Legislator Gender and Trade Policy Preference

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Abstract

In this paper, I seek to determine whether the robust gender difference in preferences for trade protection shown in surveys of individuals extends to legislators' votes in the U.S. House of Representatives. Since this phenomenon would equate with a voting pattern other than that which most benefits their constituents and their party, it could show that demographic characteristics of legislators can cause them to "shirk" the interests of their constituents and their party. I examine a large 20-year sample of House votes on trade policy combined with a dataset of congressional district characteristics and legislator gender. I find that protectionist voting is not significantly correlated with legislator gender when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between districts.

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1 Introduction

A recent literature finds a significant effect of gender on trade policy preferences among the general public. Specifically, females have a much greater propensity to indicate a preference for trade protection in surveys of individuals' preferences over trade policy choices. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) find robust gender effects in a cross-national survey. Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) once again find a robust infuence of gender in a U.S. survey, particularly among the college-educated. However, this literature is only indicative of a gender difference in preferences among citizens, not among legislators.

On the contrary, the question of whether this gender difference persists in Congress has gone largely uninvestigated. Should persistence be found, it would show that male and female legislators in the same situation would have significantly different probabilities of voting for protectionist policy. It is assumed that constituents do not change their preferences for trade policy simply because they happen to have a male legislator instead of a female one, and that political party leadership would like all of that party's members to vote in the same manner. Therefore, this would imply that legislators are imperfect agents of their constituents as well as the party to which they belong, at least when it comes to protectionism.

The issue of a principal-agent problem in legislative voting has been a topic of discussion in the political economy field for some time. Kalt and Zupan (1984) provide one of the canonical analyses of shirking behavior by looking at the influence of legislator ideology on voting through the use of the vote index of a watchdog organization. Kau and Rubin (1979) use several indices and several bills to analyze this ideologically-based shirking behavior. This approach is criticized by Peltzman (1982), who points out that the roles of ideology and constituent characteristics are difficult to disentangle, and by Coates and Munger (1995), who seek to determine evidence of shirking by looking at the effect of electoral security on the influence of constituency characteristics on legislators. They also examine whether some legislator characteristics influence voting behavior, but give no rationale for the characteristics they choose. In addition, their samples are limited to one bill in their first regression, and an index of votes in a single congress in their second. Finally, a thorough review of the literature on this subject is provided by Bender and Lott (1996). I seek to expand upon these findings as to shirking on the one hand and expand upon the literature linking gender to trade policy preference on the other.

Coates and Munger provide a framework for analyzing legislative voting behavior based on the concept of an indirect utility function using legislator characteristics, constituency characteristics, institutional pressures, and electoral security as arguments. This model allows me to test whether gender has an effect on voting behavior independent of constituency characteristics though an impact on legislator preferences over outcomes. I adapt it to a linear probability model of a legislator demand function and use a dataset containing individual U.S. House of Representatives trade policy votes merged with data on the con-

stituency characteristics of each congressperson. I find that, ceteris paribus, female legislators do not necessarily have a higher utility-maximizing probability of voting in favor of protectionist policy than do male ones; instead, it is likely that some unobserved heterogeneity causes districts that favor more trade protection to also elect female representatives more often.

The plan of the paper is as follows: In the next section, I present my version of Burgoon and Hiscox's model, and my hypothesis about the legislator gender effect. Next, I discuss the data used, and how the votes used were selected. In section four, I present my empirical results and briefly discuss their significance. Finally, I offer a conclusion.

2 Model

I use a version of the model formulated by Coates and Munger. Suppose, in a game based on repeated voting, that a legislator's utility function is of the form $U(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{x})$ where $\mathbf{g}$ is a vector of consumption goods, including trade policy, other policy, and reelection outcomes, and $\mathbf{x}$ is a vector of preference-determining characteristics. But maximizing this utility is subject to a reelection constraint which can be written as an implicit function as follows:

$$F(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{p}, \mathbf{s}) = 0 \tag{1}$$

where $\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{p}, \mathbf{s}$ are vectors of constituent interest, party and institutional pressure, and electoral security variables, respectively.

