THE EFFECT OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

ON

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Patricia Reher

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Progressive Movement

With the force of a tsunami, American complacency of the early twentieth century was shattered by a new dynamic force. The tidal wave of change pulled Americans irresistibly into an era of reform and reaction to the inadequacies of existing institutions. The country was off on a moral crusade that was to profoundly alter the face of the nation and was to signify her entrance as a new power on the world political stage.

For over a century little change had occurred in the form of American governmental institutions. The people who had exhibited their adaptibility to the variable conditions of settling a new continent, had grown accustomed to stability in ethics as well as in politics. Though change was forever a part of American life, it was change within the limits of an established moral and political framework. The fundamental theories of democracy were taken for granted as ethical standards were unquestioned.

It was a rude shock to America of the 1890's when

the problems that had been slowly growing in their demands for attention burst through the confines of established thought and institutions. The focal points of stability disappeared, leaving the young nation groping its way to new answers and solutions.

The many and diverse changes that caused this upheval reached in varying degrees into every section, every town, every home in the nation. The character of business and industry had altered. From the small concern to the huge trust, industrialism grew with phenomenal speed. It brought with it the problems of urban expansion, slums, trusts, business and political corruption, racial minorities, and maldistribution of wealth. Reform work in these areas made the necessity of adapting the federal system to a centralized economy and of revaluating the laissez-faire system of economics obvious. The very weight of this hydra-headed monster forced it upon the public conscience.

One of the major changes was in the character of the labor movement. The young organizations were consolidating the gains made in the first advance of the 1880's and were pressing business harder than ever. As a natural result, management consolidated to combat the common danger. By 1900, collectivization had laid firm hold of the labor movement, and rapidly was becoming a part of American life.

Clashes of the labor-management variety served to turn the attention of rural America towards the cities. Great advances had been made in agricultural technology, but the farmer, with little to show for his efforts, felt himself subjected to an economic dictatorship from the industrial centers. Because of the relatively minor power held by the areas of the South, the Mid-West, and the Far West, they experimented with a number of devices to break the stranglehold of the influencial East. The first discontent manifested itself in the Granger Movement. Then with a growing consciousness, it grew into the Populist movement.

These upheavals in industry and agriculture were accompanied by and thrived upon fresh contributions to philosophical thought. The most notable of these were the pragmatic concepts of William James and John Dewey. Their philosophy attacked the fundamental concepts of the nineteenth century mechanistic world in which man was more or less a controlled instrument of a Calvinistic scheme of predestination, a Hegelian or Marxian dialectic, a Darwinian process of selection or of Newtonian physics.

William James proposed a philosophy of causes, of expediency, and of free will. His pragmatism was based upon the concept that truth can be made. Truth is whatever proves itself to be good through the course of events. The individualism of his philosophy was derived from the

role of the individual in influencing events and it placed upon him full responsibility for the successes or failures of his endeavors. It was a philosophy of expediency for James rejected all standards but that of workability. But it also had a humane and optomistic content, for it gave every man a role of active participation and held that man controlled the future. This common sense approach was fully compatible to American life and reflected the many qualities of the American character. It expressed the rugged individualism of the early American and the opportunism of the progressive movement.

John Dewey, working from the same pragmatic concepts as William James, adapted them to the individual working within society. In his opinion and in the opinions of the masses of people he influenced, truth was to be achieved through cooperative action. He accomodated pragmatism to the growing trend towards socialism by shifting the emphasis to the reconstruction of society.

William Graham Sumner and Lester Ward waged a sociological battle that was to be popularized in the familiar disputes of free silver versus sound money, and private enterprise versus socialism. Sumner was a firm advocate of Darwinism while Ward was the ablest opponent of that system of negative and absolute sociology. In his studies, Ward concluded that social evolution was the result not of natural law, but of "man's intellectual capacity" to

"shape environmental forces to his own advantage." The academic dispute between these two men provided the basic issues of the Populist crusade, of the Progressive movement, of the New Freedom, and much later, of the New Deal.

The church was little affected by the battles of the secular world. As in all other countries it had proved to be one of the most effective forms of expression for American humanitarianism. Recognition of this obligation in the twentieth century came to be called Christian socialism; the attitude was old though the terminology was new. But religious emphasis had been and continued to be placed on individual salvation rather than social reconstruction, and those who reversed the order of primary and secondary importance found their ways to be easier outside the established churches than within them. This is not to say that religion scorned social advances or obstructed their progress, for even in the divorced conditions of the secular and religious worlds, theology was influenced by popular opinion.

As the church reacted slowly to the changing philosophy, jurisprudence clung to the historical and natural schools of law. Oliver Wendell Holmes blazed the new trail that was eventually to change the legal character of America. He rejected the belief that law is based on nearly immutable principles and replaced it with the thesis that law is human experience and man's total material and intellectual

environment. His greatest deviation from traditional jurisprudence, pragmatism, gradually came to form the center of judicial thought in the United States.

While these occurrences were rocking the continent with heated disputes, a subtler alteration--at times as subtle as a sledge hammer--was reaching into every community within the nation. Women had slowly worked their way into the world of men, and by 1900 national women's clubs, devoted to the study of social issues, had become common. Their demand for equality and reform left an indelible mark on the new century.

The problems that confronted Americans of the new century were not ones that could be conveniently disposed of by established formulae--many of the issues were not to be immediately settled by any formula. They found their way from the Progressive movement to the New Freedom and eventually the New Deal, living on to pester socialists, economists, and politicians for the next half century. Isolationism and internationalism, laissez-faire economics and government planning, poverty and prosperity, business control and labor rights, integration and racism, agricultural improvement and industrial growth, conservationism and socialism of democracy; these were the areas that involved every person in America in the age of reform.

The initial impulse for reform came from agricultural

America, but as the issues broadened, leadership of the slowly expanding movement was transferred to the cities. The rural areas had been fighting a nebulous enemy that lurked somewhere in the East and held a nearly incomprehensible economic weapon aimed in their direction. The city, to the contrary, had a very real enemy to fight on familiar ground. Two broad and sometimes diverse schools of thought were therefore welded together by twentieth century pragmatic values; one influenced by the Populist inheritance, the other by the simple process of urban life.

In general, the progressive aim was to restore a type of economic individualism and political democracy that was supposed to have been a part of early American life. It was widely believed that to recover these virtues, as well as a kind of morality and civic purity that had also been lost, it would be necessary to reform their destroyers, the political machine and the great corporation. Urban problems, labor, social welfare, municipal reform, and consumer interests came to characterize the primary interests of the progressives.

The progressive mentality may be summed up as a compound of many strange elements. George Mowry says that it was reactionary as well as reform, that it burned with an ethical strain, that it had intense feelings of moral superiority, that it emphasized individual dynamism, that

it looked back to small democratic America yet forward to a highly centralized nationalistic state, and that it contained an element of racism.[1]

This racism was characteristic of the progressives, although they had no monopoly on the feeling and there were important exceptions to the rule. Among the exceptions was Herbert Croly, author of The Promise of American Life. This book formulated the progressive platform and gave it a name that was to be immortalized by Theodore Roosevelt, the New Nationalism. The implications of his program warned against the effect that progressive acquiescence had of strengthening the tendency towards inward thinking in minority groups. If reform was to be achieved, he thought, it would have to be by joint control and support. Roosevelt carried the anti-racist thought a step farther when he took wholesale control of the New Nationalism. Although he saw many races as inferior because of environmental factors, he did not believe that this limited the ability of any individual within the race. His opinion always carried many people along with it, and this issue was no exception.

The four great leaders of the progressive era were William Jennings Bryan, Robert La Follette, Woodrow Wilson, and

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1. George Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 109

Theodore Roosevelt. Despite the differences in party allegiance and in character, they had much in common. They were all children of the Enlightenment, evolutionists, and pragmatists. They all understood the nature of public opinion, recognized the economic basis of political thought, and realized the scope and power of pressure groups in the formulation of policy.

Among the middle-class leaders were a great variety of individualists: Dolliver of Iowa, Cummins of Iowa, Clapp of Minnesota, Borah of Idaho, and Beveridge of Indiana, as well as a number of governors, writers, and men from every other profession. That they were widely respected for their great abilities added immeasurably to the success of their efforts.

The progressive movement was associated with a group of citizens known as muckrakers who became self-appointed voices of the new impulse towards change and criticism. The first of these voices was that of William Demarest Lloyd who aimed his attack against the unethical practices of Standard Oil and other corporations in his volume, Wealth Against Commonwealth. He was followed by Lincoln Steffins' Shame of the Cities, Lawson's Frenzied Finance, and others. Their theme was always the same; the corrupt alliance of business and politics. This thesis was popularized in McClure's, Collier's, Munsey's, Everybody's,

and other mass circulation magazines. They rumaged their way into every major section of American life. Their realistic approach tore into the conscience of the Protestant Yankee. Guilt was personally placed on the head of every person. With the protective shield of Darwinism removed, each individual assumed a portion of the blame for the filth and corruption that surrounded him. Consequently, for many the movement became an affair of the conscience.

