

CONTINUING TRADITIONS IN CHINESE STUDENT ACTIVISM: THE
RED GUARD MOVEMENT AND THE 1989 DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT.

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A THESIS

Presented to the Robert D. Clark Honors College
of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts, Honors College

Presented to History Department, University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for Departmental Honors

August 1991

Approved: 

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An Abstract of the Thesis of
Stephen Hays for the degree of Bachelor of Arts
in the Honors College and Departmental Honors in History
to be taken August 1991.

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Ever since the founding of the student-led Democracy Movement in April of 1989, supporters of the Democracy Movement have gone to great lengths to deny any link between the student-led Red Guard Movement and the Democracy Movement. However, the two movements can be seen as similar in that both student movements shared the same goal of reforming the party, both were led by students from China's most elite universities, and were both stricken with internal factionalism that negatively affected their progress towards achieving their goals.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Professor Richard Kraus

Professor Michael Fishlen

Professor John Nicols

Professor David Milton

Professor John B. Hays

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Perhaps
our youth will be flung onto
the gradually dimming embers of truth.
Perhaps
our raw throats will become hoarse
and for a time silent.
Perhaps our sincerity will be cut down by honest
misunderstanding
like a dead branch.
Perhaps
from the desert's vast stretches
the weary camels will never emerge.

But
please believe, Mama,
in history's deep, knowing valleys
will always be inscribed
my ringing echoes:
"Mama, we are not wrong."

Ye Fu, May 1, 1989
big-character poster

"Those who suppress student movements will come
to no good end"

Mao Zedong, September 1966

INTRODUCTION

To most readers with a passing knowledge of recent Chinese history, the two most recent Chinese student movements; the Red Guard movement during the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Student Democracy Movement seem to be opposite ends of the Chinese political spectrum. The Red Guards, in the eyes of both Westerners and Chinese were fanatical, brutal zealots who seemed to turn on the Communist Party and plunged China into years of terror and turmoil at the whim of a power-mad Mao Zedong, during the three years the movement lasted. On the other hand the students behind the Democracy Movement were generally seen as earnest reformers, who used non-violence and reason to try to bring about peaceful reform in the Communist Party, during the seven weeks the Democracy movement lasted.

The view of the Red Guard movement as a bringer of terror and anarchy has made it an anathema in China. Consequently the leaders of the Student Democracy Movement took great pains to declare the differences between their movement and the Red Guards. One political poster hung up during the Democracy Movement stated that the two movement had nothing in common, in that:

The ten years of turmoil [brought by the Red Guard Movement] brought great disasters to the nation, involving the persecution of intellectuals, damage to democracy and the legal system, taking the economy to the verge of collapse, and disrupting the educational system. The present Patriotic-Democratic Movement will eventually lead to the strengthening

of the democratic system and rule of law. The masses will have greater democracy and freedom. Government officials will be honest. The Chinese nation will prosper!¹

However, despite the belief of the students and prominent intellectuals, like Fang Lizhi, that the Red Guard movement and the Democracy Movement were not at all similar,² I believe that the two movements cannot be looked upon as entirely separate phenomena. Instead, the two movements, despite some major differences in substance, that is the movements' origins and tactics and the risks involved to the participants in either movement, in my opinion, had many common structural characteristics which make the two movements seem very analogous. The structural similarities in two movements, despite the major differences in their substance, reveal a major structural pattern for student movements in China.

The structural similarities between the two movements were, in my opinion: first, that both movements, despite their ideological differences, shared the same basic goal of reforming the Communist Party because it had strayed from its original ideals and goals; second, both movements were founded and dominated throughout their entire existence by students from China's most elite universities; last, both movements,

¹Large Character Poster, in Voices From Tiananmen Square, ed Mok Chiu Yu, (New York: Black Rose Books, 1990), p. 93.

²Fang Lizhi, Interview, *ibid*, p. 161.

despite efforts to unite them, were stricken from the beginning by internal strife and factionalism which negatively affected their outcome. These three common salient aspects of the Red Guard Movement and the Democracy movement, in my opinion show that the two had more in common than just the common inspiration of the May Fourth movement, the first great Chinese student movement.

I will present my argument in five stages. First I will give a background history of the two movements. The two histories will not only show the *raison d'être* for each movement, but will also show the dissimilarities in the substance, that is the origin, and tactics and risks involved in participating in either movements, of the two movements.

The second section will focus on the convergent goals of the two movements. I will show that although the Red Guards were pushing for more a traditional Marxist government and the students in the Democracy were pushing for more democracy and a crackdown on corruption, both movements shared a very similar goal: the participants in both movements originally believed that the Communist Party had strayed from its original ideals, and their movements were simply to rectify these mistakes and reform the Party.

The third section will explore how both movements had been spearheaded and led by students from the same

handful of elite universities. The Red Guard and the Democracy movements, had been founded by students from the same elite Beijing-area federally-run universities. Both movements were also carried on outside of Beijing by a combination of elite Beijing students and students from elite federally-run universities in the provinces.

The fourth section will show how both movements were stricken from the beginning by factionalism that shattered internal unity and cooperation. The Democracy movement and the Red Guards, almost from their inceptions, were split by internal arguments and divisions concerning tactics and goals, which eventually led to the development of internal factionalism that made united action by either movement almost impossible.

In conclusion I will show how the three salient similarities between the Red Guards and the Democratic Movement outweigh the differences in the two movements. I will show that the two movements did have major differences which distinguish the two movements, but in spite of these differences, the two movements could still could be both seen as similar and parallel. I will also explore the reason why the Chinese deny any similarity between the Red Guards and the Democracy Movement, despite the aforementioned similarities.

PART I: BACKGROUND

Throughout the history of post-imperial China students have played an active role in the realm of government and politics. Several times this has manifested itself in nationwide student movements which sought to reform the contemporary Chinese government. These student movements have generally tended to have a major impact of Chinese government and society.

For example, the first of the modern student movements, the May Fourth Movement, was a student-led protest against the corruption and weakness of the Chinese Government in 1919. It eventually became a nation-wide movement, and was considered by many historians to be the dividing point between modern and classical Chinese history.³ Parallel to this tradition were the next two most important large-scale Chinese student movements; the Red Guard Movement during the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Student-led Democracy Movement. Both of these movements claimed to be carrying on the work of the May Fourth.⁴

The Democracy and Red Guard movements, despite their mutual claim to be the successors of the May Fourth movement, had dissimilar origins. They also were

³Chesneaux, Jean, China from the 1911 Revolution to Liberation (New York: Pantheon Books, p 67.

⁴Wuer Kaixi, Speech: "The New May Fourth Manifesto, in Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p

differentiated by their radically different tactics. The Red Guards tactics in their anti-capitalist roader struggles were marked by brutality and lawlessness while the Democracy Movement's tactics were almost entirely legal and non-violent. In addition the two movements were also differentiated by the fact that the Red Guard Movement was sponsored by the most powerful leader in China, while the Democracy Movement had very little effective official support and in fact was opposed by almost all the highest leaders in the Communist Party. Thus the Red Guards operated in the knowledge that they were almost completely immune from retaliation from their targets, while the students involved in the Democracy movement

The Red Guards were started by China's paramount leader, Mao Zedong, while the Democracy Movement, although it was abetted in some ways by government officials, was started by students.

The Red Guards were founded as a result of Mao's calling for proletarian groups to attack his opponents in the Chinese Communist Party. The political history of the Communist Party in China had been marked, almost from the beginning of the People's Republic of China, by the struggle for dominance between two opposing lines of Marxism within the Party leadership. The left wing of the Communist Party were believers in Mao Zedong's leftist interpretation of Marxism. The "leftists" were opposed in

the Party leadership by the moderate revisionists, who were also known as the "pragmatists." The leftists were led by Mao Zedong. They believed that the socialist revolution was a continuous process and the process of creating a truly communist, proletariat state should not be delayed for any reason. They believed that industrialization was important, but they wanted industrialization in conjunction with progress towards the creation of a truly socialist state.⁵

The pragmatic "revisionists" led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping believed in the revisionist Marxist model first used by Nikita Krushchev. This model stressed that only through industrialization and technical development could true socialism eventually be attained. The revisionists felt that short-term socialist goals, such as empowering the masses could be temporarily sacrificed for this end.⁶

After the early 1960's the pragmatists had become the dominant force in the communists Party. Mao and the leftists had become discredited by the failures of their modernization plan, The Great Leap Forward. The Great Leap Forward attempted to create a modern industrial base through direct proletariat participation instead of government participation. For example, peasants were expected to form their own steel-producing cooperatives,

⁵Chesneaux, Jean, China: The People's Republic, 1949-1976 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), pp 114-16.

⁶ibid.

the famous "backyard steel mills." However, even sympathetic historians agree that the Great Leap Forward was a economic disaster.⁷ Consequently Mao and his allies, as the Great Leap's architects, were discredited. As of 1965 Mao Zedong and his allies were widely believed to have lost most of their political power.⁸

In contrast to Mao the fortunes of Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi had been on the rise. Deng's and Liu's pragmatic policies after 1962 were widely credited with rescuing China from the economic mess created by the Great Leap Forward. At the beginning of 1966 Deng and Liu controlled the highest positions in the Communist Party and were steering China towards a course of moderate revisionism⁹

However, by 1965 Mao had begun to believe that the revisionists, by stressing industrial development over progress towards socialism, had betrayed the socialist revolution, he had helped to create. Mao also believed the pragmatists had allowed the Communist Party cadres and functionaries to become overly bureaucratic and removed from the common people and their desires. Consequently, Mao felt that the cadres were usurping the proletariat as the rightful rulers in Socialist China. However, since Mao was in political decline, it was

⁷ibid, p 105.

⁸ibid, p 114.

⁹Chesneaux, Jean, China: The People's Republic, 1949-1976 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), pp 119-124.

believed he could do little to oppose the entrenched pragmatists. But the people who discounted Mao as a political force underestimated the tremendous popular support Mao wielded because of his leading role in the 1949 Communist takeover in China. Most Chinese from 1949 on had been taught the sayings and writings of Mao.¹⁰ Starting in the early 1960's they had also been indoctrinated with a cult of personality surrounding Mao.¹¹

Starting in 1965 Mao would begin a political comeback and initiate a campaign against the pragmatists. This campaign, which came to be known as the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, saw the reemergence of Mao as the dominant force in Chinese politics, the political downfall of Deng Xiaoping, and the downfall and death of Liu Shaoqi.

One tactic Mao used in his struggle against Deng and Liu was the creation of a power base separate from the existing revisionist-led Chinese Communist Party. Mao, as the acknowledged founder of Communist China, could not openly attack the Communist Party. Creating an independent power base allowed him to attack certain elements within the Party, without attacking it as a whole. One way Mao created his independent power base was

¹⁰Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), p 7.

¹¹Bennett, Gordon and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: the Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), p 96.

by appealing directly to the "proletarian" elements in Chinese society among whom he was so popular. These proletarian elements, according to Mao, consisted of the students, workers and peasants. Mao called upon these proletarian elements to resist the policies of the revisionists and to support him in his anti-revisionist struggle to return China to a Marxist system of government that was more leftist.¹²

One of the main proletarian groups that Mao used against the entrenched revisionists was the Red Guard: organized thousands of bands of Chinese junior high, high school and college students. As early as July of 1966, in a speech before thousands of Chinese students, Mao said, "youth is the great army of the Great Cultural Revolution! It must be mobilized to the full."¹³ Mao also spread his message through other speeches, massive rallies and newspaper editorials like "Sweep Away all Monsters" and "We are the Critics of the World." Mao called for the students to form committees to criticize, arrest and rehabilitate the revisionists and bureaucratic cadres in the Party. The Red Guard were fanatically loyal to Mao, and responded with zeal to his calls.

This zeal often manifested itself in overzealous and brutal tactics. They roamed all over China and verbally

¹²Chesneau, Jean, China: The People's Republic, 1949-1976 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), p 140.

¹³Mao Tse-tung, Chairman Mao Talks to the People (London: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 253.

and physically attacked and arrested thousands of Party cadres whom Mao accused of being "capitalist roaders," and "reactionary elements."¹⁴ These accused leaders were subjected to humiliating criticism sessions¹⁵ and were usually dismissed from office and imprisoned, and sometimes executed. Even many of China's highest leaders were exposed to type of attack. For example a small group of Red Guards were allowed to enter Deng Xiaoping's and Tao Zhu's houses and "struggle" against them. Part of one such struggle session went as such:

[to Deng Xiaoping]

Question: Are you not a real power faction which walks the capitalist road?

Teng: I am a real power faction, walking the capitalist road.

Question: Did you not oppose the Mao Tse-Tung thought?

Teng: The reform of my world view was not good, and I stood on a bourgeois reactionary position.

[to Tao Zhu]

Question: What kind of person is Liu Shao-ch'i?

T'ao: He is the biggest real power faction in the party, walking the road of capitalism.¹⁶

However, because Tao and Deng were very high officials, the Red Guards were not allowed to publicly struggle

¹⁴Chen Jo-hsi, "The Execution of Mayor Yin" in The Execution of Mayor Yin and other Stories of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1979), pp 13-14.

¹⁵Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (London: Grafton Books, 1986), p 280

¹⁶Hinton, Harold A. ed., The People's Republic of China 1949-1967: A Documentary Survey: Volume III: 1965-1967. The Cultural Revolution Part I (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980), p 1726.

against them or to sentence them to jail or other punishment.

