

Developing An Integrative Structural Model To Capture Worldviews Associated With Support
For Political Violence In The United States

by

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

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Title: Developing An Integrative Structural Model To Capture Worldviews Associated With Support For Political Violence In The United States

In any field of research, standardization of theoretical constructs and measurement tools allows researchers to build on each other's work and share the same language. In the task of measuring political worldviews, there is no such tool to standardize theory or measurement. There are, however, a plethora of theory-driven constructs that have only been empirically validated independently of each other. Because these constructs have discrete theoretical foundations but share similar behavioral outcomes, it remains to be seen whether they capture the same underlying worldview. This dissertation seeks to understand the relation between these theoretically discrete constructs by examining them not only in terms of concurrent association/correlation but in terms of their predictiveness regarding an outcome/criterion they might all predict – support for violence as an acceptable means to achieve political aims (hereafter referred to as SPV, Support for Political Violence).

Using a high-dimensionality approach to maximize comprehensiveness, I gathered a large item pool sourced from existing measures of worldviews associated with SPV and found a set of 14 high-dimensionality factors that captured granular components of an overall structural model. Study 1 developed the initial structural model, while Study 2 determined the relative strength of each factor in predicting SPV in a US sample. Four notable findings emerged from Study 2: (1) dehumanization, xenoparanoia, and ingroup purity predict both state violence and partisan physical violence; (2) military imperialism, pro-torture, and conservative political

orientation positively predict state violence while negatively predicting anti-state violence; (3) left-wing authoritarianism positively predicts anti-state violence while negatively predicting identity-based indirect violence; and (4) two predictors had a narrower range of effects on support for political violence: pluralistic spirituality in negatively predicting identity-based indirect violence and political alienation in positively predicting anti-state violence. By understanding which worldview dimensions are most strongly associated with SPV, one can enhance existing early-warning violence prediction and prevention tools and better assess the efficacy of interventions.

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This endeavor would not have been possible without my parents, Roanne and Brian, who have supported me in every aspect of my life and who have modeled academic excellence. I am also grateful to my sister Emma for being my cheerleader from day one, and to my partner Danny for cheering me on, grounding me, and helping me envision and build a life post-PhD that I am excited to lead.

DEDICATION

To my ancestors whose lives and dreams were cut short by genocide. To my peers, in the hope that we may walk a different path. To my descendants, in the hope of a more peaceful future.

We were all to be queens
of four kingdoms on the sea:
Efigenia with Soledad,
and Lucila with Rosalie.

In the Valley of Elqui, encircled
by a hundred mountains or more
that blaze red like burnished offerings
or tributes of saffron ore,

We said that, enraptured,
and believed it perfectly,
that we would all be queens
and would one day reach the sea.

With our braids of seven year olds
and bright aprons of percale,
chasing flights of thrushes
among the shadows of vine and grape.

And our four kingdoms, we said,
so vast and great would be,
that as certain as the Koran
they would all reach the sea.

We would wed four husbands
at the time when we should wed,
and they would all be kings and poets
like King David of Judea.

Gabriela Mistral

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
<i>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</i>	5
<i>LIST OF FIGURES</i>	11
<i>LIST OF TABLES</i>	12
<i>I. BACKGROUND</i>	13
What is Political Violence?	13
Anti-State Violence: Violence for Social Change.....	14
State Violence: Violence for Social Control	14
Intergroup Violence.....	15
What is the Opposite of Political Violence?.....	16
What Worldviews Have Been Associated with Support for Political Violence?.....	17
Absolutism vs. Integrative Complexity	17
Blind vs. Constructive Patriotism.....	17
Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Victim Beliefs	18
Perceived Illegitimacy vs. Legitimacy of Authorities	19
Pro-violence vs. Anti-violence	20
Authoritarianism.....	21
Dehumanization.....	21
Ethnocentrism & Racism.....	22
Fundamentalism	23
Nationalism.....	23
Perceived Threat & Xenophobia	24
Social Dominance Orientation	25
Democidal Mindset	25
Fascism.....	26
Militant Extremist Mindset.....	26
<i>II. DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A STRUCTURAL MODEL</i>	27
Research Question.....	27
Study Design	27

Data Collection Procedures	27
Sample Size and Rationale	28
Selection Criteria	28
Measured Variables	28
Analysis Plan	32
<i>III. RESULTS OF THE NEW STRUCTURAL MODEL.....</i>	<i>36</i>
Demographics & Summary Statistics.....	36
Political Affiliation	37
Ethnic/Racial Identity	37
Religious Identity	37
Principal Components Analysis	38
Parallel Analysis.....	38
Exploratory Factor Analysis & Factor Reduction.....	38
Comparison of Candidate Structures.....	39
Item Selection.....	40
<i>IV. STUDY ONE DISCUSSION.....</i>	<i>48</i>
Dimensions of the New Structural Model.....	48
Political Alienation	48
Constructive Patriotism	48
Dehumanization.....	49
Individual Rights	49
Ingroup Purity.....	49
Left Wing Authoritarianism	49
Orthodox Religiousness.....	50
Military Imperialism.....	50
Moderation	51
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	51
Internal Sabotage	51
Pluralistic Spirituality	51
Victim Beliefs.....	52
Xenoparanoia.....	52
Overview	52
<i>V. TESTING THE PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF THE NEW STRUCTURAL MODEL.....</i>	<i>54</i>

Research Questions	54
How to Measure Support for Political Violence in the US	54
Support for Anti-State Violence	54
Support for State Violence	56
Support for Intergroup & Partisan Violence	58
Control Variables	59
Personality Traits	60
Psychological Variables	60
Demographic Variables	60
Socioeconomic Variables	61
Study 2 Design	61
Data Collection Procedures	61
Sample Size and Rationale	62
Measured Variables	62
Analysis Plan	64
<i>VI. RESULTS OF PREDICTIVE VALIDITY TESTING</i>	<i>67</i>
Demographics	67
University Student Sample	67
Representative US Sample	68
Confirmatory Factor Analysis	69
Zero-Order Correlations	74
Hierarchical Linear Regression	76
Identity-Based Collective Violence	76
Partisan Violence	80
Anti-State Violence	83
State Violence	86
<i>VII. STUDY TWO DISCUSSION</i>	<i>92</i>
Broad Trends	92
Predictive Capacity by Outcome	92
State Violence	92
Partisan Violence	94
Identity-Based Violence	95

Anti-State Violence	96
Predictive Capacity by Scale	97
Limitations.....	97
Implications for Existing Models and Future Research	98
<i>APPENDIX A</i>	<i>101</i>
<i>APPENDIX B</i>	<i>103</i>
<i>REFERENCES CITED</i>	<i>104</i>

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure		Page
1.	Average replicability across variable-sets for each number-of-factors solution	43
2.	Density plots of score distribution across dimensions of a 14-factor model	49
3.	Density plots of score distribution across scales of a 14-scale inventory in raw data	74

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. The maximum number of sufficiently sized and interpretable factors for each combination of acquiescence-centered versus original/raw data and orthogonal vs. oblique rotation with initial factor ceilings set by either the 60% variance approach or parallel analysis	39
2. Average correlations shared between variable-sets.	40
3. Dimensions of a 14-factor model and initial contents (their highest-loading items)	41
4. Dimensions of a 14-factor model and the items selected for each dimension based on selection priorities and criteria	43
5. Items remaining in 14-factor model after CFA on both representative US sample and university sample.	69
6. Table of reliability, unidimensionality, and summary statistics of potential predictor and outcome variables.	73
7. Hierarchical linear regression predicting identity-driven collective physical violence from 14 scales	77
8. Hierarchical linear regression predicting identity-driven collective verbal violence from 14 scales	78
9. Hierarchical linear regression predicting identity-driven collective indirect violence from 14 scales	79
10. Hierarchical linear regression predicting partisan collective physical violence from 14 scales	82
11. Hierarchical linear regression predicting partisan collective verbal violence from 14 scales	84
12. Hierarchical linear regression predicting partisan collective indirect violence from 14 scales	85
13. Hierarchical linear regression predicting anti-state violence from 14 scales	87
14. Hierarchical linear regression predicting state violence from 14 scales	91

I. BACKGROUND

What is Political Violence?

The field of psychology narrowly characterizes political violence as the use of violence against state institutions or presumed political supporters of the state to attain political goals, most usually treated as synonymous with acts of terrorism. However, to better understand the motivations behind such acts, it would be useful to broaden the definition of “political” to fall more in line with the definitions offered by the field of political science. Political scientists view politics as involving the distribution of power, rights, and privileges in a society. Thus, (a) violence targeted at state institutions as a means of effecting social change (i.e., changing the distribution of power) would be considered political violence, but so would (b) violence perpetrated by the state to establish social control or (c) violence that is targeted neither at nor by the state by actors who seek to influence the distribution of power in society. For instance, while hate crimes may be considered nonpolitical in the sense that they do not involve state institutions, they are political because they involve the distribution of power in a stratified social hierarchy. If one were to see these three different forms of violence as sharing the same root motivations of seeking to influence the distribution of power, rights, and privileges in society, one can better understand the interplay between them. This review will go through three types of violence concerning the distribution of power, rights, and privileges in society: anti-state violence, state violence, and intergroup violence.

Anti-State Violence: Violence for Social Change

Many researchers view political violence as the use of violence or force against the institutions of a state, its presumed political supporters, or an opposing political party by actors who seek to attain their political goals and have their voices heard in policy decision-making (Detges, 2017; Dyrstad & Hillesun, 2020; Zaidise, Canetti-Nisim, & Pedahzur, 2007). As the inverse of violence perpetrated by the state, political violence can also be framed as an attempt by subordinate groups to effect social change and resist oppression by a dominant group (Gerber et al., 2016). Based on this definition, acts of political violence include political assassinations, attacks on government buildings, civil war, ethno-nationalist violence between countries, and violence against political leaders (Dyrstad & Hillesun, 2020; Kacholia & Neuner, 2022; Zaidise et al., 2007).

Some researchers of political violence include within its scope non-state violence that targets civilians, such as local religious intolerance-based violence (Fair et al., 2012; Zaidise et al., 2007) or violence against members of the opposing political party (Mernyk, Pink, Druckman, & Willer, 2022; Muddiman, Warner, & Schumacher-Rutherford, 2021). These instances of violence fit better into a framework of hate crimes, as they target civilians rather than state institutions. Presumably, non-state violence that targets civilians assumes that attacking them will achieve political goals, either because those civilians are seen as powerful, protected, or favored by the state, or because violence is seen as an effective means of weakening that political party. Ultimately, anti-state violence may be framed as ‘punching up’.

State Violence: Violence for Social Control

State violence is perpetrated by the state internationally (e.g., through military action) or domestically (e.g., through police violence and policies like the death penalty) (Kalmoe, 2013).

Acts of state violence can be framed both as tools of maintaining control by a dominant group as well as means of establishing and maintaining “law and order” or ensuring national security (Gerber et al., 2016; Hou & Quek, 2019). For instance, violence perpetrated against refugees by the state is used as a tool of state repression and scapegoating in response to threats to state security (e.g., terrorist attacks) (Savun & Gineste, 2019). The distinction of what may be considered *justified* violence by actors of the state is a fraught and complicated discussion; some may argue that *any* use of force by state actors is unwarranted violence, where others may contend that force is sometimes necessary to apprehend violent criminals. For the purposes of this paper, I distinguish between force used to evenly apply the rule of law to all citizens (e.g., chasing down a wanted murderer) versus force used to suppress civil disobedience (e.g., tear gassing protesters, conducting violent raids of the homes of political dissidents) or to unevenly target a specific group (e.g., preemptively shooting at people of a specific racial or ethnic identity who are being apprehended for minor, non-violent crimes). Ultimately, state violence may be framed as ‘punching down’.

Intergroup Violence

Intergroup violence may be framed as ‘punching over’ or ‘punching across’ group lines, though in context it can be interpreted as punching up or down in a social hierarchy.

Failed State and Partisan Violence. Failed state violence involves struggles for power in which multiple groups compete for commercial territory (in drug wars) or political power (in civil wars or violence within a political party). Similarly, partisan violence involves attacks on members of an opposing partisan group (e.g., political party) to vie for political power (Kalmoe & Mason, 2019). Struggles for power that do not necessarily involve a state are not exactly

‘punching’ up or down, though each party may view themselves as fighting to gain social control and dominance.

Hate Crimes. Hate crimes can be defined as illegal acts committed against an individual based on the perpetrator’s bias or prejudice against the victim’s actual or perceived group status (e.g., race, color, national origin, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, political affiliation, age, or homelessness) (Craig, 2002, p. 86; Hayes, Mills, Freilich, & Chermak, 2018, p. 73). This third type of violence, while not implicating state institutions, nevertheless may be used as a means of influencing the distribution of power in society. When perpetrated against groups perceived as lower status (or groups who the perpetrator thinks should be lower in status), hate crimes are a means of ‘punching down’ to symbolically keep a group ‘in their place’ in the social hierarchy – or, in fact, eliminate them altogether. When perpetrated against groups perceived as higher status, they are a means of ‘punching up’ to symbolically attack a group deemed as too powerful.

What is the Opposite of Political Violence?

To best understand the worldviews and beliefs that are positively associated with support for political violence, it would be useful to also capture the opposite end of the spectrum as well. However, for each type of political violence, there are three potential options for their opposite: neutrality, support for non-violent actions that achieve the same goals, or support for non-violent resistance against such goals. Because these are such meaningfully different outcomes, it is beyond the scope of this investigation to investigate the worldviews and beliefs associated with each. Rather, I will include items and measures designed to capture the opposite end of the spectrum for each worldview or belief (like pro-torture and anti-torture), but I will not seek out

new constructs to include that are explicitly associated with other types of outcomes (like beliefs associated with nonviolent political activism).

What Worldviews Have Been Associated with Support for Political Violence?

A review of the literature indicates the following worldviews to be associated with support for various forms of political violence in empirical, peer-reviewed research studies.

Absolutism vs. Integrative Complexity

Absolutist thinking conceives of the world in binary, polarized terms that offer no possibility for compromise or accommodation (Alvarez, 2008). Among prominent cases of democide (genocide, politicide, and other mass murders perpetrated by a government), there is an overarching theme of oversimplifying beliefs that essentialize groups and fail to tolerate “uncertainty, nuance, exceptions to a rule, or alternative explanations” (Saucier & Akers, 2018 p. 84-91). Its inverse is characterized by integrative complexity, which accommodates multiple points of view and allows for the possibility of nuance (Lösel et al., 2020). Value complexity serves as a protective factor against support for anti-state violence and interventions that promote value complexity have been found to bolster individuals’ resilience against anti-state extremism among Muslims in the UK and Kenya (Liht & Savage, 2013; Lösel et al., 2020; Savage, Khan, & Liht, 2014).

Blind vs. Constructive Patriotism

Blind patriotism involves uncritical idealization, acceptance, and support of state policies and practices (Livi et al., 2014). They have been found to also perceive the nation as being vulnerable to foreign threats and contamination of their national culture from outgroups

(Flannery et al., 2021; Schatz, Straub, & Lavine, 1999). As a result, they are intolerant of internal criticism and view unquestioned loyalty favorably because they perceive a need for internal unity in the face of such external threats (Schatz et al., 1999). Blind patriotism has been positively correlated with aggression directed at outgroup members (Flannery et al., 2021; Livi et al., 2014; Schatz et al., 1999).

Conversely, the ability to critically evaluate one's ingroup can motivate individuals to condemn ingroup-committed violence and increase their support for affirmative action and compensation for the victimized outgroup (Leidner, Tropp, & Lickel, 2013). One such manifestation of ingroup critique is constructive patriotism, an attachment to and consideration for the well-being of one's nation that is inclusive of the rights and welfare of others (Flannery et al., 2021; Livi et al., 2014). At its core, it is patriotism that allows for constructive criticism. It is positively associated with nonviolent political activism (Schatz et al., 1999).

Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Victim Beliefs

Exclusionary or "exclusive" victim beliefs involve a perception that one's ingroup has been more severely or uniquely victimized than other groups (Vollhardt et al., 2021). They have been associated with support for political and economic exclusion of ethnic outgroups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi, support for causing harm and employing military actions against an adversarial outgroup among Jewish Israelis, and support for anti-refugee policies among Hungarians (Canetti et al., 2018; Szabó et al., 2020; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015). Perceived group-based discrimination and injustice overall have also been associated with greater support for, willingness to participate in, and participation in political violence across samples, including among Jewish and Muslim residents in Israel and Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands (Bartusevičius et al., 2020; Canetti et al., 2010; Kruglanski et al., 2018). On a more

individual level, perceived individual relative deprivation (a feeling of being treated less fairly than others) has been significantly positively associated with violent intentions and engagement in violent extremism (Doosje et al., 2012; Van Brunt et al., 2017).

Inclusionary or “inclusive” victim beliefs, in contrast, involve a perception of similarity between an ingroup’s experience of collective victimization or oppression and the experiences of an outgroup (i.e., a sense of, “I understand what you went through because I went through something similar”) (Vollhardt, Nair, & Tropp, 2016). They have been associated with support for other refugees and immigrants when measured among members of historically oppressed groups in India and Vietnamese Americans. Even between adversarial groups that have encountered oppression at each other’s hands, invoking the similarities between their experiences of victimization reduces the conviction to defend the ingroup at the other group’s expense (Warner, Wohl, & Branscombe, 2014). Inclusionary victim beliefs have been associated with prosocial attitudes towards historical perpetrator groups among Armenian and Jewish Americans and towards targeted religious and ethnic outgroups among Poles and Hungarians (Vollhardt et al., 2021).