The return of Theodore Roosevelt from his journeys across Europe and Africa brought fresh life to the progressives who found it difficult to live with the Taft administration. As soon as Roosevelt had settled down at Oyster Bay, they began urging him to accept another term of office on a progressive platform. Throughout the summer of 1910, Roosevelt edged towards acceptance. Then, in August he officially accepted and publicly declared the New Nationalism. In his famous August 31, address at Osawatomie, Kansas, Roosevelt put the national need before all other concerns. His speech emphasized public welfare, and the necessity of strengthening the central government. "I mean that I stand not merely for fair play under the present rules of the game, but that I stand for having those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial equality of opportunity... The New Nationalism puts the national need before sectional or personal advantage. It

is impatient of the utter confusion that results from local legislatures attempting to treat national issues as local issues. It is still more impatient of the impotence which springs from overdivision of governmental powers... This New Nationalism regards the executive as the steward of public welfare...(It) rightly maintains that every man holds his property subject to the general right of the community to regulate its use to whatever degree the public welfare may require it."[2]

Roosevelt's program quickly became a rallying point for progressives. In 1912, when the Taft forces defeated Roosevelt and his platform in the Republican party convention, the liberal and progressive elements of the party walked out and held their own convention. Naturally, Roosevelt secured the nomination for president. The ringing strains of the "Battle Hymn of the Republic," indicative of the mood of the convention, were soon tempered by the practical considerations which faced the new party. Roosevelt's enormous personal popularity and the dedication of the delegates to their cause held the convention together. The quarrels which arouse when the necessity of compromising with business to secure enough funds to conduct a campaign and with minority and special interest groups to win

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2. Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny, p. 162-3

political support, demonstrated the weaknesses of the organization. If Roosevelt were removed and progressive zeal were transferred elsewhere, the destruction of the new born party would be complete. This was, of course, exactly what happened when Wilson assumed the progressive program and Roosevelt, ever the practical politician, moved back to the Republican fold. But none of this was recognized in the first hours of enthusiasm for Roosevelt and the New Nationalism.

The nomination of a progressive Democrat, Woodrow Wilson, foredoomed the Progressive party. A victory for the new party could have come only with the support of the left wing Democrats. Despite this and other disadvantages, Roosevelt ran a close second to Wilson, and drew many more votes than Taft. On the lower level, however, the "Bull Moose" party did not fare so well and failed to secure enough offices to provide the necessary patronage for party workers.

After the election of 1912, the Progressives found it difficult to maintain a spirit of unity within the party, especially in Congress, where the members refused to cooperate with each other. Little by little support from minority factions was withdrawn as they found the party unable to satisfy their wants and Wilson's progressive program infinitely capable of doing so. Party finances

fell into disrepute, and a general form of decay and atrophy set in.

Because Wilsonian democrats had adopted their program and were successfully initiating and passing legislation based upon it, the Progressives went shopping for a new issue to wage battle on, and to revive the flagging party. As the imminence of war grew, they became completely preoccupied with foreign policy to the exclusion of domestic affairs. "...by 1916," William Leuchtenburg wrote, "the Progressives were completely absorbed with foreign policy issues and their movement was moribund."3

This steady deterioration was brought to an abrupt end when Roosevelt used his still considerable popular support to negotiate his way back into the Republican party. He was followed by the mass of insurgents, still smarting from their political defeat and the defection of their leader.

The end of the party coincided almost exactly with America's entrance into World War I and the end of the progressive movement. But the spirit of progressivism was kept alive through the periods of reaction and "return to normalacy", and was to blossom again in the

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3. William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 39:492, Dec., 1952.

administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. This was possible because the movement was based on the traditional American preoccupation with legalism, insistence on fair play and equal opportunities, obsession with morality, and extreme nationalism. These qualities that came to full bloom during the progressive era had a great effect on the nation's foreign policy, a policy that in this period assumed the rough outlines of what it would eventually become.

The exploding forces of discontent on the domestic scene found a brief outlet in the rising tide of nationalism and national self-consciousness evoked by the Spanish-American war. The unexpected windfall of colonies that fell to the United States after the war, left her an imperialistic nation and touched off a heated controversy over her proper role in the world at large. This dispute was not settled immediately and did little to resolve the unique situation involved in formulating policy for a country that was economically and politically imperialistic yet retained the old moral and psychological arguements for isolation.

But the "ultra-American spirit of patriotism" provided one of the most important progressive ideological ties with the rising forces of expansionism and belligerency

in the world. In addition, George Mowry stated, "The confidence in progress, the emphasis upon accomplishment for the sake of accomplishment, and the almost evangelical belief in the ethical, political, and cultural mission all contributed to a more energetic and ambitious foreign policy."[4]

With frustrating contradiction, national sentiment embraced the role of world power. The public was quite willing to reap the profits of an expanded influence in international politics, but was not in the least prepared to accept the responsibility which accompanied these policies.

A vast new world opened to Americans of the twentieth century. Increasing industrialization provided surplus capital that was put to use in all parts of the world, expanding America's economic empire. After the Spanish-American War she was recognized as the dominant power in the Caribbean and the Americas. The United States became the possessor of a large imperialist holding in the Pacific with the entailing obligation of participation in the disputes of the Far East. John Hay had opened the door in China, Admiral Mahan was expounding his beliefs in naval supremacy, and imperialism, Theodore Roosevelt secured the Panama Canal and became the mediator in the

4. Mowry, op. cit., p. 145

Russo-Japanese War, and Woodrow Wilson was one of the Big Four at Versailles. The United States, with these and many other examples before her, began to understand that she was actually part of the political world.

This dynamic age of reform within the state was thus accompanied by an even more revolutionary change in foreign policy. The progressives who initiated the reform movement never opposed the expansion of the United States as a world power, although they often split on the pragmatic grounds of analyzing specific phases of any foreign policy. In 1912, Herbert Croly preached the role of progressive thought in foreign policy. According to him, "The American nation, just in so far as it believes in its nationality and is ready to become more of a nation, must assume a more definitive and a more responsible place in the international system."5 He also instructed the public that, "The one way in which the foreign policy of the United States can make for democracy is by strengthening and encouraging those political forces which make for international peace... The United States must stand in every practicable way for a peaceful international system."6

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5. Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life, p. 289

6. Ibid., p. 249

The following sections of this paper are an attempt to analyze the broad effect of progressive doctrine and ideology on the foreign policy of the Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. As always, the personalities of great leaders left their imprint on the policies they molded, but the period in which they worked also left an indelible mark. Each of the policies we are to examine had this personal stamp of the man and the dynamic domestic movement that dominated the entire period. Persistent problems in the Far East and Latin America were a consistent source of irritation to all three of these administrations. Since they were persistent and changed only in form and not in content, they provide a convenient basis for comparing the foreign policies of the presidents of the United States during the progressive period.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

The complacency of those who profited from the continuation of out-dated Republican policies was destroyed by the death of William McKinley on September 12, 1901, and the inauguration of Theodore Roosevelt two days later. They remembered, only too well, his zeal as a Civil Service Commissioner, his actions as Head of the New York Police Board, and his reforming intentions as Governor of New York. Their apprehensions were somewhat quieted, however, when he sedately took the oath of office and promised to continue the policies of his predecessor. During the following months, the conservatives found that they had little to fear from their energetic President.

After Roosevelt won the presidency in his own right in 1904, he set out with zeal to expand the powers of the government and the executive branch in particular by curtailing the powers of the great industrialists. As the first President of the United States with progressive

ideas, he preached the progressive doctrine of executive leadership and advocated the use of federal powers to promote clean, efficient government, to check exploitation by large-scale capital, and to strengthen the bargaining position of lower-income groups. His actual accomplishments in this area were not overwhelming, but he provided the direction and indicated the path for his successors to follow.

One of Roosevelt's dominant urges was a desire for power, a desire that was tempered by his strong conviction that he could use that power in the interests of the public.[7] He was primarily a politician, but occasionally his temper and fighting blood were aroused. It was the latter tendency which led him to form the progressive party; his astute political acumen took him back to the Republican fold.

In dealing with other countries, Roosevelt followed a policy that was peculiarly personal. Throughout his life he was an intense nationalist who desired to force the respect of other nation for the United States. Both before and after his presidency this wish took the form of advocating war. But during his years in office, he followed a two-edged policy: building America's power at home to use that power abroad in the cause of peace and

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7. George Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, p. 15.

and justice.

The President's policy of intervention in foreign affairs is often criticized as endangering the security of the United States. If the President had misjudged his foreign counterparts during the years he participated in international politics, this criticism would have become valid. As it was, he seemed to allow for a margin of error and went ahead with his grandiose schemes. He avoided that pitfall of so many statesmen, making threats he couldn't back with force. Roosevelt was an internationalist in the sense that he believed that the United States should take its rightful place as a world power in the council of nations.

"In all of his foreign ventures Theodore Roosevelt had the support of the majority of the progressives."[8] Because domestic concerns vastly overshadowed foreign policy during this period, it is difficult to trace the position of the "progressive" senators over a long period of time on issues concerning foreign affairs. At times their actions seem to indicate political expediency rather than well-thought-out convictions. But, as Leuchtenburg writes, "Progressives, contrary to the orthodox accounts, did not oppose imperialism but, with few exceptions,

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8. Leuchtenburg, op. cit., p. 483-5.

ardently supported the imperialist surge or, at the very least, proved agreeably acquiescent... It was the conservatives that bore the burden of the anti-imperialist campaign..."[9]

Progressive participation in world affairs was no more fantastic than the transportation of progressive morality from middle class parlors, local church buildings, and cloistered university halls into the smoke-filled backrooms populated by political bosses. In comparison, the advance of progressive thought and morality across national boundries and into cultured diplomatic circles lost its uniqueness. At the turn of the century, international relations was a relatively virgin field to Americans. The progressive influence penetrated foreign policy and gave it a flavor that has never disappeared.

The crusading spirit of Roosevelt, which attracted the progressives, was given a loose rein in foreign affairs, and he felt no more concern at reading a lecture to his contemporaries than at lecturing the American people on the virtue of the good life. However, he did so judiciously and seldom allowed his zeal to interfere with his policies. Through all the elaborate tactics of Roosevelt's diplomacy, the moral issues of progressivism and the

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9. Ibid., p. 483-5

obsessive idealism of the American people appear.