However, other Chinese who were not high officials, were not so protected. The Red Guards had the power of life and death over them. Their struggle sessions against non-high-ranking officials and were public, and the Red Guards were allowed to punish them as they saw fit. For example, Nien Cheng, who was accused of being a Rightist during the Cultural Revolution, was present as a prisoner during a criticism session. At the end of the session the Red Guard leader:

called out one name after another of prisoners sentenced to death because they had not confessed to their crimes. He gave such particulars as their age, address, occupation, 'reactionary' family background and described the crimes they had committed, all of which came under the category of 'crimes against the proletarian class' ... many of these crimes consisted of statements of opposition to the Cultural Revolution or disparaging comments about Chiang Ch'ing, Lin Piao or Mao Tze-tung himself ... The list of names to be executed when on and on.

It was followed by a list of those sentenced to life imprisonment or terms of twenty five years or more in prison, all examples of 'severe punishment dealt out to those who had not confessed fully or whose confessions which were not considered sincere. Finally he read out a list of names of cases given 'lenient sentence' [three to five years], because these men and women had not only confessed but also rendered meritorious service by providing evidence to incriminate others.¹⁷

Nien Cheng's account showed that although Mao had admonished the Red Guards to "struggle with arguments,

¹⁷Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (London: Grafton Books, 1986), p 167.

not their fists,"¹⁸ in their zeal to carry out Mao's directives, many Red Guards actions were characterized by excessive brutality and force and persecution of innocent officials.

In addition, although the Red Guards were carrying on their campaign in an often brutal fashion, against thousands of targets, they were, for the most part aware that they were protected because their actions had been blessed by Mao himself. Although the Red Guards were attacking many powerful government figures, such as Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping, their actions were carried out with the knowledge that they were protected by Mao Zedong himself, and the Red Guards were therefore almost completely immune to retribution from their enemies during the early Cultural Revolution. At the Eleventh Party Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party, in August of 1966, Mao and his allies regained their dominant position in the Communist Party. Indicative of this victory was the issuing of the Sixteen Points declaration, which identified the targets and purposes of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. Part of this document stated:

The Party Central Committee requires Party committees at various levels to uphold correct leadership, be courageous, mobilize the masses with a free hand, change their state of weakness and

¹⁸Hinton, Harold A. ed., The People's Republic of China 1949-1967: A Documentary Survey: Volume III: 1965-1967, The Cultural Revolution Part I (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980), p 1567

impotency, encourage the comrades who have made mistakes but are willing to make amends to lay down their packs and join the battle, and dismiss the power holders who take the capitalist roads, so as to let the leadership return to the hands of the proletarian revolutionaries.¹⁹

This part of the directive essentially ordered all members of the Chinese government to comply with the actions of the proletarian groups taking part in the Cultural Revolution, including the Red Guards. Consequently, most officials did not oppose the Red Guards or retaliate against them during the Cultural Revolution. To do so would have been the same as directly defying Mao Zedong, the ultimate form of counterrevolutionary action. Most Red Guards knew that they were immune from revenge. One former Red Guard, Dai Xiaoi, recounted, "the moment we saw Chairman Mao wearing a Red Guard armband, we knew that he had given us his sanction, and that no one in the government or otherwise would dare oppose us."²⁰

Consequently, the students involved in the Red Guards were able to carry out their reforms almost completely insulated from opposition and retaliation from their targets by virtue of Mao's sponsorship of their movement. Although students did willingly lay down their lives for Chairman Mao's campaigns, their deaths were

¹⁹Hinton, Harold A.ed, The People's Republic of China 1949-1967: A Documentary Survey: Volume III: 1965-1967. The Cultural Revolution Part I (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980), p 1567.

²⁰Bennett, Gordon and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: the Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), p 79.

usually a result of factional infighting, not retaliation by their targets within the Party.

Thus it can be seen that the Red Guards were a student movement started by a figure outside of the student population. Mao Zedong not only encouraged the founding of the Red Guards, but he also placed them under his protection, insulating them from attack. It is also apparent that though their goal was not to replace the Communist Party, but to merely reform it, the Red Guard movement was marked throughout the entire campaign by violence, brutality and chaos.

The origins and tactics of the Democracy Movement were a direct contrast to origins and tactics of the Red Guards. The Democracy Movement was also different from the Red Guard Movement in that the Student Movement was from the beginning labeled by almost all the higher Chinese officials as a counterrevolutionary movement and was not protected by any powerful figure in the party, and was thus open to attack from its very beginning.

The Democracy Movement arose within the ranks of China's university students. During the years following the death of Mao and the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976 until the Democracy movement in 1989, there had been an upsurge of intellectual and student disillusionment with the rule of the Communist Party. The years of chaos and suffering that were the Cultural Revolution had shattered the image of infallibility that the Communist Party had

previously enjoyed. Deng Xiaoping and others had stated that the Cultural Revolution had been a tremendous mistake. As a consequence students and younger intellectuals grew cynical about communism and its promises of progress. They were tired of leftist slogans and campaigns and wanted real progress instead, for as Shen Tong, a later leader of the Democracy Movement stated, "we were brash and willful ... old slogans like 'Learn from Chairman Mao, build a New China' didn't work on us."²¹

At the same time of the growth of disillusionment with Communist rule, there had been growth in interest in Western culture, and especially in the Western concepts of freedom and democracy. Western books and ideas had poured into China because of the opening of China to trade with the West. Although the government tried to stamp such ideas out with its "anti-spiritual pollution campaign," it found that because of the Cultural Revolution, "the hard-liners found it was no longer possible to launch an ideological movement ... the people would no longer participate in a government propaganda effort."²²

At the same time as the growing desires of the students for more freedom, was a growing dissatisfaction with the rampant corruption within the Communist Party.

²¹Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 127,

²²ibid, p 115.

Officials and their children were believed to make money influence peddling, and by using their position to get foreign and other hard to get items at a cheap rate, and then selling them for high rates to other Chinese.²³ Officials were also accused of having special ration cards, which allowed them to buy luxury goods set aside for them and of engaging in bribery and nepotism. The anger over official corruption was exacerbated by the fact that there had been "reoccurring, government-sponsored campaigns against government-sponsored corruption."²⁴

The combination of these factors had led to wide-scale student resentment of the Communist Party. Students wanted an effective crackdown on corruption and wanted democracy, that is more say in governmental policies and freedom of speech and the press.²⁵ Student activism became common in the universities. At Qinghua and University of Beijing, students gathered in rooms, dubbed salons in honor of the French Revolution, and discussed democracy and reform.²⁶ The students resentment often broke forth into spontaneous demonstrations. For example in 1986, a famous dissident, Fang Lizhi, gave a pro-

²³Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) p 28.

²⁴Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 11.

²⁵ibid, p 23.

²⁶Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 151.

democracy speech in Anhui. His speech sparked pro-democracy demonstrations throughout the country.²⁷

On April 18th 1989, Hu Yaobang, the former Secretary-General of the Communist Party, died. Hu Yaobang had been popular among the students for his pro-reform and anti-corruption stances. However he had been ousted by Party hard-liners after the aforementioned 1986 student protests and made a scapegoat for the protests by Deng Xiaoping. However, his position as scapegoat for the 1986 protests served to make him even more of a hero to the students.²⁸ Within hours students began gather to mourn Hu Yaobang, and their mourning quickly turned into criticism of the Party and its policies.²⁹ The students quickly seized upon the death of Hu to as a means of expressing their political dissent, for as Shen Tong stated, "to honor Hu at the time of his death was a way to challenge the current party hierarchy ... Hu Yaobang's death [had] the potential to start a student movement."³⁰ That night, Beijing University students began a march to Tiananmen where they were joined by students from other universities. In the protests they demanded both a rehabilitation of Hu Yaobang, democracy and an end of

²⁷ibid, p 114.

²⁸ibid, p 166.

²⁹Liu Binyan, Tell The World, Trans. Henry L. Epstein, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p 9.

³⁰Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 167.

corruption.³¹ This protest marked the beginning of almost two full months of peaceful protests that was the Democracy movement.

Thus it can be seen that the Democracy Movement was generated within the student population, in contrast to the Red Guards. There were cases when government officials abetted the movement in its early stages, like when in Fujian, university officials provided busses to transport Fujian Teachers College students to a nearby pro-democracy demonstration.³² However, the bulk of the ranking Chinese officials came out against the Democracy Movement and did not abet it in any fashion. Thus it can be seen that the Democracy Movement's origins still lay almost entirely within the ranks of the university population.

The tactics of the Democracy Movement were polar to those of the Red Guards. The Democracy movement was almost completely non-violent. It was characterized by peaceful sit-in demonstrations, petitions and hunger strikes. These tactics did not change throughout the entire movement, for as Han Minzhu, a Chinese journalist stated:

In spite of the students refusal to bow to party authority and in spite of the blunt critiques of the Party and of socialism, the student movement was not a radical one. From the very first demonstrations to the last hours in Tiananmen, students insisted on

³¹Liu Binyan, Tell The World, Trans. Henry L. Epstein, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p 9.

³²Kraus, Richard, Personal Interview, 25 July 1991.

non-violent protest. At no time did the students (aside from a few extremists) consider storming government buildings, taking over the television or radio stations, or arming themselves.³³

The nonviolent nature of the Democracy Movement was in direct contrast to the many years of brutality and suffering which made the Cultural Revolution so notorious even today.

In addition to the differences in tactics and origins between the Red Guards and the Democracy Movement, the students involved in the Democracy Movement were distinguished from the Red Guards in that they lacked any protection from retribution from forces within the government. However, they still choose to join the Democracy Movement.

Early in the student movement, the *People's Daily*, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party, published an editorial called "Take a Clear-Cut Against Turmoil." In it, the Party leaders stated that:

in the wake of the mourning service [for Hu Yaobang] a number of people with ulterior motives have continued to use the grief of the students ... to hurl invective at and attack the Communist Party leadership and state leaders. They wantonly violated the country's constitution by advocating opposition to the Communist Party's leadership and the socialist system. ...The whole Party and the whole nation must clearly recognize that if the disturbances continue, the country will have no

³³Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Deomocracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 298.

peace.³⁴ This struggle concerns the future of the nation.

Through this editorial, the Government had effectively labeled the Democracy Movement as counterrevolutionary and treasonous. Consequently the students who took place in the Democracy Movement knew that they were involved in a movement that the government was hostile to, and that they were accepting tremendous risks by joining the movement.

However, despite the risks, the Chinese students joined the movement in huge numbers. Most of these students felt that, as a student involved in the Democracy Movement stated "under autocratic rule, China ha[d] no future."³⁵ Most of the students believed that the Chinese government had settled upon a course of totalitarianism and corruption which it would not correct on its own accord, and that it was up to the students to correct this problem. For example, one small-character poster [xiaozi] posted early in the Democracy Movement stated:

China's future rests on the shoulders of her one billion people. Only if we [the students] implement widespread democracy ... will China have a way out. Democracy will check the hereditary system that breeds corruption; freedom of speech and freedom of the press will provide effective supervision over the government; and equality will

³⁴"Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against Turmoil," in *The People's Daily, in Crisis at Tiananmen* (San Fransisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), pp 156-57.

³⁵Han Minzhu, *Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Deomocracy Movement* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 129.

unite the people into a greater force. But none of this will come to us: we must reach out and struggle for it.³⁶

The Chinese students, for the most part, believed that it was up to them to change the nature of the Communist Party and if they did nothing to change the system, no change would come to the Communist Party. Consequently, when the Democracy Movement started, many students joined the Democracy Movement and knowingly risked both their futures and their lives. As university students, the participants in the Democracy Movement, like almost all other University students, expected to take up jobs in the Chinese government,³⁷ and thus escape the drudgery of physical labor that was the lot of the majority of the Chinese population. Thus by joining a movement that had been declared counterrevolutionary by the government they risked not only arrest, but their entire future. However, as the aforementioned *xiaozibao* showed, students felt that they were the only ones who could change the nature of the government in China, and thus they chose to risk arrest and to risk losing the comfortable future a government job promised.

³⁶Small-Character Poster, in Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, *ibid.*

³⁷Kraus, Richard, Personal Interview, 25 July 1991, Eugene, Oregon.

PART II: REFORM AS A GOAL

Although the Red Guard Movement and the Democracy Movement had dissimilar origins, used radically different tactics in the pursuit of their goals, and had different positions vis-à-vis the governmental approval of their movements, the two movement had structural similarities. For example the goals of the two movements were relatively similar. The Red Guards and the students behind the Democracy Movement had parallel goals: both believed the Communist Party had strayed from the principles it had been founded with in 1949, and both originally wanted to reform the party, not overthrow it.

Although the Red Guards were later accused of almost destroying the Party, their actions had been motivated mainly by a belief in Mao's statements that the Party was full of capitalist roaders and counterrevolutionaries, and that the students, as a revolutionary vanguard, had to reform it. In mid-August of 1966, Mao and his allies issued a directive, called the Sixteen Points in which he outlined the guidelines for the Red Guards. In the document Mao stated that hidden within the Communist Party there were cadres and officials taking the "capitalist road."³⁸ He also stated that there "were certain academic and cultural authorities who continued

³⁸Gao Yuan, Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987), p 82

to propagate bourgeois ideology."³⁹ It also said that most of the cadres and academics were good, but that the students should take action against those who were "anti-party, anti-socialist rightists ... and that persons in charge should not take measures against students involved in the movement."⁴⁰ The 16-points also called for a campaign against the "Four Olds -- the old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes."⁴¹

Most students readily believed Mao's statements about the presences of counterrevolutionaries within the ranks of the Party and the academic authorities. They readily sprang up to "defend Mao's revolutionary line,"⁴² by taking action to reform those who they believed to have counterrevolutionary tendencies.