Then, since for any vote i, a legislator has a binary choice between trade policies, the utility-maximizing probability of voting for a policy such as free trade is a function of the constraint and legislator preferences, i.e. a demand function

$$k : \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{p}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{x} \to [0, 1]$$

This demand function can be modeled as a function of an approximation to the constraint F and characteristics $\mathbf{x}$, as Coates and Munger do with their indirect utility function. Thus I estimate

$$FREETRADEVOTE_{ij} = \alpha_j + \mathbf{c}'_{ij}\varphi + \mathbf{p}'_{ij}\pi + \mathbf{s}'_{ij}\delta + \mathbf{x}'_{ij}\beta + \mathbf{c}'_{ij}\mathbf{\Gamma}\mathbf{s}_{ij} + \mathbf{x}'_{ij}\mathbf{\Theta}\mathbf{s}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where, in specifications with bill fixed effects, $FREETRADEVOTE_{ij}$ denotes vote i on bill j and, in specifications with congressional district fixed effects, $FREETRADEVOTE_{ij}$ denotes vote i by the representative of district j.

- For $\mathbf{c}$, I use the demographic controls listed in section 3. In congressional district fixed effects specifications, the α_j fixed effects control for unobserved district-specific heterogeneity instead.

- For $\mathbf{p}$, I use a party variable for party pressures. In bill fixed effects specifications, the α_j fixed effects control for institutional pressures and other unobserved bill-specific heterogeneity.

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- For **s**, I use years of incumbency to proxy for electoral security.

- For **x**, I use legislator gender, the variable of interest. Note that, as Coates and Munger do, I use an interaction term between incumbency and demographic controls to capture any reduction in the effect of constituent effects brought about by the increased electoral security that comes with incumbency. Additionally, I use an interaction term between incumbency and gender to capture any difference in gender effects brought about by electoral security.

I test the hypothesis

$$H_a : \beta \neq 0 \tag{2}$$

that is, that in aggregate, legislator gender characteristics have an effect on policy choice even when they conflict with constituents' preferences, against the null hypothesis

$$H_0 : \beta = 0 \tag{3}$$

that is, that gender-based legislator preferences are outweighed by political concerns, and that constituents choose to elect legislators with specific revealed preferences, whether those preferences are formed by gender or some other factor.

3 Data

Data are taken from U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call votes as documented in the 1971-1992 Congressional Quarterly almanacs; see Table 4 for a listing of the specific votes used. These votes were determined to be pro- or anti-free trade based on whether they had an obvious positive or negative effect on net barriers to trade. Votes with a large foreign policy element, as opposed to being strictly about trade protection, were excluded; for example, strategic export controls and political sanctions were not included in the sample. I conflate all yes and no positions; i.e. if the representative took a yes position but did not actually vote, I count it as a yes vote. I then generate a $FREETRADEVOTE$ variable that takes the value of 1 if the representative took the free trade position and 0 if he or she took the anti-trade position. I generate a GOP variable taking the value of 1 if the representative is a Republican and 0 if he or she is a Democrat. Independents were dropped.

The resulting data were merged with E. Scott Adler's congressional district data files for the appropriate congress to gain the district preference variables $BLUCLLR$ (number of SIC "blue collar" workers in district), $AGE65$ (number of persons age 65+ in district), $COAST$ (district adjacent to ocean or Great Lake), $MDNINCM$ (median family income in district, in thousands of 1982-84 dollars[1], and $URBAN$ (population in urban areas). The demographic variables

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[1]Observations with $MDNINCM < 1$ were dropped due to apparent data error.

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$AGE65$, $BLUCLLR$, and $URBAN$ were divided by population to produce per capita variables $PCT65$, $PCTBC$, and $PCTURB$. These, along with the interaction variable $PCT65 \times PCTBC$ were selected as controls because Mayda and Rodrik find strong effects on preference for income, age, and urban location, and because Blonigen (2009) finds life-cycle interaction effects between retirement and trade exposure, as well as effects for sectoral trade exposure (proxied here by $BLUCLLR$). $COAST$ was used to control for the dependence of a district's economy on trade flows. I generate a years of incumbency variable, $YRSINC$, and use it to proxy for electoral security. The congressional district index variable used for those fixed effects takes a different value for each congressional district and, for a given district, takes a new value every time redistricting occurs, either by census, or by mid-decade redistricting documented in the Adler data.

