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THE RHETORIC OF SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY IN THE OREGON PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE PRIMARY OF 1968

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter

I. THE SPEAKER 12

Significant Biographical Data
Reputation
Physical Presence

II. THE AUDIENCE AND THE OCCASION 31

The National Political Scene
The Oregon Political Scene
The Kennedy Strategy in Oregon

III. THE ALL-PURPOSE CAMPAIGN TALK 50

Audience Adaptation
Content
Use of Proofs
Style
Delivery
Effect

IV. THE MAJOR ADDRESS 68

Preparation
Thesis and Lines of Argument
Use of Proofs
Style
Delivery
Effect

V. ADDITIONAL CAMPAIGN RHETORIC 95

Press Coverage
Newspaper and Television Advertising
Printed Hand-Out Rhetoric

Chapter Page

VI. CONCLUSIONS 105

Interpreted Election Results
Reasons for Kennedy Defeat
The Role of Rhetoric in the Oregon Primary

BIBLIOGRAPHY 115

APPENDIX I 126

APPENDIX II 135

APPENDIX III 145

INTRODUCTION

Following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in late 1963, there was much speculation about the political future of his brother, Robert Francis Kennedy. As the younger Kennedy began to move again in the public eye, political analysts attempted to second-guess his motives and sought clues in his numerous speaking appearances. Likewise, Oregonians looked to him and other prominent political figures as they evaluated possible candidates for the 1968 version of their historic Presidential Preference Primary. It is the purpose of this thesis to combine an evaluation of the rhetoric of the late Robert F. Kennedy and a discussion of the 1968 Oregon campaign to provide conclusions as to Kennedy's rhetorical effectiveness in that vote-seeking drive.

The campaign for the Presidency in 1968 has been melodramatic and newsworthy, but nothing has captured and sustained the nation's interest more than the sudden candidacy, enthusiastic crowds, victories and defeat, brutal assassination, and touching funeral of the junior Senator from New York. The life and death of Robert Francis Kennedy have been a constant headline since his entry into public life in the early 1950's; the words--Kennedy, success, and publicity--have had close association in myriads of newspaper and magazine articles throughout the years. His campaign in Oregon in 1968 was the only

election defeat he ever experienced. His subsequent success in the California primary, and his untimely death on June 8, 1968, have made the Oregon primary an important element in speculation concerning the possible historical change wrought by the assassination of Robert Kennedy; but without that sudden change in the election picture, the unsuccessful Oregon campaign by an extremely successful campaigner would have constituted an interesting and profitable rhetorical study.

The Kennedy Candidacy

The timing of Senator Kennedy's entry into the Presidential race of 1968 reflected a political calculation which arose directly from Senator Eugene McCarthy's impressive showing in the New Hampshire primary of March 12. In the preferential race for President on the Democratic ballot, McCarthy came within six percentage points of defeating his own party's incumbent President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and when 5,511 Republican write-in votes were added to the tally, he had lost by only 230 votes. More important, however, was his rightful claim to twenty of that state's twenty-four delegates to the Democratic convention.[1] McCarthy's astonishing political upset clearly indicated the vulnerability of President Johnson to this nation's Democrats and Republicans and, more specifically, to Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

For months, Senator Kennedy had been debating with himself and his supporters whether or not to challenge the renomination of

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[1]"The Making of Gene McCarthy," Newsweek, March 25, 1968, p. 22.

the President. Kennedy forces had canvassed the Democratic organizations across the country in early January and concluded that President Johnson had the nomination locked up. Late in that same month, Kennedy announced: "I can conceive of no circumstances under which I would oppose Lyndon Johnson."[2]

By March 12, those "inconceivable circumstances" certainly appeared to exist. Another informal canvass indicated a perceptible change among Democrats across the country, much of it based on military setbacks in Vietnam and the probability of a lengthening conflict there. In early March, local Democratic leaders from around the country were called to Washington for consultation about primary dates and possible pledges of support. State Senator Edward N. Fadeley, Chairman of the Oregon Democratic Party, made such a trip on March 5 and encouraged Kennedy to enter the national race and the Oregon Primary of May 28.[3] In contrast, both his brother, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, and long-time adviser, Theodore C. Sorensen, urged the Senator against running. Kennedy, meanwhile, was noncomittal.