At both the university and high school levels students began to attack all the professors they believed to be harboring rightist tendencies. Although some students attacked their teachers and university officials because of personal vendettas,⁴³ most believed they were carrying out Mao's wishes. For example at Beijing University, students seized the professors who they felt were counterrevolutionary in their thinking, and forced

³⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ *ibid.*

⁴² *ibid.*, p 246.

⁴³ Gao Yuan, Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987), p 48.

them to write self-criticism and attend public self-criticism sessions in the hope that they would in this way see their mistakes and come over to the side of true Communism.⁴⁴ At Qinghua University, students accused their University president, Jiang Nanxiang, and other professors and administrators of being rightist elements and dragged them to mass meetings where they could be "repudiated" and then eventually be reformed.⁴⁵

The students also targeted government officials. They at first began to investigate and attack lower-level governmental officials. Most genuinely believed that by attacking government officials and cadres, they were carrying out Mao's instructions for reform. For example, a former Red Guard in an interview recounted:

[We] formed rank-and-file teams that went into all the communes to carry out investigations and spread the directives of Chairman Mao. We helped the cadres to understand their mistakes and accept the criticism of the masses, so that their ideology could be changed and they could make a fresh start in a revolutionary spirit.⁴⁶

The students not only attacked lower level officials, but they also began to move against higher state officials. Many Red Guards believed that almost every official in the middle echelons of government were

⁴⁴) Yue Daiyun and Carol Wakeman, To the Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985, pp 157-159.

⁴⁵) Hinton, William: Hundred Days War: the Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972, p 38.

⁴⁶Karol, K.S., The Second Chinese Revolution (New York: Hill & Wang, 1974), pp 171-172.

counterrevolutionaries.⁴⁷ They attacked officials in local, city, and provincial governments. For example Zhao Ziyang -- who later became Secretary-General of the Communist Party -- when he was Secretary of Guangdong Province, was attacked as a counter-revolutionary and was seized by the students, criticized, and stripped of his position.⁴⁸

The Red Guards eventually targeted even national leaders. Mao Zedong had let it be known to the millions of Red Guards that the main capitalist roaders within the Party was the Secretary General Liu Shaoqi and his ally Deng Xiaoping. Consequently the Red Guards began to target these people who were at the highest level of the Chinese government. For example, on January 6, 1967, Liu Shaoqi's daughter Liu Dao, a Qinghua University student, called her parents and fraudulently told them she had been hurt in a car accident. This call caused both Liu Shaoqi and his wife Wang Guangmei to come to Qinghua where they were both seized by Qinghua Red Guards. Although Liu was eventually released because of the personal intervention of Premier Zhou Enlai, Wang Guangmei was forced to go through hours of criticism at a repudiation or "struggle session," where the students

⁴⁷Lo Fulang, Morning Breeze: A True Story of the Cultural Revolution (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 50.

⁴⁸Bennett, Gordon A. and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), p 149.

demanded she confess her errors and "expose her wrong line and methods of work."⁴⁹

In their struggle to rectify the Party, the Red Guards even targeted leading not only national figures who were not sanctioned for attack by Mao, but even Mao's allies. Red Guards had begun to attack Zhu De, one of Mao's early allies, because he had been a former warlord. He had formerly been in charge of the People's Republic's armed forces. Zhu De came under so much criticism that he went to Mao to directly ask him to stop the Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution.⁵⁰

In the spring of 1967 some Red Guards began to criticize Chen Yi, China's foreign minister. The students were attacking Chen Yi because they believed that by attacking Chen Yi they could get to Zhou Enlai, who they believed was the "'hou ta'i' (the backstage power) behind all the government ministries, and consequently was one of the biggest counterrevolutionaries in China.⁵¹ Although Zhou Enlai was too powerful, because of his position as Prime Minister, and too close of an ally to Mao to be subjected to the direct "struggle sessions," and other forms of mass struggle, he was constantly

⁴⁹Hinton, William: Hundred Days War: the Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p 104.

⁵⁰Gao Yuan, Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 194.

⁵¹Milton, David and Nancy Milton, The Wind Shall Not Subside: Years in Revolutionary China - 1964-1969 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), p 227.

criticized in wall posters, handbills and speeches broadcast over loudspeakers. The fact that the Red Guards would choose to struggle against one of the highest figures of government, an ally of Mao, seems indicative of the lengths to which the Red Guards were willing to go to carry out the directives of Mao Zedong.

Overall it can be seen that the Red Guards were generally sincere reformers. Though they were responsible for brutalizing and killing thousands of the officials intellectuals they targeted, they believed they were responding to a call to rectify the Communist Party by reforming the errant officials that could be reformed and expelling the officials would could not be reformed.

The Red Guards were very devoted to the cause of reforming the Communist Party. Students went on thousand-mile marches to imitate the Great March and to prove their loyalty to Mao. Students constantly proclaimed their willingness to die defending Mao Zedong's anti-Revisionist line.⁵²

The Red Guards carried their reforms to the highest-ranking members of the Party and the People's Liberation Army, despite the risks such a move entailed. There were Red Guard campaigns against units in the army, army leaders and even Mao's wife Jiang Qing, the leader of the

⁵²Gao Yuan, Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987), p 246.

Gang of Four and Mao's proclaimed protégé Lin Biao.⁵³ The students believed such risks were necessary in order to save the socialist movement in China.

The Red Guards' zeal, and their goal of reform, were echoed by the students who took part in the Democracy Movement of Spring 1989. Although the students behind the Democracy movement did not believe that the Communist Party was being taken over by counterrevolutionaries and capitalist roaders, they, like the Red Guards, believed that the Party had strayed from the ideals which it had been founded with in 1949. The two most important of these ideals were to serve the people and to create a truly socialist state. The students believed, as one *xiaozibao* stated, in China, "the people themselves were supposed to administer the country, and the government and its officials exist only to serve their wishes ... [but] because of the corruption in the party and its autocratic decision-making process," the Communist Party "had denied this purpose" and was not serving the people, but its members selfish interests.⁵⁴

In addition the students in 1989 believed, like their counterparts in the Red Guards, that only they, the students, had the ability to lead a movement to reform

⁵³Pan, Stephen and Raymond J. de Jaegher, Peking's Red Guards: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (New York: Twin Circle Publishing, 1968), p 235.

⁵⁴Small-Character Poster, in Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp 59-60.

the Communist Party⁵⁵ and return it to the "high ideals" with which it had been founded.⁵⁶

The students, for the main part, when they pushed for democracy, were not pushing for overthrowing Communist Party rule and replacing it with western-style multi-party democracy.⁵⁷ Instead, by demanding democracy, the students wanted, as Yi Mu, a Beijing journalist, stated, "a more broad-based decision-making process which [took] into account a range of opinions."⁵⁸ By demanding democracy, the students were also pushing for the rights that were guaranteed to them by the Chinese Constitution. The Chinese Constitution guaranteed all Chinese freedom of speech, the press and the right to assemble and march.⁵⁹

Coupled with the demands for democracy was a demand to fight the corruption and official privileges which ran counter to the ideals of Communism. The students traced the corruption of the government to two basic tendencies within the Party: increasing separation between the common people and the Party officials; and the constant search for privilege and luxury among by the officials

⁵⁵Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 174.

⁵⁶Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 23.

⁵⁷Erbaugh, Mary S. and Richard Kraus, "The Democracy Movement in Fujian," in The Australian Journal for Chinese Affairs, volume 33, January 1990, p 137.

⁵⁸ibid, p 10.

⁵⁹Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement (New York: Black Rose Books, 1990), p 66.

and their families, who were protected from prosecution by their connections with other members of the Party.⁶⁰ Both the constant greed for luxuries and the seeming immunity of the offenders from prosecution were viewed as a violation of what the Communist Party stood for. Consequently, the students felt that in order to rectify the Chinese Communist Party, they also had to fight the corruption within its ranks.

The great majority of students involved in the Democracy Movement, from the beginning of the movement to the massacre of 4 June, thought cooperation with the Party was the main way to help the Party reform itself. Although later in the movement the students began to call for the ouster of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, most of the students did not favor overthrowing the party.

Despite the overwhelming majority of students who sought only reform, there were some participants in the movement who wanted to overthrow the Communist Party. For example one large-character poster put up near the end of the movement labeled the Communist Party reactionary and "the most evil Party of its time." The poster also declared the need for the overthrow of the Party.⁶¹ However such radical opinions were in the minority, and

⁶⁰Large Character Poster, in Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement, *ibid*, p 87.

⁶¹Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp 59-60.

the leaders of the student movement on several occasions moved to distance the Democracy Movements from overtly anti-Party acts. For example, when three men defaced a mural of Mao Zedong in Tiananmen Square to express their hatred for the Communist Party, they were arrested by the students and handed over to the police.⁶² Also, when the official Party newspaper claimed that people in the student movement were shouting "down with the Communist Party!" large-character posters were posted by the students which reaffirmed the students support of the Communist Party. For example, one of the posters simply stated "I will firmly support a Communist Party that represents the interest of the people."⁶³

The push for reform was maintained from the beginning of the movement to the end. Although the students specific demands changed, their main goal was always democratic reform. When the movement started on the 18th of April, over a hundred thousand people had gathered in Tiananmen square to demand reform in the Communist Party. According to Liu Binyan, one of China's foremost journalists, the students were demanding the following: a posthumous rehabilitation of Hu Yaobang; the revealing of the financial status of Party members and their children; freedom of the press, speech and

⁶²Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement (New York: Black Rose Books, 1990), p 29.

⁶³Large Character Poster, *ibid*, p 90.

assembly; and the elimination of corruption.⁶⁴ The students' main goal in the early days of the movement was to take these demands to the ruling body of the Chinese Communist Party, and engage it in a dialogue in which the students demands and their plans for the implementation of their demands could be presented.⁶⁵ According to the petition the students handed to the National People's Congress, the dialogue had to be two-sided, televised, and the student delegation had to consist of students elected by the participants in the Democracy Movement.⁶⁶

From April 18th to April 26th the students' demands and their goal of getting government leaders like Li Peng, to accept a petition stating their demands for reform did not change. The students stayed in the square and protested, using banners and loudspeakers, because Li Peng and other high-ranking Communist leaders refused to come out the central offices of the Party, accept their petition, and agree to a dialogue.

A major turning point in the movement was the aforementioned April 26th editorial in the *People's Daily* called "Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against Turmoil." In the editorial, the leaders of the Party stated their belief that the movement was being manipulated by a small number

⁶⁴Liu Binyan, Tell The World, Trans. Henry L. Epstein, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), pp 9-10.

⁶⁵Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 169.

⁶⁶The Students Petition for an Equal Dialogue, in Crisis at Tiananmen (San Fransisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), Appendix One pp 158-59.

of people who wanted to seize power. The editorial also stated that the movement was counterrevolutionary and was aimed at stirring up trouble. The editorial declared further mourning for Hu Yaobang illegal, and called on all Party members to resist all further student activities.⁶⁷

This editorial enraged the students. Being accused of being counterrevolutionary was the most serious political crime in China. After this editorial, the students still decided to carry on their reform movement. They planned a rally in Tiananmen for April 27th, despite the fact that such rallies were now illegal. Over 160,000 students defied the government and marched to Tiananmen. During the April 27th rally and afterwards, the students in addition to retaining their demands for reform and a dialogue, insisted that the government retract the April 26th editorial and recognize their movement as patriotic.⁶⁸ However, dialogue with the government remained their first priority.

As time passed and the government refused to meet the students demands for a dialogue and the retraction of the April 26th editorial, the protests in the square continued. On May 6th the students began to demand an

⁶⁷People's Daily, April 26, 1991, in Crisis at Tiananmen (San Fransisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), Appendix One p 155.

⁶⁸Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Fransisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 47.

"immediate discussion that would be broadcast live."⁶⁹
 The protests continued day after day, and the students decided to schedule a large protest to coincide with the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to protest government delays vis-à-vis their demands. According to Shen Tong, protesting during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit was meant to use the large media presence that Gorbachev's historic visit had brought to Beijing to publicize their struggle in both China proper and in the world.⁷⁰

On May 13th, to protest the governments refusal to deal with the students or to accept their demands, 3,000 started a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square. Almost as soon as the hunger strike started, students began to collapse and had to be hospitalized. When high-ranking leaders like Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang visited some of these students in the hospital, the hospitalized students reiterated, as one Beijing journalist wrote, that:

they [the students] were not trying to overthrow the government, [but instead] they only wanted to speed up political reforms and revive the people's confidence [in the government.]⁷¹

The hunger strikers two demands were a dialogue and the retraction of the April 26th editorial.⁷²

Around this time many students began to demand the ouster of Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping. Li Peng, as a hard-

⁶⁹Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 205.

⁷⁰ibid, p 189.

⁷¹Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 23.

⁷²ibid, p 23.

liner, had always been unpopular with the students. The students began to demand the ouster of Deng Xiaoping after Zhao Ziyang revealed to Gorbachev, on national television, that all decisions made by the Party had to be approved by Deng Xiaoping.⁷³ This enraged the students because Deng Xiaoping had supposedly already retired from the Party leadership. The fact that he was still the ultimate decision-maker in the Party seemed to the students to be reminiscent of the old imperial system, and therefore not something that should be happening in the Communist Party. Posters and banners began to appear labeling Deng as a modern-day feudal emperor and demanding his resignation. One such large-character poster [*dazibao*] stated:

The Qing Dynasty has already been extinct for seventy-six years (sic). Yet China still has an emperor without a crown, an aged, fatuous dictator. Yesterday afternoon, Secretary General Zhao Ziyang publicly announced that all of China's major policy decisions must be reviewed by this decrepit dictator, who is behind the times ... the dictator must resign.⁷⁴

Although the students were seeking the ouster of the two most powerful men in the Party, these demands were aimed at speeding the progress of reform by removing the greatest impediments to reform, not at overthrowing the Communist Party as a whole.

