

BRITISH POLICY IN THE BALTIC REGION - 1919

by

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INTRODUCTION

The German government's acceptance of the Allied terms of surrender and the subsequent Armistice of November 11, 1918 ended one of the most destructive wars in history. The "war to end wars" was over and Europe was looking forward to an era of peace. But although the Western Front was quiet the struggle had not ended in some parts of Europe. One such area existed only 950 miles from the peace tables of Paris. There, along the low-lying shores of the Eastern Baltic, a bitter struggle ensued for the domination of that strategic region known, prior to 1919, as the Baltic provinces of Russia.

The aims of this thesis are twofold: first, to examine the policy of Great Britain in the Baltic provinces in those troubled times immediately following World War I; and, second, to show how British policy in this area fitted into the overall European policy of Great Britain. The year 1919 has been selected for concentrated analysis because it was one of the most complex periods in modern Baltic history. At the time, it seemed that the whole future destiny of the area hung in the balance, and that the outcome of the contest in 1919 would determine who would rule the Baltic for generations to come: Germany, Russia, the Allied Powers, or the Baltic

peoples themselves.

Much of the material for this thesis has come from a recently published and voluminous selection of British Foreign Office documents for the interwar years 1919-1939. The first three volumes of this series, entitled Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 and published in 1947-49, constitute a rich mine of new information on British policy in the Baltic area just after the First World War. No historian has yet drawn on these materials for a fresh analysis of the topic. These Foreign Office documents are supplemented by another recently-published collection of United States State Department records. Thirteen volumes of these papers, bearing on the 1919 Peace Conference, appeared in 1942-47. This valuable source also has drawn little attention from historians, and none at all from students of the Baltic area. For that matter, there exist very few scholarly and objective studies of recent Baltic history or of Western policy in that region.

In order to understand Britain's Baltic policy in 1919, it is necessary to examine the geographical and historical background of this area. A brief geographical sketch and an account of the history of this region prior to 1900 will be included in the introduction. This will be followed by a more detailed account of Baltic history from 1900 through 1918, which will stress the independence movements within the Baltic area and the beginnings of British Baltic policy. The remainder of the thesis covers the year 1919 and deals

primarily with British attempts to free the Baltic of German and Bolshevik domination.

Geographically, the Baltic region is a low, flat, agricultural land, located on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea. It stretches from the Gulf of Finland to the Polish frontier. Only two rivers of any size or importance are to be found; the Nieman, flowing through Lithuania and emptying into the Baltic at Memel, and the Duna, flowing through Courland and emptying into the Gulf of Riga. Both of these rivers have their sources in Russia and are closely connected with the Russian river system.

The northernmost part of the Baltic provinces was shortly to become the Estonian republic. When the frontiers were finally defined, the new state of Estonia covered an area of 18,200 square miles (about the size of Massachusetts) and had a population of about 1,750,000. Tallinn (formerly Reval) was by far the best port on the Estonian Coast. Its importance went back to the days of the Hanseatic League. This port had always been of great value to Russia, as the Gulf of Finland beyond Tallinn was frozen for four months in the winter. During these months, Tallinn served as one of Russia's chief trade outlets.¹

¹George D. Hubbard, The Geography of Europe (New York, 1937), p. 452.

South of Estonia lay the emerging Latvian republic. Latvia, as eventually defined, was about 25,000 square miles in size and had a population of approximately 2,600,000. Riga, Windau, and Libau were all good ports. Riga was once a Hanse town, and in Tsarist days had been the greatest timber market in the world.²

The southernmost segment of the Baltic region made up the area that was seen to become Lithuania. This new state, when it came into existence, included an area of 24,000 square miles and a population of about 4,300,000. Memel was the only seaport.

The geographical location, more than size, inhabitants, natural resources, important events, or great men, has determined the fate of this area,³ as it lies between the East and the West and has served many times as both a bridge and a battleground between the two. This region lies at the terminus of the natural water routes from Russia to the West.

The area comprising what came to be known after 1919 as Estonia was originally settled by a group of peoples of Finno-Ugrian stock. The future republics of Latvia and Lithuania were settled by Indo-Europeans, known in earlier centuries as Aistians. These peoples of the Eastern Baltic

²Hubbard, Geography of Europe, p. 464.

³Walter Kirchner, The Rise of the Baltic Question (Newark, Del., 1954), p. 2.

maintained trade relations with ancient Greece as long as five hundred years before Christ. The Roman historian, Tacitus, is given credit for the first recorded note concerning the territory occupied by the people known today as Letts and Lithuanians.⁴ The Aistians were known to Theodoric (c. 454-526), ruler of the Ostrogoths and later, in the eighth century, to Charlemagne. The Baltic peoples first came in contact with the Vikings in the period from 800-1000 A.D. The Norsemen established bases in the Baltic in order to protect their trade routes to Byzantium.

The Baltic peoples first established contact with the Eastern Slavs in the latter half of the ninth century. These contacts were with the Rus whose capital, at that time, was at Kiev. The Rus launched many military expeditions against the Baltic peoples during the following two centuries. The Baltic peoples were also in contact with the Scandinavians and the Germans during this period.

Christianity made its first real penetration into the area in the late twelfth century. Bishop Albert of Bremen and his German crusaders were responsible for most of the early successes of Christianity. For a period of more than four hundred years -- from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries -- the Baltic region was under German domination. This domination was exercised by the Order of the Livonian

⁴Thomas G. Chase, The Story of Lithuania (New York, 1946), p. 4.

Knights, which controlled most of the rural areas and fortresses; by the Church, which had an archbishopric at Riga and a number of bishoprics scattered throughout the region; and by the Hansa towns, which enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. German Christianity changed the Baltic area from a slowly developing, backward region into a flourishing feudal community which became the "pivot of contact between East and West."⁵ The resulting East-West trade furnished western Europe with many commodities needed for the development of a modern economy. With its great harbors, commercial centers, and numerous fortresses, the Baltic region became an important outpost of the Holy Roman Empire.

Further Teutonic expansion eastward had been discouraged after the Russian victory over the Teutonic Knights on Lake Peipus in 1242.⁶ The Russians, however, showed no particular interest in the Baltic area until the time of Ivan the Great in the late fifteenth century.⁷ This was primarily due to the fact that Russia was under Tartar rule at that time and looked eastward rather than westward. After Russia had thrown off the Tartar domination, the new rulers of Russia began to look toward the west for trade. The most

⁵Kirchner, Baltic Question, p. 1.

⁶The Livonian Knights had merged with the stronger Teutonic Knights in 1237.

⁷Kirchner, Baltic Question, p. 88.

satisfactory trade routes were through the Baltic area. In 1558, the armies of Ivan IV began an invasion of the Baltic lands. Successive campaigns were launched in 1559 and 1560, but most of the Baltic area remained under German domination.

During this period of fighting, England was firmly enough entrenched in the Baltic trade to be vitally interested in the struggle.⁸ Many of the supplies which Russia desperately needed for the invading armies of Ivan IV were supplied by the English. Queen Elizabeth made no attempt, however, to claim any special rights in the Baltic, although earlier (in 1383) England had been offered a protectorate over the area comprising the Bishopric of Dorpat, in what was later a part of Estonia. This offer was made by the Bishop of Dorpat, who desired to entrust the protection of his bishopric to the English crown.⁹

In 1525, the Order of the Teutonic Knights collapsed. This left a vacuum in the Baltic area in which Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and Russia vied for control. Each country gained domination over a part of the area. The Northern War (1563-1570), involving Denmark, Sweden, and Poland, resulted from the conflicting interests of these states.¹⁰

⁸ Kirchner, Baltic Question, p. 249.

⁹ Kirchner, Baltic Question, p. 248.

¹⁰ Kirchner, Baltic Question, p. 48.

England, profiting from its friendly relations with the Tsar, and from the disunity of its former competitors, further strengthened its position at the expense of all of the warring contenders. In 1567, Ivan IV gave English merchants the exclusive right to trade in the Livonian region of the Baltic without paying duties, but the Russians were driven from the Baltic in 1583 by Sweden and Poland, and England lost all of the special privileges allotted it by Russia. The final peace settlement imposed on Russia by the victorious powers deprived England of any further commercial advances in the Baltic.¹¹ However, the region was still important to England for more than a century after this, as it depended to a large extent on the Baltic trade for certain essential naval supplies.¹²

For a period of about 250 years, from the collapse of the Teutonic Knights until the partitions of Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and Russia fought, at various times, for control of the Baltic region. Sweden dominated most of the region during the seventeenth century. In 1700, the Great Northern War broke out between Russia and Sweden as a result of Peter the Great's desire to gain control of ports on the

¹¹Kirchner, Baltic Question, p. 253.

¹²Kirchner, Baltic Question, p. 253. By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries England was getting her naval stores from her overseas colonies, primarily those in North America.

Baltic Sea. Sweden was defeated in 1721 and in the Treaty of Nystadt, surrendered its primacy in the Baltic area. Russia again absorbed Livonia and Estonia. Neither Sweden nor any of the other contending countries ever played an important role in the affairs of Northern Europe after that period and Peter the Great established Russian rule even more firmly in the Baltic region with the founding of St. Petersburg and its designation as the new Russian capital.

The only part of the Baltic area that achieved any distinction as an independent nation during its early history was that region which was to become Lithuania. From the beginning of the thirteenth century until the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century Lithuania was, at different times, a kingdom or a Grand Duchy. After the partitions of 1772, 1792, and 1795, Russia acquired nearly all of the remaining Baltic provinces and dominated the whole region until 1918.

Nationalism did not develop in Eastern Europe to the extent that it did in western Europe. The first overt signs of active national feeling in the Baltic area appeared in the nineteenth century. Lithuania followed the lead of Poland in the insurrections of 1830-31 and 1863-64 and suffered additional measures of Russification after the failure of the uprisings. Other than this, Lithuanian

national feeling was expressed in clandestine publications¹³ and in the writings of various emigrants who had left the country after the insurrections. Estonian and Lettish nationalism found their beginnings among university students who began to unite in secret societies in the 1860's.¹⁴ Various publications in the regions of Estonia, Livonia, and Courland kept these nationalist feelings alive during the course of the nineteenth century. Opposition to this new nationalism came from the Baltic Germans as well as the Russians. It was not until the Russian Revolution of 1905, however, that Baltic nationalism began to play an important part in the lives of the Estonians, Letts, and Lithuanians.

¹³Chase, Lithuania, p. 239-40. All of these clandestine publications were printed in East Prussia and smuggled across the frontier into Lithuania. The newspapers first appeared in 1863 and various editions were circulated between then and 1905. Many books, banned by the Russians, were also smuggled into Lithuania in this manner.

¹⁴Arnolds Spekke, History of Latvia (Stockholm, 1951), p. 305.

CHAPTER I

THE EMERGENCE OF THE BALTIC NATIONAL STATES

During the nineteenth century, there had been a rise in national consciousness throughout most of Europe, but the Baltic peoples of Russia, with the exception of the Lithuanians, were not notably affected until the beginning of the twentieth century. However, their desire to free themselves from the oppressive domination of the Baltic Germans gave them a feeling of unity which bordered on national consciousness.

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the Russian government inaugurated a new policy of "Russification" and minority repression. The Baltic peoples responded to this policy by directing their resentment more and more toward the Russian government as restrictions were placed on the use of their language and customs, and they lost control of local administration. However, the Revolution of 1905, followed by the establishment of a quasi-constitutional monarchy in Russia, resulted in a more liberal policy toward the minority groups.¹ The first Duma (one of

¹Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 6-7.

the two houses of the new Parliament), consisting of members elected by the nation, convened on May 10, with the minorities fairly well represented. In the case of the Baltic nationalities, the Lithuanians had twelve seats, the Latvians seven seats, and the Estonians five seats.² This was out of a total of 524 seats.

In Estonia the 1905 revolution led to the emergence of an organized labor movement, and the Estonian intelligentsia, feeling that the Tsarist government would never give them the autonomy they now desired, actively allied themselves with the Russian revolutionaries, thinking that in the success of such a movement in the Empire would lie the best guarantee of peaceful autonomous development for Estonia itself.³ They were bitterly disappointed that the first Duma ignored the question of internal autonomy for the borderlands. The Russian members of the Duma still held the concept of "Russia, one and indivisible."⁴

The revolution brought out a strong nationalistic and socialistic trend among the Letts. In the Duma, the Lettish representatives played a creditable role. "Without venturing on too futile or too extreme a program, the Latvian leaders

²These figures are based on the percentage representation given by Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, p. 7.

³Graham, New Governments of Eastern Europe (New York, 1927), p. 250.

⁴Graham, New Governments, p. 251.

lent their cooperation to the various Russian parties."⁵ However, the Letts wanted not only political autonomy, but financial autonomy, their own army, diplomatic representation, separate customs, and their own railway administration.

Autonomy was foremost in the minds of the Lithuanians also. One of their first acts after the outbreak of the Revolution of 1905 was to summon a National Lithuanian Diet (Seimas) at Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, in December, 1905.⁶ This Diet demanded autonomy for all of Lithuania with a Diet at Vilnius, elected by universal ballot. It called upon the Lithuanian people to revolt against Russian rule. A general uprising followed but was ruthlessly put down by Russian military forces.

By the time the third Duma was elected in November, 1907, the government had been able to regain its supremacy over the liberal elements and to change the electoral laws in favor of the Russian upper classes. Besides this, the membership of the Duma was reduced from 524 to 442. As the percentage of representation remained the same and the number of seats was reduced, the border areas, which had small representation, were among the hardest hit. However, they continued to be represented in the Duma, but in smaller numbers. In spite of this, the third Duma sat without interruption from 1907

⁵Graham, New Governments, p. 321.

⁶Chase, Story of Lithuania, p. 248.

to 1912. The fourth Duma, elected in 1912, was even more conservative than the third, but it lasted until 1917.

During the initial stages of the First World War, the Russians made notable advances into East Prussia. The German army soon recovered, however, and stopped the Russian advance at Tannenberg on August 31, 1914. In the spring of 1915, the Germans in turn took the initiative and by midsummer had not only recovered all of their territory previously lost to the Russians but had occupied Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, as well. Some Ukrainian and Belorussian provinces were also overrun.

The failures of the Russian military forces in 1915 caused serious differences of opinion between the Duma and the Government. Continual offensive action and lack of supplies and arms caused a terrible drain on Russian manpower and also affected the morale of the Russian soldiers. Nicholas II took over the command of the Russian army and attempted to solve Russia's mounting problems without the aid of the Duma, but was unsuccessful.