Then the results from New Hampshire poured into his New York City apartment and a hastily-arranged meeting of what had come to be called the Kennedy "brain trust" began. Cornered by reporters the next morning in the corridors of the New Senate Office Building, Kennedy

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[2]John Herbers, "Kennedy is Ready to Run, Says Vote for McCarthy Discloses Split in Party," The New York Times, March 14, 1968, p. 30.

[3]Interview with Edward N. Fadeley, State Senator and Democratic Chairman of Oregon, March 27, 1968.

remarked: "I am reassessing the possibility of whether I will run against President Johnson."[4] That evening on Walter Cronkite's news show on CBS-TV, Kennedy amplified his earlier statement:

> I was reluctant to become involved in this struggle because I thought it might turn into a personal conflict between President Johnson and myself and that the issues I believe in and which I think are being ignored at the moment would be passed over. . . . One of the major reasons that I didn't want to become involved earlier was because I thought that I might be the instrument of dividing either the country in a way that it would be difficult to put back together--the Democratic party in a very damaging way. I think the primary in New Hampshire indicated this great concern was in the Democratic party--this uneasiness--this restlessness about the future of the country. . . . For all of these reasons I am taking another look at my own position and what I should do in the future.[5]

Another strategy session was held later that evening during which Kennedy's two alternatives were evaluated: he could delay formal entry into the Presidential race until after the primaries or he could enter it immediately and attempt to cooperate with Senator McCarthy to halt President Johnson's move toward renomination. As the Kennedy men left the United Nation's Plaza apartment in New York, they were quick to emphasize that no decision had been made. But rumors flew; the Los Angeles Herald Examiner broke an unconfirmed story in its March 14 editions that Kennedy would announce his candidacy the following Monday.[6]

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[4]"RFK Reassessing Political Plans," The Aberdeen (Washington) Daily World, March 13, 1968, p. 1.

[5]"Transcript of Interview with Kennedy," The New York Times, March 14, 1968, p. 30.

[6]"Kennedy to Enter Race Monday?" The Aberdeen (Washington) Daily World, March 14, 1968, p. 3.

On Friday, March 15, the Senator scheduled a news conference for 10 A.M. Saturday in the Caucus Room of the Old Senate Office Building, the same room where his brother, John F. Kennedy, announced his candidacy for the Presidency in 1960. A couple of minutes past ten on March 16, 1968, Robert F. Kennedy stood under the television lights and began, "I am announcing today my candidacy for the Presidency of the United States. I do not run for the Presidency merely to oppose any man but to propose new policies."[7] He went on to indicate his plans to seek delegate strength in three primaries --Nebraska, Oregon and California--and left open the possibility of his entering the Indiana primary of May 7. Kennedy concluded, "I do not lightly dismiss the dangers and difficulties of challenging an incumbent President. But these are not ordinary times and this is not an ordinary election."[8]

His announcement left political analysts attempting to discover his motives. James Reston of The New York Times attributed his move to his loss of popularity over recent months:

> His policy of waiting and sniping at the Administration from the sidelines was losing him support within the party conservatives and liberals alike. . . . The Oregon and California primary elections at least give him a chance for a comeback.[9]

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[7]Robert F. Kennedy, "Statement of Candidacy and Excerpts from News Conference," The New York Times, March 17, 1968, p. 68.

[8]Ibid.

[9]James Reston, "Kennedy's Great Gamble," The Seattle (Washington) Post-Intelligencer, March 17, 1968, p. 18.

Kenneth Crawford of Newsweek was led to write: "Maybe it is only what it has been most often called--ambition and such singleness of purpose that it amounts to ruthlessness."[10] Finally, John Herbers of The New York Times called it ". . . a concern about the direction the country was headed."[11]

While analysts continued to disagree, national, state and local politicians were forced to decide whether to form a Kennedy bandwagon. Nationally, Senator McCarthy refused to minimize his own future in the Presidential race. Former President Harry S. Truman said that Kennedy's bid ". . . will make it easier for Johnson. It spreads it out."[12] Johnson aide, James Rowe, expressed fear that Kennedy's entry might ". . . destroy the Democratic party for a generation."[13] Arthur M. Schlesinger and Theodore Sorenson both issued public statements of support.[14]

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon decided to remain neutral in his home state's upcoming primary in light of his own difficult drive for re-election. State Representative Edith Green reassessed her earlier statements of neutrality and subsequently pledged her support. State Senator Fadeley's earlier contacts with Kennedy were made public,

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[10]Kenneth Crawford, "Political Grace," Newsweek, March 25, 1968, p. 38.

