

FOLK ART, NATIONALISM, AND IDENTITY
IN A KYIV, UKRAINE SOUVENIR MARKET

by

ABBY GREWATZ

A THESIS

Presented to the Folklore Program
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts

December 2013

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Student: Abby Grewatz

Title: Folk Art, Nationalism, and Identity in a Kyiv, Ukraine Souvenir Market

This thesis has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the Folklore Program by:

Dr. Carol Silverman	Chairperson
Dr. Katya Hokanson	Member

and

Kimberly Andrews Espy	Vice President for Research and Innovation; Dean of the Graduate School
-----------------------	--

Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School.

Degree awarded December 2013

© 2013 Abby Grewatz

THESIS ABSTRACT

Abby Grewatz

Master of Arts

Folklore Program

December 2013

Title: Folk Art, Nationalism, and Identity in a Kyiv, Ukraine Souvenir Market

Since the collapse of the USSR independent Ukraine has used politics and culture to define a separate national identity, in contrast to Russia. Through a performance studies lens I describe Kyiv's largest souvenir market, Andriyivsky Uzviz, and place it in the context of nationalism and cultural promotion. I draw on Conquergood who situates the performing of culture at the intersection of history and identity, and Kapchan who notes that markets are key sites where ethnic identity is defined within sociopolitical frameworks. While profit and customer demand are important to vendors in the Uzviz, Ukrainianness is consciously emphasized through their folk art items. Vendors wear national costume, sell "traditional" Ukrainian items, and explicitly identify as Ukrainian, not Russian. Through one Uzviz folk artist I illustrate vendors' use of folk arts to express Ukrainian cultural identity and show how the market is a microcosm of the larger nationalist movement in Ukraine.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Abby Grewatz

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

University of Oregon, Eugene
University of Montana, Missoula

DEGREES AWARDED:

Master of Arts, Folklore, 2013, University of Oregon
Bachelor of Arts, Russian, 2009, University of Montana
Bachelor of Arts, Anthropology, 2009, University of Montana

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

Folk art, nationalism, identity, authenticity, Ukraine, Russia

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Discussion Instructor in Folklore, University of Oregon, Sept.- Dec. 2013
Instructor of English Composition, University of Oregon, Sept. 2012-Jun. 2013
Student Archivist in the Randall V. Mills Archives of Northwest Folklore,
University of Oregon, Sept.-Dec. 2011, Apr.-Jun. 2012

GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS:

Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Folklore, fall 2011, spring 2012, and fall 2013
Graduate Teaching Fellowship, English, 2012-2013
Graduate School and Folklore Program Research Award, "Folk Art in Context: Ukrainian Cultural Promotion in a Kyiv Souvenir Market", University of Oregon, 2013
Folklore Program Travel Award, "Folk Art in Context: Ukrainian Cultural Promotion in a Kyiv Souvenir Market", University of Oregon, 2013
Title VIII Program Grant, thesis research in Ukraine, U.S. Dept. of State, 2012

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express many thanks to Professors Silverman and Hokanson for their assistance in the preparation of this manuscript. Their comments and suggestions made this thesis more than I expected it could be. I also thank the other professors of the Folklore Program and REEES who have encouraged me in my studies over the last two years. I am grateful to have completed my research in Ukraine with the help of a Title VIII Program Grant of the United States Department of State. This program, which was sadly defunded in 2013, supported many aspiring scholars' research in Russia, Ukraine, and other countries of East Europe and Eurasia.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Overview	1
Methods	4
Note on Transliterations	7
II. FOLK ART HISTORY AND POLICY IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION	8
Beginnings of Folk Art Study in Imperial Russia	8
Folk Art Revival	12
Imperial Government Involvement in Folk Art	17
Folk Art in the Pre-Stalinist and Stalinist Soviet Union	21
Folk Art in the Post-Stalin Soviet Era	26
III. UKRAINIAN HISTORY AND NATIONALISM	33
History of Kyiv and the Kievan Rus'	33
Ukraine in the Russian Empire	34
Nationalism in Ukraine	37
Ukraine in the Soviet Union	43
Independent Ukraine	48
Language in Ukraine	51
The Orange Revolution	55
The 2012 Language Bill and Debate	60
Current Events	64

Chapter	Page
IV. ANDRIYIVSKY UZVIZ SOUVENIR MARKET IN KYIV	67
Overview of the Market and its Surroundings	67
Maintenance and Regulation of the Market Space	71
The Market's Vendors and Wares	75
Ukrainianness in the Market	87
Gosha, an Uzviz Artist.....	91
Expressing Identity in the Uzviz.....	98
V. CONCLUSIONS.....	106
APPENDIX: TYPES OF UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN FOLK ART IN	
IMPERIAL RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION	111
REFERENCES CITED.....	113

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. The first matryoshka design.....	14
2. The Gorby doll.....	30
3. “I’m against Yanukovych!”	59
4. Posters of Yulia Tymoshenko	60
5. Protesters of the 2012 language bill.....	62
6. St. Andrew’s Church.....	68
7. The top of the Uzviz	69
8. Map of the Uzviz	70
9. Uzviz renovation facades.....	72
10. An Uzviz embroidery stall.....	80
11. Pysanky	81
12. Upper Uzviz stands	86
13. A women’s folk shirt	89
14. A men’s folk shirt	89
15. One of Gosha’s miniatures.....	93
16. Gosha’s business card.....	95
17. Gosha and his Uzviz stand.....	97

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Souvenir markets are often an integral part of a tourist's experience in Ukraine. Many people purchase items that become gifts, memories, and parts of personal history. Markets are complex, dynamic places that allow interaction among tourists, local residents, and material culture. In the following thesis I focus on a souvenir market in Kyiv, Ukraine, known in Ukrainian as Andriyivsky Uzviz.

To contextualize the market, in Chapter II I outline a general history of folk art in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This chapter focuses on the folk art revival on the late 19th century, and then on general government policies and regulation of folk art production and sale. I explore how the government in the past has officially used folk arts, both as a mode of cultural preservation and later as propaganda. Revivals set the stage for the entrance of folk arts into international markets, as well as contributing to ideas of national identity in the Russian Empire. This changed drastically in the early Soviet period, when the regime initially tried to eradicate folklore. However, leaders changed their minds and instead placed strict control over folk art production. After the death of Stalin, folk art producers enjoyed looser policies and eventually folk art found its way to souvenir markets, such as Andriyivsky Uzviz, that were founded in the 1980s.

In Chapter III I contextualize the market further by discussing the history of Ukraine, emphasizing its relations with Russia. The two countries have intertwined histories, tracing back centuries to their shared ancestry of the Kievan Rus'. Ukraine was later part of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union. Although Ukraine attempted

many times to gain more independence under the Russian and Soviet ruling powers, it was not able to do so until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Along the way many Ukrainians adopted ideas of romantic nationalism, and these ideas have continued to inform Ukrainian politics today. The nationalist movement in contemporary Ukraine is complex and multi-faceted. It is complicated by the ethnic makeup¹ of the country and by the population's use of both Ukrainian and Russian languages. Many Ukrainians would like to see increased separation from Russia, but the fact remains that Ukraine is highly dependent on Russia for gas and trade. In this chapter I discuss political developments such as the Orange Revolution of 2004, the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and the language bill of 2012 that show that many Ukrainians support more Ukrainian independence. However, other more recent developments, such as President Yanukovych's scrapping of signing agreements with the European Union, have shown that this may be quite difficult. Large scale protests against Yanukovych in December 2013 show the fragility of the situation.

In Chapter IV I discuss one small area where I see strong promotion of Ukrainian national identity. I describe the market in detail, profile an artist and his life history, and explore how the market expresses the rising nationalism that is currently permeating the country's politics, particularly in cities like Kyiv. As in any market setting, profit and customer demand are important to vendors in the Uzviz. Alongside this, artists and vendors also consciously emphasize Ukrainianness through their folk art items. Vendors

¹ Ukraine's most recent census in 2001 indicates that ethnic Ukrainians made up 77.8% of the population, and ethnic Russians were about 17%. Ukraine's minority ethnic groups made up around 5-6% of the total population. They included Belorussians (0.6%), Moldavians (0.5%), Crimean Tatars (0.5%), Bulgarians (0.4%), Hungarians (0.3%), Poles (0.3%), Jews (0.2%), Armenians (0.2%), and Roma (0.1%), among others. ("All Ukrainian Population Census 2001" 2003-2004) This thesis focuses on the majority ethnic Ukrainian and Russian populations' relations.

wear national costume, sell “traditional” Ukrainian items, and explicitly identify as Ukrainian, not Russian. Through one Uzviz folk artist I illustrate vendors’ use of folk arts to express Ukrainian cultural identity. I show how the market is a microcosm of the larger nationalist movement in Ukraine, but emphasize that it is not in the same category as street protesters or radical politicians who communicate their nationalist views more overtly. The market is a safer, more innocuous setting to express ethnic and national pride, and this pride is in fact expected and supported by market visitors who come to the market hoping to purchase Ukrainian souvenirs.

I draw on Conquergood (1992 and 2006) who situates the performing of culture at the intersection of history and identity, and Kapchan (1996) who notes that markets are key sites where ethnic identity is defined within sociopolitical frameworks. Uzviz artists and vendors are not explicitly political, but they incorporate their political leanings into their market practices by choosing to only sell Ukrainian folk arts. I build on this and suggest that cultural promotion in the Uzviz is a small part of a greater movement of Ukrainian nationalism that is happening currently in the country. Politics in Ukraine since 1991 has been informed by cultural and national contestation with Russia. It is my goal in this thesis to discover if and how this contestation informs market activities. In several specific behaviors, some of which include selling only Ukrainian folk arts, choosing to speak only Ukrainian, and wearing Ukrainian folk costume, artists and vendors present themselves as Ukrainian, though their motives for doing such things may vary. For example, some say outright that they are pro-Ukrainian and do not want to sell Russian souvenirs or speak Russian in the market. Others use their Ukrainian identities to sell

more wares, such as one woman who says her sales increased substantially after she began wearing Ukrainian folk costume in the market.

In Andriyivsky Uzviz wares may be contemporary souvenir items like commemorative t-shirts or coffee mugs, or folk art forms like carved wooden spoons or embroidered scarves. Folk art forms have roots in history and traditions dating back hundreds of years. In my discussion of the market in the present I show that vendors unofficially use their folk art wares to assert national identity. In this way the Uzviz is also an avenue of cultural promotion and transmission, due to the current nationalistic political backdrop. Visitors² see the market as a nice place to purchase souvenirs, which it is, but that is usually the extent of their knowledge about the market. Some are unfamiliar with the differences between Russian culture and Ukrainian culture, because of these countries' shared histories, so they expect to see Russian souvenirs. Artists and vendors know this and by selling only Ukrainian wares hope to change this misconception.

Methods

In my research, I was primarily interested in three large questions. First, what kinds of souvenir folk arts can be found in the Uzviz and how do vendors choose what to sell? Second, given the history of folk arts in the Soviet Union (and earlier) how and why have they entered the souvenir context? Third, how can they be interpreted specifically in the larger political context of independent Ukraine? To answer these questions I engaged

² Ukraine's State Statistics Service reports on tourism in Ukraine. The most recent information available indicates that around 23 million foreign citizens visited Ukraine and around 2 million domestic tourists traveled within Ukraine in 2012. ("Turistichni Potoky" May 2013) A 2007 report of the Ukraine Ministry of Economic Development and Trade states that visitors to Ukraine came from the following regions: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states 57% (mostly Russia, Poland, Moldova, and Belarus), European Union (EU) states 36% (mostly Hungary, Slovakia, and Germany), other 7% ("Tourism Trends in Ukraine 2007" 2007). It appears that this government agency does not publish this information yearly. Hypothetically, if we assume that at least 30% of tourists visit Kyiv, and then assume that they probably visit Andriyivsky Uzviz, we can estimate that about 7.5 million people may pass through the Uzviz yearly.

in several types of ethnographic research. I spent six weeks in Kyiv, Ukraine doing fieldwork as part of an intensive Russian language program. While in Kyiv, I did research at Andriyivsky Uzviz primarily engaging in general and participant observation. I closely observed and recorded how many souvenir stands and stalls there were on a given day, who was selling souvenirs, how they were dressed, what kinds of souvenirs they were selling, and who was buying, among other things. I also participated as a tourist at the market. I conducted impromptu interviews with vendors, asking general questions about their jobs as souvenir vendors or artists, what they sold and why, and purchased a few souvenirs myself. I gained a great deal of information from short conversations with vendors and tourists, and from overhearing conversations of market-goers. I took many photos during my times at the market, which allowed me to recreate descriptive images of the market; these accompany my analysis. Unless otherwise stated, all photos in the following chapters are mine. I was fortunate to conduct more in-depth interviews with one artist and from these I gained detailed information about his life history, career as an artist, and about inner workings of the market.

I used print and online resources to gather background historical information and current information on the political situation in Ukraine. These included historical sources on Soviet folk arts and government folklore policies, as well as contemporary analyses of these phenomena. I also consulted online newspapers and journals in English and Russian, from which I gathered information about Ukraine's current political climate. I also took a small amount of information about Andriyivsky Uzviz from online sources such as Russian travel websites and video sites like YouTube.

My knowledge of the Russian language became an integral part of conducting this research. This could cause complications at times, due to my less-than-native fluency. Furthermore, Kyiv presented another yet another challenge because Ukraine is a bilingual country. Most Ukrainians speak both languages, though they may speak one better than the other. Eastern Ukraine is primarily Russian-speaking and western Ukraine is primarily Ukrainian-speaking. Kyiv is located in east-central Ukraine, and Russian is the main language of many of its inhabitants. Russian has been used in Ukraine for hundreds of years, especially when it was part of the Soviet Union, and many consider it to be the official language of public life. That is, Russian is used in the workplace, in schools, and on the street. However, Ukrainian is also widely used. In fact, although many people speak Russian in public, most street signs, billboards, and business names are in Ukrainian. Thus the bilingual quality of life in Ukraine is somewhat balanced, but is also a source of political debate and sometimes conflict. In Chapter III I address a few small aspects of this conflict. Many Ukrainians would like to see a transition to using more Ukrainian in public life. Some even support a complete eradication of the Russian language in Ukraine.

While in Kyiv I began to understand the implications of this with regards to conducting my research. I noticed the use of both languages in different contexts. Many Kyivans speak Russian at work or school, and Ukrainian with friends and at home. In shops I often participated in conversations in which I spoke Russian and the shop owner spoke Ukrainian. Bilingual conversations and code switching within conversations is common. It was important to me to be ethical and considerate of the people and place I was studying, and part of this was speaking the language to better understand my topic in

context. However, I spoke no Ukrainian, so this became impossible. Although this may have placed certain limitations on my research I feel that I have successfully navigated any possible shortcomings. Russian is the de facto language of many parts of Ukraine, including Kyiv, and speaking Russian there did not seem to limit my gathering of information in any measurable way. Also, most official documents, including those I have analyzed in my research, from Ukraine from the Soviet period were written in Russian because it was the official language of the Soviet Union. While I feel that speaking Ukrainian would have enriched my research experience in Kyiv, it was not completely necessary, and I do not recognize any deficiencies in the results of my research directly caused by not speaking Ukrainian.

Note on Transliterations

For ease of reading, I have chosen to transliterate all Russian or Ukrainian words that appear in this thesis. Well-known Russian names of places or people, such as Moscow and Gorky, have been left in their Anglicized equivalencies. Other transliterations are mine and generally follow the U.S. Library of Congress system. Historically, Ukrainian names have often been transliterated from their Russian translations, rather than directly from the Ukrainian (e.g. Kiev, instead of Kyiv). I have chosen to transliterate directly from Ukrainian. Some Ukrainian church names have been Romanized for ease of understanding and reading (e.g. St. Andrew's Church, instead of Andriyivska Tserkva).

CHAPTER II

FOLK ART HISTORY AND POLICY IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

Before describing and analyzing Andriyivsky Uzviz, it is necessary to understand the background of folk art and folklore policy in the former Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union. Of particular note will be that, in contrast to much of history, in Ukraine today the government does not influence folklore quite as much as it did in the past. In the following chapter I trace the history of the study of and policies about folklore and folk art, from Imperial Russia, through the Emancipation of the serfs in 1861, and during and after the communist revolution of 1917. Much of this chapter centers on the general Soviet policy on folklore. In Chapter III I expand on the specific history of Ukraine.

Beginnings of Folk Art Study in Imperial Russia

Scholars and upper classes in Imperial Russia divided art and culture into “high” and “low” culture. High generally consisted of classical music, opera, ballet, sculpture, and other arts which were part of and supported by the state-owned Academy of the Arts. Low was defined as peasant or folk culture, and included forms such as folk music, wood carving arts, and folktales. High art was considered of the elite, wealthy, upper classes, and low art was a completely separate realm of the poorer classes of society (Stites 2005, 2). High and low did not mix and those in the elite class did not consider themselves to have much connection to folk culture. However, in the mid-nineteenth century elite thought with regard to folk culture began to change. Some elites began to see folk culture as a representation of “real Russianness” and connected it to Russian national identity

and heritage. This connection was officially made and endorsed by the imperial government in the late 1800s. At that time the study of folklore itself was relatively new in Russia; very few had begun to collect Russian folklore in earnest until the late eighteenth century (Perrie 1989, 121), and this mostly included oral tradition such as folktales and folksongs. (Hellberg-Hirn 1998, 137) Many of these collections began as ethnographic studies, at the time an emerging discipline.

Ethnography as a discipline in the Russian Empire began in the late 18th century and early 19th century when Russian scholars began collecting folk songs and stories, mostly for entertainment value. There were a few folklore collections that emerged in the 1820s as intellectuals became interested in defining the Russian national spirit. In 1845 the Ethnography Division of the Russian Geographical Society was founded and set up ethnography as a distinct academic discipline in Russia. The Empire was quite widespread geographically by this time and part of the interest in ethnography came from an interest in the various ethnic and cultural groups that were encompassed by the Empire, knowledge of whom would be useful for two reasons. First, understanding the ways these groups lived would allow for easier governance of them because local policies could be improved based on the needs of the people. Second, ethnographers considered themselves enlightened and felt the need to raise awareness of Russian national history and culture. Developing heritage would require reforms to emancipate the peasants, who were seen as the roots of national consciousness in Russia. (Knight 1998, 132-133)

Emancipation occurred in 1861 but in the 20-25 years immediately following, former serfs still had not really been integrated into the greater society; most of the upper class looked down upon the former peasant class. However, there was a certain

contingent of the high class, those who had been introduced to the ethnographic studies of the past several decades, who gained sympathy for the poor after the emancipation. They discovered, just as the ethnographers had, a romanticized, spiritual, and aesthetically pleasing aspect to the poor, and especially to their arts and crafts³, and appropriated this for their own artistic uses. Artists began to paint idyllic scenes of country life, architects began to emulate the style of the *izba*, a traditional log hut lived in by many peasants, and even the Imperial Porcelain Factory borrowed designs from peasant embroidery to paint on tea sets. (Salmond 1997, 6)

The rich began to collect folklore directly from the peasantry, filling their private collections and museums, engaging in a sort of armchair study of folklore. The upper class began to spread the idea that peasants were *the* ideal Russians, the repositories of all cultural knowledge and tradition. Wealthy collectors seemed to be, maybe paradoxically, both selective and vague in terms of what they collected. On the one hand, only certain folklore was deemed worthy of collection and documentation, so any material judged to be "impure" in some way was left out, a process that seems quite specific and detailed. On the other hand, that which *was* chosen to represent Russian national identity was idealized, generalized, and oversimplified. (Hellberg-Hirn 1998, 138) In fact, some scholars argue that although nationalism was becoming an important issue in intellectual circles, actually there was a weak sense of a mass national or ethnic identity in Russia at this time. The reasons are variable: first, the empire occupied a huge amount of territory and tsarist policies did not include mass education and spread of information to the people; second, only the educated upper classes knew anything about Russian historical events and personalities; third, because the empire encompassed so many different ethnic

³ See Appendix for a list of folk arts and crafts.

groups, and ethnic Russians at the time tended to define themselves only in opposition to other groups (e.g. Jews, Armenians), it would have been difficult and probably impossible to unite the entire population under the banner of one identity and nationality. (Brandenberger 2002, 10-17) Ukrainians in particular were a special case to the imperial government. Ukrainians constituted the largest non-Russian ethnic group in the empire, and Ukraine's land was considered economically and strategically crucial to the continuing success of the empire. Both Russians and Ukrainians claimed a common ancestry, and Ukraine's language, culture, and people were very similar to Russians'. Because of their shared history, most Russians believed that Ukrainians were similar enough to Russians to be absorbed into the greater Russian population⁴. In fact, starting in the late 18th century, this had already begun to happen in the upper classes. Ukrainians often used intermarriage with Russians to gain a higher socioeconomic status. However, Russians generally did not support any notions of equality for Ukrainians, but rather, thought that absorbing them would be a way more strongly to control them. In short, the average Ukrainian was not socially or economically equal to the average Russian, and thus occupied a position of opposition to Russian ethnic identity. (Kappeler 2001, 61-67) The results of ethnic Russians' views of the various minority ethnic groups were collections of tales, songs, and art that were chosen only from ethnic Russians to represent everyone, but without recognizing that these neither represented all Russians, nor all citizens of the empire.

During post emancipation, the rich collectors soon realized that what they had was a finite resource, and that something needed to be done to replenish it. They focused primarily on folk arts for three reasons. First, their personal collections consisted mostly

⁴ Ukraine was even known as "Little Russia" during the imperial era.

of material culture: embroidered clothing, pieces of wood carving taken directly from the sides of peasant huts, wood carved bowls and spoons. Material culture is what they were interested in because it could be collected and displayed in their homes. Second, due to emancipation and the empire's rapid modernization and industrialization, many peasants moved to cities where they could find higher paying jobs in industry. This meant leaving behind their traditional folk arts and crafts, the production of which carried no financial profit to them. (Salmond 1996, 6) Peasants were less likely to stop telling folktales or singing folk songs because these were oral traditions they could take with them to cities; though, admittedly these folklore practices would change under the influence of urban life. Third, producing traditional folk arts was becoming more impossible, since industry generally had a monopoly on raw materials. The peasants often were the growers and producers of materials like wood, flax, and clay but it was most profitable for them to sell their yearly production to industries such as the railroad, and textile and ceramics factories. This did not leave much raw material for folk arts and crafts. (Salmond 1987, 128) The problem of vanishing folk arts and crafts was solved in a simple, yet effective way.