Perceived Illegitimacy vs. Legitimacy of Authorities

Political and religious violence perpetrated by adolescents and young adults in Belgium has been associated with perceived procedural injustice, perceived alienation, and a lack of perceived legitimacy of authorities (Schils & Pauwels, 2016). Conversely, acceptance of police legitimacy¹ and law abidance have shown large significant protective effects against engagement

¹ Given the role of the police in enforcing social control on behalf of the state, it is relevant to consider whether acceptance of police legitimacy affects support for state violence. Notably, while perception of police legitimacy is associated with greater support for police use of “reasonable” force (e.g., using force in self-defense), it does not

in and support for anti-state violence (Jugl, Bender, & Lösel, 2021; Lösel et al., 2020; Wolfowicz et al., 2020). Positive perceptions of procedural justice and institutional trust have also shown medium significant protective effects against support for anti-state violence (Jugl, Bender, & Lösel, 2021; Lösel et al., 2020; Wolfowicz et al., 2020).

Pro-violence vs. Anti-violence

Pro-violence attitudinal dispositions involve support for violence as a legitimate means of achieving one's objectives (Borum, 2014, p. 72). Saucier and Akers (2018) noted pro-violence attitudes among perpetrators of democide. However, because pro-violence has also been linked to more frequent non-political violent behavior and psychopathy, it cannot be taken as a unique predictor of support for political violence (Borum, 2014, p. 298). Conversely, pacifistic beliefs and perceived inefficacy of violence both serve as protective factors against support for or engagement in political violence (Leader-Maynard, 2016). Perceived inefficacy portrays violence as ineffective and damaging to critical infrastructure and objectives (e.g., economic development or political stability) while pacifism portrays nonviolence (e.g., civil disobedience or peaceful protests) as a preferable means of effecting social change. During transition periods from autocracy to democracy in Southeast Asia, leaders of nonviolent pro-democracy movements were partly motivated to remain nonviolent through perceived inefficacy of violence and pacifism emanating from spiritual beliefs (Montiel, 2006). Higher relative perceived efficacy of nonviolent social movements has also been associated with greater support for and willingness to join nonviolent movements over violent ones (Orazani & Leidner, 2019).

predict support for "excessive" use of police force, which would be considered state violence (Bradford, Milani, & Jackson, 2017; Gerber & Jackson, 2016).

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism has to do with a desire to preserve an existing status-quo power structure and norms, and a willingness to use violence against groups or individuals who threaten that status quo (Altemeyer, 1998). In contexts that subscribe to Western conceptions of a left-right political spectrum, right-wing authoritarianism has been positively associated with support for violence that would restrict civil liberties if such violence would protect the current system (Webber et al., 2020). It is also associated with a willingness to kill, torture, and hunt down immigrants, antidemocratic and militaristic attitudinal dispositions towards war, support for corporal punishment, and support for the restriction of human rights and civil liberties by a government (Bartusevičius, van Leeuwen, & Petersen, 2002; Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018; Borum, 2014, p. 288; Cohrs, 2012, p. 59; Faragó et al., 2019, p. 114; Pauwels & Heylen, 2020).

While right-wing authoritarians seek to uphold existing institutions that preserve traditional conservative norms and values, left-wing authoritarians (according to Conway et al., 2018) seek to uphold institutions that favor politically left-wing norms and values (Altemeyer, 1998; Conway et al., 2018). While left-wing authoritarianism has not yet been associated with SPV, it is included because of its obvious conceptual relation to right-wing authoritarianism. During the COVID-19 pandemic, both right- and left-wing authoritarianism were significantly positively correlated with support for pandemic-mitigating authoritarian governmental measures that involve expanded powers to detain criminal suspects and enhanced state control (e.g., restricting the right to trial by jury and emergency-enhanced punishment) (Manson, 2020, p. 4).

Dehumanization

Dehumanization is a set of beliefs that defines certain groups as being less worthy or valuable than others, often portraying them as inhuman or subhuman, and asserts that outgroup

members should be denied uniquely human rights (Alvarez, 2008; Leader-Maynard, 2014; Markowitz & Slovic, 2020). In this way, dehumanization can be seen as a kind of exclusionary moral standpoint where a moral boundary is drawn between ingroups and certain other outgroups (Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian, 2016). It is linked to greater support for immigration raids and the death penalty, as well as support for torture and retaliatory violence after incidents of intergroup violence (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015; Markowitz & Slovic, 2020). Slovic et al. (2020) also found that dehumanization of Iranians was associated with greater approval for a nuclear attack against Iran, regardless of the scope of civilian casualties.

Ethnocentrism & Racism

Ethnocentrism is marked by negative attitudinal dispositions (i.e., prejudice) towards an outgroup and positive attitudinal dispositions towards one's own group (Flannery et al., 2021; Pauwels & Heylen, 2020). Negative attitudinal dispositions towards outgroups and perceptions of ingroup superiority have been found to predict hostility towards outgroup members, adoption of radical attitudes, and endorsement of right-wing motivated violence (Doosje et al., 2012; Pauwels & Heylen, 2020; Wolfowicz et al., 2020). Ethnocentrism also implies an underlying reductive group essentialism in which one assumes that being part of a group means that an individual embodies certain stereotypes inherent to that group; such reductive group essentialism has been found among the stated attitudes or rhetoric of perpetrators of democide (Saucier & Akers, 2018).

Racism is a more specific manifestation of ethnocentrism that relies on the process of racialization to create socially constructed distinctions between ingroups and outgroups. Concerns with preserving the integrity and identity of one's racialized group are a strong historical predictor of political violence against outgroup members, especially when there is a

threat of intermarriage or racial genetic mixing (Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 2014; Bracey, 2019; Craig, 2002; Glaser et al., 2002; Grover & Mark, 2019).

Fundamentalism

While religious attitudes may seem like a departure from the political attitudes discussed, Islamic fundamentalism has been associated with political violence in recent decades and thus religious fundamentalism has been the subject of much political violence research.

Fundamentalists hold beliefs in a dualistic way (like absolutism, discussed earlier), exhibit paranoia, and defer to a charismatic leader (Borum, 2014; Strozier, Terman, Jones, & Boyd, 2010). They also hold apocalyptic beliefs, which suggest that a select few will be saved or redeemed through an imminent cataclysmic or transformative event (Borum, 2014; Strozier et al., 2010). Religious fundamentalism in particular involves a literal interpretation of religious texts and attempts to return to the original practices and principles of that religion (Alvarez, 2008). It inherently rejects modernity, secularism, and pluralism, instead invoking God or divine power as a source of moral authority who alone can determine whether violence is legitimate (Liht et al., 2011; Stankov et al., 2018). Religious fundamentalism has been associated with a higher likelihood to engage in lethal terrorist attacks and greater risk of adopting radical attitudes, intentions, and behavior (Webber et al., 2020; Wolfowicz et al., 2020).

Nationalism

Core to the construct of nationalism is a perception of national superiority and a preference for national dominance (Alvarez, 2008; Livi et al., 2014; Schatz et al., 1999).

Multiple types of nationalism have been associated with support for political violence, including popular nationalism, religious nationalism, and ethnonationalism. Right-Wing Protective Popular

Nationalism is a form of nationalism characterized by concern that the presence of outgroup cultural influences will replace or ‘water down’ ingroup culture and a conviction that ingroup members must protect their national culture from the outgroup (Flannery et al., 2021). It was significantly positively associated with negative behavioral tendencies (aggression and avoidance) towards ethnic minorities in an Australian sample. Christian nationalism, a set of beliefs that conflates what it means to be American with what it means to be Christian, frames the US as having a Christian origin and perceives “apocalyptic” future threats to that heritage (Armaly, Buckley, and Enders, 2022, p. 939). It has been associated with tolerance of racism and police violence against Black Americans and support for the January 6, 2021, insurrection at the US Capitol. While ethnonationalism is generally oriented around preserving an ethnic group’s political autonomy, collective will, integrity, and territory, more extreme aspects of ethnonationalism (ingroup idealization in particular) have been associated with democide perpetration (Saucier & Akers, 2018; Siritzky & Saucier, 2021).

Perceived Threat & Xenophobia

Borum (2014) posits that a group’s perception of external threat and danger can feed into negative attributions of the outgroup associated with the threat, causing the ingroup to act “defensively” (p. 299). This is supported by the finding that perceptions of symbolic and realistic threat show medium significant positive effects on support for anti-state violence (Wolfowicz et al., 2020). In their analysis of 20 global cases of democide, Saucier and Akers (2018) found that xenophobia (negative attitudes towards foreigners) and a perception of external threat of annihilation of one’s people were core themes of democide perpetration. They also identify paranoia regarding the political situation (e.g., themes of conspiracy, subversion, internal enemies, and suspicion of treason) in the speech of leaders who have perpetrated atrocities.

Related to a perception of external threat is belief in a dangerous world, which frames life as a violent, competitive struggle in which other people seek to cause harm (Cook et al., 2016). It has been associated with greater prejudice, fear, and social distancing towards groups associated with safety threats.

Social Dominance Orientation

Social dominance orientation is an attitude that varies across individuals and captures the degree to which an individual prefers social hierarchy or hegemonic relationships between social groups over intergroup equality; at its core, it involves viewing inequality between social groups as natural and/or justified (Cohrs, 2012; Henry et al., 2005; Ho et al., 2015; Pratto et al., 1994). Social dominance orientation is correlated with support for the violent restriction of civil liberties and other forms of political violence if such violence would protect the current system or existing group-based hegemony (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Pratto et al., 1994; Webber et al., 2020). It also predicts support for social policies that uphold an existing hierarchy (e.g., wars of dominance, punitive criminal justice policies like capital punishment, and military programs) (Henry et al., 2005; Pratto et al., 1994).

The following measures have been theoretically associated with support for various forms of political violence, though the association has not been tested empirically.

Democidal Mindset

Democidal mindset is a mindset endemic to the perpetration of democide -- the intentional murder of an individual or individuals by a government (Rummel, 1994; Saucier & Akers, 2018). The construct was developed based on content analysis of text spoken or written

by elites across 20 global cases of democide (Saucier & Akers, 2018). It broadly emphasizes the blame-justifying inculcation of an outgroup and violation of the human rights of individuals in that outgroup.

Fascism

Though it has not been tied to behavioral outcomes, Paxton (2007) theorizes that fascism is a major driver of political violence. Fascism, according to Paxton, is a set of mobilizing passions marked by a desire for purity and regeneration of one's nation with a disregard for the cost that process would incur to free institutions and the rule of law. Pursuit of these goals involves an abandonment of democratic liberties and the pursuit of redemptive violence, internal cleansing, and external expansion without ethical or legal restraints.

Militant Extremist Mindset

Militant extremist mindset is a set of beliefs and motivations that can lead to violent behavior by terrorists against the organized state under certain conditions (Stankov, Saucier, & Knežević, 2010; Stankov et al., 2018). It involves sixteen themes that, combined, form a coherent narrative centered around the perception that society has reached a crisis point stemming from violations of sacred values, and that addressing this crisis through violence is a glorious mission (Saucier et al., 2009).

II. DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A STRUCTURAL MODEL

The current study develops a new, more parsimonious structural framework for a comprehensive set of worldviews and beliefs associated with political violence by using items obtained from preexisting measures rather than developing novel items. I compiled measures that have been associated with support for political violence as well as factors resulting from a factor analysis of ‘isms. I included ‘isms’ because they offer a unique set of worldviews that have not been investigated in relation to support for political violence given the lack of obvious theoretical connection. I collected data from a US university-student sample.

Research Question

Which structural model of political violence-promoting worldviews gives the most evidence for robustness and offers the greatest comprehensiveness and depth of insight in a US sample?

Study Design

Data Collection Procedures

Participants were University of Oregon students recruited from the Human Subjects Pool using the SONA website. All SONA participants received credit for their participation. All participants were 18 years of age or older. Participants participated online and participated only once (i.e., the survey included only one session of data collection and was expected to be completed in one sitting). Responses to the surveys completed by the participants were recorded through Qualtrics.

Sample Size and Rationale

My target sample size was 400 participants. Recommended sample sizes for factor analysis range from a minimum of 100 (Hair, 2009) to a minimum of 300 (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Ullman, 2007), with Comrey and Lee (2013) suggesting that a sample size of 100 is poor, 200 is fair, and 300 is good (more is better, of course, in terms of enhancing precision of parameter estimates). To account for potential ineligible responses on the basis of inattentive or deviant responding, I collected data from 421 participants.

Selection Criteria

To get a sample that is more representative of broader US demographics, I used screening questions for racial/ethnic identity and gender identity.

Measured Variables

452 items were included in this study².

1. Data Cleaning:

1. Yeasaying Versus Naysaying Index (YVNI) (developed by Saucier & Kimmelmeier) (20 items)
2. Inattentive and Deviant Responding Inventory for Statements (IDRIS) (Kay, 2021) (14 items)
3. Instructed Response Item Set (IRIS) (Kay & Saucier, 2022) (10 items)

2. Demographic Variables:

1. Age

² 44 items for data cleaning. 5 items for demographic variables. 260 items from measures. 15 items from isms. 88 items for outcome variables. 40 items for control variables.

2. Gender Identity
 3. Religious Affiliation
 4. Political Orientation
 5. Racial/Ethnic Identity
3. *Absolutism vs. Integrative Complexity:*
1. Good-Evil Dualism Scale (Saucier, 2013) (4 items).
4. *Authoritarianism:*
1. Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Traditionalism (ACT) Short Scale (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013) (18 items). The ACT scale fits a three-dimensional model and captures three discrete dimensions of right-wing authoritarianism. The three dimensions also show high reliability and high unidimensionality across cross-cultural samples (Duckitt et al., 2010; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013, p. 850).
 2. Left-Wing Authoritarianism 13 Scale (Costello & Patrick, 2022b) (13 items)
 3. Left-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Conway et al., 2020) (10 items)
5. *Blind vs. Constructive Patriotism:*
1. Blind Patriotism Scale (Schatz et al., 1999) (12 items).
 2. Constructive Patriotism Scale (Schatz et al., 1999) (6 items).
6. *Dehumanization:* Ascent of Man measure (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015) (13 items). This measure captures blatant dehumanization.
7. *Democidal Mindset:* Democidal Mindset Questionnaire (DMQ) (Landau et al., 2020) (63 items)
8. *Ethnocentrism & Racism:*

1. Ethnocentrism Scale (Saucier, 2013) (4 items). This scale captures ingroup superiority and antisemitism but does not include elements of ethnocentrism that involve denigration of other outgroups. Those sentiments are captured by other measures.
2. Caste Maintenance Orientation (Saucier, 2013) (4 items). The items for this scale deal with interracial dating and marriage, which touches on themes of racism.
9. *Exclusive vs. Inclusive Victim Beliefs*: Global Victim Beliefs Items (Vollhardt et al., 2021) (10 items)
10. *Fascism*: Fascism Scale (Siritzky & Saucier, 2021) (11 items)
11. *Fundamentalism*: Fundamentalism Scale (Saucier, 2013) (21 items)
12. *Isms*: Isms items (15 items). This consists of the top three items for each dimension from Saucier (2013). The isms items are based on 266 discrete attribute-nouns (i.e., nouns ending in -ism) extracted from the third edition of The American Heritage Dictionary (1992) that refer directly to a belief, opinion, principle, view, or conviction that could be held by an individual. Statements based directly on the dictionary definition (and not the ism noun itself) have already been organized into 335 distinct definitions by previous work (Saucier, 2000; Saucier, 2013).
13. *Militant Extremist Mindset*: Militant Extremist Mindset items (Saucier et al., 2009) (38 items).
14. *Nationalism*: Ethnonationalism Scale (Siritzky & Saucier, 2021) (7 items)

15. *Perceived Illegitimacy vs. Legitimacy of Authorities: Trust in Government*³ (Saucier, 2013) (4 items).

16. *Perception of Threat & Xenophobia:*

1. Dangerous World Scale (Saucier, 2013) (4 items). This scale captures the belief that the world is a threatening, unpredictable place.
2. Nativism (Saucier, 2013) (4 items). This scale captures anti-immigrant sentiments.
3. Xenophobia (Saucier, 2013) (4 items).

17. *Pro-Violence vs. Anti-Violence: Support for Violence Scale* (Bartusevičius et al., 2020) (2 items).

18. *Social Dominance Orientation: Short Social Dominance Orientation Scale* (Ho et al., 2015) (8 items).

The above variables were identified based on published, peer-reviewed research studies. In addition, I added variables measured in the Eugene-Springfield Community Sample that have not been associated with support for political violence in published research studies but seem plausibly to be good candidate predictors. Those include the following measures, which were all employed in some analyses in Saucier's (2013) isms paper:

1. Imperialism Measure (18 items)
2. Militarism Measure (4 items)
3. Support for Military Measure (4 items)
4. Extrapunitiveness Measure (3 items)

³ Note that this variable may have compromised retest stability across years because answers may depend jointly on who is in power and the participant's own political affiliations (e.g., how many Democrats trust a Republican-led government). Nevertheless, the strength of the response was still considered useful for determining the structural model.

5. Freedom from Unfair Detention & Imprisonment Measure (6 items)
6. Freedom of Sexual Orientation Measure (4 items)
7. Freedom of Speech Measure (6 items)

Analysis Plan

Data Exclusion. Participants were excluded based on their score on the IDRIS (Inattentive and Deviant Responding Inventory for Statements) and IRIS (I have included one attention check item for every 15 items in this study). As recommended by Kay, I included pairs of attention-check items from the IDRIS in each block of the survey. In each block, I included equal numbers of normally-scored and reverse-scored items. To score them, I reverse-scored the designated normally-scored items and averaged all of the items within a given block together. As such, if a person responded "strongly disagree" to the normal-scored item in a given block and "strongly agree" to the reverse-scored item in a given block, they would have a score of 3 (on a scale of 1 to 5) for that block. The higher the value, the more likely they were to be engaging in careless responding. From there, I excluded anyone who scored an average of greater than 3 across blocks. I also included IRIS items in each block and scored each correct response as 1 and each incorrect response as 0. I excluded anyone who scored 5 or less (out of a possible 10) on the IRIS scale. I also excluded any participants who did not complete the study.

