kind of thinking is a cause of obfuscation. Otherwise, we will fail to see life as it actually occurs and fail in our endeavors as pragmatists.

Summary

Dewey's logic of inquiry serves to thwart the implication of essentialism in its articulation of the uselessness of traditional dichotomies and the fallacy of antecedent conditions. His theory also thwarts the implication of relativized experiences (standpoints) by emphasizing the necessity of a contextualized problematic. The context of selective interests and particular purposes limits the arbitrariness when subjective components are introduced into epistemology. From Chapter III we also conclude that knowing arises not from the standpoint following inquiry, but the standpoint that contextualizes the indeterminate circumstances at the beginning of inquiry. Each implied problem narrows the context of any inquiry to the point that a functional consciousness is converted into an antecedent

existence whereby past experiences are taken as an indication of objective reality.[50]

Dewey's work on co-education marks an attempt to frame a feminist issue pragmatically. He uses the experiences of the particular women he works with at the University of Chicago and at Hull House to conclude that (1) the underlying economic values that support the absence of women have to be examined and discarded; and (2) those values that support a growth in intelligence--i.e., democratic values--should be examined and embraced.[51]

When Dewey's logic of inquiry regarding the issue of co-education is viewed in light of Charlene Haddock Seigfried's historical research on women's experiences in philosophy in Dewey's time, we notice that Dewey is beginning to offer us a new dimension of pragmatism: feminist pragmatism. By evaluating the underlying values that support any one experience or plural experiences, Dewey avoids judging subjective experiences relativistically and avoids judging objective experiences (of women generally) as universal. Even though it seems clear that Dewey successfully engaged gender in an understanding of what determines the problematic rather than assuming that the problem is a woman's problem or a problem with women, it is unclear whether others, particularly the

president of the University of Chicago and his fellow pragmatists, also did (although perhaps Herbert Mead did).

Pragmatism as theory is poised to be feminist. The extent to which pragmatism can align women's experiences with theory provides evidence for Dewey's claim that our experiences can influence our perspectives and value judgments.[52] The limitation of pragmatism is the incompleteness of its logic. The pragmatist moves too uncritically from the "indeterminate" situation to the "problem" situation. The problem is created out of the gendered indeterminate setting. It would be improper to identify it later in the process of inquiry as a problem of gender. The pragmatist must take the role of gendered experience (standpoint) seriously at work in the formulation of the problem.

Pragmatism, as a political theory, develops a critical perspective, a sensitivity to context and situation, and a collaborative and interactive engagement of personal experiences that test theories. Political theory has practical consequences. Without an analysis of gender underwritten as a specific, rather than a general, context, nonfeminist pragmatism offers us only limited methods for the reconstruction of culture.

In theory, pragmatism, as a critique of culture, presents the role of philosophy as the socializing of intelligence and the emergence of thought

through experimentation. A gendered analysis affords the opportunity for pragmatic philosophers to dissemble the masculinistic value orientation of philosophy and offer a feminist methodology that addresses the patriarchal, competitive and militaristic values and expressions of everyday life.

If we fail to recognize knowledge as emergent from within the context of selective interests, we in effect too readily convert it into its virtual denial[53] and overlook the important context of the relation of this knowledge to social and political factors.[54] I point out in Chapter I how Lawrence Kohlberg too easily constructs a reality in which standards--e.g., moral maturity--are, as Dewey says, "found in what is prior to the consequences of overt activity and independent of it."[55] Kohlberg concludes that women are morally immature prior to the consequences of their own overt activity and independently of it, and he reaches this conclusion by the use of a standard other than their own. Such omissions in the process of logical inquiry create a failure to see life as it actually occurs. We must, as Dewey suggests, undergo a self-corrective process of the operations we perform by determining whether they are sources of enrichment or causes of obfuscation. Our ability to grow intellectually and educate ourselves is evidence of human nature's flexibility in forming new ways of thinking, feeling, desiring and believing. If we allow the inertia of custom to lead us

to believe that women's roles should be limited to past experience, we "doom individuals to a fixed channel of expression."[56]

Feminist pragmatism provides a framework that broadens individual projects or hypotheses to encompass the evidence that actually supports the research.[57] Unrecognized sexist assumptions as well as a residue of cultural attitudes make the link between the context of women's lives and philosophical praxis difficult to establish and maintain. Feminist pragmatism provides the intellectual labor to establish and maintain a pragmatism that contextualizes sexist selective interests.

The reason biases toward women persist in the face of overt pragmatic efforts to change these biases is that epistemology still lacks an authentic view of the relationship between knowledge and social and political power relations.[58] The isolation of women in academia and career placement caused by epistemological biases is more subtle than the overt political isolation that Jessie Taft experienced for years. So, the role of standpoint in pragmatism must be increased and expanded to earlier stages of inquiry (not just the problematic situation).

Notes

[1]Lynn Hankinson Nelson, "A Question of Evidence," Hypatia 8, no. 2 (1993): 185.

[2]Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "Where Are All the Pragmatist Feminists?," Hypatia 6, no. 2 (1991): 1-20.

[3]Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "Classical American Philosophy's Invisible Women," Canadian Review of American Studies, Special Issue (1992): 83-116.

[4]See Catharine MacKinnon, "Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court," chap. in Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1987); and Sandra Harding, "Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible Only Now?," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Reidel, 1983), 311-24.

Dewey's critique of the uselessness of classical philosophical dichotomies when applied to the lives of women today reconstructs our culture in such a way that job security for part-time employees and health care for the working poor, both of which apply predominantly to women, take a commanding role.

[5]Nelson, "A Question of Evidence," 177.

[6]See Dewey, "The Objectivism-Subjectivism of Modern Philosophy," LW 14:189-201.

[7]For a more in-depth discussion of (1) how these traditional dichotomies work to the disadvantage of women and (2) the fact that women do not view them as dichotomous, see Morwena Griffiths and Margaret Whitford, eds., Feminist Perspective in Philosophy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988); Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston, and Jane English, eds., Feminism and Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977); Lloyd, The Man of Reason (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Nancy Tuana, Women and the

History of Philosophy (New York: Paragon House, 1992); Anne Phillips, Engendering Democracy (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 1991); Dale Spender, Women of Ideas (and What Men Have Done to Them) (London: Ark, 1983); Dorothy Smith, The Everyday World As Problematic; bell hooks, Ain't I a Woman? (Boston: South End Press, 1981); and Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

[8]See Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "Validating Women's Experience Pragmatically," in Philosophy and the Reconstruction of Culture: Pragmatic Essays After Dewey, ed. John Stuhr (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993), 124. Also, see Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "The Missing Perspective: Feminist Pragmatism," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 27, no. 4 (1991): 412.

[9]There is a tremendous range of contemporary philosophical work that critiques classical philosophical works in the history of philosophy: Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman; Ann Ferguson, Sexual Democracy: Women, Oppression and Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Lloyd, The Man of Reason; Tasmin E. Lorraine, Gender, Identity, and the Production of Meaning (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, Woman, Nature and Psyche (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987); Mary O'Brien, Reproducing the World: Essays on Feminist Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); Nancy Tuana, The Less Noble Sex (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993); and Tuana, Women and the History of Philosophy.

The following anthologies are also helpful: Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt, eds., A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays of Reason and Objectivity (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Mary Lyndon Stanley and Carole Pateman, eds., Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991); Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus, eds., Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987); Lorenne M. Clark and Lynda Lange, The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979); and Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King, eds., Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

In regards to individual historical figures (e.g., Hegel), see Seyla

Benhabib, "On Hegel, Women and Irony," in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, ed. Mary Lyndon Shanley and Carole Pateman (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), 129-45; Joanna Hodge, "Women and the Hegelian State," in Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche, ed. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 127-58; Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, "Hegel and 'The Woman Question': Recognition and Intersubjectivity," in The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche, ed. Lorenne M. G. Clark and Lynda Lange (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 74-98; and Heidi Ravven, "Has Hegel Anything to Say to Feminists?," The Owl of Minerva 19, no. 2 (1988): 149-168.