McKinley's successor inherited the one clear American policy in foreign affairs; that was intervention in Latin America based on the ancient Monroe Doctrine. Prior to the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, Americans had begun to feel their own nationalism and believed in their own supremacy. During the period of westward continental movement in the early nineteenth century, this belief was termed "manifest destiny." Later, when Darwin's theories appeared, Americans eagerly grasped the phrases "survival of the fittest" and "natural selection"; socially these were transformed into "white supremacy." These concepts were highly gratifying to the national ego. At the end of the nineteenth century they fed the fire of nationalism by taking the form of imperialism. Fanned by the yellow press, Americans rushed into the Spanish-American War. "The great sport" of the young Theodore Roosevelt provided a release for the energies of state and, what was more important, it convinced the bulk of the populace of their own strength. The easy victory over Spain was an ego builder. The relatively young North American state claimed a colonial empire which raised her from the ranks of third-rate powers into the limelight. The United States acquired responsibilities that lifted her out of her isolated status. There was little

precedent to guide the actions of American statesmen, envoys, and diplomats. The field was ripe for molding by dynamic men and ideas.

It had long been a prevalent belief among many of the nation's intellectuals that Americans were superior to their Latin American neighbors. The idea spread with direct contact. This superiority complex, combined with the moral attitude that Americans were bound by duty to aid humanity, determined the relationships of the United States with Latin America for the following thirty years.

Theodore Roosevelt was representative of the American people in his feelings towards the "wretched republics" and their deplorable "insurrectionary habits." Europeans who were creditors of the Latin American states had pointed out that Washington had certain obligations. Roosevelt, who would not permit the foreign powers to collect their debts by force, decided that it would be necessary for the United States to intervene and compel her Southern neighbors to pay their bills. This policy, incorporated in his annual message to Congress in 1904, became known as the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. The President outlined the case to Congress: "Chronic wrongdoing...may in America as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to

the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of an international peace power."[10] Thus, the emphasis of the Monroe Doctrine changed. Its original intention, to prevent European intervention, was amended to prevent it by a justified American intervention.

The issue of the Panama Canal, the second intervention in Cuba, and the Venezuelan crisis are all examples of Roosevelt's tactics in Latin America. Intervention in the affairs of the Dominican Republic provides a particularly interesting example of Roosevelt in action.

The President was very concerned with the deterioration of affairs in that country. Corruption followed rebellion in a predictable cycle. The unstable situation was enough to arouse Roosevelt, but his ultimate actions were based on the threats of European creditors to take over control of the island in order to collect their debts. The Dominican Republic occupies a strategic situation in the Caribbean. At this time the Panama Canal was the chief executive's favorite project, and to allow any European power to occupy its approaches was in the realm of folly. Thus, as pressure from European powers

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10. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 505

mounted, Roosevelt graphically, through a method later named "gunboat diplomacy," persuaded the miniature state to agree to a customs receivership by the United States.

The treaty of 1905 provided that the United States should control the Dominican customs. She was to retain 45 per cent of the receipts for Dominican expenses and to allocate 55 per cent for outstanding debts. The President tactfully interpreted his action as the result of a "moral mandate," which widely appealed to the national pride of Americans. He submitted the treaty to the Senate on the grounds of security, benevolence, and peace, but the upper house declined to ratify the treaty. Therefore, Theodore Roosevelt converted the original treaty into an executive agreement, effective for some twenty-eight months. The agreement drastically changed the usual state of affairs of the Dominican Republic. Business was conducted in an orderly manner, revolutions lost their frequency and intensity, and the European creditors received their due. Finally, in 1907 the Senate approved a new treaty that incorporated, with some modifications, the substance of the original agreement of 1905.[11] Roosevelt's intervention set a precedence for future dealings in the Caribbean based on American supremacy, progressive reform idealism,

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11. Ibid., pp. 505-6

and practical politics. Combined with the prevalent belief that the American form of democratic government was superior to all others, it characterized the diplomacy of the progressive years.

Roosevelt's favorite project during his administration was the building of an isthmian canal. For years men had been challenged by the vastness of the project and the difficulties involved in working on the isthmus. The French, who first attempted to build the canal, lost millions of francs and many men in the jungles of Panama. After the failure of the French company, the scene of speculation shifted from Paris to Washington D. C., where the reorganized New Panama Canal Company under the energetic leadership of William N. Cromwell and Philippe Bunau-Varilla attempted to arouse interest in the Panama route. They found a sympathetic listener in the President, and after this events moved rapidly against a background of skillful maneuvering.

The chief problem in the negotiations for a Panama Canal was the natural desire of the Colombian government for profit. When Colombia rejected the Hay-Herran Treaty, the ingenious Bunau-Varilla fostered the revolutionary tendencies of the Panamanians. The role Roosevelt played in this piece of backhand dealing is still uncertain. He was later to announce to his profound regret, "I took

the Canal," but it is debatable whether he had an actual part in the intrigue. Certainly, he was not ignorant of the proposed revolution.

With outside aid, the Panamanians were successful in their attempt to secure the canal route and independence. Shortly after Roosevelt received the news, he authorized "de facto" recognition which was granted three days later. The way was open for the linking of East and West by sea. On November 18, 1903, the President signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla pact which gave the United States additional territory in the zone by widening the strip from six to ten miles and also granted the United States extraordinary sovereign rights.

The President's hasty actions provoked a storm of abuse from the Democratic party, but they were generally approved by the imperialistic and nationalistic elements in the United States as well as by the large number of people who would profit from the canal.

Western progressives were among those who gave their whole-hearted support to the project. They saw a double advantage in a successful conclusion of the canal. An isthmian route would lessen the cost of transport to the West by breaking the stranglehold of the railroads on Western commerce. Closely connected with this was a hope that the canal would increase the prosperity and thus the power

of the West. If so, the way would be cleared to break the hold of Eastern industrial and boss-controlled machine politics and to pass the liberal reform measures desired by the progressives.

The Republicans, both progressive and conservative, tended to favor Roosevelt's behavior in the Caribbean. The policy was satisfactory if a bit mild to those who considered themselves imperialists; to the anti-imperialist it was justified by a moral obligation to aid the revolutionary states of Latin America--to guide them towards a better way of life.

America's interest in the Far East was as old, or older than that of Europe. This interest was based on American missionary zeal and on trade, a once lucrative business that the United States wished to maintain. The Open Door policy had originally been designed to maintain trade profits through a balance of power which would ensure equal commercial opportunity in China for all. However, as Kennan has pointed out, "The trouble with the Open Door doctrine and the integrity of China as political principles was simply that these terms were not clear and precise ones which could usefully be made the basis of a foreign policy."[12]

12. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950, p. 43

He goes on to say that this policy increasingly led to bewilderment, suspicion, and concern in foreign minds, and led other states to suspect that our statesmen had ulterior motives in pressing abstraction upon them as the criteria of agreement. This was partially the result of an attempt to use an old diplomatic weapon in the context of American idealism.

The balance of power concept in diplomacy had been used for many purposes, all of them to ensure the status quo for someone's benefit. When one power was strong enough or several powers found the status quo advantageous, the policy was successful. Self-interest, not humaneness was the motivating factor. The Open Door was Europe's first indication of the developing form of American diplomacy. Reared in the hard school of the primacy of national self-interest, European diplomats found it hard to believe that the Americans were not just mouthing pretty words while they stole the China trade. This opinion was widespread because the words used by Secretary Hay seemed to have little substance. To Europeans, the American concept of equal advantage for all and territorial integrity for the Chinese simply did not ring true, and they acted accordingly. The democratic heritage upon which the progressives founded their doctrines thus worked against the United States in the Far Eastern theater.

Roosevelt's intervention in the Russo-Japanese War is unparalleled in the diplomatic history of the United States prior to this time and in unexplicable except in terms of the President's personality.

The mediation between Russian and Japan occurred against a kaleidoscopic background of personalities and negotiations. Roosevelt skillfully used key personalities to win the confidence of both sides, even going so far as to enlist the Czar's cousin, the "nervous" Kaiser Wilhelm. His real desire was to end the war before one side became a dominant power or both became so weak that they would devolve into second China's. But, on the other hand, he didn't want the two sides to join hands in the Far East.

Both participants exhausted their energies as the war dragged on, and it was later evident that they had been fighting with their last reserves. Without Roosevelt's intervention, it seems likely that the two nations would have fought to a standstill.

The Portsmouth Conference was a unique occurrence in the United States and additional proof to Americans of the colorful character of their President. It was also proof of Roosevelt's resourcefulness. Using every possible means he brought the two parties to a compromise position, even over the touchy problems of the Sakalin Island and the question of indemnities. Both parties

returned home patently satisfied.

American intervention, as Roosevelt explained it, was related to a broad policy of a navy adequate to protect her possessions and command the respect of Japan, courteous handling of the immigration problem, an aggressive commercial policy in the Far East, and the Panama Canal project. But his main concern was to preserve the balance of power, which he felt was important for a successful conclusion of the above goals.[13]

The President in this way was working towards the same ends in the Far East that were prevalent in earlier negotiations with the European states. The ends were democratic and progressive ones, but the means were peculiarly Roosevelt ian and oriented in the traditional European style. He accepted the existing world situation and achieved his goals.

Following the Russo-Japanese war, more than a thousand Japanese poured into the United States each month, and an unyelling fear followed them; fear of the fanatical military prowess the Japanese had shown, and fear of the low wages that they would accept. Racism was by no means peculiar to the progressive mentality, but was characteristic of it. Some progressives, such

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13. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 168

as Herbert Croly, appealed to the American people to work together rather than as congeries of minority groups. His plea as others went unheard or unheeded by the majority of the American people.

Roosevelt was unlike many racists in that he attributed racial differences to acquired characteristics and to the effect of geographic environment. "In so far as he feared the Japanese he feared them not because of their race but for the same reasons he feared Germans and Russians--because they were an economically powerful, militarily effective rival power."[14] Roosevelt felt no contempt for an individual member of a race who had attained qualities superior to other members of a backward people.