Acquiescence-centering. Using a protocol outlined in Rammstedt, Danner, & Bosnjak (2017) and the Yeasaying Versus Naysaying Index (YVNI) developed by Saucier & Kemmelmeier, I acquiescence-centered the data to consider acquiescence-centered data in generating a robust candidate structure. To do this, I scored the acquiescence scale by averaging all yeasaying-neasaying items. Given that eight items were positively-keyed and eight items were negatively-keyed, the resulting mean score did not reflect any construct variance but rather

only acquiescence (and random measurement error). I then subtracted 3 from each acquiescence scale score⁴ to yield the degree of acquiescence bias per participant. Finally, I subtracted this number from the original scores on each variable to partial out the effect of acquiescence bias.

Define the Initial Model Structure. I used exploratory factor analysis to derive an initial model (i.e., an expectation of how many relatively independent fine-grained constructs will be measurable). I sought to find what structure of political violence-promoting worldviews would give the most evidence for robustness, a structure which, though offering less parsimony, offers greater comprehensiveness and depth of insight, including insight on the range of associations with support for political violence.

Exploratory Factor Analysis. I was looking to isolate the most robust emic maximum factor structure (i.e., the structure having the largest number of interpretable factors that are sufficiently sized) for the existing data. ‘Robustness’ is here operationally defined as a tendency to appear regardless of data handling (acquiescence-centered versus original data) and use of orthogonal versus oblique rotation method. Beginning with several factors that accounts for 60% of variance in the data⁵ and then reducing the number of factors as needed, I ran varimax, equamax, and oblimin rotations on original and acquiescence-centered data⁶. Previous work (e.g., Saucier & Iurino, 2020) has suggested the latter two rotation methods are best for identifying high-dimensionality structures. Varimax was included because it tends to yield more low-dimensionality structures as useful for comparison. To expand the selection of potential high-dimensionality structures, I also applied parallel analysis, a method that recommends a

⁴ Three was the middle value of the response scale, so subtracting three from the scale score made zero the point at which there was no acquiescence of any kind.

⁵ Hair et al. (2009) advise that the target cumulative percentage of variance explained should be 60%.

⁶ One prominent method of oblique rotation – promax – is intentionally omitted from the analyses because it is based on varimax and would tend to converge extremely highly (be redundant) with varimax.

specific number of factors (typically well below 50 or 60% of variance, and thus more moderately high in dimensionality), to original and acquiescence-centered data.

Factor Reduction. I discarded solutions with any insufficiently sized factors, by a preset ‘sufficient size’ minimum of two salient terms with a loading of at least .3000 in absolute magnitude, also including at least one salient term with a loading of at least .3500 in absolute magnitude. For the solutions that remained, I determined the maximum number of interpretable factors. That is, any solutions with any factors that were judged as impossible to interpret substantively were eliminated⁷.

Comparison of Candidate Structures. For each of the remaining solutions – the maximum number-of-factors (that are sufficiently sized and interpretable) within each data set was set out as a candidate structure, and then compared across data sets, so as to sort out which number-of-factors had relatively better and worse convergence across methods (i.e., use of acquiescence-centered versus original/raw data and of orthogonal vs. oblique rotation), by use of correlations between factor scores. This was based on the assumption that just one of the four emic-maximum candidate structures (i.e., the ones from varimax, equamax and oblimin for original data, and the same three for acquiescence-centered data) would stand out as the most robust and the best emic-maximum model.

Item Selection. I sought to develop a measurement model that has (a) good model fit (i.e., the items load strongly on a factor and their loadings are relatively similar to each other), (b) a broad range of item difficulties so it can pick up on subtler manifestations of the underlying worldviews and help guarantee good ‘discrimination’ at very high or very low levels of the construct rather than just around the middle of the distribution, (c) good balance between

⁷ To reduce subjectivity, I cross-checked any factors I considered uninterpretable with another psychology researcher; any factors they deemed interpretable were retained rather than discarded.

positively- and negatively coded items so acquiescence bias is reduced and predictive capacity is maximized, and (d) high internal reliability and qualitative comprehension of the items. Model fit was maximized because only items with relatively high loadings on the construct/factor (the top 10 loading items) were selected into the pool to begin with⁸. I selected five⁹ items for each factor based on the following priorities using the methods described:

1. I prioritized items that had relatively extreme (high or low) means compared to other items. The utility of doing so is that when there is a range of endorsement means, the scale does a better job of distinguishing respondents not just at the middle of the score distribution, but also at relatively high and low ends. This should enhance prediction to some degree. I chose items with relatively extreme means by calculating the mean score and standard deviation across items. I scored items as “extreme” if their mean was one standard deviation or more away from the overall mean, “moderately extreme” if their mean was 0.5 standard deviations or more away from the overall mean, and “slightly extreme” if their mean was 0.25 standard deviations or more away from the overall mean.
2. I then prioritized items that had a low dispersion or spread (standard deviation) in their correlation with other items for the factor. This priority tends to help the unidimensionality of the scale, because unidimensional scales tend to have equal loadings on the latent construct, and equal intercorrelations tend to lead to equal loadings. I did this by building a correlation matrix of all the items in a given factor and calculating the mean correlation and standard deviation of the correlations. I scored a correlation as “low

⁸ There were two exceptions to this rule: in factor two I selected the item with the 13th highest loading because it had a slightly extremely high mean, and in factor four I selected the item with the 11th highest loading because it had a moderately extremely high mean.

⁹ I selected five items to build in a buffer in case some of the items were “duds” in subsequent samples. Ultimately, I envision a measure that consists of 3-4 items for each factor.

spread” if it was one standard deviation or less away from the overall mean. I then summed the number of “low spread” correlations for each item to capture its overall degree of dispersion from other items. I prioritized items with lower numbers of “low spread” correlations.

3. When possible, I prioritized items in a way such that both poles of the dimension were well-represented in the set of items selected. However, for many of the factors, there were no negatively keyed items found in the top ten loading items, so this was not possible in many cases.
4. I finally prioritized internal reliability and qualitative comprehension of the items. For instance, one factor contained only three items that were theoretically related. In that case, I did not include additional items that did not qualitatively make sense in conjunction with the other items selected. To measure factor saturation -- how much unidimensionality is within the item set – I used McDonald’s ω , which is better suited than Cronbach’s α because it has sufficient tau-equivalence across items.

III. RESULTS OF THE NEW STRUCTURAL MODEL

Demographics & Summary Statistics

Of the 404 participants who passed the quality checks for inattentive and deviant responding, nearly three fourths identified as female (72%), a quarter identified as male (25%), and 4% identified as another gender identity. The average age of participants was 20 (SD = 2.8).

Political Affiliation

Over half of participants identified as Democrats (54%), a quarter identified as “other” or “none” regarding political affiliation (25%)¹⁰, 15% identified as Independents, and only 5% identified as Republicans¹¹. When asked to place themselves on a spectrum from extremely conservative to extremely liberal, over two thirds identified as somewhat (47%) or extremely (24%) liberal, while less than one tenth identified as somewhat (8%) or extremely (1%) conservative. One fifth of participants identified as neither conservative nor liberal (21%).

Ethnic/Racial Identity

Two thirds of participants identified as White or Caucasian (67%), 14% identified as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, 11% identified as Asian or Asian-American, 5% identified as Black or African American, 2% identified as American Indian or Alaska Native, and 1% identified as Native Hawaiian or another type of Pacific Islander¹².

Religious Identity

Over half of participants did not identify with a religion, identifying as agnostic (15%), atheist (10%), or nothing in particular (26%). 11% of participants identified as Roman Catholic, 6% identified as Protestant, 3% identified as Jewish, 1% identified as Muslim, 1% identified as Buddhist, 1% identified as Orthodox (Christian), and less than 1% identified as Sikh or Mormon.

¹⁰ Of the 102 participants who identified as “other” or “none” regarding political affiliation, almost half of them (46%) doubled down on their apolitical stance and identified as neither conservative nor liberal on the conservative-liberal spectrum. Half of them identified as somewhat (26%) or extremely (22%) liberal. Only one tenth of them identified as somewhat (5%) or extremely (5%) conservative.

¹¹ 1% of participants did not answer this question.

¹² 1% of participants did not answer this question.

10% identified as some other religion not specified. The remaining 62 participants selected numerous religious identities¹³.

Principal Components Analysis

I began with a number of factors that accounts for 60% of the data and then reduced the number of factors as needed. A principal components analysis found that 41 factors cumulatively explain 60% of the variance in both raw and acquiescence-centered data, so I selected a 41-factor solution as my starting point.

Parallel Analysis

Parallel analysis recommended 12 factors for the raw dataset and 13 factors for the acquiescence-centered dataset as initial ceilings on the number of factors to consider.

Exploratory Factor Analysis & Factor Reduction

Each combination of acquiescence-centered vs. original/raw data and orthogonal vs. oblique rotation yielded a candidate model for the maximum number of factors that were sufficiently sized and interpretable by me or another psychology researcher. The maximum number of sufficiently sized and interpretable factors for each combination can be found in Table 1. Note that because the 60% variance approach and parallel analysis recommended different factor solutions as initial ceilings, there were ten initial candidate structures rather than six.

¹³ Of these 62 participants, 28 chose some combination of “agnostic”, “atheist”, “nothing in particular”, and “something else”.

Table 1. The maximum number of sufficiently sized and interpretable factors for each combination of acquiescence-centered versus original/raw data and orthogonal vs. oblique rotation with initial factor ceilings set by either the 60% variance approach or parallel analysis.

	60% Variance Approach		Parallel Analysis	
	Raw	Acquiescence-Centered	Raw	Acquiescence-Centered
Varimax	11	11	11	11
Oblimin	16	14	12	13
Equamax	22	14	10	13

Comparison of Candidate Structures

For each candidate number-of-factors I calculated the average correlations between matched factors across orthogonal and oblique rotations (see Table 2, column Orth-Obl) and across acquiescence-centered versus original/raw data (see Table 2, column Raw-Acq)¹⁴. I then averaged these values (Orth-Obl and Raw-Acq) to get an approximation of the robustness and replicability of each number of factors (see Figure 1).

The 14-factor acquiescence-centered oblimin solution stands out as the most robust and the best emic-maximum model. The 11-factor raw varimax solution is slightly more robust but accounts for less variance and is less comprehensive. The 13-factor oblimin solution is also slightly more robust (especially when the coefficients are standardized), but the 14-factor solution includes a unique factor that makes it considerably more comprehensive than the 13-factor model. The 14 dimensions can be conceptualized using Table 3, which lists the initial content based strictly on highest loading items.

¹⁴ In table 2, the average correlations shared between variable-sets are raw correlations. I also standardized the correlations as z-scores to check if the outcome would be the same (which it was). To see the standardized correlations, see Appendix A.

Table 2. Average correlations shared between variable-sets.

	# factors	Orth-Obl	Raw-Acq	Mean
Equamax	10	0.934	0.920	0.927
Varimax (raw)	11	0.951	0.927	0.939
Varimax (acq)	11	0.944	0.927	0.935
Oblimin	12	0.960	0.863	0.911
Oblimin	13	0.954	0.920	0.937
Equamax	13	0.954	0.881	0.918
Oblimin (acq)	14	0.945	0.927	0.936
Equamax (acq)	14	0.945	0.855	0.900
Oblimin	16	0.951	0.862	0.906
Equamax	22	0.884	0.827	0.856

Item Selection

In developing a new integrative structural model, I selected up to five items per factor to reduce the risk of having chosen ‘dud’ items for factors when it came time to administer them in new samples. There were some factors for which only three or four items were theoretically related, in which case I did not select additional items. One factor contained only items from the Ascent of Man measure, and all the items loaded onto the factor approximately equally; rather than selecting five target groups from the original measure, I simply chose to include the entire Ascent of Man measure to capture that factor. The items I selected, as well as their alpha and omega scores, are listed in Table 4. The distribution of scores for each dimension are visible in Figure 2.




Figure 1. Average replicability across variable-sets for each number-of-factors solution.

Table 3. Dimensions of a 14-factor model and initial contents (their highest-loading items).

Dimension	Highest-scoring items
Xenoparanoia	A certain ethnic group should be separated from us, so as to prevent any contaminating contact. It's wrong to believe ideas from foreign countries. I get disgusted when people start praising the culture of some other country. Foreigners are to blame for our country's failures.
Left-Wing Authoritarianism	Our country will be great if we honor the ways of progressive thinking, do what the best liberal authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the religious and conservative "rotten apples" who are ruining everything. Our country desperately needs a mighty and liberal leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical traditional ways of doing things that are ruining us. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush the evil of pushy Christian religious people, and take us forward to our true path. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get rid of our "traditional" values, put some tough leaders in power who oppose those values, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad (and so-called "traditional") ideas.

Table 3 continued

Dimension	Items
Dehumanization	People can vary in how human-like they seem. Some people seem highly evolved whereas others seem no different than lower animals. Using the image below as a guide, indicate using the sliders how evolved you consider the average member of each group to be. 1. Austrians 2. Swiss people 3. Muslims 1. Arabs
Orthodox Religiousness	Someone all-powerful will come from heaven to reward and protect believers. At a critical moment, a divine power will step in to help our people. I don't follow any kind of organized religion. [reverse-keyed] 1. I follow a sacred scripture that is never wrong.
Individual Rights	Those with extremist views should still be allowed to speak, work, and walk about freely in this country. No matter their political views, every individual should get the same legal rights and protections. We should have complete freedom of speech even for those who criticize the country. 1. Our enemies are human beings deserving of rights and dignity.
Military Imperialism	We should ensure that our military is more powerful than that of all other nations combined. We should not permit any nation to be as powerful as our own nation. Certain parts of the world need more of the civilizing influence of our values and culture. 1. Our military prowess is a glorious demonstration of the greatness of our people.
Political Alienation	I don't trust the government to do what is right. The world is headed for destruction. The present-day world is vile and miserable. Our public institutions have become corrupt.
Victim Beliefs	My ethnic group is a good people, who have never done any real harm to anyone. My ethnic group, I must admit, has done considerable harm to others. [reverse-keyed] While all experiences of victimization are somewhat different, my people's experience is truly unique. Despite some clear differences, the victimization of other groups in the world is similar to my peoples' experiences. [reverse-keyed]
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	We should never use violence as a way to try to save the world. Torture is never acceptable. One must always create peace and never create war. If our country becomes ruled by foreigners, the best way to resist would be non-violent.

Table 3 continued

Dimension	Items
Pluralistic Spirituality	Souls and spirits exist throughout nature -- in animals, plants, mountains, rivers, thunder, and wind. I believe in reincarnation -- rebirth of the soul in another body. It is impossible to communicate with the dead. [reverse-keyed] 2. More than one religion can be true.
Constructive Patriotism	I oppose some U.S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it. I express my love for America by supporting efforts at positive change. If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love for my country. 2. If you love America, you should notice its problems and work to correct them.
In-group Purity	People of different ethnic backgrounds should not have sexual relations with one another. People of different races and nationalities should live in different places apart from one another. Interracial dating should be avoided. 2. We should do things exactly the way the founders of our religion did them many years ago.
Moderation	It is virtuous and righteous to practice moderation and avoid extremes. Progress and success always require making compromise with the opposition. 2. The world will be better if we all use moderation and avoid extreme responses to any situation.
Internal Sabotage	Some groups of people in our country are out to sabotage the country. Certain groups of people have savage customs. A certain group, one could say, is sucking the blood of our people. We should be alert: The principal enemy of our civilization is living right here among us, in this nation.

Table 4. Dimensions of a 14-factor model and the items selected for each dimension based on selection priorities and criteria.

Dimension	Items
Political Alienation ($\alpha = 0.73$) ($\omega = 0.76$)	3. I don't trust the government to do what is right. 4. The present-day world is vile and miserable. 5. Our public institutions have become corrupt. 6. The people running this country don't really care what happens to people like me. 7. Today the human race is on the edge of an enormous calamity.

Table 4 continued

Dimension	Items
Constructive Patriotism ($\alpha = 0.66$) ($\omega = 0.74$)	3. I oppose some U.S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it. 4. If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love for my country. 5. If you love America, you should notice its problems and work to correct them. 6. I value being a citizen of a nation that is diverse -- with more than one religion, language, and ethnicity. 8. My love of country demands that I speak out against popular but potentially destructive policies.
Dehumanization ($\alpha = 0.98$) ($\omega = 0.99$)	People can vary in how human-like they seem. Some people seem highly evolved whereas others seem no different than lower animals. Using the image below as a guide, indicate using the sliders how evolved you consider the average member of each group to be. 3. Austrians 4. Swiss people 5. Muslims 6. Arabs 7. Icelanders 8. South Koreans 9. Australians 10. Mexican immigrants 11. Japanese people 12. Chinese people 13. Europeans 14. French people 7. Americans
Individual Rights ($\alpha = 0.66$) ($\omega = 0.71$)	3. Those with extremist views should still be allowed to speak, work, and walk about freely in this country. 4. No matter their political views, every individual should get the same legal rights and protections. 5. We should have complete freedom of speech even for those who criticize the country. 6. If accused of a crime in this country, a foreigner has the right to a prompt and fair trial. 15. The authorities must never detain anyone for long periods without charging a crime.
In-group Purity ($\alpha = 0.77$) ($\omega = 0.81$)	1. People of different ethnic backgrounds should not have sexual relations with one another. 2. Interracial dating should be avoided. 3. Gay or homosexual people should be kept away from children. 4. Those who share my ancestors, religion, and language should make ourselves a separate nation. 7. It is unjust to try to make groups equal.