⁷³ibid, p 22.

⁷⁴Large-Character Poster, in Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp 221-222.

On May 18th Li Peng agreed to meet with student leaders for a dialogue. However Li Peng refused to discuss reforms and only lectured the students about ending the protests. The students, on their part, merely berated Li Peng about the corruption within the Party, and the its anti-democratic nature. The meeting broke down without any progress being made.⁷⁵ After the failure of the May dialogue, the students still retained their demand for a real, effective dialogue with the government.

On May 20th, after the ouster of the moderate Party General-Secretary Zhao Ziyang, the Party hard-liners, led by Li Peng, citing the disruption of government activities caused by the students, declared martial law in Beijing and sent troops from the People's Liberation Army to Beijing. The declaration of martial law caused another change in the demands of the students. After the declaration many students left the square. However, a great number remained there. They were determined to press their demands, even if they had to martyr themselves for their cause. Many made out their wills and wrote goodbyes to their parents and friends.⁷⁶ The demands of the students still included a dialogue with the government about reform. However, they also began to

⁷⁵Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 57.

⁷⁶Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 304.

demand the lifting of martial law and a promise that there would be no reprisals against the students.⁷⁷

Accompanying the new demands was an intensification of the campaign for the ouster of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng. In addition the students also began to demand the resignation of other hard-liners in the Party leadership, such as Yang Shangkun. However, like before, these demands stopped short of calling for an overthrow of the Communist Party.⁷⁸

The protests continued even as the Army began to move into the streets around Tiananmen in early June and to the eve of the violence of June 4th. However the students demands stayed the same as they had been with the declaration of martial law on the 21st of May. Thus it can be seen that from the inception of the student movement until it was crushed by Army tanks, the movement retained the same core goal of reforming the Chinese Communist Party. Although later demands were added to their list of demands, such as retraction of the April 26th editorial and the lifting of martial law, the push for reform remained the main goal of the Democracy Movement.

Overall, the Democracy Movement's goal of reforming the Communist Party, and persistence despite the risks,

⁷⁷Liu Binyan, Tell The World, Trans. Henry L. Epstein, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p 55.
⁷⁸Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 22.

were very similar to the goals and dedication of the Red Guards. The members of both movements believed that the Party had strayed from the ideals it had been founded with. The Red Guards believed the members of the Party had strayed from Mao's ideal of the continuous socialist revolution and were leading China towards revisionism and capitalism. The students in the Democracy Movement believed the Party had strayed from its purpose of serving the people, because of its autocratic nature and the rampant corruption within its ranks. Both groups started movements to rectify the errors each perceived the Party to be making and kept this as the goal of their movement throughout its progress. Each movement, in addition also carried their reform movement against the highest-ranking members in the Party. Thus it can be seen that at least in terms of their goals, the two movements, if not identical, were at least very similar. The converging goals of the two movements were the first part of the pattern of structural similarity between the Red Guard Movement and the Democracy Movement.

PART III: ELITE LEADERSHIP

It has already been shown that the Red Guard Movement and the Democracy Movement were differentiated by the catalysts behind their inception, their tactics and their different positions in vis-à-vis to governmental approval of their actions. However, despite these differences, the two movements were also structurally similar in that both were led from their very beginnings by students from China's most elite universities. In addition the Red Guards and the Democracy Movement were also similar in that the pattern of elite domination in both movements was two-tiered. In the first tier, the students of the elite universities in Beijing were the spearheads of both movements and had the greatest amount of power, both in Beijing and in the rest of China. They were widely accepted throughout China as the overall leaders of the two movements.

The second level of the elite domination of the two movements was by students outside of Beijing, in other provinces and cities, who were from the local, provincial elite universities. Although the Beijing Red Guards and the Beijing students behind the Democracy Movement, were originally looked to as the ultimate authorities, the movements in the provinces were further led by students from each region's most elite universities.

The Chinese higher education system consists of three levels of colleges: those which are run by local

municipalities; those which are run by the provincial governments; and those which are directly run by the national Ministry of Education in Beijing. Of these the nationally-run schools are China's most elite and prestigious.⁷⁹ These nationally-run schools include University of Beijing [Beida], Beijing Normal University, People's University [Renda], and Qinghua, all of which are in Beijing. Other nationally-run schools outside of Beijing include Nankai University in Tianjin, Fudan University in Shanghai, Zhongshan University in Guangdong, Sichuan University in Sichuan, and Wuhan University in the middle-Yangzi valley. Of these, the schools in Beijing, especially Beida and Qinghua, were considered by the Chinese to be China's best universities.⁸⁰ However all the aforementioned Universities were very exclusive and prestigious. In China, all students who wished to enter universities were given a long, difficult, standardized college entrance exam. Only the students who scored extremely high on these tests were admitted to the national-level universities.

At the onset of the Cultural Revolution, two universities, Qinghua and Beida, became the birthplace of the Red Guard movement. In addition, Qinghua and Beida

⁷⁹Lo, Ruth Earnshaw, In the Eye of the Typhoon: An American Woman in China During the Cultural Revolution (New York: Da Capo Press, 1980), p 288.

⁸⁰Kraus, Richard, Personal Interview, 25 July 1991.

Red Guards were the first tier of elite domination of the Red Guards both in Beijing and the provinces. Qinghua and Beida were China's premiere universities. Consequently they attracted China's best, most intellectually able students. The students also tended to be the children of intellectuals and officials. In addition the students at these universities usually expected jobs in the government after they graduated. For all of these reasons the students tended to follow the actions of the government very closely.⁸¹

At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the students were well apprised of Mao actions vis-à-vis his opposition in the Party. On May 26, 1966, Mao Zedong, in a speech, praised a *dazibao* put up by a Beida Professor, Nie Yuanzi, in which she had accused the authorities at Beida of opposing the socialist revolution and called for an overthrow of these revisionist authorities.⁸² In his speech, Mao stated, that Nie Yuanzi's *dazibao* was the "first true revolutionary [*dazibao*]" and that the students should follow Nie's example and criticize "those who oppose the Great Cultural Revolution."⁸³

⁸¹ibid.

⁸²Milton, David and Nancy Milton, The Wind Shall Not Subside: Years in Revolutionary China - 1964-1969 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), p 129.

⁸³Mao Zedong, Speech: 21 July 1966, in The People's Republic of China 1949-1967: A Documentary Survey: Volume III: 1965-1967, The Cultural Revolution Part I (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980), p 1553.

Consequently the students began to cover the walls of Qinghua and Beida with *dazibao* in which they attacked what they saw as bourgeois tendencies at their universities. To fight these bourgeois elements the students formed discussion and criticism groups. Students at Qinghua were the first to call participants in these groups "Red Guards." The term quickly caught on among the different revolutionary student groups at both Qinghua and Beida.

These groups were the first Red Guard units. These early Red Guard units began to coalesce around the most outspoken critics of the authorities at Beida and Qinghua. For example, the aforementioned Nie Yuanzi, because of her recognition by Mao, became the first Red Guard leader at Beijing, while at Qinghua, an outspoken leftist student, Kuai Dafu became the first leader at Qinghua. The Beijing and Qinghua Red Guards actions were buoyed when Mao appeared at a rally wearing an arm-band with Red Guard [hong weibing] written on it, and when Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, appeared at Beida to praise the actions of the Red Guards there. This movement spread throughout all the universities in Beijing, and students throughout China formed their own Red Guard groups in imitation of the Beijing Red Guards.⁸⁴

⁸⁴Lo Fulang, Morning Breeze: A True Story of the Cultural Revolution (San Fransisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 10.

However, the Beida and Qinghua Red Guards remained the most powerful and respected of the Red Guards, because they were the best informed,⁸⁵ and by virtue of their status as the first Red Guard units formed, and the first to actively engage in struggle against the revisionism in the universities and in the government.⁸⁶ Their status as the first Red Guards meant that "they received the strongest support from the central authorities."⁸⁷ Almost all the Red Guard units in the city of Beijing were allied with the main Beijing units at Beida and Qinghua.⁸⁸ The leaders of the main factions at the two universities, such as Kuai Dafu and Nie Yuanzi, owing to their status as leaders of the Red Guards at those elite schools were among the most powerful figures in Beijing.⁸⁹

The Qinghua and Beida Red Guard groups extended their power throughout China as a whole, by sending out members to "fan up the flames and light the fire of revolution,"⁹⁰ that is to proselytize their beliefs and their models of organization among the new Red Guard

⁸⁵Bennett, Gordon A. and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), p 71.

⁸⁶ibid, p 91.

⁸⁷Ken Ling, The Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Young Chinese (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1972), p 160.

⁸⁸Yue Daiyun and Carol Wakeman, To the Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985), p 201.

⁸⁹ibid, p 170.

⁹⁰Ken Ling, The Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Young Chinese (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1972), p 35.

groups forming all over the country.⁹¹ Throughout China, middle-school and high school students had also begun to form their own Red Guard groups. However, many of these groups were unsure of their tactics and goals.

Consequently, when Beida and Qinghua sent out students to teach and organize the Red Guards in other provinces, these emissaries were readily accepted by the provincial Red Guard units. According to Dai Xiaoi, a Red Guard leader in Guangdong province, when Song Xuemin, a Qinghua Red Guard came to organize their group along the lines of the Qinghua/Beida model, a meeting was immediately called to hear the "condescending"⁹² Song speak:

Song [Xuemin] had just arrived from Beijing. He was a Red Guard from Qinghua. That meant he knew all the latest news and also that he was entitled to our respect. We wanted to know if our organizational plan was correct. Song was the man who could tell us. Naturally we gave him our complete attention.⁹³

Since Song was a Qinghua Red Guard, his suggestions were adopted, because as Dai believed "opposing a Beijing Red Guard, would be like opposing Mao himself."⁹⁴ After Song had satisfied himself that his work was complete he left Dai Xiaoi's unit to proselytize the organizational model and the tactics of the Beijing Red guards to other units in Guangdong province.

⁹¹Yue Daiyun and Carol Wakeman, To the Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985), p 200.

⁹²Bennett, Gordon A. and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), p 71.

⁹³ibid.

⁹⁴ibid, p 72.

The Beijing Red Guards were believed by many to be the "mouthpiece" of Mao and his faction, consequently provincial Red Guards felt that listening to the Beijing Red Guards was the same as hearing it from Mao Zedong himself. For example, Ken Ling, a Fujian Red Guard leader stated that when the Beijing Red Guards approved of the Fujian Red Guards attacks on a Party official in Fuzhou, the Fujian Red Guards felt they had received Mao's personal blessing for their actions:

since [the Beijing Red Guards] served as the mouthpieces of the central authority, [their approval] was as good as learning the latter's intentions directly.⁹⁵

Thus whenever the Beijing Red Guards approved the actions of a local faction, in their eyes, it was the same as receiving the approval of Mao himself.⁹⁶ The Beijing Red Guards also sponsored rallies and lectures for the provincial Red Guards. Sometimes they even took the leading role in attacking provincial officials.⁹⁷

These Beijing Red Guards traveled as far as Heilongjiang in the far north, and Xinjiang and Tibet in the far west. Despite this, some Red Guard units did not receive emissaries. However, many of the units that did not receive emissaries from the Beijing, still felt it

⁹⁵Ken Ling, The Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Young Chinese (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1972), p 162.

⁹⁶ibid.

⁹⁷Matthews, Thomas Jay, "The Cultural Revolution in Szechwan," in The Cultural Revolution in the Provinces, ed. Ezra Vogel, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, pp 102-103.

necessary to establish liaisons with the Qinghua/Beida Red Guards because of their elite status. As Ken Ling a Red Guard leader from Fujian Province said, "[everybody] wanted to get close to the favorite child [the Beida/Qinghua Red Guards] of the central authorities," the central authorities being Mao and his group.⁹⁸ These provincial Red Guard units also sought to ally themselves with the Beida/Qinghua Red Guards in order to strengthen their legitimacy in their own provinces.

The Beijing Red Guards' position as the most powerful in all of China was also a result of the fact that the Red Guard newspapers they published were the most widely circulated and read in all of China. The Beijing Red Guards were close to the seat of power of the Chinese Communist Party, and the Beijing Red Guard were often leaked sensitive documents by people inside the government. Government officials leaked documents because they sympathized with the Red Guards and/or because the documents they leaked would incriminate their rivals.⁹⁹ Whatever the case, the Beijing Red Guards access to such documents meant that their publications were the most widely read. Their publications were even sometimes picked up and published by major Chinese publications because of their sensitive contents.¹⁰⁰ Consequently the

⁹⁸Ken Ling, The Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Young Chinese (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1972), p 161.

⁹⁹Kraus, Richard, Personal Interview, 25 July 1991, Eugene, Oregon.

¹⁰⁰ibid.

Beijing Red Guards influence was spread not only through direct contact, but also by both their own and by major national publications.