Because of the nature of the federal system, there was little that Roosevelt could do but bargain. The result was the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907-08, which only temporarily calmed feverish tempers. As George Kennan said, when speaking of the possible causes of the Second World War, "We would repeatedly irritate and offend the sensitive Japanese by our immigration policies and the treatment of people of Japanese lineage, and of oriental lineage in general."[15]

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14. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, p. 30

15. Kennan, op. cit., p. 46

America, as a democracy, showed a tendency around the turn of the century to use its own moral standards on the international scene. Since the progressives presumed that they were the judges of ethics, they raised the banner of American ethics and displayed it as their own. The peculiarities of moral diplomacy can be considered either as stemming from the progressives or through them from the movement's heritage.

Although Taft and Wilson repeatedly showed their lack of comprehension of international politics by continuing to blunder in the Far East and Europe, Roosevelt acted in a manner the Europeans could understand. Briefly, he was a skillful statesman who accepted the balance of power doctrine, but who was influenced by progressive thought. His diplomacy shows a curious mingling of these two elements. Roosevelt used practical weapons to back his beliefs in dealing with foreign powers. With astute understanding he used the large arsenal of diplomatic methods to achieve his own ends, which were largely determined by an excessive nationalism, and his moral principles.

Theodore Roosevelt, as the first president of the United States with reforming ideas, set the tone of the movement on the national scene. His dashing personality, tremendous energy, and political skill made him the

chosen leader of the reforming elements. He took these same qualities that won him acclamation on the domestic scene into the international arena to win success after success. With them he set the tone of future domestic and foreign policies, blazing trails in Caribbean policy and setting an example at the conference table that other men were to follow.

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

The doors of the White House swung open in 1909 to admit the large person of the incoming president, William Howard Taft. All indications favored a successful administration, for Taft had proved himself to be an able lawyer and an even better administrator. His big-hearted disposition, which more than matched his broad physique, had endeared him first to the Filipinos and then to the people of the United States. In addition, he was the hand-picked successor of Theodore Roosevelt who was still idolized by millions of Americans.

But Taft settled uneasily into the president's chair. Unlike his predecessor who had never doubted his own ability, the new president was hesitant about following in the footsteps of such a dynamic man. Immediately, hundreds of detailed problems pressed in upon him, complicated by the political factors necessarily involved in any decision. While Roosevelt departed for Africa,

Taft went to work.

In making presidential decisions and in formulating policy, William Taft was both aided and hindered by his personal ideals. "I feel seriously that I represent the people's cause," he wrote his brother towards the end of his administration, "that I represent the cause of constitutional government, that I represent the cause of liberty regulated by law."[16]

William Taft had a well-developed sense of the importance of right and wrong, of responsibility to his friends and benefactors, and of moral accountibility to the public. His principles were firmly established from his background in jurisprudence. They consistently pushed him towards the support of any measure he considered right or just whether they were issues supported by Roosevelt, the conservatives, or the progressives. At the same time, his early background, and his experiences as Governor of the Phillipines, and as a judge, tended to make him conservative in outlook and in temperament. He naturally sought men of similar views as friends and as advisors. But his belief in welfare legislation, beneficial to the people, and in the continuation of the program outlined by Roosevelt gave him the same ends in many cases as the

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16. Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, Vol. II, p. 645

progressives. Such benevolent views, which pulled him between the progressive and conservative factions within the Republican ranks, caused a vacillation that confused and irritated Republicans at both extremes of the party.

During the opening days of the administration, the progressives were led to believe that they could rely on the President for support. His seeming defection to the enemy on the tariff issue aroused their lasting bitterness and suspicion. The chief executive's support of the Payne-Aldrich bill confirmed their worst expectations. Where Roosevelt's magnetism had allowed him to drive ahead, certain of a fairly united support from his party, Taft's personal predilections led him to fall back on the stronger and conservative wing of the Republican party.

President Taft's program of legislation was neither conservative nor reactionary. The mission Roosevelt had entrusted to his successor could not have been placed in hands more willing to carry it out. Taft aimed at legislation that was fundamentally Rooseveltian and progressive: more efficient government; an end to unfair business practices; and a better way of life for the mass of American people. These were founded in progressive ideology, but the progressives felt no kinship with the President.

Here lay Taft's greatest drawback as president; he was mentally unable to play the role of a politician.

Time after time he committed blunders in the political arena that impeded progress on essential legislation. When he needed the support of the liberals he was seen hobnobbing with their opponents; when he desired conservative backing he was vigorously spiking their guns through anti-trust activities. The result was that a rebellious Congress often ran away with the initiative, and built their own programs, completely independent from any presidential influence.

Unfair comparison, considering the differences in temperaments and accomplishments, were often drawn between Taft and Roosevelt. Some of these conclusion which Roosevelt's friends reached and later impressed upon him brought the two men to an irreconcilable split. Taft felt himself condemned for following his instructions tempered by his own beliefs and the necessities of office; Roosevelt believed that he had been betrayed by a trusted friend, the person to whom he had willed the White House.

The rift between these two men preceded a greater division within the Republican party. It insured a Democratic victory in 1912, and led to the transfer of the leadership of the progressive movement to that party and ultimately to Woodrow Wilson. Many repercussions thus sprang from a single factor, one that had great importance to the successes and very future of the progressive

movement.

As the administration developed, it compiled a record of beneficial legislative and administrative action. At each turn, however, Taft was hindered by a recalcitrant Congress. Opposition in the first two years by his own party and a Democratic majority in the House during the last two years sealed the fate of many sound proposals. Despite the struggle, at the end of four years Taft had managed to follow up most of Roosevelt's early gains. Under labor legislation he could point to a mining bureau bill, an employers' liability act, a workman's compensation act, and a children's bureau bill. In Roosevelt's favorite arena, trust-busting, Taft prosecuted a large number of suits, including several big cases against the Standard Oil Company, the Tobacco Trust, the United States Steel Corporation, and the International Harvester Company. In addition, he attempted to unscramble the governmental system which no one understood; he sponsored the Mann-Elkins Act increasing the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission; he drove through judicial reform; he tried to initiate civil service reform; and he worked to clear up the financial tangle by designing the first administrative budget.

All this serves to point out the deep impression that the philosophy underlying progressivism made upon

Taft. But while this influence appeared in his domestic policy, it was markedly absent from his foreign policy.

Despite the diplomatic experience he had gained from his services to Theodore Roosevelt, he almost completely turned over the responsibilities for foreign affairs to his Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox was an excellent lawyer and a good politician, having served as Attorney General for Roosevelt until he resigned to become a Senator from Pennsylvania. It was his qualification as an outstanding lawyer that led to his appointment. The President, whose supreme ambition was to sit on the bench of the Supreme Court, wanted as many legal minds in his cabinet as possible. But despite his competence as a polician and corporation lawyer, Knox had no training in the intricacies of foreign affairs.

The executive's foreign policy in the Far East acquired a tag that carried over to his South American policy and was to identify both as "Dollar Diplomacy." American policy in these areas had long been conditioned by the exigencies of trade and the moralistic attitudes of the Open Door and the Monroe Doctrine. To secure these odd principles as well as peace and stability in the Caribbean and territorial integrity in China, Taft and Knox devised a policy that would economically strengthen the countries involved and, ipso facto, their political systems as well. The policy involved encouraging American banks

and businesses to invest in government approved projects abroad in conjunction with diplomacy through regular channels. Other nations had long been practicing a similar form of diplomacy in which the pound sterling, franc, or ruble was successful in leading to political domination.

In an address in May, 1910, Taft summed up his views on this policy, "We believe it to be of the utmost importance that while our foreign policy should not be turned a hair's breath from the straight path of justice, it may be made to include active intervention to secure for our merchandise and our capitalists opportunity for profitable investment which shall insure to the benefit of both countries concerned. There is nothing inconsistent in the promotion of peaceful relations and the promotion of trade relations... To call such diplomacy "dollar diplomacy"...is to ignore entirely a most useful office to be performed by a government in its dealings with foreign governments."[17]

Dollar Diplomacy was thus a two-pronged economic weapon. It gave American surplus capital a foreign outlet and, as the loan agreements stipulated that the funds were to be used for American goods, business was stimulated. The new device also strengthened the economic base of the country which received the investments.

17. Ibid., p. 678-9

In application, this policy did not live up to expectations. Its short run successes were evident in the Caribbean where bankrupt governments led to foreign intervention to collect debts and encourage revolutionary activity. But financial investment could not under prevailing conditions halt or sidetrack the forces detrimental to peace and security. In the Far East, American financiers stood no chance midst the fierce rivalry of the European states who saw in China a weak country subject to colonial grabbing and a battleground in their continental diplomatic struggles.

Nevertheless, possessed only of foresight, the Taft administration considered this form of diplomacy both admirable and successful. In 1911, Knox declared: "If the American dollar can aid suffering humanity and lift the burden of financial difficulty from States with which we live on terms of intimate intercourse and earnest friendship, and replace insecurity and devastation by stability and peaceful self-development, all I can say is that it would be hard to find better employment."[10]

The political split between Taft and the progressive Republicans was bitter, as the insurgents saw the President moving hand-in-hand with the conservatives. They hotly contested his policies, but generally approved

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10. Bailey, op. cit., p. 550

Dollar Diplomacy, though they sometimes attacked it because of the general feud. As Taft professed that his policy would secure peace and security among the South American states and among the great powers in the Far East, and that it was aimed at the betterment of the common people of other lands, and supposedly stimulated the economic development of the United States, the progressives favored or were at the very least apathetic towards Dollar Diplomacy. William Leuchtenburg summed up his views on the progressive position of 1910: "Taft was beleagured by a progressive bloc which opposed him on purely ideological grounds, on occasions out of personal spite, but at no time because of disagreement with Taft's Dollar Diplomacy."[19]

The policy followed by Taft and Knox was later ridiculed. But at the time, Dollar Diplomacy met little opposition on the basis of its merits or lack of them. A new era of American diplomacy had begun which was to lead to Bryan's proposed foreign aid to Nicaragua, the Marshall Plan, and today's large-scale investment of government and private funds abroad.