Folk Art Revival

Beginning in the 1870s, a few well-known gentry women of Moscow and St. Petersburg undertook the task of reviving Russian women's folk arts and crafts. They believed women's arts were important because of women's typical roles in the home: they raised children and passed on the folk culture that rich collectors were so worried about losing. These gentry women were patrons of the arts, collectors, historians, and artists. Although they are known today as the first revivalists of women's folk arts and

crafts, what they did was under the auspices of their landowning husbands and of male artists of the time. Artists such as Sergey Malyutin, Ilya Repin, Mikhail Vrubel, and others were the public faces of the revival efforts. In fact, most folkloric collecting up to this time was male-centered, that is, male collectors who collected folklore from men and generally ignored female and children's folk tradition (Hellberg-Hirn 1998, 138), so this revival was an interesting deviation from the norm.

The women established folk art workshops on their husbands' estates and offered peasants a deal: if they would quit their industry jobs to do their traditional arts and crafts, and if they would be open to "guidance" by their benefactresses, they would be rewarded with a secure income and guaranteed markets to sell their goods. The workshops accomplished two important things. First, they guaranteed that the dying folk culture would be renewed and strengthened. Second, the folk art would be reincorporated into the greater Russian culture as a new profitable industry, specifically targeted at foreign markets. The focus on foreign markets was a direct result of wealthy Russians' interest in preserving Russian folk culture. Their goal was to elevate the empire's status in the world by showing how rich and unique their folk culture was. To do this, they needed material culture, i.e. folk arts, to sell to foreign visitors in shops in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and to export to important European exhibitions in cities like Paris for foreigners to see and purchase. There were no souvenir markets at this time, so shops and exhibitions were the only locations where people could purchase Russian folk arts. However, the folk art workshops always allowed visitors, especially the owners' wealthy friends, to observe artists creating folk arts. (Salmond 1997, 8)

The most famous workshop was called Abramstevo, located near Moscow on the estate of railway magnate Savva Mamontov. His wife Elizaveta established the workshop as a community of artists who were looking for a “authentic, subjective experience of Russian history, landscape, and culture.” (Salmond 1997, 8) She enlisted the help of artists such as Malyutin and Elena Polonova to direct the workshop and teach local peasant children. Malyutin in particular considered himself qualified to teach the peasant children because he had studied folk painting, architecture, ceramics, and other folk arts and. These children were recruited so that they would not grow up to seek work in the cities and increase the rate of loss of peasant culture. One of the most famous products from Abramstevo was the *matryoshka*, also known as the nesting doll, shown in Figure 1, in its original paint design. This doll, which was created by Malyutin in 1891, would become the quintessential symbol of the folk revival, and also a very popular Russian souvenir in more recent times.



Figure 1. The first matryoshka design

Everything about the matryoshka is folkloric. She is a peasant woman, stereotypically dressed in a peasant skirt, apron, and blouse, with a scarf on her head. She holds a rooster. The smaller nested dolls are dressed similarly, holding a basket of berries and a loaf of bread, with the two smallest representing children. The name matryoshka comes from “*Matryona*”, a popular name for Russian peasant women of the time. The matryoshka is carved from

wood, often the ubiquitous Russian birch on a wood-turning lathe. Each must be

handmade or the tops and bottoms will not fit together properly. Then they are painted and lacquered. Usually men carve and women paint. When the dolls first were made, each workshop had its own style and the dolls could be classified as such. At this time themes were folkloric in nature, but in recent years painting has diversified, especially after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Matryoshki are often painted in batches of the same design, and each one is unique because they are handmade. Since the upper class strongly supported folk arts and folk arts education, local and international markets began to demand more sale of the dolls. Matryoshka making became an important part of the folk art industry, with the town of Sergiev Posad acting as the center for production. (Ertl and Hibberd 2003, xi)

The success of Abramstevo spread and more workshops were opened. Another famous workshop patroness was Maria Tenisheva. Tenisheva was a trained opera singer who later became a historian, collector, and artist. In 1900, through these interests – and with the help of her rich husband's money – she decided to purchase an estate near the city of Smolensk that would be made into a large workshop, called Talashkino, for studying and learning to make folk arts. She invited Malyutin, who had since left Abramstevo, to head the workshop and together they selected peasant children who they deemed most capable from the surrounding villages to take classes at the workshop. Under Malyutin's training, pupils created a large collection of folk arts, which would eventually make its way to an exhibition in the Louvre in Paris in 1907, the first exhibition of Russian folk art abroad. Tenisheva worked to increase the number of students at Talashkino, but not many children seemed interested. She left Malyutin to

teaching his classes and took a different approach to increasing the number of artists.

(Tenisheva 2008, 417)

She changed her focus to peasant women, who, she said, needed a way to earn a living that would allow them to stay at home with their families. These women were already talented in certain folk arts such as embroidery and fabric dyeing, so they would not have to be trained to participate in Tenisheva's preservation efforts. They would work at Talashkino, earning a salary for making clothing, which would then be sold at a shop called Rodnik in Moscow. The catch was that the women would have to agree to make designs, patterns, and colors on the clothing as Tenisheva dictated. Tenisheva believed that traditional clothing had gone out of style with the upper classes because there were no colors or designs that appealed to them. The way to make them fashionable again was to change the "indigenous" styles to more modern ones. She proposed her idea to the local peasant women, who were reluctant at first, but eventually agreed to be employed at Talashkino making embroidery. (Tenisheva 2008, 418)

Peasant women were employees of the workshop, but could actually work out of their homes. They had the raw materials such as cloth, yarn, and canvas, which they produced themselves, and Tenisheva paid them for the use of those materials. The materials were taken to Talashkino to be dyed in the appropriate colors, and sent back to the women, who sewed and embroidered the clothing at home. Tenisheva was very satisfied with their output and soon commissioned the women to begin making larger items, such as window drapes, tablecloths, and furniture upholstery. The number of women working for her increased to two thousand, and at the same time, Malyutin's part

of the workshop began to grow, so that all of Talashkino was full of artists and their works. (Tenisheva 2008, 419)

The workshops also had a third, unofficial, and perhaps unrecognized, goal. That is, because the elites were in control of it, folk arts revival was in fact another way for them to control the masses. The options for these peasant women were either to work in factories, making low wages in dangerous jobs, or to work making their traditional folk arts. Of course, making folk art was probably more enjoyable than industry work, and they were making a small profit for their arts, but they were not in charge of their own means of production or of what they could produce because the elites were the ones with the funds to support it. Artists such as Malyutin who taught in the workshops did not teach all types of folk arts, nor did they focus on any arts besides ethnic Russian. This was a significant time for elite control and use of folk art in the Russian Empire, because it would continue in the following century after the revolution.

Imperial Government Involvement in Folk Art

By the end of the 1890s, even before Talashkino, the imperial government saw how successful these workshops were and decided to start its own, including both men's and women's folk arts, but with a bit more control, and over a wider area throughout the empire. Local provincial governments were in charge of running the workshops, and every craft and item produced was carefully monitored by teams of artists, administrators, and marketing specialists. Certain aspects of design and form were considered more appropriate for representing Russia to the world and these were favored and encouraged.

Folk arts of the Russian Empire were displayed on the world stage at the 1900 Paris Exhibition Universelle, in the over 6000-item Section of *Kustar* (handicraft) Object

and Handicrafts. The exhibition was the site of many demonstrations of national identity and culture, and Russia capitalized on this trend, presenting itself as an “exotic other” but also as belonging in the modern world. Many elite women involved with the folk art revivals of previous decades helped organize the Russian section, as well as some of the male artists associated with the workshops. (Notably, no peasant men or women were part of the organization or selecting of items.) One of their goals was to represent Russia as unique, traditional yet modern, and successful in the art world. The section included many types of arts: embroidery, lace, clothing, toys, furniture, and even an architectural display of small peasant houses. Elite artists created many of these objects, not the peasants whom the art was supposed to represent. However, this did not seem to bother any exhibition visitors, and the Russian pavilion was well received and won many awards. (Harkness 2009, 266-271)

After the Revolution of 1905 the government apportioned even more money to folk art preservation in attempt to show connection to and support of the people. It created a new organization to support peasant arts and crafts industries, called the Chief Administration of Agricultural and Land Tenure (*GUZZ*). The goal of this supporting administration was ultimately to increase economic profit and political gain, under the guise of supporting the common people. Exhibitions of folk arts and crafts were regularly held, and these exhibitions served to further enforce Russian hegemony and to justify continued autocratic control. (Warren 2009, 749-750) These exhibitions were usually put on in Moscow or St. Petersburg, where they would be accessible to international visitors, and where the Russian elites could admire folk arts without having to get too close to the actual folk.

In 1911 the School of Folk Art was opened in St. Petersburg. This school was sponsored by GUZZ and was patronized by the imperial family itself. It brought peasant girls from all over the empire to be trained in rigorous courses in all traditional women's arts and handicrafts. Classes were taught by wealthy elites who had learned to make folk arts, not peasants who had grown up making the arts. One of the School's goals was to make a standardized set of rules, patterns, and skills, and proper teaching would not be possible with individual peasant artists who did not conform to the standards. After completing the courses, each girl would return to her home province to teach other peasant girls her new folk art skills. In this way the government could continue to spread the folk art revival using the least amount of resources. (Salmond 1997, 13) The School's purpose and results can be interpreted in two ways. First, it preserved many traditional Russian folk arts and ensured that production would continue. Second, it commercialized and standardized folk arts and crafts, taking them out of their original contexts. Students were taught to make certain arts in certain ways, and then to pass their skills on to their peers. They were participating in a scripted production of folk art, which, on the one hand, served to more explicitly define "Russian culture", but, on the other hand, actively excluded and replaced things that were also "Russian", such as the folk arts of the many other ethnic groups of the empire. This meant that even ethnic groups such as Ukrainians who were most closely related to Russians were not represented. For example, *pysanky* (sing. *pysanka*), painted eggs, were one of the most famous types of Ukrainian folk art but were not selected to be taught in the School. This selection and favoring of Russian folk arts would continue into the Soviet era.

Folk arts were displayed again in 1913 at the Second All-Russian Kustar Exhibition held in St. Petersburg. By this time the nobility were thoroughly interested in folk art, and many, including Tsar Nikolai, attended the exhibition. It included only the highest quality, most well made examples of ethnic Russian folk art – embroidery, furniture, wood carved items such as toys and decorative bowls – specifically selected for the show. It was also part of the celebration of the 300-year anniversary of the Romanov dynasty. Because it was so heavily attended and successful, this exhibition was touted as a great victory for imperial influence on folk arts. (Warren 2009, 744) But not everyone shared this view.

Avant-garde artist Mikhail Larionov critiqued this exhibition with his own exhibition, which premiered just days after the Second All-Russian. His was the Exhibition of Icon Patterns and *Lubki*, on display in Moscow at a small private gallery. *Lubki* (sing. *lubok*) are icon templates or art prints painted on wood or paper, a very popular folk art form in Russia. This exhibition was smaller, more intimate, and consisted of more modest items. Larionov questioned how peasant arts and crafts could be used to celebrate the empire, when the very peasants who were creating these works had struggled so long under the empire's yoke and were eager to be free from it. Larionov also did something that no one else had done: he connected folk arts with the avant-garde. His exhibition ran in conjunction with an avant-garde exhibition in a neighboring room of the same gallery.

This exhibition, put on by Larionov's partner Natalya Goncharova, was a stark contrast to Larionov's in terms of content (hers was a display of abstract, rayonist⁵

⁵ Rayonism was a style of abstract painting developed by Larionov and Goncharova, inspired by the Futurist art movement of the time. It was so named for the style's characteristic brush strokes, which

paintings), but it also served to make a link from the present to the past. In displaying folk arts and the avant-garde in such close proximity, these two exhibitions showed that the past and the present can coexist, each in its own right, and without influence by one on the other. While the physical differences of the two types of art were obvious, Larionov elevated folk arts to the same status of the avant-garde and challenged viewers to see them as aesthetically equal. He believed that the government did not need to change or select for peasant crafts; they were a high art form in the same way that the avant-garde was. (Warren 2009, 745-746)

Ultimately, what the Second All-Russian and Larionov's exhibitions showed was a fundamental difference in how an avant-garde artist and the state viewed traditional folk art. Not only did they disagree on what authentic folk art was, but they also disagreed on who the folk were and what that meant for nationality. The government viewed folk art as static, in the past, in need of preservation, and as a way to express a certain selected version of Russian nationality; whereas Larionov viewed it as dynamic, very much in the present, as a way to express "true" Russian nationality, and as a tool of political opposition. But what they had in common was their inheritance of the last century's principles of folk art revival, which, like revivals in other European countries, was "a response to crises of collective identity in the face of dramatic economic change." (Warren 2009, 747) It was a way to connect with a simpler peasant time, before industrialization and modernization. It was rooted in exoticism and nostalgia (Hilton 1994, 82) and in the idea of "the folk," or *narod* in Russian.

Folk Art in the Pre-Stalinist and Stalinist Soviet Union

resemble rays of light. See John E. Bowl's *Russian Art of the Avant-garde: Theory and Criticism 1902-1934*.

After the Communist Revolution of 1917, official government control of folk art took another shape, though not immediately. In the first few years after the revolution, as the new ruling party was otherwise occupied setting up government, folklorists were free to do their work uninterrupted. This was the so-called Golden Age of Soviet folklore. Some of the most important Soviet folklore studies, such as those of Vladimir Propp, were completed at this time. However, in the 1920s, the Proletarian Cultural and Educational Organization (Proletcul't) of the new government began to hear of these works and their contents, and decided that folklore was potentially dangerous to Soviet ideals. Many folktales and songs glorified the tsars, empire, and bourgeois ideas that had been Russian culture for almost the last 500 years. Much of Russian folklore also included references to Orthodoxy, the official religion of Russia since 988 CE. These themes were considered hazardous to children's education in the new communist regime because they promoted ideals that didn't coincide with the new communist ideology. The Proletcul't sought to eradicate folklore, despite the protests of folklorists like Azadovskii and Sokolov. (Oinas 1978, 77) The reason for this was that, to the Communists, everything had a purpose, including culture. Although their Marxist ideology tended to skew this purpose toward economics, they also recognized the power that popular culture could have on the masses. The old ideals and morals were considered outdated, depraved, and useless. They saw that folk culture had been used in the past by the bourgeoisie to promote and maintain the elite culture, status, and agenda, and wanted to put a stop to it immediately. (Stites 1992, 37-38) Their solution was to eradicate folklore and culture in general, which became part of Stalinist culture policy beginning in 1929. However, the move to forbid and destroy folklore did not last long.

Soviet writer Maksim Gorky helped support a new state-sponsored folklore by convincing the Proletkul't of the potential uses of folklore and art. In a speech made to the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, he showed that folklore represented the common people, that it expressed humanity's deepest moral aspirations, and had high artistic value. Instantly, this speech opened the eyes of government leaders to the possibilities folklore could have in the new administration. State officials realized that they could use it to propagandize Soviet ideology. (Miller 1990, 8) They could unite all Soviet citizens, regardless of ethnicity, social origins, or occupation, under the banner of patriotism and loyalty, while also attempting to integrate everyone into one cultural identity. (Bradenberger 2002, 30) The idea that popular tradition was in the people's collective memory went nicely with the ideals of communism. (Howell 1992, 396) Soviet officials saw folk culture as something already familiar and artistically excellent, as shown by its popularity and continuity throughout time, so all the party had to do was insert its own ideology and make it convincing and appealing to the masses. Later scholars would later refer to this as "folklorism" or "pseudofolklore". It was based on traditional forms, which would need to be collected and maintained, but with Socialist ideology inserted. (Stites 1992, 38-39, 72)

The party initiated huge folklore collection projects. Folklorists, university students, and intelligentsia were drafted and sent to villages around the USSR to gather the local folklore. These efforts were not just about collection, but selection, too. Keeping communist ideals in mind, the folklorists had to choose the most appropriate folklore to record and bring back to the party leaders. Only that which was fit for representing the party was allowed to be documented. The rest, such as "thieves' and hooligans' songs",

would be destroyed. Upon return, the folklorists' findings would be published in scholarly journals and newspapers such as *Pravda*, the leading paper of the USSR. (Oinas 1978, 78-80) These folk arts that were traditionally performed orally, in villages, were appropriated and performed through text for the masses of Soviet people, and used to indoctrinate them as the party saw fit.

Besides controlling folk literature and music, the party placed great importance on propagandizing other forms of folklore, such as folk art. Artists were rather strongly encouraged to incorporate themes of socialism into their pieces. Art was seen as a legacy and as a tool for creating the new socialist state. (Hilton 1994, 86) Popular subjects included scenes of children studying diligently at school, tractors on the farm, and factory workers happily laboring for the party. Icon makers began to depict scenes of rural electrification, of Lenin speaking to an attentive crowd, or dam building. Porcelain dishware painters replaced traditional motifs of flowers with the hammer and sickle, farm tools, or red stars. (Hilton 1995, 267-270) Wooden plates and bowls, and lacquer boxes were painted with similar communist motifs. These things were visual and pictorial, and therefore didn't require literacy to disseminate quickly and efficiently. They were also specifically designed to keep the elegance and traditional look of past forms, so they would be recognizable to people as their own folk art, but to smoothly convey communist images and ideals. The party believed that folk art was tied to the collective life of the people and during this time of great culture change, it was important to keep the "old peasant art" alive and invigorated. (Hilton 1995, 274) The meaning of *narod* changed slightly. Now it indicated not just peasants, but every good Soviet citizen. Officially, socialism was about egalitarianism, the common people, and collectivism, therefore

everyone was part of the narod, and the new kind of propagandized folk art was meant to represent everyone.

As part of the Stalinist stance on folklore, the party decided to create new folklore specifically formulated as propaganda. Writers began to create new folktales, stories, songs, and poetry in praise of Stalin and communism. Folk artists incorporated communist imagery such as the red star and the hammer and sickle into their pieces. Themes glorifying labor, the military, the defeat of the tsars, technological advances, socialist construction, and Stalin himself were popular subject matter. (Oinas 1978, 84) According to communist party ideals, Soviet folklore was mass produced, quickly disseminated, and standardized. Just as factory production of goods proliferated, so did factory folklore. (Olson 2004, 42)

Officially and publically, of course, the goal was to unite all Soviet citizens as one group with one identity for the purposes of solidarity and harmony. This permeated all aspects of life. Soviet leaders engaged in the “reinvention of tradition” on a startlingly large scale, spreading Soviet ideals and selected parts of Russian history to the masses. As Eric Hobsbawm points out in *The Invention of Tradition*, things that groups consider traditional are often more recent than people remember and are often invented. The process of inventing traditions involves repetitively formalizing and ritualizing, and referencing the past. Inventors take a practice, art form, belief, or idea and through these processes make it traditional. (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1993, 1-6) In the case of the Soviet regime, leaders even went so far as to alter history books and other historical narratives to only include the history of the USSR. These included fabricated accounts of famous Soviet heroes of the recent past. This process was complicated by the fact that during the

Stalinist purges of the 1930s, many of these heroes were expelled from the party, and so were no longer considered suitable models of Soviet valor. The party had to constantly modify books and narratives and “search for a usable past”⁶ to rally and maintain popular support. This was especially true in the midst of Stalin’s Great Terror when many writers, musicians, and artists were being arrested, tortured, and executed. (Brandenberger 2002, 34-41, 90-92)

Although on the outside it may have appeared as though the government supported folk culture and art, the effect of their control actually suppressed it. Important characteristics that the state supported included sameness, conformity, nationalism, ease of dissemination, ease of understanding; anyone who tried to be creative, progressive, complex, or innovative (which was not common or easy to do because of the tight control the party had over anything artistic), was discouraged and prohibited. All citizens consumed the same art and culture and were subjected to propaganda. It would be difficult to argue that citizens were unaware of the effect the government had on art production, but it is safe to say that they did not have much choice in the matter. However, in the next decades this would begin to change.

Folk Art in the Post-Stalin Soviet Era

The cult of Stalinist folklore continued until his death in 1953, at which point folk arts gained a new freedom. When Khrushchev took over leadership of the USSR, almost all factions of society experienced “the thaw”. He purged the Soviet Union of Stalin by

⁶ Soviet writers engaged in this same search, using great writers of the past to create a post-revolutionary present. Soviet authors often portrayed revered writers, such as Alexander Pushkin, in a way that was most usable for their own time; that is, to create a connection between the vast cultural differences of the pre-revolutionary past and the post-revolutionary present, to make a new narrative about themselves and their culture. See Angela Brintlinger’s *Writing a Usable Past: Russian Literary Culture, 1917-1937* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2000).

sacking bureaucrats, instituting social reforms, and promoting a more open cultural atmosphere (Stites 1992, 123). Folklorists decided that folklore for Stalin could scarcely be called folklore at all, nor did it have much connection to the idea of Russianness. They rejected all of the fabricated folklore of the past decade or so, condemned it as forgery (Howell 1992, xv), and began to turn their attentions to more serious scholarly folklore study. Folk artists were still required to keep themes within the general range of socialist ideals, but were allowed more creativity and individualism. (Oinas 1978, 92-93)

Although more freedom was allowed in folk arts production, the state sponsored arts organizations still remained more popular and better supported than new art and artists. Throughout Khrushchev's leadership, cultural authorities focused on industrial production and fulfilling production goals according to government plans. Creativity was not important, only the execution of quick and successful manufacture. (Hilton 1995, 278) Creating art was a way for a worker to serve his government and people, and to help build and maintain the socialist society. Although Khrushchev removed many of the restraints of the Stalin era, he was still not completely open to a large change in folklore. His views on the subject were rooted in his "peasant" sensibilities, that is, his tendency towards simplicity and tradition, and therefore themes in folk arts were restricted to what he considered traditional and proper. (Stites 1992, 130, 146)

The Brezhnev era brought many improvements in Soviet life from higher rates of employment to urbanization to economic growth, but Brezhnev also wanted complete control of cultural production, particularly of folk material culture. It was during this time that the souvenir industry was gaining momentum, and Brezhnev wanted to manage the Soviet Union's image in the world. As part of this control, he decreed that folk art was an

inalienable part of Soviet culture, of the narod, and needed to be protected. Folk masters had to be able to work in safe conditions, and there had to be exhibitions every five years so the public could examine the work and progress of the artists. In conjunction with these exhibitions, the Ministry of Culture would meet to discuss the current status of folk art industries and address any problems with workshops, conditions in the villages where arts were made, and quality of production. This increased the value of folk art. Items made by masters were put on display. These masters were named “Honored People’s Artists” of the Soviet Union and they were encouraged to be a bit more creative in their painting and designs. (Hilton 1995, 281-282)

The contrast between the individual master artist and the collectivity of Soviet society is interesting, and shows the importance of the narod concept to the idea of national identity. The party was willing to give master artists more freedom to create art to represent the USSR, rather than let only the cheaply produced souvenir art be the face of the Soviet Union to the world. The factory was a part of the socialist collective. The master was an individual, a member of the narod, and was more valued in this situation. For the party leaders, Soviet image in the world was important enough to allow certain citizens to separate themselves from the collective with creativity in their folk art works. These artists were the representatives of Soviet folk culture to the world.

