COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE POLICIES IN FORMER SOVIET STATES: REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE

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LIDIYA BEISEMBAYEVA

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[redacted]

Jean Stockard, Chair of the Committee

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DATE

Committee: Jean Stockard
Renee Irving

ABSTRACT

Language policy focuses on launching a deliberate change in the official or minority language of the country. It also acts as an instrument that manipulates economic rejuvenation, political stabilization, educational reform and ideals of equality.

This field is exceptionally interesting for research in the former Soviet Union republics. During the Soviet era these republics experienced a 70 year long Russification policy but, since the demise of the USSR, have often established nationalistic language policies. A comparative analysis of language policies was conducted in ex Soviet states, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Effects of Kazakh bilingual and Ukrainian monolingual policies were examined in the spheres of public sector, education, population distribution and economic development. The ways in which the language policies are related to earlier Soviet policy may influence the current nation building of both countries.

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CHAPTER ONE

Language Policy and Planning: What It Entails

The fate of the language is the fate of the people.

Kyrgyz Saying

Through years of intense globalization, the world has been in constant redevelopment and countries search for an authentic identity that can represent their history, culture and language. Even countries with a long-established system of laws and regulations are torn through historic momentums between modernization and traditionalism. For instance, countries like France, with thousands of years of history that has steadily aimed at shielding and preserving its language from outside pressure, are now being influenced by steady migration and globalization. Newly independent countries that have undergone colonization and authoritarianism are searching for their own selves that were previously negated or repressed. Consequently, the involvement of specific public policies that will greatly affect language development and assist in reviving long lost bona fide identity or in integrating ideas and cultures are long awaited, encouraged and expected.

This chapter first examines issues regarding the development of language polic. Then it looks at literature regarding the relationship of identity and nationalism. Following chapters expand on this work by examining language policies and their association with identity formation in two countries of the former Soviet Union. The Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine have been selected for a comparative analysis in order to determine the effects of language policies, nation and state building methods and an undying search for identity that has been suppressed for at least three centuries. Chapters three to six evaluate Kazakhstan's and Ukraine's developments in language legislation and its possible effect on public sectors, migration, education and the economy. The last chapter will present conclusions and recommendations for a successful expansion of language policies that are intended for the benefit of the people.

Language policy 101

Language policy is often used in launching a deliberate change in the official or minority languages of a country. Language is described as an instrument or a machine that can be altered and manipulated in a country's public policy. It is essential to understand the history and background of the region and gather necessary facts for the development and implementation of a successful policy targeted for present and future generations. Often, language policy is described in the form of *who* plans *what* for *whom* and *how*, because it is essential to understand the actual rationale behind the future oriented strategy.

Language Policy is controlled by legislative bodies and is often supported by linguists and language specialists. At the same time, local communities' activities could influence the diffusion and adoption of language within the country. Therefore, language policy and its implementation is determined by numerous actors even though government is recognized as the principle representative.

The purpose of language policy is intended to be modification of language utilization. If one examines the issue deeper, it becomes obvious that language is a social institution where individuals' behaviors and relationships are defined and language is intertwined with politics of the state. The underlying significance of the policy is recognized within nonlinguistic areas such as economic rejuvenation, political stabilization, educational reform and nationalistic ideals such as equality and liberation. Even though, the core of the policy is stated as an alteration in linguistic behavior and communication for the benefit of community, the state's elites can determine future developments with the assistance of a manipulative instrument such as language.

There are certain reformative approaches in determining and developing a successful public policy, which may be specifically seen in language planning. Since language policy and planning are frequently intertwined in popular discussions, it is essential to understand that missions of these two are quite distinct. Policy identifies a long-term design of national aspirations that should theoretically be based on historical and cultural evaluations, but often is shaped by the vision of a particular political leader. Planning is a set of intended activities through which policy is realized through out a specific period of time. Although, language policy

and planning project different levels of control and activities, they are conjoined due to ideological values of ethnicity and identity search.

Three main types of planning activities- status, corpus and acquisition- can be applied to language policy implementation as well as its vitality. Status planning is a tool that restructures language's status within the local and world community. In other words, "it intervenes into society's environment" (Chriost, 2007). It also aims at enhancing the prestige of a language that could result in social and economic growth. As the number of individuals educated in a proposed language increases, the more vitality it achieves through its expansion. One of the examples discussed later in this research is the Republic of Kazakhstan, which has developed an ambitious program attempting to revive the Kazakh language that was suppressed throughout the reign of the Soviet Union due to the Russification program. The new reverse program, Kazakhization, aims at spreading the Kazakh language and increasing its vitality within the local population as well as enhancing the language's prestige around the world.

Corpus planning is more detail oriented in its development of a public policy. Chriost identifies corpus as "intervention into linguistic condition" (Chriost, 2007). This planning activity develops dictionaries and disseminates new words and terms, provides guides to grammatical and orthographical usage and unites different varieties of communication into one official version of language. Depending on the area of the country, language varies in its verbal and written practice, and this variation could be problematic in implementation of public policy. Therefore, through corpus planning equality and intimacy of the language will be achieved.

Acquisition planning is a recent development attributed to public policy. It involves the reformation of education and an increase in literacy rates. It aims at dedicating more language hours to curriculum and increased hours of language study as children progress through school. For example, in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh language exam is required in order to graduate from high school as well as for admission into any state university.

Language is a complex system where cultural and historical aspects collide, and the relationship between individuals and language is identified. Some academics refer to these aspects as linguistic ecology and an interrelation of bio or eco systems. They stress that the interaction between these two systems is exceptionally interconnected and preserving each one of the systems is vital for the successful outcome of future oriented language policy.

There are also strong criticisms of language policy. These criticisms derive from the belief that, through these policies, government elites may pursue their own self interests and negatively impact economic and social progress. There is also a particular notion of one nation=one language=one state, a notion which Chriost suggests rejects contemporary trends of westernization and modernization. Chriost defines this as "socio-cultural colonization" that prevents any multiculturalism growth and the expansion necessary for today's globalization and instead creates societal and cultural inequalities (Chriost, 2007).

Identity and Nationalism

To say language is to say society
Levi-Strauss, 1997

In order to further examine language policies, it is essential to introduce the aspect of identity, a concept that is especially prevalent in literature on nationalism as well as found in policies of the former Soviet Union. Identity is extremely intriguing where areas of policy and planning, sociology, anthropology and psychology are enveloped as one. It creates a solid and historic base for nationalism by providing certain characteristics for the individual to further mature, develop and expand into the role of a loyal and patriotic citizen.

Theorists debate which of two types of identities are more established in today's society. Primordial identity is recognized as something inherited such as skin color and is not capable of alteration throughout life. One who believed in primordial identity was Joseph Stalin who dominated power over the Soviet Union for many years and pressed all 13 republics within the communistic rule toward a common culture, language and economy. In contrast, instrumental identity highlights the construction and adoption of various choices presented to individuals via communication with family, friends and other veins of society. Laitin describes this type of identity as a formation of an art project where an individual selects his or her beliefs, principles and commitments within linguistic, political, cultural and religious areas. It is essential to note that the level of identity change depends on the level of connection between an individual and the social group. As Karl Deutsch pointed out, identity shifts are successful when "the

probability of interacting with a person from a different nationality is equal to that of interacting with a co-national" (Laitin, p.55, 1998). For instance, identity shifts in Ukraine are more prevalent compared to Kazakhstan, where Ukrainians and Russians are in a similar ethnic group and the population is divided in almost equal fragments.

Even though, identity theories are clearly defined and supported by extensive psychological research, there are often endeavors to affect and alter citizens' identities in order to begin a national revival process or achieve linguistic and cultural assimilation. The main aim of such process is to create a certain equilibrium within a society that does not seek alternative identity and is satisfied with the cultural and political principles of the nation. In the case of Kazakhstan, Kazakhs and Russians are separated in their opinions of language policy as well as their feelings of belonging to the nation. For the government, it is essential to find a policy equilibrium where both ethnicities are satisfied with socio political and economic developments. (Laitin, 1998).

National revival policies are designed to achieve cultural, political and economic independence. In regards to linguistic elements, the movement is aimed at *tipping* fellow citizens toward using a different language, for instance Russians in Kazakhstan speaking Kazakh rather than Russian, and creating a belief that the movement is extensively growing in support. Therefore, with such activities targeted at advancing a particular language, the relationship between two distinct languages becomes diaglossic with high and low functions, or a colloquial spoken form and a more formal standard form within the society (Laitin, 1998).

Scholars suggest that there are at least six characteristics that could lead individuals toward assimilation into a society, including, for example origin, territory, religion, history, culture and certainly language. Through identifying one or two of these characteristics, one is capable of establishing his or her legitimacy as a citizen of a nation, strengthening a loyalty toward the state and creating a modus Vivendi with the rest of society. Table 1 demonstrates the sources of ethnic identification in Ukraine. For the Russian population in Ukraine language is the main source of assimilation, whereas territory demonstrates a stronger source of identity for Ukrainians.

Table 1: Sources of ethnic identification in Ukraine (%)

Table 7.1 Sources of ethnic identification in Ukraine (%)

	Ukrainians	*Russians*
Parents	79.8	78.4
Territory/Residence	68.7	22.4
Citizenship	67.6	24.0
Language	60.8	78.7
Closeness to tradition/culture	55.7	43.6
National consciousness	52.5	47.7
Common historical fate	51.6	37.5
Religion	30.2	26.3

Source: M. N. Guboglo, 'The Disintegration and Synthesis of Identity in Post-Soviet Space and Time (the Case of Ukraine)', *Harriman Review*, vol. 9, nos 1–2 (Spring 1996), p. 98

Source: Taras Kuzio, 1998

Assimilation is an adoption of cultural practices that are predominant in the nation and a way to incorporate minorities into the domineering society. There are two distinct types of assimilation, linguistic and cultural. Linguistic assimilation is the adoption of the dominant language system and defines the relationship between the titular identity and minority group, also known as *ethnie*. Landau states that language is a "powerful symbolic vehicle of nationalism" that provides uniqueness for the nation and acts as a "cohesive as well as disruptive force" for those involved in the assimilation process (Landau, p.5, 2001). Specifically for the ex Soviet Union republics that endured linguistic and cultural repression, the newly gained independence led to a path of re-identification and a way to strive for authentication (Landau, 2001).