Taft and Knox also were interested in maintaining the traditional policy of the "open door" in China by using Dollar Diplomacy. They acted under the influence

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19. Leuchtenburg, op. cit., p. 486

of Willard D. Straight, consul general at Mukden and later agent for an American banking group, and E. H. Harriman, famous for his successful railroad building projects in the United States. Straight was vehement in his belief that the internal stability and territorial integrity of China could be ensured and the "open door" secured by using large sums of American capital for internal improvements. Harriman was drawn into the Far East question by his dream of a global transportation system.

The administration plunged vigorously into the turbulent Chinese situation with convictions that bordered on extreme idealism. It is not known whether accurate information on the Far East was unavailable to them, or they ignored it because of a belief in the infallible power of the dollar. In any event, the United States had no support in its ventures to improve the economy of China, thereby strengthen the Manchu Empire, even from China herself.

The nations of Europe were interested in China only as a weapon for ensuring peace in Europe. Since China had been opened to trade in the 1850's, the imperialistic and colonial powers sought to expand their spheres of interest in the weak Chinese state with the thought of establishing actual colonies if the situation warranted the risk. By 1910, the problem was explosive, and it was

feared that an upheaval in the East would lead to war in Europe. If war could be avoided by partition, they would partition China.

The key to the Chinese situation was Manchuria. By 1907, Japan and Russia had divided this province into spheres of influence, each with its own railroad lines. Taft proposed to block their move towards colonial domination by advancing a huge sum of money to the Chinese from American banks to enable them to regain full control of Manchuria by buying the essential railroads.

Only a skillful statesman with a deep understanding of the existing alliance system and the exact interests of all the countries involved in this complex issue could have carried out the American policy. Knox was unable to cope with a situation that he didn't understand. The net effect of his efforts was to drive Japan and Russia into a treaty of amity in 1910, which closed firmly the Open Door in Manchuria, and in effect, in China also. Taft apparently was ignorant of the implications of the treaty, for he continued to encourage American investment in China, which Russia and Japan systematically blocked.

Roosevelt had recognized the weakness of the Open Door and preferred that the United States withdraw rather than suffer an ignominious retreat from a position that

she could not maintain. As he wrote to Taft, "the Open Door policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to run the risk of war rather than to forego its intention."[20] Knox, to the contrary, preferred to have Americans stand by their principles, even though they should fail in having them adopted. Few Americans, even within the State Department, understood the factors at work in China. The time-sanctioned Open Door principle found wide approval among the progressives. The maxim "what is old is good" sufficed for knowledge, while Americans continued to wrangle over more pressing affairs.

Taft was as devoted to the old principles of the Monroe Doctrine as he was to the Open Door. His large heart responded to the idea of giving protection to peoples less able to defend themselves, involving a spirit of brotherly love towards America's weak neighbors. But even he was soon exasperated by the Southern "brothers", and at times wished to, and did, wield the "big stick" as vigorously as his predecessor claimed to have done.

Thus, Taft and Knox reversed Root's tactics of conciliating the Latin American states. They embarked on a new and fundamentally aggressive policy of Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean that was inspired by Roosevelt's

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20. Kennan, op. cit., p. 15

successes in the Dominican Republic. The result was an extension of America's financial empire into the Caribbean.

President Taft considered peace and stability in the five states of Guatemala, Honduras, San Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica as primary American objectives. Their proximity to the Panama Canal made them strategic factors in America's South American policy.

President José Santos Zelaya of Nicaragua was the main obstacle to this objective. According to Taft, Zelaya had brought about civil war and had blocked any prospects of peace among the five republics. In December, 1909, American troops forced Zelaya to abdicate.

With the collaboration of Zelaya's successor, the Estrada government, a loan treaty was prepared providing for $1,500,000 at 6 per cent interest to tide over the penniless government. This treaty provided for a customs collectorship under the control of American banking houses but with nominal approval in the hands of the Taft administration. It failed to pass the American senate. Nevertheless, Juan Estrada received the money, then frittered it away. Discontent, never long dormant in Nicaragua, made itself felt through the traditional revolution led by Luis Menas and the Liberal party. United States marines were landed to protect American property and restore peace to the small republic. For

the second time a treaty was drafted providing for American supervision of Nicaraguan affairs, but it too failed in the Senate, defeated by insurgent Republicans in alliance with the Democrats.

The American bankers obtained only moderate profit from their Nicaraguan investments. The surprising fact is that they made any profit at all. On the balance sheet, Taft's policies did help to stabilize the chaotic Nicaraguan situation but only at the expense of the Liberal party of the tiny state. His actions, whatever their motives, caused distrust and resentment in other Latin American countries.

Diplomacy aimed at profit for American business was carried a step further than simple Dollar Diplomacy in the Panama Canal Tolls controversy. American shippers paid millions of dollars in tolls each year. The prospect of additional tolls from the Canal was not inviting. Naturally, they protested to Washington and vigorously pointed out that the United States owned the Canal. Why, they asked, must her citizens be required to pay for its use? The public felt almost exactly the same way and the powerful force of national sentiment swung behind the shippers. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, however, stood in the way of remission of tolls to American shippers. To solve the dilemma, Taft first thought that the government

could use subsidies to pay the tolls, which would have the beneficial result of lowering rates on trans-continental shipping. But he later shifted to proposing abolition of the tolls. England vehemently protested against this discrimination and argued that such a move by the United States would violate the Anglo-American treaty. On the other hand, the United States government reasoned that it would not violate the treaty, for the wording of the document did not specifically say that the "owner" of the canal would have to pay the same rates as everyone else.

Congress passed the Panama Canal Tolls bill, with the only opposition coming from the railroads, who stood to lose from cheap shipping rates via the Canal. The progressives vigorously supported the measure which would lower transcontinental rates, break the power of the railroads, and lead to greater economic development in the West and proportionally more power for that region in national politics.

Closely connected with the problems of the canal were the upheavals in the strategic Caribbean area. The Roosevelt system had proven successful in the Dominican Republic, but the assassination of President Ramon Caceres and the election of Eladio Victoria brought new troubles for the President. Conflict within the Dominican Republic spilled over into a boundary dispute

with Haiti. Border warfare, guerrilla activity, and sniping between liberal and conservative factions in the Dominican Republic turned the island into a dangerous inferno. In less than a year Dominican indebtedness had skyrocketed, and a revolution seemed inevitable. The President saw no way to restore order except by taking over the entire government, and he hesitated to make this move. Events did not wait for the American President to make up his mind. Shortly before the 1912 elections, further revolutions forced Taft to dispatch warships.

To resolve the situation Washington exerted pressure to force Haiti and the Dominican Republic to approve a "de facto" boundary line established by the United States. The office of the General Receiver was to enforce the observance of the boundary through use of a border patrol. This did little to abate the turmoil which continued and was inherited by Taft's successor, Woodrow Wilson.

Such summary actions aroused indignation throughout Latin America. It was obvious to the Hispanic American countries that the American government did not consider them responsible republics. Fear and distrust of American motives burned an intense wound that influenced their thinking and actions for decades afterwards. Dollar Diplomacy was not the sole cause of this, but it was another

reminder of the power wielded by a superior economy.

A striking contrast to the usual form of diplomacy towards Latin America was the administration's project to promote good relations with countries such as Chile by supplying them with American army officers to instruct their artillery officers. In addition to encouraging an Inter-American exchange of personnel and ideas, this program was fostered by the government to influence Chile towards modeling their coast artillery along the lines of the United States. American contractors could supply Chilean needs and industrialists would profit. Except for Robert La Follette, few progressives protested. The Senator from Wisconsin charged that the Secretary of State and the President would go to any lengths to secure business for their friends on Wall Street, and were motivated by this desire.

This shot from a leading progressive fell wide of the mark. For at the same time as the charge was made, Taft was making equally intransigent enemies among the conservatives by his rapidly-developing anti-trust activities. This incident serves to point up Taft's political ineptness. He unhappily blundered into the firing lines of first one faction then another, while trying to pacify all and still act as his conscience directed.

William Taft and Philander Knox made only one substantial change in American foreign policy; that was the use of the dollar as a "handmaiden" of their strategy. This concept was a new one in the United States, but it did not spring from the progressive movement or from liberal thought. It came rather from the desire to utilize economic pressure for the support of American policy. The means by which the dollar was to boost peace and security included raising the standard of living within the countries concerned. The humane ideals involved here appealed widely to the American people and particularly to the progressives. They were attracted to the policies aimed at increasing the liberties and welfare of a people. But the European balance-of-power system was beyond their comprehension, and the raison d'etat of early twentieth century international politics did not interest them.

Where Roosevelt had stepped in, Taft declined to tread. Instead of pitting America against the major powers of the continent he retreated to the time honored practices of the Open Door and the Monroe Doctrine. The progressives had no quarrel with them, but they often opposed the President out of spite. As always, foreign policy was closely connected with domestic occurrences. Since Taft had put himself on the wrong side of the political fence,

the insurgents within his party allied with the Democrats to defeat many of Taft's treaties. The progressives thus had an important effect on the course of his foreign policy, but it was a negative one.

WOODROW WILSON

Woodrow Wilson entered the White House as the recognized leader of the progressive faction of the Democratic party, and as the self-appointed leader of the American liberal movement. As such, he had based his entire campaign around domestic problems.

Wilson's philosophy on government as well as his platform were written into the New Freedom. Basically, it called for an end to the trusts and unfair business practices of expanded industry, and looked back to the old democratic principles of competition. In both his concepts of presidential power and broad legislative action he resembled Theodore Roosevelt, as leader of the Progressive party. Throughout his administration he was consistent in trying to live up to his ideals on both counts. With amazing vigor he expanded the scope of the executive branch and worked towards closer cooperation with the

legislative and judicial branches; always trying to make the government fit the needs of the time.