The USSR’s presence in the world began to increase due to Brezhnev’s expansion of the army, resulting in a larger tourist economy. With this came the tourist market, of which souvenir folk art was a large part. Souvenir folk arts had been sold in shops and at exhibitions up until this time, but because of a dearth of tourism had not become a very profitable industry. To keep up with increasing demand, folk art workshops were turned

into larger scale factories with standardized production of items, especially matryoshki, which soon became the most popular souvenir item in the Soviet Union. At first, factory souvenir items were sold in souvenir shops in large cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kyiv. Though master folk artists continued to be revered for their work, tourism was a new way to make money from foreigners, using “traditional” Russian art forms. In the 1980s small markets were set up in cities, most famously Izmailovo market in Moscow and Andriyivsky Uzviz in Kyiv. Vendors there sold both mass-produced factory-made art, and folk arts made by individual artists. The government knew that tourists would buy folk arts of any kind, so the focus was to provide the easiest way to make Soviet (Russian) culture accessible. (Ertl and Hibberd 2003, 220) With the founding of tourist markets, artists were able to make a profit from their creativity. As part of the free market, they were able to ascertain which designs and forms sell best, and use this knowledge to turn a greater profit. (Hilton 2002, 470)

In 1985 when Gorbachev began his term of leadership in the Soviet Union culture and art were included in his new policy of *glasnost*, which manifested in greater freedom of expression. Gorbachev instituted personnel changes in the ministry of culture and in artists’ unions, the most famous of which was installing minister of culture Nikolai Gubenko, a liberal actor and film director. Restrictions on music, writing, dance, and art that had previously been in place were lifted. For example, criticism of politicians, obscene lyrics, nudity, and irreverence began to appear in all art forms (Stites 1992, 178). In folk art an example of this was the types of wooden nesting dolls that became popular. The Gorby doll, shown in Figure 2, was particularly famous for its depiction of Gorbachev, scar included, on the outside largest nesting doll, and inside the successively

smaller nested dolls each portrayed images of Gorbachev's predecessors, the smallest



Figure 2. The Gorby doll.

Photo courtesy of therussianshop.com.

being Stalin depicted holding a knife behind his back.

Although these and other similar nesting dolls were made for tourists, the general public and Gorbachev himself did not seem to take offense to it. This new cultural openness continued to include other

nontraditional images such as sports

figures or animals on nesting dolls, and the resurgence of religious symbols on folk art icons and painted lacquer boxes, something that had been prohibited since 1917.

Although certain folklorisms were still prevalent, such as the state-sponsored folk music ensembles, and received the majority of state funds for art, it was obvious that a massive change in Soviet popular culture was occurring. Western influences and the openness policy effected changes in film, theater, literature, dance, and music. Gorbachev stated that he wanted to provide a more inviting atmosphere for Soviet citizens to express themselves (Stites 1992, 201). Creativity, social criticism, and fun were encouraged and seen as the new way to narrow the gap between the government and the people. That is, if the government loosened its grip on popular culture and people were permitted to use art to express themselves, they would view the government more favorably for allowing it. This would strengthen the people's trust in the government. Whether or not this was effective is debatable because by the end of the 1980s political unrest and revolution

would once again change the Soviet Union drastically. In the end perhaps the government was not successful in keeping their citizens united under the banner of communism, but the end result allowed more freedom of expression in art. This represented the growing pluralism and splintering of Soviet society of the time as well as the rising conflicting views and opinions on folk and popular culture of the people. (Barker 1999, 19)

Because of the growing autonomy of folk artists, folk art became more independent from government control during the Gorbachev period. Artists took back folk art for themselves and made a profit. Because artists had more liberty to create pieces more creatively, they were able to express their own personal identities through their art. They signed their paintings, lacquer boxes, and the bottoms of their matryoshki. They were not constrained by factory rules of meeting a daily quota of production, but rather created their arts by their own standards and choices. In Ukraine specifically, artists gained more autonomy and control over their folk arts compared to the past. The Soviet government's stance since the 1920s had generally been that Ukrainian folklore and folklorists were entirely too nationalistic for the ideals of the Soviet Union and therefore must be suppressed. However, in the last years of Soviet rule, this suppression was lifted and artists were could more openly create items with Ukrainian folklore motifs, in Ukrainian styles of carving, embroidering, and painting, and traditional Ukrainian items such as pysanky that were previously banned. (Klymasz 1978, 102-103)

After the splintering of the USSR following its break up in 1991, Russia and Ukraine became separate countries, and this new national and geographical separation began to underscore the cultural differences that many Ukrainians saw between themselves and Russians. Folk arts took on a new role in the political situation of newly

independent Ukraine. Just as souvenir folk arts were a way for the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union to promote national culture, so too are folk arts in Ukraine today a way to promote Ukrainian culture and heritage. I will expand this argument regarding Andriyivsky Uzviz in Kyiv to show the relationship between folk arts and politics. Before this it is necessary to understand more about the specific history of Ukraine during the Russian Empire and Soviet eras, which will serve as background information on the relationship between Russia and Ukraine.

CHAPTER III

UKRAINIAN HISTORY AND NATIONALISM

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, it has become clear that Ukraine has been trying to distinguish itself from Russian influence and assert its independence beyond geopolitical borderlines. Ukraine has a long and complex history with Russia, which is something that complicates this process. In this chapter I discuss a general history of Kyiv and Ukraine and their roles in the Russian Empire and the USSR, and how their relationship with Russia has changed over these years. I will then explore more in detail post-Soviet Ukraine's political situation and analyze how it relates to my own research.

History of Kyiv and the Kievan Rus'

Since its founding Kyiv, Ukraine has been an important city and cultural and historical center of Eastern Europe. Although Slavic groups had lived in the area around the Dneiper River for hundreds of years, historians agree that Kyiv arose as a commercial hub along the trade routes connecting Europe with the Middle East sometime in the late ninth century. The exact story of its founding is not clear, but some accounts say that three brothers of an ancient Slavic tribe settled in the area and built a city in honor of the eldest brother, Kyi. "Kyiv" then means "of Kyi". Other accounts say a group of Varangians, or Vikings, came to the area from Scandinavia and founded the city. Regardless, the city became the capital of the political entity called the Kievan Rus', which most Russians today consider to be the site of their cultural roots. It included parts of what are today the countries of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and other parts of Eastern Europe. In 988 Kyiv's ruler Vladimir the Great converted the Rus' to Christianity, and

soon thereafter it became the largest political unit in Europe and one of Europe's most beautiful cities. (Hamm 1993).

In the following centuries, Kyiv experienced a decline, since political power was moved to St. Petersburg and Moscow, and Ukraine became a disputed and coveted area for various groups who were in power. Kyiv was destroyed by the Mongols in 1240, and sacked and raided intermittently by Tatars in the 15th- 16th centuries. Later in the 15th century Ukraine was incorporated under Polish-Lithuanian rule, though the authorities were never quite able to fully control the affairs of Kyiv. In the 17th century Ukraine became a source of struggle among Poles, Russians, and Ukrainian Cossacks, who all wished to control the rich land and resources. In 1667, as the result of an agreement between Russia and Poland, most of Left Bank Ukraine, an area east of the Dneiper, including Kyiv, was incorporated into Muscovy (later known as the Russian Empire). Tsar Peter the Great, after declaring himself Emperor and thus making Muscovy an empire, focused on expanding his reach even further and made Kyiv a strategic city to help in this endeavor. Because of its location on the periphery of the empire, Kyiv became a frontier city with a blend of different peoples. By the 18th century Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgars, Germans, Poles, Russians, Jews, Roma, and Ukrainians could be found in the city. (Hamm 1993, Kappeler 2001, Subtelny 2000)

Ukraine in the Russian Empire

The specifics of how Ukraine became incorporated into the Russian Empire marks the beginning of close Russian-Ukrainian relations. Ukraine was part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1648 when Bohdan Khmelnytsky led a Ukrainian uprising for independence. This revolution continued for years as the commonwealth

tried to regain control, and Muscovy and Ottoman Empire became interested in taking a piece of Ukraine. Khmelnytsky's revolt was too small to fight the commonwealth, so he began looking for allies. He found a reliable one in Muscovy, then ruled by Tsar Aleksei. In return for Muscovy's assistance in fighting the commonwealth, Khmelnytsky agreed to swear fealty to the Tsar and give the Left Bank⁷, a region east of the Dneiper River, to be controlled by Muscovy⁸. Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth entered into a war over the rest of Ukraine in 1654, followed by a truce in 1656. Under this truce, Ukraine was divided into two parts, a division that remains unofficially today. Muscovy kept the Left Bank and Kyiv, and the commonwealth kept the Right Bank⁹, the region west of the Dneiper. Other smaller parts of Ukraine were claimed by Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. The Right Bank was completely subsumed into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, particularly the region called Galicia which was furthest west. In the Left Bank, Ukrainians were given a modicum of autonomy, as part of the deal with the Tsar, but at any signs of uprising Muscovy was quick to clamp down. This region became known as Malorossiiia, or "Little Russia". (Kappeler 2001, 63-65; Magosci 1996, 259)

After the establishment of the Russian Empire by Peter the Great, the Left Bank continued to enjoy relative independence with its own leader, or *hetman*, nobility, educational institutions, and economic policies. However, in 1764, following a series of

⁷ The Left Bank comprised the modern day oblasts of Chernihiv, Poltava, and Sumy, the eastern part of Cherkasy Oblast, and the city of Kyiv.

⁸ In Kyiv today there is a monument to Khmelnytsky, celebrating his courage in fighting for Ukrainian independence. Many Ukrainians consider him a hero, and will tell the story of his revolution with pride. Once while visiting this monument, a Ukrainian told me this story. When she recounted the agreement with Muscovy (Russians), she, almost with resignation, explained that he did what he had to do but it was sad that this began the long period of Russian control of Ukrainians.

⁹ The Right Bank included the modern day oblasts of Volyn, Rivne, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, and parts of Cherkasy and Ternopil Oblasts.

Ukrainian uprisings, Empress Catherine II abolished the hetmanate. She did not believe that “Little Russians” needed any independence because their elites were being absorbed into the Russian nobility. Ukraine was also becoming more strategically important for the Russian Empire as it expanded its borders south to the Black Sea. If Ukrainians kept revolting, Russia could lose important resources and sea access. By the end of the 18th century Left Bank autonomy had vanished and the region was solidly in the control of the Empire. (Kappeler 2001, 66-68)

Meanwhile, the Right Bank continued to be ruled by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, split into smaller regions that were each administrated by a Polish official. As part of reforms to fully integrate the Right Bank into the commonwealth, the Polish king enacted religious reforms banning the practice of Orthodox Christianity. Beginning around the 1730s, Ukrainians protested these reforms rather strongly in a series of violent revolts known as the *haidamak* movement. The Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko would later describe the Ukrainian peasants involved, called Haidamaky, as heroes fighting national oppression. The eventual outcome was significant. In the final haidamak uprising, the Russian Empire intervened. On the one hand, the empire supported Orthodoxy, but this is not what guided its decisions. On the other, stronger, hand, if Ukrainians were successful, the empire imagined that they would try to gain more political, social, and economic power and independence, which could then spread to Ukrainians in the Left Bank. Thus, Catherine II ordered her armies to crush the Haidamaky in the Right Bank, a decision that would anger Ukrainians but that would also set the stage for acquisition of the Right Bank in the coming decades. (Magosci 1996, 290-300)

With the weakening of Poland towards the end of the 18th century, the Russian Empire made agreements with the Austrian Empire to partition Poland. Geographically and culturally it made the most sense for Russia to have most of Ukraine, and for Austria to take territories further west. By 1795, the Russian Empire controlled all Right Bank Ukrainian territories once ruled by Poland, with the exception of a few western regions, which were ruled by Austria. (Magosci 1996, 302) It is interesting to note that at this time, ethnic Ukrainians made up 96% of the Left Bank population, and ethnic Russians only 5%. In the Right Bank, Russians were only 0.1%. (Kappeler 2001, 119-120) Territorially, most Ukrainians were citizens of the Russian Empire, but the divide between Right and Left was still apparent in the changes in the social structure of the two banks. In the Left Bank, the structure remained largely the same because it had already been a part of the empire. The Right Bank was forced to conform to the empire's social policies. Social ranks were shuffled, leaving some Ukrainians in lower statuses than before, and many of them became serfs. (Magosci 1996, 320) This created a strong divide between the Russian elites and Ukrainian lower classes, particularly in the Right Bank, which would play into later nationalist movements in the region.

Nationalism in Ukraine

Nationalism in Europe as a whole arose in the 18th century. In Western Europe it was a result of the Enlightenment, liberalism, and secularism. (Wilson 1989, 22) Benedict Anderson also links it to the decline of dynastic rule and the establishment of languages of print media in various regions and empires. People began to question the legitimacy of a divine dynastic ruler, and believed freedom from this could be manifest in an independent, sovereign state. Printed language created distinct groups, fixity of those

groups, and the ability to imbue power to those who spoke and read it. People who speak a common language identify with each other as the same community; Anderson describes national communities as imagined. That is, the concept of a nation has no definition, and can only be felt by people who consider themselves part of a nation group. They do not all know each other, but find themselves united by common feelings and goals.

(Anderson 1993, 6-7, 19, 39-45) Western Europe, then, followed a more liberal nationalism, in which anyone who felt themselves a part of a national group could be considered a member of that nation. (Wilson 1989, 23)

In Central and Eastern Europe, nationalism took on a variant form: romantic nationalism. In these regions, national boundaries did not coincide with the current state boundaries. Nationalism was not used to protect individuals against an authoritarian state, but rather to redraw boundaries to match ethnic boundaries. People in these areas believed that each ethnic group deserved its own state, which meant that each state would be built on the history, culture, and traditions (including folklore) of that ethnic group. Most responsible for this notion is German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, who formulated a set of principles of nationalism that have been used up to present day by emerging nations. He argued that each nation was created by nature and thus it was the responsibility of the people of the nation to develop and support it, separately from other nations who could not share or understand each other's different histories. To Herder, the most natural human condition was to live in nation states only with one people and one national character. To accomplish this, the group should proclaim its shared history, language, and culture to create a national character. (Wilson 1989, 22-28)

Folklore was an important tool in establishing this for all nations. Herder nebulously defined the folk as those who were organically one with their culture, who were most in tune with their national character, and who were spontaneous, emotional, and free. They were the creators and bearers of folklore, and the most valued members of the nation. According to Herder, folklore genres such as music, tales, legends, material culture, symbols, and poetry were tools to identify and differentiate groups. When groups formed, they used folklore to unite themselves and to highlight their differences from other groups. They told common stories, sing folksongs, wear traditional costume, and produce the arts of their ethnic group, including only positive and patriotic lore that supported their group goals, often looking to the past for inspiration. This then would result in the perfect nation state. However, in reality, Herder's prescription for nationalism created an idealized and romanticized group. Folklore justifies nationalism and is also created by it. Through these rose-tinted glasses, people often begin to believe that their nation really is the idealistic place it was made out to be, regardless of what reality shows. (Wilson 1989, 29-32)

Herder's ideas were attractive to people in Eastern Europe, and Ukraine was particularly interesting to him because Ukrainians were living in a multiethnic empire of many languages and cultures that were minimized in favor of the dominant Russian group. (Magosci 1996, 353) By the early 19th century the idea of nationalism had come to Ukraine. Several things contributed to this: the University of Kharkiv was founded in 1804 and became the center of Ukrainian literature, the first official Ukrainian grammar was published in 1819, and Ukrainian poets were becoming more famous and respected. National poet Taras Shevchenko in particular had a lasting effect on the Ukrainian

language due to his creation of a standard accepted Ukrainian literary language. Finally, in 1846 a historian in Kyiv formed the first nationalist organization. (Anderson 1993, 74)

Before this time, many Ukrainian residents tended to identify with multiple groups based on language, geographic area, and religion. Some considered themselves Little Russians, Russians speaking Little Russian, Vinnytsians, Galicians, Catholics, Orthodox Christians, etc., but the intelligentsia at the time began to spread the idea of mutual exclusivity by ethnicity. Russians and Little Russians could not be and were not the same. At the same time folklore collecting began in earnest in Russia, Ukraine began to do the same. They needed to collect culture and heritage to further their nationalistic goals. Although Russian and Ukrainian cultures were similar, they had different folktales, songs, art, and stories. One collector, Nikolai Tsertelev, interestingly himself ethnically Georgian but born in Ukraine, compared Russian folk songs with Ukrainian and declared Ukrainian songs to more moral and less aggressive than Russian songs. (Magocsi 1996, 354-357)

At the beginning of Ukraine's nationalist movement language did not play an important role for Ukrainian identity because most people at the time considered Ukrainian, or Little Russian, to be a dialect of Russian. However in the 1820s language became more important, due to scholars at the University of Kharkiv. Many faculty were foreign-born and had been brought in by the university's philanthropist founder to train imperial bureaucrats, the original purpose of the university. Soon faculty, who had brought with them romantic and nationalist ideas from Western Europe, became interested in Ukraine from an academic perspective, especially in its history and culture. The university began to publish anthologies and periodicals in Ukrainian, such that poets

like Taras Shevchenko became very famous and beloved for writing in Ukrainian and promoting Ukrainian nationalism¹⁰. In fact, scholars at Kharkiv were the first to begin referring to Ukrainians using the term Ukrainian, rather than Little Russian. Language became a tool to communicate and spread knowledge about Ukrainian history, literature, and culture in educated circles. Soon the imperial government involved itself in the study of Ukraine, but for its own political reasons. (Magocsi 1996, 358-359)

In 1834 Tsar Nicholas I founded Kyiv University in Kyiv, with the ostensibly academic purpose of promoting Slavic studies. His actual purpose was twofold: first, by studying the history of Kyiv and the region, he hoped to prove that the Ukrainian territories were the ancestral lands of Russians (i.e. the Kievan Rus'), which would further justify Ukraine's incorporation into the Russian Empire; second, by promoting this history, he could justify the Russification of Ukraine, particularly the Right Bank with its sizeable Polish population, who the tsar felt was politically unreliable. It is worth noting that Kyiv was on the border between the Right and Left Banks, so it was a strategic location chosen for its proximity to both banks and its status as an important historical city. Most scholars at Kyiv University were from Moscow, and while their research and writing on Ukraine were part of the Tsar's political plan, they provided an organizational basis for Ukrainian studies in the future. Interestingly, Kyiv University's Slavic studies did not seek to explicitly minimize or disparage Ukrainian national identity, but rather to point out that it was a valid identity in the hierarchy of nationalities

¹⁰ Notably there are many ethnic Ukrainian writers who have been claimed by Russia as its own. One of the most famous was Nikolai Gogol, who never even wrote in Ukrainian except for letters. His works are recognizable for his Ukrainization of the Russian language, and paradoxically, he had such a great impact on literature in the Russian Empire because he wrote Russian instead of Ukrainian. See Edyta Bojanowska's *Nikolai Gogol: Between Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).

in the empire, with Russian at the top, of course. And so, in its own way, the imperial government legitimized Ukrainian identity, at least at the beginning of its focus on Slavic studies. However, this legitimacy only went so far. (Magocsi 1996, 359-360)

The imperial government supported Ukraine and Ukrainians only culturally and linguistically; that is, Russians considered Ukrainian culture quaint and curious, and the Ukrainian language an interesting dialect of Russian. However, this support did not extend to Ukrainian political independence. Movements such as the 1840s Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood of Dneiper Ukraine, who promoted Slavic equality and education for the masses, and the 1850s Right Bank *khlopomany*, who supported serf emancipation and democratic government, were immediately quashed and the leaders exiled to Siberia. These and other such movements suggested to the imperial government that Ukraine might want to separate from the Empire. The Empire began to more closely control Ukraine, arresting known populists, suppressing the use of Ukrainian language in schools and universities, and outlawing any Ukrainophilic, or Ukraine-supporting, political activity. Even the Orthodox Church in Ukraine began to discourage Ukrainian, as most of the high-ranking clerics considered themselves Russian and supported the state unquestionably. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Ukrainian support movement tried to politicize itself by being more involved with the state government and forming official political parties, but this was quickly snuffed out with arrests and exiles. The government no longer considered Ukrainian identity as legitimate, but rather, as one to be controlled. Ukrainians could not gain any social, economic, or political benefits unless they Russified. (Magocsi 1996, 364-380)

Until World War I nationalism and the notion of an exclusive Ukrainian identity prevailed only in intellectual fringes of Ukraine in the Russian Empire. However, these ideas prospered in the ethnic Ukrainian region of Galicia, just to the west of the Right Bank, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Here Ukrainians had enjoyed a significantly less troubled nationalist movement that included its own newspapers, publications, cultural organizations, and representation in the national parliament. Peasants had been emancipated and could participate in public and political life. Galician Ukrainians even had their own military formations. All of this was with the support and encouragement of the imperial government. (Magocsi 1996, 382, 416) These noted differences between Ukraine in the Russian Empire and Ukraine in the Austro-Hungarian Empire would continue to affect united Ukraine's future in the Soviet Union and later as an independent state.

Ukraine in the Soviet Union

Soon after the Revolution of 1917 what had been formerly Ukraine of the Russian Empire found itself a republic of the new Soviet Union, with Kyiv as the capital¹¹. It is important to note that Ukrainians had their own revolution alongside the Russian Revolution, both of which began in 1917. Ukraine's revolutionary era lasted for three years, and it was marked by competing Ukrainian political groups, peasant uprisings, foreign invasion, and civil war. Some wanted to declare independence and some, including a large contingent of Bolshevik supporters, wanted to join with Russia. After fighting the Red Army, Ukrainian leaders, called the Central Rada, asked Germany and Austria for military support. With this help they pushed the Red Army east of the Left

¹¹ The very western region of Galicia that had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire remained as such until 1939.