Cultural assimilation is compared by Laitin to religious conversion, suggesting that older generations portray pragmatism toward culture and history of the nation, while the younger generation is more prepared to incorporate culture into their identity. However, previous research states that cultural assimilation was never successful in the republics of the Soviet Union. This was especially in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan because the cultures of Kazakhs and Russians are too diverse (Laitin, 1998).

Landau (2001) and Laitin (1998) suggest that a search for identity through assimilation is observed on a constant level in today's society. Minority groups, especially in the Soviet Union, are defined by an ubiquitous search for collective identity. Scholars suggest that various incentives for adopting the language and culture of the majority are often rejected with frustration and disbelief. As a result, ex communist counties such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine in

the early 90's inherited disunited polities that struggle between ethnic and civic identity and lack solitary cultural values that are crucial in nation building. Kuzio states that:

> The problem of forging a unifying, as opposed to a divisive, nation in a multinational society is common to most post-communist states. State and nation building, policies intended to overcome these inherited difficulties, are therefore common to all post-communist countries (Kuzio, p.150, 1998).

This research will examine the policy background and outcomes of these struggles. Language policies and identity formations will be reviewed in two countries of former Soviet Union republics, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, in order to understand the validity of past, current and future oriented objectives. These two countries provide an important contrast in understanding the role of language policies. While sharing the history of political domination during the Soviet era, they have different ethnic populations, with Kazakhstan incorporating much more diversity and the Ukraine comprised primarily of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Thus, examining policy developments and outcomes in these two countries provides a way to understand the role of policy changes within two demographic contexts.

Chapter two focuses on historical developments during Imperial Russia and the Soviet Regime language policy that promoted Russificiation in 15 countries in the duration of 70 years. Chapter three defines the language legislature in the Republic of Kazakhstan as Chapter five examines Ukraine language legislation. Chapters four and six conduct comparative analyses of language policies of Kazakhstan and Ukraine that directly or indirectly affected four spheres of public sector, distribution of population, economy and education.

Through globalization and modernization, language policies are rapidly becoming an important issue in today's world. This comparative analysis was essentially performed in order to understand the confusion and chaos in the identity of ex Soviet states' that are torn between nation and state building and divided in language issues. This comparative analysis could be portrayed as a framework for further examination of other countries with similar concerns and questions.

CHAPTER TWO

Language Policy of Soviet Regime

This chapter focuses mainly on the development of language policy in the pre and post Revolution period and the evolvement of its stages during the formation of the United Soviet Socialist Republics. This chapter is particularly important in this comparative analysis because the multinational union was involved in extensive language policy developments and retained under strict control by a centralist government for seven decades. Consequently, this chapter will provide background information necessary to fully understand current issues of language policy in the two Soviet republics, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which are described in subsequent chapters.

Pre Imperial Russia and Birth of Soviet Union

Prior to the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union, language policy was already a vital issue in imperial Russia. Tsars such as Alexandr III, Nickolas II and Cathrine II pressed rationalization processes that limited the usage of languages such as Polish and Lithuanian, banned literature materials in these languages and standardized government documents in the only official language of the empire, Russian (Laitin, 1998).

The demographics of the Russian empire throughout the 18th century were extremely diverse since half of the population was not of Russian heritage. Even though Ukrainians and Belorussians were of Slavic descent and comprised much of the empire's population, the differences between cultures were immense. Thus, it became significant for the empire to highlight state building tactics, remove heterogeneity and substitute Islam for Orthodox Christianity (Laitin, 1998).

Elites of various regions were responsive to the language policy of the Russian empire since its incentives involved better education and administrative job opportunities. Attachment to a specific culture and language were more pronounced by peasantry located on the peripheries of the nations who lacked the knowledge of Russian as well as the urge to acquire it. As the Age of Enlightenment promoted European endeavors in education and language acquisition, the

rationalization process initiated by Catherine II prompted peasants to resist Russian language and cultural assimilation in the 18th century (Laitin, 1998).

As the revolution erupted in 1917 with the Bolshevik assembly driving the force of change into a deprived and starving population, the Russian empire collapsed in a matter of days. Political, social and economic policies were about to undergo major reconstruction based on Marxist theory that was passionately supported by Bolsheviks such as Lenin and Stalin. It was essential for a political leader such as Lenin to eradicate illiteracy, to bring the backward empire to the cultural level of Western countries and proclaim a democracy targeted toward a just and free society. The new slogan "Workers of the world unite" was created to strengthen the international proletariat in a newly developed territory known as the United Soviet Social Republics.

There were three main goals for the newly organized government that focused on strengthening the Soviet state, building a Soviet society and molding a Soviet man. These goals focused on unification and homogeneity where Stalin stressed the strategy of common language, territory, economic life and culture of all fifteen countries. Russian language was pronounced the de jure, an opiate of nations and a "cultural integrator". A good Soviet citizen working toward the goal of socialism was expected to acquire high level of competency in Russian.

Why was Russian the chosen language of national communication between Georgians, Kazakhs, Estonians and others? Why was a different lingua franca such as Tatar or Azerbaijani not opted for? One of the main reasons was that 25% of Soviet citizens were of Slavic heritage such as Byelorussians and Ukrainians who had a similar linguistic repertoire as Russian. Moreover, Russian was among the top five literary and scientific languages of the world and opened the world of culture, science and modernization. For Bolsheviks it was the historic symbol of freedom that overthrew oppression and discouraged an attitude of Russian chauvinism.

Prior to the development of USSR, some government leaders, specifically Vladimir Lenin, recognized the importance of preserving national languages and the multinational nature of the Soviet Union. The Soviet movement struggled with chauvinistic tendencies left from the tsarist regime that emphasized negative attitudes toward local populations within various republics of the USSR. Even though Stalin stressed that there were risks of nationalities' chauvinism, in 1922

Lenin introduced the Soviet Nationalities Policy with a statement that the proletariat of Soviet people does not suppress other nationalities who contribute to creation of socialism. There was then a hidden paradox of language policy between the notion of centralization and autonomy and promotion of nationalities (Suny & Martin, 2001).

For the language policy of the Soviet Union to be successful in the 1920's and early 30's, it was essential to create an equilibrium between the central functions of the Russian language and practical necessities' of national languages to which citizens outside of Moscow had great emotional attachment. Lenin and Stalin realized that an artificial forcing of nations into unification and minimization of nationalities' roles could decelerate successful policy development.

Bernard Comrie states that there were three aspects of the Soviet policy centered around the nationalities movement that Lenin developed. Firstly, Russian was not meant as a lingua franca of the Soviet Union nor were any other languages of the regime given this status. Secondly, everybody had a right to utilize the national language anywhere and anytime. Thirdly, any individual could choose education or job opportunities available in his or her native language. These three points of the policy were later recognized as too idealistic and were eventually adjusted (Bernard, 1981).

As the USSR was undergoing formation of its borders, the central government decided to reconstruct the ethnic geography of each Republic in order to achieve a homogeneous composition. For example, if a Kazakh individual resided in Ukraine SSR, he or she would be required to relocate to her country of origin in order to attain consistency and further strengthen the centralist approach. Through such approaches, the socialist government hoped to promote not only the development of national languages and lingua franca, but everything else that unites people together.

Formation and Implementation of Soviet Language Policy

In the early 1920's, the Soviet nationalities policy disapproved of ethnic groups' Russian assimilation due to Lenin's attack on Great Russian Chauvinism. However, there was concern that the nationalities policy might promote titular nationalism due to identity formations within Soviet Republics. In order to establish centralist control for such a large territory, it was essential

for the government to control the country in smaller units such as national districts, soviet villages and collective farms. Promotion of local elite into leadership positions supported Moscow with decision making in education, industries and official languages from the peripheries. Therefore, the Soviet centralist regime strengthened the nationalities policy, also known as the process of indigenization (Suny & Martin, 2001).

Indigenization or *korenizatsiia* policy was primarily created for indigenous people and promoted their linguistic rights and opportunities. Each republic within the Soviet Union had a policy named after its titular nationality such as Kazakhizatsiia, Ukranizatsiia and Georginatziia. This particular policy allowed local elites to promote the cultures and languages of their ancestors and develop education and job opportunities targeted toward the local population. Through this practice, positive psychological associations of Soviet nationalism were meant to appear:

> the (non Russians) masses would see that Soviet power and her organs are the affair of their own efforts, the embodiment of their desires. Soviet power, which up to the present time has remained Russian power, would be made not only Russian but international and become native for the peasantry of the formerly oppressed nationalities. Native languages would make Soviet power comprehensible. Native cadres, who understand 'the way of life, customs and habits of the local population,' would make Soviet power seem indigenous rather than an external Russian imperial imposition (Suny & Martin, p.74, 2001).

The Soviet Union policy has been recognized as the most enlightened language formation strategy. No other country has attempted such significant language policy modification with such an extensive territory as the Soviet Union. It has been declared that the most successful result of the Soviet language policy was the campaign to eradicate Russian illiteracy as well as of national languages on a consistent level throughout 70 years. During the tsarist reign the literacy rates were as low as 28% and it was essential for Soviet leaders to strengthen education according to Western standards. In order for the Soviet regime to fight illiteracy, the centralist government focused on gradual improvement of not only Russian, but particularly of other languages. There was a great need to expand national languages' materials, access to education in both languages and work opportunities with incentives to excel and triumph over illiteracy (Lewis, 1972).