His legislative program was designed not to limit, as originally planned, but to expand the role of the government along progressive lines. The President's first assults were made on the old high tariff, which resulted in the Underwood-Simmons Tariff and lowered duties by about 10 per cent. The Glass-Owen Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, and the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 are all representative of the type of legislation he initiated and his power to see it through Congress.

At the time of his election he knew painfully little about foreign affairs. Wilson dryly remarked to a friend that it would be ironic if the success of his administration should be judged upon issues of foreign policy. Weeks before he took the oath of office, it became apparent that a number of dangerous situations were building up abroad.

Much to the amazement of his contemporaries, one week after Wilson entered the presidency, he issued two statements on foreign policy, one dealing with China and one with Mexico; both contained a wrathful denunciation of Taft's Dollar Diplomacy. On March 11, he declared what was to be the essence of his foreign policy, he was

to apply the vision of democracy to the world as well as to America. "We hold that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval... We shall lend our influence of every kind to the realization of these principles in fact and practice."[21] The professional diplomats in the State Department were aroused to protest, the progressives of both parties were enthusiastic, and foreign embassies evinced a doubt heavily tinged with scorn.

The roots of these pronouncements from a man who admittedly knew very little about foreign policy, were the same as those of the New Freedom. The new president early began to apply the old democratic and moral principles of the United States to international problems. He looked upon foreign policy as a mere continuation of domestic policy.

Bryan and Wilson had little knowledge of foreign countries or diplomatic techniques. They went into office armed with progressive ideas and handicapped by a profound distrust of the conservative State Department bureaucracy. The professionals reciprocated the attitude, suffering under Wilson's "impractical, amateurish, and

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21. Ray Standard Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters: President 1913-1914, Vol. IV, p. 242

idealistic" pronouncements.

Because of the antipathy between the conservative servants and their liberal boss, Wilson began using extra-diplomatic agents and special emissaries. He was determined to keep the administration from slipping into a rut of "mere legalism". On the other hand, Wilson's circumvention of usual channels tended to paralyze normal relations and understanding between the State Department and their counterparts in other countries.

While Wilson was initiating his ambitious legislative program in Washington, trouble was breaking in Mexico City. The ambitious and implacable Indian, Victoriano Huerta, with active aid from the American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, had seized power from President Madero and assassinated him. The news shocked many--none more so than Wilson. Taft in the awkward final hours of his administration postponed recognition, leaving the matter to his successor. Many conflicting reports reached the new President. Those from South America showed unrest, suspicion, and fear of the United States, because of its meddling, materialism, and the implications of its Dollar Diplomacy.

The problem of recognition was compounded by British and South American recognition of the Huerta government as well as by intense pressure from vested American

interests in Mexico. Traditionally, the recognition policy of the United States required both effective power and consent of the governed. But because of the difficulties involved in establishing this, the United States came to accept governments with just "de facto" power.

Since 1858, there had been concern in Washington over the validity of revolution as a manifestation of a popular mandate, and in the 1870's, the United States required a new Mexican government to promise to uphold its international obligations. Wilson not only invoked the consent of the governed clause and demanded proof of Huerta's willingness to fulfill international obligations; he went further. Never before had a recognition policy been based on the desire to promote constitutional government as the basic corrective for conditions breeding disturbances, or looked toward the improvement of internal interests of Latin American states as distinct from the interests of the United States. Wilson was specifically thinking of a kind of moral intervention in Mexico through non-recognition to advance the welfare of the people and of their democratic institutions.

In December of 1913, one of Wilson's special emissaries reported from Mexico City that the diplomatic corps there was openly stating that the United States must fail for Europe would not allow her material interests to be

sacrificed to a "deluded altruism."

Although foreign opinion of American policy was doubtful, hostile, or just apathetic, Wilson had aligned public opinion behind him in the States. Except for business interests, most Americans seemed sincerely hopeful that their president could find a way to introduce a stable democracy in Mexico. As an admirer wrote in Harper's Weekly, "It is exciting to have in the White House a man who is capable of focusing the most progressive moral principles of the time and applying them successfully to the most complicated situations, fearless of mere conventional criticism, and confident of the triumph of right ideas."[22]

Relations between the United States and Mexico grew steadily worse throughout 1913. Early in 1914 the Tampico incident set a match to the explosive situation. The American jingo press was aroused over the arrest of a handful of sailors from Admiral Mayo's fleet, and the subsequent refusal on the part of the Huerta government to apologize. The United States was astir with war and imperialist sentiment. The progressive, Senator Borah, wrote, "This looks like armed intervention. In that case, I can only say, if the flag of the United States is ever run up in Mexico it will never come down. This is the

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22. Ibid., p. 320

beginning of the march of the United States to the Panama Canal."[23]

Huerta persistently refused to retreat before American threats and Wilson clung hopefully to his original position. News of a shipload of guns en route from Germany to Vera Cruz forced the President's hand. American troops immediately occupied the port city and captured the weapons. Mexico's stubborn dictator even then would not admit defeat. The revolutionary forces of Carranza and Obregon looked with nationalistic disapproval on Wilson's maneuver and refused to give him the aid he had expected from within Mexico.

The President thus succeeded in involving himself in a veritable quandary. A war would be costly, bloody, and at variance with his Mobile Address. Fortunately, the ABC powers of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, graciously offered their services as mediators, but the reprieve that Wilson gained lasted only long enough to see Carranza's government established. Wilson, the peace lover, next found himself confronted with Francisco Villa, a Mexican revolutionary with the regrettable habits of raiding across the United States border, and of massacring mining mining engineers. The result was General Pershing's

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23. Ibid., p. 320

famed dash into Mexico, which left a snarling Carranza, an uncaptured and delighted Villa, an unfinished revolution, and a deep hatred for the United States in Mexico.

But Wilson had held fast to his fundamental purposes, to put down "government by murder," to assist to power a more democratic form of government in Mexico, to weaken the exploitation of other foreigners, and to avoid actual war when results might have led to American territorial aggression.

The Panama Canal Tolls Dispute was another important carry-over from the previous administration. During the elections of 1912, the Republicans were silent on this issue, Roosevelt's Progressives were vigorous in their approval of exemption, and the Democrats were in favor of exemption but less violently so. In his campaign, Wilson atfirst concurred with his party's position, linking low water rates with his campaign against "privilege" and "private monopoly." These speeches were to cause him no little embarrassment in the coming congressional battle.

Great Britain voiced strenuous objections over the United States Panama Canal Act, passed in 1912, which allowed free passage to United States coastwise vessels. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 had specifically guaranteed equality of treatment for all ships of all nations. Defenders of the law argued that it was an American Canal,

constructed by Americans and paid for by Americans. Thus, our coastwise shipping should be exempt while ships of the United States in foreign trade would pay the same tolls as those of other nations.

Wilson, when he examined the situation, decided that Great Britain was morally right, especially when he found that coastwise shipping was a virtual monopoly. The only honorable thing to do under the circumstances was to uphold the original agreement. He sincerely believed that a nation was no different than a person in this respect; the nation was only as good as its word.

The congressional battle was a strangely mixed affair. All party lines were destroyed. Such stalwart Republicans as Lodge and Root supported the bill, while other Republicans like Smoot and Norris opposed it. The Democrats were likewise divided. The proposal presented a strange choice to the member on Congress. On one hand stood America's honor as a nation in upholding treaty agreements, on the other were cheaper transcontinental rates and nationalism. Wilson's influence held, however, and on June 11, 1914, the bill became law.

The Panama Canal Tolls Dispute provides a good example of the problems progressives as well as all Americans faced when dealing with other states. Policy became a strange mixture of selfish and altruistic motives.

This goes a long way towards explaining the contradictions in long term goals and immediate actions.

Wilson's distrust for Dollar Diplomacy and his hope for closer relations with America's neighbors led to a number of these inconsistencies. For instance, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1916, giving the United States a canal option and the right to intervene in Nicaragua, was voted in with the approval of a number of Republicans on the ground that it was but a logical continuation of Taft's Dollar Diplomacy.

The President never had the time to devote to the affairs of Central and South America that was necessary. Intense pressures from all sections of the United States as well as from many parts of the world claimed his constant energy. As a result, Wilson was seldom well-informed on current affairs south of the border with the exception of Mexico. Instead of tending to these problems, himself, he left them in the hands of his trusted advisor, Secretary of State Bryan.

American difficulties in the Caribbean were complicated by a lack of efficient personnel, the desire of the bankrupt governments to continue bank loans from the United States, and the constant revolutionary ferment in these states.

The "Great Commoner" was at a loss to reconcile these problems. The personnel difficulties developed from

the many political debts left from his presidential campaigns. The men he sent to the Caribbean and points South came highly recommended by the party, but had little else in their favor. They were, for the most part, men who had been left out when the spoils were divided. The most notorious of these was James Sullivan who was sent as United States Minister to the Dominican Republic. In time, men such as Sullivan were replaced, but the damage was done.

In attempting to solve the need of Caribbean countries--Nicaragua in particular--for money, without resorting to American banks, Bryan developed the first plan for foreign aid. But Wilson, looking to the effect such a plan would have on Congress, deemed it impractical, despite its merits.

President Diaz of Nicaragua, hard pressed by revolutionaries and a bankrupt treasury, was desperate. Needing some solution, Bryan finally arranged a bank loan with stiff terms which was entirely agreeable to Diaz. Certain stipulations were placed on the loan, among them was a special advisor appointed by the United States government. Oddly enough, his salary was paid by Brown Brothers. In this way American policy in the Caribbean resumed the financial shape it had taken under the Taft administration.