Bank and declared independence in 1918 as the Ukrainian National Republic. But this was very short-lived, lasting only a few months. Germany and Austria were only willing to continue military support if Ukraine would agree to provide them with foodstuffs; Ukraine was not willing, so they left. After two more years of conflict and weakening of Ukrainian nationalist leaders, Ukrainian Bolsheviks established government in Kyiv, with the support of Soviet Russia, and became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Ukrainian Bolsheviks also acquired the region of Crimea on the Black Sea, by pushing out Tatar leaders and declaring it part of Soviet Ukraine. Many members of the former Central Rada and other nationalists were sent into exile. (Magocsi 1996, 472-502)

Although the Bolsheviks orchestrated and supported the unification with Russia, they still wanted a degree of independence as a republic in the USSR, and Ukraine initially enjoyed a period of Ukrainization, or Ukrainian cultural revival. The Communist regime set up its nationalities policy, which included concessions aimed at easing the transition to Soviet rule. The party would allow Ukraine, and the other republics, to de-Russify and promote their own culture and heritage, while simultaneously making the political changeover to Soviet rule. Ukraine took advantage of this opportunity and made rapid headway on the revival, which included switching to the use of Ukrainian in schools and public places. However, in the late 1920s, Stalin abandoned these concessions and while beginning his massive collectivization campaigns, also reversed the nationalities policy. It became clear that he wanted to eliminate Ukraine as a political factor in the Soviet Union. He did this by sacking Ukrainian political elites, terminating Ukrainization, and some scholars even suggest that Stalin purposefully orchestrated the famine of 1932-33. Ukrainian scholars in particular see Stalin's excessive grain quotas as

a premeditated attack on Ukraine meant to prevent it from trying to gain too much power. Ukraine had great importance to the Soviet Union as the major producer of grains; Stalin may have believed they would try to starve the regime out of power by refusing to export grains. Other scholars argue that the famine was an unintentional result of collectivization, which highlighted problems in Soviet agriculture. This famine killed millions of peasant Ukrainians, and is known as the Holodomor, which means “extermination by hunger” in Ukrainian. With Ukraine sufficiently pacified after this, Stalin could send trusted members of his party, one of whom was Nikita Khrushchev, to run the republic. (Nahaylo 1999, 11-13)

A few years later, in 1939, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany made the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. The Soviet Union acquired the region of Galicia, thus uniting Galician Ukrainians with the rest of Ukraine. The Union also acquired a small part of Romania, which became the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, a region where ethnic Ukrainians also lived. In Galicia the regime combined policies of Ukrainization, to win over the people, with Sovietization and political repression. (Nahaylo 1999, 14)

After the Second World War Ukraine’s situation seemed not to have improved, following a series of occupations, invasions, deportations, starvation, and virtual colonization by Nazi Germany, the Red Army, and the surrounding countries; its desire for independence remained unfulfilled. To win the Ukrainians over, Stalin ultimately had to promise to concede a bit to their wishes. He demanded Soviet Ukrainian representation in the United Nations, which meant that for the first time, Ukraine would represent itself as an independent state on an international level. He also facilitated the return to western

Ukraine of around 200,000 Ukrainians who had been political refugees during the war. Sadly, these concessions had no lasting effects: there was no real meaning in Ukraine having UN representation, as it was still part of the USSR, and the returned political refugees were often punished for their betrayal of Soviet ideology. During the war, Western Ukrainian nationalists had formed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and fought against Nazi Germany near the border of Poland; after Germany was eventually pushed out of Ukraine, the Insurgent Army turned on the Red Army in a struggle against the re-imposition of Soviet rule. This fighting did not cease until the 1950s, after a series of Sovietization policies and mandates were put into place, including deporting up to 200,000 Ukrainians to Russia and shipping in tens of thousands of Russians to Ukraine. (Nahaylo 1999, 14-17)

Ukraine in the post-Stalin era enjoyed a brief period of de-Russification when Khrushchev allowed Ukrainians to move back to Ukraine, gave Crimea to Ukraine, and allowed Ukrainians to resume political positions both in the republic and in Moscow. This was short-lived, since it amounted to the regime treating Ukraine as an extension of Russia. Khrushchev and the Twenty-second Congress in 1961 tightened the nationalities policy to accelerate the fusion and merging of all people of the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1960s-70s Ukrainian writers, intellectuals, and other leaders of the nationalist movement protested and attempted to strengthen Ukrainian dissent, and though Ukrainian authorities tried to implement Ukrainization policies in Ukraine, their combined efforts were met with staunch repressive actions by Moscow. The nationalist dissenters became radicalized in 1975 when a group of former political prisoners set up the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group to expose human and national rights violations; they were

met with repression and arrests. As a result, more Ukrainian dissidents mobilized in support of independence. (Nahaylo 1999, 19-41)

In the 1960s-1970s, economic relations between Soviet Ukraine and Russia complicated the political situation. In the post-Stalin era through the 1960s, Ukraine was relatively successful economically, but beginning in the 1970s it began to see that the effects of centralized planning meant to serve the interests of the Soviet empire. Its resources and energy were depleted, which meant that it was increasingly economically dependent on Moscow. Independence would be very difficult to accomplish without a solid economic base. (Nahaylo 1999, 47-48)

When Gorbachev took over rule of the Soviet Union in 1985, his new policy of glasnost was manifest in Ukraine with writers of the Ukrainian Writers Union exposing and questioning Moscow's policies. They wrote about ecological damage, the repression of Ukrainian language, censorship of Ukrainian national history, and forcible Russification. They also wrote about the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1989. When the plant was built just years before, many Ukrainian scientists and authorities expressed concerns about labor safety, which fell on deaf ears in Moscow. The accident was considered another indication that Moscow did not care about Ukraine beyond what was necessary to keep it as part of the Soviet empire. It also became clear that the nationalities policies only supported ethnic Russians. Ukrainian culture and heritage were still suppressed. Many Ukrainians felt that the supposedly more liberal policies of Gorbachev were only a façade, and in fact the government had not changed its view on Ukraine at all. (Nahaylo 1999, 60-65)

This feeling galvanized Ukrainian dissidents even more, particularly in Western Ukraine, where the nationalist movement had always been stronger. At the end of the 1980s, the Ukrainian Cultural Fund was established to preserve historical and cultural monuments, museums, and to prepare revised history and culture reference books for Ukraine. Ukrainian language societies sprang up in various cities. Catholic Ukrainians began to reopen their churches, which had been closed down and banned. More Ukrainians became involved in protests and the movement gained momentum. (Nahaylo 1999, 118-121) All of this led up to the momentous day on August 24, 1991 when Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union. It is estimated that nine out of ten Ukrainians supported the move to independence, which showed that the movement was not only one of extreme nationalists, but of the people as a whole. (Magocsi 1996, 674)

Independent Ukraine

Following official independence and the first presidential elections, Ukraine experienced complications. It had very little experience with democratic processes, especially since its post-communist leaders were the same leaders as its former Communist leaders. It was still heavily economically dependent on Russia, which by then was also a separate independent country, and tensions with Russia exacerbated this situation. Many Ukrainians felt their independence to be tenuous and maintaining it was a high priority. The new government asserted control over all the former Soviet military units stationed in Ukraine, including the Black Sea Fleet, an action that was not received well by Russian authorities. Ukraine and Russia also disagreed about Crimea; although it had been part of the Ukrainian republic under Communism, Russia claimed it. (Nahaylo 1999, 435-441)

To ease the transition for former republics, leaders formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which included all but the Baltic States. The CIS is a loose association of states that promotes peaceful political and economic cooperation among members. Ukraine and Russia both became members in 1991, but with different approaches to their membership. Russia, as the largest member, seemed to consider it a way to assert its authority and to maintain close ties to countries it needed – Ukraine being one of them. Ukraine, on the other hand, seemed to view the CIS as the most orderly framework to separate from Russia's direct influence, wherein Ukraine could manage its own complex of problems resultant from the break up. CIS meetings provided peaceful settings for discussing issues among former republics, and in these meetings it became obvious that Russia and Ukraine disagreed on many issues. (Nahaylo 1999, 425-429)

Although Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk and Russian leader Boris Yeltsin were able to come to bilateral agreements about some of the issues, and it was obvious that neither wanted to see deepening tensions between the two countries, mistrust and conflict continued. (Nahaylo 1999, 445) Both seemed to realize they needed the other – Russia needed access to the Black Sea and trade routes, and Ukraine needed energy, gas, oil, and other resources – but each wanted these things on their own terms, which was not always possible for Ukraine. Due to its dire economic circumstances, Ukraine had to agree to deeper economic integration with Russia, who was threatening to suspend oil deliveries to Ukraine if it couldn't pay its increasing debt. Ukraine also agreed to lease the port of Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula to Russia and divide control over the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine eventually also had to offer Russia control of a section of oil

pipeline in Ukraine and a percentage of its refinery shares. Conflict within Ukraine about the constitution and parliament, and over who should be president made matters more chaotic in an already economically unsteady country. In 1994 Leonid Kuchma became president and Ukraine adopted a new constitution, which indicated a positive note of progress. (Nahaylo 1999, 452-456, 482-489)

Following this, leadership in Kyiv took further steps to strengthen its relations with NATO, the European Union, and with other European countries and seemed to separate itself more and more from Russia. Kyiv was more concerned with maintaining relations with the rest of Europe, and parliament member and diplomat Hennadiy Udovenko stated that it was Ukraine's long-term goal to be a full member of the EU. However, leadership did not underestimate the effects Russia could still have on Ukraine and the other former republics. Yeltsin was reelected in 1996, and Kuchma hoped that a dialogue about Ukrainian-Russian relations could be started. Instead, Yeltsin imposed a large import tax on Ukraine, supposedly to protect Russian interests. It had a damaging effect on trade and Ukraine's fragile economy; at the time, it had just introduced its new national currency. (Nahaylo 1999, 516, 531)

Despite all of these problems, Ukraine was relatively successful in its first years of independence. Progress was slow, but it managed to maintain peace and relative stability within its borders, something that could not be said for other emerging democracies. While political tensions continued, there was also a move to strengthen cultural, educational, scientific, and historical organizations in the country. Many had been forced to fold during the transition to independence due to lack of funding. (Nahaylo 1999, 549-550) Part of this was an increase in tourism, which had actually

begun in the 1980s. With this, the sale of souvenirs became more prevalent. Kyiv in particular became a popular tourist destination site. With the influx of tourists the sale of souvenirs became a way for many Kyivans to earn a living. For some, making and selling souvenirs was their only source of income. Andriyivsky Uzviz market was and is one of the main locations in the city to purchase souvenirs; I will show that the market is a vibrant site of cultural contestation.

Language in Ukraine

Thus, current relations between Ukraine and Russia are strained. This can be traced via linguistic roots. Ukraine's name in Russian, *Україна*, comes from the root *край* meaning edge or border. Interestingly, in Ukrainian the country's name, *Україна*, though it contains the same root *край* meaning edge or border, comes from the Ukrainian word *країна* meaning country or nation. Though Russian and Ukrainian are similar languages, this small difference is represents the different ways that Russians and Ukrainians have viewed Ukraine.

In more recent years, tensions between Russia and Ukraine have escalated. Regional ethnic and linguistic differences have divided Ukraine in to two main parts: East Ukraine, which has been mostly Russian-speaking and contains a higher percentage of ethnic Russians; and the mostly Ukrainian-speaking, more ethnically Ukrainian West Ukraine. According to the most recent census in Ukraine, in 2001, ethnic Ukrainians made up 77.8% of the population, whereas ethnic Russians were about 17%. These percentages vary within regions and range from the Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine, where the Ukrainian population was about 57%, and Russians made up about 38%, to the Lviv region in western Ukraine, where Ukrainians were almost 95% and Russians almost

4%. The city of Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula is the only region where ethnic Russians are the majority at 71.6%. ("All Ukrainian Population Census 2001" 2003-2004)

Although I focus on ethnic Ukrainians in this thesis, it is important to note the presence of minority groups and acknowledge their influence on the dominant Ukrainian and Russian cultures. Ukraine contains many minority ethnic groups. At the time of the 2001 census, these groups made up around 5-6% of Ukraine's total population. They included Belorussians (0.6%), Moldavians (0.5%), Crimean Tatars (0.5%), Bulgarians (0.4%), Hungarians (0.3%), Poles (0.3%), Jews (0.2%), Armenians (0.2%), and Roma (0.1%), among others. In each *oblast*, or region, these percentages may be different. For example, in the southern oblast of Odessa, Bulgarians and Moldavians represent 6% and 5%, respectively. In Kyiv oblast, Jews make up 0.7%. In the Chernivtsi region, Romanians make up 12.5% of the population. And in the Zakarpattia region, Roma constitute 1.1%. ("All Ukrainian Population Census 2001" 2003-2004) Ukraine has tended to avoid ethnic clashes in the post Soviet years, probably partially due to the Declaration of Rights of Nationalities, which gave citizenship to all ethnicities in Ukraine at independence. This policy is regarded as one of the most successful in the former Soviet states. (Helbig et.al. 2009, 13-14) The diversity of minority groups adds complexity to an already complicated society and includes ethnic and national identities with many languages, cultures, and types of folklore.

Like in other former Soviet nations, ethnic differences are complicated by language use. Ukrainian is the official language of Ukraine, but Russian is still extensively used. Language splits the people of Ukraine into more categories, some of

which are: Ukrainians who know Russian as their first language, because of what part of the country they live in, or because they were born during the Soviet era; Russians who speak only Russian or only Ukrainian; Ukrainians who speak both languages, but refuse to use Russian because of nationalist feelings; Ukrainians who support using only Russian because it has been so widely used in Ukraine for so long; etc.. According to the 2001 census, 95% of ethnic Russians considered their native language to be Russian, whereas 85% of Ukrainians said Ukrainian was their native language, which shows a difference in the prevalence of the two languages. ("All Ukrainian Population Census 2001" 2003-2004) What this census doesn't explicitly show, and what is most interesting, is that though Ukrainians are the ethnic majority in all of Ukraine, Russian is the dominant language. Many citizens speak both languages, but Russian is the language of public interaction, the workplace, politics, and education. Conversely, Ukrainian is the language of public traffic and street signs, government and business building names, public transportation, education, and cultural sites. (Pavlenko 2010, 149) This seems to complicate circumstances even further, as does the fact that Russian and Ukrainian are linguistically quite similar. They are both East Slavic languages, and contain only small differences in phonetic sounds, but have larger grammatical and vocabulary differences. Though they are not technically mutually intelligible, a Russian speaker and Ukrainian speaker could probably engage in basic communication in everyday life situations.

It is common to overhear conversations on the streets of Kyiv that are a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, and even with one person speaking Ukrainian and the other responding in Russian, and both understanding each other perfectly. Most Ukrainians are functionally bilingual, at least passively in that they may speak one language better, but

they fully understand the other. (Bilaniuk 2005, 3-7) These factors may contribute to the continuing opinions of some that Ukrainian is not necessary to living in Ukraine or that it is similar enough to be considered a dialect, albeit an inferior one. Many associate Ukrainian with provincialism, lower education, and lack of culture, while Russian is associated with centrality, better education, and high culture. Russians and Ukrainians alike can hold these stereotypes, and so it is interesting that both groups perpetuate the perceived similarities and differences that have produced conflict in the past. (Bilaniuk 2005, 38)

As described above, nationalism in Ukraine has been a significant part of its history, and after its independence the nationalist movement has intensified, particularly in relation to use and presence of the Russian language in Ukraine. During the Soviet period, Ukraine experienced alternating periods of Russification and Ukrainization, which resulted in a bilingual society. After independence Ukrainian was declared the official language and de-Russification of public spaces began in earnest. Russian-language signage was completely converted to Ukrainian. Though most people spoke Russian, bilingual signage was uncommon, unless it was Ukrainian-English, which was to keep up with the new trend of using English as a global language. (Pavlenko 2010, 145-146) More recently spoken Ukrainian has become more commonly used in some areas, such as in Kyiv and in western Ukraine. (Bilaniuk 2005, 3) In fact, many nationalist Ukrainians have come to consider native language, *ridna mova*, to be a biological phenomenon transmitted from one generation to the next, and thus the most important indicator of Ukrainian national identity. (Helbig et. Al. 2009, 54)

The Orange Revolution

In this section I will highlight two important events of the last decade that have brought Ukrainian politics and language to world attention: the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the language debate of 2012. 2004 was a presidential election year for Ukraine and the main candidates were Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko, two politicians who represented very different and opposing sides of Ukrainian political society. Yanukovych was prime minister at the time and was publicly backed by Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin, and supported by current president Leonid Kuchma. He was also more popular with Ukraine's Russophones, particularly in east Ukraine. He is ethnically Russian, from the Donetsk Oblast of east Ukraine, and spoke primarily Russian. Many believed that he would strengthen relations with Russia and promote Slavic unity. Yushchenko, on the other hand, was self-nominated and considered himself the representative of the "real" Ukraine. He saw Ukraine as a member of democratic Europe and he wished to strengthen ties to the west. He had more supporters in west Ukraine and among Ukrainophones. He is ethnically Ukrainian, from the northern city of Sumy, and speaks primarily Ukrainian. Many Ukrainians saw him as a stark contrast to Yanukovych just with regard to language use. Yanukovych did not have a good command of Ukrainian, despite the fact that all presidents of Ukraine, by constitutional law, are required to show fluency in the language; he made spelling mistakes on his official application for presidential candidate and spoke with many grammar errors. Some opponents pointed out that even his Russian skills were questionable, too, though it was his native language. He tended to use non-standard jargon and offensive language, and many believed this was a reflection of corrupt

character. He seemed to emphasize Yushchenko's lack of Russian use so as to make Yushchenko out to be anti-Russian. He also promised to make Russian an official language in Ukraine if elected. Yushchenko opposed this motion, but regularly spoke publicly in Russian to show his acceptance of Russian as a part of Ukraine. (Bilaniuk 2005, 195-199) Russian as an official language would continue to be a divisive issue in Ukraine for the next eight years.

It was obvious that Ukraine was strongly divided between the two candidates, but was not strictly demarcated down the usual line of east and west. Supporters of both could be found in all cities across the country, particularly Kyiv, which tends to fall on the border of east and west Ukraine. This division became very publicly visible when the election took place. On November 21, 2004, the day of the election, exit polls indicated victory for Yushchenko. However, when official results came in, Yanukovych had supposedly won by 2.5%. Just hours after initial exit polls were reported, official reports showed a huge increase in voter turnout in Yanukovych-supporting east Ukrainian regions, some regions showing increases from 78% to 96% overnight. Supposedly these voters shifted the balance to Yanukovych, giving him the votes he needed to win. Independent domestic monitors reported election fraud. It appeared that Yanukovych supporters were stuffing ballots and purposely miscounting, and teams of voters were being transported to polling sites and voting multiple times with multiple absentee ballots. (Karatnycky 2005)

Yushchenko supporters decried this fraud as a blatant attempt by the corrupt elite to control the people of Ukraine. They protested for the next month, gathering in the streets, especially in downtown Kyiv in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square).

They wore orange clothing and carried orange flags; orange was the official color of Yushchenko's political campaign. These protests and political negotiations, later named the Orange Revolution, eventually led to a new election on December 26, 2004, which was carefully monitored and the results showed that Yushchenko was the true winner. (Bilaniuk 2005, 196) Significantly, he had no party affiliation, which seemed to show that he and his supporters were trying to move away from the established politics of the country, to something more democratic and more similar to the west. He would be president for one term, until 2010.

By 2007 Yushchenko began to lose popularity because of Ukraine's political instability, and his Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko took greater prominence in Ukrainian politics. She had been a leader with him in the Orange Revolution but their relationship was strained due to personal disagreements. (Levy 2007) She had been acting Prime Minister for a few months in 2005 just after Yushchenko's election, but he fired her due to internal conflicts with other senior officials. She indicated at that time that she would separate entirely from Yushchenko and his political aims, even saying that he had ruined Ukrainian unity. (Myers et al. 2005) However, she was renamed Prime Minister under Yushchenko in 2007. In 2010 she decided to run for president against both Yushchenko and Yanukovych, and as Yushchenko failed to garner support, she and Yanukovych became the two primary candidates.

Yanukovych was declared president in February 2010, with a majority of the popular vote, and though Tymoshenko protested, Parliament saw no solid grounds for a revote or recount. (Schwartz 2010) Yanukovych expressed the desire to unite Ukrainians under his leadership, and to give people a reason to support his future actions and

policies. However, he did not wish to keep Tymoshenko as Prime Minister; he hoped that she would resign rather than having to be ousted, which she did, albeit after extensive protest. Even European leaders and U.S. president Barack Obama voiced their congratulations to Yanukovich, stating that the election was fair and Tymoshenko did not have a strong case for protesting the results. (Levy (2) 2010) In fact, many leaders saw this election as a triumph of Ukrainian democracy. The Orange Revolution's leaders may not have been in power anymore, but they allowed for this election to take place fairly. Ukrainians seemed to appreciate this fact, despite showing frustration with the state of economic and social affairs in the country. Russian president Vladimir Putin also showed his support for Russophone Yanukovich, who had been his choice for president since the last election and who had indicated that he would strengthen ties with Russia, as opposed to the west, as Yushchenko had. Some Ukrainian officials even postulated that Ukraine would be more successful and peaceful if it used Russia as a model for government. (Levy (3) 2010)

Though she resigned in 2010, Tymoshenko did not disappear from the public eye, but rather was forced into a more prominent position when in early 2011 she was accused of abuse of office over a natural gas imports contract signed with Russia in 2009. Prosecutors said that she signed this contract knowing that Ukraine would pay higher prices for Russian natural gas than other countries and that this would hurt the Ukrainian economy. These charges were expanded to include tax evasion dating back to her time as the head of a private energy company in the 1990s. She and her lawyers argued that these charges had been fabricated by Yanukovich himself as an attempt to remove her from the political scene in Ukraine forever. In October 2011 she was sentenced to seven years in

jail in the east Ukrainian city of Kharkiv. ("Profile: Yulia Tymoshenko" 2012) The European Union conveyed its disappointment with the verdict, stating that this would affect Ukraine's chances of being admitted to the EU in the future. Even Russian president Putin expressed that he did not understand why she had been jailed. ("Ukraine ex-PM Yulia Tymoshenko Jailed Over Gas Deal" 2011) She maintained, and still today maintains, her innocence. She has gone on several hunger strikes and has been hospitalized several times for related illnesses. Many Ukrainians support her, and she often receives higher opinion polls than any political leader in Ukraine. ("Profile: Yulia Tymoshenko" 2012)

At the time of my research, protesters for Tymoshenko could be seen lining Khreshatyk Street in downtown Kyiv in white tents with signs declaring, "I'm for Tymoshenko" in Ukrainian. They stood with posters and placards, handing out information about her court case, and denouncing the actions of the Yanukovych administration. They also distributed stickers that say in Ukrainian, "I'm against Yanukovych!", shown in Figure 3.