Certain languages underwent severe alternations due to the Soviet policy of development and improvement of writing systems and alphabets. Languages such as Georgian, Armenian and

those of the Baltic countries never adopted or altered alphabets of their ancestors. However, Islamic republics of the union endured three distinct changes in alphabets, which will be discussed further in this analysis. Since multiple dialects existed throughout the territory of various republics of the union, the government selected the main dialect as the official language of each republic and further promoted its development and spread throughout the territory. Some regard the success of the Soviet language policy as due to extensive works targeted toward the survival and revival of several national languages that previously performed as dialects with mere oral traditions (Lewis, 1972).

With the assistance of such developments, the socialist regime aimed at reducing the number of dialect groups. The result was the identification of fewer but larger language groups within the union. Vocabulary and syntax were distinctly reformed in a manner that would require borrowings from Russian language. Albeit, Russian was not influenced by other languages. As a result, there is a tendency to believe that such bilingualism was a transitional stage to monolingualism (in favor of Russian) on the behalf of ethnic groups.

When Stalin became the leader of the USSR, indigenization of the ethnic population was no longer a significant aspect of his language policy formations. His claims such as "disavowed any adherence to the concept of national culture" as well as "I do not understand National culture"- (Lewis, p.69, 1972) illustrate this sentiment. Due to the rising fear of the prospect of World War II and a centralist new approach toward Soviet patriotism, the government decided to develop a stronger demarcation from outside forces and readjust the language equilibrium with the main focus on Russian. Even though Russian was never pronounced an official language of the USSR and did not intend to replace the importance of national languages, it became inevitable that it would become the *de facto* official language (Comrie, 1981 & Lewis, 1972).

By 1938 Russian, as the *lingua franca* became a compulsory subject in all schools and full acquisition of Russian was a crucial advantage in obtaining technical careers, promotions and recognition of the highly respected Soviet party. Stalin believed in a culturally uniform Soviet population and declared Russian language as an obligatory subject in all non Russian schools through the Soviet Union. Suny and Martin (2001) describe the "paranoid, xenophobic and Russocentric atmosphere of the 1930's"- as a catalyst of the Russification language policy in republics of the regime (p. 255). Even a severe lack of methodological materials, textbooks and

sufficiently trained teachers of Russian did not prevent the development of policy that sought to promote universal knowledge of Russian (Suny & Martin, 2001).

Another important characteristic of Stalin's language policy was the mass mobilization of Russian and Ukrainian populations throughout the republics, particularly in Central Asia. Other nationalities such as Germans who were colonized in 18th century, Chechen, Ingush, and Tatar Crimea were also sent to Islam Republics in order to work toward agricultural and industrial campaigns and enhance the spread of the Russification movement (Kenez, 2006).

In 1953, Nikita Khrushchev was appointed as the next political leader of the Soviet Union. He believed that "only a great attentiveness to the interest of the various nations removes the grounds for conflicts and removes mutual distrust" (Lewis, p.74, 1972). Khrushchev's main language policy outlook was to reform a education system that attains unbalanced language curriculum. He presented Thesis 19 that defined modification of the education system where instruction must be carried out in the native languages and parents held the right to choose the language of instruction. Khrushchev declared that "instruction in the Soviet school is conducted in the native tongue. This is one of the important achievements of the Leninist nationality policy. At the same time, in schools of the Union and autonomous republics, the Russian language is studied seriously" (Green, p. 16, 1997, Kenez, 2006 & Lewis, 1972).

Through his leadership, Khrushchev attempted to revive national languages and cultures of the Soviet Republics. However, he shortly realized that his leadership style greatly differed from Lenin's and Stalin's manner of controlling centralist government. Therefore, he rejected his initial philosophy on nationality and developed the most restrictive language policy the Soviet population had endured. He realized that alteration of ethnic identity is impossible in order to achieve the brotherhood of Soviet people and aimed at "promoting a Soviet people; a new historical community in which all semblance of national culture, Russian or non-Russian, would necessarily be lost" (Green, p. 19, 1997). In result, Khrushchev's language policy aimed at heavy promotion of Russian language in order to achieve control, efficiency and suppress potential ethnic tensions within the Soviet society.

Leonid Brezhnev's 18 year long control has been described as a time of economic and political stagnation. Heavy rise of corruption was also present among the political elite who had lost faith in equality and freedom as foundation of socialism. During this time, the Soviet Union

was regarded as a highly stable society with an exceptionally strong military foundation. However, the regime's weakness persisted in the nationalities policy, which had undergone cycles of Stalin's repressions and Khrushchev's cultural autonomy (Kenez, 2006).

During the 1970s and 80s, Brezhnev's administration was pressed once again to stabilize an equilibrium between centralization and autonomy. The first nationalities protests began to appear in Ukraine and Georgia, with protestors demanding promotion of national culture and language and respect for economic interests of the nation. It became obvious that the rise of nationalism was not shaped by Stalinist policies but instead by modernization, universal literacy, urbanization and mass mobilization that prevented further expansion of Soviet identity. Therefore, continuous experimentations and ambitious campaigns were abandoned by government apparatus in order to achieve conservatism and avert transformations that define disintegration (Kenez, 2006).

As the collapse of Soviet Union approached with Gorbachev's leadership, prospects of independence and democracy guided 15 Soviet Republics to adopt the law on languages in 1989. The law for each republic awarded national languages with official status and Russian was declared as the language of intercommunication of the Soviet Union. The dream of long awaited independence had finally disembarked in the early 1990s and all 15 ex Soviet Republics began a democratic journey toward revival of national culture and language. Numerous struggles and unpreparedness were defined by socio economic and political instabilities after the collapse of the 70 year long regime. It was essential for each republic to endure democratic destiny with much patience and realistic ambitiousness that could find a new equilibrium between nation and state building of independent countries.

This chapter examined implementation stages of language policy during Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Building a brief association with the history of language policy is crucial in understanding the complexities and difficulties of current language policy and planning in the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Based on the knowledge of historical successes and struggles, the current government is hopefully competent of designing more efficient and future oriented policies that could potentially bond the multicultural population of ex Soviet states.

The next chapter examines the formation of language policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The development of main legislative documents such as language law, constitution and assembly of the nationalities provides Kazakh's government perspective toward the multinationality and the official bilingual policy of the state.

CHAPTER THREE

Formation of Language Policy in Kazakhstan

The Kazakh language space has receded more than the Aral Sea
Temirkhan Medetbekov

Central Asia is one of the unique areas of the world that offers rich history and exceptional outlook for public policy research and international development. This chapter provides extensive discussion on the formation of Kazakhstan's language policies that define struggles of nation building methods and equality.

The Republic of Kazakhstan is currently the ninth largest country in the world. It has exceptional natural resources and an extensive territory. At the same time it has recently experienced major social and political evolutions. In the last 20 years, the evolvement of post Soviet language policies portrays an example of continuous challenges and distinct achievements. However, Kazakhstan also experienced many forces related to language policy and identity in earlier eras. The first section of this chapter examines these earlier eras, while the second examines changes in the last two decades.

Source: Central Intelligence Center

Pre and Soviet Kazakhstan

The history of Kazakhstan dates back to the 15th century when it was inhabited by nomads of Central Asian ethnicity whose main economic activity was breeding livestock. The

main language of Kazakhs, also known as Kirghiz, was initially Arabic focusing on oral traditions of ancestors. Writing and reading systems did not exist. As Kazakh territory joined imperial Russia in the 18th century, language policies described in the previous chapter were initiated in order to transform the backward nomads into a Russified population.

Throughout the history of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan's large territory of steppes and resources was of primary interest to the centralist government. The dictatorship of Joseph Stalin and ambitious campaigns of Nikita Khrushchev took a disastrous toll on the population with results that are still apparent. Seven major developments are most noteworthy.

First, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the centralist government developed writing systems for Central Asian republics. Throughout the seventy year Soviet rule, Kazakhstan underwent three distinct alphabet changes from Arabic to Latin and finally to Cyrillic. This gradual change initiated by Lenin is recognized as being the groundbreaking phase toward the full intense language policy of Russification.

Second, collectivization and five year plans in the early 1930's focused on the regime's economic development. In result, the nomads' major economic foundation was destroyed and over one million Kazakhs died of starvation or fled to neighboring countries of Mongolia, Turkey, Iran or Afghanistan. This particular period of history is defined by Kazakhs as an act of genocide.

Third, the Soviet Union's Virgin Island Campaign promoted industrialization by utilizing the vast steppes of Kazakhstan and Siberia. It was essential to recruit a qualified labor force and this force was ultimately comprised of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. As these additional 500,000 workers migrated toward new economic objectives, the demographics of the Soviet Kazakh Socialist Republic (SKSR) were altered significantly. Statistics reveal that in 1959 Kazakhstan became the only republic in the Soviet Union where the titular minority (Kazakhs) comprised a minority (30%) of the population, whereas Russians accounted for 43%. Even though those of Slavic ethnicity were a significant segment of the Kazakh population, there was forcible transfer of people of several additional nationalities into Kazakh territory. The population of people with ethnicities such as Korean, German, Crimean Tatar, Northern Caucasians such as Ingush and Chechen equaled 406, 400 individuals by the 1940's.

Consequently, the language of inter ethnic communication that bonded all the nationalities was Russian (Fierman, 1998 & Zardykhan, 2004).

Fourth, one of the main public policies of the Soviet Union regime was to create a "historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a community of culture"(Esenova, p.20, 2002). Political intelligentsia who showed resistance to Russian assimilation and defended the nomadic lifestyle were ultimately eradicated by the Moscow centralist government. As a result, Kazakhstan became the most Russified nation of the 15 Soviet republics. By the 1970's only 29% of Kazakhs were bilingual.

Fifth, since the majority of individuals conformed to the Russification policy and obtained high levels of proficiency, education and job opportunities greatly depended on the knowledge of Russian. The Russian language no longer held the symbol of only an elite status. And there were strong financial incentives for the ethnic population to choose Russian medium education, which offered superior materials and instruction over Kazakh medium schools.