Table 4 continued

Dimension	Items
Left-Wing Authoritarianism ($\alpha = 0.70$) ($\omega = 0.75$)	1. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush the evil of pushy Christian religious people, and take us forward to our true path. 2. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get rid of our “traditional” values, put some tough leaders in power who oppose those values, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad (and so-called “traditional”) ideas. 3. All political conservatives are fools. 4. Progressive ways and liberal values show the best way of life. 9. The ‘old-fashioned’ ways and ‘old-fashioned’ values need to be abolished.
Orthodox Religiousness ($\alpha = 0.81$) ($\omega = 0.84$)	1. Someone all-powerful will come from heaven to reward and protect believers. 2. I don't follow any kind of organized religion. [reverse-keyed] 3. History, philosophy, and literature provide better guidance in life than religion does. [reverse-keyed] 4. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. [reverse-keyed] 8. At the end of history miraculous events will occur, with good triumphing over evil.
Military Imperialism ($\alpha = 0.75$) ($\omega = 0.81$)	1. We should not permit any nation to be as powerful as our own nation. 2. Our military prowess is a glorious demonstration of the greatness of our people. 3. The military should be considered the most important branch of government. 4. Our nation should provide police functions in critical and unstable regions of the world. 16. Our nation should intervene actively in the world to shape circumstances in our favor and prevent threats.
Moderation ($\alpha = 0.52$) ($\omega = 0.55$)	1. It is virtuous and righteous to practice moderation and avoid extremes. 2. Progress and success always require making compromise with the opposition. 8. The world will be better if we all use moderation and avoid extreme responses to any situation.
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture ($\alpha = 0.74$) ($\omega = 0.80$)	1. Torture is never acceptable. 2. One must always create peace and never create war. 3. We must sometimes engage in forceful actions, or other people and nations will not take us seriously. [reverse-keyed] 4. There are times and places where torture is acceptable. [reverse-keyed] 3. Going to war can sometimes be sacred and righteous. [reverse-keyed]
Internal Sabotage ($\alpha = 0.69$) ($\omega = 0.72$)	1. Some groups of people in our country are out to sabotage the country. 2. A certain group, one could say, is sucking the blood of our people. 3. We should be alert: The principal enemy of our civilization is living right here among us, in this nation. 4. A certain group, seemingly loyal, works to corrupt and damage our country from within. 5. We may sometimes need to repress certain political movements that disturb national unity.

Table 4 continued

Dimension	Items
Pluralistic Spirituality ($\alpha = 0.69$) ($\omega = 0.49$)	1. Souls and spirits exist throughout nature -- in animals, plants, mountains, rivers, thunder, and wind. 2. I believe in reincarnation -- rebirth of the soul in another body. 3. It is impossible to communicate with the dead. [reverse-keyed] 10. More than one religion can be true.
Victim Beliefs ($\alpha = -0.22$) ¹⁵ ($\omega = 0.83$)	1. My ethnic group, I must admit, has done considerable harm to others. [reverse-keyed] 2. Despite some clear differences, the victimization of other groups in the world is similar to my peoples' experiences. [reverse-keyed] 3. My people have a lot in common with other ethnic, national or religious groups that have been targeted. [reverse-keyed] 4. While other groups have been victimized, my people's experience is overall much more severe. 9. No other group in the world has suffered as much as my people.
Xenoparanoia ($\alpha = 0.86$) ($\omega = 0.88$)	1. A certain ethnic group should be separated from us, so as to prevent any contaminating contact. 2. It's wrong to believe ideas from foreign countries. 3. Foreigners are to blame for our country's failures. 4. God wants us, for the sake of good, to hate a certain group of people. 17. Ideally, our country would consist of people with just one language, religion, and culture.

¹⁵ The negative alpha for this scale can be attributed to an interpretation issue with items 2 and 3. These items derive from a measure developed by Vollhardt et al. (2021) that tried to distinguish between people who felt that their group had been *uniquely* victimized beyond what other groups had experienced and people who felt that their group's suffering was comparable to the suffering of other groups. This distinction seems to have been too subtle for this sample, as any items that dealt with one's group being victimized were positively correlated with each other. The opposite end of the scale as interpreted by participants in this sample would be viewing one's group as a perpetrator or admitting that they've caused harm.




Figure 2. Density plots of score distribution across dimensions of a 14-factor model. Dimension scores are on a 1-5 scale, with 1 being “strongly disagree” and 5 being “strongly agree”.

IV. STUDY ONE DISCUSSION

While prior research has disaggregated ‘political’ worldviews into a collection of discrete measures, choosing which to administer in a given study for opaque reasons, the current study shows that these worldviews can actually be consolidated into 14 dimensions. Their composition and thematic content are described below.

Dimensions of the New Structural Model

Political Alienation

The dimension of political alienation aggregates items from several preexisting worldviews: trust in government, militant extremist mindset, and inequality aversion. It encompasses a distrust of state institutions paired with a more generalized sense of pessimism about the state of society.

Constructive Patriotism

The dimension of constructive patriotism remains the same as the original worldview and encompass a sentiment of support for the US that is defined by a willingness to interrogate and challenge its actions when they need improvement¹⁶.

¹⁶ Of course, which actions could be considered to ‘need improvement’ are a matter of political opinion. It is worth noting that the constructive patriotism score distributions for Democrats and Republicans were almost entirely overlapping (for Democrats, the mean score was 3.7, SD = 1.09; for Republicans, the mean score was 3.6, SD = 0.91). As much as both sides may consider the other to ‘blindly’ follow their party lines, both equally (and positively) identify as valuing constructive critique of their country’s actions.

Dehumanization

The dehumanization dimension, which consists solely of items from Kteily et al.'s (2015) Ascent of Man measure, remains a faithful replica of the existing measure, though this more likely reflects the unique formatting of the items than theoretical discreteness. It captures the degree to which an individual regards people who identify with specific nationalities as more or less human.

Individual Rights

The dimension of individual rights is a composite of items from three preexisting worldviews: freedom of speech, freedom from detention, and blind patriotism. Taken holistically, it captures the belief that regardless of someone's identity or what they believe, they deserve equal democratic, Constitutional rights and freedoms.

Ingroup Purity

The dimension of ingroup purity aggregates items from several preexisting worldviews: caste maintenance orientation, freedom of sexual orientation, social dominance orientation, and ethnonationalism. It maintains that any sort of intermingling among (particularly racial or ethnic) groups poses a threat to the integrity of the ingroup, so groups should be kept separate from each other.

Left Wing Authoritarianism

The left-wing authoritarianism dimension not only draws from items developed by Costello et al. (2022b) and Conway et al. (2020) but also is clearly theoretically representative of core left-wing authoritarian beliefs. It encompasses a derision for 'traditional' Christian

conservatives paired with what Altemeyer might call a strain of authoritarian submission – a conviction that American society can only be cured of the evils of conservatism by following a single (politically left-leaning) leader who will harshly clamp down on dissidence.

Orthodox Religiousness

The dimension of Orthodox Religiousness aggregates items from several preexisting worldviews: militant extremist mindset, fundamentalism, authoritarianism, and tradition-oriented religiosity. Two of its items express messianic beliefs that there will be a final apocalyptic battle between good and evil in which believers will be rewarded. Its other items are related to an affiliation with organized religion and an acceptance of traditional religious beliefs (i.e., disapproval of premarital sexual intercourse). While many people in the US are affiliated with organized religion, the combination of affiliation with messianic and purity-related religious beliefs suggests that this dimension captures a more specific and extreme orthodox, perhaps fundamentalist strain of religiosity.

Military Imperialism

The Military Imperialism dimension consists of items from the preexisting worldviews of imperialism and militarism. It captures two underlying sentiments: (a) that the military is of primary practical and symbolic importance to the nation, and (b) that the state (through military action) should intervene in international affairs to promote the nation's interests.

Moderation

The dimension of moderation aggregates items from the worldviews of militant extremist mindset and polarized thinking (from the Democidal Mindset Questionnaire) to espouse the merits of moderation and compromise.

Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture

The dimension of Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture aggregates items from the worldviews of militant extremist mindset and support of torture (from the Democidal Mindset Questionnaire) to reject the utility of torture and war.

Internal Sabotage

The Internal Sabotage dimension consists of items from the preexisting worldviews of sabotage and purity of thought (both from the Democidal Mindset Questionnaire). It captures two underlying sentiments: (a) that a group of internal actors poses a threat to the safety or integrity of the nation, and (b) that any domestic movements that pose a threat to national unity should be repressed.

Pluralistic Spirituality

The Pluralistic Spirituality dimension draws from subjective spirituality and fundamentalism items (specifically, the inverse of fundamentalism) to express support for religious pluralism and esoteric spiritual beliefs.

Victim Beliefs

The dimension of victim beliefs takes Vollhardt et al.'s (2021) Global Victim Beliefs Items and one item from Landau et al.'s (2020) Democidal Mindset Questionnaire (from the Ingroup Blamelessness dimension) to encompass a perception that one's ingroup has been more severely or uniquely victimized than other groups and is blameless in regard to the suffering of other groups.

Xenoparanoia

All the items comprising the xenoparanoia dimension derive from Landau et al.'s (2020) Democidal Mindset Questionnaire but were originally grouped in different dimensions: racist views, xenoparanoia, and pro-torture. The new aggregate dimension captures the underlying sentiment that foreigners are a contaminating, destructive force to American society and the integrity and safety of the US depends upon its isolation from foreign influence.

Overview

This study set out to determine which structural model of political violence-promoting worldviews gives the most evidence for robustness and offers the greatest comprehensiveness and depth of insight in a US sample, with a goal of testing how well each factor of the final structural model predicts support for political violence. A 14-factor structure in acquiescence-centered data using an oblimin rotation emerged as the most robust and comprehensive solution.

Given that my goal was predictive capacity, I chose to use EFA to reach this conclusion because it is suited to identify a maximally predictive set of relatively independent variables, which leads to more prediction than a relatively more correlated set. Holding degree of independence constant, the more predictors there are, the more prediction is possible. I chose the

14-factor solution over other, more robust, possibilities because of its greater number and comprehensiveness of predictors. If one were to hold degree of independence constant, more predictors yield greater prediction. The following chapters will test the predictive validity of the 14-factor structure herein identified.

V. TESTING THE PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF THE NEW STRUCTURAL MODEL

To determine what dimensions are most useful in predicting support for different forms of political violence, I determined the relative strength of each worldview dimension in predicting SPV in a US population. I also tested whether the factor structure of the new structural model is generalizable to a more representative US sample.

Research Questions

1. What dimensions of a comprehensive structural model of political violence-promoting worldviews are most strongly associated with support for anti-state violence in the US?
2. What dimensions of a comprehensive structural model of political violence-promoting worldviews are most strongly associated with support for state violence in the US?
3. What dimensions of a comprehensive structural model of political violence-promoting worldviews are most strongly associated with support for intergroup violence in the US?
4. Is the structural model of worldviews developed in Study 1 replicable in other US samples?

How to Measure Support for Political Violence in the US

Support for Anti-State Violence

Measures Developed to Capture Support for Anti-State Violence. Many measures of support for anti-state violence ask broadly about the legitimacy of using violence when circumstances call for it (e.g., “in support of a just cause,” “when a national disaster is at hand,”

or “to fight for a better world”) (Bartusevičius et al., 2020; Belanger et al., 2019; Bhui et al., 2020; Canetti et al., 2010, p. 578; Detges, 2017; Herrington, 2021; Jahnke et al., 2021, p. 476; Kacholia & Neuner, 2022; Mernyk, Pink, Druckman, & Willer, 2022; Muddiman, Warner, & Schumacher-Rutherford, 2021; Schumpe et al., 2020; Zaidise et al., 2007; Zhirkov et al., 2014). The ambiguity of this approach has been found to overstate participants’ actual support for anti-state violence, as they may include and endorse low-level property crimes in their definition of violence while condemning more severe acts like assault and murder (Westwood et al., 2022).

Some measures of support for anti-state violence ask participants how much they approve of other people taking violent action for a political cause, whether this is in the form of support for existing militant groups, endorsement of past acts of partisan violence, or hypothetical support if a group they endorsed were to use political violence (Fair et al., 2012; McKeown & Taylor, 2017; Vergani et al., 2022; Westwood et al., 2022). This approach has the benefit of measuring participants’ tacit acceptance of violent anti-state behaviors and capturing the effect of social acceptance on anti-state violence. It does not, however, measure participants’ own violent intentions.

Potentially the most useful type of measure asks about participants’ use of or willingness to use violence against the state or powerful elites, detailing more specific circumstances (e.g., if the government turns repressive or during the George Floyd protests in the summer of 2020) or types of violence (e.g., by throwing stones at the police or participating in violent protest) (Bartusevičius et al., 2020; Becker, 2021; Costello et al., 2022a; Dyrstad & Hillesun, 2020; Faragó et al., 2019; Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009; Pauwels & Heylen, 2020; Pavlović & Wertag, 2021). Some measures also capture non-violent participation in political protest activities like attending community meetings or protest marches, based on the idea that the use of

anti-state violence to pursue a political cause exists on the same spectrum as more conventional political engagement and political activism (Adamczyk & Lafree, 2019, p. 953; Bartusevičius et al., 2020; Becker, 2021). Prior research suggests that expressed intentions to engage in political violence are a better predictive tool to assess actual participation in political violence because, unlike attitudinal support for violence, they involve practical considerations of limitations and opportunities for action (Bartusevičius et al., 2020).

Current Study. To capture support for anti-state violence, I included Support for Violent Collective Action measures based on those developed by Costello et al. (2022b). Costello et al. (2022b) created a 9-item measure asking about support for violent collective action during the 2020 protests against police brutality against Black Americans¹⁷. The current study also included a version of the measure that asked about the Stop the Steal protests after the 2020 US presidential elections. For both versions, I included additional preliminary items asking about participants' familiarity with the protests and whether they attended any of them. I also included items capturing individuals' past participation in violence against the state.

Support for State Violence

Measures Developed to Capture Support for State Violence. Measures that ask participants how much they approve of the state taking violent action for a political cause are commonly used to assess support for state violence by looking at layperson support for specific violent or repressive domestic policies such as the death penalty, domestic spying, torture of suspected terrorists, and police use of preemptive lethal force (Hou & Quek, 2019; Kalmoe,

¹⁷ They also included a corresponding 9-item measure that assesses behavior during those protests. However, due to my own error, I only included this measure for the Black Lives Matter protests and not Stop the Steal. For this reason, I did not include them in my analyses.

2013; Saucier et al., 2018; Slovic et al., 2020). Other measures look at support for specific violent international policies, such as the endorsement of certain violent military actions rather than diplomatic responses to interstate tensions (Li et al., 2016; Slovic et al., 2020).

Current Study. To capture support for state violence, I measured support for specific violent domestic policies as well as support for the use of nuclear weapons against the civilian population of another country. I chose this selection of policies because they are directly tied to the use of violence by state institutions against individual non-combatants, rather than being more loosely tied to repressive or controversial policies (e.g., gun control laws). Using item structures (and some items) developed by Slovic et al. (2020), I asked the following questions:

1. *Nuclear Attacks on Civilians.* Participants read a hypothetical news story about a ground war between the US and Iran, taken verbatim from a study by Sagan and Valentino (2017) and used by Slovic et al. (2020). They then answered two questions regarding what they would do in this hypothetical scenario:

. Participants were told that the nuclear option would kill approximately 2,000,000 Iranian civilians. The questions are as follows:

- a. “Given the facts described in the article, if you had to choose between launching the nuclear strike against the Iranian city or continuing the ground war against Iran, which option would you prefer?” [Slightly, moderately, or strongly prefer to continue the ground war or slightly, moderately, or strongly prefer to launch the nuclear strike.]
- b. “Regardless of which option you preferred, if the United States decided to conduct the nuclear strike against the Iranian city, how much would you approve or disapprove of that decision?” [Slightly, moderately, or strongly disapprove of

the nuclear strike or slightly, moderately, or strongly approve of the nuclear strike.]

2. *Death penalty*. “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?”
3. *Armed Forces Special Powers Act (not commensurate with current US laws)*. “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose laws that allow armed forces to shoot or kill civilians if they suspect them of committing crimes?”
4. *Anti-abortion (not commensurate with current US federal law)*. “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose laws that allow people to commit violence in the name of the protection of unborn children and punish people who perform abortions with life imprisonment?”
5. *Pro-abortion (not commensurate with current US laws)*. “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose laws that allow people to commit violence in the name of the protection of individuals seeking abortions and punish people who prevent access to abortions with life imprisonment?”

Support for Intergroup & Partisan Violence

Measures Developed to Capture Support for Intergroup & Partisan Violence. Some specific and targeted measures exist to capture support for intergroup violence by asking about the legitimacy of the use of violence against specific outgroups or members of an opposing partisan group (Faragó et al., 2019; Kalmoe & Mason, 2019). Some also ask about the degree to which more specific and varied examples of potential behaviors (e.g., spreading rumors about a specific outgroup, forming separate school classes, or spitting on members of that outgroup) are justified against a specific outgroup (Winiewski & Bulska, 2020). These measures are preferable

as they contain a broader range of potential behaviors that could encapsulate different degrees of violence endorsement.