Figure 3. "I'm against Yanukovych!"

Figure 4 shows some of the posters seen on Khreshatyk during summer 2012. They depict her in parliament, in crowds of Ukrainians, smiling, interacting with them. Her hair is blond, like the original Kievan Rus' people, and it is braided in a traditional Ukrainian way, and also resembles a halo. She is a symbol of Ukrainianness and culture. She wears light colors, which are a symbol of purity and does not use excessive amounts of ornamentation or

cosmetics. These photos give her a very positive image; she is one of the people, and she cares about Ukraine. She is in the midst of adoring crowds who see her as the honest woman she claims to be. These images are somewhat ironic because Tymoshenko was also known as an oligarch in the early 1990s when she was the head of an energy company, and at the time was one of the richest Ukrainians. She is also known to be a bold and fiery orator, and one who at times can be argumentative and aggressive. Supporters seem to see her as standing up for their rights and views. She is a strong leader who is not afraid to be daring.



Figure 4. Posters of Yulia Tymoshenko set up by her supporters on Kyiv's Khreshatyk Street, July 2012

The 2012 Language Bill and Debate

Although Yanukovych seemed to have gained the trust and support of many Ukrainians when he became president, this was not true for all. He has stated that part of his foreign policy goal is to strengthen ties with Russia, something that nationalist-

leaning Ukrainians have not been supportive of in the past three years. Most recently, in June 2012, this included passing a bill to give the Russian language a higher status in Ukraine. *Kyiv Post* newspaper reported that the bill was rushed through parliament just minutes after a surprise proposal by one majority party leader, which gave opponents almost no time to cast their vote. The bill didn't officially make Russian a second official language but it recognized Russian (and other languages such as Bulgarian and Hungarian) as a "regional" language in primarily Russian-speaking areas of the country, such as many regions in east Ukraine. Opponents argued that it was a symbol of Moscow's continuing influence on Ukraine, a dilution of Ukrainian national identity, and a deepening of the rift between Russian and Ukrainian speakers. (Reuters 2012)

("Ukrainian Opposition Protests Russian Language Bill" 2012)

Ukrainians all over the country began protesting the bill immediately, especially in Kyiv. People gathered in the city center, near parliament and other government buildings, carrying signs and placards, playing drums, shouting in bull horns, wearing Ukrainian national costume, painting their bodies in yellow and blue paint representing the colors of the Ukrainian flag, as symbols of their national pride and solidarity. They had altercations with police, often starting fights themselves. Figure 5 shows a small, peaceful group of protesters in July 2012 who assembled on the steps of Ukrainian House, a large exhibition-presentation complex situated on European Square at one end of Khreshatyk Street. Many Ukrainian national flags are visible, and there are also some red and black flags. These colors were used on the flags of underground Ukrainian nationalists during World War Two (Pancake 2010), and they became a new symbol for the language debate. Protesters say red signifies freedom and black signifies death, so the

sentiment is “freedom or death”. It is obvious that the question of language is more than just speaking, reading, and writing for these Ukrainians.



Figure 5. Protesters of the 2012 language bill, July 2012

In August 2012 President Yanukovich signed the language bill into law. Protests have continued, despite Yanukovich's reassurances that the bill doesn't affect Ukrainian at all, but rather makes Russophones more comfortable in their own country, which he argues is good for Ukrainian unity. (Balmforth 2012) In recent months the president has also tried to appease protesters by including funding in the 2013 national budget for Ukrainian language development and reiterating that Ukrainian must be protected in Ukraine. Parliament has said that the language bill may even be put to referendum, since the constitution explicitly states that Ukrainian is the only official language. ("Russian Language Status May Be Put to Referendum, Rada Should Have Final Say" 2013)

There are already some measures put in place that protect Ukrainian to a certain extent. For example, in television and radio, according to national law, half of all programming must be Ukrainian-language programming. However, in practice, these requirements are not always met. In print media, books, magazines, and newspapers are more commonly sold in Russian rather than Ukrainian, which also gives the impression that Russian is favored. Some Ukrainians have such strong feelings about the language debate that they no longer speak Russian, especially in public. They may refuse to answer if addressed in Russian, or even boycott restaurants or other establishments that don't use Ukrainian. (Shevchenko 2012) The western Ukrainian city of Lviv even declared the language law invalid in its region just two months after Yanukovich signed the bill into law. ("Lviv Regional Council Declares Language Law Invalid on Region's Territory" 2012) Lviv is known for being particularly nationalistic and is primarily Ukrainian-speaking, so this came as no surprise.

The language debate in Ukraine represents more than just having the choice of languages to speak. It represents for some Ukrainians an attack on their heritage and culture. With its long history under Russia as a territory, a Soviet republic, and even now as an independent country, still in Russia's sphere of influence, Ukraine has long felt oppressed. Having a unique language is one of the primary tenets of being a nation; without it, Ukrainians feel that their identity is not complete and is being snuffed out. The conflictive history with Russia makes some Ukrainians understandably wary of Russian having an official status in Ukraine, after nationalists have made efforts to resist Russian influence. This debate is representative of the political relations between Russia and Ukraine and a whole. They have a tenuous relationship in which both need each other;

however, whereas Russia would like to keep Ukraine as close as possible, Ukraine is struggling to escape the weight of Russian influence to make its own path as a fully independent nation.

Current Events

On the other hand, recent events have shown that Ukraine and Russia's relationship may be growing closer. After initially deciding in 2012 to pursue political and trade agreements with the European Union, in November 2012 Ukraine's cabinet of ministers announced that it would suspend these plans and instead focus on new agreements with Russia and other former Soviet countries. EU leaders expressed disappointment with this development and stated that if Ukraine passes on this opportunity, it was unlikely to receive another in the future. Although President Yanukovych did not give reasons for his decision, it appears that they are twofold. First, an unofficial condition of signing EU agreements was that Yulia Tymoshenko had to be freed. EU leaders believed that her imprisonment was politically motivated, merely a way for Yanukovych to keep the popular figure from running against him in elections. (Herszenhorn (2) 2013) Second, President Putin of Russia made threats of cutting off gas exports to Ukraine (which supply 60% of its gas needs), and stopping all Ukrainian imports at the border. (Herszenhorn (3) 2013) Analysts say Putin viewed the EU as a threat from the west trying to overrule Moscow's power in Ukraine, though Putin himself told reporters that Ukraine's decision was entirely internal. Other analysts have speculated that Yanukovych may have rejected the EU agreement in order to force the EU to offer more support in case Russia cut off energy shipments. However, Yanukovych's statements suggest that this was a long-term decision. (Williams 2013)

The potential loss of Russian trade is no joke; Russia has recently cut off trade with other former Soviet countries seeking stronger EU ties. Armenia had been on track to stronger EU trade agreements until September 2013 meetings in Moscow appeared to change President Serzh Sargsyan's mind. He declared that Armenia would scrap its EU plans and join the Kremlin's customs union. In September 2013, after Moldova began talks with the EU, Russian officials banned Moldovan wine, one of the country's most important exports, and threatened to halt gas supplies during winter. There were rumors that Moldovans working in Russia would be expelled and that Moldovan apple exports would be refused. However, President Nicolae Timofti has stated he will not let these threats deter Moldova's EU aspirations, as it has long had goals of unification with the west. (Herszenhorn (3) 2013)

For Ukraine, the decisions are complicated, and the last decade has made it obvious that the relationship with Europe and Russia must be balanced. Despite the recent strengthening of Ukraine's alignment with Russia, many Ukrainians disagree with their government's actions. Protesters gathered in Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv chanting, "Ukraine is Europe!" to show their support for EU accession. (Herszenhorn (2) 2013) It is clear that many people support Ukraine's right as an independent country to move away from Russian influence.

The nationalistic struggle manifests in other parts of Ukrainian life as well, such as history textbooks, as Jan Germen Janmaat illustrates (2005). The complex nature of ethno-linguistic groups in Ukraine makes it difficult for authors and educators who write textbooks to certainly agree about what Ukraine's national identity is (this is difficult in many countries). The way Ukrainian history is portrayed in textbooks has a powerful

influence on children, whether the portrayal is positive, negative, exclusionary, inclusive, or otherwise. Janmaat notes a tendency of textbooks to favor the ethnocultural approach that touts ethnic Ukrainians as the most important group that determines national identity through culture and language. Books do acknowledge the presence of other ethnic groups but often place them in opposition to Ukrainians. Ethnic Russians in particular are depicted as outsiders who dominated the eastern part of the country, but who cannot stake a legitimate claim to those lands. Janmaat's conclusions point to potential future change towards a less nationalistic approach in the textbooks. However, he underscores the importance of the political climate in determining these changes. (2005, 20, 28-30, 35)

The author's study shows that nationalistic education in Ukraine begins in childhood, and is therefore part of many Ukrainians' mentalities. This example illustrates how nationalism permeates Ukrainian life in ways that are not explicitly political. In the following chapter I describe and analyze another small part of nationalism in Ukrainian life: Ukrainian souvenir sales in Andriyivsky Uzviz souvenir market in Kyiv.

CHAPTER IV

ANDRIYIVSKY UZVIZ SOUVENIR MARKET IN KYIV

The following chapter describes and analyzes Andriyivsky Uzviz through a performance studies lens, based upon my fieldwork completed in summer of 2012. By taking this approach, I show that the market is not only a place of economic profit, but also one of cultural heritage promotion and performance for the Ukrainians who make and sell folk arts there. The Uzviz contains more than folk artists and folk arts, including cafes, museums, and other types of souvenirs such as contemporary and Soviet memorabilia items. I will describe these things in the following pages; however, I will focus my analysis on folk arts and folk art vendors (focusing on one artist) because here I locate the most interesting Ukrainian cultural promotion. This chapter discusses the history and spatial dimensions of the market as well as the people involved (vendors and customers), and the material contents of the market. I also explore the possible meanings of objects and their production and transaction within Ukrainian culture and between Ukrainians and international tourists.

Overview of the Market and its Surroundings

Andriyivsky Uzviz means “Andrew’s Descent” and it is the name of the street on which the market is located. It begins at the top of Old Kyiv Mountain, and snakes down, ending near one of Kyiv’s main squares, Kontraktova Square. St. Andrew’s Church, shown in Figure 6, which was built in the 18th century, sits at the top of the mountain and is what gives the street its name. From almost anywhere on the Uzviz, visitors will see the large robin’s egg blue church jutting upwards to the sky. Near St. Andrew’s, the street morphs from asphalt to old cobblestone, smooth and shiny from hundreds of years of




Figure 6. St Andrew's Church

triangular shaped piece of land, where a few souvenir stands and food carts are located. Shown in Figure 7 is where the two streets come together. The red tents are food carts. On the left is the outer wall of St. Andrew's, and on the right are souvenir stands.

The Uzviz has been an historic artists' street for hundreds of years. Some have compared it to the Montmartre in Paris or Old Arbat in Moscow. Many writers, artists, merchants, and craftspeople lived on the Uzviz and displayed their works and wares in galleries, shops, and outside on the street. Today, the buildings still contain not only galleries, shops, and museums, but also cafes, restaurants, and other points of interest. Along the north side of the street itself where there are no stalls, artists (often students of the nearby art academy) can be observed creating and selling their works, but the souvenir stalls and stands make up most of the market.

wear. There is a small square at the base of the church on which sometimes musicians or dancers perform for the passersby.

The street originates at the confluence of two other streets, Desyatynna and Volodymyrska, which come together at an acute angle just uphill to the east from the church. About one half of a city block uphill from the merge point is a short connecting street between the two streets. This forms a small




Figure 7. The top of Uzviz

2007, indicates that it was founded sometime in the 1980s, but does not state exactly when, or who founded it. (Budko) From the information I could gather from vendors, it seems that people began selling folk art souvenirs there because it was one of the most popular tourist areas in Kyiv in the 1980s when international tourism to Ukraine began to increase.

Four food carts and music performance spaces for busking are located in the small square at the top of the Uzviz. Vendors sell soda, bottled water, candy, ice cream, beer, and other snack items, which are convenient for visitors to consume while shopping. Two of these stands have plastic chairs and tables for public use. These are the only places to sit on the street, and are important on a hot summer day. In summer it is common to see visitors walking down the Uzviz enjoying an ice cream while perusing the souvenir selection. On weekends music performances are common; often there is just a single

The specific history of the Uzviz is unclear. There is a dearth of scholarly research on it, and travel websites in English, Russian, and Ukrainian do not provide many details. Based on its history as an artists' street where craftspeople and artisans have worked and sold items for many years, it seems that the market formed gradually and organically from this past. One quarterly online magazine, *Ukraine Magazine*, whose website seems not to have been updated since

performer, such an accordionist playing traditional Ukrainian folk music; or there may be a small group of guitarists singing contemporary music, collecting tips in an open case. Music adds to the festive tourist atmosphere at Andriyivsky Uzviz.¹²




Figure 8. Map of the Uzviz

Figure 8 depicts a map of the Uzviz, shown with Ukrainian labels. Most tourists or potential shoppers enter Andriyivsky Uzviz at the top of the mountain, either by following Desyatynna Street or Volodymyrska Street towards the confluence near St. Andrew's Church. The three colors denote different categories of buildings or sites with local, national, or cultural significance. Number 23 on the lower right corner of the map is St. Andrew's Church. Below and to the right is the

small square and the intersection of Volodymyrska and Desyatynna Streets. Around number 21 is the dividing line between the upper Uzviz and the lower Uzviz.

¹² Music in the Uzviz is another topic entirely, and I omit it from this thesis because it is very complex and deserves more discussion than my limited knowledge could provide. While Ukrainian folk music is common in the Uzviz, it is important to acknowledge that other ethnic groups – including but not limited to Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians, Poles, Tatars, Jews, and Roma – in Ukraine have their own musical traditions, some of which perform in Andriyivsky Uzviz. This complicates national and cultural expression in the Uzviz, and contributes to the market's diversity. For more information on music in Ukraine, both in the Soviet and post Soviet eras, see Adriana Helbig's chapter entitled "Ukraine" in *The International Recording Industries* (ed. Lee Marshall, Abington: Routledge, 2012), and the chapter entitled "Music" in Adriana Helbig, Oksana Buranbaeva, and Vanja Mladineo's *Culture's and Customs of Ukraine* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2009).

Maintenance and Regulation of the Market Space

In the last 15 years there have been several important instances when the city involved itself in market activities. One was in 2000 when the Podil District Administration (PDA) attempted to ban vendors from selling in the market during the winter weather months between December and May, citing the hazard of hanging icicles' potentially falling and injuring market visitors. Vendors and artists immediately organized and formed a group called the Kyiv Creators to protest the ban. Winter holidays provide a chance for vendors to earn income during an otherwise slow business season. A spokesperson for Kyiv Creators' 200 members expressed that for most vendors, selling in the market is their only source of income; selling in winter is critical for them to make their living. Members wrote letters to government heads, picketed government buildings, and alerted the media. The PDA soon rescinded the ban. It also allowed issuance of more trade licenses, although it had previously stated there were too many vendors on the street. The head of the PDA even promised that while he was in his post, there would be no further bans on trade in the Uzviz. ("Artists Face Eviction from Andriyivsky Uzviz." 2000; "Craftsmen Can Now Call Andriyivsky Uzviz Home" 2000)

Another example of positive city involvement in the Uzviz was in 2002 when the Kyiv City State Administration decreed it under protected status, which established specific construction rules disallowing demolition of any buildings or renovating without approval by the Department for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Sites. Also in 2012 the Ministry of Culture granted the Uzviz the status of an urban architecturally significant site, which makes every building and the street itself a historical site.

(Maksymenko et al. 2012)

Many buildings along the Uzviz have been renovated and repainted recently, as part of a restoration project by the city (Maksymenko et al. 2012, Shevchenko (2) 2012). The new building facades have been painted in bright colors and decorated with hanging flowerpots. The sidewalks have been remade with new red brick cobblestone. As of July 2012, the buildings that had not yet been finished being renovated were draped with canvas that had been painted to look like a building façade, as seen in Figure 9. The colors and newness of the buildings and canvasses evoke a constructed, purposed atmosphere, almost like that of a theatre stage. The canvases indicate that the city enacted



Figure 9. Uzviz renovation facades

a careful plan to create the Uzviz's image.

Other streets being renovated in Kyiv do not look like the Uzviz.

They are less likely to be painted in such whimsical colors, and are less likely to be

fitted with canvas

facades during restoration. This suggests that the Uzviz occupies a special category in city renovators' plans, and also represents a valued part of the city, not only because of its historical significance, but because it brings tourism to Kyiv. It is also the site of various art festivals during the year and the Kyiv Day celebration in May, in which many Kyivans participate.

Despite the hazy history of the souvenir market, it is clear that the Uzviz is a culturally significant street in Kyiv, and the market within is valuable to Kyivans. In fact, some Kyivans refer to the Uzviz as a museum with no roof, implying that its contents are meant to be protected and maintained. It is particularly vital to artists and vendors, whose primary purposes are selling souvenirs and catering to tourist visitors. It must maintain its image and market atmosphere to remain within the parameters of what tourists expect. The only changes that are made are those that are perceived to enhance the market, i.e. renovating buildings. Vendors must follow certain city rules in order to sell: gain a permit from the city, which costs about 100 USD, and pay a monthly fee of about 5 USD and an annual fee of about 20 USD to sell on the street during open hours of the day. Permanent stalls are rented out by the city, but non-permanent stalls' locations are regulated by vendors themselves. They must also agree to register their items on the permit to ensure that only acceptable souvenir items are sold. Regardless of origin, acceptable items are Russian or Ukrainian folk arts, contemporary items like t-shirts and magnets that have some connection to Russian or Ukrainian culture (i.e. a t-shirt that says "I love Kyiv", or a magnet depicting a Ukrainian peasant hut), Soviet memorabilia, and anything that is handmade by an artist, even if it is not a type of folk art. Wares with no connection to Russian, Ukrainian, or Soviet culture are not permitted (i.e. blank coffee mugs or cheap, imported jewelry). I give specific examples of wares, especially folk arts, in the following pages. The PDA regulates vendors and wares as much as possible; however, at the lower end of the Uzviz unlicensed squatters often try to sell items such as plastic children's toys, modern clothing like blue jeans, or cheaply made jewelry. If discovered, these squatters are immediately forced to leave the Uzviz, but it is difficult to regulate this.

Before renovations, many residents of Kyiv felt that the street was in great need of repair, specifically because it was a popular tourist destination. *Kyiv Post* newspaper extensively covered the renovation process from the beginning, reporting on progress and interviewing Kyiv residents to find out what they thought of it. *Post* reporters also documented protests after billionaire businessman Rinat Akhmetov proposed demolishing an historic building on the Uzviz to make room for a modern office building, as part of the Uzviz renovations. (Shevchenko (4) 2012) Their reports quote wary residents worrying that the renovations might not be done correctly, that the atmosphere and beauty of the Uzviz might be compromised for more modern looking buildings, and hoping that there would be enough money to finish. (Shevchenko (3) 2012) Renovations began in early 2012 and were planned to be finished by May 2012, in time for the Kyiv Day celebrations. At the time of my research in summer 2012, renovations were still ongoing.

The Uzviz represents Kyiv to many tourists. The ability to present the Uzviz as a modern, yet traditional tourist spot where visitors can experience historic Kyiv is a point of pride for many vendors. It is also a source of collective identity for them. They are quick to recount tidbits of Ukrainian history or provide recommendations on which café to visit, and they always know the life stories of famous Ukrainians who lived on the Uzviz. They recount which buildings are the oldest and what used to be housed in them. The Uzviz is not only their workplace, but also their home. Vendors say that the market's main purpose is to sell souvenirs as well as to provide an experience to visitors. They want to create an atmosphere that imparts upon visitors the feeling that they have experienced something uniquely Ukrainian. This significance was adopted by city

renovators; each building has been renovated according to a specific city plan, to keep the historical and cultural aspect of the Uzviz's traditional image.

The Market's Vendors and Wares

Souvenirs are the material culture of travel, events, relationships, and memories. As I describe them in this thesis, they are items tourists take away and collect that have various uses, but generally serve as mementos of travel. The object may have a practical function, such as a piece of clothing or a painted bowl, but the meaning of the souvenir symbolizes much more. Items carry value for many reasons: their monetary value, their place in home décor, their indications of wealth or class, and their personal meaning to the traveler, among others. (Graburn 2000, xii-xiii) Anna Pechurina points out that immigrants may use souvenirs as markers of national or cultural identity in their new country. (2011, 97) Michael Hitchcock illustrates that souvenirs can be used as symbols of indigenous identity and solidarity. (2000, 8) Although I do not focus on the specific meanings of Uzviz souvenirs to tourists, I later explain that items are perceived to have authenticity in different ways, and these perceptions affect what vendors sell and what tourists buy. In the Uzviz there are different kinds of souvenirs in the two main areas of the market.

I have termed The Uzviz's two parts upper and lower. The upper part consists of mass-produced souvenir items sold in permanent concrete and sheet metal stalls, mostly on the west side of the Uzviz. Here, most vendors say that they sell souvenirs solely to make a profit. They are interested in selling items that have proven to be popular with tourists, which may or may not include folk arts. They successfully sell wares because of their position in the upper Uzviz, where most tourists enter the market; tourists often

purchase souvenirs from one of the first stalls they see. People are often deterred by the steepness of the rest of the Uzviz: walking back up a steep street in the heat of the afternoon is usually something to avoid. Often upper Uzviz stalls have a mixture of contemporary items like t-shirts and coffee mugs, Soviet memorabilia, and some folk art items. Some stalls sell all three, or else one or two types of items. Soviet memorabilia (old and worn, and are often war-related) is the only souvenir type in a few stalls. Old canteens, soldiers' hats or helmets, propaganda posters, and firearms and knives sometimes sit next to a cheerfully painted wooden bowl or colorful coffee mugs. Most stalls have a combination of contemporary souvenirs and traditional folk arts. Contemporary souvenirs include coffee mugs, shot glasses, commemorative ceramic plates and bells, t-shirts, and refrigerator magnets. Some coffee mugs have simple slogans such as "I love Kyiv", or "Kyiv, Ukraine" and a picture of a famous cathedral, and some are more intricately designed with actual cityscapes, and some have illustrated pictures depicting two traditionally dressed Ukrainian men dancing and drinking. Shot glasses tend to be simpler, and only say "Kyiv" or show a simple picture of a church. Ceramic plates and bells sometimes have pictures of various points of interest in Kyiv, such as churches, museums, or monuments.