Sixth, due to industrialization and the growth of technical job opportunities, language planning activities affected the Kazakh's language lexicon and grammar. In order to quickly and efficiently advance in fields of technology, the government introduced Russian based words that were nonexistent in Kazakh language into Kazakh. Such corpus planning intervention linking two different languages severely impacted Kazakh and led to eradication of the pure form of the language, which produced multiple versions of the language, particularly between the north and south regions of the country.

Finally, by the Brezhnev era, the large disparity between the size of the titular nationality and others began to slowly decrease. This was due to greater natural population growth among the Kazakhstan and the emigration of Slavic population. By the 1970's, Kazakhs made up 32.6% of the population, Russians 42.5% and Ukrainians 7.2% of the total population (Zardykhan, 2004).



Republic	Titular Republic Nationality	Russian	Minor Nationality	Other
R.S.F.S.R.	—	84%	Ukrainians 4%	12%
Ukraine	Ukrainians 72%	21%	Jews 1%	6%
Belorussia	Belorussians 80%	12%	Poles 4%	4%
Estonia	Estonians 65%	28%	Ukrainians 3%	4%
Latvia	Latvians 43%	30%	Belorussian 5%	8%
Lithuania	Lithuanians 80%	9%	Poles 8%	3%
Moldavia	Moldavians 64%	13%	Ukrainians 14%	9%
Georgia	Georgians 66%	8%	Armenians 9%	18%
Armenia	Armenians 90%	3%	Azeris 6%	1%
Azerbaijan	Azeris 78%	8%	Armenians 8%	6%
Uzbek	Uzbeks 98%	1%	Tajiks 4%	16%
Kazakh	Kazakhs 40%	40%	Ukrainians 6%	14%
Tajik	Tajiks 56%	11%	Uzbeks 23%	7%
Turkmen	Turkmens 68%	13%	Uzbeks 8%	9%
Kirghiz	Kirghiz 48%	25%	Uzbeks 12%	14%

Source: Central Intelligence Center

Together, these seven major developments made the nomadic people of Kazakhstan considerably dependent on the Russian regime for decades. Socio economic and political decision making eventually triggered ethnic riots that symbolized a national consciousness within the formerly nomadic people. The Soviet system succeeded in linguistic assimilation via its Russified language policy. However, the system failed considerably in completing ethnic assimilation of Kazakhs. The next section describes developments of language policy in subsequent years.

Legislative Body in Kazakhstan

As the Soviet Union system collapsed, the Republic of Kazakhstan proclaimed its independence on December 17, 1991. Two major issues pressed the new Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, for immediate policy decisions. First, nation building was an essential concern for the Kazakh population. At the same time, there existed a large Russian population. Consequently, there was a public policy development known as Kazakhization aimed at promoting a titular nationality that comprised 40% of the population compared to 40% Russians and 20% other minorities by 1989 (Zardykhan, 2004). It was essential to find a delicate

equilibrium between Russophones (Slavic population and Russian speaking Kazakhs) and Kazakhophone interests (Rivers, 2001). Therefore, reconstructing national identity through national building process and multicultural policy were top priorities of the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan. Three different aspects of this policy are most noteworthy.

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The first element of this response was the development of the Kazakhstan constitution. **Version 1** of the constitution was first created in 1993 with euphoric public participation and the thrill of fresh possibilities of independence. The Law declared Kazakh as an official language of the state, and Russian as the language of cross-national communication. However, overestimated resources, ambiguous wording and considerable favoritism toward Kazakh created anxiety in Russians and the Russian speaking minority population. There was a great demand to clarify and/or provide substitute wording in order to avoid ambiguity in the law and diminish the probability of ethnic conflict (Fierman, 1998).

Version 2 of the constitution was adopted two years later, in 1995. After much discussion and debate, a new compromise formulation was created in this second version. This final version defined the state language as Kazakh, and the official language as Russian. Article 7 states that "in state bodies and bodies of local-self-government Russian shall be used officially on a par with Kazakh" as well as all necessary preconditions will be created for the development of the "languages of the people of Kazakhstan" (Holm-Hansen, p. 189, 1999).

There is a distinct separation between the meaning of state and official. Rivers defines Russian as the language of "political integration" that is responsible for transmission of social functions and Kazakh as "national integration" that is responsible for transmission of culture.

> The difference in status between "state" and "official" languages: language, which serves only to further the functions of the government-stands as an "official language," of somewhat lesser status than the "state language," in that it fulfills fewer sociolinguistic functions overall, and fewer functions of high prestige and official visibility, than the state language (Rivers, p.161, 2001).

This constitutional provision involved issues of identity as well as language. A central question is, "Can a Russian become a Kazakhstani?" After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the

population residing in the Republic automatically received Kazakh citizenship, unlike Latvia and Estonia, which both require 16 year residency for citizenship. The Constitution officially addresses not Kazakh people in terms of ethnicity, but Kazakhstani citizens, no matter what their ethnicity and national identity may be. Therefore, linguistic and cultural rights are recognized, but particularly of Kazakhs whose identity and culture were suppressed for decades on their own historic land. (Becker, 2004).

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Languages

The law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Languages is the second major policy development and the first version was adopted in 1989. It stated that the sole language of the Republic is Kazakh, and Russian acted as the language of intercommunication. The second version was adopted eight years later, in 1997. Its objective is to sustain the articles in the constitution related to language issues. The law asserts obligations of Kazakh citizens to obtain knowledge of the state language, Kazakh. The government expects that the ex Soviet Russification policy will take decades to reverse. However, the core of Kazakh language policy is based on reinforcing people to prefer communication in Kazakh over Russian by offering distinct conditions (Smagulova, 2008).

The law on languages contains 27 Articles that supply guidelines in regard to management of language issues. Several highlights of these articles:

- **Article 5** re-states that Russian language must be used on a par with the state language, Kazakh.
- **Article 6** affirms that "each citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be entitled to use a native language, to freely choose the language for communication, upbringing, education and creation" (Legislation, Chapter 1: General Provisions).
- **Articles 8 through 18** affirm the usage of both languages in media, science and culture, education, armed forces, legal proceedings and documentation managements.
- **Article 23** declares "development of the languages shall be ensured by the State Program stipulating the priority of the state language and a stage-by-stage transfer of office work to the Kazakh language" (Legislation, Chapter 5: Legal Protection of Languages).

Kazakh language legislation suggests that Russian and minority languages of Uzbek, Uighur, Ukranian, German and others have particular rights. The constitution and law on languages highlight the superiority of Kazakh by stating that it must be utilized in all fields regulated by the state. Such extreme reversal of language statuses is considered emblematic in multicultural societies where titular inhabitants were marginalized by non indigenous members of the country. Therefore, it could be suggested that Kazakhs are seeking dominance and authority through language status switch (Smagulova, 2008).

Assembly of the Nationalities of Kazakhstan

A third major policy element is the Assembly of the Nationalities of Kazakhstan. In 1995 the president created this consultative body consisting of selected members from national cultural centers. The key goal of the assembly is to cultivate harmony and unity, promote ethnic groups and represent groups' interests in the language legislation (Holm-Hansen, 1999).

The assembly consists of 320 members where 26% are Kazakhs, 15% Russians, 6.5% Koreans, Germans, Tatars and other nationalities. It is important to note that compared to various national minorities of Kazakhstan, the Russian population is not recognized as a national minority within the Assembly. Instead, the consultative body focuses on promoting and protecting the nominal (non-Russian) minorities whose linguistic and cultural rights have been recognized. Groups like Kurds, Uigurs, Uzbek and Tatar who live in clusters ranging from 300,000 to 900,000 are guaranteed primary education and media in the minority language. Russians' demands for political and social acknowledgments have been refused by the government (Peyrouse, 2007).

Via the Assembly of the Nationalities the president attained the role of a protector of multiple ethnic groups within the country. All 17 regions are responsible for establishing efficient cultural centers that support and sustain the cultures of minority groups within their regions. Individuals of minority heritage such as Korean and Caucuses origin receive certain state funded compensations for rehabilitation and education through national cultural centers provided by the assembly (Holm-Hansen, 1999).

The main aim of the Republic of Kazakhstan is to promote its status as a multinational state where 126 nationalities are protected by constitution in a bilingual state. It is evident that Kazakhstani legislation targets to support the growth of Kazakh language and increase its

vitality. Although, it is essential for the Kazakh government to design a much needed equilibrium between ethnic Kazakhs and the Russian speaking population in order to strengthen the bilingual policy. It has been observed that Kazakhstan's strive to proceed with multinational policy is getting weaker and monolingual policy is a possibility in the future. Following chapter identifies the limitations of bilingual policy where the language hierarchy is delineated between two ethnicities that are more divided as ever before.

CHAPTER FOUR

Outcomes and Effects of Language Policy in Kazakhstan

It is essential to examine the effects of language policy based on four social structures in order to determine the successes and failures of the policy. How has the language legislation influenced the shape of the public sector and education within the urban and rural populations? Has language policy increased or decreased migration and immigration of Kazakhs, Slavs or other minority groups? What are the effects of language policy on economic growth? All these aspects supported by statistics will be discussed in this particular chapter.

Public Sector

The Soviet regime turned Kazakhstan into the most Russified republic with the titular nationality as a minority. Russians comprise over 40% of the total population. Yet, as Kazakhstan was undergoing Russian linguistic assimilation during 70s and 80s, ethnic Kazakhs comprised 60% of legislative and executive bodies and the Kazakh share of ministerial posts increased from 39% to 61%. After gaining its independence, Kazakh government appointed 80% of ethnic Kazakhs as regional governors and administrative appointees, while Russian politicians received fewer public policy positions. The ratio of Kazakhs and Russians (minority groups included) in the President's Office has been 6:1, in the Department of Economics 7:1 and the Department of Education has reduced the representation of Russian nationals from 47% to 20% (Zardykhan, 2004).