[11]Herbers, p. 30.

[12]"Truman Backs LBJ, Writes Off Others," The Aberdeen Daily World, March 20, 1968, p. 5.

[13]Tom Wicker, "Kennedy to Make Three Primary Races, Attacks Johnson," The New York Times, March 17, 1968, p. 68.

[14]Ibid.

making his support assured; and Representative James A. Redden from Medford, the House Democratic leader, echoed his guarantee of help. By March 24, Representative Green, State Representative Sid Leiken of Roseburg and Jack Beatty, a Portland lawyer, were named as a troika of co-chairmanships for Kennedy within the Beaver State, and the Kennedy camp in Oregon was organized, ". . . embarking on a perilous adventure that could doom a shattered Democratic Party to defeat in November or change the face of American politics."[15]

History of the Oregon Primary

Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, the Oregon Presidential Preference Primary came into being, the product of an independent electorate who favored a literal translation of Abraham Lincoln's phrase, "of the people." Their purpose was to quantify statewide support for potential presidential candidates and, concurrently, to provide a system whereby delegates to both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions could be chosen by all of the registered voters of Oregon.

Since its inception in 1908, the Oregon Primary has never been a particularly accurate indication of nationwide political trends. In the fourteen primaries run prior to 1968, the Oregon voters had selected the eventual Republican nominee only nine times and the Democratic nominee, eleven. In 1912, for example, both Theodore Roosevelt and

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15"'We Want Camelot Again,'" Newsweek, March 25, 1968, p. 24.

Robert La Follette finished ahead of William Howard Taft in the Oregon Primary; nonetheless, Mr. Taft was renominated by the Republican Party. Furthermore, the candidate with the highest vote total in Oregon from either party had been elected to the Presidency only five times: Calvin Coolidge won in 1924, Herbert Hoover in 1928, Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956, and Lyndon Johnson in 1964.[16]

The last Oregon preference vote prior to the 1968 primary also served as a reinforcement of this trend. The eventual Republican nominee, Barry Goldwater, cancelled all of his appearances in the state five weeks before the vote after establishing a winning trend in the earlier primaries. Nelson Rockefeller did not, however, and went on to best not only Goldwater, but also the front-runner in the Oregon polls, Henry Cabot Lodge. Joseph Kraft of the Publishers-Hall Syndicate summarized this maverick tendency of the Beaver State's voters when he wrote: "Traditionally, those who have done well in this state are moralistic loners who fight for lost causes."[17]

Oregon Constitutional Law decrees that the secretary of state, in his sole discretion, must place on the ballot the name of every person whose candidacy is "'. . . generally advocated or recognized in the national news media.'"[18] After official notification of the state official's action, the assumed candidate has twelve days to file an affadavit to have his name removed on the grounds that he is not seeking

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[16] John Corry, "Oregonians Put Men Over Parties, and Like Them Independent," The New York Times, May 26, 1968, p. 60.

[17] Joseph Kraft, "Oregon Has Shattered the Kennedy Spell," The Oregonian, May 30, 1968, p. 31.

[18] Lawrence E. Davies, "Two New Yorkers on Oregon Ballot," The New York Times, March 11, 1968, p. 32.

the Presidency. This final filing deadline is constitutionally set as seventy days prior to the Primary Election. On May 10, 1968, Secretary of State Clay Myers announced to newspaper, television and radio reporters in the nation's capitol that he had placed on the Republican Presidential ballot the names of former Vice President Richard M. Nixon, Senator Charles H. Percy of Illinois, Governor Ronald Reagan of California, and Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York. He also named President Lyndon Johnson, Senator Robert F. Kennedy of New York, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy of Minnesota, and Governor George Wallace of Alabama as Democratic aspirants.[19] Subsequently, Governors Percy, Reagan and Wallace filed affadavits of noncandidacy and the Oregon Primary Ballot for 1968 had been determined.

State law also requires a declaration of party preference as a part of voter registration in the primary state; by May, 1968, there were more registered Democrats in Oregon than Republicans--546,446 to 428,975.[20] Unlike Nebraska and Indiana, other major primaries of 1968, cross-over voting is not permitted, forcing voters to choose between only their party candidates.

The winner of the Oregon Democratic primary in 1968 was guaranteed the votes at the national convention in August of that state's thirty-three delegates; they are bound by state law to support him through the first two ballots, until he receives less than thirty-five

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[19] Ibid.