In the summer of 2012 Kyiv was host to the Union of European Football Association's Euro Cup in soccer, and souvenir t-shirts were a popular item in the Uzviz. Other popular novelty t-shirt designs seem to have Russian references, such as replicated pictures of Soviet propaganda posters, or images of Cheburashka, a Russian children's cartoon, or the golden arches of a certain well-known fast food restaurant with "McLenin's" written instead of "McDonald's". Refrigerator magnets include simple

images of Kyiv, or a traditional Ukrainian hut, or a small wooden plate. With the exception of these magnets, most items in the upper Uzviz do not relate to Ukrainian folk arts, or even to Ukrainian culture. Rather, they are consistent with other contemporary souvenir base forms, such as the t-shirt or coffee mug, found around the world. They can be customized to be sold anywhere. Although these types of souvenirs were not common in Kyiv before the early 1990s, they seem to be quite popular now. The majority of souvenir stands in the upper area of Andriyivsky Uzviz contain at least one of these types.

Most vendors of souvenirs are middlemen, that is, they order their wares from factories or artists and then sell them in the Uzviz. Towns such as Chernigov, Donetsk, and others have souvenir factories, and some vendors insist that all of their wares come from such factories. However, many vendors admit that at least some of their items were made in China or Vietnam. In fact, some vendors worry about the effect of imported souvenirs. Factories and artists in Ukraine simply can not keep up with the manufacturing capacity of China. Souvenir vendors and artisans often have to compete with commercialized factory production, and must work hard so that their items bear a mark of “authenticity” to attract tourists to purchase them. They are bound by tourist preferences, but there also must be balance between these preferences and what the vendor or artist has the ability to sell. (Herzfeld 2004, 1) While it may be cheaper for a vendor to sell Chinese-made souvenirs, tourists will not always purchase an item labeled “Made in China” because it lacks the authenticity of having been made in Ukraine. For this reason, some vendors have resorted to deliberately removing “Made in China” labels in order to sell the items more successfully. To add another dimension, some items made in China

contain dangerous substances, such as lead paint, which vendors and tourists alike may have no way of detecting. Moreover, because they have no direct connection to the production of the souvenirs, middlemen may be more focused on profit than an artist who sells his or her own works in the market, and may not check the safety of the items. These issues reflect the lack of effective management of the Uzviz, and the lack of enforcement of the registration policy that vendors are required to complete. (Kalenska 2012)

The lower Uzviz is a different story. There are no permanent stalls, only wooden or metal structures which are portable and taken home with the vendor each night. They also contain fewer of the mass-produced items that are so prevalent in the upper part. Vendors here are more likely the makers of the wares they sell, and thus concerned with more than just economic profit. They are interested in promoting themselves as artists and in differentiating themselves and their art from the vendors and mass-produced souvenirs in the upper Uzviz. Often wares in the lower Uzviz are classified as “traditional” Ukrainian folk arts. Labeling an item as “traditional” can be problematic, but to help with this I use Barre Toelken’s conceptualization as a pre-existing set of cultural characteristics and conditions that influence a performer more than his or her own preferences or tastes (1996, 37). This is to say that a performer of traditional folklore favors qualities and techniques that reference how folklore was created in the past, according to cultural custom and preference. I use this definition throughout because it takes into account the performer’s agency, something that is important in Andriyivsky Uzviz.

For many vendors and artists in the lower Uzviz, choosing what to make and sell is influenced by what they view as Ukrainian traditional culture. When asked, some will

explicitly say that they only sell Ukrainian arts because they want to show tourists what Ukrainian culture is. They believe that as vendors in the Uzviz they have a responsibility to display Ukrainian items. A common misconception of tourists who are not familiar with Ukrainian culture is that Ukrainian folk culture is almost the same as that of Russia. This is probably related to Ukraine's relatively recent independence; in the Soviet era and before, Russians and Ukrainians were considered parts of the same cultural group, with slight differences. As a result of this, some tourists come to the Uzviz expecting to find Russian folk art souvenirs – which they do find, in some stalls. Matryoshki are very popular and their mere presence in the Uzviz, probably in the upper area, perpetuates the misconception that they are Ukrainian.

In addition, it is true that there is some overlap in what scholars consider traditional Russian and traditional Ukrainian folk art. Painted wooden plates, bowls, and spoons, and some types of lacquer boxes, can be found in both cultures. Some Ukrainian material arts may also be found in other Slavic folk art traditions, such as Czech and Slovakian painted eggs. To complicate this further, there are some Ukrainians who make Russian folk arts, as is the case of one lacquer box artist I will profile later in this chapter, and vice versa. The complex interaction of Russian and Ukrainian folk arts and culture in the Uzviz shows that the notion of “traditional” cannot have an objective definition. However, it is important to note that I am interested in portraying the artists' and vendors' points of view of what defines an item as traditional or not; Ukrainian arts vendors in the Uzviz know what they consider to be traditional and many of them hope to show tourists precisely “authentic” Ukrainian folk arts.

For these vendors, traditional souvenir items are those that have roots in Ukrainian history. For example, a traditional Ukrainian embroidered blouse is one that is made from white fabric and red or black embroidered thread because these are the materials and colors Ukrainians used in the past and that came to be associated with Ukrainian culture. Several vendors, such as the one in Figure 10, sell only traditional Ukrainian embroidery on tablecloths, napkins, blouses, dresses, and even small bookmarks. The most common color combination is red thread on a white cloth background, but there are other colors as well. Today the embroidery is done with machines, but vendors consider hand-sewing more traditional. Floral and geometric motifs are common, with popular designs varying regionally in Ukraine.



Figure 10. An Uzviz embroidery stall

Another example of traditional Ukrainian art is painted eggs, or pysanky, shown in Figure 11. They are arguably the most Ukrainian of souvenirs and most Ukrainians would consider them to be very traditional, because they have a long history in Ukrainian folk culture, dating back before Christianization. Historically pysanky were made of real eggs, and the designs were drawn with colored beeswax. Now souvenir pysanky are usually made of wood, and are painted in great detail, meticulously designed, usually in



Figure 11. Pysanky

black, red, and yellow paints, though all colors and new designs can also be found. Sometimes they also come with a display stand that looks a bit like a candlestick holder and is painted in a similar fashion to match the pysanka.

Although pysanky are

quintessentially Ukrainian, they are not found in most souvenir stalls in the Uzviz. This may be due to the influence of Russian culture on souvenirs in Kyiv, or the economic fact that tradition is not always the first priority for sales. As Iancu and Tesar note in their discussion of the politics of Romanian peasant art, sometimes, due to market demand and financial constraints, vendors can not produce or sell art that would be considered more traditional. Vendors must be flexible with where they procure their wares because such business decisions depend on customer preferences. (2008, 60) In the Uzviz it is the same; many vendors focus entirely on profit because the market is their livelihood. They do not have the luxury of picking and choosing the most traditional Ukrainian items to sell just because they are Ukrainian.

Pysanky simply do not sell as well as other types of souvenirs. They are often more expensive because of their detail and design, and many tourists prefer to buy other items. Because of this preference, few vendors sell pysanky in the Uzviz. This shows the complexity of negotiating vendors' economic and cultural roles as sellers of folk art. It also indicates the importance of profit in the market. It is easy to romanticize artists and vendors of traditional Ukrainian arts, but the reality is that many cannot afford to sell only what is traditional. Their livelihoods depend on sales and this means they must sell what tourists will buy.

Although souvenir folk arts are considered traditional and modeled after old forms, many are in fact mass-produced. However, in this case, mass-produced does not mean mechanized production. Items such as painted wooden spoons, pysanky, and lacquer boxes usually cannot be carved and painted by machines. Many are made in factories in and outside of Ukraine, but carving and painting by hand is required because many of these items are small and the details of the design are minute. Factories are privately owned and, depending on their size, can employ up to 100 people. Items are produced by assembly lines of lathe operators and painters. Painters may work on several batches of items at a time; while one batch's first coat of paint is drying, painters begin the next batch. There are several factories in operation in Ukraine that make folk art items, mostly in cities in eastern Ukraine. However, factories only produce a few designs, probably whichever ones seem to be most popular, and the constraints of time, money, and materials result in lower quality products. Usually these items are made of cheap wood and paint, and do not display very intricate designs. Uzviz middleman vendors know that their items are factory produced, but to them, this does not drastically

detract from the tradition of an item. A pysanka made in a factory is still traditional Ukrainian art, but made in an easier, more modern way. Of course, it is possible that these vendors claim this traditional quality so that their items are more appealing to potential customers. An independent artist who makes pysanky would not agree that a factory-made pysanka is as traditional as his/her own pysanky.

Independent artists make items in their homes or in private workshops. They are able to take more time and use better wood and paint, and incorporate more variable and diverse designs. Stylized floral patterns and fairy tale themes are common designs. The items also tend to be of higher quality, and therefore more expensive. These items are also usually signed by the artist, indicating a more personal and higher quality. In the Uzviz there is a leatherworker who makes purses, satchels, vests, belts, and other items. He buys the leather, but makes everything by hand. He comes to the Uzviz every day but Sunday during the summer to sell his works. Summer is the high tourist season, so this is when he can make the most money. In this case, leatherwork is not necessarily what most people would consider a traditionally Ukrainian folk art, but he is a Ukrainian artist, and because of this, he labels his works as traditional.

In addition to traditional folk arts, other types of contemporary items that are usually not handmade, such as jewelry and scarves, are sold in the lower Uzviz. The jewelry does not appear to have any cultural or traditional connection to Ukraine or Kyiv; it is jewelry that could be found at any shop and is sold only for profit. Similarly, scarves sold here also might be found in stores; they are neither embroidered in the traditional way, nor are they souvenir scarves. That is, none of them say “Kyiv” or have pictures of churches or points of interest in Ukraine or the city. Though these are probably sold

solely for profit, they also have another use. St. Andrew's Church is nearby and visitors are allowed inside. As part of church modesty custom, when women enter an Eastern Orthodox church they cover their hair. Not all women choose to do so, but many do, and if they happened to forget their scarf, they can purchase one from one of the stands in the lower Uzviz.

Vendors in Andriyivsky Uzviz make the market a market. Without vendors the market would not exist. They are responsible for obtaining items to be sold, bringing them to the market, organizing and pricing them, transporting to and setting up stalls or stands in the market, and then manning their stations, often all day. In contrast to the sale of souvenirs and folk arts in the Soviet Union, where the government strictly controlled all sales operations, Uzviz vendors have relative autonomy. They must sell approved items, but there are many options within this category. As long as they are registered with the city and have paid the city permit fees, they are free to set up their stall or stand and sell whenever they choose. Summer is the high tourist season in Kyiv, and with the weather often pleasant, tourists may be in Andriyivsky Uzviz from 7:00 in the morning until 10:00 in the evening. The tourist season produces the most profit, so vendors must take advantage of this time; in fact, they may not sell in the market at all during winter. Many of them spend most of the rest of the year making inventory to be sold in the following summer. The non-summer seasons are also when other souvenir and arts events take place in Ukraine. There are regular exhibitions in various cities in Ukraine and other countries that artists attend to network with other artists and sell items. Some are recognized internationally as master artists. (Kachur et al. 2013)

Vendors take great care in the ways they display their wares. Most stands or stalls are small and have limited space that must be taken advantage of efficiently. To ensure sales, having a variety of products is essential to cater to customers' different tastes and preferences. Usually a stand has a table or counter on which wares are arranged, and sometimes there is also a wall or shelf structure behind. Smaller and less expensive items sit towards the front, and larger and more expensive items towards the back. It is strategic to place items like this because vendors know that tourists are more likely to purchase cheaper items; to a certain extent, items near the front will be handled the most, so it makes sense to place smaller and cheaper items there. This way, there is less risk of something large or expensive being damaged. For example, a stall where embroidery is sold may be a temporary structure with three walls and a small table in the front. On the table lie small napkins, table runners, and bookmarks. These are smaller, cheaper, and easier to access and handle. On the side walls hang small tablecloths and blouses. They are larger, more expensive, and require help from the vendor to take down.

Vendors' sales behavior in the market is gendered. Some vendors, usually men, tend to be more talkative and vocal with customers than others. I call these the salesmen. Men tend to stand close to their stands, closely watching potential customers and making conversation. Although Russian is often the language of public use in Kyiv, many vendors in the Uzviz speak English because of tourism. Many immediately speak English to tourists, probably because in their experience, tourists do not speak Russian well, or at all. They ask, "Can I help you find something?" or "You are looking for something particular?" If the customer says they are just browsing, the vendor may pick up an item and show how it works. For example, a vendor may take apart a matryoshka doll, to show

how many nested dolls are inside the largest one. He may point out the craftsmanship of the carving or the detail of the paint. If the customer is inspecting a Ukrainian ceramic whistle, which, according to folklore can keep evil spirits away, the vendor may take his own whistle and play a little tune on it, to show the good quality of the whistle, its tone, and to demonstrate how to play it. If the customer is undecided, the vendor may pick up another item and show that it also has the same qualities, to show consistency across his products. These salesmen are focused on the form of the item and its aesthetic quality. If the price is the issue for the customer, a male vendor may offer a discount as a bargaining tool. These vendors are also quick to point out if the item is a traditional folk art. They know that tourists often look specifically for these items because they are considered authentic and desirable.



Figure 12. Upper Uzviz stands with male vendors sitting nearby

Other vendors are less vocal with customers. These tend to be women. They stand to the side while customers peruse their wares, and rely on the initiative of the customer

to ask for help in selecting or purchasing an item. Some customers may prefer this method because they are free to look at the souvenirs without feeling obligated to buy. Of course, these quieter vendors have extensive knowledge of their items, just as the more vocal ones do. If asked, they will share information on what the product can be used for. For example, they may show how to take apart a matryoshka doll, and then point out that children might love to have it as a toy. They may unfold an embroidered tablecloth to show how large of a table it would cover, and then show the customer the matching placemats and napkins, to be used in a full table setting in the home. Although they show that the products are well designed, they seem to focus on how they can be used. Women also offer discounts without the customer showing any interest in bargaining. If a customer wants to buy a painted wooden bowl, a female vendor may offer the matching wooden spoon at a discounted rate, because it is a set and is meant to be used together. If a customer wants to purchase two embroidered napkins, a female vendor may offer a discount for purchasing three or four.

Ukrainianness in the Market

Some vendors in Andriivsky Uzviz are concerned with their image as Ukrainian souvenir artists. Language is a contentious topic for many Ukrainians, as I explained in Chapter III, and in the Uzviz it is also sometimes an issue. Vendors and artists recognize that tourists are often international and do not speak Russian or Ukrainian, so they often use English to interact with customers. Only a few words and phrases on the part of tourists are needed to make a purchase and for the most part, vendors do not seem to mind which language is used. However, tension can sometimes arise over a tourist's use of Russian over Ukrainian. The extensive use of Russian in Kyiv does not agree with

some Ukrainians, and some vendors will assert this in the market. For example, if I addressed a vendor in Russian (because I do not speak Ukrainian) sometimes he or she answered only in Ukrainian. This, of course, might indicate that that particular vendor did not speak Russian well. However, this occurred several times, and with the extensive use of Russian in Kyiv, it seems unlikely that so many vendors' Russian skills were lacking. Vendors I interviewed consistently said that some vendors prefer not to speak Russian, and may even refuse to do so. This can also be observed in other parts of Kyiv in similar types of business transactions. In this choice, vendors assert their Ukrainianness and linguistically claim the market as Ukrainian.

Another way that vendors assert their ethnicity is in wearing traditional Ukrainian costume. Of the over 100 individual stands, perhaps a quarter of the vendors wear costume. Usually they do not wear full costume, but only a shirt. Traditional Ukrainian garb differs for men and women, but both sexes wear a similar type of embroidered shirt. It is usually white, but sometimes black, with red and black embroidered flower or geometric shapes on the chest and/or sleeve area. It has large, billowy sleeves, and a rounded or square collar line. Some women's styles tend to have more embroidery than men's. Compare those shown in Figures 13 and 14. While this type of traditional wear may seem out of place in modern times, in Kyiv and in the Uzviz it is not. It is relatively common to see people on the street wearing traditional costume on an average day. In the Uzviz, some vendors sell these shirts, so they may wear one as an extension of their merchandise display. Other vendors do not sell them, but wear them for other reasons. One vendor said she began wearing traditional costume and her sales increased by 20%. She said tourists began to show more interest in her stand because she was wearing a

traditional blouse. She thinks it gives her items authenticity, with an added economic bonus. To other vendors, it is important to wear a traditional outfit because they want to display Ukrainian culture. They are selling Ukrainian souvenirs, so they want to look the part. They also said it makes the market more authentic and attractive to tourists. Visitors feel that they are purchasing from a “real” Ukrainian, and this authenticity is transferred to the item itself, even though it may be factory-made.



Figure 13. A women's folk shirt
Photos courtesy ukrainiansite.com



Figure 14. A men's folk shirt

In *In Search of Authenticity* Regina Bendix discusses the many issues that arise when trying to define or quantify authenticity. She points out that past scholars have used authenticity “as an agent to define [folklore], differentiate it from other cultural manifestations, develop methods of analysis, critique competing theories, or create new paradigms.” (1997, 5) However, concrete definitions of it have varied, and Bendix argues that authenticity is nothing more than a social construct: the emotional longing for something essential, soulful, genuine, primitive, or transcendent. Delving deeper, it becomes apparent that the notion of authenticity implies the existence of the inauthentic, which ultimately serves to perpetuate potentially narrow ideas of cultural purity. Historically, notions of authenticity were associated with romantic nationalist ideals and

became a way for people to identify and differentiate themselves in relation to others. However, within the concept of authenticity lies a paradox: once something has been declared authentic, it is legitimized, demand for it rises, and thus it becomes commercialized and no longer authentic. Scholars, then, are not interested in an unchanging definition of authenticity, but rather in how people use and relate to the term and how it informs their behavior. (Bendix 1997, 3-15)

In the case of Andriyivsky Uzviz, authenticity has varying definitions, depending on the type of item. For example, a pysanka would be considered authentic if an individual artist in Ukraine made it. It would be less authentic if it was made in a factory, and even less authentic if it was imported from China. Soviet memorabilia are authentic because they are old and represent a historically significant time period and the people and events associated with it. Contemporary t-shirts, for example, may be authentic because they come from Ukraine and have words in Ukrainian on them. Vendors make judgments of authenticity to decide what wares they will sell. Tourists make similar judgments to decide what items to purchase. Different kinds of authenticity may have varying levels of importance depending on the person. Thus authenticity is a subjective, yet essential component of market activities.

Although I give examples above, I do not attempt to explicitly define authenticity in the Uzviz. In the case of folk art it seems to relate to what I have described as traditional in the market. Perhaps because of the setting on the historic Uzviz, and the cultural richness of Kyiv, vendors believe tourists come to the market expecting to see traditional folk arts sold by traditional-looking people who are knowledgeable about their culture. Here, traditional indicates rural or peasant culture, which is the origin of the

Ukrainian folk art items in the Uzviz. Vendors use this demand for a cultural experience in the Uzviz to both sell more souvenirs, and to educate visitors about Ukrainian culture.

Gosha, an Uzviz Artist

For one artist¹³ who sells his own works, the process of doing business in Andriyivsky Uzviz encompasses many of the concepts I have described above. Gosha makes lacquer boxes and pysanky and sells them in the market. He is ethnic Ukrainian; he was born near Kyiv but moved to Moscow as a child and lived and worked there until the breakup of the Soviet Union when he and his wife, Sveta, who is also Ukrainian and had moved to Moscow in her youth, moved to Kyiv. They were part of the Ukrainian diaspora living in Moscow, and yearned to move back to their homeland. Being Ukrainian is a defining part of Gosha's identity: Ukrainians should live with other Ukrainians, he says.

Gosha couldn't find work in Kyiv, so he began learning to carve and paint miniature paintings¹⁴. He lived near an elder artist, who had been making miniatures for most of his life, and Gosha learned from him. While many factory-made miniatures are made of papier-mâché, Gosha's mentor taught him to make them using a wood turning lathe. It is a much higher quality, he says. Gosha and Sveta both learned the painting techniques in the Kyiv style. Miniatures are a common Ukrainian as well as Russian folk art. The methods for making miniatures are the same in both cultures, but paint designs are different. Russian miniatures are often larger and painted with scenes of Russian folktales, whereas in the Kyiv style, miniatures are small, detailed, and colorful flowers

¹³ For anonymity he will be called Gosha, and his wife will be called Sveta.

¹⁴ This is the term he uses, but his pieces can also be categorized as lacquer boxes or painted eggs (pysanky). I will call them by his term.

are the main design. Sveta is particularly skilled at painting many different types of flowers. She uses at least 30 colors of paint, and some of the paintbrushes she uses have only three hairs. In their business, she is mostly in charge of painting, while Gosha carves. Gosha also paints, but he prefers to paint forest scenes and traditional huts rather than flowers. His paint designs are not considered traditional Kyiv style, because miniatures in the Kyiv style are painted exclusively with floral designs. However, Gosha says he does not paint flowers as well as Sveta and wants her work to be the main attraction. He says his forest and hut scenes are a bit more masculine and do not contain any “women’s colors” such as pink, appealing to male customers. He likes that he can offer his customers options, by selling Sveta’s more traditional flower designs and his more contemporary designs side by side.