Based on this literature, the expected signs of the regression coefficients are as follows:

Variable	Expected Sign
GOP	
$FEMREP$	−
$PCT65$	−
$PCTBC$	−
$PCT65 \times PCTBC$	+
$PCTURB$	+
$COAST$	+
$MDNINCM$	+
$YRSINC$	
$YRSINC \times PCT65$	+
$YRSINC \times PCTBC$	+
$YRSINC \times PCT65 \times PCTBC$	−
$YRSINC \times PCTURB$	−
$YRSINC \times MDNINCM$	−
$YRSINC \times COAST$	−
$YRSINC \times FEMREP$	−

The summary statistics table offers some insights about these data. As an aside, note that female legislators provide less than 5% of the sample votes. Table 5 shows that in my sample of 117 roll-call votes, the margin of victory is within 5% of house membership, or roughly 21 votes, in only 10 cases. Therefore, it is unlikely that a small effect on the voting propensity of a small group causes any significant difference in trade policy outcomes in this sample. However, I am investigating revealed preferences, not policy outcomes.

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4 Results

Although theoretically, the linear probability model has a number of shortcomings, I use it here since I am only concerned with revealed differences in preferences and not with making predictions, and because for these data, maximum-likelihood techniques had their own problems:

Results of the linear probability model under specifications (1) using bill fixed effects with $YRSINC$ but without its interactions with constituent (demographic) variables, (2) using bill fixed effects with $YRSINC$ and its interactions with gender and demographics, (3) using congressional district fixed effects with $YRSINC$ but without its interactions, and (4) using congressional district fixed effects with $YRSINC$ and its interactions are presented in Table 2.

Examining the signs of the coefficients of the control regressors in the bill fixed effects specification yields mixed results as to their consistency with my expectations. First, the literature predicts negative signs on the coefficients of $PCT65$ and $PCTBC$ and positive sign on their interaction; however, I find the opposite to be true. Being a Republican rather than a Democrat significantly increases the probability of voting for freer trade. Urban and coastal location seem to only cause incumbency to have a more protectionist effect rather than cause any effect independently. As hypothesized, constituent income has a strong pro-trade effect; incumbency does not diminish this. Incumbency itself has a strong anti-trade effect in specification (1) but specification (2) shows that this is only the case in districts that are urban, coastal, or both relatively aged and relatively blue-collar; otherwise, incumbency strongly increases the probability of voting for free trade.

In the congressional district fixed effects specifications (3) and (4), uninteracted demographic variables are omitted due to perfect collinearity with the fixed effect. These specifications produce qualitiatively similar results with regard to political party and incumbency variables as (1) and (2); however, coefficients on incumbency's interaction terms are in no case significant at even the 10% level.

Turning now to the variable of interest, regardless of which specification is used, the models with bill fixed effects yield a gender effect significant at the 1% level with sign consistent with my hypothesis. In each specification the magnitude of the gender effect is between 3.0% and 4.1%. This is much smaller than the magnitude of the effect in Mayda and Rodrik at 7.4%, in Burgoon and Hiscox at 9.2%, and in O'Rourke and Sinnott of 8.2%. However, when using congressional district fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity, the gender effect is not significant at the 10% level. It is likely that either this difference is caused either by the very limited within-district variation of gender due to the small percentage of observations with $FEMREP = 1$, or by omitted variables bias from the unobserved district-level heterogeneity in the bill fixed effects model.

Maximum-likelihood estimation technigues were also considered, but ultimately rejected in favor of the linear probability approach:

- For the bill fixed effects model, conditional fixed effects logit models did not converge in Stata.

- For the congressional district fixed effects model, maximum likelihood estimates of gender's effect are based on the very few instances where legislator gender changes within the lifetime of a congressional district.

Thus despite the theoretical shortcomings of the linear probability model, I use it here and check its results for robustness to the use of maximum-likelihood techniques.

For bill fixed effects models, unconditional fixed effects logit specifications are presented in Table 3 as a robustness check. However, one can see that except for increased significance of the incumbency interaction terms, the logit model produces results that are qualitatively the same as those produced by the linear probability model.

For congressional district fixed effects models, conditional fixed effects logit specifications are presented in Table 4 as a robustness check. Again, the logit model produces results that are qualitatively the same as those produced by the linear probability model.