[20] "Test for Kennedy Tuesday in Oregon," The New York Times, May 26, 1968, p. 61.

percent of the convention vote, or until he releases them. The number of votes at the Democratic National Convention had doubled in the last eight years, so that by 1968 the total was 2,622; thus, to win the nomination, a candidate would need 1,312 votes.

The political importance of the Oregon primary in 1968 lay in its strategic location on the primary calendar as the gateway to California. Just a week after the May 28 election, on June 4, the primary in the populous southwestern state would carry with it 174 delegate votes and an incalculable boost in political prestige for the winner. Again in 1968, Oregonians knew that the nation would look to them for election insight, just as she had every four years since 1908, and election officials were prepared. More than fifty-four per cent of the state's 2,598 precincts (representing almost eighty-five per cent of the state's voting population) would be counted by electronic equipment within four hours after the polls closed at 8 P.M., Pacific daylight time.[21] By midnight, the major race in the Oregon Primary would probably be decided.

Scope of the Study

To understand the complete political rhetoric of Senator Kennedy and to evaluate its total effect in the Oregon campaign, this thesis will consider the term rhetoric in a broad scope. Three forms of political persuasion will be examined: the all-purpose campaign

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[21]Wayne Thompson, "Heavy Write-Ins May Delay Count," The Oregonian, May 19, 1968, Forum Section, p. 1.

talk, represented by eight extemporaneous speeches taped throughout Oregon over a two-month period; the major address, represented by the formal, prepared speech delivered at the University of Oregon on May 18, 1968; and miscellaneous campaign rhetoric, represented by two half-hour television films, numerous printed hand-out materials, three taped spot announcements, and a large collection of statements by Kennedy, advance men, and influential Kennedy campaign workers. In sum, all available rhetoric of Robert F. Kennedy will be examined to demonstrate its force in the outcome of the Oregon Primary and in the political climate of the nation. The analysis will be based on neo-Aristotelian principles, utilizing the classical divisions of logical, emotional and ethical proof.

CHAPTER I

THE SPEAKER

Robert Francis Kennedy has long been the subject of this nation's attention. As an outspoken member of an unusually-prominent family, Kennedy has generated much positive and negative response; the stimuli for these responses have been the details of his active personal and political life, the reputation which has followed him, and the physical presence he has displayed to America.

Significant Biographical Data

Bobby Kennedy was born in a twelve-room house on Naples Road in distinctly-Yankee and Protestant Brookline, Massachusetts, on November 20, 1925, the son of Joseph Patrick and Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy and the possessor of a proud Irish heritage and a rich political legacy. Patrick Kennedy, Robert's great-grandfather, left his tiny farm in New Ross, County Wexford, Ireland, in 1804, raised the twenty-dollar steerage fee for an ocean crossing, and landed on Noodle's Island in East Boston. By the turn of the century, his only son, Patrick Joseph, owned several saloons, a liquor company, a coal company, and a bank interest and had already become a Democratic ward leader in East Boston. Thus, the political magic which has come to surround the Kennedy name had its beginning in America.

About the same time as Patrick's immigration, Rose Fitzgerald's grandfather, Tom, left County Limmerick and sailed from Cork to Boston. His son, John F. Fitzgerald, better known as "Honey Fitz," began his political career as a ward leader in the North end but went on to even greater fame as mayor of Boston. The union of these two Irish families through the marriage of their next-generation offspring provided an extensive political and financial base which would prove invaluable in the coming political campaigns of the twentieth century. As Paul O'Neill wrote: "Together, 'Honey Fitz' and 'PJ' founded a clan that was to fulfill all of those immigrant dreams."[1]

Joseph Patrick Kennedy has since become one of the legendary speculators of the 1920's, leading Richard Whalen to write in his book, The Founding Father:

> Luxuriant legends have sprung up about Kennedy's exploits in the stock market. . . . He went about his operations with closemouthed secrecy. . . . Kennedy sometimes played golf with the expansive [William H.] Danforth and the others in the Boston trading fraternity, and kept his ears open for tips and indiscretions, but said nothing of his own market activity.[2]

His first big fortune was amassed through the infant movie business and his holdings in the Film Booking Offices; in the late 1920's he retired from Hollywood five million dollars ahead. During the Depression, Kennedy continued to make money through speculation in real estate and liquor-importing.

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[1]Paul O'Neil, "The Kennedys: 'They Draw the Lightning,'" Life, June 14, 1968, p. 16.