The Beida/Qinghua Red Guards, however were not always welcomed by the local Red Guard units. Some Red Guard units did not welcome the intrusion by the arrogant Beijing Red Guards. Other Red Guard units resented the power of Red Guards who were not from their same province.¹⁰¹ However, despite the resentment against them, according to Dai Xiaoi the Beida/Qinghua Red Guards still remained the most powerful group in the Red Guards, and were acknowledged as the leaders of the movement.¹⁰² Most other Red Guard groups imitated their structure and their tactics and looked to them for news and inspiration. According to Lo Fulang, even though the provincial students resented the arrogance of the Beida/Qinghua Red Guards, the students in her school started their Red Guard faction in exact accordance to with what "students in the city of Beijing had done earlier."¹⁰³ Thus it can be seen that while the Beida/Qinghua Red Guards did not have dictatorial control over other Red Guards, they still had the greatest

¹⁰¹Ken Ling, The Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Young Chinese (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1972), p 162.

¹⁰²Bennett, Gordon A. and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), p 89.

¹⁰³Lo Fulang, Morning Breeze: A True Story of the Cultural Revolution (San Fransisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 10.

influence over the movement in both Beijing and in the provinces. Almost all the other Red Guards respected them and paid close attention to their publications and actions.

The elite domination of the Red Guards extended beyond the dominant role of the Red Guards from Qinghua and Beida. The provincial Red Guard movement was also dominated by the elite nationally-run universities located in the provinces. The power of these provincial elite universities was extensive in their provinces and sometimes in provinces near them, but their power was never nation-wide like that of the Beida and Qinghua Red Guards.

After Mao called for the formation of the Red Guards, groups appeared in almost every university, high school and junior high school throughout China. In the beginning of the movement almost all of these Red Guard units were active in carrying out Mao's directives. They attacked and struggled against the officials in their schools. However, as time progressed and the Red Guard movement grew more powerful, hierarchical coalitions formed among the Red Guards. In these coalitions, university students dominant over high school and junior high school students, and students from the elite universities were dominant over the students from less prestigious schools.

Dai Xiaoi stated that as a high school Red Guard leader, he had originally played an active role in deciding policy for Guangdong Red Guards. However as the movement progressed, and the Red Guards began to more thoroughly organize themselves and began to attack higher officials, Dai and other high school and junior high school students were excluded from any leadership role in the movement:

Previously, middle school students had played a relatively active role ... [However], university students, with their greater access to communication channels, their broader background, and their generally greater levels of experience, emerged as the primary spokesmen for Canton's student groups. Beginning in January 1967, [Dai's] involvement [in Red Guard activities] came increasingly to be manifested in observation, rather than direct participation in events. By January of 1967, [High] School students had ceased to be a salient leadership force.¹⁰⁴

Even when non-university students were allowed to directly participate in Red Guard activities, they were still led by university students. For example, in Sichuan Province, most of the Red Guard units from junior High and high Schools belonged to state-wide coalitions. In these coalitions, lower-level Red Guards were allowed to directly participate in the actions of the coalition. However, these coalitions were controlled by students from Sichuan and Chengdu universities, and it was these university students who planned policy for all the

¹⁰⁴Bennett, Gordon A. and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), p 142.

coalition members. Lo Fulang, a Sichuan Red Guard, stated that by August of 1967, Sichuan province was divided by two major Red Guard groups:

the 8.26 [Red Guard] organization represent[ed] Sichuan University and The East is Red [Red Guard] group represent[ed] Chengdu University of Communications. All high schools groups [in Sichuan] obey[ed] one or the other of these universities.¹⁰⁵

The Red Guard coalitions in the provinces were further dominated by the Red Guard groups from the elite universities. These elite students made the decisions, not only for the non-university Red Guards, but also for the Red Guards from the other universities in the province. For example, in Shanghai, according to Neal Hunter, an Australian teaching in Shanghai during the cultural Revolution, the Red Guards from Fudan University, a national level university, were the most powerful Red Guard group in Shanghai.¹⁰⁶ In Guangdong province, the Red Guard movement was dominated by students from Zhongshan [Sun Yat-sen] University, a national level University in Guangzhou, and the leader of the Sun Yat-sen Red Guards, Wu Chuanpin, was the most powerful Red Guard leader in Guangdong.¹⁰⁷ As a national level school, Sun Yat-sen University had much greater

¹⁰⁵Lo Fulang, Morning Breeze: A True Story of the Cultural Revolution (San Fransisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 120.

¹⁰⁶Hunter, Neal, Shanghai Journal: An Eyewitness Account of the Cultural Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p 190.

¹⁰⁷Bennett, Gordon A. and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), p 144.

resources and a more diverse, politically motivated student body. Zhongshan had liaisons with many other elite universities, including Beida and Qinghua. These connections helped Sun Yat-sen University students to coordinate their actions much better, and obtain information from Mao and the Cultural Revolution headquarters in Beijing before other Red Guard units. Consequently, when Red Guards seized control of the government of Guangzhou [Canton], Zhong Zhongshan Red Guards played a leading role.¹⁰⁸

Thus it can be seen that the elite domination of the Red Guard nationwide by Qinghua/Beida Red Guards, was paralleled in the provinces by local national level schools. Though the elite schools in the provinces were not as powerful as the Qinghua/Beida Red Guards, they had considerable power in their own provinces. Some provincial schools had liaison groups in other provinces who played major roles in Red Guard activities in the other province. For example Wuhan University had a Red Guard Liaison group in Guangzhou which played a leading role in the Red Guard seizure of power from Zhao Ziyang.¹⁰⁹ However, the networks of liaison groups never approached the power and nationwide alliances that the Beida/Qinghua Red Guards enjoyed. The provincial

¹⁰⁸ibid, p 147.

¹⁰⁹ibid, p 148.

universities' power was mainly limited to their home states.

Overall the Red Guard Movement was nationally led by the elite Beijing groups because of their status as the originators of the movement. On the provincial level, the Beijing Red Guards had the most influence, but the elite universities at the provincial level also dominated the student movement in their province. This two-tiered pattern was almost completely repeated during the Democracy Movement. The Democracy Movement, like the Red Guards, originated at several elite national level universities in Beijing. These elite Beijing schools had the greatest power over the movement during its whole progression. In addition, the most powerful non-Beijing students involved in the Democracy Movement, as in the Red Guard movement, were the provincial National Level Universities.

The Democracy Movement in Beijing was dominated from the beginning to the end by students from Beida and Beijing Normal University. Students from Beida had the greatest role in the actual creation of the movement. However, as the movement progressed, students from Beijing Normal began to play an equal role in the leadership of the Democracy Movement. Before Hu Yaobang's death, Beida had been the main hotbed of student discontentment in China, for according to Han Minzhu, a Chinese journalist, the Beida students were well aware of

"Beida's ... rich tradition, stretching back to the May Fourth Democracy Movement, of spearheading student protests against government policies."¹¹⁰

As early as a year before Hu's death Beijing students were meeting in the aforementioned "Democracy Salons" to discuss democratic reforms. These were the first of the formal democratic discussion groups. Other elite universities in Beijing, such as Qinghua, Beijing Normal, and People's University [Renda], had Democracy Salons, but according to Han Minzhu, the Democracy Salon movements at the other universities were on a much smaller scale than those at Beida.¹¹¹ The leaders of the Beida democracy salons, according to Liu Binyan, one of China's foremost journalists, because of the experience they gained organizing these salons, such as Shen Tong and Wang Dan, went on to become some of the most powerful leaders of the Democracy Movement.¹¹²

When Hu Yaobang died Beida students took the first steps in starting the actual protest movement. The Beida students would play the greatest and most important role in the early days of the movement.¹¹³ Within several

¹¹⁰Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 9.

¹¹¹ibid, p 15.

¹¹²Liu Binyan, Tell The World, Trans. Henry L. Epstein, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p 35.

¹¹³Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement (New York: Black Rose Books, 1990), p 15.

hours of Hu Yaobang's death on April 15th, *dazibao* began to appear on the campus of Beida, mourning Hu Yaobang and suggesting "the wrong man died."¹¹⁴ The next day Beida students started the first actual protest at Tiananmen. On April 18th, 3,000 Beida students marched to Tiananmen square to lay wreaths commemorating Hu Yaobang. Along the route of their march, they were joined by several thousands students from Renda. Once in the square, the Beida and Renda students decided to present their aforementioned demands for reform to the Standing Committee of the Communist Party at their meeting place near Tiananmen.

After the demonstrations had begun in earnest, Beida students formed the first student organization to lead the protests. Called the "Preparatory Committee," it was totally made up of Beida students. The members of this committee saw themselves as the leaders of the growing protest movement. The Beida students believed their school had the foremost tradition of leadership of student movements in China, a reputation they wanted to maintain, for as Yi Mu, another well-known Beijing journalist stated "Beida, which had laid claim to leadership in student movements ever since the May 4th Movement in 1919, did not want to be outdone by any other

¹¹⁴Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Fransisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 271.

schools."¹¹⁵ As a consequence, most Beida students felt that they should be the ones to lead the movement in Tiananmen.¹¹⁶ The Beida students sought to maintain their position when other student groups tried to play leadership roles. For example, on April 19th a group of Qinghua students wanted to start a separate demonstration at Xinhuaamen, a gate which led from Tiananmen to the homes of the high-ranking officials in the Zhongnanhai compound. However, members of the Preparatory Committee convinced the demonstrators not to follow the Qinghua students, but instead to stay with them in the square.¹¹⁷

According to Shen Tong, a leader of the Beida contingent in Tiananmen square, Beida's dominant role was accepted by students from other schools. For example Shen Tong stated that early in the movement Beida students were leading a march to Tiananmen. During the course of the march they picked up students from other universities. When Beida students decided to leave halfway during the march, the students from other schools would not let them leave because they believed the protest march would not continue without the Beida students, "'You can't [leave],' one of them [a Renda student] said. 'If Beida leaves halfway, what will happen to the rest of us?'"¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ibid, p 47.

¹¹⁶Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 173.

¹¹⁷ibid, p 174.

¹¹⁸ibid, p 204.

The Beida students also had a great deal of control over the student movements because students at other universities looked to Beida as a model for their own actions. As the original founders of the Democracy movement, the Beida students were looked to as the most knowledgeable of all the student groups in the movement. Consequently, many of the actions taken by the Beida students were immediately emulated throughout the mass of student groups involved in the movement. For example, Liu Binyan stated that when Beida students decided to boycott classes because of the government's decision to ban them from the square, "students at more than a dozen universities and colleges announced they were also on strike."¹¹⁹

A turning point in the movement came when the students involved in the meeting decided to organize an official leadership coalition for the democracy movement. Beida ceased to be the dominant power in the student movement. Beida was still one of the most powerful participants in the movements. However, with the creation of the independent student union, students from another elite school, Beijing Normal University, came to play a large leadership role in the movement. From that moment on, the students from Beida, along with Beijing Normal, were the vanguard of the student movement and played the

¹¹⁹Liu Binyan, Tell The World, Trans. Henry L. Epstein, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p 12.

biggest role in organizing the movement. As such, according to Yi Mu, they were recognized by other students as the leaders of the movement from the organization of the independent student union until the crushing of the Democracy Movement.¹²⁰

As the movement grew, and students from over 40 Beijing universities were came to Tiananmen, the students recognized the need for some type of governing body in the square to both oversee food distribution and also to plot strategy for the movement. There already was a student union encompassing most of Beijing's colleges. It was, however, sponsored by the government and was seen as being a puppet of the central authorities.¹²¹ Consequently the students felt the need for an student association independent of the government, it would serve as a council to plot strategy, and would represent all the student groups within the movement, so that if and when a dialogue was granted, "the movement would able to speak with an unified voice."¹²²

On April 21, Wuer Kaixi, a Beijing Normal student passed out a pamphlet announcing the establishment of a student association. When the association was elected, students from most of Beijing's universities were

¹²⁰Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 41.

¹²¹Liu Binyan, Tell The World, Trans. Henry L. Epstein, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p 19.

¹²²Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 191.

included on its board. Most were from the elite universities like Qinghua, Renda, Beida, and Beijing Normal.¹²³ However, despite the membership in the new Interim Student Association of Beijing Colleges and Universities [ISABCU] being balanced, throughout the movement, the most powerful and influential leaders of the student movement were mainly from either Beijing Normal or Beida. According to Han Minzhu, an eyewitness to the Democracy Movement, Beida:

by virtue of its prestige, its large number of student activists, and its early leadership of the [Democracy Movement], [was] the physical and symbolic center of the movement.¹²⁴

Beida students published the *News Herald*, the independent newspaper of the student movement.¹²⁵ However, despite the dominant role of Beida, the Democracy Movement was also partly directed by Beijing Normal students. Wuer Kaixi, Feng Congde, and his wife Chai Ling were Beijing Normal students, Wang Dan and Shen Tong were Beida students. In addition Chai Ling had also been an undergraduate at Beida, and was doing graduate work at Beijing Normal when the Democracy Movement broke out. Those five students were the most important and influential leaders in the student movement, and they had, according to Yi Mu:

¹²³ibid, pp 190-91.

¹²⁴Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 70.

¹²⁵ibid, p 79.

naturally emerged as leaders as leaders because they had stood in the frontline of the movement and had played a major role in organizing the demonstrations. In other words those who were willing to stand up and risk the wrath of the government became the natural leaders.¹²⁶

Only one of the most important Beijing leaders of the movement, Zhou Yongjun, a student at the University of Political Science and Law in Beijing, was not a member of either Beida or Beijing Normal.

Students from these elite schools continued to dominate the movement until the end. Wuer Kaixi was one of the first Chairman of the ISABCU. When the students began their hunger strike on May 13th, the main leader behind the hunger strike was Chai Ling. Chai Ling traveled to Beida and other schools, to promote the hunger strike in order to increase the number of participants.¹²⁷ By the time the hunger strike started, over half of the participants were Beida students.¹²⁸

When the students' demand for a dialogue with Li Peng was finally met, students from Beijing Normal and Beida were of a majority of those present. Wang Dan and Xiong Yan were present from Beida, while Wuer Kaixi was present from Beijing Normal. There were two students from two other universities present. However, the discussion

¹²⁶Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 41.