Since these results indicate that the significance of gender in the bill fixed effects specifications may be due to omitted variables bias, I test my hypothesis with the congressional district fixed effects specifications instead. I therefore fail to reject $H_0 : \beta = 0$ and conclude that legislator gender characteristics may not persist even in the face of electoral pressure due to conflicting constituent interest. Instead, some unobserved heterogeneity between districts may simultanously increase the probability of that district electing a female representative and increase the amount of trade protection which that district prefers. Since female membership in Congress has expanded a great deal since 1992 (Women in Congress, 1917–2006), future research might extend the sample to a more recent time period in order to determine whether is the case, or whether the inconsistency between models is being driven by the fact that, for many districts, there is no within-district variation in legislator gender.

5   Conclusion

In a representative democracy, the task of a legislator is to represent his or her constituents' interests in the legislative body to which he or she belongs. However, in practice this is not always the case, as Coates and Munger find; legislators do in fact shirk. While their analysis is narrow in its sample and includes several legislator characteristic regressors, mine has a large sample and a single characteristic variable with an influence on policy preference supported by a rich literature. I find limited evidence that gender characteristics cause legislators to vote with a different degree of protectionism than the constituent, party, institutional, and electoral security constraints to which they are subject would suggest, but the results of a different specification calls the unbiasedness of these results into question. Thus I conclude that the most likely explanation is

that some unobserved district-level heterogeneity positively influences both the amount of trade protection a district prefers and the likelihood of that district electing a female representative. However, expansion of the data to increase the sample variance of gender would be necessary to conclusively determine whether this explanation is correct or this "shirking" phenomenon really exists.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
$FREETRADEVOTE$	48,936	0.454	0.498	0	1
GOP	48,936	0.396	0.489	0	1
$FEMREP$	48,936	0.0483	0.214	0	1
$PCT65$	48,936	0.146	0.0573	0.00824	0.438
$PCTBC$	48,936	0.102	0.0379	0.0279	0.263
$PCT65 \times PCTBC$	48,936	0.0138	0.00491	0.00131	0.0330
$PCTURB$	48,936	0.732	0.228	0.165	1.000
$COAST$	48,936	0.320	0.466	0	1
$MDNINCM$	48,900	24.32	5.158	7.368	44.08
$YRSINC$	48,936	6.243	5.066	0	21
$YRSINC \times PCT65$	48,936	1.009	1.025	0	9.199
$YRSINC \times PCTBC$	48,936	0.585	0.481	0	2.892
$YRSINC \times PCT65 \times PCTBC$	48,936	0.0894	0.0880	0	0.686
$YRSINC \times PCTURB$	48,936	4.597	4.205	0	21.00
$YRSINC \times MDNINCM$	48,900	109.3	108.9	0	694.7
$YRSINC \times COAST$	48,936	1.949	4.027	0	21
$YRSINC \times FEMREP$	48,936	0.249	1.469	0	21

Table 2: Linear Probability Model

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GOP	0.286***	0.286***	0.245***	0.243***
	(0.00410)	(0.00410)	(0.00905)	(0.00912)
$FEMREP$	-0.0304***	-0.0408***	0.000438	-0.0114
	(0.00868)	(0.0134)	(0.0173)	(0.0202)
$PCT65$	1.113***	1.147***		
	(0.0981)	(0.160)		
$PCTBC$	0.981***	0.909***		
	(0.164)	(0.240)		
$PCT65 \times PCTBC$	-12.83***	-8.985***		
	(1.141)	(1.773)		
$PCTURB$	-0.00809	0.0224		
	(0.0103)	(0.0161)		
$COAST$	-0.00868**	0.00119		
	(0.00414)	(0.00651)		
$MDNINCM$	0.00256***	0.00308***		
	(0.000466)	(0.000618)		
$YRSINC$	-0.00119***	0.0139***	0.00161**	0.0145*
	(0.000432)	(0.00435)	(0.000741)	(0.00767)
$YRSINC \times PCT65$		-0.00406		-0.0193
		(0.0198)		(0.0358)
$YRSINC \times PCTBC$		0.00647		-0.0161
		(0.0367)		(0.0603)
$YRSINC \times PCT65 \times PCTBC$		-0.573**		-0.426
		(0.230)		(0.405)
$YRSINC \times PCTURB$		-0.00492***		-0.00159
		(0.00182)		(0.00323)
$YRSINC \times MDNINCM$		-0.000138		-0.0000406
		(.0000898)		(0.000166)
$YRSINC \times COAST$		-0.00177**		-0.00176
		(0.000820)		(0.00149)
$YRSINC \times FEMREP$		0.00175		0.00264
		(0.00196)		(0.00329)
Constant	0.210***	0.120***	0.0114	0.0399**
	(0.0205)	(0.0311)	(0.0164)	(0.0165)
Bill fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects?	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	48,900	48,900	48,936	48,900
F-statistic	731.9	416.1	261.7	236.1
R^2	0.119	0.120	0.264	0.264