Current Study. To capture support for violence against specific targeted outgroups, I used a measure based on Winiewski and Bulska's (2020) Multidimensional Scale of Acceptance of Collective Violence. The benefit of the scale is that rather than asking about participants' violent intentions, it measures participants' tacit acceptance of violent behaviors towards outgroups. Furthermore, it is designed to allow for different types of behaviors to be endorsed and capture the effect of social acceptance on collective violence. In the original scale (administered to a Polish sample), participants read a short story about an intergroup conflict between a majority group (Poles) and a minority group that had just taken up residence in a Polish city, leading to open hostility between members of the groups. They were asked to rate to what extent a range of potential behaviors that the majority group could engage in were justified¹⁸. For a US sample, I adapted the scale to be set in a U.S. city. I asked about two target outgroups: an identity group that is widely disliked by their community, and a political group that is widely disliked by their community.

Control Variables

A number of other variables may play a role in driving support for political violence. I accounted for them in my models to see the relative contribution of worldviews and beliefs in accounting for support for political violence.

¹⁸ The potential behaviors fall into six clusters: physical violence (e.g., lynching), verbal or psychological violence (e.g., threats or insults), discrimination/exclusion (e.g., segregation), positive reactions (e.g., spending time together or helping them learn the language), passiveness/exclusion (e.g., ostracism), and indirect violence (e.g., protests or strikes against the outgroup) (Winiewski & Bulska, 2020).

Personality Traits

Amoral aspects of personality -- in particular the so-called ‘Dark Tetrad’ of narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism -- have been associated with support for political violence. Psychopathy predicts subtle prejudice against asylum seekers while Machiavellianism predicts overt prejudice against them (Anderson & Cheers, 2018). Trait aggression has also predicted support for anti-state violence and violent state policies (Kalmoe, 2013; Kalmoe, 2014).

Psychological Variables

Newer research has pointed to psychological factors as contributors to support for violence. Group relative deprivation – a sense that one’s group is disadvantaged compared to other groups – positively predicted support for violence among supporters of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement as well as among members of an immigration-critical group (Lindström, Bergh, Akrami, Obaidi, & Öymyr, 2024). Emotional aspects of group deprivation were also found to interact with Dark Tetrad traits to predict radicalized intentions (Pavlović & Franc, 2021).

Demographic Variables

Much research on support for and engagement in anti-state violence has focused on socio-demographic and background characteristics (e.g., age, gender, religion, and education), but a field-wide systematic review of risk and protective factors found that socio-demographic characteristics have the smallest - and sometimes even non-significant - effect on ‘radical’ attitudes, intentions, and behaviors (Wolfowicz et al., 2020). Age, for instance, does not affect an individual’s likelihood to adopt anti-state worldviews as strongly as it impacts who takes action

in support of those worldviews. Despite this finding, I have included age, gender, and religion in the current study to eliminate them as potential contributors to support for political violence.

Socioeconomic Variables

Prior research has focused little on the role of objective economic inequality in fostering support for political violence, and what few studies exist yield inconsistent and context-dependent findings (Franc & Pavlović, 2023). Perceived economic inequality, in contrast, has been positively associated with far-right radicalization in a small number of studies. The specific metric of subjective social status (SSS) has not been directly investigated in relation to support for political violence, though lower SSS has been associated with higher levels of aggression and intimate partner violence (Greitemeyer & Sagioglou, 2016; Wang, Wong, & Fong, 2022). To further clarify the relation of perceived and objective socioeconomic status with support for the political violence, the current study included measures of both.

Study 2 Design

Data Collection Procedures

Participants for the US university sample were University of Oregon students recruited from the Human Subjects Pool using the SONA website. Participants for the representative US sample were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. All SONA participants received credit for their participation, and all MTurk participants received monetary compensation for their participation. All participants were 18 years of age or older. Participants participated online and participated only once (i.e., the survey included only one session of data collection and was

expected to be completed in one sitting). Responses to the surveys completed by the participants were recorded through Qualtrics.

Sample Size and Rationale

My target sample size was 200 participants. Using G*Power, I calculated that a sample size of 200 participants would give me 90% power to detect correlations as small as 0.23. The average effect size in social psychology is equivalent to $r = 0.21$.

Measured Variables¹⁹

1. Data Cleaning:

1. Yeasaying Versus Naysaying Index (YVNI) (developed by Saucier & Kimmelmeier) (20 items)
2. Inattentive and Deviant Responding Inventory for Statements (IDRIS) (Kay, 2021) (14 items)
3. Instructed Response Item Set (IRIS) (Kay & Saucier, 2022) (10 items)

2. Demographic Variables:

1. Age
2. Gender Identity
3. Racial/Ethnic Identity
4. Education Level
5. Religious Affiliation

3. Predictor Variables

¹⁹ Study 2 includes 236 items, which was projected to take participants an average of 40 minutes (at a rate of 10 seconds/item).

1. *New Measure of Worldviews* (63 items, top five items for each dimension)
2. *Political Orientation*
4. *Outcome Variables:*
 1. *Support for Anti-State Violence:* Support for Anti-State Violence Measure (Costello et al., 2022b) (40 items)
 2. *Support for State Violence:* Support for State Violence Measure (10 items)
 3. *Support for Intergroup Violence:* Multidimensional Scale of Acceptance of Collective Violence (Winiewski & Bulska, 2020) (44 items, 22 for each target group)
5. *Control Variables:*
 1. *Perceived Discrimination:*
 - i. Group Relative Deprivation Scale (Leviston et al., 2020) (5 items)
 - ii. Personal Relative Deprivation Scales (Leviston et al., 2020) (3 items)
 2. *Material Hardship:*
 - i. Material Hardship and Deprivation Scale (Diemer et al., 2013) (3 items)
 - ii. U.S. Household Food Security Survey Module: Six-Item Short Form (USDA, 2012) (6 items)
 3. *Subjective Social Status:* MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status - Adult Version (Adler et al., 2000) (2 items)
6. *Personality Variables:*
 1. *Trait Aggression:* Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (Short Form) (Buss & Perry, 1992) (12 items)
 2. *Dark Tetrad:* Short Dark Tetrad (SD4) Measure (Paulhus et al., 2021) (28 items)

Analysis Plan

Combination of Data. Except for Confirmatory Factor Analysis, all analyses were performed on combined data from the SONA and MTurk samples.

Data Exclusion. Participants were excluded based on their score on the IRIS (I included IRIS items in each block). I scored each correct response as 1 and each incorrect response as 0. I then excluded²⁰ anyone who scored less than 5 (out of a possible 10) on the IRIS scale. I also excluded any participants who did not complete the study.

Four “participants” in SONA data were excluded using hierarchical cluster analysis because there was reasonable cause to believe they were duplicates of previous responses (i.e., their profiles of item responses were correlated with a prior response above $r = 0.9$ and their start time was exactly the same as the end time of that response). These exclusions were not preregistered.

For analyses looking at gender, non-binary gender identity responses were to be excluded from analyses unless at least 20 participants listed “other” as their gender identity. In that case, a third category was to be created.

For analyses looking at support for collective or partisan violence, I excluded participants who did not identify an appropriate target group to answer about. For the collective violence measures, I asked participants to identify an identity group that that is widely disliked by their community (e.g., Jewish people), while for the partisan violence measures, I asked participants to identify a political group that is widely disliked by their community (e.g., Trump supporters). If

²⁰ For SONA participants, I excluded them from receiving credit. For MTurk participants, I excluded them from receiving compensation. For both, I excluded them from analysis.

they, for instance, chose a political group when they were asked to choose an identity group, they were excluded from analyses about that measure.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis. To test Research Question 4, I conducted CFA to determine whether the factor structure established in Study 1 would hold in a second sample²¹. I first ran CFA on the representative US sample from MTurk because it was the most different from the original sample. To understand which items reduced model fit the most and remove them from the model²², I calculated the top 100 modification indices. I then removed the items from each scale that most reduced model fit according to the modification indices (i.e., those items that lowered CFI values and raised RMSEA values the most in each factor). On the assumption that reducing scales to two or fewer items would yield linear composites rather than coherent factors, I retained at least three items for each scale. I then ran CFI on the university sample as a cross-validation of the revised scales, which gave the closest approximation possible to the original data source.

Acquiescence-centering. Using a protocol outlined in Rammstedt, Danner, & Bosnjak (2017) and the Yeasaying Versus Naysaying Index developed by Saucier & Kemmelmeier, I acquiescence-centered the data after my analyses to see if acquiescence-bias significantly affected my findings (e.g., by making the findings statistically insignificant when they appeared significant in raw data). If acquiescence-centered and raw data yielded the same findings, I only reported findings from the acquiescence-centered data. If they yielded different results, I reported

²¹ I did not include the Ascent of Man (dehumanization scale) in the CFA because it specifies a different group (e.g., Japanese people, Austrians) in each item. CFA would suggest that some of these groups should be removed because they are too highly intercorrelated or they are too different from other groups. However, these patterns may shift culturally, and all groups are included to capture cultural variance.

²² While it is sometimes appropriate to move items between factors based on the recommendation of modification indices, removing such items entirely was more appropriate for the purpose of scale development.

findings from the acquiescence-centered data in the main text and included the differing results from raw data in footnotes.

Zero-Order Correlations. I calculated zero-order correlations to see the relations between dimensions, with the outcome variables of interest, and with the control variables.

Multiple Regression. I first ran hierarchical linear regression models to see the impact of demographic variables, then I ran hierarchical linear regression models to see the impact of personality variables (specifically, trait aggression and the Dark Tetrad) when accounting for demographic variables. These first two steps account for demographic and personality variables that are not explicitly attitudinal in nature, before incorporating the more attitudinal variables at the last step. I then ran hierarchical linear regression models to see the impact of the entire set of scales when accounting for demographic and personality variables and separate hierarchical linear regression models for each scale²³ to see the relative impact of each scale when taking personality and demographic variables into account. I used a p-value threshold of .01 to reduce the possibility of Type 1 error in my analyses (a decision which was not included in my preregistration).

To test research questions 1-3, I estimated support for anti-state, state, and intergroup violence respectively from the participants' scores on each scale, controlling for age, gender identity, religious affiliation, racial/ethnic identity, subjective social status, personal relative deprivation, group relative deprivation, food insecurity, material hardship, trait aggression scores, education level, and Dark Tetrad trait scores.

²³ And for political orientation, which I did not include as a control variable.

VI. RESULTS OF PREDICTIVE VALIDITY TESTING

Demographics

University Student Sample

Age and Gender Identity. Of the 104 participants who passed the quality checks for inattentive and deviant responding, 66% identified as female, 31% identified as male, and less than 1% identified as another gender identity. The average age of participants was 20 ($SD = 2$).

Political Affiliation and Orientation. Nearly 2/3 of participants identified as Democrats (63%), 11% identified as Independents, 6% identified as Republicans, and 19% identified as “other” or “none” regarding political affiliation²⁴. When asked to place themselves on a spectrum from extremely conservative to extremely liberal, 76% identified as somewhat (51%) or extremely (25%) liberal, 15% identified as neither conservative nor liberal, and 9% identified as somewhat (9%) or extremely (0%) conservative.

Racial and Ethnic Identity. 65% of participants identified as White or Caucasian, 15% identified as Asian or Asian-American, 11% identified as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, 8% identified as Black or African American, and less than 1% identified as Native Hawaiian or another type of Pacific Islander.

Religion. Over half of participants did not identify with a religion, identifying as agnostic (16%), atheist (11%), or nothing in particular (31%). 7% of participants identified as Jewish, 7% identified as Roman Catholic, 2% identified as Protestant, and 1% identified as Buddhist. 8%

²⁴ Of the 20 participants who identified as “other” or “none” regarding political affiliation, 7 of them identified as neither conservative nor liberal on the conservative-liberal spectrum. Two identified as somewhat conservative, while 11 identified as somewhat or extremely liberal.

identified as some other religion not specified. The remaining 19 participants identified with a combination of religious affiliations.

Representative US Sample

Age and Gender Identity. Of the 100 participants who passed the quality checks for inattentive and deviant responding, 53% identified as male and 47% identified as female. The average age of participants was 46 ($SD = 15$).

Political Affiliation and Orientation. Around a third of participants identified as Democrats (35%), 33% identified as Republicans, 27% identified as Independents, and 5% identified as “other” or “none” regarding political affiliation²⁵. When asked to place themselves on a spectrum from extremely conservative to extremely liberal, 44% identified as somewhat (26%) or extremely (18%) liberal, 39% identified as somewhat (25%) or extremely (14%) conservative, and 17% identified as neither conservative nor liberal.

Racial and Ethnic Identity. 74% of participants identified as White or Caucasian, 11% identified as Black or African American, 9% identified as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, 5% identified as Asian or Asian-American, and 1% identified as Native Hawaiian or another type of Pacific Islander.

Religion. Just over a third of participants did not identify with a religion, identifying as agnostic (14%), atheist (13%), or nothing in particular (11%). 31% of participants identified as Protestant, 22% identified as Roman Catholic, 2% identified as Jewish, 1% identified as Buddhist, 1% identified as Hindu, and 1% identified as Sikh. 4% identified as some other religion not specified.

²⁵ Of the 5 participants who identified as “other” or “none” regarding political affiliation, 2 of them identified as neither conservative nor liberal on the conservative-liberal spectrum. Three identified as extremely liberal.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that an RMSEA smaller than .06 and a CFI and TLI larger than .95 indicate relatively good overall model–data fit. CFA ran on a representative US sample ($n = 100$) on the original model yielded poor model-data fit (RMSEA = [0.091, 0.100], SRMR = 0.133, CFI = 0.586, TLI = 0.553). When ill-fitting items were removed, CFA showed close to good model-data fit (RMSEA = [0.049, 0.070], SRMR = 0.099, CFI = 0.874, TLI = 0.852)²⁶. When the new model was run on the university student sample ($n = 104$), model-data fit was, again, not ideal (RMSEA = [0.068, 0.086], SRMR = 0.096, CFI = 0.756, TLI = 0.713). Two additional ill-fitting items were removed, yielding closer to good model-data fit (RMSEA = [0.065, 0.084], SRMR = 0.097, CFI = 0.779, TLI = 0.736). The remaining items are found in Table 5. The distribution of scores in each scale are found in Figure 3; the score distributions closely resemble those found in the first study. Descriptive statistics for each scale by sample are found in Table 6.

Table 5. Items remaining in 14-factor model after CFA on both representative US sample and university sample.

Dimension	Items
Xenoparanoia ($\alpha = 0.63$) ($\omega = 0.65$)	1. It's wrong to believe ideas from foreign countries. 2. Foreigners are to blame for our country's failures. 3. God wants us, for the sake of good, to hate a certain group of people.
Left-Wing Authoritarianism ($\alpha = 0.79$) ($\omega = 0.79$)	1. All political conservatives are fools. 2. Progressive ways and liberal values show the best way of life. 3. The 'old-fashioned' ways and 'old-fashioned' values need to be abolished.

²⁶ One factor (moderation) started out with three items and modification indices suggested that all three of its items reduced model fit. For this reason, I removed this latent variable from the model, as reducing its items by even one would yield linear composites rather than coherent factors. If I had left it in, the fit indices would have been: RMSEA = [0.060, 0.078], SRMR = 0.106, CFI = 0.823, TLI = 0.793.

Table 5 continued

Dimension	Items
Dehumanization ($\alpha = 0.97$) ($\omega = 0.98$)	People can vary in how human-like they seem. Some people seem highly evolved whereas others seem no different than lower animals. Using the image below as a guide, indicate using the sliders how evolved you consider the average member of each group to be. 1. Austrians 2. Swiss people 3. Muslims 4. Arabs 5. Icelanders 6. South Koreans 7. Australians 8. Mexican immigrants 9. Japanese people 10. Chinese people 11. Europeans 12. French people 13. Americans
Orthodox Religiousness ($\alpha = 0.83$) ($\omega = 0.84$)	1. Someone all-powerful will come from heaven to reward and protect believers. 2. I don't follow any kind of organized religion. [reverse-keyed] 3. History, philosophy, and literature provide better guidance in life than religion does. [reverse-keyed]
Individual Rights ($\alpha = 0.58$) ($\omega = 0.60$)	1. We should have complete freedom of speech even for those who criticize the country. 2. If accused of a crime in this country, a foreigner has the right to a prompt and fair trial. 3. The authorities must never detain anyone for long periods without charging a crime.
Military Imperialism ($\alpha = 0.59$) ($\omega = 0.64$)	1. We should not permit any nation to be as powerful as our own nation. 2. Our military prowess is a glorious demonstration of the greatness of our people. 3. Our nation should provide police functions in critical and unstable regions of the world.
Political Alienation ($\alpha = 0.64$) ($\omega = 0.66$)	1. Our public institutions have become corrupt. 2. The people running this country don't really care what happens to people like me. 3. Today the human race is on the edge of an enormous calamity.

Table 5 continued

Dimension	Items
Victim Beliefs ($\alpha = -0.31$) ²⁷ ($\omega = 0.81$)	1. Despite some clear differences, the victimization of other groups in the world is similar to my peoples' experiences. [reverse-keyed] 2. While other groups have been victimized, my people's experience is overall much more severe. 3. No other group in the world has suffered as much as my people.
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture ($\alpha = 0.77$) ($\omega = 0.81$)	1. Torture is never acceptable. 2. We must sometimes engage in forceful actions, or other people and nations will not take us seriously. [reverse-keyed] 3. There are times and places where torture is acceptable. [reverse-keyed]
Pluralistic Spirituality ($\alpha = 0.69$) ($\omega = 0.71$)	4. Souls and spirits exist throughout nature -- in animals, plants, mountains, rivers, thunder, and wind. 5. I believe in reincarnation -- rebirth of the soul in another body. 6. More than one religion can be true.
Constructive Patriotism ($\alpha = 0.52$) ($\omega = 0.56$)	1. I oppose some U.S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it. 2. If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love for my country. 3. If you love America, you should notice its problems and work to correct them.
In-group Purity ($\alpha = 0.88$) ($\omega = 0.88$)	1. People of different ethnic backgrounds should not have sexual relations with one another. 2. Interracial dating should be avoided. 3. People of different races and nationalities should live in different places apart from one another.
Internal Sabotage ($\alpha = 0.63$) ($\omega = 0.66$)	1. Some groups of people in our country are out to sabotage the country. 2. A certain group, seemingly loyal, works to corrupt and damage our country from within. 3. We may sometimes need to repress certain political movements that disturb national unity.