In regards to Nietzsche, see Alison Ainley, "'Ideal Selfishness': Nietzsche's Metaphor of Maternity," in Exceedingly Nietzsche, ed. Krell and Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988), 116-30; and Ellen Kennedy, "Nietzsche: Women As Untermensche," in Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche, ed. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 179-201.

In regards to John Stuart Mill, see Lea Campos Boralevi, "Utilitarianism and Feminism," in Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche, ed. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 159-78.

[10]See Helen Longino, Science As Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Nelson, Who Knows; and Bleier.

[11]Dewey, "The Construction of the Good," LW 4:211.

[12]Jo Ann Boydston cites two 1902 statements in favor of co-education which Dewey wrote to University of Chicago president William Rainey Harper. Although unpublished and not particularly philosophical, they do constitute a public stand on co-education. See John Dewey to William Rainey Harper, 9 January 1902, Transcript in the Presidential Papers, 1899-1925, Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago; and John Dewey to A. W. Parker, University of Chicago Senate, 25 July 1902, Transcript in the Presidential Papers, 1899-1925, Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago.

Dewey also wrote three articles. Two of these had arguments, one written in 1885 (for Science) and another in 1886 (for Popular Science Monthly), that advocate the statistical study of women's health and education. See Dewey, "Education and the Health of Women," in John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1898 (hereinafter cited as EW), ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969-72), 1:64-68; and Dewey, "Health and Sex in Higher Education," EW 1:69-80.

[13]See Rosiland Rosenberg, Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots of Modern Feminism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 43-51, 115-116; and Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "The Chicago Connection: The Untold Story of Feminism and Pragmatism," paper presented at a conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Houston, TX, March 4, 1994.

[14]The inferiority argument consists of the claim that women are not morally mature individuals since they cannot reason objectively in a manner which is dispassionate and free of personal affiliations.

[15]Jo Ann Boydston's research uncovered this correspondence. Dewey's letter to Klyce, 5 July 1915, quoted in Jo Ann Boydston, "John Dewey and the New Feminism," Teacher's College Record 76 (1975): 443.

[16]Dewey, "Is Co-Education Injurious to Girls?," MW 6:162.

[17]The continuity of his philosophical thought in regards to democracy and the normal processes of his life is reflected in the political stand he takes in regard to war. Robert Westbrook, in John Dewey and American Democracy, traces Dewey's engagement in debates over whether America should enter World War I. His conflict is between his thought that the U.S. should enter the war and his own pacifist stand. By way of thoughtful experimentation, Randolph Bourne debates Dewey, and in the process, Dewey changes his mind and concludes that entering the war is warranted.

[18]Dewey, "A Symposium on Women's Suffrage," MW 6:152-53.

[19]Dewey, "Professor for Suffrage," MW 7:409.

[20]Dewey, "Philosophy and Democracy," MW 11:45.

[21]Dewey, "Education As a Necessity of Life," MW 9:9-10.

[22]Dewey, How We Think, rev. ed., LW 8:116.

[23]Dewey, "Individuality and Experience," LW 2:61.

[24]Stuhr, John Dewey.

[25]Dewey, "Education As Growth," MW 9:54.

[26]The development of new habits and the continuing renewal of this capacity itself is explicitly in line with his theory of the experimental nature of democracy.

[27]Dewey letter to Klyce, 8 May 1920, quoted in Boydston, "John Dewey and the New Feminism," 447.

[28]Dewey, "Education As Growth," MW 9:51-53.

[29]Dewey, "Is Co-Education Injurious to Girls?," MW 6:161.

[30]See Dewey, "Does Human Nature Change?," LW 13:286.

[31]Dewey's letter to Klyce, 5 July 1915, quoted in Boydston, "Dewey and the New Feminism," 446.

[32]Dewey. "A Symposium on Women's Suffrage," MW 6:153.

[33]Dewey, "Is Co-Education Injurious to Girls?," MW 6:159-60.

[34]Of note are also Dewey's colleagues' efforts to support women. Veblen Thomas and George Herbert Mead were among those quite supportive of their women students. Mead directed Jessie Taft in "The Women Movement from the Perspective of Social Consciousness" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1913), which may be the first philosophy dissertation written on a feminist issue, according to Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "Introduction to Jessie Taft: The Woman Movement from the

Point of View of Social Consciousness," Hypatia 8, no. 2 (1993): 215-18. Dewey himself recommended Elsie Clapp to replace him when he retired from teaching his education courses at the Teachers College at Columbia in 1927. He not only provided guidance and mentoring to those women with whom he spent time, but acknowledged when these women were a great influence on his own work.

[35]Susan Laird claims that even the canonical texts of Dewey's philosophy of education (namely The Child and the Curriculum, MW 2:271-92; The School and Society, MW 1:1-110; Moral Principle in Education, MW 4:265-92; Democracy and Education, MW 9; and Experience and Education, LW 13:1-62) "never publicly, explicitly demonstrate his privately claimed 'feminism.'" Susan Laird, "Woman and Gender in John Dewey's Philosophy of Education," Education Theory 38, no. 1 (1988): 113.

[36]This work by Dewey can also be found entitled "Democratic Versus Coercive International Organization--The Realism of Jane Addams," LW 15:192-98.

[37]Dewey acknowledged her for her influence in the preface of Democracy and Education, MW 9, originally published in 1916.

[38]In addition to all the others I have mentioned, another example of a pragmatic problematic situation is Seigfried's cite of the failure of Ms. Puffer (Howes) to renew a grant at Smith College in 1925. She wanted to continue to research practical ways of combining marriage and motherhood with professional careers. The grant was not renewed because the faculty viewed the program as diluting liberal education with vocationalism.

John Stuhr points out that for Dewey to ask whether formal education should be liberal or vocational is to operate with assumptions unfounded in actual experience. Such dichotomies are the tedious fictions of philosophers who fail to inquire into the nature of schooling as it actually occurs. Stuhr, John Dewey.

[39]See Seigfried, "Classical American Philosophy's Invisible Women," 106. Sexist attitudes can be misinterpreted as only personal (as in personality) difference if the differences are misconstrued as natural or customary. On the other hand, differences need not be sexist. See Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (New York:

Crossing Press, 1983), particularly chapter 2.

[40]On the other hand, Mary Jo Deegan suggests in Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School, 1892-1918 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 253, that Jane Addams laid the groundwork for philosophical pragmatism.

[41]Ibid., 309. Also, see Mary Jo Deegan, "Women in Sociology: 1890-1930," Journal of the History of Sociology 1 (1978): 19-23. Seigfried's paper, "The Chicago Connection," presented at the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy conference, in Houston, Texas, indicated that much of the movement of women into the university at the turn of the century had more to do with the institution's financial need than that with women's skill and intelligence. Men's superiority was re-established when finances were stable. Women were moved out of the university and/or marginalized into traditional female disciplines. See Rosenberg.

[42]Seigfried, "Classical American Philosophy's Invisible Woman," 103.

[43]Lucy Sprague Mitchell, Two Lives: The Story of Wesley Clair Mitchell and Myself (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953), 193.

[44]Joyce Antler, "Feminism As a Life Process: The Life and Career of Lucy Sprague Mitchell," Feminist Studies 7 (Spring 1981): xx.

[45]Seigfried, "Classical American Philosophy's Invisible Women," 109.

[46]Ibid., 110.

[47]Nelson, "A Question of Evidence," 177.

[48]Dewey, Outlines for a Critical Theory of Ethics, EW 3:239-388.

[49]Dewey's letter to Klyce, 5 July 1915, quoted in Boydston, "Dewey and the New Feminism," 445.

[50]Dewey, Experience and Nature, LW 1:3-326.