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Table 3: Unconditional Logit Model

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
GOP	0.383***	0.383***
	(0.00565)	(0.00579)
FEMREP	-0.0549***	-0.0574***
	(0.0189)	(0.0189)
*PCT*65	1.619***	1.585***
	(0.146)	(0.237)
PCTBC	1.433***	1.232***
	(0.249)	(0.357)
*PCT*65 × *PCTBC*	-18.91***	-11.93***
	(1.723)	(2.648)
PCTURB	-0.0124	0.0354
	(0.0158)	(0.0239)
COAST	-0.0132**	0.00174
	(0.00618)	(0.00961)
MDNINCM	0.00376***	0.00474***
	(0.000707)	(0.000932)
YRSINC	-0.00172***	0.0221***
	(0.000656)	(0.00647)
YRSINC × *PCT*65		0.0117
		(0.0296)
YRSINC × *PCTBC*		0.0346
		(0.0558)
YRSINC × *PCT*65 × *PCTBC*		-1.163***
		(0.358)
YRSINC × *PCTURB*		-0.00847***
		(0.00281)
YRSINC × *MDNINCM*		-0.000277**
		(0.000136)
YRSINC × *COAST*		-0.00277**
		(0.00124)
YRSINC × *FEMREP*		0.00253
		(0.00300)
Bill dummies?	Yes	Yes
Observations	47,323	47,323
χ^2 statistic	17548	17622
Pseudo R^2	0.270	0.271

Listed are marginal effects, not coefficient estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Conditional Logit Model

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
GOP	1.488***	1.468***
	(0.0595)	(0.0599)
$FEMREP$	0.0152	-0.0741
	(0.116)	(0.134)
$YRSINC \times PCT65$		-0.246
		(0.271)
$YRSINC \times PCTBC$		-0.247
		(0.465)
$YRSINC \times PCT65 \times PCTBC$		-1.256
		(3.062)
$YRSINC \times PCTURB$		-0.0138
		(0.0228)
$YRSINC \times MDNINCM$		-0.000547
		(0.00124)
$YRSINC \times COAST$		-0.0145
		(0.0103)
$YRSINC \times FEMREP$		0.0194
		(0.0225)
$YRSINC$	0.0125**	0.115**
	(0.00512)	(0.0586)
District fixed effects?	Yes	Yes
Bill dummies?	Yes	Yes
Observations	48,617	48,581
χ^2 statistic	14669	14660
Pseudo R^2	0.282	0.282

Listed are coefficient estimates; Stata did not compute any marginal effects.