Why is there such a high share of Kazakhs in official posts in contrast to Russians? The language policy requires high proficiency in reading, writing and speaking of the state language, Kazakh, which strips Russian speakers from prospective involvement in the political arena. Members of the Kazakh state administrative structure must undergo a Kazakh language test supervised by five evaluators who examine their ability to communicate efficiently. For example, during the presidential elections in 2005, five out of 18 candidates failed the language exam and were discarded from the race (Smagulova, 2008).

Moreover, the constitution demands that by 2010 all state administrative posts must be held by Kazakh speaking officials. All written rules and regulations must be transferred from Russian to Kazakh language by the end of 2010. This rule refers not only to state administrative structures, but also to privately owned businesses that must submit financial, statistical and

technical files to the government in both languages. Becker et al (2005) believe that after the collapse of Soviet system, Kazakhs took control of political, social and economic developments through establishment of language policy:

> With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kazakh network emerged as the victor and has used the machinery of the state to place its staff in positions of power and to pass laws that cement its dominant position. Although the motivation is not one of outright ethnic antagonism, the effect of the policies is one of creating new winners and losers who are identified primarily along ethnic lines (Becker, p.168, 2005).

In reality, 20 to 30% of the government's paperwork is completed in Kazakh with the rest done in the Russian language. Smagulova performed research to identify government officials' levels of Kazakh proficiency. The research showed that only 50% had showed any writing ability with 40% writing fluently in older population. Moreover, the state language has received a great deal of status planning, but has lacked serious corpus planning. All 17 regions of the republic differ in dialects, which results in no unification of vocabulary as well as stylistic variety. Low levels of proficiencies and no standardized style of the Kazakh language has hindered the progress of language policy even in state administrative structures (Smagulova, 2008).

An opinion poll in the 90s determined the level of satisfaction in language policy among the citizens of the Republic. Its results reported that 56% supported the proposal of Russian and English as state languages, 29% supported Kazakh's status as the state language and Russian with status of interethnic language of communication. Only 4% encouraged Kazakh as the sole official language and 4% preferred a state with no official language status (Brill Olcott, 2002).

A 2001 questionnaire attempted to examine the satisfaction of Kazakhstani citizens with state language legislation. Its results concluded that 68% of Kazakhs, but only 2% of Russians supported the existing language policy. The prospect of official bilingualism, with both languages having the same status, was supported by 85% of the Russian speaking population.

Distribution of Population

The Kazakhstani territory is the ninth largest in the world and various language and ethnic groups are unevenly distributed across the vast area. As of 2009, the population in Kazakhstan was 15,776,492 (The Agency of Statistics of the RK). Kazakh and Russian speaking

populations generally do not have regular contact with each other, especially because the distribution of the population is uneven. Kazakhs are primarily in the south of Kazakhstan where they constitute almost 90% of the population. In the north they are a mere 25% of the population. The Nnorth part of the Republic shares an extensive border with Russia, and in this area 60% of the population are Slavs. In the Eastern part of the country 63% are Slavs. For example, a southern village has 97% of Kazakhs and 1% Russians, a northern village has a primarily Slavic population with few Kazakh residents (Feirman, 1998).

As the Soviet system collapsed, there was an escalating exodus of Russians, Ukrainians, Belyrussians and Germans from Kazakhstan with the emigration peaking in 1994-1995. Throughout the1990-1999 period over 50,000 people immigrated to Europe and North America, comprised of 65% Germans, 27% Russians and 1% of Kazakhs. In the same time span, 200, 000 people emigrated to "near" abroad areas (ex Soviet States) comprised of 82% Russians, 4% Germans and 5% Kazakhs. Slavic migration has primarily originated from the southern and western parts of the country with 13% of Slavs in these regions leaving urban areas and 8.7% from rural areas. It is expected that the northern part of the Republic will continue to be composed primarily of a Slavic population due to its very long shared border with Russia (Becker 2003 & Becker, 2005).

According to Brill Olcott, a world expert on Kazakhstan, an estimated 1.5 million of the ethnic Russian population emigrated between 1992 and 2000. The economic instability and the newly developed legislature has also prompted the emigration of ethnic Kazakhs. Between 1991 and 1998, 210,000 Kazakhs emigrated to near or far abroad. It is interesting to point out that repatriated Kazakhs migrating from China, Iran, Mongolia back to the Republic since the collapse of the Soviet regime is less than the amount of ethnic Kazakhs emigrating (Brill Olcott, 2002).

As the Slavic population decreased, Kazakh population persisted to increase due to higher birth rates and greater average number of children per family. In 1999, the Kazakh population comprised 53% of the nation, Russian 30% and minority groups consisted of 17%. Out of 10 million Slavs in Central Asia, Kazakhstan envelops 6 million. Two-thirds of them were born in Kazakhstan or have lived in the Republic for at least 20 years. However, due to

differential migration and birth rates, it is expected that by 2015, Kazakhs will make up 60% of total population (Peyrouse, 2001).

What has increased the rapid immigration rates of the Russophone population? Economic instability and the low standard of living in the 90's are essential factors in prompting immigration rates. However, the language policy of Kazakhstan was also a catalyst behind the higher emigration rates since the Russophones' economic prospects were low and economic incentives began to disappear. For example, the Slavic population complains of discrimination during the job application process and in competition for job promotions.

Economy

The rapid emigration of the 90's has definitely increased the percentage of Kazakh ethnic nationality in Kazakhstan, but has also affected the country's economic development. Certain ethnic groups comprised a strong labor force with technical skills that are particularly demanded in scientific fields. Between 1985 and 1993, the decline of skilled workers was by 44%. As a result, it became evident to the Kazakh government that alienation of ethnic groups through language policy could significantly damage economic progress. Hence, objectives for stable economic growth defined a multinational policy (Becker, 2005 & Brill Olcott, 2002).

As the urban economy began to grow and job opportunities increased, emigration rates decreased. Becker believes that "from a cost benefit perspective, an individual should move if the present discounted value of expected utility from a new location exceeds the present discounted value of one's current location by more than the cost of moving"(Becker, p. 235, 2003). Since the gross domestic product growth increased by 14% in 2000 and 2001 and the economy began to stabilize, the movement out of the country became less pronounced.

The Kazakhstani Statistical Committee demonstrated in 1998 that 60% of Kazakhs occupy rural regions of the country where as the majority of the Slavic population inhabits cities. Since there is economic stability within the major cities and a stagnant agricultural sector, the rural population is moving to the cities. Kazakh's representation in cities has increased from 27% in 1989 to 46% in 1999. At the same time, the Russian urban population has dropped from 51% to 37% (Fierman, 1998 & Smagulova, 2008).

Kazakhstan's economy is also linked with that of Russia. How intertwined are the Kazakh and Russian economies? Tracing back into the Soviet era, Russian military posts and commercial centers were strategically located in the Northern cities of Kazakhstan, which fostered close links between the two neighbors. The longest border in the world, 4000 miles, with little natural obstacles has created a great number of links. Also, a Soviet built physical infrastructure, such as electrical power, pipelines and industrial production, are still heavily connected with Russian sectors. The northern parts of Kazakhstan contain oil reserves, 30 billion barrels of which are refined in the Russian region of Siberia. In addition, the Kazakh south region refines crude oil from Russia (Fierman, 1998 & Blackmon, 2005)

Central Asia Republics, specifically Kazakhstan, act as a buffer between the Russian Federation and other Asia countries such as China. It is in Russia's interests to oversee developments in social and economic spheres of Kazakhs in order to control and forecast its diplomacy and actions. Moreover, the presence of a Slavic population provides leverage for the Russian Federation to influence public policy of the Kazakh nation. Thus, in 1995 the two neighbors signed an economic integration agreement that incorporated nine out of 17 regions of Kazakhstan. Through such agreement, the president attempted to portray an image of Kazakhstan as a multinational and liberal Central Asian country (Zardukhan, 2004).

Reflecting these relationships, evidence suggests that workers in the most advanced occupations do not need to know Kazakh, and Russian is the preferred language for these jobs. The 1989 census demonstrated that between 25% and 40% of ethnic Kazakhs do not have knowledge of their ethnic language. The 1999 census, the most current, shows that 74.8% of ethnic Kazaks have great knowledge of Russian and 25.2% are bilingual in both languages. On the other hand, 8.5% of Russians had Kazakh knowledge in 1994, which dropped to 7.7% by 1996. These statistics show that Russian is definitely a linguistic capital that provides more information to cultural and economic spheres than the Kazakh language. For Russians learning the state language, often described as folkloric, is not economically efficient since Russian is heavily utilized in technical and business fields. There is a certain belief among the Slavic and Russian speaking population that "no one will lose his job because he doesn't know Kazakh and no one will get a good job just for learning Kazakh"(Nauruzbayeva, p.10, 2003). Therefore,

economic incentives to learn the state language barely exist even among urbanites, and rural Kazakhs feel the pressure to conform to economic demands.

The constitution declares that "it is a responsibility of each citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan to learn the state language" (Constitution, Article 6). In order to attract the ethnic population toward learning the state language, the president created a campaign that promotes an image of a competitive Kazakh individual. The official statement of the president:

> The lack of Kazakh proficiency and resistance to it in official and public domains impedes the development of Kazakhstan as an economic power because only a consolidated nation could gain economic power and a common state language is a means of such unification (Smagulova, p.453, 2008).

As a result, the Russian speaking resistance to learn the state language is seen as preventing economic developments and nation building of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Economic incentives such as raising salary by 25% are emphasized in language policy in order to attract the population of Russian speakers to learn the state language.

Education

The Soviet regime took a drastic toll on the education system in Kazakhstan. Since the population heavily consisted of Russians and Russian speaking minorities, Kazakh based education became almost unattainable, especially in urban areas. For instance, the capital of the Soviet Kazakhstan in 1960s offered only four Kazakh boarding schools for rural students, whereas urban students had no language education assortment, only Russian based education. The Soviet regime also deprived the education system from any language textbooks and qualified instructors proficient in Kazakh. (Smagulova,2008).