[2]Richard J. Whalen, The Founding Father: The Story of Joseph Kennedy (New York: New American Library, Inc., 1964), p. 65.

When his father was appointed Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934, Robert was nine years old, the seventh of the nine Kennedy children. Nick Thimmisch and William Johnson described Kennedy's early years when they wrote in Robert Kennedy at 40:

> He was a Cub Scout, a knob-kneed terror at sports, an undistinguished scholar, a reasonably profitable breeder of white rabbits in a tool shed (he opened his first bank account with the proceeds), and the owner of a beloved pig named Porky. He once broke a toe when it was crushed beneath an old radiator that he had been forbidden to play with and he hopped about in silent agony for an hour before he dared to tell his parents of the accident. He gashed his head against a heavy table when he made a blind, furious charge at his sister Eunice. He had a brief seige of pneumonia that was more irritating than critical because it came at the height of the swimming season.[3]

This superficial description, however, did not take into account the three most significant influences in his childhood: the family competition and unity promoted by his father, the religious example of his mother, and the exemplary presence of his older brothers, Joe Jr. and Jack.

The importance of the family to the Kennedy clan must be placed in the context of Joseph Kennedy's concept of its organization:

> From childhood on, he had conceived of the Kennedys as living in a fortified city, holding off the rest of the world. The government of this entrenched unit was authoritarian and hierarchical. . . . The male pecking order was clearly established . . . Joe Jr. was the focus of his father's ambition, with the American Presidency openly earmarked for him. After Joe's tragic death in World War II, succession was established in Jack, with Bobby and Ted forced

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[3]Nick Thimmesch and William Johnson, Robert Kennedy at 40 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965), p. 35.

> back into the wings until the stage of Kennedy history had been cleared.[4]

Rose Kennedy emphasized this unity when she remarked: "The Kennedy's are a self-contained unit. If any of us wants to sail or play golf or go walking or just talk, there's always a Kennedy eager to join in."[5]

In addition to this almost-military chain of command and solidarity, the senior Kennedy also encouraged excellence and self-improvement. Whalen wrote,

> He saw life as a contest, in which the winner took all. The runner-up was merely a loser. On the evidence of his own rise, he believed that the Kennedy's were born to win, that they could do anything they were determined to do. Proud and implacable, he thrust his ideas and ambitions on his children.[6]

Beyond his philosophical lectures, Kennedy provided stimulating experiences for his large family; Bobby's mother, Mrs. Rose Kennedy, described these experiences when she said:

> Their father worked with President Roosevelt on different commissions--the Hoover Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission--and then afterwards he was Ambassador to England. There they learned a great deal about history and they were acquainted with . . . people who were making history. . . . And they all went to the Soviet when they were very young, around twenty years old. . . . It was very easy for them to know about government and about history.[7]

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[4]Ralph de Toledano, R. F. K.: The Man Who Would Be President (New York: Signet Books, 1967), p. 26.

[5]Whalen, p. 502.

[6]Ibid., p. 169.

[7]Interview with Mrs. Rose Kennedy, mother of Robert Kennedy, May 23, 1968.

In 1938, Joseph Kennedy was appointed by President Roosevelt as his Ambassador to the Court of St. James, expanding Bobby's view from New England to Britain. William Nicholas described events of those years when he wrote in The Bobby Kennedy Nobody Knows: "There, Bobby attended parties with the Princesses Elizabeth and Margaret Rose, and was personally introduced to such awesome idols of the day as Charles Lindbergh and Douglas 'Wrong Way' Corrigan."[8] The schools selected for his third son also indicated his father's concern for a prestigious education: Milton Academy, an exclusive preparatory school in Massachusetts; Harvard, from which he received his bachelor of arts in Government in 1948; and the University of Virginia Law School from which he graduated with his Doctorate of Jurisprudence in 1951. In counsel, contacts, family support and education, Joseph Kennedy determined that his sons would not place second.

Rose Kennedy was another contributor to her sons' upbringing; she determined to have them make God and their Church a dominant part of their daily lives. She implanted the seeds of faith and mutual love in her offspring and " . . . made it a point each day to take them to church for a visit."[9] Nicholas claimed that as an adult, Bobby still filled in as a volunteer altar boy when a regular acolyte failed to appear. He went on:

> Although he doesn't make it to mass every morning (as his devout mother has for years), Bobby practices his faith with vigor and

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[8]William Nicholas, The Bobby Kennedy Nobody Knows (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1967), p. 39.