From a military point of view, 1916 was a better year for the Russian army. During the winter of 1916-17, the conflict between the Duma and the Tsar became more acute. The Duma felt that the Tsar was being unduly influenced by the Tsarina who, in turn, was under the influence of Rasputin, an uneducated peasant "prophet". The Duma was afraid that Rasputin and some of the more reactionary circles might

attempt to make a separate peace with Germany. Rasputin was assassinated in the hope of ending his influence on the royal family. The Tsar's policy did not change even then, so some of the members of the court circle decided to overthrow the Tsar and appoint another member of the royal family as his successor. Before this plan could be carried through, the Russian people staged their own revolt in March, 1917.

On March 12, 1917, the members of the Duma set up a Temporary Committee whose task it was to attempt to lead the already existing revolutionary movement. The Duma Committee appointed a Provisional Government with Prince Lvov as head. The Tsar decided, on March 14, to abdicate in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. The Grand Duke Michael refused the throne, however, and full power passed to the Provisional Government.

Actually there were two governments in Russia at this time: the Provisional Government under Prince Lvov, which represented the political revolution, and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies, which represented the social revolution. The emerging strong man of the Provisional Government was Alexander Kerensky, a former socialist member of the Duma, Minister of Justice in the first Provisional Government, and later Minister of War and Marine.

The Provisional Government, as early as April 12, 1917, issued a decree granting autonomy to Estonia.⁷ This decree

⁷Graham, New Governments, p. 253.

made provision for all Estonian-inhabited areas to be placed under a single Estonian administrative system. The northern half of the province of Livonia and the city of Narva, formerly in the province of Petrograd, were added to the existing province of Estonia under that arrangement.⁸ Another decree, issued on July 5, 1917, provided for the election of a National Council. Elections for members of the council were held on July 7-8 and the first meeting of this new body was held on July 14.

Latvia was in a deplorable condition when the Provisional Government took office. Since the German drive eastward in 1915, Latvia had been partitioned between Germany and Russia. Not only had the Lettish lands been devastated by war, but commerce was almost non-existent. The war had shown the Letts another fact that they were not likely to forget. This was that "the vaunted power of the Russian Empire to protect a weak people -- the principal justification for the retention of minor nationalities within the confines of empire -- proved in reality an illusion."⁹ Less than a week after the abdication of the Tsar, a Lettish congress met at Valmiera. It urged that the Russian Provisional Government create an autonomous administrative unit out of the provinces of Livonia

⁸Malbone W. Graham, The Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States, Part II: Estonia (Berkeley, 1939), p. 233.

⁹Graham, The Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States, Part III: Latvia (Berkeley, 1941) p. 400.

(the southern half), Vitebsk, and Courland.¹⁰ At that time, however, the Letts fully expected that Latvia, as they proposed to call the new unit, would remain "an inseparable province of Russia."¹¹ As was the case with the Estonians, the Letts' initial reaction to the change brought about by the Russian Revolution was to unite the separate parts of their nation administratively. After the April decree granting the Estonians autonomy, the Letts pressed for similar recognition, but the Provisional Government demurred. Finally, on July 5, 1917, the Russian Provisional Government conceded that a provincial parliament and executive should be organized by the Letts.¹² The capture of Riga on September 3 by the Germans prevented the Letts from carrying out the proposed plan. Many of the Letts fled eastward into unoccupied Russia during the German invasion and organized a Latvian National Council. Others stayed behind in Riga and formed a similar body.

Lithuania fared much the same as Latvia in respect to war devastation and military occupation. After months of battling back and forth across Lithuanian territory, the Russian forces were finally driven from most of Lithuania and the country was under German occupation from September, 1915 until the Armistice in 1918. After the fall of the Tsar

¹⁰Graham, New Governments, p. 325.

¹¹Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, p. 400.

¹²Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, p. 402

in March 1917, the Lithuanian exiles in Russia organized a Lithuanian National Council. In May, 1917, this Council called delegates and representatives of the nation (those in exile in Russia) to Petrograd for a National Diet to make plans for the liberation of Lithuania from Russian rule.¹³ Similar assemblies met at Stockholm and Voronezh. Another group of Lithuanians formed the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Nation in Russia at Voronezh. This Council came out with a program based on self-determination and the demand that all of ethnographic Lithuania should become a separate state.¹⁴ The Lithuanians still under German occupation in Vilnius were not idle either. In August, 1917, contrary to the wishes of the Germans, who said that "no Lithuanian political activity would be tolerated, except that it be carried on in view of intimate alliance with Germany,"¹⁵ they began to make plans for a representative organization of the Lithuanians still living in Lithuania. The Conference of Vilnius, which was similar to the Vilnius Diet of 1905 in form, was the result of their planning.¹⁶ It met from September 17 to 23 at Vilnius and demanded that Lithuania

¹³Chase, Story of Lithuania, p. 260. This should not be confused with the Lithuanian National Council. The Diet was not a governing body but an assembly to discuss future plans.

¹⁴Chase, Story of Lithuania, p. 260.

¹⁵Chase, Story of Lithuania, p. 263.

¹⁶Graham, New Governments, p. 363.

be given its independence. It also created a Lithuanian National Council (Taryba) of twenty members. Lithuanians in Russia, Switzerland, the United States, and Sweden recognized this National Council as the "official agent of the Lithuanian people."¹⁷

After the fall of the Kerensky Provisional Government on November 7, 1917 and the assumption of power by the Bolsheviks under Lenin, the Baltic peoples were faced with a new problem. They had three alternatives. First, they could recognize the Bolshevik government as the new government of Russia and attempt to deal with it much as they had dealt with Kerensky's Provisional Government; second, they could look to the Germans, now occupying most of the Baltic region, in the hope that the Germans would recognize the three groups of people as autonomous units of the German empire; or third, they could declare their independence and hope that they might manage to avoid domination by either Russia or Germany.

All three peoples, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, chose the third course. Earlier, the Bolsheviks had announced a policy of self-determination for all non-Russian people within the Empire. Lenin had said in the summer of 1913, concerning the right of self-determination: "The paragraph of our program dealing with national self-determination cannot be interpreted in any other way, but in the sense of

¹⁷Chase, Story of Lithuania, p. 263.

political self-determination, that is, as the right to separation and creation of an independent government."¹⁸ But Lenin did not really believe that Eastern Europe would break up into its various national components. Lenin was certain that once the state convinced the minorities that they did have the right to separate and to form independent states, they would no longer distrust the state and thus the primary cause of national movements would be destroyed. Economic factors would then have a free field in which to accomplish their centralizing, unifying task, with no opposition from nationalism. The minorities, by remaining within the larger political unit, would find many advantages not otherwise available to them. There would thus be created a lasting foundation for the emergence of large states and an eventual "united states of the world."¹⁹

Lenin also argued against any charges that his slogan threatened a breakup of Russia, with his qualification of the right of self-determination. "To advance the right to separation did not mean, Lenin asserted, to condone actual separation."²⁰ The interests of the proletariat superseded the interests of nationality and the latter had to be abandoned in the event of conflict.²¹ Therefore, he neither

¹⁸Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, p. 43.

¹⁹Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, pp. 44-45.

²⁰Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, p. 45.

²¹Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union, p. 45.

desired nor expected that the right of self-determination would really be exercised by such groups as the Baltic peoples. The Baltic peoples, of course, interpreted Lenin's proposed self-determination in their own way and proceeded accordingly.

The Letts who had fled to Russia after the fall of Riga met at Valk on November 16, 1917, and once more expressed a desire for autonomy and an independent policy, with Lenin's doctrine of self-determination as the basis of its action.

"It was not independence directly, but independence by implication that the National Council endeavored to put forward, to try out the feelings of the Bolshevik government."²²

However, about this time the Bolshevik government had extended its decrees to include Latvia and wherever possible in that country had "inaugurated the social revolution and the soviet system."²³ A rural Red Guard was organized in the regions still controlled by Russia and the Latvian National Council was forced to go underground.

Similarly, the Estonian National Council proclaimed the political independence of that country on November 28, 1917.²⁴ The new government was short-lived for the National Council and administration were dispersed by the local soviets

²²Graham, New Governments, p. 326.

²³Graham, New Governments, p. 326.

²⁴Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, p. 237.

and the rural Red Guards.

The Lithuanians were having trouble also at this time, but mostly with the Germans. The Lithuanian Taryba passed a resolution on December 11, 1917, declaring the independence of Lithuania, with Vilnius as the capital of the new nation.²⁵ In order to frustrate possible annexation by Germany and to void any future claims of Russia to Lithuanian territory, the Taryba also asked for German aid during the period of reconstruction, and for an alliance between the two countries.²⁶

It appeared that the Germans still desired to annex Lithuania, so on January 8, 1918, the Taryba reiterated the decree of the Vilnius Diet and called for an immediate convocation of a Lithuanian Constituent Assembly, a matter it had not brought up in its December 11th declaration, due to German pressure. On February 16, 1918, the Taryba issued another official declaration of independence based on the Vilnius Diet of 1905. This declaration was unacceptable to the German government, but after several weeks of negotiation, a plan was worked out whereby Germany agreed to recognize Lithuania's independence on the basis of the December 11th resolution.²⁷

²⁵Graham, New Governments, p. 367

²⁶Chase, Story of Lithuania, p. 264.

²⁷Chase, Story of Lithuania, pp. 265-66.

Germany now sought to force a monarchical regime and a German prince upon Lithuania. In the light of this new threat and the apparent lack of Allied interest in Lithuania, steps were taken once again to frustrate German ambitions. On June 4, 1918, the Taryba proclaimed a short monarchical constitution and invited to the throne William of Uraeh, Duke of Wittenberg, a lineal descendant of the old Lithuanian nobility.²⁸ Duke William accepted the offer in July, but the German government refused to recognize the actions of the Taryba. Because of differences of opinion in the Taryba, a compromise solution was necessary. The election of Duke William was nullified eventually (November 2, 1918) and it was decided that a future constituent assembly would choose the form of government.²⁹

Estonia, during this period, was having trouble with the Germans also. The Estonian constituent elections had been scheduled for January and February, 1918. The Bolsheviks allowed them to be held and even entered their own candidates in the hope of polling a majority and thus taking over control of the government legally. Upon learning they had failed in that plan they took up arms, thus precipitating a small-scale civil war. The Germans stepped in at this point

²⁸Chase, Story of Lithuania, p. 266. The reference is to Lithuanian Grand Duke Mindaugas I (c. 1225-1263). William was asked to assume the throne as Mindaugas II.

²⁹Graham, New Governments, p. 370.

and offered to help if the Estonians would declare themselves a state under German protection. The Estonians refused the offer and proceeded to issue a manifesto declaring that Estonia must be proclaimed an independent democratic republic and must be neutral as well.³⁰

At this same time, Estonian representatives were attempting to ascertain the British government's attitude toward the Estonian declaration of independence. They contacted the British Charge d'Affaires at Petrograd, Mr. Francis O. Lindley, and informed him of the German offer of a protectorate over Estonia and the implication by the Germans that Estonia would be occupied if the offer were refused. The Estonians explained that they would take a chance and reject the offer if Great Britain would support their claim to independence at the Peace Conference.³¹ Mr. Lindley was unwilling to make a commitment of any kind until he had contacted the London government. In writing to the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Alfred J. Balfour, "he expressed the view that their [the Estonians'] original intention of contenting themselves with autonomy (April 12, 1917 decree of the Provisional Government) was a wise one but that, should that prove impossible, it would seem desirable to do everything possible to prevent their falling under German

³⁰Graham, New Governments, p. 258

³¹Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, p. 239.

domination."³² It would appear that the initial consideration was one of high strategy, which left the inclinations of the Estonians out of account.³³ Mr. Lindley went on to say:

The question of the future of the Baltic Provinces should be given serious consideration.... Without them Russia will hardly continue to be a great western power, while their accession to Germany would immensely increase the latter's strength. It would therefore seem desirable that, if possible, Russia should retain them, failing which they should be independent and form a block with Scandinavia, Finland, and perhaps Poland.³⁴

The nebulous reply suggested by Mr. Lindley and approved by Mr. Balfour stated that:

His Majesty's Government will do all they can at the Peace Conference to prevent annexation by Germany against their will and to secure some form of international guarantee of the independence of any states that may come into existence as a result of the war.³⁵

The Germans, however, were already moving and on February 24, 1918, they began their drive toward Tallinn. The Bolshevik elements fled as the German armies approached, and the Estonians, taking advantage of this brief period between occupations, issued anew a formal declaration of independence.³⁶

In an attempt to cope with the German invasion the

³²Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, pp. 339-40.

³³Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, p. 240.

³⁴Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, p. 240.

³⁵Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, p. 240.

³⁶Graham, New Governments, p. 259.

Estonian representatives abroad contacted Sir Esme Howard, British Minister in Stockholm, for further assurances concerning Estonia's independence movement. Sir Esme replied in general terms that "the desires of the Baltic peoples were regarded with sympathy by His Majesty's Government, who would give them favorable consideration at the Peace Conference which could alone definitely decide these questions," and added "that if Russia were to become a federal state with free institutions it might be more advisable that Estonia and countries like her should be satisfied with autonomy in such a state."³⁷ In replying to this British statement, one of the Estonian representatives, Jaan Tõnisson, a newspaper editor and a former member of the Duma, proposed the following plan:

If the independence of Estonia could not immediately be recognized by Great Britain, the people would be greatly encouraged in their determination not to be annexed by Germany, if the Constituent Assembly were at least provisionally recognized by the Western Powers as a de facto independent body until the meeting of the Peace Conference and if the Western Powers would state that a final statement settlement could only be made by the conference.³⁸

This argument was further backed up by an appeal for immediate action, "before the Germans reached Estonia, so that they might be faced with a fait accompli."³⁹ The

³⁷Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, p. 242.

³⁸Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, p. 242.

³⁹Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, p. 242.

British Foreign Office was intrigued by such an imaginative argument. The signing of the peace of Brest-Litovsk was only a few hours away and to be able to forestall Germany "by assigning, through recognition, legal title to areas otherwise subject to litigation and bargaining at the peace table" greatly appealed to the British.⁴⁰

Written confirmation was delayed, but the British government gave its oral assurances and authorized the British Minister at Stockholm on March 20, 1918, to inform the Estonian representatives "that His Majesty's Government are prepared provisionally to recognize the constituent assembly as a de facto independent body until the peace congress takes place, when the future status of Esthonia ought to be settled on the principle of self-determination. His Majesty's Government will not recognize any settlement which is contrary to this principle."⁴¹ The French Minister recognized the Estonian National Assembly in similar language.

The Baltic representatives, it would appear, were only welcomed in Allied capitals so that the Allies could more easily work against the domination of the Baltic area by

⁴⁰Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, pp. 242-243.

⁴¹Senate Documents, 66th Congress, 1st Session, Dec. No. 105, "Report of the Mission to Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the Situation in the Baltic Provinces," by Robert Hale (Washington, D.C., 1919), p. 13. (Hereafter cited as Senate Documents, No. 105)

Germany, or, perhaps later, by Russia.⁴² De facto recognition meant only that the Allies recognized that a newly constituted government was in temporary military control of an area. Apparently the Allies were counting on the Russian counter-revolutionary forces being victorious and relying on their promise that the border nationalities would receive their due.