¹²⁷Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) 47.

¹²⁸Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 252.

from beginning to end was almost completely monopolized by the students from Beida and Beijing Normal. Wang Dan and Wuer Kaixi made over eighty percent of the student commentary, while the two non-Beida/Beijing Normal Students made only three short comments between the two of them.¹²⁹

In addition to the more famous leaders, other Beida and Beijing Normal students also continued to be the vanguard of the movement, and to be its most committed members. For example, on May 5th all the Beijing schools resumed classes except for Beijing Normal and Beida.¹³⁰ Students at these universities refused to return to class, because they felt they had not yet accomplished their goals.

The domination of the Democracy Movement by Beida and Beijing Normal students continued even after the square was taken over by students from other provinces. Non-Beijing students had been pouring into Beijing since April 21 to take part in the democracy movement. Even though they came to represent a large percentage of the total students in the square, they were denied a corresponding amount of power in the student movement. As their numbers grew, the non-Beijing students demanded to

¹²⁹"Li Peng's Conversation with Student Leaders," in Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), Appendix I pp 168-176.

¹³⁰Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement (New York: Black Rose Books, 1990), p 23.

be included in the decision-making process of the independent students union. However, according to Shen Tong, the leaders of the Democracy Movement would not let them join the ISABCU, believing that as the creators of the movement, Beijing students should have the final say in the decisions of the Democracy Movement.¹³¹ Finally, a compromise was reached. The non-Beijing students formed their own association, but also agreed to abide by the decisions of the Beijing independent student union.¹³² Thus the elite Beijing schools continued to dominate the movement.

By the end of the movement, non-Beijing students had become the overwhelming majority of the students in the square. At the end of June students from the provinces comprised 70 percent of the students in Tiananmen. However, Beijing students still controlled the movement. On May 23rd the leadership of the student movement had been transferred to a new leadership council, the "Protect Tiananmen Headquarters."¹³³ The make up of this group still favored Beijing universities, despite the predominance of the non-Beijing students in the square. The overall leader of the new group was Chai Ling. Wuer Kaixi and Wang Dan also had prominent roles in this new

¹³¹Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 282.

¹³²ibid.

¹³³Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Deomocracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 328.

group. Only one non-Beijing student, Li Lu, a Nanjing University student, played a prominent role in the decision-making process for this group. Chai Ling remained the overall commander of the student movement until the June 4 crackdown.

Thus it can be seen that the Democracy Movement in Beijing was dominated from beginning to end first by Beida students, then by a combination of Beijing Normal and Beida students. As the movement grew and began to receive press coverage throughout China, students in other provinces began to hold their own demonstrations. However, the Beijing students remained the overall leaders of the movement nationwide. The Beijing students' authority was acknowledged by schools and student leaders in other provinces. Their authority came from their status as the pioneers of the movement, and because of the establishment of alliances with groups in other provinces.

By April 21st, the protests in support of the Democracy movement had broken out all over China. Newspapers reported demonstrations in Wuhan, Guangzhou [Canton], Shanghai, Chengdu, Xian and Tianjin.¹³⁴ According to Liu Binyan these demonstrations were simply to show support for the actions of the Beijing students.¹³⁵ However, the Beijing students soon began to

¹³⁴ibid, p 232.

¹³⁵Liu Binyan, Tell The World, Trans. Henry L. Epstein, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p 18.

establish ties with elite universities in other states, so as to effectively coordinate the activities of the Beijing and non-Beijing students. Beida sent out students to other universities in Tianjin and Shanghai. These Beida students asked the student groups in the universities to send daily reports of their activities to Beijing and to establish liaisons with the Beijing students.¹³⁶ Those universities that the Beijing students did not send emissaries to were contacted by fax, phone and by mail. Students at the non-Beijing schools acknowledged the authority of the Beijing students and made an effort to strengthen their ties with Beijing. By April 24th Beijing students had contacted enough universities nation-wide to create the independent "National Federation of Student Unions of Universities and Colleges."¹³⁷ Although the network formed by these activities was "loose ... and embryonic," they were sufficiently organized that by the beginning of May, student activists in the provinces were coordinating their actions with those of the Beijing students.¹³⁸ Thus on May 4, the Beijing students were able to organize a nation-wide protest against the government in commemoration of the May 4 movement. Protests not only

¹³⁶Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 189.

¹³⁷Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) p 70.

¹³⁸ibid, p 135.

occurred in Beijing and other major cities like Shanghai, Wuhan and Guangzhou, but also in smaller cities like Changsha, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Chengdu, Chongqing and even smaller cities like Taiyuan and Chengdu.¹³⁹ This network would last until the Democracy Movement was suppressed on June 4th.

Thus it can be seen that the Democracy Movement, like the Red Guard movement, was dominated, both in Beijing and in the provinces, by students from two elite Beijing universities. The provincial universities accepted the leadership role of the Beijing schools¹⁴⁰ and based their actions on the example and the directions of the Beijing students, for as one eyewitness to the provincial Democracy wrote, "the *raison d'être* of local [Democracy Movement] activities was to mobilize support, both moral and financial for the students in Beijing."¹⁴¹

However, as during the Red Guard movement, there was a second level of elite domination in the student movement. The Beijing students were the national coordinators of the Democracy Movement. The Democracy Movements in the provinces, however, were further dominated by the elite National Level universities in the provinces. The National Level universities were the most

¹³⁹ibid, p 134.

¹⁴⁰Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 162.

¹⁴¹"Impressions of the Popular Unrest in Hangzhou April/June 1989," in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, volume 33, January 1990, p 98.

active participants in the provincial Democracy Movement and among the non-Beijing schools who sent students to Tiananmen. For example, the first non-Beijing students to enter Tiananmen Square were from Nankai University, a National Level university in Tianjin. The Nankai students first entered the square on April 21.¹⁴² The elite provincial universities also played the dominant role in the organizations of the non-Beijing students in Tiananmen. For example, the leader of the activists from non-Beijing universities was the aforementioned Li Lu. Li Lu also became only non-Beijing student to hold a major leadership position in the ruling bodies, of the movement when he became vice-commander of the Protect Tiananmen Headquarters under Chai Ling and Feng Congde.

The provincial National Level universities also played a leading role in the student movement back in the provinces themselves. The elite schools were the best organized and most active in promoting the Democracy Movement. They served as examples to the other universities in their areas. Students at Wuhan University, a National Level university, were the first students to post pro-reform *dazibao* in their city.¹⁴³ The elite schools also served as information conduits for

¹⁴²Fox, Jose[hine], "The Movement for Democracy and its Consequences in Tianjin," in The Australian Journal for Chinese Affairs, Volume 33, January 1990, p 567.

¹⁴³Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Deomocracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp 56-57.

other provincial schools through their contact with the Beijing movement leadership. Students at the elite universities also often took the lead in organizing pro-democracy rallies within their province. For example, Fudan University students "led the first three pro-Democracy marches in Shanghai and organized a pro-democracy protest in Shanghai in which over 100,000 people took part."¹⁴⁴ Protests in Sichuan were in part organized and led by students from Sichuan University.¹⁴⁵

Overall it can be seen that the Democracy Movement had a second layer of elite leadership: provincial elite schools. These provincial schools dominated the Democracy Movement among the provincial students in both Tiananmen and in the provinces through their ties with the Beijing leadership, their better organization, and the prestige they enjoyed as the best students in their provinces. Thus it clear that in terms of leadership, the Red Guard and the Democracy Movements were very similar. In both cases a handful of elite Beijing Schools had the greatest power nation-wide, while the movement among provincial universities was further led by the elite National Level Universities in each province.

¹⁴⁴Warner, Shelly, "The Political Fortunes of the World Economic Herald," in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, volume 33, January 1990, p 120.

¹⁴⁵Chan, Anita and Jonathan Unger, "Voices from the Protest Movement, Chongqing, Sichuan." in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, Volume 33, January 1990, p 266.

PART IV: FACTIONALISM

Factionalism in the Red Guards, is well known to those familiar with modern Chinese history. However, what has not yet really been touched upon is the subject of factionalism in conjunction with the Democracy Movement.

It has already been established that the two movements were structurally similar in terms of a common goal and the presence of elite domination. The two movements were also structurally similar in that they both experienced factionalism within their own ranks. Although the factionalism in the Democracy Movement never progressed to the splintering of the movement into thousands of different factions who clashed violently with each other as the Red Guard Movement did, the Democracy Movement still suffered from an internal lack of unity. The Democracy Movement from the beginning, suffered from a lack of agreement between the different factions within about goals and tactics. This lack of agreement resulted in factionalism which compromised the students involved in the movements ability to act in concert. The Red Guards were also struck from the very beginning by factionalism, which destroyed all semblance of unified action. Some of the reasons for the factionalism in the movements were the same, such as conflict between moderate and radical entities within the two movements. Some of the reasons for the factionalism were peculiar to either the Democracy Movement or the Red

Guards, such as the issue of parental heritage during the Cultural Revolution, and the issue of whether or not to compromise with the government during the Democracy Movement.

The Red Guard movement was struck by intense internal rivalry almost from its beginning in August of 1966. The factionalism divided universities, colleges, high schools and even junior high schools against themselves. By the time the movement was suppressed in 1967, these rivalries had become so intense and violent that by early 1967, as Lo Fulang recounted, Red Guard units were hijacking Army trains and recruiting munitions factory workers so they could commandeer "heavy artillery, guns, tanks, cannons and bombs ... to shoot at [rival factions] every night."¹⁴⁶

The two main reasons behind the factionalism were the issues of who could be a Red Guard and how far the movement should be taken. Disagreements over these issues escalated into violence because of Mao's ambiguity concerning these issues and because of a lack of centralized control and organization of the Guards. When Mao called for the start of proletarian movements, like the Red Guards, he did not explicitly state who could and could not take part in the anti-counterrevolutionary struggle, and exactly how far the students were to take

¹⁴⁶Bennett, Gordon A. and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), p 135.

their anti-government official campaigns.¹⁴⁷ He also did not establish a central headquarters or ruling body for the movement that would have established guidelines and rules. The creation and governing of the movement was left up to the students.

Consequently, the aforementioned points of contention, coupled with the lack of centralized control, resulted in the formation of rival Red Guard units which espoused different views about Red Guard goals and membership. As Yue Daiyun, a Professor at Beida during the Cultural Revolution stated, "Red Guard factions would coalesce around a group of people with the same views," and they would "formalize their existence by means of a poster" stating whatever name they picked for themselves.¹⁴⁸ Almost the Red Guard groups formed, no matter their beliefs vis-a-vis the aforementioned issues, believed that they "represent[ed] the masses and [were] carrying out Mao's revolutionary lines."¹⁴⁹ This belief led the many of the different Red Guard factions to conclude that factions which disagreed with them were opposing Mao's revolutionary line. Consequently cooperation was impossible. Although there were attempts in Beijing and in the provinces to unify the Red Guards into a cohesive body, these attempts, such as the attempt

¹⁴⁷ibid, p 142.

¹⁴⁸Yue Daiyun and Carol Wakeman, To the Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985), p 200.

¹⁴⁹ibid, p 199.

in Dai Xiaoi's province of Guangdong, ended in failure. In September of 1966, leaders of Guangzhou's different Red Guards met to "discuss the unifying of all of [Guangzhou's] Red Guards."¹⁵⁰ However, as Dai recounted, because of disagreements between the participants about the issue of parental heritage, soon "[people], rushed up onto to the stage and tried to seize the microphone ... blows began to fly. Soon there was a brawl, a real free for all."¹⁵¹ The factionalism in the Red Guards was first expressed in a refusal to cooperate with opposing groups,¹⁵² however it soon degenerated into open violence with torture, kidnapping, assault, and killing as ends in the struggle.

The issue of how far to carry the revolution centered on the Red Guards confusion concerning the degree to which Mao intended the students anti-revisionary activities to go. Were a majority of officials and intellectuals capitalist roaders, or were just a few? Could accused counter-revolutionaries serve the government after they were reformed, or were they to be excluded from the government for life? At Qinghua, the birthplace of the Guards, one faction, the Jinggan Mountain Red Guards argued that almost all the government

¹⁵⁰Bennett, Gordon A. and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), p 80.

¹⁵¹ibid, p 82.

¹⁵²Hinton, William: Hundred Days War: the Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p 132.

officials and cadres were bad, while the other major faction, the Qinghua Mao Zedong Thought Red Guards thought that only a few of them were bad, and that many could be reformed and returned to government service.¹⁵³ One circular put out by the Qinghua Mao Zedong Thought Red Guards, stated that:

It must ... be soberly recognized that most of the cadres are good, and that the alien class elements who have wormed their way into the ranks are very few in number. ...To refuse to make a class analysis of persons in authority and instead to suspect, negate, exclude, and overthrow them all indiscriminately is an anarchist trend of thought.¹⁵⁴

The Red Guards who followed the attitudes espoused by the Jinggan Mountain Red Guards were known as "rebel" Red Guards. The Red Guards who followed the more moderate approach followed by the Mao Zedong Thought Red Guards were known as "Conservative" or "Royalist" Red Guards.¹⁵⁵

Soon after the split at Qinghua, almost all of Beijing was divided into conservative and rebel Red Guards. Within in days of the founding of the Guards at Beida, they had split into rebel and conservative factions.¹⁵⁶ Soon almost all universities in Beijing were similarly divided. Eventually two great alliances emerged in Beijing, one was a city-wide rebel alliance and the

¹⁵³ibid,p 108.