Gosha’s miniatures are of much higher quality than factory produced miniatures, which is reflected in the intensive creation process. Gosha says it takes about three weeks from start to finish to produce one miniature. He and Sveta make them in batches, filling their workshop with tables of miniatures at various stages of production. First a miniature is carved from durable birch or linden tree wood that Gosha cuts from the forest. They must be perfectly shaped for the bottoms and lids to snugly fit together. If Gosha makes a mistake in the wood turning process, he begins again because painting in later stages will only magnify any imperfection in the shape. He also does not want to include any less-than-perfect pieces in his Uzviz display because it would reflect poorly on his work as an artist. Luckily, he does not make mistakes often, since he has been making miniatures for almost 25 years. In addition, sometimes if he begins with the intention of carving a larger miniature but makes a mistake with the lathe, the wood can still be made into a smaller

miniature, thus avoiding wasting wood. After carving, the miniature must sit in a warm dry place for several days to dry out. Paint does not adhere to wet wood very well, even the high quality paint that Gosha and Sveta use. After drying out, the miniature is painted entirely with a thick coat of black paint three times and allowed to dry in between. Then the inside is painted red, usually two coats. The red distinguishes their miniatures from other Kyiv miniatures, the insides of which are usually black. Then the designs are painted, also in stages. In a floral design, for example, larger leaves and petals are painted first and allowed to dry. Then smaller petals and other details are painted in stages. It may take up to three or four hours to paint a single miniature that is no larger than a kiwi fruit. After the floral design is finished, the whole miniature must dry for a day. Then Gosha applies lacquer because he likes the shined and polished look it produces. He dips the miniature into a large container of the lacquer three times and allows it to dry between dippings. Then it must dry for at least a day until it is ready to be sold. Figure 15 shows one of Gosha's pieces. On more cheaply made miniatures there are visible inconsistencies in the thickness of the lacquer on different parts. This occurs when the



artist allows lacquer to pool inside or drip from an edge, usually a result of working quickly. Gosha and Sveta's miniatures show no such inconsistencies – a mark of quality production.

Figure 15. One of Gosha's miniatures

When each miniature is completely dry Gosha and Sveta do several things to mark them as artists. They put a small sticker on the bottoms of their pieces that says in English “Wood 100%”, declaring the rare quality of their miniatures. On the underside of a miniature lid, they write in gold paint in Ukrainian “Kyiv ...”, with the year it was made, and put a small sticker that says in English “Ukraine”. They do not sign their names to the pieces, which is a bit unusual for folk artists in the Uzviz. Gosha says he prefers to let the pieces stand alone, without attaching his name to them because they are Ukrainian works of art. Without Ukraine, he says, he could not have produced these miniatures and so he is giving credit to his homeland and culture instead of himself. He also views the art of miniature making as a shared art; it is not his, but all Ukrainians’. For customers who are curious about him as an artist, he keeps business cards at his stand at the Uzviz. When Gosha speaks about the process of making his miniatures, it is difficult to miss the note of pride in his voice. He is modest, but he takes great care in making his art and labeling it as Ukrainian folk art. He seems to see himself as a representative of Ukraine and Ukrainian culture in the market, almost as if it were his duty.

During the summer, Gosha sells his pieces every day except Sunday in Andriyivsky Uzviz. He owns a small apartment in Kyiv to live in during these times. The rest of the year he lives in a small village outside of Kyiv, where he maintains his workshop. He enjoys Kyiv in the summer, but the rest of the year he prefers to spend in the quieter, cleaner village. It is closer to nature, and to inspiration, he says. Gosha built a small wooden stand that he uses for display in the Uzviz. The shelves that sit on the back of the stand are a bit slanted from the weight of the miniatures, but it is a sturdy display.

He has a translucent tarp ready nearby in case of rain, but he does not need to use it much in the sunny Ukraine summer weather. Unlike most vendors in the Uzviz, he has personalized his stand. It represents a confluence of cultures, languages, and heritage. To show his Ukrainian pride he displays a small Ukrainian flag on one side of the stand. He keeps his handmade business cards (see Figure 16) in the center in a small zip top bag, which show his and Sveta's status as "Folk Masters of Ukraine. Artists of lacquered miniatures." This title is state-conferred, carried over from the Brezhnev era when folk artists could earn this title by entering judged exhibitions. (Hilton 1995, 281-282) This is how Gosha earned the title¹⁵. These cards are printed in Russian. He says Russian is the language of his professional and business life, similar to many Ukrainians, thus he uses Russian on the cards. He is happy to translate them for any tourists who are interested. He uses the words *narodnye мастера*, which mean folk masters. The root of *narodnye* is *narod*, which carries meanings of "people, folk, nation". It means much more than the




Figure 16. Gosha's business card. Identifying information has been blurred for anonymity

stereotypical notion of folk. A folk artist is one that represents his or her people and who is a bearer of culture, to use Barre Toelken's term. Gosha also uses the word *khudozhniki*, which means

artist or painter or craftsman, and has connotations of respect and high value. It indicates the quality of Gosha's work and how seriously he takes it.

¹⁵ Other artists in the Uzviz may also have this title, but those that I spoke with neither mentioned it nor had business cards like Gosha's that stated it.

On the top of the stand he displays a large sign, which reads in English, “Kiev Miniature Paintings. Wooden ware. I am an artist, and this is my work.” (See Figure 17) It is atypical of Uzviz vendors to visibly declare any individual identity in the Uzviz; Gosha uses the first person and directly identifies himself as an individual artist. In this he participates in the market current trend of artist made and sold items, which may add to the authenticity of his wares. He uses English on his sign because many tourists do not speak Russian or Ukrainian. He wants the sign to be very visible to anyone who walks by, to differentiate himself from other vendors. Indeed, this is effective; almost all passersby at least slow down when walking by his stand, and many stop to look. Gosha speaks a bit of English and when someone stops to look at his works he immediately begins talking about his pieces and his artistic process. He is quick to point out several things: the beautiful detail of his wife’s paint work, the high quality wood, and the fact that he is the artist. He knows that there are relatively few artists selling their own works in the Uzviz, so this can be a selling point for customers. He emphasizes the quality of the item and how much time goes into making it. He has to be quite proactive in selling because his prices are higher than other vendors who sell factory-made miniatures. In fact, Gosha’s miniatures cost at least twice as much as factory made ones. Many potential customers are put off by the prices, which is why he is so diligent about the way he promotes himself.



Figure 17. Gosha and his Uzviz stand

However, Gosha does make a living from his art. Different sizes and shapes of miniatures have different costs. For example, the smallest miniature, a round box with the circumference of a United States silver dollar, costs 150 Ukrainian hryvnia, which is about 19 USD. One of the largest miniatures, about the size of a softball, costs 450 hryvnia, which is about 55 USD. Gosha says he usually sells 10-15 miniatures a day, sometimes more. To give a low estimate, if he sold 10 of the smallest miniatures, he would make 1500 hryvnia (UAH), or about 184 USD per day. If he sells this amount for the four months of the tourist season (May – August), about 120 days, he would make 180,000 UAH, or 22,500 USD. He sells the smaller pieces more often, but he says there are many tourists who buy his larger ones, which adds to his daily profit. Gosha also earns income when he sells at festivals and exhibitions during the year. He usually

attends two exhibitions and three festivals each year. Each of these events is around three days, during which time Gosha could sell up to 45 miniatures, with a combined income for all events around 32,000 UAH, or 4,000 USD. With selling in the Uzviz and at yearly events, Gosha makes around 212,000 UAH, or 26,500 USD, per year.

According to Trading Economics' most recent statistics, the average monthly wage in Ukraine in 2012 was around 3,400 UAH. (Fedec et al. 2013) Extrapolating an average monthly wage based on Gosha's yearly earnings would be 17, 670 UAH, or 2,200 USD, per month. His living is well above the average Ukrainian. The cost of living in Ukraine is fairly low, especially in the villages, according to Gosha, so he makes enough for he and his wife to live from his art. His children are adults, so he no longer has them to support. Gosha is very modest; he says he is grateful that his art is good enough to sell and that he is able to make a living as an artist. He sells in the Uzviz to reach the largest group of people, to show them what true Ukrainian art is and to represent his heritage to international audiences.

Expressing Identity in the Uzviz

Polese and Pregarin note in their analysis of bazaars in Odessa, Ukraine, that markets not only serve economic purposes, but also provide opportunities for cultural socialization and continuity of traditions. The informal aspect of markets allows vendors to profit from sales, but also to engage in cultural traditions, such as foodways, and share them with market goers. (2013, 110-113) Customers consider bazaars in Odessa unique, high quality, and genuine, especially if a vendor has some connection to her/his cultural heritage. The authors show that bazaars have modernized in the post-Soviet era and this gives them a characteristic mix of tradition and modernity, which keeps customers

returning. (2013, 123-125) In the same way, Andriyivsky Uzviz is a modern market where vendors earn profit by producing and promoting Ukrainian culture in the form of souvenir folk arts. Although the Uzviz's customers are more likely to be tourists than the Ukrainian customers at Odessa's bazaars, they are similar in that both groups see a measure of authenticity in their respective markets, which promotes their success.

Graeme Evans describes how markets play a fundamental role in the relationship of souvenirs and tourism; markets may be the only contact tourists have with local culture, and thus the only places they buy souvenirs. This means that markets must be strategically located and presented authentically to attract the most tourists. Evans points to the commercialization and commodification of tourist art as a way that ethnic groups can promote their art and culture, but that this can lead to alterations of the art to match tourist preferences, which makes the art less valuable. (Evans 2000, 127-146) In Andriyivsky Uzviz, it is obvious that profit and tourist demands drive what vendors make and sell, but it would be remiss to discount the agency of vendors' ethnic and national identities in the making and selling of souvenir folk art. Through the performances and wares in Andriyivsky Uzviz visitors interact with Ukrainian culture.

Bennetta Jules-Rosette argues that souvenir art has artistic value, and that market interactions between vendors and tourists communicate symbolic meaning on multiple levels. Artists' identities in particular manifest in the art, and Jules-Rosette found in her fieldwork in Africa that many artists expressed in their paintings their ethnic and national identities, particularly those in countries with ongoing ethnic conflict. The paintings and their associated identities transmitted cultural information to tourists who purchased the paintings. (Jules-Rosette 1984, 15-29) In the Uzviz, vendors do the same. Although they

may not all be artists, their wares are symbols of ethnic and national identity, which is expressed through the vendors' choice of what to sell, how to dress, and what language to speak.

As I explain in Chapter III, folklore is often associated with nationalist thought, and using identity and history to distinguish Ukrainianness began in the 18th century, with nationalists such as Mykhailo Maksymovych who studied the folklore, language, and history of Ukraine in attempt to find its “national authenticity”. (Bilenky 2012, 270-279) Richard Dorson has written about examples around the world and points out that language and folklore often nurture nationalism. (1966, 277-298) This allows groups to intensify their identification from within, and to strengthen their differentiation from without. To use Benedict Anderson's term, Ukraine's “imagined community” employs nationalist ideals to further its cultural contestation with Russia, and this plays out in the Uzviz. Vendors engage in nationalistic behaviors in what they sell, and how they act, dress, and speak. They are aware of Ukraine's history with Russia, and they use this awareness as well as their own Ukrainian identities to challenge the dominant Russian culture. It would be difficult to say that any of the vendors are explicitly political; this is not their primary goal, nor is it the purpose of the market. However, their wares and their behaviors lend themselves to a larger nationalist movement in Ukraine: the effort to differentiate Ukraine as separate from Russia, culturally and linguistically as well as geographically.

In her study of the Ivan Kupalo crop ritual in rural post-Soviet Ukraine, Natalie Kononenko writes that reviving the ritual was a way for Ukrainians to affirm their Ukrainian identity through celebration, wearing national costume, traditional dancing,

and singing folksongs. Kononenko points out that nationalistic thought is not so common in rural areas of Ukraine, and so engaging in the ritual might be a way for people to connect with their pre-Soviet past, a time when their traditions were not tightly controlled by the Soviet regime. Ivan Kupalo has become a way for Ukrainians to reacquaint themselves with their traditional agrarian culture, and thus with their Ukrainianness. (Kononenko 2004, 196-197) Likewise, in Andriyivsky Uzviz, making and selling Ukrainian folk arts are ways that vendors can relate to and proclaim their Ukrainianness. The idea of connecting to a pre-Soviet time when Ukrainians could practice their cultural traditions without Russian influence, is part of why nationalism is so appealing. Folklore, tradition, and notions of individual “authentic” culture are all associated with national ideologies, and are primary reasons why they are relevant in Ukraine today.

In his study of Hmong immigrant women in the United States making story cloths Dwight Conquergood illustrates that the performance of identity occurs most urgently in situations of erasure. When a group or culture becomes threatened in some way – politically, physically, or otherwise – it tries to find ways to assert and strengthen itself, to avoid elimination (1992, 242). While it would be an exaggeration to say that Ukrainian culture is on the verge of disappearing today, in recent history such a statement would not be so hyperbolic. Russian powers, whether in imperial Russia or the Soviet era, many times attempted to suppress and minimize Ukrainians and their language and culture, alternating with periods of allowed Ukrainization (Subtelny 2000, 210, 274, 408, 421-4, 492, 500, 516-7, 521-4). These periods created cycles of uncertainty for Ukrainians, who could never be sure if they would be permitted to maintain their language and cultural traditions or if they would be punished. Gosha expressed that he felt sad for his people,

Ukrainians, who have had to work hard over hundreds of years to maintain the viability of their traditions. He feels solidarity with Ukrainians of the past and unity with those in the present. In fact, he is no stranger to Ukrainian cultural suppression, as he has lived through later Soviet periods of Russification, and observed their effects. Russification may not be occurring in Ukraine today, but it is clear from the protest against the 2012 language bill that many Ukrainians are wary of it (see Chapter III). Giving official status to the Russian language in Ukraine is a reminder of the past. The vendors of Andriyivsky Uzviz are indirectly participating in the effort against Russification by selling wares associated with Ukrainian cultural nationalism.

Conquergood points out that marginalized people often use cultural performance to recollect and reassert their identities (1992, 243). Through cultural performances they can construct their public lives, which act as an arena in which identity is delineated, discussed, and showcased. (2006, 360) Public life for a vendor in the Uzviz involves the promotion of Ukrainian cultural identity. Artists and vendors can use a non-political space to make a political statement, through the clothes they wear, the items they sell, and the language they speak. Some such as Gosha, are very aware of what they are doing – they script their own performance, so to speak. They know how they want to represent themselves and Ukrainian culture, both for economic and cultural reasons.

Deborah Kapchan has observed that markets are places where social performances and ethnic identity are defined within sociopolitical frameworks. In *Gender on the Market* (1996), she shows how women challenge traditional male power and influence in Moroccan society through their performances in the marketplace. Broadening this argument, we can say that one group challenges another more

historically powerful group through cultural performance in a market. In Andriyivsky Uzviz, Ukrainians challenge the dominant Russian culture. Vendors may not perform like Moroccan women, but they performatively promote Ukrainian culture in a way that supports the larger cultural nationalistic movement; they purposefully speak Ukrainian, sell folk arts, and wear folk costumes.

Approaching identity in Andriyivsky Uzviz from another perspective, I also argue that although the market expresses Ukrainian identity, that identity contains within it compromises and contradictions. Consider the example of Gosha. He identifies strongly as Ukrainian, and symbolizes this in his art. However, his business card is printed in Russian because it is the language of his business life, as it is for many Ukrainians. His lacquer box miniatures are based on a Russian folk art tradition that he has brought into the Ukrainian space by painting in the Kyiv style. Gosha makes compromises in his Ukrainianness so that he can run a successful business. However, this also shows that Ukrainianness is not always dependent on language, at least for Gosha.

The overlap of Russianness and Ukrainianness appears in the market's wares and vendors. Both Ukrainian and Russian souvenirs are sold. As I explain in Chapter III, approximately 17% of Ukrainian citizens are ethnic Russians, so it is likely that some vendors are Russian. Vendors have to make compromises in selling to tourists. Many tourists take scheduled, guided trips to Kyiv, and may not know anything of its unique history or culture. Some may expect to see Russian souvenirs, and some may only be looking for something "authentic". To make a sale, some vendors allow tourists to think that they have bought something authentically Russian, or authentically Ukrainian, even if the item is not. Rather than explaining to tourists what it means to be Ukrainian,

vendors may simply smile agreeably, and use the opportunity to make a profit. Thus, promotion of Ukrainianness does not always singularly drive market activities. This shows that the binary of Russian and Ukrainian is in some ways artificial.

Vendors emphasize Ukrainian culture while at the same time Russia stands as the unstated “other”. Ukrainianness seems always placed in opposition to Russianness. The imperial context I discuss in Chapter II is therefore still in play in the market, and in Ukrainian nationalism as a whole. Ukrainians in the market resist the dominant Russian culture, and in doing so, acknowledge its existence. Sherry Ortner remarks that the binary of resistance and domination highlights the play of power between two groups; one cannot exist without the other. Resistance relations among groups and enforces their respective identities. (Ortner 1995, 175) Without the Russian foil, Ukrainian nationalism (in the Uzviz, Ukrainian political life, or elsewhere) would not be as potent.

Considering the history of Ukraine’s relationship with Russia we can see that Andriyivsky Uzviz is a place of political performance. The lack of explicit political statements is indicative of the acceptable parameters for behavior at the market; the market space is more like a festival than a political stage, although politics do manifest there. A festival is multigeneric, spatially bound, and defined by the presence of a large group of people, with food, drink, and celebration. Symbols, rather than words, communicate messages and values. It is a safe place where people can express their identities and question others’. (Schechner 1993, 46) The importance that some Uzviz vendors and artists place on making and selling only authentic Ukrainian souvenirs and self-identifying as Ukrainian is the way they communicate their identities in the non-threatening market space. They are part of the larger nationalistic sentiment. In my

concluding remarks I will explore what this might mean for people in the Uzviz, Kyiv, and even Ukraine as a whole. Richard Schechner even points out that festivals can result in great political change. (1993, 47) The goal is not necessarily complete independence from Russia, because, indeed, Ukraine economically relies on Russia for many things, such as gas. What is important is cultural independence; that is, that Ukrainian culture be recognized as independent from and on equal footing with Russian culture.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

In the last three chapters I have explored and analyzed the history of folk arts in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations and Ukrainian nationalist thought, and, to show how these histories have come together in present day Ukraine, profiled Andriivsky Uzviz souvenir market in Kyiv. In the market we can see the legacy of Ukrainian folk arts in the contents of vendors' stalls. A state government body no longer controls the market, and vendors have more autonomy in choosing what they sell compared to the way folk arts were regulated by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Many vendors sell contemporary souvenirs such as t-shirts and coffee mugs, some sell Soviet memorabilia items, and others sell only Ukrainian folk art wares. Some of these include pysanky, embroidered folk costume, and wood carved bowls and spoons. I focus on these folk art items to show the aspects of continuity and dynamism in folk art production in Ukraine. Vendors successfully entered the tourist market, and in Andriivsky Uzviz, they have tailored their business to cater to tourist demand and preferences. The continuing presence of folk art wares in the market (handmade, mass-produced, or imported) shows that they are still an important part of Kyivans' economic and cultural lives.

In Chapter III I complicated the topic of folk art in Ukraine by discussing the history of Ukraine's relations with Russia. The two countries share a long, intertwined history that makes today's Andriivsky Uzviz more than just a souvenir market. The rise of Ukrainian nationalism began in the 18th century; the ideology that sprang from Herder's romantic nationalism continues to manifest today. Ethnic Ukrainians and

Russians have many similarities: histories, languages, folklore, and cultures. They also rely on each other economically. Yet, many Ukrainians would like to see increased separation from Russia. Ukrainians have politically, socially, and linguistically challenged Russian hegemony in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Language in Ukraine is particularly sensitive, as the language of public life has been Russian for decades, but many Ukrainians would like to see more Ukrainian usage in public. The Orange Revolution of 2004 and the 2012 language bill protests showed the ability of thousands of Ukrainians to unite against what they considered to be overreaching of Russian influence. Such protests continue to bolster nationalist Ukrainians' determination to break away from Russian dominance. Most recently, in November 2013 Ukrainians protested in the streets against President Yanukovich's decision not to seek a bid for Ukraine's admission to the European Union. Many consider this move to have been in response to Russian threats to freeze gas trade with Ukraine if it tried to align more with the west.

The nationalism that permeates these political events also flows through the street of Andriyivsky Uzviz. Not all vendors are ethnic Ukrainians or sell Ukrainian folk arts, but those who do make a statement about Ukrainian identity and culture. They are not explicitly political, but they use the relative harmlessness of a souvenir market to express their Ukrainianness. Many wear traditional folk costume, speak Ukrainian rather than Russian, and sell Ukrainian folk art items like embroidery and pysanky. Artists such as Gosha assert their Ukrainianness, by mounting small flags or listing prices in Ukrainian. Gosha does not consider himself political, but he has strong opinions about his Ukrainianness, and he is open about declaring it. He feels a responsibility to make his art

so that visitors to Andriyivsky Uzviz see what Ukrainian folk art and culture is. His performance of identity is an important component of his market activities, and he also enjoys a well-made living from his art.

In order to reap the economic benefits of market activities, vendors must sometimes make compromises in their Ukrainianness. For example, Gosha often uses Russian and English while conducting business. He also has taken a Russian folk art form and made it Ukrainian by painting his miniatures in the Kyiv style. The binary of Ukrainian and Russian is, then, sometimes artificial. Yet, one contrasts with the other; the struggle of Ukrainian nationalism in the market depends on the existence of the Russian “other”.

My research in the Uzviz has omitted many other complexities of the market, which offer future opportunities for research. In this thesis I focus primarily on vendors and folk art souvenirs, but I do not analyze tourists and how they interact with vendors. In future research I would like to spend time at the market listening to conversations between vendors and customers to understand their motivations; I can imagine that they haggle prices, ask questions, or discuss the history of an item. This information would provide insight on how Uzviz customers choose items to buy, and how vendors verbally represent their wares. It might also indicate ethnic or national identities of tourists.

I have also omitted explorations of ethnic groups other than Russian and Ukrainian. As I briefly discuss in Chapter III, Ukraine contains many minority ethnic groups such as Belorussians, Romanians, Moldavians, Poles, Tatars, Jews, and Roma, among others. The national census in 2001 only reports those groups that make up at least 0.1% of the total population of Ukraine. Ethnic groups vary in different parts of Ukraine.

They are generally accepted into the larger population and, since the 2012 language bill, their languages are recognized in Ukraine as regional languages. I am interested in if and how any of these groups present in Andriyivsky Uzviz. Diversity may affect vendor relations in the market and would complicate my conclusions about its Ukrainianness. I have focused on Ukrainians' struggle against Russian culture, but minority ethnic groups may be engaged in similar struggles against the dominant Ukrainian culture and thus create many other binaries that I have not touched on. This would add a deeper dimension to my research and enrich my argument. Another topic I omit is music in the Uzviz. I observed many different types of musicians playing in the square and I believe future research would show a fair amount of ethnic diversity in performers. This would also allow me to analyze how the music may add to visitors' market experiences and may express divergent forms of Ukrainianness.