Revolutions in the Caribbean continually hampered

the effectiveness of the policies of Wilson and Bryan, as they had Taft and Roosevelt. In the Dominican Republic the problem was solved by elections which were attended by "observers" and in Nicaragua by the presence of Marines.

The policies of the Wilson government in the Caribbean were almost total failures in the terms of the administrations long-range objectives. Two of Bryan's interpretations of the President's ideas in that area were to carry America's form of democratic government to the South and to move international diplomacy into harmony with the "universal conscience." When faced with the harsh realities of international economics and the state of affairs in the Latin American countries these policies met defeat.

Bailey sums up the fate of Wilson's policies rather neatly: "Attempting to reverse Taft, he managed to reverse himself and carry out dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean on a much larger scale than his maligned predecessor. A foe of armed imperialism, he practiced a kind of moral imperialism. An avowed lover of peace, he landed marines in Haiti and Santo Domingo, and twice invaded Mexico."[24] On the other hand, he supported Bryan's draft of a general Pan-American treaty in 1914, kept the liberation of the Mexican masses in mind, avoided a full-scale war, and, by deferring to the Latin American powers, helped the cause

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24. Bailey, op. cit., p. 562

of mediation and Pan Americanism.

Progressive reform concepts proved unsuccessful when applied to Spanish America. The fact that the attempt was made, however, is very important. For the first time, American thought and culture were expanding beyond the nation's boundaries, and the form presented to the world through Wilson's efforts was the dominant domestic influence, progressivism.

The murder of the Duke of Serbia that began the fatal chain reaction of events in Europe was ignored in the United States. Americans had become largely immured to wars on the European continent. Wilson's unsuccessful efforts as a peacemaker were thought of as an unnecessary gesture if they were considered at all. It was simply taken for granted that the decadent states of Europe could not possibly start a war large enough to involve the United States.

As the flames of war engulfed nation after nation on the continent, America felt its effects. The advantages of a neutral under the old rules of war were multitude, and the United States was prepared to profit from them. But the massive conflict on the other side of the Atlantic soon assumed a strange and ominous form. While warlike incidents continued to threaten the peace, Wilson held

into a second term under the slogan "He kept us out of war," and debates on the merits of entering the conflagration on either side mounted.

The progressives had two important arguments against involvement: "any nation participating in the conflict would be joining a greedy struggle for power and wealth, and much more harm than good would come to the United States from entering the war."[25] But many progressives were against entering the war simply because involvement would necessarily bring an abrupt end to reform. Since America had never participated in a war that consumed all of her energies, they had little conception at the time of how far war would retard the reform movement.

As the din of guns grew louder in America, more and more citizens favored entrance into the struggle. Theodore Roosevelt, his blood seething again as it had before the Spanish-American War, the lessons of his presidency forgotten, joined the group. Roosevelt represented the faction that favored involvement. It was his belief that the United States was potentially one of the world's greatest powers, if not the greatest, and that it was her duty to enter the struggle that was enveloping the world. In his opinion it was necessary that the enormous power

[illegible]

25. Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny, p. 192

and power potential of the United States be placed on the side of justice. The ex-president had a brief struggle with his conscience on just exactly which side justice lay, but once he had reached a conclusion he was ready for war.

In the White House, Wilson struggled with his own conscience. His war message to Congress indicates how he resolved the problem for himself and for many other Americans, especially the doubtful progressives. He stated firmly and confidently that the United States was entering a contest of principle, not greed. This war was to be the one which ended all wars; it was to clear the way for unending peace and reform. Some progressives became convinced that the future of the reform movement in America and even America itself rested on the war.[26]

President Wilson transmuted the war into a religious crusade whose utopian spirit took a more substantial form in the Wilson proposal for a league of nations. The idea, was neither new nor utopian. Statesmen and writers had talked of a world organization to abolish war for centuries. But when the American formulated his suggestions for a league, it began to take the form of reality and became freighted with utopian aspirations.

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26. Goldman, op. cit., p. 201

In May, 1916, Wilson declared his support of American participation in a postwar association of states. Then, on January 8, 1918, to counter Bolshevik contentions that the war was an imperialist struggle, he presented to Congress his famous Fourteen Points, which explained to the world at large the principles for which the Allies were fighting.

The Fourteen Points were intended to satisfy the world, to buttress the forces of peace, and to advance the role of democratic freedoms. Wilson called for the abolition of secret diplomacy, for freedom of the seas, the self-determination of states, the removal of economic barriers between states, the adjustment of colonial claims in the interests of both the colonies and the nations involved, and the guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity through a "general association of nations."

There were three basic ideas in Wilson's Fourteen Points: national self-determination, democracy, and international law and order. The theory of self-determination was a world-wide success. The plea for democracy was founded in progressivism to the extent that it meant change. The doctrine of international law and order had been stated earlier by the progressive, Herbert Croly, "The one way in which the foreign policy of the United

States can make for democracy is by strengthening and encouraging those political forces which make for international peace... The United States must stand in every practicable way for a peaceful international system."27

Progressivism had long been closely allied to nationalism, particularly among Theodore Roosevelt and his followers. Roosevelt himself gave up on progressivism and swung behind the war movement to "uphold the national honor." In 1916, the Progressive party merged with the "old guard" Republicans on nationalist grounds and adopted the domestic ideology of the Republicans at the same time. Wilson, as the progressive spokesman of the Democratic party, won over large numbers of the Progressives to internationalism who had become disgusted with Roosevelt and his indorsement of Lodge and other conservatives.

The break-up of the Progressive party was followed by the effect of the dislocations of war on the progressive movement itself. In 1914, the progressive impulse was triumphant, but six years later it was seemingly dead, killed by the war. The progressive leaders were hopelessly divided by the issues of war. Bryan had resigned from the cabinet in 1915, and La Follette and Norris who opposed the war, had been declared traitors in disguise. Roosevelt's men looked upon Wilson and

27. Croly, op. cit., p. 297

La Follette with angry contempt, and Senator Albert Cummins of Iowa signed a document censuring La Follette as disloyal.

The war years also reversed the progressive trend of the preceding years by fostering large-scale business operations. Inflation hit the nation, civil liberties were virtually abolished, and Congress passed sweeping legislation dealing with espionage, sedition, and trading with the enemy. Hysteria swept across the country. But this anti-reform tendency did not still the enthusiasm of the progressives for war and Wilson's program; if anything it increased their belief in an ultimate peace after the necessary evils that they were experiencing.[28]

Wilson went to Versailles armed with the Fourteen Points, his own brand of progressive idealism, and hope of the world for a lasting peace. From the outset it was an impossible task. Progressive idealism and reformism were domestic movements that could have occured in few other nations. Wilson's attempts, though laudable, were futile. But his sojourn at Versailles was not without lasting repercussions. The younger diplomats of London and Paris had heralded his program as the beginning of a new era of international justice, morality, and even diplomacy. Much of the failure of the Versailles venture

28. Goldman, op. cit., p. 260

was due to American misunderstanding of the function of diplomacy... Mistaking diplomacy for policy-making, he put the blame not on the policies and their creators but on the men who had to carry them out. He was determined therefore that the post-war world was to be made safe for democracy by making it free of the old diplomacy."[29]

Wilson's chief quarrel with this "old diplomacy" was its secrecy; however, Wilson's substitute of "open covenants openly arrived at" did not long survive his arrival in France. Wilson tried to substitute an evangelistic and moral sense into diplomacy in place of the ancient practice of trading mutual benefits. Because of this heresy, advocates of the "traditional" or "professional" diplomatic school still place Wilson in the villain's role. They heap condemnation upon him for undermining the old tenents of diplomatic practice. John Connell, an historian of the British Foreign Office and a typical diplomat of the old school, reflects the bitterness of the British diplomatic corps, "That combination of cloudy idealism and sudden cynical, pettifogging disillusionment never afflicted the Foreign Office, but it...and the rest of the world...suffered severely from its effects."[30]

29. Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat, p. 69

30. John Connell, The Office, p. 253

The treaty which the League Covenant included was at first welcomed by a large majority in the United States. But even before Wilson's return, Lodge was lining up a small but powerful opposition in the Senate. A former imperialist, Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, stated in a letter to Lodge that he was definitely against a "permanent foreign political alliance, involving them forever in historic and alien entanglements."[31]

Senator William Borah of Idaho declared war to the death on the "unholy thing with the holy name." He stated categorically that, "If the Savior of man were to revisit the earth and declare for a League of Nations, I would be opposed to it."[32] It was the severity of the treaty which appalled most progressives, while the conservatives were alienated because it was too soft on Germany.[33] Progressive opponents did not attack the treaty from an isolationist position, but rather because it failed to carry out the Fourteen Points. Freedom of the seas was not achieved; the reduction of armaments was agreed upon as an intention only; and the Allied forces were still trying to overthrow the Bolshevik government.

31. Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, p. 479

32. William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, p. 58

33. Ibid., p. 58

America's progressives were sorely disillusioned. By 1920, the men who had joined Wilson in 1916, abandoned him, convinced that he had betrayed their democratic ideals at Versailles and then stamped out dissent a home.

The treaty, however, was not defeated because of public opposition to the League of Nations, but because of the forceful machinations of a small group of men, the "Irreconcilables," whose opposition was directed against Wilson rather than the League. It is clear that these men could not have swung the Senate against ratification if it had not been for Wilson's unknowing cooperation. By refusing to make use of a bi-partisan policy in formulating the treaty and by refusing to compromise in the end, he ensured the defeat of the treaty.

By 1919, the pro-progressives were discouraged by the war and the peace that had followed it. Herbert Croly expressed the dominant spirit in the New Republic, "The chief distinguishing aspect of the Presidential campaign of 1920 is the eclipse of liberalism or progressivism as an effective force in American politics."34

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34. William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, p. 124

During Wilson's two terms of office, he continually tried to adapt the principles of his domestic policy to the realities of international politics and economics. He wished to advance the welfare of the peoples of the world and spread the American vision of democracy. But what began as a liberal foreign policy ended with the conservative treaty of Versailles. The war, which caused the reaction in foreign policy, also had its effects within the United States; the back of progressive thought and impulse was broken.