[51]See Phillips.

[52]See Seigfried, "Validating Women's Experience Pragmatically," 115.

[53]Dewey, Context and Thought, LW 6:19.

[54]Dewey's own example of fact derived without context is Newtonian science. Newtonian science sets up substances, particles and atoms with inherent mathematical properties. There is no discrete piece of evidence that warrants them. While these properties are viewed as ultimate realities, there is a systematic and, in many cases, a directed denial of the context in which they arise.

[55]Dewey, "Conflict of Authorities," LW 4:59. See Chapter I of this dissertation regarding Kohlberg's scales of moral maturity. In addition, another case in which the social and political relations are disengaged from scientific research is the finding that gay men have a smaller hypothalamus in their brains that heterosexuals have. Given the social condemnation of gay men, it is not coincidence that studies are undertaken to find out what is different or "wrong" with them. The same kind of study could also be done on gay women, but they remain invisible in the issue of homosexuality. This may be a blessing in this case, but not overall.

[56]Dewey, "Does Human Nature Change?," LW 13:292.

[57]Nelson, "A Question of Evidence," 183.

[58]Some of Foucault's work addresses this relationship more adequately. See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).

CHAPTER V

ENGENDERED PRAGMATISM

From Feminist Standpoint Theory and Pragmatism to Engendered Pragmatism

The study of philosophy involves a self-reflective analysis of lived experience.

> There is a special service which the study of philosophy may render. Empirically pursued it will not be a study of philosophy but a study, by means of philosophy, of life experience.[1]

Dewey's pragmatic method of inquiry, when used as the means for such an analysis, can provide an emancipatory philosophy for women if, as he says, the theories it projects "refer back to ordinary life experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful."[2] Dewey's logic of inquiry enables us to determine the warrantability of our behaviors. Inquiry begins with an indeterminate situation: a set of circumstances or underlying conditions that has brought about unanticipated consequences. The problem, the subject of inquiry, is formulated in terms of its underlying conditions, novel

consequences and degrees of felt dissatisfaction. With this process in mind, pragmatic inquiries provide knowledge in the form of warranted solutions. Knowledge is viewed in its relation to particular lived situations rather than viewed as discovered independently of lived existence.[3] What is viewed as knowledge is the transformation of selected parts of our everyday experiences. John Dewey's epistemology offers us a method of inquiry that enables us to reflect and ultimately test the warrantability of our beliefs and values. His logic requires us to examine the context of past interests, hopes and desires, and evaluate what values and beliefs conflict with novel circumstances: those new conditions that make up current life experience.

Chapter IV underscores that gender must be incorporated as a component of the underlying indeterminate circumstances prior to inquiry. Consequently, the process of inquiry is altered to the extent that a new view of what the problem entails emerges. By infusing gender at this point, we do not simply apply pragmatism to women's experiences. Pragmatism moves too uncritically from the "indeterminate" situation to the "problem" situation. On the other hand, feminist standpoint theorists emphasize the importance of the woman's voice and the feminist perspective. The theory highlights the importance of gender in any investigation. Taking gender seriously forces us to recognize not only the importance of subjective

components of reasoning. We come to understand that there are differences among subjectivities that are epistemologically relevant.

Chapter III points out that feminist standpoint theory can mistake the place of gender in epistemology. Gender is a category, but the fact that there are feminist standpoints that we start with means that the standpoints are not knowledge standpoints. They are standpoints that exist prior to the act of inquiry. Harding is right that efforts to know arise from standpoints but not as standpoints following inquiry. Engendered pragmatism as an epistemology involves a process of inquiry that pays attention to individual experiences. Engendered pragmatism locates standpoints prior to the process of inquiry by identifying the gendered components of experience in the indeterminate circumstances. When gender is incorporated at this point the creation of the problematic situation can be determined in different ways. There may be disagreement about just what it is that is wrong, about what the problem is. Feminist standpoints indicate that women who are in a shared indeterminate situation can suggest that something is wrong. Consequently, problems that take gender into account can be handled pragmatically.

Before turning to more theoretical issues in greater detail, I introduce a hypothetical case whose analysis will serve as an illustration of

engendered pragmatism. Thus, this chapter has three subsequent sections before its conclusion. The next section is a case study, followed by a section entitled "The Emergence of Feminist Perspectives in Law," which explains the historical and traditional legal methodology that used the reasonable man standard and its informal change to the reasonable person standard in the 1980s, due primarily to the rise of women in law. The informal switch indicated a consciousness among judges and lawyers of the need to change the masculine standards in the language of law. This historical move presents the emergence of the feminist standpoint as important in any inquiry. This portion of the dissertation also explicates the specific components of a feminist standpoint analysis that are incorporated in the feminist pragmatic analysis of the hypothetical case in the penultimate section.

The penultimate section, "Engendered Pragmatism," highlights the elements of a feminist pragmatic analysis and applies them specifically to the hypothetical case. Engendered pragmatism assists in evaluating which intersubjective differences are warranted and which are not.

A Case Study

Dr. Harry Stone was professor of architecture and urban studies and advisor to the undergraduate students in his department at Bucks University in 1995.[4] Bucks University is reputed to have the best architecture program in the region. Leigh Admunson was a sophomore majoring in architecture. Dr. Stone and Leigh Admunson became acquainted at a preregistration faculty-student meeting with undergraduates who were interested in declaring their majors in the department of architecture and urban studies. At that time Leigh introduced herself as someone interested in the field and who wanted more information about the department. Dr. Stone provided her with literature regarding requirements for a major in architecture. Leigh decided that term to take an introductory course in architecture that Dr. Stone taught.

Over a period of several weeks, Dr. Stone began to leer at Leigh in a sexually suggestive fashion. From time to time, over a several-month period, he would touch her, rub up against her, place objects between her legs, make suggestive remarks and comment upon her breasts and legs. Two of her undergraduate friends reported to her that on at least one occasion they each had overheard Dr. Stone refer to Leigh as a "fox" with

"a nice ass" to other professors in the hall outside the department office door.

On one occasion when Leigh entered the classroom for class, Dr. Stone whispered to her that he "had to have her" and that "he would have her." He asked her to come to his office to confer about a paper she was writing for his class. He told her that she was much brighter than any of his male students and that, via his one-on-one tutelage, she could make good progress. He confided in her that he did not like having women in his architecture classes, that women should not be architects, but that she was among the few exceptions he had noticed over the last five years and had felt a responsibility to work with more closely. She, like only a few female students before in his classes, was taken under his wing due to her high skill level. She agreed to meet with him in his office and did so over a period of several months.

However, during Dr. Stone's meetings with Leigh, he would tell her that her work was inadequate and that there was some question as to whether she would succeed in the program. She began to worry and feel dependent on him for his approval.

Within two months, Dr. Stone engaged Leigh in a violent sexual relationship by telling her that she "owed him" for all he was doing for her

as her supervisor and mentor. He explained to her that he and his wife had an "open marriage." He advised her that she wanted to have sex with him as an outlet for her abundant creativity. When Leigh resisted oral sex, he declared that her fear of "sucking on his cock" was due to the conflict she felt between very much wanting to do so and never having done it before. She complied with this and other various sexual requests throughout the school year.

Within a few weeks of the beginning of the sexual relationship, Leigh felt that she should not be doing what she was doing with Dr. Stone, though she could not explain her feelings to herself. Intermittently, she began to turn down his requests to come to his office, although she feared that he could and would kick her out of the program if she did not give in to his demands. She found that the conditions of her progress--work-study jobs in the department, internships, final grades, and even other faculty support--varied from time to time, depending on her responsiveness to Dr. Stone, even though her level of commitment to her studies and overall achievement remained constant.

In addition, during this time, Dr. Stone posted sexually explicit cartoons on his door that remained there for days at a time. She saw some of these when they were posted, and was embarrassed and ashamed. Leigh

called her parents at some point late in the spring term and declared that she wanted to take time off and planned not to return to school the following year.