Kazakhstan's current education system has created accessibility to Kazakh and Russian education. Students of all levels have options of Kazakh, Russian and minority language education, which is supported by the Constitution of the Republic. Since governmental policy aspires to raise the prestige of the state language, the Kazakh government and nationalists vigorously advocate Kazakh based education that strengthens childrens' identity roots via the language of ancestors. As a result, the Department of Education integrates mono cultural concepts in students' textbooks that hardly mention multicultural cooperation of Kazakh population and tend to avoid themes of globalization and modernization (Asanova, 2007).

It is apparent that government has been centering on nation building in the Republic of Kazakhstan by endorsing Kazakh education. What are the effects of language policy on individuals' selection of education?

Since independence, the share of students enrolled in Kazakh language schools has increased from 30% to 55%. Compared to 1991, 781 more schools have been incorporated into Kazakh language system, which demonstrates demand for a desired enrollment by ethnic Kazakh parents. UNDP reports that roughly 80% of ethnic Kazakh children are enrolled in Kazakh language school, which is an increase from 34% in 1991. This trend, however, is more prevalent in rural areas of the south where student body remains mono-ethnic with just 200,000 non Kazakh enrollment (Smagulova, 2008).

As a result, the segregation of the population between south and north regions of the country defines educational accommodations and students' preferences. Russian language schools are persistently favored by 44% of population, specifically the urbanites and northern region of the Republic. An example of metropolitan city of Almaty with over 1.5 million inhabitants, demonstrates 41,081 students enrolled in Kazakh medium schools where as 64,784 are enrolled in Russian language schools in 2007 (Smagulova, ---- & Smagulova, 2008).

Depending on the primary language of the school, Kazakh and Russian are obligatory subjects with varying amount of hours dedicated to each. In a Russian school, Kazakh language is introduced in the 1st grade with three to four hours of class time per week. In a Kazakh school, Russian language courses are conducted starting from 4th grade with a mere two hours per week dedicated to Russian grammar and literature. Prioritizing state and official languages starting from elementary and middle education provides a base for language policy developments.

Higher education follows a similar framework as medium education by providing instruction in both languages and requiring students' acquisition of Russian and Kazakh despite their main language education. Unlike the Soviet structure's focus on Russian instruction, current higher education has broadened into technological and scientific specialization for Kazakh speaking students, which increases economic competitiveness of students and expansed corpus planning of the state language (Smagulova, 2008).

What is the percentage of students receiving education in either of the languages? The 1999 census showed that 72% of students are enrolled in Russian based higher education, 27%

chose Kazakh and 1% in other languages. It is apparent that the official language of Kazakhstan, Russian, still holds a strong position within the society that is engrossed in receiving education mainly in the Slavic language. Language policy is succeeding in enriching educational options for Kazakh speakers; however, the lack of trained instructors and sufficient materials still depicts struggling prospects for policy makers.

This chapter studied the effects of language policy in Kazakhstan. The main findings portray great demand for Russian language within the public sector, education and economy despite nation building targeted toward the Kazakh language. It is fascinating to assess language legislature developments as well as examine the pragmatics of knowledge, demands and the level of desire among the Kazakh and Russian population toward the Republics' state and the official languages. There is an evident struggle between nation building and state building where aspirations and goals collide. There is a definite imbalance and clash between the language policy's objectives and the governments' financial and social capabilities.

Currently, Kazakhstan holds the status of a multinational state with bilingual language policy. However, as more Russians and Russian speaking minorities emigrate to near and far abroad due to economic instability and ethnic divide, the language policy will eventually transform into a monolingual policy in favor of ethnic population, Kazakhs.

CHAPTER FIVE

Formation of Language Policy in Ukraine

Ukraine was one of the 14 Republics of the Soviet Union that experienced the Russification policy for 70 years. There is a belief that Slavic neighbors, Russians and Ukrainians, share unique and similar traits and are resiliently united in a cultural, social and linguistic system. Such rapport between two ethnicities is also known as a "Slavic brotherhood" that is eternal and inevitable.

This section will examine Ukrainian language policy framework. Just as Kazakhstan since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine is caught in a quandary between nation building and state building. Ukraine poses an interesting case with its strive to "return" to Europe and its Westernized roots, its cultural and linguistic similarity within Slavic population and the distinct thirst to promote democracy through nationalization of authentic Ukraine. This chapter first briefly describes the history of Ukraine before, during, and after the Soviet era and then describes the nation's language related policies.

Pre and post Soviet Ukraine

Ukraine is located in the heart of Europe, surrounded by fellow survivors of the Soviet Union's Russification policies, Moldova and Belorussia. On the other side, there are politically and economically appealing European countries such as Austria, Hungary and Poland.

Source: Central Intelligence Center

A number of historical events have helped define language policy developments in modern Ukraine and its deeply intricate relationship with Russia:

Firstly, Western neighbors had an immense effect on bordering regions of Ukraine between the 14th-19th centuries. Current Ukrainian regions as Lviv, Zakarpat'ska and Volyn'ska belonged to Western Europe's Kingdoms that either encouraged development of Ukrainian culture and language or forbade its usage in public and excluded it from schools. These particular historic affairs shaped the Ukrainian language on the Western part of the country with Austrian, Polish and Hungarian linguistic influences. Only after World War II was the Western region incorporated into the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine.

Secondly, the South and central part of the country were regulated by Russia in the15th century. As Imperial rule prevented language usage over its extended territory, Ukraine was labeled *"little Russia"* and restricted from practicing its ethnic culture and language. Ukrainian publications were removed from public libraries and Ukrainian individuals were punished for speaking their native language. It is important to note that Ukraine was called "little Russia" for centuries, which created a hierarchical relationship between the Slavic population. Russian was established as the dominant segment and Ukraine as the backward brother.

Thirdly, in 1945 the Soviet Regime segregated the West and East regions in order to prevent movement of individuals with strong national consciousness. The centralist government attempted to destroy cultural institutions that highlighted the difference between Russian and Ukrainian ethnicities. Therefore, differences between Russian and Ukrainian cultures were blurred, especially in central and eastern regions where the Ukrainian language was greatly marginalized. Today, residents of Eastern Ukraine are more likely to affirm that Ukraine and Russia are basically the same than those in Western regions.

Fourthly, in order to assimilate folk based language of Ukrainians to the high prestige Russian, the government steadily introduced Russian based words. This corpus planning altered the pure form of Ukrainian language and created "syrzhyk," which is a fusion of two Slavic languages. This blend is still prevalent in current Ukraine, which impeded language policy's progress.

How similar are the two languages, Ukrainian and Russian? Russians believe that there is a slight difference between the two languages, which are both East Slavic languages. The two

languages share grammatical and lexical characteristics, but contrary sound changes, phonetics and phonologies comprise 38% of total difference between Russian and Ukrainian. Therefore, these languages are not as dissimilar as Russian and Kazakh, but do obtain dissimilarities.

Fifthly, the 1926 census reported a population of 26 million of which 94% of ethnic Ukrainians listed Ukrainian as a native language and 6% listed Russian. The ethnic Russian population indicated a 98% confidence of Russian as a native language. In 1989 the census population consisted of 73% Ukrainians, 22% Russians and 5% others representing a large increase in the proportion identifying as Russian. Thus, by the end of the Soviet Regime, Russian became a native language of 40% of population. Ukrainian was considered a mother tongue by 60% of the population. In result, the Ukrainian ethnic population was tipped toward Russian language assimilation. In contrast, the longer a Russian individual lived in Ukraine, his/hers cultural and language assimilation greatly redeveloped into Ukrainian identity.

As the collapse of Soviet Union approached, people were caught between nationalism, the possibility of Westernization and the legacy of the Soviet system. The Western region of Ukraine was eager to promote nationalism that focused on nation building and restoration of Ukrainian culture and language. Even though there was a belief that economic issues required immediate policy making, language became a symbolic meaning of new values. It became significant to take leadership toward developing an independent nation that has been suppressed under the communistic regime and recreated political and cultural values through manipulation of language policies.

Legislative Body

Language Law in 1989 was the implementation of the first nation-building tactic in Ukraine that focused on social cohesion. Just like the rest of the Soviet Republics, Ukraine established Ukrainian as the sole official language and declared its independence on the 1st of December, 1991. It is essential to note that Ukraine has not altered or revised its language law since independence.

The language law requires that all documentation and paperwork in state bodies, enterprises, establishments and organizations must be done in the official language, Ukrainian. Legal proceedings and mass media broadcasting must be completed in the sole language of the

state, unless national minorities exceed the number of Ukrainians in certain areas. Therefore, other languages could be used on a par with Ukrainian if the population using that language were sufficiently large.

Via the language law, the Ukrainian state obliges to create necessary conditions to preserve minority languages and guarantee cultural and linguistic rights to various nationalities. In terms of education, Article 25 guarantees "the free choice of language for learning shall be the integral right of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR" (Language Law, 1998). Moreover, the law declares the right of other nationalities to utilize their languages in bodies of state power in their compact residences.

The Law of Ukraine on National Minorities was approved by the parliament in June 1992. National minorities are individuals who are legal citizens of Ukraine and express national self consciousness, but are of a different nationality than Ukrainian. The law's fundamental principle guarantees "equal political, social, economic and cultural rights and freedoms to all citizens of the republic regardless of their national origin, supports development of national self-consciousness and self-expression" (Official Website of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/anot.cgi?nreg=2494-12).

The law also guarantees the right of public speaking and education in minority language. Developments in mass media and observance of traditions, literature and symbols are assured for the national minorities by the law of Ukraine (Official website).

The Constitution of Ukraine was adopted on June 28th, 1996. There are several articles that highlight the importance of a monolingual policy where Ukrainian is of most importance:

- **Article 10** asserts that Ukrainian is the sole language of the state. Its comprehensive development and functioning in public and social spheres is protected by the constitution. Minority languages' free development, use and protection are guaranteed by legislation that promotes minority languages for international communication. Therefore, the constitution guarantees the utilization of all languages of Ukraine.
- **Article 11** defines Ukrainian ethnicity as the titular nationality and aims to "promote the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness,

traditions, and culture, as well as development of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine"(Official Constitution of Ukraine, 1996).