The British policy was restated by Mr. Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, on May 3, 1918, when he informed the Estonian representatives that the British Government "was glad to reaffirm its readiness to grant provisional recognition to the Esthonian National Council as a de facto independent body until the peace conference takes place, when the future status of Esthonia ought to be settled as far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the population."⁴³ France again went along with British policy, as did Italy. Only the United States failed to extend such recognition to Estonia. Bakmetev, the Kerenskist Ambassador to the United States, may have been partly responsible for this action, as he had been attempting for some time to convince the United States government that the Baltic peoples' claims to independence should be ignored.⁴⁴

In the meantime German troops, in their drive eastward,

⁴²Graham, New Governments, p. 279.

⁴³Senate Documents, No. 105, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁴Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, p. 246.

had entered Tallinn and other areas of Estonia. Although these troops found a civil government functioning under the direction of a committee of the National Council, they declared the committee null, dissolved the National Council and set up a military occupation of the country.⁴⁵ The representatives of the civil government of Estonia fled, many going to Great Britain. After the German surrender on November 11, 1918, these representatives returned and took over the reins of government again. In the intervening time the whole of Estonia was under German occupation.

The impending peace between the Bolsheviks and the German government caused the Latvians also to reexamine the independence policies. Accordingly, on January 15, 1918, the Latvian National Council assembled again to determine what course of action should be taken.⁴⁶ New executive departments were created to provide the administrative machinery of the new state. The French government, through its ambassador at Petrograd, immediately gave provisional de facto recognition to the Latvian National Council.⁴⁷

After the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918) the German armies took over the remaining areas of Latvia and immediately began a series of intrigues in an attempt to

⁴⁵Senate Documents, No. 105, p. 13. Germany had expressly agreed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, that no German troops would be sent to Estonia except as a police force.

⁴⁶Graham, New Governments, p. 327.

⁴⁷Graham, New Governments, p. 327.

help the Baltic Germans reclaim their former holdings. In July 1918, the Latvian National Council met again, declared its independence and sent emissaries abroad to obtain recognition from the Allied nations.⁴⁸ Mr. Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, notified the Latvian emissaries on November 11, 1918, that their cause had been successful and that Great Britain was according provisional de facto recognition to the Latvian National Council.

His Majesty's Government have viewed with the deepest sympathy the aspirations of the Lettish people and its desire for liberation from the German yoke. They are glad to reaffirm their readiness to grant provisional recognition to the Lettish National Council as a de facto independent body until such time as the Peace Conference lays the foundations of a new era of freedom and happiness for your people. In the meantime His Majesty's Government will be glad to receive you as the informal diplomatic representative of the Lettish Provisional Government.⁴⁹

The Latvian National Council, which had been formed in Russia by the Letts who had fled the German occupation of their country, was able a few days after the Armistice, to join forces with the political leaders who had remained in Riga during the occupation. On November 18, 1918, the independence of Latvia was formally proclaimed,⁵⁰ with Karl Ulmanis as the new head of the government.

⁴⁸Graham, New Governments, p. 328.

⁴⁹Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, p. 406. The Latvian emissaries were Janis Chakste and Zigfried Meierovics. These two men were primarily responsible for the British recognition of their country.

⁵⁰Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, p. 407.

The Allies had become concerned over the possibility of a Bolshevik threat to the Baltic region about the time that the German armies surrendered, and decided upon what appeared to be an excellent, as well as inexpensive, way to deal with the problem. They decided to use German troops to combat the Bolshevik threat. The assistance rendered by these German troops was to be given in conformity with Article XII of the Armistice agreement of November 11, 1918, which provided, in part:

...All German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined (as they existed on August 1, 1914), as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.⁵¹

"The Germans were, therefore, present in the Baltic provinces with the full consent of the Allies and, indeed, by their implied command. The framers of the armistice agreement recognized that the red tide could not be held by any bulwarks which any of these native races could maintain."⁵² But the Allies were not to get off that easily. The Germans, smarting under the humiliation of the Armistice, were in no mood to fight their late enemies' battles. They mutinied, laid down their arms, and began to leave the Baltic.⁵³ At

⁵¹For the full text of Article XII and for other articles of the Armistice agreements pertaining to the Baltic region, see Appendix A.

⁵²Senate Documents, No. 105, p. 8.

⁵³Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, (Cambridge Mass., 1952), p. 100.

this crucial stage the Free Corps⁵⁴ entered the Baltic picture and once again it appeared to the Allies that their Baltic problems might be easily solved. Either the German reasons for furnishing these Free Corps units were not evident to the Allies at that time, or the Allies chose to overlook the obvious fact that the Germans hoped to retain a Baltic foothold.

For nearly seven hundred years the shores of the Baltic appear to have had a compelling attraction for Teutonic adventurers.⁵⁵ As a matter of fact, during the war, as soon as the Western Front showed signs of crumbling, both Hindenburg and Ludendorff seriously considered the possibility of continuing the war from bases in Courland.⁵⁶ Now, with the Armistice signed and a disastrous peace settlement in the offing, the Supreme Command once again looked to the Baltic; for there in the East they saw the chance to redeem the defeat in the West.

Karl Ulmanis, Latvia's new president, had been desperately attempting to organize an army so that he could

⁵⁴The Free Corps was made up of self-sufficient combat units composed entirely of volunteers. Many of their number were former Storm Troopers (elite commando-type units organized in the German army during the early days of World War I). The idea of a Free Corps was conceived in December 1918 by General Maercker, a former infantry division commander. The various Free Corps units took their names from their point of origin or from well-known military leaders.

⁵⁵Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 97.

⁵⁶Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 98.

drive the Bolsheviks from the country. He was unable to organize even an adequate force to maintain order among the Letts, so as a last resort he appealed to the Germans for help.

At first the Germans held back, but as soon as the internal situation was so desperate that Ulmanis was willing to accept aid at almost any price, they acted. The man with whom Ulmanis had to deal was August Winnig, German plenipotentiary in the Baltic. Prince Max⁵⁷ had sent Winnig to the Baltic in October 1918, to establish good relations with the newly formed governments there.⁵⁸ After the November Revolution in Berlin, the Ebert government had authorized him to stay on as the general plenipotentiary of the new German Republic. As early as 1915, Winnig had shocked his Socialist colleagues by demanding that Germany expand into the Baltic area. One of his admirers quotes him as having said: "Prestige on the seas is lost, the way to the West blocked off. But here in the East the way must be kept open -- it is the way to the world..."⁵⁹ Ulmanis, therefore, was dealing with

⁵⁷Prince Max of Baden, one of the Imperial Princes, had assumed the leadership of the German government after General Ludendorff's military dictatorship had collapsed in October, 1918. Prince Max turned the government over to Friedrich Ebert, Socialist Chancellor of the revolutionary government, in November.

⁵⁸Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 101. August Winnig, a Majority Social Democrat, was sent to the Baltic as Reich commissar for the East. In 1920 he was expelled from his party for supporting the Kapp government. He later became a loyal champion of the Nazis. During World War II, he changed sides again, turning against Hitler and gave some support to the Canaris-Beck-von Hassell opposition group.

⁵⁹Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 101.

a man who knew what he wanted in the East.

Winnig knew that the first thing he must do was to convince Ulmanis that Germany and Germany alone could help Latvia.⁶⁰ Winnig knew, too, that the British could not possibly help the Letts at that time, so he advised Ulmanis to see the British first and to request their aid. Ulmanis followed his advice, but received from the British only sympathy and a vague promise of help from the sea. They further assured him that British participation in land warfare in the Baltic region was out of the question.⁶¹

When Ulmanis came back empty-handed, Winnig knew he had proved his point and offered Latvia aid in the form of Free Corps troops. Ulmanis, after conferring with British representatives and getting their approval, accepted Winnig's offer.⁶² Since the success or failure of the Free Corps' Baltic adventure depended, for the most part, on the approval of Great Britain, the reasons for British endorsement of this venture are worth noting. It appears that British policy was dictated by two main factors: "fear of Bolshevism and war weariness."⁶³

At this time the general feeling in British government circles seemed to be that Bolshevism was the real enemy and

⁶⁰Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 101.

⁶¹Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 102.

⁶²Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 102.

⁶³Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 103

that something would have to be done about it; but not too much, for Britain was already feeling the serious economic consequences of the war and the people were tired.⁶⁴ Then, too, the Labour Party opposition was constantly reminding Lloyd George and his following that the ideal of self-determination applied to Russia as well as to other areas.

Ulmanis and the Germans completed their negotiations with the signing of a treaty of December 29, 1918.⁶⁵ By its terms the Latvian Provisional Government agreed to accept the help of the German Free Corps and to allow German officers to command the Corps. It was further stipulated that any increase in the number of native Latvian troops would necessitate a corresponding increase of German troops. In return for their services, all German soldiers who had fought for at least four weeks in the Baltic would be granted full Latvian citizenship.⁶⁶

The treaty of December 29, 1918 did not, however, promise land to these German troops. The German forces later claimed that the Latvian government did promise them land, and used this supposedly broken promise as an excuse for delaying evacuation of the Baltic in 1919. August Winnig himself later recalled his numerous and frustrating efforts to pin Ulmanis down and force him to sign a definite land-grant

⁶⁴Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 103.

⁶⁵The short, four point treaty is printed in its entirety in August Winnig, Heimkehr, 2nd ed. (Hamburg, 1935), p. 88.

⁶⁶Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 104.

these efforts failed provision.⁶⁷ All i, however, as the final treaty of December 29 contained no such provision. Winnig later wrote, in recounting this incident:

The treaty still contained no promise of land settlement. The Lettish Government had committed itself not to granting land, but only to promising full rights of citizenship. To be sure, the treaty was often interpreted in Germany as a colonization treaty, but in so interpreting it, people went too far.⁶⁸

Though no land had ever been promised by the Latvian provisional government, all Free Corps troops arriving in the Baltic were confident that they would soon own great estates. This was due mainly to the elaborate recruitment campaign within the Reich which encouraged such dreams.⁶⁹ The Red peril, against which these men were supposed to defend the Baltic, was more of an excuse than a cause for their recruitment.

By the end of 1918, therefore, the Baltic peoples had officially declared their independence from Russia. Only two of them, Estonia and Latvia, had been given recognition by the Allies at that time. The Germans had surrendered, but they were still in the Baltic, and by Allied invitation.

⁶⁷Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 104.

⁶⁸Winnig, Heimkehr, p. 89. The original German reads: "Der Vertrag enthielt noch kein Siedlungsversprechen, die lettische Regierung verpflichtete sich noch nicht zur Landgabe, sondern nur zur Gewährung des vollen Bürgerrechts. Der Vertrag wurde zwar in Deutschland vielfach als Siedlungsvertrag bezeichnet, doch damit ging man zu weit."

⁶⁹Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 105.

The Baltic nations thus found themselves in about the same position as during the war -- caught between the Germans and the Bolsheviks.

CHAPTER II

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE BALTIC -- 1919

Britain's policy in the Baltic area immediately after World War I appears to have been influenced primarily by two factors; first, by its relationship with the Russian counter-revolutionary governments and, second, by its determination to keep the Baltic area free of German domination.

Prime Minister Lloyd George and President Wilson realized that the situation existing in Russia early in 1919 could not go on indefinitely. Allied troops could not remain on Russian soil,¹ nor could the Allies maintain those troops and supply the White Russian forces with military supplies and money. Lloyd George later said of the situation:

Personally I would have dealt with the Soviets as the de facto Government of Russia. So would President Wilson. But we both agreed that we could not carry to that extent our colleagues at the Congress, nor the public opinion of our own countries....²

¹Allied troops had landed at Murmansk and Archangel in June-July 1918. Other contingents of British, American, Japanese, and French troops landed at Vladivostok.

²David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. I (London, 1938), p. 331.

The French were particularly opposed to any recognition of the Bolsheviks.

The idea that was finally accepted was also suggested by Lloyd George and came to be known as the Prinkipo proposals. It was adopted by the Allied statesmen on January 21, 1919, and presented to the Russian people. In it the Allies stated that they desired only to help the Russian people and that they did not intend to interfere in any manner with the right of the Russian people to settle their own problems. The Allies therefore invited "every organized group that is now exercising, or attempting to exercise, political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia, or within the boundaries of European Russia...to send representatives, not exceeding three representatives for each group, to the Princes Islands, Sea of Marmora, where they will be met by representatives of the Associated Powers, provided, in the meantime, there is a truce of arms amongst the parties invited...."³ The proposed meeting was expected to take place on February 15, 1919. Lloyd George had suggested earlier that such a meeting be held in Paris, but Clemenceau had objected.⁴

The Bolsheviks accepted the invitation, as did the

³W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations (London, 1945), p. xli.

⁴Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. I, p. 355. W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, in their History of Anglo-Soviet Relations, even go so far as to accuse the French of jamming the wireless in order to keep the invitation from reaching the Bolshevik Government.

provisional governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But the three organized White governments of Russia -- at Omsk, Ekaterinedar, and Archangel -- refused to meet with the Bolsheviks.⁵ Consequently, the projected conference never materialized. Thus British policy-makers were faced with a dilemma. They had made commitments to the Russian counter-revolutionary government of Kolchak which forbade them from recognizing the independence of the new Baltic states before the peace settlement, yet they had to lend support to the new states in order to force the German troops to evacuate the area and to prevent the Bolsheviks from filling the void.

Lloyd George evidently realized, as many of his colleagues failed to do, that after four years of war the Allies were in no position to carry on the war in the form of intervention in Russia. An attempt to fight in Russia at that time would have led, at best, to a Pyrrhic victory; at worst, to wholesale mutiny on the part of the Allied troops. Even Churchill admitted later that during this period in which he entered the War Office as Secretary of State for War:

...Our armies were melting fast. The British people would not supply the men or the money for any large scale military establishment elsewhere than on the Rhine. It was highly questionable whether any troops raised under compulsion for the war against Germany would consent to fight anybody else in any circumstances, or even to remain long in occupation of conquered territory...⁶

⁵Coates, Anglo-Soviet Relations, p. xiv.

⁶Winston S. Churchill, The Aftermath (New York, 1929), p. 171.

The largest share of the Allied troops then engaged in Russia were British. Canada and other members of the Empire refused to send troops. The British estimated that nearly 150,000 men would be needed for a full-scale intervention in Russia. The probability of obtaining such a large number of volunteers was very remote, as the United States, Italy, and France were not interested in furnishing any additional troops. Also the Allies were not interested in feeding, equipping, or paying the 400,000 Russian troops which the British estimated would be necessary if Russians were to participate in full-scale fighting against the Bolsheviks.⁷ With such a situation existing, Lloyd George may have felt that any Russian venture would be sheer suicide for Great Britain economically, if not militarily. Thus the hope for a solution to Britain's dilemma vanished when the Prinkipo Conference failed to materialize.