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: House Trade Votes

"Free trade" position	Name in Table	CQ Vote	Bill No.	Year	Passage	Yea	Nay
N	Budget Resolution/ Oil Import Fee	42	H Con Res 106	1989	N	49	173
N	Unfair Trade Practices of Japan/ Adoption Under Suspension of the Rules	42	H Con Res 107	1985	Y	394	19
N	Statement of Disapproval of Any FTA Jeopardizing US Law	376	H Con Res 246	1992	Y	362	0
N	Sense of Congress That Japan Should Correct Trade Imbalance/ Adoption Under Suspension of the Rules	561	H Con Res 376	1980	Y	363	2
N	Fiscal 1988 Continuing Appropriations/ Prohibit Japanese Firms From Working on Public-Works Projects	456	H J Res 395	1987	Y	399	17
Y	Disapprove Oil Import Fee/ Passage	263	H J Res 531	1980	Y	376	30
N	Fiscal 1987 Continuing Appropriations/ Require 50 Percent Of Labor and Materials In Offshore Drilling Rigs Be American In Origin	439	H J Res 738	1986	Y	264	133
Y	Fiscal 1987 Continuing Appropriations/ Imported Wine, Beer, and Spirits Standards	438	H J Res 738	1986	Y	297	113
N	Disapproval of Fast-Track Procedures/ Adoption	115	H Res 101	1991	N	21	140
N	Fast-Track Resolutions/ Rule	114	H Res 101, H Res 146	1991	Y	274	148
N	Remedy for Violation by Japan of US/Japan Semiconductor Agreement / Adoption Under Suspension of the Rules	74	H Res 146	1989	Y	416	0
Y	Grant Fast-Track Procedures/ Adoption	116	H Res 146	1991	Y	329	85
Y	Foreign Trade Reform/ Rule	472	HR 10710	1973	Y	230	147
Y	Foreign Trade Reform/ Passage	475	HR 10710	1973	Y	272	140
Y	Foreign Trade Reform/ Adoption	532	HR 10710	1974	Y	323	36
N	Textile and Apparel Trade Act/ Rule	318	HR 1154	1987	Y	305	111
N	Textile and Apparel Trade Act/ Passage	319	HR 1154	1987	Y	263	156
N	Textile and Apparel Trade Act/ Passage	341	HR 1154	1988	Y	248	150
N	Textile and Apparel Trade Act/ Veto Override	426	HR 1154	1988	N	272	152
N	Meat Import Act/ Passage	802	HR 11545	1978	Y	289	66
Y	Meat Import Act/ Raise Minimum Import Quota	786	HR 11545	1978	N	131	139

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Table 5: House Trade Votes

"Free trade" position	Name in Table	CQ Vote	Bill No.	Year	Passage	Yea	Nay
Y	Suspend Duty on Bicycle Parts/ Passage Under Suspension of the Rules	312	HR 12254	1976	Y	370	41
N	Auto Domestic Content Requirement/ Place Conditions on Sunset Provision	416	HR 1234	1983	Y	214	196
N	Auto Domestic Content Requirement/ Passage	417	HR 1234	1983	Y	219	199
Y	Auto Domestic Content Requirement/ Prohibit Requirements If They Violate GATT	415	HR 1234	1983	N	178	232
Y	Treasury, Postal Service Appropriations/ Prohibit President From Imposing Fees or Quotas on Oil Imports	643	HR 12930	1978	N	194	201
N	Fiscal 1979 Defense Appropriations/ Prohibit Purchase of Foreign Trucks to Haul Cargo in Combat Areas	579	HR 13635	1978	N	72	302
N	Sugar Stabilization Act/ Passage	785	HR 13750	1978	Y	186	159
N	Sugar Stabilization Act/ Adoption	831	HR 13750	1978	N	177	194
N	Sugar Act Extension/ Rule	183	HR 14747	1974	Y	370	13
N	Sugar Act Extension/ Passage	187	HR 14747	1974	N	175	209
Y	Sugar Act Extension/ Phase Out South Africa Quota	184	HR 14747	1974	N	149	238
N	Port-Cargo Diversion Rate Filing/ Passage Under Suspension of the Rules	350	HR 1511	1984	N	188	209
N	Textile Import Quotas/ Rule	319	HR 1562	1985	Y	277	139
N	Textile Import Quotas/ Passage	320	HR 1562	1985	Y	262	159
N	Textile Import Quotas/ Concur in Senate Amendments	385	HR 1562	1985	Y	298	109
N	Textile Import Quotas/ Passage	386	HR 1562	1985	Y	255	161
N	Textile Import Quotas/ Veto Override	265	HR 1562	1986	N	276	149
N	Fiscal 1988 Defense Authorization/ American Work on SDI	114	HR 1748	1987	Y	229	187
Y	Suspend President's Oil Import Fees Authority/ Passage	5	HR 1767	1975	Y	309	114
Y	Fiscal 1988-89 State Department Authorization/ Voice of America Contracting	196	HR 1777	1987	Y	334	70
Y	Fiscal 1988-89 State Department Authorization/ Voice of America Contracting	197	HR 1777	1987	N	167	237
N	Penalties for Foreign Shipbuilding Subsidies/ Rule	119	HR 2056	1992	Y	290	125
N	Penalties for Foreign Shipbuilding Subsidies/ Passage	121	HR 2056	1992	Y	339	78