- **Article 53** reaffirms the Law on National Minorities declarations. It defines minorities' access to education which "shall be guaranteed, in accordance with law, the right to education in their native language, or to study their native language at the state and communal educational establishments or through national cultural societies" (Official Constitution of Ukraine, 1996).

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was joined by Ukraine on June 19th, 2003. The provisions of the charter apply to Ukraine's' minority groups such as Crimean Tatar, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Gagausian, Greek, Jewish, Moldavian, German, Polish, Russian, Romanian, Slovak and Hungarian.

The main objective of the charter is to provide opportunities for minority groups toward safeguarding and expressing their cultural heritage in public and private spheres. The equality and understanding are essential between linguistic groups and the charter aims at establishing links among people of different ethnicities and languages. The Charter aspires to stress multilingualism and interculturalism through greater unity as long as minority languages do not work to the detriment of the status of official languages.

After signing the charter in 2003, Ukraine planed to revise the law in the near future. Since the Russian population does not recognize its minority status as viable due to the "Slavic brotherhood" conviction, the ratification of the Charter is meant to prevent treating Russian as a minority language (Regnum News Agency, 2008).

Ukraine has an official monolingual policy that defines Ukrainian as the sole language of the country. It has developed National Council for Television and Radio in 2004 and Concept of State Language policy in 2006 that promote spread of Ukrainian language in younger generation especially in urban areas of central and eastern regions. The state has dedicated the budget toward development of media, periodicals and books. Even though, Russians prefer to think that no ethnic differences exist within Slavic brotherhood, Ukrainians desperately divide the two ethnicities and highlight the cultural disparity toward nation building of Ukraine.

CHAPTER SIX

Outcomes and Effects of Language Policy in Ukraine

This section will examine the effects of Ukranization policy within four spheres. What was the impact of the official monolingual language policy on population distribution and immigration, education, public sector and the economy? Is the country tipping toward nation building or state building mode through the assistance of language policy? All these aspects are important in this comparative analysis in order to understand the evolvement of post Soviet language policy in ex socialist states.

Public Sector

According to Ukrainian legislation, the official language of the state is Ukrainian. Throughout the Soviet regime, the majority of public officials holding important administrative positions were of Russian ethnicity. Currently in Ukraine, public officials have a symbolic role in promoting monolingual policy through the use of Ukrainian language in public speeches and meetings. To witness public meetings conducted in the Russian language is almost impossible within the government of Ukrainian.

In February 2000, the Council for Language Policy Issues proposed testing public officials' knowledge of the Ukrainian language in order to prevent any further underdevelopment of it. All newly state officials undergo language examination within three months starting of their service and are assigned posts depending on their level of proficiency. For those officials who have failed the test, a year is given to master the Ukrainian language. If the second test is failed, an individual is released from the official post (Fournier, 2002 & Kuzio, 1998).

Distribution of Population

The latest Ukrainian census in 2001 presented a population consisting of 48.5 million inhabitants of whom 77.8% declared Ukrainian ethnicity. Ukrainian as a native language was declared by 67.5% and 26.8% declared Russian their mother tongue. If compared to the 1989 census, there was a 5% increase in the indication of Ukrainian nationality and 3% growth in the designation of Ukrainian as native language (Bilaniuk, 2008 & http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua).

In 2001, Russians made up 17.3% of the population of whom 98% declared Russian as their native language. Other minority groups included Belarusians, Moldavians, Crimean Tatars

and others who together make up 5% of population. The majority of minority groups claim Russian as their native language within the territory of Ukraine (http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua)

Russian and Ukrainian ethnicities are unevenly distributed throughout the 24 regions of Ukraine. The Central and East regions of Ukraine are predominantly comprised of Russian ethnic citizens. In contrast, the West region consists mainly of a Ukrainian speaking population that is known for its nationalistic movements and fierce support for the monolingual official policy.

According to the 2001 census, 67% of Ukrainian citizens resided in urban areas and 33% in rural parts. The majority of rural areas are located in the Western part of the country that focuses on agricultural aspects of the economy. For instance, the Ukrainian speaking region of Lviv, which is located on the Polish border, is 41% rural. An Eastern region of Donestk with a high fraction of Russian speakers is 90% urban (http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua).

Urbanization has had a great impact upon Ukrainian and Russian language utilization. The 1989 population census demonstrated that 44% of the urban population indicated Russian as their native language. As more rural Ukrainians start migrating into the cities, there is a strong possibility for them to tip toward Russian language assimilation due to the power of urbanization. In result, the demand for the knowledge of Russian language grows as the percentage of Russian speakers steadily augments. Usually the tipping assimilation from Ukrainian to Russian language occurs when the population of Russian urban speakers increases by 25% to 35%. (Liber,1998).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, how many ethnic Russians immigrated to Russian Federation? Interestingly enough, 75% of ethnic Russians in Ukraine no longer identified with the Russian Federation as their ethnic land. The emigration rate from Ukraine to Russia has been steadily low, which could demonstrate signs of nationalism toward Ukrainian political, cultural and social policies by these ethnic Russians (Fournier, 2002).

Economy

During the 70 year long Soviet era, the intertwinement of economic spheres such as agriculture, oil and gas made the Soviet republics greatly dependent on each other. In the 19th and 20th century, the soviet government succeeded in isolating Ukraine from Western Europe, which further increased Ukraine's dependency on the economy of the USSR. As Ukraine

awaited the collapse of the Soviet regime, the independence turned into a pivotal opportunity to join the Western European economic forces. However, soon it became apparent that economic connections between Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were inevitable because they shared the same Soviet gas pipeline structure. In result, the severe state of Ukrainian economic conditions demanded immediate state building actions focused on economic development without the West European support.

The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, was recognized for his fierce promotion of nation building. His design of language policies and attempts to cut economic ties with the Russian Federation set the tone for the direction of Ukrainian future. During the 1990's, language legislation became the Ukrainian's government main concern. The government dove into multiple nation building tactics such as creation of the Education Acts, status and corpus planning and differentiating ethnic groups of Ukrainians and Russians via legislation. The lack of economic development during Kravchuk's presidency surfaced population outcries such as "Ukrainians can't eat their national flag and Ukrainian can't survive on national symbols alone" (Kuzio, p. 139, 1998). A1994 poll demonstrated Ukrainian citizens' support toward economic reforms. In the Western regions 58.4% of residents and in the Eastern regions 65.3% declared economic issues as the "most important issue confronting Ukraine today." These statistics demonstrate the unbalance between the populations' focus on economic development and the government's dedication to language policy issues in the post Soviet Ukraine (Liber, 2008).

Leonid Kuchma, who became the second Ukrainian president from 1994-2005, reestablished economic ties with the Russian Federation and stated that "genuine statehood is impossible without a stable, well developed economy, social well being and dignified living conditions for citizens" (Kuzio, p. 131, 1998). In February 1995 the two countries signed the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership allowing the Russian Federation to have a base port in the Crimean region. In 1998, an economic co-operation agreement was signed that promised to "gradually shape and develop a joint economic space, alignment of the normative and legislative foundations of economic co-operation with abroad, mutual participation of privatization and investment projects" (Olszanski, p.37, 2001).

Currently, Russia is the most important trading partner for Ukraine due to its geographic and geopolitical position. Ukraine imports 80% of its natural gas, 90% of its oil, 60% of its timber and 80% its cellulose from the Russian Federation.

The Ukrainian economy has grown rapidly in recent years: 9.4% in 2003 and 13.4% in 2004. Russia is one of the leading strategic investors in numerous Ukrainian industries. In result of increased investments from Russian Federation, Russian is the primary language of Ukrainian and Russian businessmen. As in the case of Kazakhstan, fluency in Russian represents linguistic capital for Ukrainians.

As with language policy, Ukrainians' attitudes toward economic issues depend on regionalism. Western nationalists fiercely promote the sole official language of the state and appear to be more tolerant of Ukrainian economic hardships. The Eastern and Central population are employed by the main mining and heavy Ukrainian industries that are located near the Russian border. Therefore, the Ukrainian and Russian economic relationship is of main concern for the Eastern population. If economic ties are not supported between two economically strategic neighbors, the restructuring and downsizing of the economic sector could result in the rise of unemployment and poverty.

Education

Through most of the 20th century, Soviet-based education was highly Russified within Ukraine. By the 1960's, an overwhelming number of teachers taught primary and secondary schools primarily in the Russian language. In Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, Ukrainian language education was offered only to 70,000 out of 300,000 students (23%).

As Ukraine gained independence in 1991, the Education Act was adopted in 1991 and revised in 1996. The aim of the act was to create cultural nation building among a younger generation that was extremely Russified, especially in the Eastern and Central regions of the state. It was evident from the start that Ukrainian language education was underfunded and lacked basic materials such as books and sufficiently trained teachers. Therefore, 21st century reforms have led the government to budget appropriate funds for the improvement of Ukrainian language education.

The Education Act and Ukrainian language policy have created serious improvements in promoting Ukrainian as the language of instruction. In the 1990's, 45% of schools were

conducted in Ukrainian in contrast to 54% in Russian. Due to language policy and nationalization, by 2005 the proportion of Ukrainian schools has increased to 78% and Russian has declined to 21%. Other minority languages such as Polish, Romanian and Moldavian were studied by only 1% of students (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008).

The availability of Ukrainian and Russian language instruction varies across regions of the country. Western regions of Ukraine do not focus on Russian language instruction and only 1% of students are studying in that language. The East and Central regions are much more likely to have Russian based instruction, with 58% in the autonomous Republic of Crimea and 39% in the region of Luhansk that borders with Russian Federation. It is important to remember that, based on the Constitution of Ukraine, all schools' curriculum are required to include Ukrainian language courses regardless of their language of instruction (Bilaniuk & Melnyk, 2008).