The Kolchak government at Omsk was the dominant counter-revolutionary government during 1919.⁸ Its military success impressed the Allies and on May 26, 1919, the Supreme Council addressed a note to Admiral Kolchak in which it was stated that the Allied and Associated Governments were "disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Kolchak and his Associates with munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves

⁷Harold Spender, The Prime Minister, (New York, 1920), p. 375 (Appendix C).

⁸Admiral Kolchak assumed the leadership of the Siberian government on November 18, 1918.

as the government of all Russia, provided they receive from them definite guarantees that their policy has the same object in view as that of the Allied and Associated Powers.⁹ These guarantees were embodied in eight conditions for acceptance by Admiral Kolchak. Condition five, which pertained to the Baltic, stated:

...if a solution of the relations between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaucasian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations which may exist between their de facto Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.¹⁰

Admiral Kolchak replied on June 4, 1919, to the Allied note:

The Government over which I preside has been happy to learn that the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to Russia is in perfect accord with the task which the Russian Government itself has undertaken...¹¹

During this period Admiral Kolchak's government expressed a desire to treat with the Estonians on a de facto basis. Kolchak's government went on to explain that inasmuch as it was only a provisional authority its recognition of Estonia

⁹E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds.). Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, Vol. III (London, 1949) p. 331. Supreme Council dispatch to Kolchak, May 26, 1919. (Hereafter cited as British Documents, with appropriate volume and page.)

¹⁰British Documents, III, 332. Supreme Council dispatch to Kolchak, May 26, 1919.

¹¹British Documents, III, 362. Telegram from Mr. de Martel, French Charge d'Affaires at Omsk, to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 4, 1919.

must also be on a provisional basis.¹² The Estonians declined the offer and negotiations fell through.

The only other Russians of any note with whom the British dealt were General Nikolai Yudenitch, Prince Lieven, and Prince Avalov-Bermond. General Yudenitch was a former Tsarist general who had been primarily responsible for defeating the Turkish armies on the southern Russian front during the war. He received his formal appointment to command the Northwest Army, then operating in the Baltic area, from Admiral Kolchak on June 20, 1919.¹³ The Northwest Army consisted of approximately 10,000 to 20,000 men when General Yudenitch took command, and averaged that same size during most of its existence. Its headquarters was at Helsingfors at first, but later it was moved to Narva. This army was the only White Russian force that was associated exclusively with the Baltic area.¹⁴

Prince Lieven was a Balt aristocrat who had also served in the Tsar's army. He had stayed at Riga when the Russian army fell apart after Brest-Litovsk and, with German backing, organized his own detachment at Libau in December, 1918.¹⁵

¹²E. J. Dillon, The Inside Story of the Peace Conference (New York, 1920) p. 374.

¹³Gleb Drujina, The History of the Northwest Army of General Yudenitch (Stanford, 1950), p. 29. Kolchak's orders made Yudenitch Commander in Chief of all Russian (White Russian) forces in the Baltic, with dictatorial powers.

¹⁴Drujina, Northwest Army, p. 2.

¹⁵Drujina, Northwest Army, p. 57.

It consisted of about 400 men, splendidly equipped by the German army. His group fought with distinction against the Bolsheviki. After Yudenitch's Northwest Army was formed, orders were issued transferring Prince Lieven's detachment to that army.

Prince Avalov-Bermondts might almost have been described as a comic-opera character. His background was obscure. Some believed he was a German Balt,¹⁶ others that he was of Caucasian birth, but of mixed origin, perhaps partly Jewish.¹⁷ Bermondts himself claimed that he was born in Tiflis. His father was Prince M. A. Avalov. His mother was married a second time to a man called Bermondts and he subsequently used both names. Also, according to his account, he fought in the Russo-Japanese War, attained the rank of colonel before the Revolution, and was wounded and decorated many times. According to British authorities, he was a mere subaltern in the First Lancers before the war. He was believed to have earned no special distinction, nor to have any right to the rank of colonel, and most Russians questioned his right to the White Cross (a Russian military decoration) which he always wore conspicuously on his uniform. The British looked upon him as an "adventurer suffering from megalomania, highly

¹⁶Drujina, Northwest Army, p. 107.

¹⁷British Documents, III, 86. Report from Colonel Tallents to Earl Curzon, September 1, 1919.

theatrical, and obviously envisaging himself as a possible future Tsar of Russia.¹⁸

Bermondts was pro-German and preferred to associate with them at all times, although it is said that he knew only a few phrases of the language, notably "Deutschland Über Alles."¹⁹ At first he served under Prince Lieven, and he was supposedly under General Yudenitch's command after June, 1919.²⁰

In April 1919, the Paris Peace Conference set up a Commission on Baltic Affairs to deal with the perplexing problems that came up in regard to this vital area. Questions of a political nature were to have priority and economic problems were to be discussed later.²¹ Members of the Commission were Dr. S. E. Morison, United States; Sir Esme Howard, Great Britain; M. Kammerer, France; Marquis della Torretta, Italy; and M. Otchaj, Japan. Sir Esme Howard eventually assumed the presidency of the commission.

Within the Baltic area operated several smaller missions of an economic, political, or military nature. One of the

¹⁸British Documents, III, 86. Report from Colonel Tallents to Earl Curzon, September 1, 1919.

¹⁹British Documents, III, 87. Report from Colonel Tallents to Earl Curzon, September 1, 1919.

²⁰Bermondts preferred German company, however, and when General Yudenitch ordered him to join the Northwest Army in October 1919, he refused. Yudenitch thereupon declared Bermondts a traitor and ordered all of Bermondts's men to leave him and join the Northwest Army immediately.

²¹Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Estonia, p. 263.

more important of these was headed by General Sir Hubert Gough, who had been appointed Chief of the British Military Mission to Finland and the Baltic States on June 4, 1919.

His instructions on that date read in part:

The Governments of the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers (the United States of America, France and Italy) have agreed that the execution of Allied military policy in the Baltic shall be under British control and Allied officers will, therefore, be attached to your mission.²²

At first sight this might seem like an ideal arrangement, as the authority for the Baltic region was in the hands of one of the main powers, represented, in turn, by one man. Such was not the case, however. The situation was complicated by the fact that the British Government regularly received reports from two separate missions in the Baltic. The first of these was General Gough's military mission which possessed an interallied character and which normally reported to the War Office and to the British Peace Delegation²³ at the Paris Conference. The second was a British diplomatic and economic mission, under Colonel S. G. Tallents, which generally reported to the Foreign Office. Reports from the first of these two missions were usually, although not invariably, transmitted or repeated to the Foreign Office, and those of the second mission, to the Peace Delegation.²⁴

²²British Documents, III, 2. Introduction to Chapter I.

²³Headed at first by Mr. A. J. Balfour and later by Sir Eyre Crowe.

²⁴British Documents, III, iii. Preface to Vol. III, Series I.

These two officers were instructed to work in close cooperation with one another, but inasmuch as their reports were not received by the same office, there must have been some confusion at higher levels. To further complicate the picture, these two missions were both distinct from the later inter-allied mission to the Baltic provinces, under General Henri Niessel of the French Army. The British representative on this mission was General Turner.

On June 10, 1919, Sir Esme Howard, speaking for the Baltic Commission, told Latvian representatives "that it would be practically impossible to establish a definite status for these countries without the consent of the Russian government which, they were persuaded, was shortly going to be reestablished."²⁵ Shortly after this hearing accorded the Lettish delegation, British policy appeared to change. Sir Esme felt that the time had come for Allied policy toward the Baltic states to be clarified both for the peoples of the Baltic and for the government of Admiral Kolchak. Accordingly, at the close of the Baltic Commission's meeting of July 2, Sir Esme produced, on behalf of his government, a memorandum reviewing the existing situation.

Until this time, the British government had extended de facto recognition to Estonia and Latvia, but not to Lithuania. As the Baltic ports were necessary bases for all

²⁵Graham, Diplomatic Recognition, Latvia, p. 425.

anti-Bolshevik activity which might be directed against Petrograd or Moscow, stable governments had to be established in these countries.²⁶ It was also in the interest of Europe and Russia that the Baltic should not become dependent on Germany in any way. In order to bring this about, specific assurances had to be given to the populations of the Baltic states concerning Allied policy. Individual assurances would not suffice, so Sir Esme proposed that the Baltic Commission present a resolution to the Council of Five,²⁷ declarative of Allied policy. He emphasized that it must be both anti-German and anti-Bolshevik:

The Allied and Associated Powers once again recognize as independent de facto Governments the Governments of Estonia and Latvia, and for the first time the Government of Lithuania; they affirm to them that they have decided to assure to these States the free self-government which their populations desire.

At the same time the Allied and Associated Governments must express their opinion that a definitive solution cannot be reached without the consent of a recognized Russian Government and, while reserving the right to cooperate either directly or by the intermediary of the League of Nations, with a view to obtaining a solution satisfactory to both parties, they cannot for the moment take any step which would bind them to a definitive solution while awaiting the reestablishment of a recognized Russian Government.

Meanwhile they have the desire and the will to do everything in their power to help the Baltic States to organize their local defense and establish an efficient and stable administration.²⁸

²⁶Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, p. 429.

²⁷This refers to the representatives of the five leading Allied nations (Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan). Later it was known as the Council of Four and composed of the representatives of the Big Four (Great Britain, The United States, France, and Italy).

²⁸Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, p. 430.

Sir Esme suggested that a copy of the declaration be forwarded to Admiral Kolchak and to the Russian committee in Paris (Conference Politique Russe) with an explanation that such a declaration was necessary to assure the cooperation of the Baltic States in any future operations against the Bolsheviki.

The British memorandum, as one scholar has put it:

...represented, on its theoretical side, an endeavor to effect a compromise between independence and non-independence by according de facto recognition to the Baltic governments while denying status as legally constituted states to the nascent republics. It was accordingly tinctured by classic conceptions of the old international law, requiring affirmative action of the mother country as the condition prealable to recognition, as well as by newer notions of the mediatory role of the League of Nations in giving the earmarks of legality to new states. Most basically, it was conditioned upon an as yet executory action of the Allies themselves with reference to the reconstitution of a Russian government. Practically, the proposals were designed to involve Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the far-reaching interventionist schemes of the moment, while promising them in return only an illusory status, dependent upon the caprices of Kolchak, the Conference Politique Russe, or even the League of Nations. Thus did the British propose to pay themselves and their allies militarily for purely verbal generosity. Small wonder that the Baltic delegation, so far as they knew of the matter, suspected a plot against their independence.²⁹

The French were particularly intrigued by the ingenious compromise Sir Esme's memorandum proposed, and offered to accept it if all references to Baltic independence were deleted.³⁰ They felt that such references to independence

²⁹Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, pp. 430-31.

³⁰Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, p. 431.

went beyond previous commitments, and their reservations were supported by both Italy and Japan. The United States refused any kind of recognition, however circumscribed; although, as the Marquis della Torretta pointed out, the United States had implicitly recognized the local de facto government simply by participating in the negotiations with Kolchak.³¹ President Wilson had explained his reluctance to recognize the Baltic states in these terms: "By this feeling of friendship and honourable obligation to the great nations whose brave and heroic self-sacrifice contributed so much to the termination of the war, the Government of the United States was guided...in its persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic states as separate nations independent of Russia."³² Secretary of State Lansing further pointed out "that at the bottom of the whole question lay a very important principle of policy. The recognition of de facto Governments in territories formerly Russian, constituted in a measure a dissection of Russia which the United States of America had carefully avoided, except in the case of Finland and Poland."³³

Wilson's policy, in this case, can be described as

³¹Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, p. 431.

³²H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. VI (London, 1924), p. 297.

³³Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol. IV (Washington, 1943), p. 688. The independence of Finland and Poland had already been recognized by all of the Russian governments.

nebulous at best. He made a similar statement regarding the Transcaucasian area of Russia in which he said, "In line with these important declarations of Policy the United States withheld its approval from the decision of the Supreme Council at Paris, recognizing the independence of the so-called Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan."³⁴ But in the case of Armenia, Wilson was ready to recognize its independence, with the sole reservation "that the final determination of its boundaries must not be made without Russia's consent and agreement."³⁵ It seems strange that this same concept did not apply to Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Baltic states.

After suppressing all references to "independence" and "states" in regard to the Baltic area, Sir Esme's resolution was approved by the Baltic Commission on July 15, 1919, and forwarded to the Supreme Council.³⁶ The Council carefully examined the recommendations for a period of ten days and then, "exhibiting a sudden sense of realities,"³⁷ refused to follow the commission's recommendations. Thereupon, the commission abandoned the project and devoted all its future meetings to the problem of evacuating the German units still in the Baltic.³⁸ Earl Curzon, in a memorandum,

³⁴Temperly, Peace Conference, VI, 297.

³⁵Temperly, Peace Conference, VI, 297.

³⁶Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, pp. 431-32.

³⁷Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, p. 432.

³⁸Graham, Diplomatic Recognition-Latvia, p. 432.

remarked at this time:

It cannot be said that an altogether consistent policy has been pursued...no further steps have been taken to endeavor to secure the co-operation of the Border States of Russia in the policy laid down by the Allied Powers, and no communications have been addressed to the representatives of these States in Paris, in spite of their repeated requests to be informed of the intentions of the Allied Governments. Grave dissatisfaction has consequently resulted in Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia....³⁹

Even after the failure of the Prinkipo Conference, Lloyd George refused to share the beliefs of the "interventionist" groups in Britain. Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for War, was one of the outstanding protagonists of the views of these "interventionists."⁴⁰ It was largely through his influence in the cabinet that considerable assistance was given to the White Russian forces. Churchill and the "interventionists" felt that the Bolshevik regime in Russia was a menace to civilization in general and to the British Empire in particular. They felt that intervention, under these circumstances, was a necessity even if such an intervention meant a new war against the Bolsheviks. Even Churchill realized, however, that in spite of Allied supplies and arms, "If Russia is to be saved...she must be

³⁹ Churchill, The Aftermath, pp. 244-5.

⁴⁰ Edward H. Carr, Britain, A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of the War. (London, 1939), p. 140.

saved by Russians.⁴¹

Lloyd George also recognized the evils of Bolshevism and the importance of containing it. However, he decided against intervention on the practical ground that Britain was in no state to launch such a venture. He explained his stand on intervention in a House of Commons speech on April 16, 1919, in which he said:

Russia is a country which is very easy to invade, but very difficult to conquer. It has never been conquered by a foreign foe, although it has been successfully invaded many times. It is a country which is easy to get into, but very difficult to get out of.⁴²

He went on to cite the example of Germany and her trouble with Russia, even though the German army defeated the Tsar's forces. In further backing up his policy of non-intervention he reminded the members of the House of Commons:

...[It is a] fundamental principle of all foreign policy in this country -- a very sound principle -- that you should never interfere in the internal affairs of another country, however badly governed....⁴³

He went on to say:

⁴¹Churchill, Aftermath, p. 164. Churchill should have realized, even at that time, that the British Army was in no condition to be used in any kind of interventionist scheme. His first act after taking over as Secretary of State for War, on January 15, 1919, was to take drastic measures to stop the disorders and mutinies growing out of discharge procedures.