¹⁵⁴ibid.

¹⁵⁵Milton, David and Nancy Milton, The Wind Shall Not Subside: Years in Revolutionary China - 1964-1969 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), p 191.

¹⁵⁶Yue Daiyun and Carol Wakeman, To the Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985), p 198.

other a city-wide conservative alliance. Both alliances were centered on Beida and Qinghua's rebel and conservative factions.¹⁵⁷

The rebel/royalist pattern of factionalism was continued throughout China as a whole. For example, Gao Yuan, a former Red Guard leader was originally a member of a rebel Red Guard group in Yizhen, in North China. However, he split away from the Rebel group, the East-is-Red Group, to form his own Red Guard faction, the Lu Xun Commune. Gao Yuan and his allies felt that the East-is-Red was too leftist and "was overthrowing everyone." The Lu Xun Commune believed instead that the majority of teachers and cadres "were good or comparatively good" and consequently the Lu Xun group should "unite with them," instead of attacking them.¹⁵⁸

In Changsha, in Hubei province, Liang Fang split from her original Red Guard unit because she felt they had become royalists:

I quit the Red Defense Guards because they refused to attack the real seats of power, the party leaders ... but now I'm happy because there are even more people in our new rebel group. Now I'm on my way to a cotton mill to drive out people with Conservative "Protect the Emperor" viewpoints.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ibid, 117.

¹⁵⁸Gao Yuan, Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987), p 191.

¹⁵⁹Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution (New York: Alfred a Knopf, 1983), p 75.

The Conservative versus Rebel dichotomy in the Red Guards, played a role in shattering the movement throughout all of China.

The other major issue behind the splintering of the Red Guards was the question of who could be a Red Guard. Many Red Guards and Red Guard leaders felt that only children from true revolutionary families could join the Red Guards. Other Red Guards felt that parental heritage did not matter, and that all that was needed to be a Red Guard was the desire to be a true revolutionary. Opposing factions of Red Guards coalesced around this issue, just like they did with the Rebel/Conservative issue.

Ever since the Communist victory in 1949, it had been a governmental practice to assign people into political categories according to their parents' pre-1949 economic status. These categories gave one either a good or a bad standing the post-1949 society. The good category consisted people who were or were descended from members of the 'Five Red Types:' Revolutionary cadres, Revolutionary martyrs, Revolutionary Soldiers, workers, and poor and lower-middle class peasants.¹⁶⁰ The members of the bad category were the people who were or were descended from the 'Five Black Types:' landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, "bad elements," and Rightists.¹⁶¹ In addition there were people who belonged

¹⁶⁰ibid, p 66.

¹⁶¹ibid.

to neither category. Their status vis-à-vis the government was always ambiguous.

When the Red Guard movement first started, many Red Guard groups wanted to exclude from Red Guard membership all those whose parents were not of the 'Five Good Classes.' Their belief, as Liang Heng, a Red Guard leaders stated, was, "if the father is a hero, the son is a brave man; if the father is a reactionary, the son is a bastard," that is all children whose parents were 'bad elements,' were by virtue of their parents, also bad elements and were therefore unfit to carry out Mao's revolutionary line.¹⁶²

However, this exclusionary policy did not prevent children of non-Five Red parents from joining the Red Guards. Students excluded from the Red Guards because of their parental heritage simply formed Red Guard units that did not take parental heritage into account as much. For example, at Beida, the first Red Guard leader was the aforementioned Nie Yuanzi. She only allowed children of the Five Red Types to join her faction. Consequently, other Beida students, who had been excluded by Nie because of their parental background, formed their own Red Guard faction to oppose Nie's exclusionary policies.¹⁶³ The anti-exclusionary Red Guards still

¹⁶²ibid.

¹⁶³Yue Daiyun and Carol Wakeman, To the Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985), p 194.

tended to discriminate against children of the black types, but they freely admitted children whose parents were in neither category. The split caused by the issue of parental heritage requirements was just as much of a source of factionalism as the Conservative/Rebel dichotomy.

The tendency for the debate over parental heritage to splinter Red Guard groups was repeated throughout China. In Guangdong Province, Dai Xiaoi split away from his original Red Guard group to form his own group which admitted non-five Red Students. Dai said:

The policy of the Five-Reds only membership policy was disastrous. Fully 70 per cent of all students were doomed to a second-class status. Nearly all of them wanted to participate but they could not ... it seemed stupid, even unforgivable that such conditions should be allowed to exist. I knew what Kaochung's [in Guangdong] non-Five Red types were like, and I had confidence in all of them. I thought they should be given a chance.¹⁶⁴

Consequently, Dai and his allies split from his original Red Guard group to form his own group.

In Hubei, Gao Yuan reported that in his town of Changsha there were Red Guards who followed the exclusionary policy to the extreme. They were followers of the Tan Lifu line. Tan Lifu was a Beijing Red Guard who formed a Red Guard faction called United Action. The United Action Red Guards would only accept the children of high-ranking cadres. In Hunan, a group of students set

¹⁶⁴Bennett, Gordon A. and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), pp 127-28.

up their own pro-Tan Lifu faction. Gao tells us that other Red Guards thought the Tan Lifu policies were "reactionary," and many other students quickly set up other Red Guard groups to oppose the Hunan United Action Red Guards.¹⁶⁵

When the issue of parental heritage was coupled with the Conservative versus Rebel debate, their combined effect was to shatter the Red Guard movement into thousands of independent factions. One group's position on the two issues was usually diametrically opposed by other factions in its area. However, there was no pattern for the distribution of these views among the different factions. Throughout China there were exclusionist Conservative factions¹⁶⁶ and non-exclusionist Conservative factions,¹⁶⁷ just as there were exclusionist Rebel factions¹⁶⁸ and non-exclusionist Rebel factions.¹⁶⁹

Whatever their beliefs on the aforementioned issues, the factions believed that only they were truly carrying out Mao's wishes. Once the disagreements started between factions, relations between them would usually deteriorate to the point that no cooperation was possible. Red Guards units would often place the

¹⁶⁵Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution (New York: Alfred a Knopf, 1983), p 122.

¹⁶⁶ibid, p 75.

¹⁶⁷Yue Daiyun and Carol Wakeman, To the Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (Berekley, California: University of California Press, 1985), p 199.

¹⁶⁸ibid, p 194.

¹⁶⁹Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution (New York: Alfred a Knopf, 1983), p 122.

destruction of their rivals ahead of carrying out the Cultural Revolution. Factionalism often became their biggest concern.¹⁷⁰ Thus it is not surprising that the different factions slowly began an escalating cycle of violence, that culminated with open warfare. The students firmly believed Mao statement, "making revolution is not a dinner party."¹⁷¹

This violent disintegration into factionalism was one of the major things for which the Red Guard movement became notorious. However, even though it was never as open and violent or as well published as the Red Guards factionalism, the Democracy Movement was also struck with a pattern of factionalism that threatened its internal unity and its overall progress. The main causes behind this factionalism were the lack of cohesive internal organization within the movement and, as in the Red Guard movement, a split between moderate and radical groups within the movement. Although the factionalism in the Democracy Movement never reached the point of open violence, as in the Red Guards, it did seriously undermine the Democracy Movement's progress and ability to act in a concerted manner.

¹⁷⁰Hinton, William: Hundred Days War: the Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p 132.

¹⁷¹Yue Daiyun and Carol Wakeman, To the Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985), p 241.

The first reason for the factionalism within the Democracy Movement, the lack of internal cohesion, was apparent from almost the very beginning of the movement. The protests had started in a rather spontaneous manner. Beida students had started the movement, and other universities joined at different intervals during its progress. However, as the students joined the protests, they, for the most part, continued to identify with their own universities, instead of completely assimilating en masse into the movement. Beida students saw themselves as separate from Renda students, just as Beijing students saw themselves as separate from non-Beijing students. To bring all the different schools together, the different leaders of the movement founded the aforementioned independent student union. Although this umbrella organization represented all the Beijing schools, it failed to completely unite the movement in that most students participating in the Democracy Movement still identified with their school in addition to the movement as a whole. In addition many schools arrived in the square after the union had been created, so the students from these schools often felt little connection to the union and its policies. The union also failed to bring non-Beijing schools. Instead, as has been shown above, the non-Beijing schools had to form their own committee. Consequently within the movement as a whole there were many distinct groups, each of which had their own leaders

in addition to the elected leaders of ISABCU. This led to friction and to, as Tony Saich, an eyewitness to the Democracy Movement in Beijing stated, "[an] inability of the student movement to act flexibly and decisively."¹⁷²

The central committee of the ISABCU supposedly had the ultimate decision-making power, but as one participant in the Democracy movement stated, the ties between the committees and the various student groups were, "loose at best."¹⁷³ Communications were poor between the center and all the groups involved. Leaders of the different groups often had very different agendas than the central leadership of the movement. Shen Tong stated that within the movement there were "so many groups with different directions that the government did not know who wanted what."¹⁷⁴ The government representatives would try to contact the students to see what their demands were at the time, and often they would get two completely different stories from two different students.¹⁷⁵ There was also friction between Beijing groups and non-Beijing groups.¹⁷⁶ In desperation one

¹⁷²Saich, Tony, "The Rise and Fall of the Beijing People's Movement," in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, Volume 34, June, p 193.

¹⁷³Hue Yu, Large Character Poster, in Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement (New York: Black Rose Books, 1990), p 65.

¹⁷⁴Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 228.

¹⁷⁵ibid, p 228.

¹⁷⁶Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Deomocracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 185.

dazibao writer begged for someone to take action "to unite the movement."¹⁷⁷

The factionalism among the different groups in the movement was also exacerbated by inefficiency in the movements leadership. For example, thousands of donations of money poured into the Democracy Movement. Consequently the student union decided to create a committee to tally and distribute the money among the different groups in the square. However, the money, either because of inefficiency or favoritism, was not distributed equally among the students. As a result, many student groups felt they were being slighted by the students within the central leadership and became very resentful towards the central leadership. The conflict over money grew so intense that students from one group of universities who were not represented within the ruling student federation, kidnapped a member of the central leadership to demand to know where all the money had gone.¹⁷⁸ In addition groups resentment of the central leadership was also caused by a perceived cavalier and non-democratic decision-making process with the ranks of the ISABCU. The perceived undemocratic nature of the ISABCU led one student to post a *dazibao* in which he stated:

[a] drawback of [the ISABCU] is the rather undemocratic nature of the organization, with power concentrated in the hands of a people who are

¹⁷⁷Tian Chun, Large Character Poster, in Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement (New York: Black Rose Books, 1990), p 70 .

¹⁷⁸Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, *ibid*, p 31.

isolated from the public. In the early days of the Movement many valuable opinions did not reach the decision makers ... we are fighting this tendency in the party, we must not let it appear in our ranks.¹⁷⁹

The overall situation with the ranks of the student movement was one of disorder and factionalism. Though there was a central leadership, the movement as a whole was formed of an alliance of many smaller groups, each with its own agenda. The situation was exacerbated by resentment towards the central leadership. Groups left the square and rejoined the movement as they pleased, and made decisions that affected the whole movement without consulting the central leadership or the rest of the movement, such as the decision by Qinghua students to withdraw from the movement after martial law had been declared.¹⁸⁰

The division among the various constituent parts of the Democracy Movement was not the only divisive tendency, the Democracy Movement was also hampered by factionalism within the ranks of its leadership. The leadership of the Democracy was divided between moderates and radicals. According to Liu Binyan, the contention between the two factions centered on tactics and goals of the movement. The moderates, such as Shen Tong and Wang

¹⁷⁹Tian Chun, Large Character Poster, in Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement (New York: Black Rose Books, 1990), p 70.

¹⁸⁰Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 93.

Dan, on one hand, were willing to compromise with the government, and were in favor of ending the hunger strikes and other extreme tactics.¹⁸¹ The radicals, such as Chai Ling and Li Lu, on the other hand would accept nothing but total government acceptance of their demands and would not moderate their tactics at all. Liu Binyan identified the radicals as the "all in one stroke" faction, and said that to the radicals:

whoever was tough, resolute, and ruthless in strategy [was popular]. Conversely, whoever was careful, flexible and took into consideration practical conditions, and proposed concession and compromise [was] despised and was accused of being a traitor.¹⁸²

The dichotomy between the moderate and radical elements within the leadership of the Democracy Movement was expressed in the disagreements and power struggles over three major issues: whether or not to end the class strike, whether or not to end the hunger strike, and when the students should withdraw from the square.

The issue of whether or not to end the class boycott was the first major issue to split the student movement. After a huge demonstration on May 4th in commemoration of the original May Fourth movement, the leadership of the movement began to debate on whether or not to call for a return to class. According to the participants in the debate, the proceedings concerning the boycott were long

¹⁸¹Liu Binyan, Tell The World, Trans. Henry L. Epstein, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p 54.

¹⁸²ibid, p 51.

and acrimonious.¹⁸³ The moderates wanted to end the class boycott. They believed that the Democracy Movement had already caught the attention of the government. They also believed that conciliatory remarks by the government and the central authorities' agreement to have a dialogue marked a government willingness to compromise. Consequently they felt that, as Han Minzhu stated, "further disruption of their studies was counterproductive and unnecessary."¹⁸⁴

However, radicals opposed ending the boycott, on the grounds that they believed the government would renege on its promises to engage in a dialogue with the leaders of the Movement if student pressure was relaxed, and that the already diminishing student enthusiasm for the Democracy Movement would be further lowered.¹⁸⁵

The moderates won and ended the boycott. However, the radicals responded by withdrawing from the union and establishing their own headquarters. The radicals' new organization mainly consisted of the hunger strike participants. It came to be known as the "Protect Tiananmen Headquarters." After the split, Chai Ling, the leader of the Protect Tiananmen group stated as a result

¹⁸³Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 197.