[9]de Toledano, p. 27.

> regularity. Whenever he is at home in the evening, the whole family troops upstairs to recite the rosary and read aloud from the Bible for a full half hour.[10]

William V. Shannon has quoted Rose Kennedy as saying: "'He [Bobby] has taken his religion seriously and still does. We never had any worries about him.'"[11]

Bobby's older brothers, Joe Jr. and Jack, became surrogate fathers to the younger Kennedys, and their roles made further upbringing that of example. In his boyhood, Bobby's hero was Joe Jr. and the eldest son assumed the responsibilities of such a relationship. In his book, As We Remember Joe, Jack wrote in 1945:

> I think that if the Kennedy children amount to anything now or ever amount to anything, it will be due more to Joe's behavior and his constant example than to any other factor. He made the task of bringing up a large family immeasurably easier for my father and mother, for what they taught him he passed on to us and their teachings were not diluted through him, but rather strengthened.[12]

With Joe Jr.'s death in July, 1944, Bobby sensed a need to perpetuate his dead brother's ideals; "And he patterned his way of life on his brother Joe's, seeking in athletics and in personal competition to duplicate [the] record on field and in [the] classroom."[13] When Jack became the political hopeful of the Kennedys, Bobby granted to him the hero-bestowed loyalty that once had been Joe's, and the Kennedy chain of command was made safe once more.

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[11]William V. Shannon, The Heir Apparent: Robert Kennedy and the Struggle for Power (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 52.

[12]John F. Kennedy, ed., As We Remember Joe (Cambridge, Mass.: The University Press, 1945), pp. 3-4, cited by Whalen, p. 374.

[13]de Toledano, p. 28.

World War II interrupted his Harvard studies. Shortly after his brother's death, the Navy named a destroyer after Joseph Jr., and Bobby went to Washington, D. C., to ask Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to assign him to the ship as a seaman. Nicholas commented on this trip when he wrote: "No one knows exactly what the callow kid from Massachusetts said to the grizzled Defense Secretary, but Forrestal did use his Pentagon knout to help and before long young Kennedy got his wish."[14] However, the combat he sought was not to be found in the Caribbean where Bobby spent the rest of the war chipping paint.

Bobby's first taste of political campaigning came in 1946 when he organized an East Cambridge district in Jack's successful bid for the House of Representatives. After his graduation from Harvard in 1948, he sought and won a journalistic assignment with the Boston Post that took him to the Israelis-Arab war and the Berlin Airlift, but "his stories of the conflict, however, lacked any spark of journalistic genius."[15] He enrolled in the University of Virginia Law School upon his return to the States in the fall of the same year and gained his first national publicity as reviver of the university's Law School Forum designed to bring nationally-prominent speakers to the campus. When he graduated in 1951, however, he was ranked fifty-sixth in a class of 125, and his future promise in government and public service were not yet evident. On June 17, 1950, Kennedy married Ethel Skakel, daughter of the enormously-wealthy George Skakel, at St. Mary's Roman Catholic

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[14] Nicholas, p. 45.

[15] de Toledano, p. 39.

Church in Greenwich, Connecticut; ". . . his wife was an outspoken girl, entirely unintimidated by the Kennedy tribal mystique and just as rambunctious and spontaneous as they."[16]

His first job was in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice where he was assigned to a Brooklyn district office for research on graft and tax fraud cases; in addition, he was admitted to the Massachusetts Bar and to practice before the United States Supreme Court in the same year. During the spring and summer of 1952, nearly all of the Kennedys were gathered in Massachusetts to support Jack's drive for Henry Cabot Lodge's seat in the United States Senate; Robert, too, resigned his Justice Department job to become the campaign manager. It was during the rush of this successful bid that Bobby delivered his first, oft-quoted political talk, given here in its entirety:

> My brother Jack couldn't be here. My mother couldn't be here. My sister Eunice couldn't be here. My sister Pat couldn't be here. My sister Jean couldn't be here. But if my brother Jack were here, he'd tell you Lodge has a very bad voting record. Thank you.[17]

Although his rhetoric was little appreciated, his skill at organization collected 262,325 nominating petition signatures, organized 268 local Kennedy headquarters, and encouraged 100,000 Democrats to register to vote. Nevertheless, a charge that later haunted him in the 1968 Presidential race found its inception in that early campaign:

> Throughout the campaign, Bobby moved restlessly up and down the state, gaining the reputation for ruthlessness and surliness that became national in 1960. . . . Bobby took it upon himself to

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[16]"The Kennedys," Life: Special Edition, [June], 1968, pp. 34-35.