The Emergence of Feminist Perspectives in Law

The traditional legal rules of evidence appraise reported facts in terms of their compliance to a definition of sexual harassment established by masculine interests. That is, a finding of sexual harassment is confirmed by the extent to which the reported facts comport with a definition that represents masculine interests. Rules of evidence narrow the context of the indeterminate situation to masculine concerns even in cases where the underlying circumstances reflected the felt dissatisfaction of women. Only those facts that fall within the category of established norms of discrimination establish sexual harassment. The masculine standard is used as an objective and neutral standard to establish truth. This standard has begun to change as feminist analyses introduce multiple perspectives. The emergence of standpoints--specifically, feminist standpoints--has moved us away from a universal perspective.

The legal rules of evidence changed informally in the early 1980s. It changed from the reasonable man standard to the reasonable person standard

due primarily to the work of feminist legal theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon. It became apparent that the reasonable man standard presented the views of the reasonable man per se and disregarded differences between what men and women perceived as reasonable in light of the differences in the socialization of men and women. It was thought, during this time, that the reasonable person standard was a better standard since it appeared neutral and thus presented an objective human view rather than a sex-linked view.

However, more recently, the assumption of gender neutrality implicit in a standard in which males' and females' definitions of harassment are treated similarly has been challenged. The challenge has resulted in the adoption of a reasonable woman standard in some federal court districts. Some judges adjudicating sexual harassment cases find that the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct cannot be judged by the reasonable person standard because it does not address that prevailing attitudes may nevertheless represent a masculine perspective. Women's complaints were considered legitimate only insofar as the offensive behavior was viewed as inappropriate by men. The feminist challenges to this view convey that males and females differ in their perceptions of what constitutes sexual harassment.

Legal language is principally informed by men's experiences, and it derives from the powerful social situation of men, relative to women.[5] Feminist interpretations are forcing a change. Women cannot continue to be considered the wife of the "man in his shirtsleeve," who considers her reasonable only for as long as she tolerates the status quo and concurrently shows appropriate feminine sensibilities.[6] Women must be considered reasonable independently of men. However, if, in American society, particularly in work and educational settings, boys and men define girls and women by their sexuality and not by their ability to reason, the only standard with which to judge women's reasonableness is the masculine one. Conversely, because feminist standpoint theory highlights subjective differences, women in particular are identified as the objects of abuse.

Unfortunately, the informal shift to the reasonable person standard in the early 1980s from the reasonable man standard inadvertently reflects a male standard whether it is called "reasonable man" or "reasonable person." This is substantiated by the fact that the majority of people recognize that prevailing attitudes do not condemn sexually harassing behavior.[7] Reflecting this view, Judge Keith, dissenting, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson states:

> In my view, the reasonable person perspective fails to account for the wide divergence between most women's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men. . . . Moreover, unless the outlook of the reasonable woman is adopted, the defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men.[8]

In an opinion written for Ellison v. Brady, a 1991 case in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the majority explains that the reasonable person standard only reinforces the status quo and "the prevailing level of discrimination."[9]

However, Judge Stephens, dissenting in the Ellison case, supports a reasonable person standard as a gender neutral standard. He claims that the reasonable person standard is adequate based on the fact that even a reasonable man can understand a woman's reaction to a given situation. Unfortunately, he fails to recognize the primary assumption that this can only be accomplished when the man has to look at the situation from the woman's point of view in order to understand it.[10] I maintain that in order to look at the situation from a woman's point of view, men must view their own lives as controlled by gendered circumstances. Not to do so suggests that those individuals enjoy the benefits they receive under the reasonable man standard. Only secondarily do they object to the reasonable woman

standard because they want a standard that more accurately presents an ungendered reasonable person.

In any event, it is becoming more difficult to hold Judge Stephens' view in light of what feminist legal theorists and lawyers have brought to judges' attention. They have brought in research that uncovers gender-based differences in a variety of sexual-harassment-related issues. Some of the social science findings offered to the courts include, for example, that females are much more likely than males to report that they experienced some form of unwelcome sexual attention,[11] that females consistently define more social sexual behaviors as sexual harassment than do males,[12] and that females believe that sexual harassment is a more frequent occurrence than do males.[13]

In 1986, as a result of feminist challenges, the Supreme Court established in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that the key criterion for defining behavior as sexually harassing is whether the target found the behavior to be unwelcome.[14] The opinions in both Ellison and Meritor propose that if there is a distinction between what a reasonable male would consider sexually harassing and what a reasonable female would consider sexually harassing, then there are significant differences between genders, and it would be inappropriate to allow the male standard to prevail, as it

would rule out salient evidence for females. Since the Meritor case, courts have decided that cases evaluating claims of sexual harassment tend to be male biased and tend to ignore the experiences of women.

Prior to the Meritor case, legal inquiries into sexual harassment issues used the perpetrator's interpretation of the victim's experience as the standard. Unfortunately, this process evaluates the experience of sexual harassment by someone other than the one who finds the behavior problematic and with a standard that the victim has not set nor approved of. Consequently, in most cases, the perpetrator would not perceive the behavior as problematic. The behavior is allowed. Or, if the behavior is deemed problematic, it is not reprehensible. An inquiry of this sort is of little value. In this case, the result of the inquiry supports such behavior.

A paradox becomes apparent. An inquiry using the standard established by the perpetrator cannot get at what is problematic and reprehensible about the behavior. The standard must reflect the victim's view in order to be able to evaluate the indeterminate circumstances adequately. The evidence must come from the victim's experiences. Audre Lorde explains the paradox by analogy: "The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house."[15] We cannot find what is sexually harassing about some behaviors using the standards created by the offender.

Prior to the Meritor case, the individual woman's experience was interpreted by men. Since for the traditional legalist, factors were judged by what was thought to be a value-free standard, no analysis into the underlying social and political conditions was required. The determination of whether the behavior of the accused violated what the law was supposed to protect against proceeded without consideration of underlying conditions.

Many people saw this type of proceeding during the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas federal congressional hearings.[16] The rules of evidence were set by a white masculine interpretation of Anita Hill's experience of sexual harassment.[17] The only relevant question was, "Which one of the parties is lying?" The hearing did not broaden the context that would have validated Hill's experience and found it true. Nor were underlying differences in the socialization of men and women introduced. The hearing was simply played out as a legal battle of truth and falsity determined politically by those with power.

A shift in perspective from the perpetrator's point of view to the target's point of view requires an epistemological shift. When what is taken as evidence changes, knowledge--in this case, what is taken as sexual harassment--changes. This is accomplished by changing the rules of evidence.

A feminist standpoint critique changes the evidence standard by including gender experiences as social/historical and political/economic. The criterion in a feminist standpoint analysis is not the woman's voice--i.e., what she said happened, although this experience in the context of her whole life does form the basis of a feminist standpoint. The feminist standpoint analysis recognizes the subjective nature of all judgment, rejects a unified judgment that ignores subjective differences, and rejects any single view prior to inquiry. Feminist rules of evidence make the plurality of women's concerns more visible. Consequently, the categories of established norms of discrimination become indefinite.

The incorporation of standpoints' concerns is vital to the pragmatic process of inquiry. However, in the course of attributing cognitive authority to the feminist standpoints prior to inquiry, we run the risk of universalizing and validating what a feminist standpoint is as "feminist." That is, in trying to determine what aspects of all women's lives are epistemologically significant, we begin to unify the category "woman." But there are no universal features of women's existence. Alternatively, if we focus on a plurality of feminist standpoints, we have to determine a criterion to mediate among them at the same time we figure out what is feminist about them.