²⁷ The victim beliefs scale contains these three items because they optimized model fit in CFA. As previously mentioned, the original measure tried to distinguish between people who felt that their group had been *uniquely* victimized beyond what other groups had experienced and people who felt that their group's suffering was comparable to the suffering of other groups. This distinction seems to have been too subtle for this sample, as the first item (which dealt with other groups experiencing comparable suffering to one's own group) was positively correlated with the latter two items (which dealt with seeing one's own group's suffering as worse than what other groups have experienced). While the first item should be reverse-keyed based on Vollhardt et al.'s (2021) original measure, it is positively correlated with the latter two items, suggesting that participants saw the theme of victimhood as more salient or understandable than the more subtle distinction Vollhardt et al. (2021) was aiming for. Even though the scale behaves differently than it was intended, I have retained the keying of the original scale as a linear composite given the theoretical integrity of the original construct.

Score distribution across dimensions of a 14-factor model




Figure 3. Density plots of score distribution across scales of a 14-scale inventory in raw data. Scale scores are on a 1-5 scale, with 1 being “strongly disagree” and 5 being “strongly agree”.

Table 6. Table of reliability, unidimensionality, and summary statistics of potential predictor and outcome variables.

	MTurk					SONA			
	Alpha	Omega	Mean	SD	Range	Alpha	Omega	Mean	SD
Outcome Variables									
Support for state violence	0.46	0.52	2.28	0.82	1-5	0.49	0.59	2.23	0.72
Support for anti-state violence	0.9	0.97	0.68	0.79	1-5	0.88	0.93	1.4	0.94
Support for partisan physical violence	0.92	0.93	1.56	1.08	1-5	0.9	0.91	1.66	1.17
Support for partisan verbal violence	0.75	0.76	2.92	1.38	1-5	0.71	0.74	3.46	1.45
Support for partisan indirect violence	0.86	0.88	2.92	1.66	1-5	0.87	0.89	2.67	1.56
Support for collective physical violence	0.89	0.93	1.4	0.96	1-5	0.92	0.92	1.72	1.24
Support for collective verbal violence	0.8	0.81	2.6	1.52	1-5	0.85	0.86	3.18	1.68
Support for collective indirect violence	0.87	0.88	2.62	1.75	1-5	0.85	0.86	2.56	1.6
Personality Variables									
Aggression	0.89	0.93	2.1	0.72	1-5	0.84	0.89	2.6	0.64
Machiavellianism	0.83	0.89	3.03	0.82	1-5	0.62	0.75	3.32	0.52
Narcissism	0.84	0.87	2.48	0.82	1-5	0.59	0.76	2.98	0.53
Psychopathy	0.8	0.88	1.74	0.65	1-5	0.74	0.8	2.27	0.66
Sadism	0.82	0.88	2.25	0.87	1-5	0.72	0.83	2.77	0.73
Worldview Scale Predictors									
Xenoparanoia	0.66	0.67	1.63	0.71	1-5	0.73	0.76	1.46	0.62
LWA	0.79	0.8	2.45	1.08	1-5	0.68	0.7	3.21	0.79
Dehumanization	0.97	0.98	87.4	15.8	0-100*	0.98	0.99	87.9	18.9
Orthodox Religiousness	0.83	0.87	2.99	0.65	1-5	0.71	0.73	2.16	0.88
Individual Rights	0.56	0.58	4.27	0.68	1-5	0.68	0.69	4.33	0.65
Military Imperialism	0.55	0.62	2.73	0.87	1-5	0.63	0.66	2.34	0.77
Political Alienation	0.7	0.73	3.67	0.87	1-5	0.57	0.61	3.69	0.72
Victim Beliefs	-0.31	0.8	2.19	0.86	1-5	-0.48	0.82	2.27	0.53
Anti- vs. Pro-torture	0.77	0.84	2.93	0.5	1-5	0.7	0.8	3.6	0.9
Pluralistic Spirituality	0.63	0.66	2.9	1	1-5	0.65	0.67	3.63	0.81
Constructive Patriotism	0.61	0.66	3.87	0.72	1-5	0.41	0.52	3.83	0.58
Ingroup Purity	0.89	0.91	1.62	0.87	1-5	0.88	0.9	1.31	0.61
Moderation	0.72	0.74	3.72	0.75	1-5	0.3	0.43	3.59	0.59
Internal Sabotage	0.68	0.72	3.32	0.96	1-5	0.55	0.6	2.93	0.83
Demographic Variables									
Material hardship			1.83	2.12	0-14			1.19	1.88
Food security	0.94	0.98	0.25	0.47	0-1.7	0.92	0.98	0.15	0.34
Subjective social status	0.89		4.72	1.5	0-10	0.57		6.07	1.39
Group relative deprivation			0.95	0.51	0.375-1.875			0.9	0.52
Personal relative deprivation			0.81	0.49	0.375-1.875			0.73	0.48

* The dehumanization scale is reversed, meaning that the higher the dehumanization score the lower the dehumanization. In the rest of the paper, the analyses will be reported reversed, so higher dehumanization scores correspond to higher levels of dehumanization.

Zero-Order Correlations

The absolute value average correlation across the inventory of scales is 0.20 ($SD = 0.15$). Xenoparanoia was highly correlated with many other dimensions (ingroup purity: $r = 0.74$, victim beliefs: $r = 0.45$, military imperialism: $r = 0.50$, orthodox religiousness: $r = 0.44$, and individual rights: $r = -0.41$) as well as being highly negatively correlated with political orientation (meaning it was highly positively correlated with identifying as politically conservative) ($r = -0.39$) (see Table 6). Ingroup purity, orthodox religiousness, military imperialism, and the inverse of left-wing authoritarianism were also all moderately to highly intercorrelated with each other (absolute value average $r = 0.39$, $SD = 0.10$) (see Table 6). This pattern suggests that if there was one factor derived from all the scales, it would center on these constructs and represent something akin to contemporary right-wing attitudes. Those variables, as well as xenoparanoia, internal sabotage, and pro-torture, were negatively correlated with political orientation (meaning they were all highly positively correlated with identifying as politically conservative) (absolute value average $r = 0.43$, $SD = 0.15$). Conversely, left-wing authoritarianism, individual rights, anti-torture, and pacifistic spirituality were all positively correlated with political orientation (meaning they were all highly positively correlated with identifying as politically liberal) (absolute value average $r = 0.38$, $SD = 0.21$) (see Table 6).

Table 6. Zero-order correlations between scales of a 14-scale inventory in acquiescence-centered data²⁸. Statistical significance represented by asterisks: * for $p < 0.01$ and ** for $p < .001$.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1 Xenoparanoia	1														
2 Victim Beliefs	0.45**	1													
3 Ingroup Purity	0.74**	0.34**	1												
4 Military Imperialism	0.50**	0.30**	0.42**	1											
5 Orthodox Religiousness	0.44**	0.26**	0.30**	0.44**	1										
6 Political Alienation	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.14	0.06	1									
7 Constructive Patriotism	-0.14	-0.21*	-0.12	-0.02	-0.03	0.05	1								
8 Dehumanization	0.22*	0.19*	0.34**	0.34**	0.04	-0.02	-0.12	1							
9 Individual Rights	-0.41**	-0.21*	-0.44**	-0.23*	-0.16	0.16	0.38**	-0.27**	1						
10 LWA	-0.32**	-0.08	-0.29**	-0.35**	-0.55**	0.04	0.1	-0.02	0.11	1					
11 Moderation	-0.09	0.03	-0.1	0.03	0.05	0.1	0.38**	-0.01	0.22*	0	1				
12 Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	-0.25**	0.02	-0.23*	-0.39**	-0.18*	-0.02	0.06	-0.29**	0.27**	0.27**	0.09	1			
13 Internal Sabotage	0.23**	0.21*	0.26**	0.23**	0.24**	0.37**	0.01	0.09	-0.07	-0.15	0.05	-0.21*	1		
14 Pluralistic Spirituality	-0.30**	-0.16	-0.38**	-0.28**	-0.13	0.16	0.1	0.01	0.20*	0.36**	0.02	0.06	-0.13	1	
15 Political Orientation	-0.39**	-0.13	-0.36**	-0.43**	-0.56**	-0.07	0.08	-0.13	0.20**	0.69**	-0.03	0.34**	-0.23**	0.29**	1

²⁸ For raw data, please see Appendix B.

Hierarchical Linear Regression

Identity-Based Collective Violence

Physical Violence. 64 participants were not included in analyses about identity-based collective violence because they did not identify an appropriate target group (more specifically, they identified a *political* target such as “Trump supporters” or “Leftists”). A regression model was constructed to predict the participants’ support for identity-based collective physical violence scores from their scores of all 14 scales, accounting for control variables (see Table 7). The first model included only demographic variables, the second model added personality variables, and the third model added the 14 scale scores. The difference in R^2_{adj} between the model with scale scores and without was not statistically significant ($p = 0.326$).

Verbal Violence. A regression model was constructed to predict the participants’ support for identity-based collective verbal violence scores from their scores on all 14 scales, accounting for demographic and personality variables (see Table 8). The difference in R^2_{adj} between the model with scale scores and without was not statistically significant ($p = .200$).

Indirect Violence. A regression model was constructed to predict the participants’ support for identity-based collective indirect violence scores from their scores on all 14 scales, accounting for demographic and personality variables (see Table 9). In total, the model explained 23% of the variance in support for identity-based collective indirect violence ($R^2_{\text{adj}} = 0.230$, $F(41, 98) = 2.01$, $p = .003$). The difference in R^2_{adj} between the model with scale scores and without was statistically significant ($p = .006$). for every one-standard-deviation increase in **pluralistic spirituality**, scores on support for identity-based collective indirect violence decreased by 0.349 standard deviations ($\beta = -0.349$, $t(99) = -3.15$, $SE = 0.183$, $p = .002$).

Table 7. Hierarchical linear regression predicting identity-driven collective physical violence from 14 scales. The first model included only demographic variables, the second model added personality variables (Step 2), and the third model (step 3) added the scale(s) identified on the left-most column. Statistical significance represented by asterisks: * for $p < 0.01$ and ** for $p < .001$. Corr. refers to zero-order correlations.

	Identity-driven collective physical violence					
	Step 2 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 β	Corr.
ALL	0.120	0.089*	0.136	0.016		
Political Alienation	0.120	0.089*	0.131	0.011	0.155	0.15
Constructive Patriotism	0.120	0.089*	0.112	-0.008	0.009	0.00
Dehumanization	0.120	0.089*	0.148	0.028	-0.198	-0.26
Individual Rights	0.120	0.089*	0.124	0.004	-0.122	-0.24
Ingroup Purity	0.120	0.089*	0.151	0.031	0.206	0.27
LWA	0.120	0.089*	0.114	-0.006	-0.055	0.01
Military Imperialism	0.120	0.089*	0.112	-0.008	0.023	0.07
Moderation	0.120	0.089*	0.112	-0.008	0.020	-0.03
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	0.120	0.089*	0.112	-0.008	0.019	-0.11
Orthodox Religiousness	0.120	0.089*	0.114	-0.006	-0.080	0.00
Internal Sabotage	0.120	0.089*	0.122	0.002	0.111	0.09
Pluralistic Spirituality	0.120	0.089*	0.112	-0.008	0.027	-0.02
Victim Beliefs	0.120	0.089*	0.115	-0.005	-0.059	-0.03
Xenoparanoia	0.120	0.089*	0.115	-0.005	0.067	0.24
Political orientation	0.120	0.089*	0.119	-0.001	-0.106	-0.11

Accounting for the other variables, participants who were **Jewish** showed lower scores on support for identity-based collective indirect violence by 0.307 standard deviations ($\beta = -0.307$, $t(98) = -2.65$, $SE = 1.02$, $p = .009$). The effects of the other individual variables could not be ruled out as being due to chance ($p > .01$).

A model containing **pluralistic spirituality** alone (not including other step three variables) explained 18.4% of the variance in support for identity-based collective indirect violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.184$, $F(28, 111) = 2.12$, $p = .003$), 9% more than a model that only included demographic and

Table 8. Hierarchical linear regression predicting identity-driven collective verbal violence from 14 scales. The first model included only demographic variables, the second model added personality variables (Step 2), and the third model (step 3) added the scale(s) identified on the left-most column. Statistical significance represented by asterisks: * for $p < 0.01$ and ** for $p < .001$. Corr. refers to zero-order correlations.

	Identity-driven collective verbal violence					
	Step 2 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 β	Corr.
ALL	0.033	0.002	0.071	0.038		
Political Alienation	0.033	0.002	0.067	0.034	0.230	0.23
Constructive Patriotism	0.033	0.002	0.039	0.006	0.128	0.10
Dehumanization	0.033	0.002	0.028	-0.005	0.063	0.00
Individual Rights	0.033	0.002	0.031	-0.002	0.090	0.01
Ingroup Purity	0.033	0.002	0.028	-0.005	0.067	0.11
LWA	0.033	0.002	0.026	-0.007	-0.058	-0.01
Military Imperialism	0.033	0.002	0.028	-0.005	-0.075	0.01
Moderation	0.033	0.002	0.025	-0.008	-0.030	0.00
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	0.033	0.002	0.024	-0.009	-0.008	-0.10
Orthodox Religiousness	0.033	0.002	0.046	0.013	-0.235	-0.09
Internal Sabotage	0.033	0.002	0.042	0.009	0.143	0.13
Pluralistic Spirituality	0.033	0.002	0.033	0.000	-0.116	-0.05
Victim Beliefs	0.033	0.002	0.044	0.011	-0.154	-0.14
Xenoparanoia	0.033	0.002	0.032	-0.001	-0.105	0.02
Political orientation	0.033	0.002	0.031	-0.002	-0.103	-0.15

personality variables (see Table 9)²⁹. The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$). Accounting for control variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in pluralistic spirituality, scores on support for identity-based collective indirect violence decreased by 0.376 standard deviations ($\beta = -0.376$, $t(111) = -3.65$, $SE = 0.170$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

²⁹ Thus, as an illustration, the regression-prediction formula would be as follows: Identity-Based Indirect Violence = $-0.376(\text{Spirituality}) - 0.048(\text{Aggression}) + 0.122(\text{Machiavellianism}) + 0.085(\text{Psychopathy}) - 0.065(\text{Narcissism}) + 0.150(\text{Sadism}) - 0.002(\text{Material Hardship}) + 0.088(\text{Food Insecurity}) - 0.031(\text{Subjective Social Status}) + 0.121(\text{Personal Relative Deprivation}) - 0.110(\text{Group Relative Deprivation}) + 0.024(\text{Female}) + 0.081(\text{Non-Binary}) - 0.240(\text{Age}) + 0.063(\text{Education}) - 0.195(\text{African-American}) - 0.101(\text{Hispanic}) + 0.083(\text{Pacific Islander}) - 0.068(\text{White}) - 0.112(\text{Roman Catholic}) - 0.314(\text{Jewish}) + 0.038(\text{Buddhist}) - 0.056(\text{Sikh}) - 0.236(\text{Atheist}) - 0.277(\text{Agnostic}) - 0.144(\text{Another religion}) - 0.320(\text{No religion}) - 0.324(\text{Combination of religions})$.

A model containing **left-wing authoritarianism** explained 14.6% of the variance in support for identity-based collective indirect violence ($R^2_{\text{adj}} = 0.146$, $F(28, 111) = 1.85$, $p = .013$), 5.2% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 9). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p = .006$). Accounting for control

Table 9. Hierarchical linear regression predicting identity-driven collective indirect violence from 14 scales. The first model included only demographic variables, the second model added personality variables (Step 2), and the third model (step 3) added the scale(s) identified on the left-most column. Statistical significance represented by asterisks: * for $p < 0.01$ and ** for $p < .001$. Corr. refers to zero-order correlations.

	Identity-driven collective indirect violence					
	Step 2 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 β	Corr.
ALL	0.094	-0.002	0.230*	0.140*		
Political Alienation	0.094	-0.002	0.097	0.003	0.117	0.12
Constructive Patriotism	0.094	-0.002	0.099	0.005	0.117	0.07
Dehumanization	0.094	-0.002	0.086	-0.008	0.009	0.01
Individual Rights	0.094	-0.002	0.087	-0.007	-0.040	-0.14
Ingroup Purity	0.094	-0.002	0.135	0.041*	0.229	0.34
LWA	0.094	-0.002	0.146*	0.052*	-0.307	-0.29
Military Imperialism	0.094	-0.002	0.086	-0.008	0.009	0.18
Moderation	0.094	-0.002	0.088	-0.006	-0.046	-0.03
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	0.094	-0.002	0.089	-0.005	-0.062	-0.15
Orthodox Religiousness	0.094	-0.002	0.088	-0.006	0.076	0.18
Internal Sabotage	0.094	-0.002	0.111	0.017	0.170	0.21
Pluralistic Spirituality	0.094	-0.002	0.184*	0.090**	-0.376	-0.32
Victim Beliefs	0.094	-0.002	0.094	0.000	-0.097	-0.05
Xenoparanoia	0.094	-0.002	0.102	0.008	0.142	0.29
Political orientation	0.094	-0.002	0.139	0.045*	-0.277	-0.36

variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in left-wing authoritarianism, scores on support for identity-based collective indirect violence decreased by 0.307 standard deviations ($\beta = -0.307$, $t(111) = -2.78$, $SE = 0.173$, $p = .006$) in acquiescence-centered data.