[17]Jacques Lowe, Portrait: An Intimate Family Chronicle (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961), p. 32.

> lecture Paul Dever, the Democratic governor of Massachusetts, on political strategy and to caution him not to make mistakes. Dever . . . called Joe Kennedy, . . . 'Keep that fresh kid of yours out of my sight from here on in.'[18]

When the Senate permanent subcommittee on investigation was organized in January, 1953, Kennedy was named one of fifteen assistant counsels under chief counsel, Roy Cohn. His work for the committee ended temporarily on July 31, 1953, after a feud with Cohn over the latter's ". . . slapdash methods"[19] during the Army-McCarthy hearings. Before rejoining Cohn in January, 1954, as minority counsel, he worked briefly for the Hoover Commission which was studying re-organization of the federal government. In 1954, John McClellan replaced McCarthy as chairman, and the twenty-nine year old Kennedy assumed the role of chief counsel, beginning a career which brought him national prominence. Early in that year he began an investigation into the Pentagon's procurement contracts and brought about the convictions of six persons for defrauding the government. From 1954 to 1956, Kennedy's subcommittee ". . . pried into conflict-of-interest cases that ended the careers of Harold Talbott, Secretary of the Air Force; Hugh Cross, head of the Interstate Commerce Commission; and Robert Ross, Assistant Secretary of Defense."[20]

When the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field was formed in January, 1957, Kennedy became chief counsel, head of an investigative staff of sixty-five, and the

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[18] de Toledano, p. 49.

[19] Shannon, p. 56.

[20] Joseph F. Dineen, The Kennedy Family (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1959), p. 174.

center of a controversy over his interrogation methods. Shannon commented on this controversy when he wrote:

> . . . although some legal observers believe Kennedy was abusive and sometimes disingenuous in his examination of witnesses, others point out that he was trying to disassemble a baffling complex of chicanery and lies and that some of the witnesses had lawyers who were exceptionally adept at manuever and obfuscation. The consensus in the legal community is that Kennedy did not impair the rights of witnesses before the committee.[21]

Again in 1956 Robert Kennedy was a campaign manager for his brother, Jack; this time the sought-after prize was the Democratic Vice-Presidential nomination. Although the Kennedys felt their first political defeat, Bobby used the event as a lesson in convention and campaign-handling. He asked for and was given an appointment as a special assistant to Adlai Stevenson's campaign director, James Finnegan. His lack of responsibility in that post led de Toledano to claim that,

> his purpose during the seven weeks he spent accompanying the candidate was to learn the ropes of Presidential campaigning. . . . Bobby hoped to evolve his own plan of action when Jack made the big try in 1960.[22]

By the fall of 1959, after completing his best-selling book The Enemy Within, Kennedy resigned his position as counsel to the Labor-Management Committee to join the national Kennedy organization as campaign manager; he was thirty-four. During the convention itself, Bobby worked as a floor-manager, directing forty campaign workers who were assigned to the various state delegations. With the nominating convention behind him, the younger Kennedy began to unite the Democratic

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[21] Shannon, p. 65.

[22] de Toledano, p. 146.

party behind his brother with a skill that led Theodore H. White to remark in his The Making of the President, 1960:

> But essentially he is a simple man moved by great emotions; and these emotions, coupled with his great ability, must be seen in all the weeks that followed until election day as the motor moving the Kennedy campaign in the direction that his brother defined.[23]

Soon after the November election returns were in, President-elect Kennedy formally announced his selection of his thirty-five year old brother, Robert Francis, as his Attorney General. Amid cries of nepotism and lack of experience, Bobby set to work as relentlessly as he had during the campaign. Within a year, Helen Fuller wrote in her book, Year of Trial: Kennedy's Crucial Decisions: "In large part by the force of Bobby's leadership and his personal performance, the Administration held the confidence of Negro citizens in 1961."[24] Shannon concluded: "Politics, sentiment, and glamor aside, he [Bobby] proved in those three and one-half years that he is capable of directing a major department of the government and performing effectively."[25] On the other hand, the responsibilities of his office added to his human and professional depth; as Theodore Sorensen wrote:

> Working with the victims of racial prejudice and with the causes of juvenile delinquency made him more compassionate. Working with the problems of peace and war made him less militant. Working with his brother made him more patient and willing to listen, less demanding and certain of his solutions.[26]

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[23]Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960 (New York: Pocket Books, 1961), p. 295.