I will begin to draw out the important components of feminist standpoint analysis in precedent cases in regards to sexual harassment. The federal court in Ellison v. Brady established the need for a "reasonable woman standard." The court noted that the trier of fact has to come to understand and analyze the different perspectives women and men have toward sexual conduct. Men, the court noted, have a greater tendency to view sexual harassment as harmless amusement. The court stated:

> For example, because women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive.[18]

The experience of the victim evaluated by the "reasonable woman standard" determines whether sexual conduct is unwelcome, creates a hostile environment, or alters an academic environment.[19] The Ellison court stressed that the intent of the judiciary is not to impose unreasonable burdens upon employers by relying upon a reasonable woman standard. Rather, the intent is to provide the same protection under the law to both males and females.

A recent 1993 study done by Rebecca Thacker and Stephen Gohmann appraised the accuracy of judges' determinations of male/female differences and the need for a reasonable woman standard. The study shows that there are systemic gender-based differences in both perceptions and effects of hostile-work-environment harassment among public employees in the federal workplace.[20] As indicated in Table 1, Thacker and Gohmann ask individual men and women to rate, on a five-point scale, five different behaviors: (1) uninvited letters, telephone calls, or materials of a sexual nature; (2) uninvited and deliberate touching, leaning over, cornering, or pinching; (3) uninvited sexually suggestive looks or gestures; (4) uninvited pressure for dates; and (5) uninvited sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, or questions. (A sixth behavior, uninvited pressure for sexual favors, is not included in the analysis, as it is an example of "quid pro quo" harassment.)[21] For such behavior, respondents are asked to respond to two questions: (1) If a supervisor did this, would you consider this sexual harassment?; and (2) If another worker did this, would you consider this sexual harassment? For every variable, the female mean was significantly higher than the male mean, indicating that females are significantly more likely than men to define the behaviors as sexually harassing. Also of note is that the differences in means between men and women are the smallest for those

TABLE 1. Results of t Tests for Gender-Based Differences in Perceptions of Behaviors That Constitute Hostile Environment Harassment

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	t Statistic
Letters/Calls from Supervisor			
Male (N = 3,921)	4.07	1.109	
Female (N = 4,356)	4.45	.878	-17.14*
Letters/Calls from Co-Worker			
Male (N = 3,911)	3.74	1.203	
Female (N = 4,346)	4.25	.977	-20.78*
Touching by Supervisor			
Male (N = 3,922)	4.42	.947	
Female (n = 4,362)	4.72	.670	-16.76*
Touching by Co-Worker			
Male (N = 3,903)	4.17	1.088	
Female (n = 4,343)	4.61	.776	-20.69*
Suggestive Looks by Supervisor			
Male (N = 3,924)	3.77	1.160	
Female (n = 4,354)	4.19	1.001	-17.39*
Suggestive Looks by Co-Worker			
Male (N = 3,902)	3.51	1.212	
Female (n = 4,341)	4.02	1.077	-19.90*
Pressure for Dates from Supervisor			
Male (N = 3,927)	4.23	1.054	
Female (n = 4,357)	4.43	.939	-9.12*
Pressure for Dates from Co-Worker			
Male (N = 3,909)	3.74	1.257	
Female (n = 4,335)	4.06	1.139	-12.08*

TABLE 1. (Continued)

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	t Statistic
Sexual Remarks by Supervisor			
Male (N = 3,929)	3.52	1.222	
Female (n = 4,362)	3.92	1.130	-15.59*
Sexual Remarks by Co-Worker			
Male (N = 3,908)	3.19	1.254	
Female (n = 4,345)	3.67	1.193	-17.88*

Source: R. A. Thacker and S. F. Gohmann, "Male/Female Differences in Perceptions and Effects of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: 'Reasonable' Assumptions?," Public Personnel Management 22, no. 3 (1993): 462, table 1.

*$p < .001$.

behaviors considered overt, and greater for those forms of harassment considered subtle. That is, men and women are closer in agreement when the behavior is overt and in less agreement when the behaviors are more subtle. Women's mean scores are significantly higher in these cases. Another result indicates that there is close agreement between men's and women's perceptions of sexual harassment when a power differential, such as between supervisor and employee, is a factor. The results of this study suggest that the courts are accurate in their interpretation of male-female differences in hostile-work-environment harassment.[22]

What needs to be ensured is that inquiry will, first of all, hear the victim's voice, not someone else's interpretation of it. But the voice must be coupled with an analysis of the social conditions and values in which such an experience of sexual harassment could arise. Our knowledge of what constitutes sexual harassment changes when not only the woman's voice is heard, but a feminist analysis is applied.[23]

The feminist standpoint broadens the sphere of relevance for investigating the experiences beyond the individual voice or the individual life.[24] When the feminist standpoint is incorporated as the expression of the context of the claimant's life, we create a different problematic situation. Women's own perceived loss of self respect, loss of self-confidence and their inability to work effectively all convey what it is that is wrong: women's bodies are frequently held as symbols of pleasure, luxury and convenience.

First, some socially dictated norms of behavior are constituted by the belief that individuals with power control others who do not have power. More particularly, women should defer to men since some men are those people with power and thereby control women who do not have any power. Had Leigh not deferred to Dr. Stone's position of power, she would have run the risk of either being ignored or perhaps not being taken seriously

solely on the basis that the practice was common knowledge and therefore generally accepted; or she may have risked the professor's incredulity, as it is frequently assumed that those without power lie to gain power. Had Leigh resisted or resisted vehemently, she would have failed to conform to that socially dictated norm of power relations.

Second, some socially dictated norms of behavior are constituted by the belief that individuals should not anger an aggressor in all efforts to gain control. More particularly, women should not anger an aggressive man so as to avoid further harm. It is as if women deserve the further harm because they resist. By analogy, an individual does not deserve injuries incurred by a mugger because the individual wanted to and went for a walk at night and failed to resist the mugging. On the occasions Leigh turned down Dr. Stone's requests, she suffered professionally.

Third, some socially dictated norms of behavior are constituted by the belief that individuals should respect authority. In this type of case, authority takes the form of greater intelligence--i.e., experience. More particularly, students should accept that professors know more than they do. Moreover, in this case Dr. Stone knew what Leigh needed to know. Had the student not respected the professor's authority, she would have inappropriately challenged his expertise. She obviously was a neophyte--

"the student," the one who needed to be taught. The fact that the professor used his position as one who teaches to teach her other things constitutes a violation of his authority.

Some socially dictated norms are constituted by the belief that men should not defer to power. They are expected to confront power. Not to confront power is a feminine value. Men are not expected to avoid angering an aggressor. The value is to cause at least as much harm to the aggressor as they incur themselves, if not more so. Furthermore, although men value respect of authority, they are not always considered to begin from a disadvantaged intellectual position, as most women are. Challenges to authority by men are frequently accepted as appropriate engagements. The professor is often amused and encouraging of the male student's challenge.

The problematic situation is constructed by exposing the gendered social/historical and political/economic nature of the underlying circumstances. Women who do not conform lose the socially dictated norm of receiving protection as vulnerable members of the community at large. The assumption is that women who put themselves outside of the socially accepted norms and are harmed "asked for it." The belief is that they provoked the ensuing harm.

The feminist standpoint analysis shows that some socially dictated norms are gendered to the disadvantage of women. Leigh's standpoint as a woman, a daughter, a student, and a female student focuses on evidence that would otherwise not be deemed problematic. Additional evidence is not only introduced and accepted for the first time because it is spoken with a woman's voice, the new facts are constituted by social and political values that reconstruct what the problem entails. Specifically, the perspective of Leigh as a woman, a daughter, a student, and a female student introduces facts that alert us to the underlying context of potentially abusive power, potential abusive demands for respect, and potential abuse of authority. Her standpoint highlights the disproportionate number of instances that these abuses are experienced by women.