Table 5: House Trade Votes

"Free trade" position	Name in Table	CQ Vote	Bill No.	Year	Passage	Yea	Nay
Y	Penalties for Foreign Shipbuilding Subsidies/ Motion to Recommit	120	HR 2056	1992	N	179	237
N	International Sugar Agreement/ Rule	482	HR 2172	1979	Y	216	12
Y	Aircraft Materials Tariff Exemption Under Reimportation/ Passage Under Suspension of the Rules	245	HR 2177	1976	Y	359	4
Y	United States/ Israel FTA/ Passage Under Suspension of the Rules	89	HR 2268	1985	Y	422	0
Y	Extend Duty Suspension on Feathers and Down/ Passage	50	HR 2492	1980	Y	371	0
Y	Meat Import Act/ Raise Minimum Level of Import Quota	585	HR 2727	1979	N	136	266
Y	Caribbean Basin Initiative/ Rule	236	HR 2769	1983	Y	212	204
Y	Caribbean Basin Initiative/ Passage	237	HR 2769	1983	Y	289	129
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Rule	67	HR 3	1987	Y	326	83
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Negotiating Objectives	69	HR 3	1987	Y	398	19
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Cuban Imports	70	HR 3	1987	Y	394	27
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Excess Trade Surplus Countries	72	HR 3	1987	Y	218	214
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Final Passage	78	HR 3	1987	Y	290	137
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Rule	63	HR 3	1988	Y	340	61
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Adoption	66	HR 3	1988	Y	312	107
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Veto Override	150	HR 3	1988	Y	308	113
Y	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Comprehensive Substitute	77	HR 3	1987	N	156	268
Y	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Recede from Gephardt Amendment	426	HR 3	1987	N	175	239
N	Steel Quota Enforcement/ Passage Under Suspension of the Rules	258	HR 3275	1989	Y	354	10
N	Tariff and Trade Act/ Adoption of Conference Report	399	HR 3398	1984	Y	386	1
N	Prohibit Foreign Construction of Naval Vessels/ Passage Under Suspension of the Rules	275	HR 3464	1981	Y	366	21
N	Food and Agriculture Act of 1981/ Require Imported Meat To Be Produced Without Drugs or Chemicals Banned In US	261	HR 3603	1981	Y	223	162
N	Food and Agriculture Act of 1981/ Require Imported Meat To Be Produced Without Drugs or Chemicals Banned In US	262	HR 3603	1981	Y	211	168

Table 5: House Trade Votes

"Free trade" position	Name in Table	CQ Vote	Bill No.	Year	Passage	Yea	Nay
Y	Drug Price Competition/ Extend Time for Catalogs to Comply With New Foreign/ Domestic Labeling Requirements	336	HR 3605	1984	N	36	323
Y	Wine Equity and Export Expansion/ Motion to Recommit and Remove Import Protection	387	HR 3795	1984	N	178	239
Y	Needles and Pins and Taxes/ Adoption	533	HR 421	1974	Y	257	71
N	Fiscal 1989 Defense Authorization/ Prohibit Awarding Contracts to Discriminatory Foreign Contractors	95	HR 4264	1988	Y	365	50
Y	Miscellaneous Tariff/ Motion to Recommit	356	HR 4318	1992	N	125	263
N	Textile Trade Act/ Rule	334	HR 4328	1990	Y	293	121
N	Textile Trade Act/ Concur in Senate Amendments	335	HR 4328	1990	Y	271	149
N	Textile Trade Act/ Veto Override	440	HR 4328	1990	N	275	152
N	Fiscal 1987 Defense Authorization/ Preference for Domestic Goods	259	HR 4428	1986	Y	241	163
Y	Trade Agreements Act/ Passage	286	HR 4537	1979	Y	395	7
N	Trade Remedies Reform Act/ Passage	294	HR 4784	1984	Y	259	95
Y	Trade Remedies Reform Act/ Recommit and Modify	293	HR 4784	1984	N	128	231
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Japanese Trading Practices	123	HR 4800	1986	Y	408	5
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Passage	128	HR 4800	1986	Y	295	115
Y	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Strike Unfair Trading Practices Provisions	120	HR 4800	1986	N	137	276
Y	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Strike Antidumping Enforcement and Countervailing Duties Provisions	122	HR 4800	1986	N	79	338
N	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Passage	231	HR 4848	1988	Y	376	45
Y	Omnibus Trade Bill/ Motion to Recommit and Report Without Ethanol Import Duty Exemption	230	HR 4848	1988	N	183	237
Y	US-Canada Trade Agreement Implementation/ Passage	267	HR 5090	1988	Y	366	40
N	Reauthorize Super 301 Authority/ Order Previous Question	270	HR 5100	1992	Y	247	167
N	Reauthorize Super 301 Authority/ Rule	271	HR 5100	1992	Y	252	163
N	Reauthorize Super 301 Authority/ Auto Trade With Japan	272	HR 5100	1992	Y	260	166
N	Reauthorize Super 301 Authority/ Passage	273	HR 5100	1992	Y	280	145