Partisan Violence

Physical Violence. A regression model was constructed to predict the participants' support for partisan collective physical violence scores from their scores on all 14 scales, accounting for demographic and personality variables (see Table 10). In total, the model explained 25.9% of the variance in support for partisan collective physical violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.259$, $F(42, 142) = 2.53$, $p < .001$), 13% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables. The difference in R^2_{adj} between the model with scale scores and without was statistically significant ($p < .001$). Accounting for the other variables, for every one-standard-deviation increase in **dehumanization**, scores on support for partisan collective physical violence increased by 0.287 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.287$, $t(142) = 3.30$, $SE = 0.005$, $p = .001$). The effects of the other individual variables could not be ruled out as being due to chance ($p > .01$).

A model containing **only demographic and personality variables** explained 13% of the variance in support for partisan collective physical violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.130$, $F(28, 156) = 1.89$, $p = .004$), 6.6% more than a model that only included demographic variables (see Table 10). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p = .002$). Accounting for the other variables, for every one-standard-deviation increase in **material hardship**, scores on support for partisan collective physical violence decreased by 0.265 standard deviations ($\beta = -0.265$, $t(156) = -2.73$, $SE = 0.05$, $p = .007$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **dehumanization** alone (not including other step three variables) explained 20.6% of the variance in support for partisan collective physical violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.206$, $F(29, 155) = 2.65$, $p < .001$), 7.6% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 10). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p <$

.001). Accounting for control variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in dehumanization, scores on support for partisan collective physical violence increased by 0.304 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.304$, $t(155) = -3.99$, $SE = 0.005$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **xenoparanoia** explained 19.4% of the variance in support for partisan collective physical violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.194$, $F(29, 155) = 2.53$, $p < .001$), 6.4% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 10). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$). Accounting for control variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in xenoparanoia, scores on support for partisan collective physical violence increased by 0.305 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.305$, $t(155) = 3.66$, $SE = 0.150$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **ingroup purity** explained 18.9% of the variance in support for partisan collective physical violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.189$, $F(29, 155) = 2.48$, $p < .001$), 5.9% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 10). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$). Accounting for control variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in ingroup purity, scores on support for partisan collective physical violence increased by 0.266 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.266$, $t(155) = 3.50$, $SE = 0.114$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

Verbal Violence. A regression model was constructed to predict the participants' support for partisan collective verbal violence scores from their scores on all 14 scales, accounting for personality and demographic variables (see Table 11). The difference in R^2_{adj} between the model with scale scores and without was not statistically significant ($p = .470$).

Indirect Violence. A regression model was constructed to predict the participants' support for partisan collective indirect violence scores from their scores on all 14 scales, accounting for personality and demographic variables (see Table 12). The difference in R^2_{adj} between the model with scale scores and without was not statistically significant ($p = .290$)³⁰.

Table 10. Hierarchical linear regression predicting partisan collective physical violence from 14 scales. The first model included only demographic variables, the second model added personality variables (Step 2), and the third model (step 3) added the scale(s) identified on the left-most column. Statistical significance represented by asterisks: * for $p < 0.01$ and ** for $p < .001$. Corr. refers to zero-order correlations.

	Partisan collective physical violence					
	Step 2 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 β	Corr.
ALL	0.130*	0.066*	0.259**	0.130**		
Political Alienation	0.130*	0.066*	0.139*	0.009	-0.124	-0.05
Constructive Patriotism	0.130*	0.066*	0.141*	0.011	-0.135	-0.15
Dehumanization	0.130*	0.066*	0.206**	0.076**	0.304	0.42
Individual Rights	0.130*	0.066*	0.154*	0.024	-0.185	-0.25
Ingroup Purity	0.130*	0.066*	0.189**	0.059**	0.266	0.33
LWA	0.130*	0.066*	0.130*	0.000	-0.091	0.00
Military Imperialism	0.130*	0.066*	0.137*	0.007	0.125	0.14
Moderation	0.130*	0.066*	0.138*	0.008	-0.119	-0.17
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	0.130*	0.066*	0.125*	-0.005	-0.017	-0.11
Orthodox Religiousness	0.130*	0.066*	0.129*	-0.001	0.100	0.03
Internal Sabotage	0.130*	0.066*	0.127*	-0.003	-0.047	-0.02
Pluralistic Spirituality	0.130*	0.066*	0.128*	-0.002	0.068	0.03
Victim Beliefs	0.130*	0.066*	0.143*	0.013	0.146	0.14
Xenoparanoia	0.130*	0.066*	0.194**	0.064**	0.305	0.34
Political orientation	0.130*	0.066*	0.146*	0.016	-0.177	-0.09

³⁰ In raw data, xenoparanoia was positively correlated with support for partisan indirect violence in a model that contained only personality and demographic variables, not other scale scores. Ingroup purity was similarly positively correlated, while political orientation was negatively correlated (thus, the more conservative someone is, the less likely they are to support partisan indirect violence).

Anti-State Violence

A regression model was constructed to predict the participants' support for anti-state violence scores from their scores on all 14 scales, accounting for demographic and personality variables (see Table 13). In total, the model explained 37.3% of the variance in support for anti-state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.373$, $F(42, 147) = 3.68$, $p < .001$), 9% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 13). The difference in R^2_{adj} between the model with scale scores and without was statistically significant ($p = .002$). Accounting for the other variables, for every one-standard-deviation increase in **left-wing authoritarianism**, scores on support for anti-state violence increased by 0.251 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.251$, $t(147) = 2.73$, $SE = 0.078$, $p = .007$). The effect of the other variables could not be ruled out as being due to chance ($p > .01$).

A model containing **only demographic and personality variables** explained 28.3% of the variance in support for partisan collective physical violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.283$, $F(28, 161) = 3.67$, $p < .001$), 5.3% more than a model that only included demographic variables (see Table 13). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p = .002$). Accounting for the other variables, participants who identified as **female** showed higher scores on support for anti-state violence by 0.208 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.208$, $t(161) = 2.73$, $SE = 0.132$, $p = .007$) in acquiescence-centered data.

After running regression models for each scale individually, multiple scales emerged as significant predictors. A model containing **left-wing authoritarianism** explained 33.9% of the variance in support for anti-state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.339$, $F(29, 160) = 4.35$, $p < .001$), 5.6% more

than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 13). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$).

Table 11. Hierarchical linear regression predicting partisan collective verbal violence from 14 scales. The first model included only demographic variables, the second model added personality variables (Step 2), and the third model (step 3) added the scale(s) identified on the left-most column. Statistical significance represented by asterisks: * for $p < 0.01$ and ** for $p < .001$. Corr. refers to zero-order correlations.

	Partisan collective verbal violence					
	Step 2 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 β	Corr.
ALL	-0.005	0.015	-0.007	-0.002		
Political Alienation	-0.005	0.015	-0.012	-0.007	-0.033	0.04
Constructive Patriotism	-0.005	0.015	-0.009	-0.004	0.050	0.02
Dehumanization	-0.005	0.015	-0.005	0.000	0.085	-0.15
Individual Rights	-0.005	0.015	-0.009	-0.004	-0.059	-0.08
Ingroup Purity	-0.005	0.015	0.003	0.008	0.126	0.16
LWA	-0.005	0.015	-0.007	-0.002	-0.080	0.02
Military Imperialism	-0.005	0.015	-0.009	-0.004	-0.052	0.00
Moderation	-0.005	0.015	0.001	0.006	-0.116	-0.12
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	-0.005	0.015	-0.009	-0.004	-0.056	-0.11
Orthodox Religiousness	-0.005	0.015	0.007	0.012	-0.218	-0.12
Internal Sabotage	-0.005	0.015	-0.011	-0.006	0.012	0.04
Pluralistic Spirituality	-0.005	0.015	0.000	0.005	-0.132	-0.03
Victim Beliefs	-0.005	0.015	-0.009	-0.004	-0.056	-0.03
Xenoparanoia	-0.005	0.015	-0.012	-0.007	0.011	0.09
Political orientation	-0.005	0.015	-0.006	-0.001	-0.092	-0.05

Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in left-wing authoritarianism, scores on support for anti-state violence increased by 0.301 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.301$, $t(160) = 3.84$, $SE = 0.066$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **anti-torture vs. pro-torture** explained 32.7% of the variance in support for anti-state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.327$, $F(29, 160) = 4.17$, $p < .001$), 4.4% more than a

model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 13). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$).

Table 12. Hierarchical linear regression predicting partisan collective indirect violence from 14 scales. The first model included only demographic variables, the second model added personality variables (Step 2), and the third model (step 3) added the scale(s) identified on the left-most column. Statistical significance represented by asterisks: * for $p < 0.01$ and ** for $p < .001$. Corr. refers to zero-order correlations.

	Partisan collective indirect violence					
	Step 2 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 β	Corr.
ALL	-0.010	-0.017	0.027	0.037		
Political Alienation	-0.010	-0.017	0.008	0.018	-0.068	-0.05
Constructive Patriotism	-0.010	-0.017	0.007	0.017	0.055	0.03
Dehumanization	-0.010	-0.017	0.018	0.028	0.124	-0.16
Individual Rights	-0.010	-0.017	0.013	0.023	-0.105	-0.12
Ingroup Purity	-0.010	-0.017	0.059	0.069*	0.246	0.27
LWA	-0.010	-0.017	0.016	0.026	-0.133	-0.10
Military Imperialism	-0.010	-0.017	0.007	0.017	0.065	0.07
Moderation	-0.010	-0.017	0.014	0.024	-0.104	-0.16
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	-0.010	-0.017	0.004	0.014	0.003	-0.03
Orthodox Religiousness	-0.010	-0.017	0.007	0.017	0.090	0.04
Internal Sabotage	-0.010	-0.017	0.004	0.014	0.004	0.04
Pluralistic Spirituality	-0.010	-0.017	0.016	0.026	-0.131	-0.12
Victim Beliefs	-0.010	-0.017	0.004	0.014	0.008	0.00
Xenoparanoia	-0.010	-0.017	0.048	0.058*	0.251	0.21
Political orientation	-0.010	-0.017	0.048	0.058*	-0.255	-0.18

Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in anti-torture, scores on support for anti-state violence increased by 0.259 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.259$, $t(160) = 3.41$, $SE = 0.063$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **political orientation** explained 32.2% of the variance in support for anti-state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.322$, $F(29, 160) = 4.09$, $p < .001$), 3.9% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 13). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p = .002$). Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in political orientation (i.e., the more

liberal someone identified as), scores on support for anti-state violence increased by 0.248 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.248$, $t(160) = 3.19$, $SE = 0.055$, $p = .002$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **military imperialism** explained 31.1% of the variance in support for anti-state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.311$, $F(29, 160) = 3.94$, $p < .001$), 2.8% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 13). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p = .007$). Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in military imperialism, scores on support for anti-state violence decreased by 0.197 standard deviations ($\beta = -0.197$, $t(160) = -2.73$, $SE = 0.074$, $p = .007$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **political alienation** explained 30.7% of the variance in support for anti-state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.307$, $F(29, 160) = 3.88$, $p < .001$), 2.4% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 13). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p = .012$). Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in political alienation, scores on support for anti-state violence increased by 0.176 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.176$, $t(160) = 2.55$, $SE = 0.075$, $p = .012$) in acquiescence-centered data.

State Violence

A regression model was constructed to predict the participants' support for state violence scores from their levels of all 14 scales, accounting for demographic and personality variables (see Table 14). In total, the model explained 33.7% of the variance in support for state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.337$, $F(42, 147) = 3.29$, $p < .001$), 15% more than a model that only included

demographic and personality variables. The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$). Accounting for the other variables, for every one-standard-deviation increase in

Table 13. Hierarchical linear regression predicting anti-state violence from 14 scales. The first model included only demographic variables, the second model added personality variables (Step 2), and the third model (step 3) added the scale(s) identified on the left-most column. Statistical significance represented by asterisks: * for $p < 0.01$ and ** for $p < .001$. Corr. refers to zero-order correlations.

	Anti-state violence					
	Step 2 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 β	Corr.
ALL	0.283**	0.053*	0.373**	0.090**		
Political Alienation	0.283**	0.053*	0.307**	0.024*	0.176	0.14
Constructive Patriotism	0.283**	0.053*	0.282**	-0.001	0.057	0.04
Dehumanization	0.283**	0.053*	0.285**	0.002	0.084	0.05
Individual Rights	0.283**	0.053*	0.286**	0.003	0.093	0.02
Ingroup Purity	0.283**	0.053*	0.282**	-0.001	-0.060	-0.10
LWA	0.283**	0.053*	0.339**	0.056**	0.301	0.48
Military Imperialism	0.283**	0.053*	0.311**	0.028*	-0.197	-0.31
Moderation	0.283**	0.053*	0.280**	-0.003	0.038	-0.03
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	0.283**	0.053*	0.327**	0.044**	0.259	0.16
Orthodox Religiousness	0.283**	0.053*	0.288**	0.005	-0.155	-0.32
Internal Sabotage	0.283**	0.053*	0.293**	0.001	-0.127	-0.18
Pluralistic Spirituality	0.283**	0.053*	0.298**	0.015	0.169	0.21
Victim Beliefs	0.283**	0.053*	0.288**	0.005	-0.108	-0.10
Xenoparanoia	0.283**	0.053*	0.300**	0.017	-0.166	-0.16
Political orientation	0.283**	0.053*	0.322**	0.039**	0.248	0.36

xenoparanoia, scores on support for state violence increased by 0.367 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.367$, $t(147) = 3.26$, $SE = 0.150$, $p = .001$). The effects of the other individual variables could not be ruled out as being due to chance ($p > .01$)³¹.

³¹ In raw data, dehumanization was positively correlated with support for state violence in a model that contained only personality and demographic variables, not other scale scores. Once acquiescence-centering was done on the data, dehumanization did not significantly predict state violence.

A model containing **only demographic variables** explained 14.4% of the variance in support for anti-state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.14$, $F(23, 166) = 2.38$, $p < .001$). A model containing **only demographic and personality variables** explained 18.7% of the variance in support for anti-state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.187$, $F(28, 161) = 2.55$, $p < .001$), 4.3% more than a model that only contained demographic variables. Accounting for the other variables, for every one-standard-deviation increase in **group relative deprivation**, scores on support for state violence increased by 0.341 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.341$, $t(161) = 2.60$, $SE = 0.189$, $p = .010$). The effects of the other individual variables could not be ruled out as being due to chance ($p > .01$)³².

After running hierarchical linear regression models for each scale individually, multiple scales emerged as significant predictors. **Xenoparanoia** emerged as the strongest predictor by far. A model containing xenoparanoia alone (not including other step three variables) explained 32.6% of the variance in support for state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.326$, $F(29, 160) = 4.15$, $p < .001$), 14% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 14). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$). Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in xenoparanoia, scores on support for state violence increased by 0.435 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.435$, $t(160) = 5.83$, $SE = 0.099$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **ingroup purity** explained 27% of the variance in support for state violence ($R^2_{adj} = 0.270$, $F(29, 160) = 3.41$, $p < .001$), 8.3% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 14). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$). Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other

³² In raw data, dehumanization was positively correlated with support for state violence in a model that contained only personality and demographic variables, not other scale scores. Once acquiescence-centering was done on the data, dehumanization did not significantly predict state violence.

scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in ingroup purity, scores on support for state violence increased by 0.311 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.311$, $t(160) = 4.38$, $SE = 0.078$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **individual rights** explained 25.9% of the variance in support for state violence ($R^2_{\text{adj}} = 0.259$, $F(29, 160) = 3.28$, $p < .001$), 7.2% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 14). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$). Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in individual rights, scores on support for state violence decreased by 0.297 standard deviations ($\beta = -0.297$, $t(160) = -4.07$, $SE = 0.086$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **military imperialism** explained 22.9% of the variance in support for state violence ($R^2_{\text{adj}} = 0.229$, $F(29, 160) = 2.94$, $p < .001$), 4.2% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 14). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p = .002$). Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in military imperialism, scores on support for state violence increased by 0.239 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.239$, $t(160) = 3.13$, $SE = 0.071$, $p = .002$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **anti-torture vs. pro-torture** explained 23.7% of the variance in support for state violence ($R^2_{\text{adj}} = 0.237$, $F(29, 160) = 3.02$, $p < .001$), 5% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 14). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$). Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in anti-torture, scores on support for state

violence decreased by 0.275 standard deviations ($\beta = -0.275$, $t(160) = -3.39$, $SE = 0.061$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **political orientation** explained 23.7% of the variance in support for state violence ($R^2_{\text{adj}} = 0.237$, $F(29, 160) = 3.02$, $p < .001$), 5% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 14). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p < .001$). Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in political orientation (i.e., the more liberal someone is), scores on support for state violence decreased by 0.279 standard deviations ($\beta = -0.279$, $t(160) = -3.39$, $SE = 0.053$, $p < .001$) in acquiescence-centered data.