I have written about Ukrainian nationalism from the perspective of the Uzviz, and related it to the current political climate; however, future research might also point me to ways that nationalists outside of the Uzviz use Ukrainian folk art and folklore in general as part of their group identity and activities. I have noticed a few instances of this such as Kyivan protesters against the 2012 language bill dressed in traditional folk costume, and imprisoned politician Yulia Tymoshenko always wearing her hair in a traditional Ukrainian folk style, but I am sure there are more.

Ukraine offers a plentiful and multi-faceted set of research questions. I have discussed and analyzed only a small part of nationalism, identity, and Ukrainianness that is found in Andriyivsky Uzviz. Politics and economics in Ukraine have proven to be dynamic and unpredictable in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and recent

events indicate that this will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future.

Highlighting this changeability, the market exhibits both continuity and dynamism in folk art and artists. On the one hand, artists like Gosha reference the past and ensure the continuation of arts. On the other hand, I have illustrated the changes of folk art over the last 150 years, how the roles of artists and vendors have changed, and the recent physical renovations to the market space. Future research on the market's diversity will surely reveal even more processes of change.

APPENDIX

TYPES OF UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN FOLK ART IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

- Architecture – (Ukr. *arkhitektura*, Rus. *arkhitektura*) varied depending on region.
Examples:
khata – Ukrainian peasant dwelling
izba – Russian peasant dwelling
carved panels for display outside and inside of the building
- Clothing* – (Ukr. *odiyah*, Rus. *odezhda*) peasant shirts, skirts, dresses, scarves, etc.
- Embroidery* – (Ukr. *vyshyvka*, Rus. *vyshivka*) more common in Ukraine, usually clothing such as shirts, skirts, hats; or household items such as tablecloths, napkins.
Common Ukrainian examples:
rushnyk – embroidered towel
vyshyvanka – embroidered shirt
- Furniture – (Ukr. *mebli*, Rus. *mebel'*) chairs, tables, etc. usually made of birch wood.
- Icons – (Ukr. *ikona*, Rus. *ikona*) religious paintings on wood, usually with gold accents.
- Lace-making – (Ukr. *kruzhevopletenye*, Rus. *kruzhevopleteniye*)
- *Lubok* – Russian (Ukr. *lubok*) a popular print depicting images from literature, folktales, or religious stories, pl. Ukr. and Rus. *lubki*
- Painting* – on canvas, on *lubki*, and on wood carved items
- Pottery* – (Ukr. *keramika*, Rus. *keramika*)
- *Pysanka** – Ukrainian (pl. *pysanky*), (Rus. *pisanka*, pl. *pysanki*) painted egg, historically made of real egg shell, now carved from wood
- Wood carved items* – Russian and Ukrainian, usually birch or linden wood
Examples:
matryoshka – Russian nesting doll, pl. *matryoshki* (Ukr. *matr'oshka*, pl. *matr'oshky*)
bowl – (Ukr. *chashy*, Rus. *chashi*)
spoon – (Ukr. *lozhky*, Rus. *lozhki*)
lacquer box – (Ukr. *shkatulka*, Rus. *shkatulka*) small wood boxes of various shapes, painted with fairy tale scenes (Rus.) or floral patterns (Kyiv style), usually on a

black paint base, then covered with transparent lacquer; also can be made of papier mache

toys – (Ukr. *ihrashky*, Rus. *igrushki*), small figurines of human or animal shapes, some have mechanisms that allow movement

Author's Note

This list represents some of the most common folk art types in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. They are first listed in English, with Ukrainian and Russian translations/transliterations. Items marked with * indicate those that were found in Andriyivsky Uzviz souvenir market in Kyiv at the time of my research.

REFERENCES CITED

- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- "Artists Face Eviction from Andriyivsky Uzviz." *Kyiv Post*, October 19, 2000.
<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/artists-face-eviction-from-andriyivsky-uzviz-3-5355.html> (accessed November 18, 2013).
- Bauman, Richard, ed. 1992. *Folklore, Cultural Performances, and Popular Entertainments*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Balmforth, Richard. "Ukraine Leader Signs Contentious Russian Language Bill into Law." *Reuters*, January 06, 2012. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/08/08/uk-ukraine-language-idUKBRE8770X920120808> (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Bendix, Regina. 1997. *In Search of Authenticity*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Berger, Harris M., and Giovanna P. Del Negro, eds. 2004. *Identity and Everyday Life: Essays in the Study of Folklore, Music, and Popular Culture*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
- Bilaniuk, Laada. 2005. *Contested Tongues: Language Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Bilenky, Serhiy. 2012. *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian Political Imaginations*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Brandenberger, David. 2002. *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian Identity, 1931-1956*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Brintlinger, Angela. 2000. *Writing a Usable Past: Russian Literary Culture, 1917-1937*. Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press.
- Bowl, John E. 1976. *Russian Art of the Avant-garde: Theory and Criticism, 1902-1934*. New York: Viking Press.
- Budko, Yevhen. "An Old Man Who Collects Old Postcards — Both He and His Collection Have Interesting Stories to Tell." *Ukraine Magazine*.
<http://www.wumag.kiev.ua/index2.php?param=pgs20051/94> (accessed November 19, 2013).

- Cash, Jennifer R. 2007. "The Social Role of Artists in Post-Soviet Moldova: Cultural Policy, Europeanization, and the State." *Europe-Asia Studies* 59, no. 8: 1405-1427.
- "Craftsmen Can Now Call Andriyivsky Uzviz Home." *Kyiv Post*, November 30, 2000. <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/craftsmen-can-now-call-andriyivsky-uzviz-home-6331.html?flavour=mobile> (accessed July 4, 2013).
- Clark, Toby. 1997. *Art and Propaganda in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harry N. Abrams.
- Conquergood, Dwight. 1992. Fabricating Culture: The Textile Art of Hmong Refugee Women. In *Performance, Culture, and Identity*, eds. Elizabeth C. Fine and Jean Haskell Speer, 207-248. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Conquergood, Dwight. 2002. "Performance Studies: Interventions and Radical Research." *The Drama Review* 46, no. 2: 145-156.
- Conquergood, Dwight. 2006. Rethinking Ethnography: Towards a Critical Cultural Politics. In *The Sage Handbook of Performance Studies*. Eds. D. Soyini Madison and Judith Hamera, 351-365. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Denby, David. 2005. "Herder: Culture, Anthropology and the Enlightenment". *History of the Human Sciences* 18 no. 1: 55-76.
- Dorson, Richard M. 1966. "The Question of Folklore in a New Nation." *Journal of the Folklore Institute* 3, no. 3: 277-298.
- Ertl, Rett, and Rick Hibberd. 2003. *The Art of the Russian Matryoshka*. Boulder, Colorado: Vernissage Press.
- Evans, Graeme. 2000. Contemporary Crafts as Souvenirs, Artefacts and Functional Goods and their Role in Local Economic Diversification and Cultural Development. In *Souvenirs: The Material Culture of Tourism*, ed. Michael Hitchcock and Ken Teague, 127-146. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
- Fedec, Anna, and Antonio Sousa. Trading Economics, "Ukraine Average Monthly Wages." Last modified 2013. Accessed November 20, 2013. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/wages>.
- Gibson, James L. 1995. The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies. In *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu, 53-111. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

- Graburn, Nelson H. 2000. Foreword. In *Souvenirs: The Material Culture of Tourism*, eds. Michael Hitchcock and Ken Teague. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
- Graves, James Bau. 2005. *Cultural Democracy: The Arts, Community, and the Public Purpose*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Groys, Boris. 1994. The Struggle against the Museum; or, The Display of Art in Totalitarian Space. In *Museum Culture*, ed. Daniel J. Sherman, and Irit Rogoff, 144-162.
- Gusev, V.Y. 1961. "Folklore Research in the USSR." *Russian Social Science Review* 2, no. 1: 51-58.
- Guss, David M. 2000. *The Festive State: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism as Cultural Performance*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hamm, Michael F. *Kiev: A Portrait, 1800-1917*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Handler, Richard. 1993. Fieldwork in Quebec: Scholarly Reviews and Anthropological Dialogues. In *When They Read What We Write: The Politics of Ethnography*, ed. Caroline Brettell, 67-64. Bergin and Garvey.
- Harkness, Kristen. *THE PHANTOM OF INSPIRATION: ELENA POLENOVA, MARIIA IAKUNCHIKOVA AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN ART IN RUSSIA*. PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2009. <http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/7438/1/HarknessETD2009.pdf>.
- Helbig, Adriana. 2012. Ukraine. In *The International Recording Industries*, ed. Lee Marshall. Abington: Routledge.
- Helbig, Adriana, Oksana Buranbaeva, and Vanja Mladineo. 2009. *Culture and Customs of Ukraine*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Herszenhorn, David M. "Ukraine's Ultrationalists Show Surprising Strength at Polls." *The New York Times*, November 08, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/europe/ukraines-ultranationalists-do-well-in-elections.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (accessed July 5, 2013).
- Herszenhorn, David M. (2) "Facing Russian Threat, Ukraine Halts Plans for Deals with E.U.." *New York Times*, November 21, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/world/europe/ukraine-refuses-to-free-ex-leader-raising-concerns-over-eu-talks.html> (accessed November 23, 2013).

- Herszenhorn, David M. (3) "Russia Putting a Strong Arm on Neighbors." *New York Times*, October 22, 2013.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/23/world/europe/russia-putting-a-strong-arm-on-neighbors.html> (accessed November 23, 2013).
- Hilton, Alison. 2002. "Humanizing Utopia: Paradoxes of Soviet Folk Art." *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 3, no. 3 (summer), 459-471.
- Hilton, Alison. 1994. Remaking Folk Art: from Russian Revival to Proletcult. In *New Perspectives on Russian and Soviet Artistic Culture*, ed. John O. Norman, 80-94. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.
- Hilton, Alison. 1995. *Russian Folk Art*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hitchcock, Michael. 2000. Introduction. In *Souvenirs: The Material Culture of Tourism*, eds. Michael Hitchcock and Ken Teague. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
- Hobsbawm, E. J., and T. O. Ranger. 1983. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press.
- Howell, Dana Prescott. 1992. *The Development of Soviet Folkloristics*. New York: Garland.
- Hrytsak, Yaroslav. 2000. National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk. In *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, and Roman Solchanyk, 263-282. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Iancu, Bodgan, and Catalina Tesar. 2008. "The Historical Role of Politics in the Constitution of the Present Romanian Market of Peasant Artefacts." *Martor XIII*-2008: 47-66.
- Janmaat, Jan Germen. 2005. "Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of the Nation in Ukraine's History Textbooks." *European Education* 37, no. 3: 20-37.
- Jules-Rosette, Bennetta. 1984. Image Creators and Image Consumers. In *The Messages of Tourist Art*, 15-29. New York: Plenum Press.
- Kachur, Kateryna, and Bogdan Hdal. "Rukotvory." Last modified 2013. Accessed July 8, 2013. <http://rukotvory.com.ua/>.
- Kalenska, Anna. "Kitch vs. Authenticity." *The Ukrainian Week*, May 23, 2012.
<http://ukrainianweek.com/Society/50916> (accessed July 4, 2013).
- Kapchan, Deborah A. 1996. *Gender on the Market: Moroccan Women and the Revoicing of Tradition*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

- Kappeler, Andreas. 2001. *The Russian Empire*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
- Karatnycky, Adrian. "Ukraine's Orange Revolution." *The New York Times*, sec. Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005.
http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/20050301faessay_v84n2_karatnycky.html?pagewanted=print&position=&_r=0 (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Kenney, Padraic. 2000. The Habsburg Empire (Re)Disintegrates: The Roots of Opposition in Lviv and Ljubljana, 1988. In *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, and Roman Solchanyk, 329-341. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara. 1998. *Destination Culture: Tourism, Museums, and Heritage*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Kivelson, Valerie A., and Joan Neuberger, eds. 2008. *Picturing Russia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Klymasz, Robert B. 1978. Folklore Politics in the Soviet Ukraine: Perspectives on Some Recent Trends and Developments. In *Folklore, Nationalism, and Politics*, ed. Felix J. Oinas, 97-108. Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, Inc.
- Kononenko, Natalie. 2004. "Karaoke Ivan Kupalo: Ritual in Post-Soviet Ukraine". *The Slavic and East European Journal*. 48 (2): 177-202.
- Kulyk, Volodymyr. 2006. "Constructing Common Sense: Language and Ethnicity in Ukrainian Public Discourse." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29 no. 2: 281-314.
- Lefkovitz, Michele Lyons. 1989. *A Collector's Guide to Nesting Dolls: Histories, Identification, Values*. Florence, Alabama: Books Americana Inc.
- Levy, Clifford. "2 Parties in Tight Race in Ukraine." *The New York Times*, September 30, 2007. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/world/europe/01iht-01ukraine.7693058.html> (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Levy, Clifford (2). "Obama Congratulates Ukraine's Election Winner." *The New York Times*, February 11, 2010.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/world/europe/12ukraine.html> (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Levy, Clifford (3). "For Kremlin, Ukraine Election Cuts Two Ways." *The New York Times*, February 08, 2010.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/world/europe/09ukraine.html> (accessed July 3, 2013).

- Levy, Clifford. (4) "In a Political Twist, a Hairdo as Manifesto." *The New York Times*, October 07, 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/fashion/07braid.html?_r=0 (accessed July 4, 2013).
- Longenecker, Martha, ed. 1989. *Folk Art of the Soviet Union*. San Diego: Mingei International Museum.
- "Lviv Regional Council Declares Language Law Invalid on Region's Territory." *Kyiv Post*, October 10, 2012. <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/lviv-regional-council-declares-language-law-invalid-on-regions-territory-314198.html> (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Magocsi, Paul R. 1996. *History of Ukraine*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Maksymenko, Olena, and Nastia Melnychenko. "Will Andriyivsky Uzviz Disappear?" *The Ukrainian Week*, April 18, 2012.
<http://ukrainianweek.com/Investigation/47391> (accessed July 4, 2013).
- Mihailescu, Vintila. 2008. "Foreword: The Cultural Market of Traditions." *Martor* XIII-2008: 11-14.
- Miller, Frank J. 1990. *Folklore for Stalin: Russian Folklore and Pseudofolklore of the Stalin Era*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, "Tourism Trends in Ukraine 2007." Last modified 2007. Accessed December 5, 2013.
<http://www.ukrexport.gov.ua/eng/economy/brief/tourism/ukr/204.html>.
- Myers, Steven Lee, and Seth Mydans. "Fired Ukraine Premier Sees End of 'Orange Revolution' Unity." *The New York Times*, September 10, 2005.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/10/international/europe/10ukraine.html?_r=0 (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Nahaylo, Bohdan. 1999. *The Ukrainian Resurgence*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Norman, John O. 1994. *New Perspectives on Russian and Soviet Artistic Culture*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Noy, Chaim. 2004. "Performing Identity: Touristic Narratives of Self-Change." *Text and Performance Quarterly* 24, no.2: 115-138.
- Oinas, Felix J. 1978. The Political Uses and Themes of Folklore in the Soviet Union. In *Folklore, Nationalism, and Politics*, ed. Felix J. Oinas, 77-95. Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, Inc.

- Olson, Laura J. 2004. *Performing Russia: Folk Revival and Russian Identity*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Ortner, Sherry B. 1995. "Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 37 (1): 173-193.
- Pancake, John. "In Ukraine, Debate Over History." *Washington Post*, sec. Europe, January 06, 2012. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-01-06/world/36923230_1_ukrainian-insurgent-army-underground-president-viktor-yushchenko (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Pastukhov, Vladimir. 2011. "The Ukrainian Revolution and the Russian Counterrevolution." *Russian Politics and Law* 49, no.5: 68-80.
- Pavlenko, Aneta. 2010. Linguistic Landscape of Kyiv, Ukraine: A Diachronic Study. In *Linguistic Landscape in the City*, eds. Elana Shohamy, Eliezer Ben-Rafael, and Monica Barni, 133-150. Bristol: Multilingual Matters.
- Peach, Andrea. 2007. "Craft, Souvenirs, and the Commodification of National Identity in 1970s' Scotland." *Journal of Design History* 20, no. 3: 243-257.
- Pechurina, Anna. 2011. "Russian Dolls, Icons, and Pushkin: Practicing Cultural Identity through Material Possessions in Immigration." *Laboratorium* 3, no. 3: 97-117.
- Perrie, Maureen. 1989. "Folklore as Evidence of Peasant Mentalité: Social Attitudes and Values in Russian Popular Culture." *Russian Review* 48, no. 2: 119-143.
- Phillips, Ruth B., and Christopher B. Steiner, eds. 1999. *Unpacking Culture: Art and Commodity in Colonial and Postcolonial Worlds*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pietikainen, S., and H. Kelly-Holmes. 2011. "The Local Political Economy of Languages in a Sami Tourism Destination: Authenticity and Mobility in the Labelling of Souvenirs." *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 15, no. 3: 323-346.
- Polese, Abel, and Aleksandr Prigarin. 2013. "On the persistence of bazaars in the newly capitalist world: reflections from Odessa." *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 31 (1): 110-136.
- Pratkanis, Anthony R., and Elliot Aronson. 1992. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. New York: W.H Freeman and Company.
- "Profile: Yulia Tymoshenko." *BBC News*, sec. Europe, April 30, 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15249184> (accessed July 3, 2013).

- Ra'anan, Uri, ed. 1990. *The Soviet Empire: The Challenge of National and Democratic Movements*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Reuters. "Yanukovych Signs Contentious Russian Language Law into Force." *Kyiv Post*, August 08, 2012. <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-leader-signs-contentious-russian-language-law-into-force-311237.html> (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Rossoshyns'ka, N.L. 1983. *Derzhavnyi muzei ukrains'koho narodnoho dekoratyvnoho mystetstva URSS: al'bom*. Kyiv: Mystetstvo.
- "Russian Language Status May Be Put to Referendum, Rada Should Have Final Say." *Kyiv Post*, January 03, 2013. <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/russian-language-status-may-be-put-to-referendum-rada-should-have-final-say-318403.html> (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Salmond, Wendy R. 1996. *Arts and Crafts in Late Imperial Russia: Reviving the Kustar Art Industries, 1870-1917*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Salmond, Wendy. 1997. "A Matter of Give and Take: Peasant Crafts and Their Revival in Late Imperial Russia." *Design Issues* 13, no. 1: 5-14.
- Salmond, Wendy. 1987. "The Solomenko Embroidery Workshops". *The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts*. 5: 126-143.
- Schechner, Richard. 2006. *Performance Studies: An Introduction*. New York: Routledge.
- Schechner, Richard. 1993. *The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance*. London: Routledge.
- Schwartz, Michael. "Tymoshenko Coalition Collapses in Ukraine." *The New York Times*, March 02, 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/03/world/europe/03ukraine.html> (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Service, Robert. 1998. *A History of Twentieth Century Russia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Shevchenko, Daryna. "The Fight for Ukrainian Language." *Kyiv Post*, November 14, 2012. <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/the-fight-for-ukrainian-language-316111.html> (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Shevchenko, Daryna. (2) "Residents Say Reconstruction of Andriivsky Uzviz Shoddy, Costly." *Kyiv Post*, April 05, 2012. <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/residents-say-reconstruction-of-andriivsky-uzviz--125571.html> (accessed July 4, 2013)

- Shevchenko, Daryna. (3) "Vox Populi with Daryna Shevchenko: What Do You Think of Andriyivsky Uzviz Reconstruction?." *Kyiv Post*, January 19, 2012.
<http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/vox-populi/vox-populi-with-daryna-shevchenko-what-do-you-thin-1-120843.html> (accessed November 18, 2013).
- Shevchenko, Daryna. (4) "Demolition on Andriyivsky Uzviz Brings Criticism, Rethink by Billionaire Akhmetov." *Kyiv Post*, April 12, 2012.
<http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/vox-populi/vox-populi-with-daryna-shevchenko-what-do-you-thin-1-120843.html> (accessed November 18, 2013).
- Sochor, Zenovia A. 1995. Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Elections in Ukraine 1994. In *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu, 206-226. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Solchanyk, Roman. 2000. Russians in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects. In *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, and Roman Solchanyk, 539-554. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, "All Ukrainian Population Census 2001." Last modified 2003-2004. Accessed July 3, 2013. <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/>.
- State Statistics Service of Ukraine, "Turistichni Potoky." Last modified May 2013. Accessed December 5, 2013. <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>.
- Stepanenko, Viktor. 2010. Kyiv: Reinventing the Agora? Public Space as Political Arena. In *Urban Diversity: Space, Culture, and Inclusive Pluralism in Cities Worldwide*. Eds. Caroline Wanjiku Kihato, Mejgan Massoumi, Blair A. Ruble, Pep Subiros, and Allison M. Garland. Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Stites, Richard. 2005. *Serfdom, Society, and the Arts in Imperial Russia: The Pleasure and the Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Subtelny, Orest. 1995. Russocentrism, Regionalism, and the Political Culture of Ukraine. In *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu, 189-207. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Subtelny, Orest. 2000. *Ukraine: A History*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Sysyn, Frank E. 2000. Grappling with the Hero: Hrushevs'kyi Confronts Khmel'nyts'kyi. In *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, and Roman Solchanyk, 589-610. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Tenisheva, Princess Maria. 2008. "My Life Impressions: Princess Maria Tenisheva (1867–1928)". *The Journal of Modern Craft*. 1 (3): 417-421.

- Toelken, Barre. 1996. *The Dynamics of Folklore*. Logan: Utah State University Press.
- "Ukrainian Opposition Protests Russian Language Bill." *RIA Novosti*, June 05, 2012.
<http://en.rian.ru/world/20120605/173867105.html> (accessed July 3, 2013).
- Wallis, Brian. 1994. Selling Nations: International Exhibitions and Cultural Diplomacy. In *Museum Culture*, ed. Daniel J. Sherman, and Irit Rogoff, 265-286. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Warren, Sarah. 2009. "Crafting Nation: The Challenge to Russian Folk Art in 1913." *Modernism/modernity* 16, no. 4 (Nov.): 743-765.
- Williams, Carol J. "Ukraine Bows to Russian Pressure, Suspends EU Entry Bid." *Los Angeles Times*, sec. World Now, November 21, 2013.
<http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-ukraine-russia-eu-20131121,0,6213359.story>
- Wilson, William A. 1989. Herder, Folklore, and Romantic Nationalism. In *Folk Groups and Folklore Genres*, ed. Elliot Oring, 21-37. Logan: Utah State University Press.
- Zimmerman, William. 2000. The Diminishing Burden of the Soviet Past: Russian Assessments of Russian-Ukrainian Linkages. In *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, and Roman Solchanyk, 633-646. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.