The female student may learn (1) that it is acceptable for a man professor to exert authority over her; (2) that it is correct for her, as a woman, to fear men based on the underlying possibility of bodily and professional harm; (3) that it is correct for the female student to minimize attention to her situation involving the professor's inappropriate behaviors, because what female students report is suspect; and (4) it is alright for the student to comply with sexual requests in the hope that the behavior will stop when the professor is satisfied with her and/or her progress. By

discerning that women who comply with these standards are harmed, feminist standpoint theorists successfully point out the manner in which women are severely harmed.

In summary, by focusing on the questions "What are the social and political conditions for a woman in which an experience of unwanted sexual advances arises?" and "What values are generated by the complainant's experience of sexual harassment?," the feminist standpoint theorist situates gendered indeterminate conditions that then make up the problematic situation. We require that pragmatism incorporate gender in the logic of inquiry at a point where the particular gendered context is highlighted in order to adjudicate which behaviors and attitudes are warranted and which are not.

Engendered Pragmatism

The introduction of the reasonable woman standard to the language of the law provides an element of the necessary condition for a new type of investigation. My claim is that the reasonable woman standard can be used as a pragmatic tool that gets us beyond a reliance on gender as a unique experience. And it does so without losing sight of our differences as men and women. The reasonable woman standard allows for the admission of

evidence from different standpoints. There have always been different standpoints, but what feminist standpoint theory requires is that we treat the plurality of standpoints differently than we have in the past. The reasonable woman standard allows the introduction of different standpoints and a re-evaluation of the evidence that they offer.

Preinquiry occurs with indeterminate circumstances. The indeterminate situation is indeterminate because there is an unexpected result. In cases of sexual harassment the unexpected result is the target's felt dissatisfaction. The pragmatic process of inquiry begins by referring to past experience in order to define the indeterminate circumstances' connections and interactions.[25] The dissatisfaction forms the specific context of the indeterminate circumstances, the subject of inquiry. Inquiry proceeds with the determination of a problem or problems. The victim has a problem because she feels harassed. The accused has a problem because he feels manipulated. Certain beliefs and values are contrasted, depicting different problems. Pragmatic inquiry begins by asking, "What about the circumstances fulfills certain conditions as a value?" Consequently, inquiry determines which problems to focus on.

When women learn to ignore sexual comments and/or actions, when women learn that it is acceptable for men to exert authority over women,

when women learn that it is right for women to fear men based on the underlying possibility of bodily harm, and when women learn that it is right not to believe what women say and report, they pragmatically fulfill certain conditions as values. These values dictate that women do not deserve respect, that women should continue to lack confidence, and that women's bodies should remain symbols of pleasure, luxury and convenience.[26] Some women have continued to accept the behavior of men based on these values. Women cope by hoping the behavior will go away or that it will be minimized if they are granted little attention. And, in many cases, women comply with sexual requests, hoping the behavior will then end, and only perpetuate the values.[27] Women learn that voicing their disapproval of these values and actions will have no effect or will have a harmful effect.

A finding of sexual harassment in the hypothetical case would depend on the warrantability (truth) of the problem (conditions that constitute values). If unwarranted, a finding will not be made. For example, there are cases where female victims may not prevail even with the pragmatic use of the reasonable woman standard. Simply because a personal experience may elicit an indeterminate and problematic situation, inquiry into this problem may not be warranted. Subjective experiences are indicative of different values, not warrantability. Facts do not have value; conditions do. The

subjective experience provides the evidence for evaluating the conditions when an indeterminate situation arises. Suppose a woman's supervisor, off the job, participates in organizations and makes speeches to various groups around the state, to the effect that women's place is in the bedroom and the home and any woman who works is neglecting her duty to serve men and children. However, on the job there is no expression of these sentiments and no activities which would render these positions apparent. Yet, his position is common knowledge to both the woman employee working for him and most of the other workers.[28] It is not clear whether any conditions which give rise to these values should change, at least on the job. The woman employee's evidence of her boss's behavior is unwarranted.

Concomitantly, if a man has been accused of sexual harassment and he denies it and alternatively claims that he has been manipulated, there are some circumstances where his problem is unwarranted--that is, false. For example, if in 1995 his advances toward a woman have been clearly and repeatedly rebuffed but he suggests that her behavior is part of the courtship, his standpoint is unwarranted, false.

Alternatively, pragmatic inquiry can make determinations of warrantability of standpoints as well as problems. If a waitress in 1990 is repeatedly patted on her breasts and buttocks and referred to verbally as a

"cow" or a "fox," her standpoint that she is not being harassed, she is just being teased, is false. And the standpoint of a man who claims he has no intention of harassing but whose behavior fits the 1991 legal definition is also false.

The feminist pragmatist uses standpoints as guidelines for inquiry and at best only possible solutions. The pragmatic method provides the means for determining warrantability of one problem (claim) over another, one standpoint over another, or one standard of evidence over another.

In general, engendered pragmatism as a theory provides an account of the plurality of our experiences as men and women neither because of our different genders, nor simply because each of us is a unique individual. Pragmatist methodology provides an account of our duty to realize the bearing our experiences have upon social practice and vice versa.[29] Knowledge claims are warranted when they present a growth in intelligence, a process by which personal experiences and group identities are socialized by examining the political and social habits of action that bear on ends-in-view.

In order to avoid "gender essentialism,"[30] gender differences as well as race differences, class differences, and sexual orientation must be acknowledged. The differences between men and women based on gender

is a valuable tool for providing the specific circumstances of a gendered experience while keeping class, race and sexual orientation in mind as well.

Our experiences as men and women cannot be accounted for based solely on the fact that we are of different sexes. Such an account relies on universal premises that are problematic, since not everyone of each gender holds similar beliefs and behaves similarly. We must keep our categories tentative, relational and unstable, particularly in the law, where abstractions are the norm.[31]

An engendered pragmatic account of knowledge is not based on a universal gendered nature of either sex. When we avoid the tendency to universalize gender difference by trying to identify a feminist standpoint and/or what is "feminist" about a plurality of feminist standpoints, we also avoid emphasizing difference. Gender domination (that is, lack of respect), not gender difference, forms the foundation of the problem between men and women in regards to sexual harassment. "Differences" are not problematic. However, when differences are used as a justification for domination and subordination the distinctions are problematic.

The reasonable woman's perspective is seen, more often than not, as defined by values that women invariably possess as a group unaffected by power disparities or contexts.[32] As a result, the gender specificity of the

reasonable woman standard precludes men's use of the standard, even though they may also be victimized.[33] However, the standard should be regarded as presenting the perspective of the less powerful (marginalized) group. Then the benefit of what standpoints provide (challenges to firmly held values) is visible.

For example, when a man is harassed by a group of men for not conforming to the male image of male heterosexuality, the reasonable woman standard should also apply.[34] When a man is intimidated by aggressive male sexual behavior in the same way that a woman is intimidated, a finding of sexual harassment should be made using this standard. Otherwise, if the reasonable man would not have been offended, no man could sustain a claim.[35] Martha Chamallas, a lawyer whom I consider a feminist pragmatist, explains:

> The victim's perspective should not be used simply to refer to a point of view shared by the gender group to which plaintiff happens to belong. Instead, it should be reserved for designating the perspective of a cultural group that has experienced group oppression. . . . Such an approach would avoid reinforcing male-centered views that are oppressive both to women and to men who fail to conform to socially dictated norms about gender.[36]

Pragmatically, this may require the court to use a means other than the plaintiff's gender to determine whether the conduct was sex-based. For

example, does the conduct reinforce domination or make the setting inhospitable for women?[37]

Interpretations of the reasonable woman standard need not be fixed. They can respond to the plaintiff's descriptions of her community and the relationships among workers. This seems preferable to having courts decide at the outset what kind of discrimination a woman has suffered. Allowing legal standards to reflect subgroup identities assists the law in responding to the existence of oppression. Since identity is not a fixed attribute but rather is linked to specific human relationships and situations, it makes sense to allow for some flexibility in describing the appropriate perspective.[38]

The benefit of a feminist standpoint analysis of Leigh's experience shows that she may not have consented to all the interactions she had with the professor. Consent cannot be implied simply in the absence of emphatic episodic signs of resistance. In spite of the fact that Dr. Stone and Leigh Admunson had been acquainted prior to the time of their sexual involvement--that is, Dr. Stone was not a stranger and therefore there was a suspicion of consent--consent cannot be implied.