A model containing **dehumanization** explained 21.2% of the variance in support for state violence ($R^2_{\text{adj}} = 0.212$, $F(29, 160) = 2.76$, $p < .001$), 2.5% more than a model that only included demographic and personality variables (see Table 14). The difference in R^2_{adj} was statistically significant ($p = .014$). Accounting for demographic and personality variables (but not other scales), for every one-standard-deviation increase in dehumanization, scores on support for state violence increased by 0.185 standard deviations ($\beta = 0.185$, $t(160) = 2.48$, $SE = 0.003$, $p = .014$) in acquiescence-centered data.

Table 14. Hierarchical linear regression predicting state violence from 14 scales. The first model included only demographic variables, the second model added personality variables (Step 2), and the third model (step 3) added the scale(s) identified on the left-most column. Statistical significance represented by asterisks: * for $p < 0.01$ and ** for $p < .001$. Corr. refers to zero-order correlations.

	State violence					
	Step 2 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 R^2_{adj}	ΔR^2_{adj}	Step 3 β	Corr.
ALL	0.187**	0.043*	0.337**	0.150**		
Political Alienation	0.187**	0.043*	0.193**	0.006	-0.108	0.05
Constructive Patriotism	0.187**	0.043*	0.182**	-0.005	-0.003	-0.02
Dehumanization	0.187**	0.043*	0.212**	0.025*	0.185	0.27
Individual Rights	0.187**	0.043*	0.259**	0.072**	-0.297	-0.21
Ingroup Purity	0.187**	0.043*	0.270**	0.083**	0.311	0.37
LWA	0.187**	0.043*	0.197**	0.010	-0.148	-0.14
Military Imperialism	0.187**	0.043*	0.229**	0.042**	0.239	0.36
Moderation	0.187**	0.043*	0.184**	-0.003	-0.045	-0.03
Anti-torture vs. Pro-torture	0.187**	0.043*	0.237**	0.050**	-0.275	-0.31
Orthodox Religiousness	0.187**	0.043*	0.210**	0.023	0.266	0.21
Internal Sabotage	0.187**	0.043*	0.198**	0.011	0.134	0.28
Pluralistic Spirituality	0.187**	0.043*	0.192**	0.005	-0.120	-0.10
Victim Beliefs	0.187**	0.043*	0.187**	0.000	0.073	0.19
Xenoparanoia	0.187**	0.043*	0.326**	0.140**	0.435	0.45
Political orientation	0.187**	0.043*	0.237**	0.050**	-0.279	-0.30

VII. STUDY TWO DISCUSSION

Broad Trends

A few notable trends emerge from the data. Perhaps most notably, the set of scales I derived from existing worldview measures *best* predicts state violence, anti-state violence, partisan physical violence, and identity-based indirect violence. They are not well-configured to predict partisan verbal or partisan indirect violence or identity-based physical or identity-based verbal violence. This suggests that past studies have not focused on predicting these forms of violence and existing scales (at least, the ones included in the current study) are unlikely to help enhance prediction of them in the future.

As is to be expected, one cannot predict all forms of violence with the same predictors. However, some predictors are more versatile than others and may be better used to predict a propensity to support *any* form of political violence, while others may be better used to predict support for one specific type of political violence. Military imperialism, for instance, positively predicts state violence while negatively predicting anti-state violence, making it a useful scale for distinguishing between the two.

Predictive Capacity by Outcome

State Violence

A central theme present among the predictors of support for state violence is dichotomous or binary thinking (e.g., good versus evil). **Xenoparanoia** and **ingroup purity** both involve group essentialism, which conflates belonging to a group with being identical to all other group members. According to xenophobic beliefs, all foreigners are “to blame for our country’s

failures,” simply by virtue of being a foreigner. In contrast, support for **individual rights** eschews the dichotomization of group identity in favor of supporting the diversity of individual paths regardless of what group someone belongs to or what they believe. How does dichotomous thinking relate to support for state violence? The aggregate measure used to capture support for state violence in this study includes support for state violence against individuals who perform or prevent abortions. Abortion is a highly dichotomized issue, with each side suggesting that the other side is comprised of “murderers” (either of unborn babies or mothers). It is possible, and worth exploring further, that a tendency to engage in dichotomous thinking (and the heady combination of conviction in one’s beliefs and demonization of the outgroup) fosters a greater willingness to endorse violence against an opposing side that is seen as cruel, inhuman, or dangerous.

The second theme present among the predictors of support for state violence is harsh exclusionary attitudes towards outsiders. **Military imperialism**, for instance, advocates for a strong military presence internationally as a means of preventing threats from other countries. **Dehumanization** frames outsiders as less than human, implying that they must therefore be excluded and protected against. Military imperialism and **pro-torture** both suggest that torture, war, and military interventions are legitimate and often necessary tools to prevent such threats. Xenoparanoia, dehumanization, and ingroup purity, in addition to distinguishing between ingroups and outgroups, also suggest that any sort of intermingling among them poses a threat to the integrity of the ingroup. How do harsh exclusionary attitudes towards outsiders relate to support for state violence? The aggregate measure used to capture support for state violence in this study includes questions about the death penalty for murderers and laws that allow armed forces to shoot civilians who are suspected (but not convicted) of committing crimes. It is no

great leap to imagine how a worldview that perceives external threat from outsiders and advocates for violent interventions to prevent that threat would endorse harsh treatment of those suspected of posing a direct threat to the safety of their community.

Even though the current study included items that would intentionally align with both sides of the political spectrum (e.g., including pro- and anti-abortion items and simply combining their scores based on which one an individual identified as), state violence was still positively associated with **conservative³³ political orientation³⁴**. This is especially interesting considering that during the time of this data collection, a Democratic president was in office. It is likely that this association is due to the use of specific items in the support for state violence scale that were not well-balanced. Support for the death penalty, for instance, was more common among political conservatives at the time of data collection. Future research should explore a wider variety of state policies that could be considered violent to capture this relation in a less potentially biased way³⁵.

Partisan Violence

Physical Violence. As is the case for support for state violence, support for acts of physical violence against people who support different political ideologies is predicted by

³³ I use the word “conservative” in this context because the political orientation scale asks participants to place themselves on a scale from very liberal to very conservative. In the political climate of 2023, this would align with more right-wing attitudes.

³⁴ One might suggest that conservative political orientation is the main predictor of state violence. However, note that it is highly correlated with both ingroup purity, military imperialism, xenoparanoia, and pro-torture, all of which also predict state violence. In a model that includes all these variables, xenoparanoia remains a statistically significant predictor, but the other step three variables – including political orientation – do not. Thus, when the subcomponents of party identity are untangled from each other, it is xenoparanoia that most drives support for state violence.

³⁵ Admittedly, I cannot at the moment think of a form of *state* violence in particular that is currently favored by political liberals/progressives.

xenoparanoia and **ingroup purity**. Support for acts of partisan physical violence is also predicted by **dehumanization**. These three worldviews make a potent combination of perceived threat and dehumanization of the target that may ease feelings of culpability among perpetrators. The surprising inclusion of xenoparanoia (which targets foreigners) may be explained by a conflation of foreigners and foreign political ideas. Notably, xenoparanoia is strongly positively correlated with conservative political orientation. Thus, in this case, xenoparanoia may reflect a fear of foreign political influences like communism.

Identity-Based Violence

Indirect Violence. Support for identity-based indirect violence is predicted by the inverse of **left-wing authoritarianism**, suggesting that there is a highly political – and, in fact, specifically right-wing – valence to engaging in protests or strikes against an identity group. This is consistent with anti-immigrant, anti-trans, and anti-“woke” policies espoused by the Republican party in 2023, which frames problems in the US as deriving from a moral degradation of society caused by the acceptance of LGBTQ+ and trans people, feminists, illegal (i.e., brown) immigrants, and people who push for racial equity for Americans of minority racial and ethnic identities.

Support for acts of indirect violence (e.g., protesting, organizing a strike, or mobilizing police) against identity groups is negatively predicted by **pluralistic spirituality**. This finding suggests that individuals who are open to the possibility of many religions being true and who feel connected to spiritual or even supernatural aspects of the world are less likely to mobilize in a collective manner around their dislike of an identity group. It is notable that one major religion that emphasizes pluralistic spirituality, Buddhism, views anger as an undesirable state. To the extent that protests or strikes are seen as manifestations of collective anger, it would make sense

that they would be inconsistent with the personal priorities and values of an individual who seeks to avoid anger. Even if not viewing anger as undesirable, a spiritually oriented person may tend to see problems as stemming from within people rather than external power structures, and thus see the solutions as also emerging from within.

Anti-State Violence

The most significant predictor of anti-state violence was **anti-torture**. Participants who supported anti-state violence also expressed beliefs that condemned torture and the use of force to achieve national goals. Relatedly, **militant imperialism** – a worldview that supports war and other international military actions – is negatively associated with support for anti-state violence. The contradiction between supporting violence *against* state actors while condemning violence perpetrated *by* them may reveal a predilection among those who support anti-state violence to color violence in more favorable hues when it is seen as the lesser among evils. Acts of violence against state institutions may be seen as necessary evils to protect a greater number of individuals who are subjected to more systemic acts of violence (e.g., torture).

Somewhat intuitively, **political alienation** – a distrust of state institutions paired with a more generalized sense of pessimism about the state of society – also positively predicts support for anti-state violence. Support for anti-state violence is also positively associated with **left-wing authoritarianism** and a **liberal political orientation**, suggesting that regardless of which political party is in power (which, at the time of this survey being administered, was the Democratic party), left-wing ideology may, at its core, foster a greater distrust in the state than right-wing ideology. Whether this is a feature of left-wing ideology more broadly is worth investigating in future studies. It is curious that left-wing authoritarianism is associated with *anti-state* sentiments, as the authoritarianism part of left-wing authoritarianism is essentially pro-state.

Left-wing authoritarianism holds that American society (i.e., the institutions of the state) must clamp down on dissidence from the right (i.e., what one might interpret as anti-state activities or sentiments) to cure the evils of conservatism.

Predictive Capacity by Scale

Of the 14 scales identified, only nine were predictive of SPV in some capacity. No scales were predictive of more than two types of political violence. Several of these scales were unique predictors of certain types or targets of violence. Anti-torture, for instance, positively predicts anti-state violence and negatively predicts state violence, suggesting that it may serve as a relevant point of differentiation between the two. Still other scales were not significant predictors of *any* outcomes of interest when acquiescence bias was accounted for (constructive patriotism, moderation, internal sabotage, orthodox religiousness, and victim beliefs). Overall, a few broad findings emerge from the data: (a) dehumanization, xenoparanoia, and ingroup purity predict both state violence and partisan physical violence; (b) military imperialism, pro-torture, and conservative political orientation, positively predict state violence while negatively predicting anti-state violence, making them useful scales for distinguishing between the two; (c) left-wing authoritarianism positively predicts anti-state violence while negatively predicting identity-based indirect violence; and (d) two predictors had a narrower range of effects on support for political violence: pluralistic spirituality in negatively predicting identity-based indirect violence and political alienation in positively predicting anti-state violence.

Limitations

This study encountered several significant limitations beyond the glaring constraints of a small sample size and limited sampling of different demographic and political groups. Because

the sample size was so small, my estimates had large confidence intervals around them, which could explain why some predictors underperformed or did not yield significant results; they may have in a larger sample. Ultimately, the goal of the study was to understand the capacity of a newly developed worldview measure to predict support for different forms of political violence. Though the support for political violence measures used were based in prior research, they paint an incomplete picture of the phenomenon. For instance, the measure used to capture support for anti-state violence does not involve targeting uninvolved civilians, which is included in the definition of anti-state violence. Similarly, the measure used to capture support for state violence involved a salient but imperfect selection of policies, some of which are not specific enough (e.g., laws that allow armed forces to shoot or kill civilians if they suspect them of committing crimes) while others are too time-constrained by the present political moment (e.g., responses to abortion laws).

A unique challenge that arose in measuring support for identity-based and partisan violence was that participants were asked to select an identity/political group that “is widely disliked by [their] community.” Some participants clearly interpreted this to refer to a group that they themselves do not dislike, but that others around them dislike³⁶. The goal of this question was to select a group they would be most likely to dislike, so this response suggested the framing was not successful.

Implications for Existing Models and Future Research

The initial impetus of this project was a curiosity (or, less generously, a suspicion) that the existing litany of worldview measures was at once too broad in numbers and too limited in

³⁶ For instance, one participant wrote, “I’m thinking of the Asian community because they have had a lot of hate against them recently for not doing anything wrong.”

aims. If the goal of the field is to map philosophical or political concepts onto individual belief systems, then it makes sense to develop measures that capture things like “patriotism” and “imperialism.” If that is the *only* goal, this study can offer nothing constructive to the developers of existing models. Nothing in this paper can speak to the internal consistency of, for instance, the theoretical construct of patriotism as envisioned by political scientists. However, for practitioners in the field who are more concerned with how such concepts may be tied to individual behavior, this study suggests that a radical restructuring – and culling – of existing measures is necessary. To get to the heart of what could make someone not just turn a blind eye to but actually *endorse* acts of violence against a group of people (which is, admittedly, not the expressed goal of all of the measures included in this study), the results of the current study suggest that existing measures can be consolidated into 14 discrete constructs, nine of which already show potential as predictors of support for political violence. The nine scales shown to be predictive are dehumanization, xenoparanoia, ingroup purity, left-wing authoritarianism, military imperialism, anti-torture vs. pro-torture, political alienation, pluralistic spirituality, and individual rights. They pull from nine existing sources: Conway et al.’s (2020) Left Wing Authoritarianism scale, Costello et al.’s (2022b) Left Wing Authoritarianism scale, Kteily et al.’s (2015) Ascent of Man measure, Schatz et al.’s (1999) Blind Patriotism scale, Ho et al.’s (2015) Short Social Dominance Orientation scale, Siritzky and Saucier’s (2021) Ethnonationalism scale, Landau et al.’s (2020) Democidal Mindset Questionnaire, Saucier et al.’s (2009) Militant Extremist Mindset measure, and Saucier et al.’s (2013) supplementary items to the isms. A notable exclusion from this list is right-wing authoritarianism. Future research should dive further into the fourteen scales identified in the current study and more directly investigate their predictive capacity for tangible outcomes like voting behavior, donations to extremist political

parties or candidates, or social media activity that involves sharing misinformation or extremist political content. It would also be advisable to replicate the current study in other contexts and geographies (preferably with a larger number of participants) to see how well this factor structure generalizes outside of a representative US population. It is also worth noting that while nine of the existing scales predicted some outcomes of interest, none of them predict identity-based physical or verbal violence or partisan verbal or indirect violence. There may be other useful predictors out there that researchers have not yet identified to predict those outcomes that I did not include in the current study.

In any field of research, standardization of theoretical constructs and measurement tools allows researchers to build on each other's work and share the same language. The current study takes a first, critical step towards building such a tool to standardize the measurement of political violence-promoting worldviews.

APPENDIX A

COMPARISON OF CANDIDATE STRUCTURES IN STUDY ONE USING STANDARDIZED VALUES

Average correlations shared between variable-sets. The values in the Orth-Obl and Raw-Acq columns are standardized as z-scores.

	# factors	Orth-Obl	Raw-Acq	Mean
Equamax	10	-0.4	0.77	0.19
Varimax (raw)	11	0.42	0.96	0.69
Varimax (acq)	11	0.09	0.96	0.53
Oblimin	12	0.8	-0.75	0.03
Oblimin	13	0.56	0.78	0.67
Equamax	13	0.56	-0.25	0.15
Oblimin (acq)	14	0.12	0.96	0.54
Equamax (acq)	14	0.12	-0.95	-0.41
Oblimin	16	0.4	-0.77	-0.19
Equamax	22	-2.68	-1.71	-2.2




Figure 1. Average replicability across variable-sets for each number-of-factors solution. The values in the Orth-Obl and Raw-Acq lines are standardized as z-scores.

APPENDIX B

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS FOR STUDY TWO IN RAW DATA

Table 2. Zero-order correlations between scales of a 14-scale inventory in raw data. Statistical significance represented by asterisks: * for $p < 0.01$ and ** for $p < .001$.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1 Xenoparanoia	1														
2 Victim Beliefs	0.45**	1													
3 Ingroup Purity	0.74**	0.34**	1												
4 Military Imperialism	0.50**	0.30**	0.42**	1											
5 Orthodox Religiousness	0.44**	0.26**	0.30**	0.44**	1										
6 Political Alienation	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.14	0.06	1									
7 Constructive Patriotism	-0.14	-0.21*	-0.12	-0.02	-0.03	0.05	1								
8 Dehumanization	-0.22*	-0.19*	-0.34**	-0.34**	-0.04	0.02	0.12	1							
9 Individual Rights	-0.41**	-0.21*	-0.44**	-0.23*	-0.16	0.16	0.38**	0.27**	1						
10 LWA	-0.32**	-0.08	-0.29**	-0.35**	-0.55**	0.04	0.1	0.02	0.11	1					
11 Moderation	-0.09	0.03	-0.1	0.03	0.05	0.1	0.38**	0.01	0.22*	0	1				
12 Anti-violence vs. Pro-violence	-0.25**	0.02	-0.23*	-0.39**	-0.18*	-0.02	0.06	0.29**	0.27**	0.27**	0.09	1			
13 Internal Sabotage	0.23**	0.21*	0.26**	0.23**	0.24**	0.37**	0.01	-0.09	-0.07	-0.15	0.05	-0.21*	1		
14 Pluralistic Spirituality	-0.30**	-0.16	-0.38**	-0.28**	-0.13	0.16	0.1	-0.01	0.20*	0.36**	0.02	0.06	-0.13	1	
15 Political Orientation	-0.39**	-0.13	-0.36**	-0.43**	-0.56**	-0.07	0.08	0.13	0.20*	0.69**	-0.03	0.34**	-0.23**	0.29**	1

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