The opportunity to select either Russian or Ukrainian language of instruction allows higher education students to show a growing Ukrainian nationalism and support of the language policy. As students enroll in colleges and universities, they are more likely to tip from Russian to Ukrainian language education. Shortly after gaining independence, 72% of students at the Eastern University and 82% of students in the west regions chose study in Ukrainian, which affirms their consciousness of national history, culture and language in building a strong nation.

It is clear that the status of Ukrainian language dramatically increased since the independence. The current younger generation realizes the importance of Ukrainian knowledge, which can provide a larger scope of work opportunities and the source of Ukrainian identity. However, the main mode of personal communication undeniably is the Russian language for both ethnic populations, Ukrainians and Russians. The aspect of frequent tipping from the Ukrainian to Russian language in interpersonal communication prompted a survey of 214 students who speak the Russian language outside of education system. The results showed that 3% thought of Russian as more prestigious, 3% did not like Ukrainian, 12% showed poor Ukrainian knowledge. The aspect of inertia and habit to the Russian language defined 82% of students tipping between two languages.

Ukraine represents a unique case in the sphere of language policy. Its drive to separate linguistically and culturally from Russians has become the source of creating national identity

and strengthening language policy. The bond, also known as "Slavic Brotherhood" between Russians and Ukrainians is extremely difficult to break due to historical, territorial and cultural similarities. Russians would prefer to avoid any future separatism, while for Ukrainians' the long awaited independence is a cherished opportunity to distinct themselves linguistically, politically and economically on the international arena.

This comparative analysis examined effects of language policy in public sector, education and economy whose vitalities are essential for an emerging country such as Ukraine. It is clear that nationalistic movements have been successful in promotion of Ukrainian language throughout the country where the Soviet identity is gradually replaced by authentic identity of Ukraine.

However, it is useless to deny that the Russian language is heavily integrated into the Ukrainian populations' lifestyle. The economic arena with flourishing Russian investments is depended on Russian language proficiency that is clearly of valuable linguistic capital to Ukrainian society. Most importantly, Russian is recognized as a language of preference for many individuals who continue to devote their interpersonal communication primarily to Russian. Is it a factor of habit or the relentless effect of Soviet mentality? The future progress of monolingual language policy will hopefully channel its society toward a stronger nationalistic identity. In contrast, the forces of Russian speaking population and the Russian Federation could affect the future of the Ukrainian language policy in promotion of bilingualism.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter summarizes the previous sections that examine language policies of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine and the impact on population distribution, education, public sector and economic development.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis was conducted in order to understand differences in language policies after the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of the Russification policy. After the 70 year long regime, ethnic languages of Kazakhstan and Ukraine were underrepresented, avoided and denied any important status within their own regions. The Russification policy was partially successful due to migration of millions of ethnic Russians and Russian speaking minorities such as Germans, Koreans and Ukrainians in Kazakhstan and Moldavians, Belorussians and Hungarians in Ukraine. Therefore, at the rise of independence the first legislative step was the adoption of Language Laws in 1989 that acted as a catalyst toward re- establishment of identity and nation building.

The search for identity is an undeniable aspect of language policies, especially when psychological complexities are intertwined with political objectives of ex Soviet states, such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The Imperial Russia and Soviet regime ruled over millions of inhabitants of multiple nationalities for hundreds of years, which resulted in distorted and confused identities that are still lingering in today's society. It is nearly impossible for the government to link dysfunctional socio economic and political pieces without discovering the identity of the state. What is the identity of the government itself that is responsible for representing and protecting its populace with the power of constitution? In the midst of globalization, the government must generate and embrace its own identity that defines future success of language policy. Undeniably, it is a challenging road for the ex Soviet states who contain cocktails of various identities where Kazakh and Ukrainian daily collide with Russian and, most persistently, with the Soviet forms of identity.

In the case of Kazakhstan, the titular nationality had the lowest percentage among all 14 republics of USSR. Consequently, ethnic Kazakhs were overexposed to Russian language, which

was widely utilized in urban areas and northern regions of the republic. As implementation of language legislation focused on bilingual policy, Kazakh was declared a state language, a higher position compared to the official status of the Russian language. As a result, the language hierarchy switched from favoring Russian in Soviet policy to favoring Kazakh.

Kazakhstan thrives upon its image as a multinational state on the international and the ex Soviet arena. It endeavors to present itself as a secular republic with 130 nationalities flourishing economically and politically while discerning their cultural and language identities via governments' resources and support. One of the imperative successes of Kazakh government's policies is its aptitude to direct intercommunications of various nationalities in such a manner that no accounts of ethnic conflict have been recorded since the independence.

In reality, the official bilingual language policy status is more complex with multiple impacts within the society. Increasing emigration rates, economic fluctuation and dependency on the Russian Federation has prompted the flow of nationalistic ambitions aimed at identifying with the Kazakh nomadic history, culture and language. It is evident that the persistent ethnic divide is sparking further emigration of the Russian speaking population that refuses to accept its second class status. Therefore, it is expected in the future of Kazakhstan that Russian's status as an official language may disappear and be substituted by one sole language, Kazakh.

In contrast, Ukrainians always constituted a larger percentage of the population as the titular nationality during Soviet regime. The Russification process occurred in other republics, Ukraine was no exception. After gaining independence, the state was eager to implement its monolingual policy with the sole official language, Ukrainian. The well proclaimed "Slavic brotherhood" had switched the hierarchical positions with the Ukrainian language finally ready to become dominant over Russian.

Ukrainian historical events such as the Orange Revolution, united Ukrainians and Russians in a momentous movement toward the same goal: the demand for democratic revitalization of the corrupted government. The economic instability, lack of efficient socio political support and severe segregation of the Western and Eastern regions had prompted Ukrainian citizens to overlook their differences and to march toward the stronger nation building of the state.

Ukraine is without a doubt an interesting case of the ex Soviet state revitalizing itself through language policy making. Even if social segregation is ingrained in its socio economic and political spheres, Ukrainian citizens are embracing and supporting government's leadership in a monolingual policy that highlights the differences of Russian and Ukrainian cultures and languages. With much resistance and disapproval of the Russian Federation, Ukraine is standing out in the international arena in a uniquely strong manner that is distinct from Russian leadership. As time goes, it is only expected that the proclaimed monolingual policy of Ukraine will grow stronger and more defined.

Nevertheless, it would be false to deny the engaging presence of Russian language in both countries, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The 70-year long Soviet regime not only altered individuals' mentalities, but also profoundly embedded the Russian language into vital characteristics of the countries. Kazakh and Ukrainian political leaders as well as policy makers resentfully recognize the magnitude of Russian language for inner socio economic and political stability. The effects of such powerful influence are expected to be endured by at least another generation. Overall, the power of Russian language is primarily observed within an education sphere that is desperate for nation building resources and in the economy that is dependent on the Russian Federation's economic development. Most importantly, however, the majority of the Kazakhstani and Ukrainian population shows a preference for the Russian language in interpersonal communication.

Recommendations for Language Policy Developments in Kazakhstan and Ukraine

Firstly, dedicate fewer resources to status planning and focus primarily on corpus planning. Kazakhstan and Ukraine experience multiple versions of official languages that hamper standardization of government official paperwork and successful education system. Due to its extensive territory, the Kazakh language greatly varies among regions, where as the Ukrainian language is a mix of two Slavic vocabularies that loses its pure form. In order to implement efficient language planning, homogeny of both languages is crucial.

Secondly, devote more resources toward the education system, which lacks trained language teachers and high quality materials. Based on this comparative analysis, both systems created language policies with minimal foundation of budgeting and resource development.

Again, a standardized version of Kazakh and Ukrainian language should be executed throughout all education levels.

Thirdly, a large percentage of Ukrainian population understands the importance of language proficiency. On the contrary, the Russian speaking population of Kazakhstan is not as enthusiastic to develop language skills, that due to the conviction that Kazakh has no future. It is essential for the government to create business and personal incentives for Russian and Russian speaking minorities to attain interest in learning the state language of Kazakhstan.

Fourthly, Kazakhstan needs to establish realistic goals for transferring government documentation into the state language and require state officials to obtain high proficiency of Kazakh. The legacy of Soviet policy is difficult to obliterate especially in a short span of 15 years.

Lastly, the political leaders of Ukraine and Kazakhstan need to establish an open dialogue with the population concerning language policies' status and progress. This dialogue could eradicate social differentiation in Ukraine and Kazakhstan and prevent any further ethnic divides in the Central Asian Republic. The Russian speaking population in Ukraine and Kazakhstan are growing alienated from socio economic and political affairs of the state. Their treatment as second class of the population hinders language policy and nation building of both countries. The current leaders should implement this step on a constant level in order to demonstrate concern for its society.

Recommendations for Future Research

This comparative analysis of language policies aimed at examining how various spheres were affected by bilingual and monolingual legislation. Kazakhstan and Ukraine both have substantial Russian and Russian speaking populations whose human and language rights must be considered. Several spheres demonstrate flourishing affects of language policy where as others are in need of comprehensive evaluation.

The initial comparative analysis intended to examine language policies of Belgium, Wales and Canada that have successfully implemented their language policies. Their lessons learned were to be suggested for the language policy of Kazakhstan. I believe that such comparative analysis is greatly beneficial and could develop a feasible framework of future language policy developments.

Extended research should be conducted on the effect of language policies on economic development. This aspect is intriguing to track down the fluctuation in the economy due to any changes in language policy. In the case of Kazakhstan, the language policy has created a great loss in human capital in scientific and medical fields. New research could focus on level of productivity at governmental posts, governmental organizations or nonprofits whose documentation is required to transfer to Kazakh by 2010.

Language policies are a vital source for ex Soviet states to ascertain themselves in representation of the true identity. As both countries are moving toward the equivalent nation building mission, it is essential for Kazakhstan and Ukraine to consolidate their national identity that was repressed for decades as they take into account the needs of multiple ethnic minorities such as millions of Russians.

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