Leigh became increasingly concerned about Dr. Stone's perceptions of her as a student. Thus, she was concerned not to anger him or do anything that would earn his displeasure and disapproval, while she

simultaneously felt compelled to prove her intellectual worth to him particularly. The capitulation to the sexual acts should be viewed in light of Leigh's own report and her social and political oppression as a woman, a student and as a female student.

In addition, feminist standpoint analysis exposes the false assumption that women generally both want to indulge sexually and are inclined to withhold this desire for the value of chastity. The assumption gives rise to the belief that women want to be taken advantage of. The assumption is substantiated in the professor's statement that she "wanted to suck on his cock" in spite of her fear. To cast suspicions on Leigh's motives, "for it is on her that the contradictory roles of sexual desirer and sexual denier have been placed,"[39] is to fail to take into account the context in which male interpretations of female beliefs prevail. What the feminist standpoint theorist considers is Leigh's web of personal experiences as a woman, a daughter, a student, and a female student and how those experiences are constituted by social and political habits of action within the particular community of academia. Were Leigh to have acted otherwise, she would have failed to conform to the ingrained, socially dictated norms mentioned in the portion of this chapter entitled "The Emergence of Feminist Perspectives in Law."

The feminist standpoint theorist's interpretation pays attention to gender, unlike traditional epistemology, but confuses the initial fact of gendered standpoints at the outset of inquiry with the results of inquiry: knowledge. This is the implied problem I describe and criticize in Chapter III. A feminist analysis of Leigh's experience would make a finding of sexual harassment prior to inquiry. Engendered pragmatism provides the inquiry that can identify just what is epistemologically significant about her experience.

Even though we can analyze the social and political conditions as feminist standpoint theory would have us do, we cannot lay out the existence and manner of oppression by establishing that all women are always oppressed everywhere based only on the fact that they are women. So we see the fluctuation for standpoint theorists between validating (1) a feminist standpoint because of shared interests that the category "woman" may confer and (2) a plurality of feminist standpoints because there are no universal features of women's existence until they are named by feminist theory.

Using an engendered pragmatic interpretation avoids focusing on a universal standard. There are no universal principles independent of lived experience and the values held by equal individuals. The focus is on testing

the values and beliefs that reinforce Leigh's confusion (indeterminate situation) in such a way that dissolves any objective basis for evaluation. The circumstances can be evaluated in terms of whether they constitute conditions that abuse respect and authority. When we focus on the experiences (Leigh's) and study the effects of assuming the gendered assignments (female student), the abuse of respect and authority becomes apparent and her claim of sexual harassment is warranted. Leigh is not a victim of sexual harassment because she has a feminist standpoint; she is a victim of sexual harassment because the circumstances of her feminist standpoint are evaluated as constituting a violation of the value of respecting another as an equal human being. Or conversely, she is a victim of sexual harassment because the circumstances of her feminist standpoint show the unwarranted nature of the values that are to the disadvantage of women. This inference does not necessarily encompass all women, however, although evidence that these kinds of abuses occur more often in situations with female students than with male students highlights the effects of assuming gendered assignments.

Using a feminist pragmatic analysis does not assume that female students are automatically victims of sexual harassment or subjects of sexual discrimination. However, if there are other women who may not have felt

the reservations Leigh felt and expressed--or men, including the alleged harasser, who have an honest belief that harassment was not involved--this does not diminish the possibility of a finding of sexual harassment in this case. Not having the same experience does not diminish the warrantability of Leigh's standpoint and its transformation into a warranted problem. When the effects of assuming the gender assignment (after inquiry) are disadvantageous, a finding of sexual harassment becomes warranted assertion. Engendered pragmatism can mediate among competing claims (standpoints) by using historical criteria to ascertain warrantability (truth).

Engendered pragmatism is also careful to avoid overly minimizing the role of gendered standpoints by assuming that the formation of a problem is a task undertaken from standpoints. Gendered standpoints form the context of inquiry (indeterminate circumstances), not the problematic situation. Pragmatism's failure to fully contextualize the logic of inquiry early on is the criticism I delineated in Chapter IV. The claim of sexual harassment is not a warranted assertion because the "problem" emerges when feminists raise the issues--as if it wasn't a problem and feminists make it a problem. The problem is created when the circumstances that constitute the indeterminate situation are contextualized--that is, gendered--from the start. The finding of sexual harassment is not determined by the sex or standpoint

of the victim. It is linked not just to values, but to the circumstances that fulfill certain conditions as values that are undesirable. The fact that those values associated with this case have been the values most often exploited is no coincidence. Leigh's claim of harassment is not a warranted assertion because she felt shamed and humiliated and female students in the past have been treated similarly by Dr. Stone. Her claim is warranted because the circumstances in which Leigh found herself fulfill the conditions of a value that denigrates this person as an individual.

To recap, what makes Leigh's problem warranted is that her standpoint has highlighted something as problematic that was not problematic before. Consensus from other women or men is not needed to find a situation problematic. The situation is worthy of inquiry in the face of others' claims that there is no problem. Once the situation involves a warranted problem, the solution must address what has been problematized. If Dr. Stone claims there is no problem, his assertion becomes unwarranted. To undergo pragmatic inquiry is not to be concerned with whether one party is lying. Engendered pragmatism is concerned with the warrantability of the problems. One problem (Dr. Stone's) in this case is unwarranted.

Engendered pragmatism uses a standpoint analysis but avoids standards that are necessarily linked to specific genders.

Conclusion

As I have expressed in Chapter IV and clarify here, the value of pragmatism is in its ability to avoid universality and relativism criticisms while handling particular individual gendered experiences. Engendered pragmatism does not advocate for a gendered standpoint. That is, neither the perpetrator's intent for acting a certain way or saying certain things[40] nor the victim's felt dissatisfaction is an indication of warrantability. Furthermore, the personal experience of sexual harassment should make up the specific context of the indeterminate situation. So, engendered pragmatism as a naturalized epistemology (1) allows us to retain the prescriptive aspects of epistemology (by appealing to individual experience), without appealing to alleged first principles (universal and objective foundations); and (2) allows us to retain a criterion that helps us identify the particular values that need further inquiry (a historic criterion) without appealing to fixed criteria that would eliminate the relativized positions of a plurality of voices, experiences, perspectives and standpoints. The criterion is provisional, always ready for change but tied to a particular context.

That we have only recently labeled sexual harassment as an offense is an indication that some circumstances fulfill unsatisfactory conditions--i.e.,

that a different set of values has arisen in the face of old behavior and beliefs. Beliefs, values and behaviors--regarding men's access to women's affections and bodies--are changing.

Doing a feminist pragmatic analysis of sexual harassment requires us to investigate the conditions and values that give rise to the felt dissatisfaction of women or other victims. The "observational operation" brings the indeterminate situation into relief. The "conceptual operation" brings the underlying conditions and values to task. The overall process of inquiry determines warranted knowledge by influencing policy and, consequently, behavior. We must test the pre-existing intuitions and test the accumulation of standpoints in order to avoid universal as well as relativist positions. In light of the fact that no one theory explains our experiences, we need a flexible theory of knowledge. We must be able to respond to subjective elements of experience and rely on provisional notions of what is shared.