⁴²The Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, House of Commons, Vol. 114, 5th Session, (April 16, 1919), 2940. (Hereafter cited as H. C. Debates with appropriate volume, date, and column.)

⁴³114 H. C. Debates (April 16, 1919), 2940.

I share the horror of all the Bolshevik teachings, but I would rather leave Russia Bolshevik until she sees her way out of it than see Britain bankrupt. And that is the surest road to Bolshevism in Britain.⁴⁴

Upon being questioned about the British supplies that were being sent to the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia, he replied that many areas, after Brest-Litovsk, remained loyal to the Allies. The Allies supported them then so now to supply them was not interfering in the internal affairs of Russia.⁴⁵ Lloyd George also discussed, to some extent, the containment of Bolshevism, which he felt was an absolute necessity. On this subject he said:

The next item in our policy is what I call to arrest the flow of lava -- that is, to prevent the forcible eruption of Bolshevism into Allied lands. For that reason, we are organising all the forces of the Allied countries bordering on Bolshevik territory from the Baltic to the Black Sea -- Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Roumania.... If Bolshevism attacks any of our Allies, it is our business to defend them.

For that reason we are supplying all these countries with the necessary equipment to set up a real barrier against an invasion by force of arms. The Bolsheviks may menace or they may not. Whether they do so or not, we should be ready for any attempt to overrun Europe by force. That is our policy. But we want peace in Russia. The world will not be pacified so long as Russia is torn and rent by civil war.⁴⁶

Britain began to reconsider its stand in Baltic and Russian affairs in July 1919, after Kolchak's forces were

⁴⁴114 H. C. Debates, (April 16, 1919), 2942.

⁴⁵114 H. C. Debates (April 16, 1919), 2942-2943. His argument, it would seem, is a little weak here and goes against the fundamental principles of foreign policy he previously laid down.

⁴⁶114 H. C. Debates (April 16, 1919), 2943-2944

so badly beaten that it was doubtful if they could recover before the end of the year. The mutiny of the major part of the White Russian troops attached to the Allied contingents serving in northern Russia and their defection en masse to the Bolsheviks⁴⁷ further strengthened British determination to revise her policies. The only effective fighting force in the Baltic area now, with the exception of the German army, was the Estonian Army.⁴⁸ The Northwest Army of General Nikolai Yudenitch was incapable at this time of any major action due to lack of manpower and supplies.

As a result, the British Foreign Office drew up a memorandum on July 28, 1919, restating the Allied policy in Russia. In part it read:

...Whilst anything in the nature of temporary setbacks should be the last reason for altering our policy in Russia, the sudden reversal of the very favourable conditions of two months ago justifies a close revision of that policy in the light of our recent military and political experiences.

The most significant feature of these events is the desertion of Russian troops from the Anti-Bolshevik to the Bolshevik ranks. These men, after having been well fed and well paid and having seen anti-Bolshevik methods and realised what the anti-Bolshevik authorities stand for, have deliberately chosen the other side. Is this the result of political conviction or is it due to more tempting prospects of loot? In any case, both in North Russia and in Siberia, where Allied troops and

⁴⁷British Documents, III, 460. Foreign Office Memorandum, July 28, 1919.

⁴⁸Estonian soldiers had been scattered throughout the Russian army under the Tsar, but after the Provisional Government's April 12, 1917 decree of autonomy Estonian soldiers were placed in separate Estonian contingents under their own officers. This was the beginning of the Estonian Army.

Allied material were being employed on a large scale, the anti-Bolshevik campaign has failed because of the defection of the Russians....

No Government in Europe or America is strong enough to undertake an extensive military expedition in Russia. We are faced with the alternative of continuing our present support or of withdrawing it altogether.

It has been decided to evacuate North Russia. There remain, however, our commitments in Siberia, South Russia and the Baltic States....

The Allied and Associated Powers declare as their policy that Russia should have the Government most acceptable to the Russian people, and should this turn out to be Bolshevik, they would presumably have to consent.... If Admiral Kolchak is unable to overturn the Bolsheviks with our aid, it is most unlikely that he will do so without it. If the mass of the Russian people were really hostile to Lenin they would long ago have definitely rallied to Kolchak.

Having gone so far in encouraging the anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia as well as in South Russia, the Baltic States and North Russia, the Allies could hardly confine themselves to the mere withdrawal of their support. It has never been the policy of the Allies to support this or that form of Government but to secure the self-determination of the Russian people, and their withdrawal from supporting the anti-Bolshevik forces can be justified by the total failure of the latter to win the assistance of any considerable section of the people in Soviet Russia.... On four separate occasions since last December the Soviet Government have declared their readiness to treat for peace,...

Bolshevism, there is good reason to suppose, has undergone considerable modification.... If the Allies merely withdraw from Russia, the Soviet Authorities, there is little reason to doubt, would take a swift and terrible revenge on the rank and file of the anti-Bolshevik armies,.... But if negotiations were proposed whilst the Allies were still in the country, they would exert very great pressure indeed and there is little doubt that very favourable conditions could be made securing amnesties, apart from acceptable general conditions, for the anti-Bolshevik armies and wide local powers for the Baltic States.

The Russians would then be left to themselves and the Government of Lenin would have to justify itself in the light of its works. If it proves unacceptable to the bulk of the people, there is no reason to fear that Lenin and his friends will not share the fate of

the Romanoffs, of Miliukoff, and of Kerensky.⁴⁹

The British government's change in policy may also have been due in part to the Labour Party opposition, which was constantly reminding Lloyd George and his following that self-determination applied to Russia as well as to other areas. Also Labour was asking embarrassing questions about the cost in lives and money of the British intervention on behalf of the anti-Bolshevik forces.⁵⁰

The Bolsheviks, evidently reasoning that they must have peace before they could establish their own rule securely, and thinking of the advantages to be gained in foreign trade if they could use the Baltic ports of Riga and Tallinn, began peace negotiations with the Baltic states.⁵¹ On September 22, 1919, the Bolsheviks sent the following note to Latvia proposing peace negotiations (the Estonians already having been approached):

A proposal to open peace negotiations has already been made by the Russian Soviet Government to the Reval Government. This proposal has been accepted by the Reval Government and peace negotiations are to begin in a few days. By this step the Russian Soviet Government has sufficiently demonstrated the absence of any aggressive intentions on its part towards the newly-established States on the borders of the former Russian Empire. Taking up the same position with regard to the Riga Government, the Russian Soviet Government proposes

⁴⁹British Documents, III, 461-64. Foreign Office memorandum, July 28, 1919.

⁵⁰118 H. C. Debates (July 29, 1919), 1969, 1970, and 1980.

⁵¹Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol. I (London, 1950), p. 313.

negotiations with the Riga Government for the cessation of hostilities and for working out conditions for peaceful relations between the two countries.⁵²

A similar note was sent to the Lithuanian government. A joint declaration was drawn up on October 1, 1919, by Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania in which they proposed to negotiate a peace with Soviet Russia.⁵³

On September 25, 1919, upon hearing that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were contemplating a peaceful settlement with the Bolsheviks, Earl Curzon again outlined British policy in the Baltic area. He said, in part:

His Majesty's Government have already recognised the autonomous existence of the Governments of the Baltic States, and have dealt with them as such. The question of the de jure recognition of the independence of the States is one which it is impossible for them to decide upon their own responsibility, or in severance from their Allies. The Peace Conference alone or the League of Nations sitting in sequel to the Peace Conference can arrive at a definite decision on a matter, in which interests more comprehensive than those of any individual State or community are concerned....

His Majesty's Government are asked whether they can continue to supply military material and stores to the States whom they have assisted in their struggle for freedom. The reduction of the available stocks of material consequent upon the termination of the war and the shortage of shipping unfortunately render it impossible to continue these contributions, which have hitherto fallen almost exclusively upon Great Britain...

Similarly as regards the provision of credit, it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to assume at this stage a financial responsibility which they have hitherto been unable to accept. While they have exerted themselves to aid the States in the provision

⁵²Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Volume I (1917-1924) (London, 1951), p. 169.

⁵³Alfred L. P. Dennis, The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, (New York, 1924), p. 115.

of loans from independent quarters, they cannot, in view of the grave financial straits in which the entire world is placed, depart from the attitude in this respect which they have consistently assumed.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government feel that they are not entitled to exercise any pressure upon the free initiative of the Baltic States and that their Governments must be at liberty to decide upon such action as may be most conducive to the preservation of their own national existence. It is for them to determine with unfettered judgement whether they should make any arrangement, and if so of what nature, with the Soviet authorities; and if, as seems to be in contemplation, they decide to act in unision, the effective control of the situation should be within their power.

His Majesty's Government will not cease to use their influence, both in the councils of the Allies and through their diplomatic representatives in the States, to assist in the preservation of their liberties and in the task of their economic and commercial reorganization.⁵⁴

An armistice was signed between Estonia and the Bolsheviks at the end of December, 1919, and it was followed by the Treaty of Tartu on February 2, 1920.⁵⁵ The conclusion of the peace treaty on Estonian territory gives some indication of the dire straits into which the Bolsheviks had fallen. The treaty acknowledged the right of self-determination even to the point of secession from the parent state; it recognized Estonian independence and renounced forever all rights of sovereignty over Estonia; it extinguished all legal basis of Russian possession under the Treaty of Nystadt (1721); it suspended any obligations due to once being part

⁵⁴British Documents, III, 569-70. Telegram from Earl Curzon to Mr. Bosanquet, British representative at Reval, September 25, 1919.

⁵⁵Graham, New Governments, pp. 284-85.

of the Russian Empire; it established a neutral zone on the frontier; and it guaranteed to respect the neutrality of Estonia should the country be internationally recognized.⁵⁶

Although Latvia had joined the other Baltic nations in a declaration to negotiate peace with Russia, it struggled on with the Bolsheviks until February, 1920, when all Red units were finally cleared out of Latvia. The two states finally effected a peaceful settlement by the Treaty of Riga on August 11, 1920.⁵⁷ This treaty contained much the same terms as the Treaty of Tartu, and was also negotiated on the territory of the Baltic state involved.

Technically, Russia and Lithuania had never been at war,⁵⁸ but they met, nevertheless and drew up a peace treaty. The Treaty of Moscow, signed on July 12, 1920, was similar to the Treaty of Riga and settled all remaining differences between Russia and Lithuania.⁵⁹

The apparent abandonment by the Bolsheviks of all claims to these Russian border areas was not wholly prompted by a sense of right. At that time the Bolsheviks were hard pressed to keep their grip even on Great Russian Territory.

⁵⁶Graham, New Governments, p. 285.

⁵⁷Graham, New Governments, p. 335.

⁵⁸Dennis, Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, p. 125. The Bolsheviks did attempt to move in as German power declined, but the presence of 40,000 German troops in addition to Lithuanian units finally discouraged them.

⁵⁹Graham, New Governments, p. 379.

Lenin had said that if the survival of Bolshevism required it, the Bolsheviks were ready to retreat even to Kamchatka.⁶⁰

Britain apparently had good reasons for adopting the attitude summarized in Earl Curzon's September 25th statement regarding the Baltic. Earl Curzon and others in high government circles may have reasoned that Bolshevism would have little appeal to countries such as the Baltic states which were just coming into their own. The Bolshevik doctrine of class warfare was not of primary importance to these nations. It appeared that one way to combat the menace of Bolshevism was to support these new nations, as the Baltic states could become a part of any potential buffer zone erected between the East and the West.⁶¹ It was also quite apparent by the end of 1919 that the counter-revolutionary governments of Russia would not be able to drive the Bolsheviks from power. From this time on British policy in the Baltic was to be influenced less by the Russian counter-revolutionary governments and more by the Bolsheviks.

⁶⁰W. F. Reddaway, Problems of the Baltic (Cambridge, 1940), p. 90.

⁶¹Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 296.

CHAPTER III

GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY IN THE BALTIC -- 1919

British leaders were convinced at the end of the Great War that Germany must be kept out of the Baltic. During the first few months of 1919, however, Britain apparently believed that the Allies had the situation under control. The Allies had exercised their right, under Article XII of the Armistice Agreement, to keep German troops in the Baltic for as long as they felt a particular situation warranted the retention of these troops. They expected the German troops to withdraw immediately upon request of the Allied Powers. Thus Britain gave its approval to the treaty of December 29, 1918 between Latvia and Germany and evidently had no qualms about the large number of Free Corps troops that were being recruited for the Baltic area.

The Germans, on the other hand, had no intention of leaving the Baltic without a struggle. They had sufficient troops to carry out their aims but they needed a competent leader. They found such a man in Count Rudiger von der Goltz. He had recently been in Finland aiding the Finns in their fight against the Bolsheviks. Once Finland was secure, he was dispatched on this new mission, which was more political

than military. General von der Goltz arrived in Libau on February 1, 1919. He set about immediately to organize the Latvian army so that it could drive out the Bolsheviks, making sure, however, that the Lettish elements were so weak that they could not hope to fight off the Bolsheviks without German help.¹ Von der Goltz's army included the Baltic Landeswehr, composed of small mixed formations of German and Latvian troops which were militarily self-sufficient; the Iron Division, made up of various Free Corps units incorporated into a divisional organization; and numerous independent Free Corps units. The attack against the Reds was launched from Libau during the second week of February, and by early March, after a series of quick successes, the Baltic coast from Libau north to Windau was cleared. Mitau was secured also.

On March 25, 1919, shortly after these initial German successes, Lloyd George circulated a secret memorandum at Paris entitled "Some Considerations for the Peace Conference Before They Finally Draft Their Terms." This memorandum shows that Lloyd George still hesitated to treat Germany too severely for fear the Germans would be driven into the

¹Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 109. Keeping the Lettish forces weak was easier than might be expected, as one of the provisions of the December 29th treaty with Latvia specified that German officers would command German troops and that any increase in the number of Latvian troops would necessitate a corresponding increase in German troops. Major Fletcher, a German, was given absolute command of the Latvian Army or Landeswehr. He then dismissed all Latvians in key positions and replaced them with German officers. By February 1919, Latvians made up less than one-fifth of their own army.