¹⁸⁴ibid, p 185.

¹⁸⁵ibid.

of the split "there was little common ground between the different groups."¹⁸⁶

The split in the leadership grew wider when disagreement arose over whether or not end the hunger strike, after the aforementioned failure of the student dialogue with Li Peng. Shen Tong and other moderates felt that to continue the hunger strike after the failure of the dialogue was pointless and would result in unnecessary deaths. Shen Tong and other members of the Beijing student union voted to end the hunger strike.¹⁸⁷ However, the hunger strikers were enraged by the move and vowed to keep the hunger strike going. The Protect Tiananmen group grew more powerful and filled its ranks with those discontented with the moderates decision. This discord, according to Han Minzhu, "foreshadowed the final disagreement over tactics that would splinter student solidarity later in month."¹⁸⁸

The leadership of the movement split completely apart and fell into a open power struggle because of the debate over whether or not to leave the square. After the declaration of martial law on May 21, many students started to push for a return to their campuses. However

¹⁸⁶Chai Ling, Interview, in Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Deomocracy Movement, *ibid*, p 197.

¹⁸⁷Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 291.

¹⁸⁸Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Deomocracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 206.

they were originally in the minority. However, some groups of students, because of their fear of government reprisals, left anyway. For example Qinghua students left the square en masse on April 26. Consequently, a decision had to be made by the Movement's leadership on whether or not to leave the square. Moderates like Shen Tong and Wang Dan wanted to leave the square. They felt that staying in the square was too dangerous, and that the Democracy Movement should be continued through other means. Radicals, such as Chai Ling denounced the moderates and all others who wanted to withdraw as "capitulationists" who had to be "resisted."¹⁸⁹ When Wuer Kaixi, a who had been a hard-liner throughout the movement, agreed with the moderates, and called for a retreat from the square, he was kicked out of his committee by the radicals.¹⁹⁰ This debate led to an open power struggle between the radical Protect Tiananmen group and Wang Dan and other moderates in the movement, over who should control Tiananmen.

The non-Beijing students, who by that point made up seventy percent of the students in the square, fell in behind the radicals and refused to leave the square.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹Chai Ling, Interview, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p

¹⁹⁰Liu Binyan, Tell The World, Trans. Henry L. Epstein, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p 51.

¹⁹¹Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement

The Beijing independent student union began to lose its power. The radicals began to use non-Beijing students to keep the moderates away from the Protect Tiananmen headquarters.¹⁹² Eventually the radical students took over completely and asked the student federation people to leave the square.¹⁹³ The federation people retreated to Beida where they remained until the movement was crushed. The Protect Tiananmen group remained in power and refused to leave the square until they were chased out by tanks on June 4.

Thus it can be seen that the Democracy Movement was stricken from its beginnings until it was suppressed, by factionalism among its leaders and its members. The factionalism caused hostility and disunity within the ranks and also resulted in an inability to make lasting decisions. Although the movement's elected leadership voted to return to class, end the hunger strike, and return to class, groups within the leadership prevented these decision. If the moderates had had their way, there would have been no massacre. However, Chai Ling, the leader of the radicals, had stated in late May that her reason to stay in the square was "the spilling of blood." She believed that only by spilling blood could the "eyes of the nations be opened and unite against the

(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 313.

¹⁹² Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p 295.

¹⁹³ *ibid*, p 306.

government."¹⁹⁴ After the factionalism within the movement led to the fall of the ISUBCU, and the ascendancy of the radicals, her wish was fulfilled.

Overall the Red Guard and the Democracy Movements were similar in terms of their political structure in that both suffered from internal hostilities that tore their movements apart and led to open power struggles among the two movements' leaders. Yet the two movements can be distinguished by the fact that the Democracy movement never experienced the extreme nation-wide factionalism that, produced thousands of tiny civil wars throughout China. However, as one political science professor who specializes in China stated, "the Democracy Movement was very brief compared to the Red Guard Movement. If it had not been suppressed in the first couple of months, who knows if its remaining internal unity would have lasted."¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ *ibid*, p 327.

¹⁹⁵ Kraus, Richard, Personal Interview, 25 July 1991, Eugen, Oregon.

PART V: CONCLUSION

Overall, it has been shown that the Red Guard Movement and the 1989 Democracy Movement, Communist China's two greatest student movements, were very different in terms of the substance of the two movements: the two movements' different origins, their divergent tactics, and the tremendous disparity in the risk involved between participating in the Mao Zedong-sponsored Red Guard Movement and the officially condemned Democracy Movement. However, in terms of structure the two movements had many similar characteristics which revealed a consistent structural pattern for modern Chinese student movements: both movements had the goal of reforming the Party, both were led by students from elite universities, both suffered from the mutual problem of internal factionalism, and in addition the two movement were suppressed by the Communist Party out of a fear of the disorder the two movements represented.

In terms of substance, the Red Guard Movement and the Democracy movement were quite different. First, the two movement had very different origins. On one hand, Mao Zedong was the primary mover behind the inception of the Red Guards, and his motives were the destruction of his rivals in the Party and the expansion of his own power. The origins of the Democracy Movement, on the other hand, lay almost entirely within the ranks of the student population. The Democracy Movement was founded by the

students as a reaction to their belief that the Communist Party had become totalitarian and corrupt.

Second, the two movements used very different tactics in pursuing their goals. Many Red Guards did not hesitate to use violence and unjust imprisonment as tactics. Of the units that did not use such tactics, many still used intimidation, verbal abuse and humiliation as means. These tactics have served the severely tarnish the reputation of the Red Guards. The participants in the Democracy Movement, in contrast, mainly relied on peaceful, non-violent means to attempt to achieve their goals. The main tactics of the students involved in the Democracy Movement were peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and the placing of their own lives in jeopardy by engaging in hunger strikes.

Third, the two movements were differentiated by the different amounts of risk that were involved in participating in either movement. The Red Guards undertook extensive campaigns against those officials who they considered to be counterrevolutionary. However, they were protected by the sanction Mao Zedong had given to their actions. Although the Red Guard movement was eventually suppressed and the futures of the former Red Guards were negatively affected, this only happened after Mao himself ordered the suppression of the Red Guards. No other Chinese leader could have ordered such a move, and Mao himself only ordered the suppression of the Red

Guards after almost three years of violence of chaos. In contrast, the Democracy Movement, was almost from its beginning, considered counterrevolutionary by the government. The only high official who openly supported the students, General-Secretary Zhao Ziyang, had been ousted from the Party leadership by hardliners. Consequently, the students involved in the Democracy Movement faced governmental retribution and suppression. Students who joined the Movement faced not only arrest and imprisonment, but the loss of their careers and their comparatively comfortable lifestyles. However, despite this fact, many students chose to join the Movement, knowing full well the risks they faced, but feeling that the risks were unimportant next to achieving their goals.

Thus it can be seen that in terms of their substance the two movements were quite different. However, in terms of their structure the two movements were quite similar. The two movements shared the common goal of reforming the Party. Although radicals in both movements sought to completely overthrow the Party, the majority of the participants in the Red Guards and the Democracy Movement sought instead to reform the Communist Party. The general goals of the two movements were somewhat different. The Red Guards, on one hand, sought to steer the Party away from revisionism back to a more leftist, Maoist policy line. The Democracy Movement, on the other hand, sought to battle corruption and the autocratic nature of the

Party. However, overall these two goals were similar in that both were based on a perception that the Party had strayed from its founding principles, and needed to be a reformed by the students of China.

The leadership of the two movements also displayed similar patterns. Both movements were dominated by China's elite National Level Universities both nationally and in the individual provinces. The Red Guards were founded at Beida and Qinghua universities. The Red Guards from these two elite universities had the greatest power over the national movement, both nation-wide and in Beijing. The Democracy Movement was founded at Beida and was dominated almost from the beginning by students from Beida and Beijing Normal University. The Beida and Beijing Normal students had the greatest influence on the movement, both in Tiananmen and throughout China. In addition the two movements were similar in that in the provinces both movements were further dominated by students from elite universities in the provinces. The activists in the provincial elite universities were, for the main part, under the guidance of the Beijing Red Guards and Beijing Democracy Movement participants. However, in their own provinces, the provincial schools took the dominant role in organizing and leading the Red Guard and Democracy Movements in their own province.

The Democracy Movement and the Red Guards were also struck by the same crippling internal rivalries. The Red

Guard movement degenerated into open violence and warfare because of factionalism caused by disagreements concerning how far the Red Guards should go in attacking officials and who could or could not be a Red Guard. The Democracy Movement also experienced factionalism during its existence. Although this factionalism was never expressed to the same degree it was in the Red Guard Movement, there was still open contention, and different factions attempting to overthrow their rivals. The factionalism in the Democracy Movement was a result of a the loose chaotic organization of the movement, and the disagreements between radicals and moderates in the leadership about tactics and goals. The factionalism in both movements undermined the two movement's abilities to act in concert, and blunted their abilities to carry out their goals.

In addition both movements were suppressed by the government because of its fear of the chaos the two movements were creating. Mao ordered the army to suppress the Red Guards because of the violence of their internal struggles and their excessive actions vis-à-vis the Party apparatus. The Red Guards had attacked so many government officials, that by the middle of 1967 China's infrastructure was on the verge of collapse.¹⁹⁶ The government also ordered the army to suppress the

¹⁹⁶Chesneaux, Jean, China: The People's Republic, 1949- 1976 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), pp 159-61.

Democracy Movement because they believed it was a threat to stability. The hard-line leadership believed the movement wanted to overthrow the Party, and therefore was a force for anarchy and disorder, and consequently a threat to both their rule and the stability of all of China.¹⁹⁷

However, despite these similarities, students and intellectuals in both China and in other countries took pains to distinguish the Red Guard movement and the Student Movement. The reason behind this insistence was that the Cultural Revolution is presently considered a tremendous mistake in China, and that the whole period was one of terror and chaos, not progress. Consequently, linking the Democracy Movement with the Cultural Revolution would have undermined the legitimacy of the Democracy Movement in the eyes of the Chinese people. The government on several occasions tried to do exactly that. On several occasions the government in speeches and in editorials accused the Democracy Movement of repeating the behavior of the Red Guards and other Cultural Revolution groups.¹⁹⁸

The Cultural Revolution had become an anathema because of the excesses it went to in pursuing its ends, and the questionable nature of its ends. The predominance

¹⁹⁷"Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against Turmoil," *People's Daily* editorial, in Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989), p 41.

¹⁹⁸*ibid*, p 27.

of these beliefs was illustrated in a dazibao posted during the Democracy Movement.

*The Ten Differences Between the Patriotic [Democracy] Movement and the Cultural Revolution.*¹⁹⁹

THE PRESENT MOVEMENT

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Nature

Opposed to remnants of feudalism, anti-bureaucratic; science, democracy and in freedom.

Strengthened the personality cult and for placed one billion people intellectual bondage.

Basic Character

Awakening the people.

Serious Turmoil.

Goal

To quicken the pace for democratic reform.

To protect the bureaucracy and the party.

Results

Ideas of democracy have been embedded in the minds of the people. Support for reform.

No progressive results. Major historical retrogression.

Initiation

Spontaneous organization of students.

Chairman Mao alone.

Methods

Non-violent petitions, constitutional.

Violence, arson, robbery and lawlessness.

Means

Strikes, demonstrations and requests for dialogue.

The more confusion the better, the whole country paralyzed.

¹⁹⁹Large Character Poster, in Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement (New York: Black Rose Books, 1990), p 91.

Attitude Towards the Communist Party.

Supporting correct leadership and opposing corruption therein.

Making revolution by destroying party committees, autocratic rule by the head of a sect.

Response of the Masses

Respect for the masses produces widespread support and sympathy.

The hoodwinked masses groan.

Its Place in History

Of equal importance to the May Fourth movement.

Eternally despised!

Although the points listed by the *dazibao* are not all completely correct, they do give an accurate portrayal of post-Mao attitudes with respect to the Cultural Revolution. Most of the Chinese people had witnessed the Red Guard movement, and the brutalities it and other groups had perpetrated. Many of them had been victims of the Red Guards themselves. Even former Red Guards felt victimized. After their suppression, many Red Guards had been judged as politically unreliable and were shipped off to virtual exile in the countryside.²⁰⁰ Others had been jailed, like Kuai Dafu, the leader of Qinghua's rebel Red Guards. Many people now call these former Red Guards "China's Lost Generation."²⁰¹ The people's

²⁰⁰Yue Daiyun and Carol Wakeman, To the Storm: the Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985), pp 254-55.

²⁰¹Barlow, Tani E. and David M. Lowe, Teaching China's Lost Generation: Foreign Experts in the People's

resentment of the Cultural Revolution had been encouraged by Deng Xiaoping, who had himself been a target of the Cultural Revolution himself.

With all these strong feelings concerning the Cultural Revolution, it is easy to see why the students and other participants in the Democracy Movement took pains to distance themselves from it. The students in the Democracy were correct in pointing out the differences between the tactics, origins and results of the Red Guards and their own movement. However, despite these differences, the aforementioned similarities in the politics behind the two movements meant that despite the students claims that the two movements were completely unrelated, the two movements were rather similar in terms of their political structure and could be seen as parallel movements in the continuing structural pattern of Chinese student activism.

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