Finally, it may be objected that as long as the end result is the same, it does not matter whether the method of inquiry is feminist or not.[41] Hence, it is not the case that any adequate method of inquiry must be feminist. My argument, in contrast, is that it does matter, and for three important reasons. First, there is the scholarly issue of accurately

representing historical reality, and that, feminists claim, requires acknowledging the historical lack of a gender analysis in philosophy as part of the subordination of women. Second, I have shown that the conceptual connections between the domination of women and the absence of a pragmatic analysis of gender are located in an oppressive, patriarchal conceptual framework characterized by a logic of domination. Thus, the failure to notice the connection leaves at best an incomplete, inaccurate, and partial account of what is required of a conceptually adequate theory of knowledge. Third, the claim that, in contemporary culture, one can have an adequate theory of knowledge that is not feminist assumes that the label "feminist" does not add anything crucial to the nature of knowledge. I have shown that at least in contemporary culture this is false, for the word "feminist" currently helps to clarify just how philosophy is linked to the domination of women and how the liberation of philosophy is conceptually linked to the termination of the domination of women. Thus, the word "feminist" has critical bite. It serves as a reminder that an unmarked, biased standard functions as a privilege. That is, without a feminist analysis, philosophy is presented as having no bias, including masculine gender bias. Failure to notice the connections is masculine gender bias.

Notes

[1]Dewey, Experience and Nature, LW 1:40.

[2]Ibid., 1:8.

[3]See Nelson, "A Question of Evidence." Nelson suggests that Dewey's naturalistic epistemology provides a more adequate account of knowledge.

[4]This is a hypothetical case, created from a compilation of facts from Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1988); Jew, M.D. v. University of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946 (1990); Karibian v. Columbia University 14 F.3d 773 (1994); and King v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 898 F.2d 533 (1990). The book by Billie Wright Dziech, The Lecherous Professor: Sexual Harassment on Campus (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990), was also used.

[5]See Lucinda M. Finley, "Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning," Notre Dame Law Review 64 (1989): 886, 893.

[6]See Blackwood, "The Reasonable Woman," 1022-23.

[7]Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 626 (1986) (Keith, J., dissenting).

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).

[10]See Blackwood.

[11]See R. A. Thacker and S. F. Gohmann, "Male/Female Differences in Perceptions and Effects of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: 'Reasonable' Assumptions?," Public Personnel Management 22, no. 3 (1993): 464, citing United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace (Washington, DC: Office of Merit

Systems Review and Studies, 1988).

[12]See A. M. Konrad and B. A. Gutek, "Impact of Work Experience on Attitudes Towards Sexual Harassment," Administrative Science Quarterly 31 (1986): 422-38; and T. Reilly et al., "The Factorial Survey: An Approach to Defining Sexual Harassment on Campus," Journal of Social Issues 38 (1982): 99-110.

[13]See E. G. C. Collins and T. B. Blodgett, "Sexual Harassment: Some See It . . . Some Don't," Harvard Business Review 59 (1981): 76-95; and B. A. Gutek et al., "Sexuality and the Workplace," Basic and Applied Social Psychology 1 (1980): 255-65.

[14]See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson; and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, "Guidelines on Sexual Harassment," Code of Federal Regulations 29 (1980): sec. 1604.11.

[15]Audre Lorde, "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House," chap. in Sister Outsider (Tramansburg, NY: Crossing Press, 1984), 110.

[16]These hearings took place in the U.S. legislature, not a court of law; therefore, changing the masculine standard of truth was not required.

[17]These rules introduce problematic issues of race. Although some of these issues parallel those of gender, others are quite different and require a different focus than what can be addressed in this dissertation.

[18]Ellison, supra, at 608.

[19]The preceding section on the "reasonable woman standard" was taken from the appeal presented before the Oregon Chancellor of Higher Education, Thomas A. Bartlett, in the matter of Sandra Newman, Grievant, and Arnulf Zweig, Respondent, on October 7, 1993, at the University of Oregon, Eugene. See Thomas A. Bartlett, "The Matter of Sandra Newman, Grievant, and Arnulf Zweig, Respondent" (Salem, OR: Office of the Chancellor of Higher Education, 1993), photocopied.

[20]See Thacker and Gohmann.

[21]Ibid., 465.

[22]Ibid., 467.

[23]Feminist standpoint theorists concede that individual experiences and standpoints, although true, cannot in and of themselves establish knowledge; however, as Chapter III points out, it is difficult for standpoint theorists to mediate among different voices, lives and standpoints. An example that depicts this foreseeable consequence is as follows: Radical feminists Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, who were initially successful in passing antipornography ordinances in Minneapolis and Indianapolis in 1986 (later deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court), were confronted by the Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force (FACT), an alliance of mostly, although not exclusively, liberal feminists. Focusing on the plural nature of experience is helpful, but it also generates categories of experience that limit inquiry.

[24]This shift from voice to standpoint prevents the defense from asserting that the response by the victim is idiosyncratic--i.e., radically subjective--and, thus, not the subject of what the law was intended to prevent.

[25]Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, LW 4:208.

[26]I use a heterosexual example because we are typically trained to think in terms of these kinds of relationships. However, that is not to say that the problematic situations do not occur among homosexuals or in cases where men experience harassment by women. A parallel evaluation can be made in regards to these relationships, although there are additional and different overlaying values structures.

[27]I refer to actions short of physical attack that are evaluated in terms of assault not harassment. Verbal behaviors are more subtle and account for the real differences in perception compared to those found in Thacker and Gohmann's study. For a discussion about other subtle forms of harassment, see "Part III: Sexism in Ordinary Language" in Vetterling-Braggin, Elliston, and English. The articles in this section argue that the wrongness of sexist language does not lie only in the fact that it expresses false claims. Sexist language actually hurts women since it reveals attitudes that are destructive

of equality and trust.

[28]Similar cases have been heard in which the supervisor of a black man is an active member of the KKK but does nothing on the job to make his views apparent. One can easily infer that he maintains racist views and discriminates against blacks in all other aspects of his life.

[29]Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, EW 3:320.

[30]See Angela Harris, "Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory," Stanford Law Review 42 (1990): 581, 588.

[31]Ibid., 586.

[32]See Martha Chamallas, "Feminist Construction of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation," Texas Journal of Women and the Law 1 (1992): 124.

[33]In a situation where a male plaintiff is taunted by a woman, the reasonable man standard presents what women fail to understand about male sexuality. This reflects a deficient account of male sexuality, based on naturalized differences, as it does in reference to female sexuality.

[34]See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. III. 1988). This case depicts the situation of Anthony Goluszek, who worked as a mechanic at a business that employed mostly men in blue-collar jobs. He never married and always lived with his mother. There was testimony describing him as coming from an "unsophisticated background: as having led an "isolated existence," and as having "little or no sexual experience." He was said to "blush easily" and to be abnormally sensitive to comments pertaining to sex. The harassment began with jokes and escalated to physical threats. Goluszek's co-workers persistently told him that he needed to get married and joked that only married persons were allowed to work at the factory. They said that his problem was that he needed "to get some of that soft pink smelly stuff that's between the legs of a woman" and offered to find a woman to get him "fucked." They showed him pictures of nude women and accused him of being gay or bisexual. Some men even poked him in the buttocks with a stick and threatened to knock him off the ladder on which he worked. The court did not use the reasonable woman's standard and did

not find in Goluszek's favor. A summary of the case can be found in Chamallas (126).

[35]Ibid., 127.

[36]Ibid., 129-30.

[37]Ibid., 130.

[38]Ibid., 139-40.

[39]See Lois Pineau, "Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis," Law and Philosophy 8 (1989): 217-43.

[40]Both the perpetrator's presumed knowledge, or lack thereof, of the victim's circumstance and the perpetrator's intent with regard to the victim have been soundly rejected by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Ellison v. Brady as determinants of whether sexual harassment occurred. Also, see Thomas A. Bartlett.

[41]The form of this last argument is taken from Karen J. Warren, "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism," in Environmental Ethics, ed. Michael Zimmerman (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983), 336.

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