Bolshevik camp. As for the possibility of German domination of the Baltic, Lloyd George seemed unconcerned:

The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw her lot with the Bolsheviks and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of revolutionary fanatics whose dream it is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force of arms.... If Germany goes over to the Spartacists, it is inevitable that she should throw in her lot with the Russian Bolsheviks. Once that happens, all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik revolution and within a year we may witness the spectacle of near 300,000,000 people organized into a vast Red Army under German instructors and German Generals, equipped with German cannons and German machine guns and prepared for the renewal of the attack on Western Europe.... [The peace must] constitute an alternative to Bolshevism.... [The Conference must deal with the Russian situation for] Bolshevik imperialism does not merely menace the States on Russia's borders; it threatens the whole of Asia and is as near to America as it is to France. It is idle to think the Peace Conference can separate, however sound a peace it may have arranged with Germany, if it leaves Russia as it is today.²

In April, 1919, however, the Free Corps became involved in a political situation which caused British policy makers to take another look at those Germans whom they had so thoughtlessly invited into the Baltic. For some time there had been a good deal of friction between the Ulmanis government and the German Balts who were totally unrepresented in the new government.³ Ulmanis, for his part, had refused to

²Dennis, Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, p. 86.

³According to Robert Waite, (Vanguard of Nazism, p. 112). "In fact it is doubtful if the Ulmanis government was representative of the broad masses of the Latvian population." The United States Senate Commission which was sent to report on the situation in the Baltic said in its report: "The Government [of Ulmanis] had no real mandate from the people; it could not possibly have been upheld by a popular election; it entirely lacked the support of large elements of the community." Senate Documents, No. 105, p. 17.

compromise in any way with the Balts. In early April, tension between the Baltic Germans and the Ulmanis government became particularly acute when Ulmanis once again "refused to consider a surprisingly moderate Balt request for better representation and more equitable treatment."⁴ General von der Goltz had the military situation fairly well in hand at this time also. It seemed like a good moment for firm action. On April 16, 1919, various Free Corps units arrested the entire staff of the Latvian army and the majority of the members of the Ulmanis government.⁵ Ulmanis himself escaped onto a British ship anchored in the harbor of Libau. Von der Goltz was absent at the time and upon hearing of this coup de force, expressed surprise. However, he recovered his composure quickly enough to declare martial law in order to "stabilize" conditions.⁶ After a short time he lifted martial law and appointed Pastor Andreas Needra as new head of the Latvian government.⁷

⁴Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 113.

⁵Men of the von Pfeiffer Free Corps accomplished the former, Baron von Manteuffel and elements of the Landeswehr, the latter.

⁶Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 113. Waite believes that even though the exact role which von der Goltz played in the April putsch may never be known; indirect evidence suggests that von der Goltz aided and abetted the coup if he did not actually plan and direct it.

⁷Needra was a Lutheran pastor, strongly anti-Bolshevik and described as being prominent among the Letts as a writer and intellectual leader.

Upon receiving word of the coup d'etat, the British government acted on impulse and demanded that the German government immediately recall von der Goltz and the Free Corps. The German government reminded the British that to recall the Free Corps would put the entire defense of the Baltic in British hands. "Was His Majesty's Government," they asked, "prepared to send an expeditionary force to the Baltic?"⁸ The British, of course, were not, and so were forced to reconsider. They finally agreed to let the Germans remain, but on condition that they were not to engage in any offensive action.

Von der Goltz had planned on conquering Riga also and was not at all pleased at the British order that no offensive action be taken. He wanted to capture Riga both because of its symbolic importance (it had once been the main stronghold of the Teutonic Knights) and because it was the finest seaport on the Baltic.⁹ Von der Goltz tried to get permission for an offensive from the Ebert government, but Ebert was in no position to defy the Allies in such a manner and so refused his request. Von der Goltz then asked if the Baltic Landeswehr might attack. Ebert told him that his government did not exercise any control over the Latvian army, which was about as much approval for an offensive as General von der Goltz

⁸Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 116.

⁹Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 116.

needed. There is no evidence to prove that von der Goltz ordered the attack, but his talk with the Ebert government and the opportune timing of the attack are too much of a coincidence to ignore. The attack was entirely successful, as the Free Corps units joined the offensive on their own initiative. Riga fell on May 22, 1919.

The fall of Riga was the high point in the Germans' entire Baltic adventure. It also marked the beginning of the end for the Free Corps' Baltic plans, for now the local inhabitants, the Allies, and the German government in Berlin were all thoroughly alarmed at the success of the Free Corps.¹⁰ Even the German commanders in the Baltic began to realize that they had gone too far too fast. As Major Bischoff, commander of the Iron Division, is said to have remarked to his chief of staff: "Um Gottes Willen, wir haben uns totgesiegt!"¹¹

The Allies now began to surmise that conditions in the border states were not as they should be. United States Secretary of State Lansing still appeared to have confidence in the good faith of von der Goltz, but the British Foreign Secretary insisted that a special committee be appointed to outline a new policy for the border states.¹² Such a

¹⁰Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 118.

¹¹"For God's sake, we have conquered ourselves to death."

¹²David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, Vol. XVI (New York, 1924), p. 253.

committee was formed, consisting of American, British, French, and Italian economic, naval, and military representatives. On May 23, 1919, the committee recommended that a competent military mission under British command be organized under the orders of a Lieutenant - or Major-General with headquarters at Libau or Reval.¹³ This recommendation was carried out, and it was this mission that General Hubert Gough headed. The mission was composed solely of British personnel and when it arrived in the Baltic in mid-June, 1919, it began at once to carry out the orders transmitted to it directly by the British War Office. Those orders instructed General Gough, among other things, to carry out Allied policy and to neutralize German influence wherever possible.¹⁴ He was given additional powers on July 8, 1919, when the Supreme Council decided, on the motion of Mr. A. J. Balfour, that General Gough should be authorized to deal directly with local German commanders in the Baltic states in order to expedite the evacuation of the German forces.¹⁵

One of the first acts of General Gough's mission was the removal from office of Andreas Needra and the restoration of

¹³The Committee's report is reprinted in Miller, My Diary, XVI, 363-64.

¹⁴These orders were given by General Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, see Senate Documents, No. 105, pp. 37-8.

¹⁵British Documents, p. 34. From notes of a meeting of the Heads of Delegations, July 8, 1919.

the Ulmanis government. Following this, the Baltic Landeswehr was purged of its German personnel and restored to the control of the Latvian Provisional Government. A British officer, Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. L. Alexander,¹⁶ took over the command of this unit. General von der Goltz had hoped to transfer the Landeswehr intact to Bermond's White Russian forces, but had been thwarted in this undertaking by Major Fletcher, former commander of the Landeswehr.¹⁷ By this time, however, von der Goltz realized that the only chance he had to see his original Baltic plans carried out was to transfer the titular command of the Free Corps to a non-German commander who was in sympathy with German plans. In that way German domination of the Baltic might still be accomplished. It was at this stage that Bermond entered the picture. Neither von der Goltz nor any of the other Free Corps officers had any respect for Bermond, but it was a case of using him or losing everything they had gained thus far. As von der Goltz said in his memoirs (Meine Sendung in Finnland und im Baltikum), concerning this phase of his career:

I was determined to hinder the withdrawal of the German troops which had already been officially ordered by the German government since the middle of May.... Obviously I wanted as slow a withdrawal as possible

¹⁶ Subsequently known for his service in World War II in North Africa and Italy and later as Governor-General of Canada.

¹⁷ Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 121. Major Fletcher's actions were caused primarily by his animosity toward von der Goltz and his contempt for Bermond.

for in the meantime Bermond could complete the recruitment of his corps...¹⁸

By this time the Allies were just as determined that the German Free Corps units must leave the Baltic. On June 13, 1919, at a meeting of the Supreme Council in Paris, the Allies for the first time demanded, by virtue of Article XII of the Armistice agreement, that the German forces withdraw from the Baltic provinces.¹⁹ On July 3, General Gough succeeded in forcing General von der Goltz to sign an agreement which promised that all German troops would withdraw.²⁰ Making the Germans sign an agreement was one thing, but making them live up to such an agreement was another. During the summer, notes were exchanged between the Allies and the Germans, but the Free Corps showed no signs of leaving the Baltic. Von der Goltz invented excuses or flatly refused to obey orders from either the Allies or the German government.

A typical example of these German tactics is found in the July 9th meeting between General Gough's representatives and a group of General von der Goltz's officers. Von der Goltz had given orders that no German representatives were to meet with the Allied representatives. In spite of this order, some of the German officers did attend the meeting. Nothing was accomplished, as the Germans refused to cooperate

¹⁸Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 124.

¹⁹British Documents, III, 1. Introductory note to Chapter I.

²⁰Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 300.

in carrying out Entente orders. Instead, they took the following position: (a) They refused to leave Latvia until they were sure German interests were secure (presumably they meant the interests and large holdings of the German Balts); (b) They refused to recognize Ulmanis's government until a cabinet was formed that, to their satisfaction, was capable of running the country; (c) They refused to be evacuated by sea; (d) They would not consider any guarantee of personal safety against Lettish attacks given by any Entente representative.²¹

During this time the frontier between Germany and the Baltic states was supposedly closed. But although the Allies had requested that the frontiers be closed and the Ebert government had issued orders in support of this request, nothing was ever done to enforce such orders. It is doubtful if the German government was ever very much concerned over such Allied requests, as the Allies failed to give sufficient evidence of their determination to insist that their orders be carried out.

Even after the June 13th demand by the Allies for the withdrawal of all German troops from the Baltic, the German government took no effective action to close the frontiers or to stop the recruiting of Free Corps volunteers. On July 26, 1919, the German Foreign Minister Müller assured the

²¹British Documents, III, 19. Telegram from General Gough (Libau) to Mr. Balfour (Paris), July 11, 1919.

National Constituent Assembly ²² that "complete evacuation of the Baltic area is in process."²³ Haase, an Independent Socialist delegate from Berlin replied:

Herr Minister Müller! The Baltic has not only not been evacuated; new troops are being sent there.... The recruitment offices and the Volunteer Corps continue to function as before... If we do not want to have the charge made against us that we are playing a dishonorable game, then it is our duty to set aside the masquerade.... Our army budget, as we heard yesterday is just as high as it was during the war. No wonder! Look how well the Volunteer Corps are supplied and paid.²⁴

Defense Minister Noske, in his reply did not deny any of these charges. He weakly claimed that there was only one railroad line available; this slowed down evacuation, and supplies had to be sent to those troops awaiting evacuation over this same line. He further stated that he knew of the recruiting still going on, but that it was not authorized.²⁵

The Allies were not only having trouble trying to keep replacements from going to the Baltic, but were having difficulty forcing the Germans already in the Baltic to evacuate. Earlier in July, General von der Goltz had met with members

²²This body was elected on January 19, 1919. It set up a provisional government at Weimar, with Ebert as President, in August, 1919, but continued to sit as a semi-executive body until about May, 1920. It was composed of 421 members, as follows: Social Democrats 163, Centre 89, Democrats 74, Nationalists 42, People's Party 22, and Independent Socialists 22.

²³Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 134.

²⁴Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 134.

²⁵Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 135.

of General Gough's mission at St. Olai (located between Riga and Mitau) concerning the problem of German evacuation. Von der Goltz said, at this conference, that he had no instructions from his government to deal directly with General Gough and that any German withdrawal from Libau would be based on military considerations and not upon instructions received through his government from the Allies.²⁶ He also told the Allied representatives that their decision to separate the German and Latvian elements in the Landeswehr would further delay the general evacuation. Colonel Tallents, a member of General Gough's mission, felt, after the St. Olai conference, that the Germans did not intend to make any serious effort to withdraw from Latvia. On the contrary, they were delaying the withdrawal in hopes that some excuse for continued intervention might arise.²⁷ He did not feel, either, that there were any grounds for von der Goltz's assertion that evacuation could not be carried out in less than 74 days under existing conditions.²⁸

General Gough sent Major Easton, another member of the British mission, to make an accurate estimate of German needs as to rolling stock, engines, etc. Von der Goltz's estimate

²⁶British Documents, III, 34. Note from Colonel Tallents to Foreign Office, July 20, 1919.

²⁷British Documents, III, 37. Note from Colonel Tallents to Foreign Office, July 20, 1919.

²⁸Von der Goltz qualified this statement by saying that with maximum improvement of track, roadbed and rolling stock the evacuation might be completed in 37 days.

of 74 days to evacuate was based on the rate of three trains per day. Maximum improvement of railroad conditions plus six trains per day would complete the evacuation in 37 days. According to von der Goltz, either plan meant that no other traffic could use the railroad while evacuation was being carried on.²⁹ Major Easton's report painted an entirely different picture of the situation. He estimated that the railroad could easily handle six trains per day (of 30 cars each) and that only twelve days would be needed for evacuation, or twenty-four days if double time were allowed for any delays.³⁰ The Germans ignored Major Easton's report and flatly declined to use Windau and Libau as evacuation ports even if the Allies would guarantee security for their troops and extra engines for the railroad. The Germans would not put forth a concrete plan of their own, however. General von der Goltz had admitted that he recognized the peace treaty and his obligation to withdraw under it,³¹ but still he did

²⁹Von der Goltz's estimated requirements for evacuation were:

	177	troop trains
	3	supply trains
	19	food supply trains
	15	munitions trains
total	214	trains.

³⁰British Documents, III, 44-45. Telegram from Gen. Burt (Riga) to Gen. Gough (Helsingfors), July 31, 1919. Major Easton figured this on the basis of an estimated 40,000 Germans in Latvia. By Easton's estimate, von der Goltz's figures at St. Olai would indicate a force of 106,000 Germans in Latvia.

³¹British Documents, III, 36. Note from Colonel Tallents to the Foreign Office, July 20, 1919.

nothing about evacuating his troops. Finally General Gough, exasperated by von der Goltz's uncooperative attitude and the negative results of the conference at St. Olai, recommended to Marshal Foch (who in turn forwarded the recommendation to the Supreme Council) the following measures:

- a. General von der Goltz should be recalled immediately.
- b. All German troops should withdraw by sea, beginning immediately.
- c. German authorities should submit a plan of evacuation before August 15th and said plan should be carried out before August 30th.
- d. The Germans should be forbidden to establish war material depots in the Baltic and should be required to supply information on all those now in existence.
- e. No further German troops should be allowed to enter Latvia.³²

The Supreme Council approved these recommendations on July 30, 1919, and sent an ultimatum to the Ebert government demanding that it withdraw all Free Corps troops from the Baltic area or suffer the consequences of an economic blockade of all German ports. On August 5th, Ebert ordered the Free Corps to return to Germany by the end of August, 1919. The wily von der Goltz was still not completely beaten, however. He went directly to Weimar and inquired what the attitude of the government would be if the Free Corps were to enter Russian service. This would have been an opportune moment to stop the intriguing of von der Goltz, had the government so desired. Instead, President Ebert, Minister of War Noske, and Foreign Minister Müller all replied that the German government would have no jurisdiction over such a

³²British Documents, I, 253 (App. G). Letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference, July 28, 1919.

privately organized army,³³ and knowing full well von der Goltz's intent, permitted him to return to his command in the Baltic. On August 24, 1919, Major Bischoff, commander of the Iron Division, led a mutiny among his troops, organized the German Legion, and joined Bermond's Russian Army of the West.³⁴ The Germans could now claim that those Free Corps troops which had joined Bermond were no longer under German control and therefore could not be ordered to evacuate.