For eight years Wilson worked strenously to achieve his domestic program and to translate it into foreign terms. The very strain he imposed upon himself as the first servant of the people advanced the day of his death. Yet when all was told he, the spokesman of progressive doctrine, discovered that the world was not prepared to accept the current brand of American idealism.

THE MEN AND THE MOVEMENT

The rigors of a world war left America exhausted, and more inclined to quietly lick her wounds than to continue with the hardships of a moral crusade. The war to end all wars had been won, the outstanding problems raised by the upheavals of the 1890's had been settled, and the Yankee conscience had been appeased. Still the progressive impulse was not dead. The new schools of economic and political theory developed in the progressive period analyzed the gains of the movement and, accompanied by a growing awareness from the legal profession and theologians, spent the next few decades catching up with the bread implications of the progressive movement. Here and there individuals carried on the campaign. The issues which had fed the fires of reform smoldered through the period of reaction until they flamed up again in the 1940's.

Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson--the first a politician, the second a lawyer,

the third a professor--all represented the progressive movement as conscious or unconscious instruments of the dominant American trend. Together with William Jennings Bryan and Robert La Follette, these men each contributed an essential part to the machinery of progressivism. They translated the hopes and demands of the masses into understandable terms and positive legislation. Each in his own way worked towards a bigger and better nation, one suited for the role of leadership in the modern world of the twentieth century.

William Jennings Bryan and Robert La Follette rank high on the roll call of great American leaders. Few people are unaware that Bryan was the Great Commoner or that La Follette made the Wisconsin State government the most efficient state government in the nation. Because of their enormous regional popularity, their influence was tremendous. Although both tried for the White House and missed, their power waned only slightly.

Bryan was the first man to formulate a program broad enough to include the hopes of the nineteenth century and the needs of the twentieth. After Americans had rejected him three times for president, he accepted the post of Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson and continued to translate the hopes and needs of Americans; this time into foreign policy.

La Follette symbolized the principle of efficiency in government and contributed the "Wisconsin idea" to America, the progressive movement, and sociologists. He of all these leaders fully recognized the advantages of the practical and pragmatic approach to politics over the moral and theoretical. Under his guidance Wisconsin pioneered dozens of measures that were to emerge as parts of the New Freedom and much later, of the New Deal. The experiences and experimentation, that he fostered, made possible the growing faith in the development of laws and politics as both art and science.

Theodore Roosevelt stumbled into the progressive movement, never more than vaguely understanding the implications of the great reforms he set in motion. This dynamic and resourceful man had, above all other qualities, a sensitiveness to the public. Where the masses were going he led and as long as the trend was towards progressivism, he broke the trail and was the greatest of all progressives. This awareness of public opinion made Roosevelt a symbolic representative of the progressive idea. As in domestic affairs, so in foreign affairs he understood the yearnings of Americans to earn the respect of other nations without becoming involved in the responsibilities of a great power. His masterful statesmanship gave expression to American nationalism and his own extreme patriotism

without once going beyond the limits where the nation would no longer follow.

William Howard Taft presents numerous difficulties to analysis when grouped with these great leaders and great progressives, for he was neither. His personal life represented the conservative; his philosophy, the quasi-judicial. Along with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Taft recognized the injustice of the prevailing institutions and sought to modify them through pragmatic means while retaining his conservatism. More than any other, his administration illustrated the difficulties of reconciling the past and the future.

Because his policy was more pragmatic and more calculated than that of his predecessors, Woodrow Wilson became known as the greatest moral crusader of his times and the most effective one. The result was one of the most impressive records of successful legislation in American Congressional history. During his terms in the White House he had the opportunity that comes to so few men of theory, that of practical application. Consistently, he attempted to live up to his personal philosophy. Because of this and his outstanding intellect, he appealed to the best qualities of the American people and came to represent them.

These men all contributed their talents in greater

———and lesser degrees towards the adaptation of the constitutional system to the needs of the modern world, towards the regulation of the economic system by centralized political control, towards the development of new administrative techniques necessary to successfully run a modern government. As president, Theodore Roosevelt started the kickball of social and progressive legislation moving. But his most outstanding contributions came from the anti-trust suits and his dynamic use of executive leadership which began the process of gradual disintegration of the checks and balances system. Where Roosevelt led in domestic policy, Taft followed. He continually pushed his recalcitrant Congress towards more and more comprehensive social legislation and initiated a vast number of anti-trust suits while following up those that his predecessor had begun. Despite his almost uncanny ability for provoking political opposition and his distrust of the progressives, he did much more than Roosevelt dared to in carrying out the progressive demands. Wilson, bearing the banner of Democratic progressivism, also confronted the issues that Roosevelt had side-stepped and provided the Congressional and party leadership of which Taft was incapable.

Where there were logical sequences of development of domestic policies under these presidents tempered by

their personalities, there were also sequences in foreign policy. The presidents were linked by a desire to raise the standards of living of the surpressed peoples of the world; were motivated by a feeling of obligation to help them. They were also joined by a nationalistic impulse to see America as a great nation, but they differed in their means of making her one, and even their very definition of nationalism. Roosevelt possessed the greatest ability as a diplomat and his achievements and skill rank with those of America's great statesmen. As he understood people, he understood states. His policies were formed from his own clear-sighted political acumen, his own brand of nationalism, and the influence of progressive thought.

Taft reverted to the old standards of American diplomacy under the new banner of Dollar Diplomacy. The conservatism which only faintly marks his domestic legislation, left an indelible imprint on his foreign policy. Even so, he definitely had the welfare of the masses of downtrodden people in mind when he conceived of the possible uses of the dollar in diplomacy. Wilson, too, was primarily concerned with the people rather than the governments of other countries. He did all within his power to guarantee them a "square deal."

The progessive impetus for change, morality, nationalism, and a strengthened executive contributed a variety

of aspects to the foreign policies of the period they dominated. For a number of reasons, the Caribbean area provided the best experimentation grounds for this kind of policy. First, American security was closely connected with control of the Sea and exclusion of the European states. Secondly, tradition made the American continents an exclusive monopoly of the United States under the popular interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. In the third place, the government had a moral mandate, claimed at least by Theodore Roosevelt and utilized by Taft and Wilson, to teach the small states the democratic way of life. Finally, because the Caribbean was regarded as a quasi-protectorate area, the chief executive found it an ideal spot to exercise the widening range of powers he possessed. The number of executive agreements made over the objections of Congress well illustrate this point.

Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson all proceeded under the same assumption, that they were obligated in their Caribbean policies to set the tiny states on the way to a form of democracy and freedom patterned after that of the United States. Roosevelt set the example in the Dominican Republic, which was followed by the other two presidents and adapted to meet similar situations. This policy involved the use of warships, marines, custom receiverships, and a type of

economic dictatorship. That they failed to achieve their ends is perhaps due to a factor which La Follette noted, that the means determine the end as often as the ends determine the means.

The Panama Canal and the Tolls Dispute issuing from it demonstrate the personalities of the presidents and the ways in which they interpreted nationalism. Roosevelt's nationalism and progressivism demanded a canal. Despite the alternate proposals and the dubious aura surrounding the new Panamanian government, he rode roughshod over all objections to get the Panama route. He did settle the difficulties of the Canal route, but Taft was left with the problem of tolls. Following the strong lead of the public disinclination to pay tolls and his own nationalistic feelings on the subject, he rationalized the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. Wilson's brand of nationalism differed from that of his predecessors. As he saw it, the United States was bound first to honor her international obligations. With his strong leadership at its best, he secured the approval of Congress over Roosevelt's cries that he was selling out to the British.

The frequent crises in the Far East, involving every major nation in the world, drew forth the best and the worst in the diplomatic techniques of Roosevelt and Taft. Roosevelt's understanding of how far Americans would

so and his comprehension of the realities of the international situation enabled him to play his hand with superb skill. Some of his long run calculations, as in Korea, were fallacious, but his short run successes, such as his mediation of the Russo-Japanese War, were astounding. Taft, to the contrary, completely failed to understand the Chinese situation and blundered so badly that he almost single-handedly forced Japan and Russia into each others arms. This was the very thing that Roosevelt had painstakingly tried to avoid. Taft, although working towards the laudable goal of an economic and politically self-sufficient China, did not comprehend the power realities that Roosevelt had understood because of his close friendships among the European diplomatic corps.

As Roosevelt's and Taft's understanding of the international situation was exemplified in the Far East, so was Wilson's in the negotiation at Versailles. Nowhere did the absolute morality of the American progressive movement so penetrate into foreign politics than in the fight over the Fourteen Points and the League of Nations. Wilson's ability to negotiate with the allies was amply demonstrated even though he failed to secure all the ends which the United States sought. But his personal disinclination to compromise his ideals and his lack of ability to force public opinion actively behind him, led

to the failure of the entire program in the American Congress.

America's tentative steps into the world, culminating in the great adventure of World War I and the mighty blow struck for freedom, taught her many lessons. The important ones were: that other nations do not take kindly to intervention, even "moral" intervention with the most altruistic motives; that the American brand of idealism was not welcome elsewhere and often even suspect; that their regard for legal change was not a universal concept; and that the world was not ready to accept democracy and freedom as designed in the United States. Unfortunately, the implications of what this meant for the future of American foreign policy were only dimly recognized. What did penetrate was that American policies had gone down in defeat and that the "blow for freedom" had been a useless one.

The progressive movement retired in defeat, desks in the State Department gathered dust, and the United States closed her political gates to the world. When they finally swung wide again it would be with remembrances of the lessons taught by Roosevelt and Wilson, the reminders of the progressive movement, in an age when the reforms of that movement were carried to their logical conclusions under Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

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