Table 5: House Trade Votes

"Free trade" position	Name in Table	CQ Vote	Bill No.	Year	Passage	Yea	Nay
N	Automobile Domestic Content Requirements/ Rule	407	HR 5133	1982	Y	191	120
N	Automobile Domestic Content Requirements/ Permit Adjustment	409	HR 5133	1982	N	11	331
N	Automobile Domestic Content Requirements/ Eliminate Penalties If Japan's Trade Surplus Falls	433	HR 5133	1982	N	88	310
N	Automobile Domestic Content Requirements/ Passage	435	HR 5133	1982	Y	215	188
Y	Automobile Domestic Content Requirements/ Rename as Smoot-Hawley Trade Barriers Act of 1982	432	HR 5133	1982	N	92	301
Y	Automobile Domestic Content Requirements/ Stipulate That Bill Does Not Supersede Requirements of International Agreements	434	HR 5133	1982	Y	195	194
Y	Department of Defense Authorization/ Allow Up To Two Non-US-Built Cruise Ships in Trade Between US Ports	172	HR 5167	1984	Y	237	159
N	Fiscal 1987 Transportation Appropriations/ Ban Purchases of Non-Domestic Goods and Services	244	HR 5205	1986	N	133	281
Y	US-Israel FTA Authorization/ Passage	385	HR 5377	1984	Y	416	6
N	Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act/ Remove Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea From Duty-Free Eligibility	388	HR 6023	1984	N	174	233
N	International Sugar Agreement/ Passage	116	HR 6029	1980	Y	367	30
Y	Suspend Zinc Duty/ Veto Override	478	HR 6191	1974	N	249	150
N	Steel Import Stabilization/ Passage	386	HR 6301	1984	Y	285	134
N	Energy Taxes/ Passage	235	HR 6860	1975	Y	291	130
Y	Energy Taxes/ Delete Oil Quota Language	204	HR 6860	1975	N	185	224
Y	Energy Taxes/ Raise Import Quotas	205	HR 6860	1975	Y	211	200
Y	Energy Taxes/ Raise Import Quotas To Offset Decline in Natural Gas Supplies	206	HR 6860	1975	N	195	213
Y	Energy Conservation and Oil Policy Act/ Delete Language Authorizing the President To Act As Exclusive Purchasing Agent of Imported Oil	391	HR 7014	1975	N	146	254
Y	Disapprove Oil Import Fee, Extend Debt Limit/ Veto Override	273	HR 7428	1980	Y	335	34
Y	Customs Procedures Reform/ Passage Under Suspension of the Rules	609	HR 8149	1977	Y	386	11

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Table 5: House Trade Votes

"Free trade" position	Name in Table	CQ Vote	Bill No.	Year	Passage	Yea	Nay
Y	Customs Procedures Reform/ Adoption	709	HR 8149	1978	Y	360	1
Y	Continue Shoe Copying Lathe Duty Suspension/ Committee Amendments	209	HR 8215	1973	Y	403	0
N	International Coffee Act Extension/ Passage	244	HR 8293	1971	Y	201	100
N	Sugar Act Extension/ Do Not Allow Amendment Deleting South Africa Quota	79	HR 8866	1971	Y	213	166
N	Sugar Act Extension/ Passage	80	HR 8866	1971	Y	229	128
N	Sugar Act Extension/ Adoption	192	HR 8866	1971	Y	195	91
N	Carson City Silver Dollars/ Prohibit Reduction or Elimination of Duties or Import Restrictions on Certain Textiles/ Adoption	833	HR 9937	1978	Y	198	29

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