As late as August 26th, General Burt, a member of General Gough's mission, reported that von der Goltz stated in writing that he would not evacuate by August 31.³⁵ It was also reported that the German authorities in Lithuania had given permission for any Germans who desired to remain in Lithuania as private citizens to do so if they desired.³⁶ Yet in September, von der Goltz wrote to General Burt:

I am instructed by the German Government to inform you that the Government is doing everything to induce the troops to return to Germany.... The German Government has no military forces at its disposal to counteract the disobedience of the troops---and can eventually

³³Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 124.

³⁴Bermond estimated his forces at 55,000 men, 40,000 being Germans. Churchill estimated from War Office reports that the total German strength was only 35,000 with 20,000 of these in Bermond's forces. (120 H. C. Debates, November 4, 1919, 1328-1329.)

³⁵British Documents, III, 81. Telegram from General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris), August 28, 1919.

³⁶British Documents, III, 131. Secret telegram from Commander-in-chief of the town and district of Siauliai (Lithuania) Officer Birontas to Chief of Lithuanian General Headquarters, August 28, 1919.

only sever its connection with them....³⁷

General Burt replied:

...In view of the time which has elapsed since Paris gave the order for the withdrawal of German troops from Courland and the propaganda for settlement in the country which during this time has been carried on among German troops, it is improbable that anyone else can be made responsible for the present state of things than the German command...³⁸

If ample military equipment had been available to the Lettish and Lithuanian armies, all movements of German troops (and Russian as well) in Latvia and Lithuania could have been settled by force, if necessary, rather than by prolonged and frustrating negotiation. British representatives present in the Baltic were aware of this situation and placed a great deal of stress on the need for supplies for this region.

General Marsh, a member of the British mission to the Baltic, sent a telegram to the Foreign Office emphasizing this point:

Quite agree with Riga that local problems can be solved by hastening equipment of Letts and Lithuanians and compelling German troops to withdraw by force. Matter more urgent than capture of Petrograd.³⁹

³⁷British Documents, III, 103. Note from von der Goltz (Mitau), to General Burt (Riga), September 4, 1919.

³⁸British Documents, III, 103-04. Letter from General Burt (Riga) to von der Goltz (Mitau), September 10, 1919. These charges could have been leveled equally at the home government and the field commanders. The order to evacuate was given three months previously, on June 13th. Troop commanders and recruiters promised land in the Baltic, while the government, though not outwardly lending support to this scheme, did know the exact terms of the German-Latvian treaty and undoubtedly saw the false advertisements, placed in newspapers, used to lure men to sign up in the Free Corps. Such propaganda could have been stopped.

³⁹British Documents, III, 113. Telegram from General Marsh (Helsingfors) to Foreign Office, September 10, 1919.

The Lettish government reported to Lloyd George, on September 21st, that since September 13th, 200 to 300 Germans had been arriving daily in Mitau, and that all signs indicated a German intention to pass the winter in Latvia.⁴⁰ Clemenceau had been urging that another ultimatum be sent to the Germans, and now the British representatives called for support of Clemenceau's proposal. They further recommended that the coercive measures to be used need not be specified at the time, although they made known that they felt that the possible use of Polish troops should not necessarily be discarded merely because of American opposition.⁴¹ On September 27, 1919, the Allies' newest ultimatum was communicated to the German government. The note read:

The Allied and Associated Governments hereby notify that until they are satisfied that their demand is being effectively executed they will not entertain any of the applications put forward by the German Government for

⁴⁰British Documents, III, 115. Telegram from Ulmanis and Meierovicz to Lloyd George, September 21, 1919.

⁴¹British Documents, III, 120. Earl Curzon to Sir Eyre Crowe (Paris), September 22, 1919. There had been a great deal of discussion at the Peace Conference as to whether Polish troops should be used to force the Germans out of the Baltic. Some members felt that once the Poles forced out the Germans, someone would have to force out the Poles. The American delegation was the most vehement in arguing against the use of Polish troops. They were afraid that such a move would cause friction between the Poles and the Germans in the Silesian area, and halt the production of that area's valuable coal and cause hardship throughout Europe. Poland claimed 545,000 men under arms and the possibility of raising 480,000 more in a few months if necessary. Many Allied officers doubted that Poland could actually raise that many men on short notice and had doubts about the quality of the Polish army.

the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. They have consequently given instructions not to proceed with the examination of any of these applications.

Furthermore the Allied and Associated Governments will refuse all financial facilities which the German Government is enjoying at the present time or which it is seeking from the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals.

In event of non-compliance on the part of the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers will take such measures as they shall judge necessary to enforce the aforesaid terms of the Armistice.⁴²

In their reply to this note, the German government representatives stated that they had issued an order on September 25th stopping pay to all units not obeying the evacuation order; that they had closed the German-Courland frontier and issued an order that any troops attempting to cross would be fired upon; that no further munitions were to be furnished to these troops already in Latvia; and that von der Goltz had been recalled. The German representatives protested against the severity of the Allied measures and proposed that a mixed commission of German and Allied representatives study the evacuation in order to find ways adequately to supervise it and speed it up.⁴³ The ideal man to head such a project would have been General Gough, but the British government declared that he was not available for the position. Sir Eyre Crowe, speaking for Britain, said that "His Majesty's Government would no doubt be prepared to

⁴²British Documents, I, 819. Note to German Government from Allied and Associated Governments, September 27, 1919.

⁴³British Documents, I, 872-73. Note from German Government to Allies, October 3, 1919.

accept a French general as chairman.⁴⁴ This proposal was accepted by all concerned.

Now that the German government realized that the Allies were ready to back up their demands by force if necessary, the actual evacuation began. While the bulk of the troops in the Baltic did not go willingly, they did begin, at last, to leave. There was still some talk in Allied quarters concerning the possible use of the Polish army. This was primarily due to the fact that the German forces greatly outnumbered the forces of the Baltic nationals,⁴⁵ so that if the German troops were to decide to resist evacuation by armed force, the Allies would need a strong force on short notice. The British Foreign Office, however, was considering still another plan. Earl Curzon sent the following message to Sir Eyre Crowe in Paris on October 14:

If not too late could not pressure be applied to the Germans by France refusing to ratify Treaty and thereby continuing the war until German forces are withdrawn from Baltic?⁴⁶

It was too late, however, for such a plan, for France had

⁴⁴British Documents, III, 144. Telegram from Sir Eyre Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon, October 9, 1919.

⁴⁵German strength including the Iron Division, Free Corps, and 2nd Infantry Brigade ran from 30,000 to 50,000 with 12,000 additional men (mostly Germans) under Bermond. The Letts had about 20,000 men and the Lithuanians 9,000. Many of these were unarmed and the best units were fighting the Bolsheviks. British Documents, III, 141, 143. Foreign Office Memorandum, October 9, 1919.

⁴⁶British Documents, III, 155. Telegram from Earl Curzon to Sir Eyre Crowe (Paris), October 14, 1919.

ratified the Treaty of Versailles on that very day.

Meanwhile the Germans were still resisting evacuation whenever the opportunity presented itself. Colonel Grove, of the British mission at Mitau, reported on October 16 that the Iron Division "drew three months' pay in advance not long ago [and] there are six weeks' supplies for the whole force in Courland and Lithuania."⁴⁷ If this were true, it meant that at about the same time the German government "closed" the border and threatened the men with a pay stoppage, they also advanced these men three months' pay, so that even if they ignored the government order, they would still be self-sustaining until the end of the year.

Colonel Grove also reported on the attitude of the Free Corps officers. He cited as examples speeches that were reprinted in a German newspaper in Mitau during October, 1919. Major Bischoff of the Iron Division had said to his men:

The Entente has threatened the German government with proclaiming blockade anew, if Latvia would not be evacuated. The Government appeals to you! Lay down the arms! Just as it was in November, 1918. As you were deceived then, you will be now duped again.⁴⁸

Captain Stewart, a naval officer, speaking to the German Legion of the Russian Western Army on behalf of various Free Corps groups and other German units, said:

⁴⁷British Documents, III, 167. Report from Colonel J. J. Grove (Mitau) October 16, 1919.

⁴⁸British Documents, III, 170-71. Appendix to report from Colonel Grove (Mitau) October 16, 1919.

The German Corps of volunteers being stationed in Courland issues the following appeal to the German fatherland and all civilized nations of the world. With a heavy heart we are fighting, having resolved contrary to the orders issued by our Government, under the pressure of the Entente, to hold out on the Bolshevik front. Although being as soldiers educated in the duty of obedience, nevertheless we think that we must consider our conscience to be higher than the obedience to compelling orders....⁴⁹

It would seem that such speeches addressed to thousands of soldiers and their officers and printed in the newspaper must have become known to German officials in Berlin. Both of these speeches were nothing short of mutiny, yet nothing was ever done to punish those who made the speeches nor did the government ever attempt to refute them.

General Eberhardt, who had taken over command of the Free Corps from von der Goltz when the latter was recalled by the German government, was apparently continuing von der Goltz's former policies. In Latvia the British representatives reported that German soldiers in civilian clothing were still crossing the frontier into Courland.⁵⁰ The Supreme Command of the German army had officially closed the German borders on October 6th as ordered by the Ebert government, but German troops guarding the border closed their eyes to any men or material going across those borders to the

⁴⁹British Documents, III, 171. Appendix of a report from Colonel Grove (Mitau), October 16, 1919.

⁵⁰British Documents, III, 199. Telegram from Colonel Rowan Robinson (Libau) to Sir Eyre Crowe (Paris), October 28, 1919.

Baltic through the months of October and November.⁵¹

By October, however, the German government was evidently beginning to be concerned over the determined stand the Allies were now taking. General N. Malcolm, the British representative in Berlin, reported:

...German Government appears to be thoroughly disturbed by the turn which events have taken [Blockade threat by Allies]. In consequence it is now doing its best to induce the German troops to return to Germany, but it has allowed things to go so far that it is almost powerless to do so.⁵²

In his October 30 report he expressed the opinion that the German government was, at that time, genuinely attempting to carry out Allied policy but that it was too late. "General Seeckt," he added, "has been sent to East Prussia to try to bring the people there to reason, and to stop the traffic across the frontier."⁵³ In November General Malcolm was able to report:

...Government is at last acting really vigorously against the various organisations which have been working in Berlin, and many arrests have been made, ...⁵⁴

By now even Lloyd George appeared to be more concerned

⁵¹Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 132.

⁵²British Documents, III, 180. Report from General Malcolm (Berlin) October 18, 1919.

⁵³British Documents, III, 207. Report from General Malcolm (Berlin) October 18, 1919.

⁵⁴British Documents, III, 224. Report from General Malcolm (Berlin) November 13, 1919. He is referring in this case to the recruitment centers which had been enlisting men for the Free Corps units in the Baltic.

over the German forces in the Baltic than he had been earlier in the year. Speaking in the House of Commons on November 17, 1919, he summed up the situation then confronting the Allies in the following terms:

There are Germans still in the Baltic provinces. That is full of menace. I wonder whether hon. Members realise altogether how full of menace it is. There is a historical root for that. When Prussia and Germany were crushed to the earth by Napoleon, the great statesmen of Germany sought to overthrow the French despotism by organising in Russia. It was to Russia they went. It was to this very province -- Koenigsberg. They went there. That is part of East Prussia; right along the Baltic provinces they formed their armies, they attracted to their standard Prussian patriots. The same thing happened then as happens now. The Prussian king did his best to stop it, because he was afraid of France. He appealed to them to disarm; they refused, they defied their own sovereign, and it was from there that the organisation started that overthrew the French power in Germany. That historical appeal is undoubtedly at the present moment having its effect in Germany, and that is why these men have formed their bands in the Baltic provinces. They must be cleared out, otherwise the peace of Europe is not safe. That is why at the last conference which I attended in Paris that question was determined; it was decided to take action in that respect.⁵⁵

About the same time, the British Foreign Office issued a memorandum concerning the extent to which the German government was involved in the action of the German forces in the Baltic area;

...Our information is certainly not sufficient to implicate the German Government as a whole...according to General Malcolm, there is a great deal going on behind the back of the German Government, or at least behind the back of Noske, who is believed to be genuinely trying to play straight and carry out the Peace

⁵⁵121 H. C. Debates, (November 17, 1919), 725-726.

contract. But he has had to employ many of the officials of the old regime in the departments under him, and there are a large number of them in the German War Office who are signing their names and putting War Office stamp on orders and secret instructions of which Noske knows nothing....

The financing of the German-Russian forces is undertaken by a number of German financial firms, chiefly Deutsche Schwere Industrie and the Schilde consortium in Berlin, while Krupp is playing a considerable role in supplying equipment and materiel.

...It seems fairly clear that the support of the Baltic venture comes from private associations and not from the Government, who are, perhaps, ready, though impotent, to check it. The latter would no doubt be glad if it succeeded, but they have quite enough on their hands to risk a foreign enterprise which would easily bring them down.⁵⁶

From the evidence available, it would appear that both the British Foreign Office and the members of the Military Mission were too benevolent toward Herr Noske in judging his role in the Baltic episode. That he attempted to play straight after the blockade ultimatum began to have its effect, may well be the case, but prior to that time this did not seem to be true.

The end was now near for the Germans' Baltic venture. The Free Corps units which had gone over to Bermond's Russian Army of the West were defeated in one campaign after another during October and November 1919. These failures were largely the fault of Bermond himself. He obviously had no conception of how to conduct a military campaign and he refused to take advice from those who did possess such knowledge.⁵⁷ By the

⁵⁶British Documents, III, 225-27. Foreign Office Memorandum on the Baltic States and Germany by Curzon, November 15, 1919.

⁵⁷Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 129.

end of November, those German soldiers who had placed themselves under Bermond's command were so disillusioned that they came to the conclusion it would be better to return to Germany under General Eberhardt.⁵⁸ This simplified the Allied problem to some extent, but by no means solved it.

On December 5, General A. J. Turner, British representative on General Niessel's Baltic mission, reported:

The evacuation continues slowly.... The centre of the Baltic Adventure has always been the Iron Division and until this unit has been wholly or partially evacuated we shall not feel sure that the Mission will accomplish its work....

Should we find later that the peaceful means at present employed by the Mission to effect its object are insufficient, we may be obliged to resort to a combined offensive on part of Lithuanians and Letts. Preliminary steps have already been taken to ensure co-ordinated action in this eventuality.⁵⁹

Further reports by General Turner show how the Free Corps attempted to frustrate Allied efforts until the very last:

...Iron Division to proceed by march route so as to give them every chance to pillage the country... marched to Memel by three columns, so as to give them every opportunity to carry out their fell purpose. The flimsy excuse for this move was the danger of the Letts interfering with the withdrawal by railway...for which there was no excuse, as the Lettish troops were in hand....

The withdrawal by road of the Iron Division is a characteristic example of...bad faith. The move had commenced forty-eight hours before [Mission] informed... and the incidents...brought forward as a pretext for the move took place after the troops had been in motion.⁶⁰

⁵⁸British Documents, III, 234. Report by General Malcolm (Berlin) to Foreign Office, November 20, 1919.

⁵⁹British Documents, III, 243. Report by General Turner (Tilsit), December 5, 1919.

⁶⁰British Documents, III, 252. Report by General Turner (Tilsit), December 9, 1919.

The evacuation was being carried out through Tilsit, but General Turner was certain that the Iron Division was going to Memel so that it would be concentrated for action in connection with any plot to overthrow the Ebert government.⁶¹

Finally, on December 14, 1919, General Niessel was able to report:

...it appears that the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the German troops may be considered as almost completed.

At this date there were, in the Baltic States, only light contingents marching towards the German frontier and at about a day's march from this frontier, as follows:

5,000 men of the German Legion marching towards Tilsitt,
6,000 men of the Iron Division marching towards Memel.

All were to have crossed the boundary by December 15th according to the agreements made by General Eberhardt.

The German Delegation to the Baltic Commission has, besides, asserted that all the German detachments or isolated men remaining in Latvia or Lithuania after this date would be considered as outlaws and thereby abandoned to the Letts and the Lithuanians.⁶²

The Baltic Adventure was closed with General Turner's message of December 14 to Sir Eyre Crowe in Paris:⁶³

German report which we believe correct states evacuation now complete with exception of small rear

⁶¹British Documents, III, 248. Report by General Turner (Tilsit) to Sir Eyre Crowe (Paris), December 6, 1919.

⁶²British Documents, II 568. Note from Marshal Foch to Supreme Council, December 14, 1919.

⁶³British Documents, III, 258. Telegram from General Turner (Tilsit) to Sir Eyre Crowe (Paris), December 14, 1919.

guards due to cross frontier tomorrow.⁶⁴
 Iron Division expected to remain Memel area for
 some days.⁶⁵

Great Britain's aim of keeping the Bolsheviks and the Germans from dominating the Baltic was successful by the end of 1919. Had the British given the Baltic nationals more aid and recognition, the Germans might have been driven out sooner, but at the expense of alienating the Russian counter-revolutionary groups which Britain was supporting at the time.

In summing up the evacuation of the Germans from the Baltic, General Turner, a British member of the Baltic mission wrote: "The evacuation of the Baltic Provinces has been effected, but to say that the Mission has been a success would deceive no one. This has not been the fault of the Mission, but is a result of the policy of the Supreme Council which has consistently refused to give the Mission any other weapon but the moral weight of its presence."⁶⁶ This may have represented Colonel Turner's feelings or those of all

⁶⁴It appears that on December 14, the German evacuation was complete with the exception of the Freikorps Rossbach. This unit passed into East Prussia, recrossed the frontier into Lithuania and finally returned to German territory on December 16, 1919 -- the last German formation to withdraw from the Baltic provinces.

⁶⁵The Iron Division completed its evacuation of Memel on January 8, 1920, two days before the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles.

⁶⁶British Documents, III, 252. Report from General Turner (Tilsit) to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, December 9, 1919.

the military personnel in the missions, but in either case it would appear that it was the opinion of people not acquainted with the whole problem. Considering the state of the Allied armies at that time, the financial conditions of the Allies, and their commitments to the Russian counter-revolutionary groups, the course which was taken was probably the best if not the only one possible under the circumstances. And it was successful with a minimum cost to the Allies in lives and money.

CONCLUSION

The role played by Great Britain in the postwar history of the Baltic provinces has been described in the preceding chapters. The question remains, why did Britain follow such a course? Did the British have what one might call a Baltic policy, or did British attitudes in that area merely reflect the government's broader European interests? From the evidence available, it appears that British leaders had little real concern for the Baltic area or its peoples, and that they were interested in it only as it might relate to a larger purpose -- the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe.

Since the sixteenth century, when the British lost the last of their continental possessions, their aim has been to preserve British influence on the continent; to maintain command of the seas, either alone or in alliance with some other power or powers; and to prevent the domination of the European continent by any single power. "A military and economic blockade has always been the greatest menace to England, and so her foreign policy has always been shaped to counteract this danger."¹ Thus any nation capable of

¹David J. Dallin, Russia and Postwar Europe (New Haven, 1934), p. 118.

creating a united Europe has been the principal adversary of Britain.

Britain's foreign policy during the whole of the nineteenth century and up to the time of World War I had been based upon the traditional maintenance of command of the seas and prevention of one-power control of the continent, as well as the promotion of a high level of world trade and the preservation of peace.² This policy remained the guiding principle of the British government after 1918.

In relying on a balance of power policy, however, the British were not necessarily thinking in terms of a balance made up of two rival groups or hostile blocs of nations, as had existed prior to World War I. They believed that such an arrangement had been one of the chief causes of the War. Rather, they had in mind "a Europe in which no Power was strong enough to attack the others."³ The only power about which Britain might have been concerned in that respect in 1919 was France. British policymakers were apparently more concerned over France's proposed treatment of Germany than they were over any possible attempts at hegemony by France. The British believed that France's policy of holding Germany down would only antagonize Germany and eventually

²P. A. Reynolds, British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years (London, 1954), pp. 11-12.

³Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars (New York, 1940), p. 246.

lead to another armaments race. Then, too, the British knew that the revival of German industry was necessary for the future prosperity of all Europe as well as for their own.

There was also the possibility that Russia and Germany "might be drawn together by the consequences of common defeat."⁴ Britain was particularly concerned over such a possibility and what Bolshevism or a resurgence of German militarism might hold, especially for eastern Europe and consequently for all of Europe. "One of the most difficult problems facing the policy of balance of power has always been the territory which separates Russia from the great nations of Europe."⁵ This territory is composed of a long belt of land, ranging in width from 100 to 300 miles, and stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. Fourteen major national groups, as well as many minor national groups, live in this belt and have a combined population of over 100 million people. These territories have often been theaters of war and frequently have served as strategic frontier zones for Russia, Germany, and other European countries.

Britain was willing to do its part, if necessary, to prevent future direct aggression against the borders of France or Belgium. Britain would not, however, undertake

⁴Arnold J. Toynbee, The World After the Peace Conference (Oxford, 1926), p. 48.

⁵Dallin, Russia and Postwar Europe, p. 120.

any commitments (beyond the Covenant of the League) on behalf of the newly established states of eastern Europe, as their "policy might be adventurous" and their "economic position was unstable."⁶ Britain's primary interest on the European continent was "neither security nor reparation but the recovery of her trade, and that required the economic rehabilitation of Germany."⁷ At the same time it was realized that such an economic rehabilitation must not be purchased at the price of German dominance over the continent. And in the background was always the fear of Bolshevism.

The key to the problem, so far as British policy toward Germany and Russia was concerned, was in the Baltic states, for it was there alone that Germany and Russia met. If the Baltic states were given their independence they became buffer states. If controlled by Germany they became a bridge to the east. Control of Russia, physically or economically, by Germany would mean eventual control of Europe. The area could also serve as a bridge to the west for Russia. Control of this area might be but the first step toward the domination of Europe. As an American official report put it, "Bolshevism menaces the world. Prussian militarism... has and may again menace the world, Bolshevism must not come through to the west; Prussia must not pierce the

⁶Toynbee, World After Peace Conference, p. 49.

⁷Toynbee, World After Peace Conference, p. 50.

east."⁸ This was the problem that faced Britain, for should either alternative develop, Europe might eventually come under the domination of a single power.

Whether the Baltic peoples gained autonomy within a restored Russian Empire or set up independent states instead was of secondary, not primary, importance to Britain. During 1917 Britain did not recognize the independence of the Baltic states because it was committed to the support of the Kerensky government. After the fall of that government it shifted its support to the Kolchak government at Omsk. By the autumn of 1919 it was obvious that Kolchak's forces and the other counterrevolutionary elements could not defeat the Bolsheviks. At the same time the Bolsheviks were making peace overtures to the Baltic nations. Here was an ideal situation for the British. They could now support the Baltic peoples' bid for independence, as the counterrevolutionary forces were all but vanquished, and thus three more nations could be added to the sordon sanitaire which the Allies hoped to erect to keep Bolshevism from spreading to Europe. There was no danger of further alienating the Bolsheviks either, as they were

⁸Senate Documents, No. 105, p. 27.

the ones who had initiated the peace offers.⁹ Bolshevism as an ideology was probably not so much feared by the British, however, as was the possibility that Bolshevism, spreading over the continent, would pull the other smaller nations into Russia's orbit, making it the single dominant power in Europe.

Britain used Article XII of the Armistice agreements to keep German forces in the Baltic and later gave its approval to the Latvian-German treaty concerning the use of the Free Corps in order that Bolshevism might be held in check until it could be destroyed or permanently contained. The British soon realized that the Germans were attempting to gain control of the Baltic region so they might nullify the Allied victory in the west and possibly gain control of Russia. This could lead to a resurgence of German military power and give them once again a dominant position in Europe. Britain demanded, again by virtue of Article XII of the Armistice agreements, that Germany withdraw all of her forces from the Baltic in order to prevent such a possibility.

⁹It was to the advantage of Great Britain to improve relations with Russia for several reasons. First, there was the matter of trade. Britain depended on trade as its means of livelihood even in normal times. At the end of the war its economy was in dire straits and Russia was a rich potential market. Second, a Russia on friendly terms with Britain could be used as a balance against any other nation that might have designs for dominating Europe. Third, Russia had for several decades been pressing down toward southern Asia (India, Afghanistan, Burma, and Iran), and Britain, already in this area, preferred to keep this movement contained.

How successful, then, was Great Britain's Baltic policy? From the evidence available, it would appear that Britain's policy in the Baltic was successful insofar as it kept both Germany and Russia from gaining control of the Baltic area. In the long run, the attempt to keep one power from dominating Europe was not successful, as Germany eventually was able to do this very thing. But this fact does not necessarily mean that Britain's policy was wrong, for basically the plan was a good one. The plan was not successful because Britain failed to realize that it was not enough merely to establish buffer states. In order to keep such states as free buffer areas against a resurgent Russia or Germany, it was essential to give these states permanent guarantees.

What was a defensible policy in 1919 eventually broke down through the short-sightedness of Lloyd George and his successors. British policy toward eastern Europe never was too certain after the March, 1917 revolution in Russia. By December, 1921, Lloyd George was already saying that "the British people were not very much interested in what happened on the eastern frontier of Germany."¹⁰ He described the peoples of eastern Europe as "unstable", and he expressed doubt that "his country would be disposed to give any guarantees which might involve them in military

¹⁰Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe (New York), p. 127.

operations in any eventuality in that part of the world."¹¹

These were not merely the thoughts of Lloyd George, but reflected British popular sentiment also. The British government evidently did not feel that it was important to direct public opinion toward recognizing the crucial role of eastern Europe in the future of Europe. Or perhaps the government itself did not recognize the importance of that area. At any rate, this negative attitude prevailed until Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939 plunged Europe into a second World War.¹²

Might it not have been better, then, to have let either Germany or Russia take over the Baltic states in 1919? It is true that Germany was later able to dominate Europe without possession of the Baltic States. However, had Germany been able to retain the Baltic states in 1919, it is conceivable that the Germans would have been able to negate the peace treaty and perhaps dominate Europe sooner than they did. Russian control of the area, on the other hand, might have allowed Bolshevism to spread into central Europe and eventually contaminate the entire continent. Britain's balance of power policy, therefore, was practical. The disappointing aspect of that policy was that Britain did not follow through with it, but instead returned to a policy of limited commitments on the continent, with even these commitments confined to western Europe.

¹¹Holborn, Collapse of Europe, p. 128.

¹²Holborn, Collapse of Europe, p. 128.

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Appendix A

Armistice Agreement Articles Pertaining to the Baltic Area

Article XII

All German troops at present in any territory which before the war formed part of Austria-Hungary, Roumania, or Turkey, shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914, and all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined, as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.

Article XIII

Evacuation of German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners, and agents, civilian as well as military, now on the territory of Russia (frontiers as defined on August 1, 1914), to be recalled.

Article XIV

German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other coercive measures with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (frontiers as defined on August 1, 1914).

Article XV

Annulment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

Article XVI

The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern frontier, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of these territories or for the purpose of maintaining order.

Appendix B

Treaty of Versailles Articles Pertaining to the Baltic Area

Part III, Section XIV

Article 116

Germany acknowledges and agrees to respect as permanent and inalienable the independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire on August 1, 1914.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 259 of Part IX (Financial Clauses) Article 292 of Part X (Economic Clauses) Germany accepts definitely the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaties and of all other treaties, conventions, and agreements entered into by her with the Maximalist* Government in Russia.

The Allied and Associated Powers formally reserve the rights of Russia to obtain from Germany restitution and reparation based on the principles of the present Treaty.

*Maximalist refers to Bolshevik Gov't. of Russia.

Article 117

Germany undertakes to recognize the full force of all treaties or agreements which may be entered into by the Allied and Associated Powers with States now existing or

coming into existence in future in the whole or part of the former Empire of Russia as it existed on August 1, 1914, and to recognize the frontiers of any such States as determined therein.

Part X, Section II

Article 292

Germany recognizes that all treaties, conventions or arrangements which she concluded with Russia, or with any State or Government of which the territory previously formed a part of Russia, or with Roumania, before August 1, 1914, or after that date until coming into force of the present Treaty, are and remain abrogated.

Article 293

Should an Allied or Associated Power, Russia, or a State or Government of which the territory formerly constituted a part of Russia, have been forced since August 1, 1914, by reason of military occupation or by any other means or for any other cause, to grant or to allow to be granted by the act of any public authority, concessions, privileges and favours of any kind to Germany or to a German national, such concessions, privileges and favours are ipso facto annulled by the present treaty.

No claims or indemnities which may result from this annulment shall be charged against the Allied or Associated Powers or the Powers, States, Governments or public

authorities which are released from their engagements by the present Article.

Part XIV, Section II

Article 433

As a guarantee for the execution of the provisions of the present Treaty, by which Germany accepts definitely the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and of all treaties, conventions, and agreements entered into by her with the Maximalist Government in Russia, and in order to ensure the restoration of peace and good government in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, all German troops at present in the said territories shall return to within the frontiers of Germany as soon as the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories. These troops shall abstain from all requisitions and seizures and from any other coercive measures, with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany, and shall in no way interfere with such measures for national defense as may be adopted by the Provisional Governments of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. No other German troops shall, pending the evacuation or after the evacuation is complete, be admitted to said territories.

Typed by Mrs. L. L. Armes