[24]Helen Fuller, Year of Trial: Kennedy's Crucial Decisions (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962), p. 144.

[25]Shannon, p. 67.

[26]Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 268.

Bobby's responsibilities were not only in the Department of Justice, however; ". . . he devoted 80 percent of his working day to the Justice Department, 5 percent to the press, 5 percent to politics, and 10 percent to foreign policy and other governmental affairs."[27] He served as a member of the National Security Council and his brother's most trusted adviser during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In a video tape on April 16, 1968, former Secretary of State Robert S. McNamara gave his account of those critical days:

> Throughout the entire period of the crisis. . . he [Bobby] remained calm and cool, firm but restrained, never nettled and never rattled. . . . [Kennedy] functioned as a prime Presidential agent on policy matters across the board.[28]

Much has been said about the close bond of these brothers, but as Pierre Salinger wrote, "It [the bond] was complete and mutual. . . . His advice to JFK was sound and his judgment good. . . . The presence of Bob gave the President the added strength he needed."[29]

The Attorney General was lunching at his McLean, Virginia, home on November 22, 1963, when he learned of his brother's assassination in Dallas. Spurred into action as the new leader of the Kennedy clan, he organized funeral details and was constantly photographed at his sister-in-law's side during the public rites. The months that followed

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[27]"Robert F. Kennedy, 1925-1968," Eugene (Oregon) Register-Guard, June 6, 1968, p. 2A.

[28]"Morton Decries McNamara Praise of Kennedy; Bids Him Quit World Bank," The New York Times, April 15, 1968, p. 24.

[29]Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), p. 100.

plunged him into deep melancholy. Trips suggested by President Johnson to Indonesia, Malaysia, West Berlin and Poland did not relieve the grief. Ralph de Toledano wrote the following description of those days:

> While newspapermen and politicians speculated about his future, and his closest friends worried and wondered, Bobby wandered erratically in and out of his office in the Justice Department, his expression glazed, his eyes puffed.[30]

While President Johnson maneuvered in choosing his Vice-Presidential running-mate and political analysts speculated as to Kennedy's future, the Attorney General won the endorsement of Mayor Robert F. Wagner, New York's most influential Democrat; formally announced his candidacy for the Democratic Senatorial nomination; and won the nomination handily with only token opposition from Sam Stratton, a New York Assemblyman. In the campaign that followed against Senator Kenneth B. Keating, the Republican nominee, Kennedy moved from town to town, drawing unbelievable crowds; seven thousand heard him in Oldan, five thousand in Oneanta, four thousand in Corning, and six thousand in Norwich, a town with a population of barely nine thousand.[31] But the emotion didn't end there; Gerald Gardner captured the empathetic responses of the New York voters to the carpetbagger who controlled the "Kennedy Legend" when he concluded his 1965 book, Robert Kennedy in New York, by saying: "The most closely watched, most tenaciously fought Senate campaign had ended. Robert Kennedy was the Senator-elect from

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[30]de Toledano, pp. 288-89.

[31]Gerald Gardner, Robert Kennedy in New York (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 173.

the state of New York. The torch had been passed."[32] Kennedy had defeated Keating by an 800,000 vote plurality and his victory marked the first time in history that three brothers--Jack, Ted, and now Bobby--had become United States Senators.[33]

His maiden speech came a short three weeks after he took his Senate seat; Kennedy introduced a successful amendment to include thirteen of New York's sixty-two counties in the Appalachia program. During his three and one-half years as the junior senator from New York, Kennedy delivered major addresses in the Senate on Latin America, poverty, the problems of the cities, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He served on the full Committee on Government Operations and as chairman of the subcommittee on Indian Affairs. He used his powers in the latter position to hold hearings in various Indian reservations in South Dakota during the 1968 Presidential campaign, much to the delight of the Indian constituents. In addition to his staid Senatorial duties, the youthful politician traveled to Europe, Latin America, South Africa and Southeast Asia. He rode a kayak through Idaho's "River of No Return," climbed Mount Kennedy in Alaska, and raced down Vermont and Colorado ski slopes.

The year 1967 marked the beginning of his soon-to-be open break with President Johnson on the Viet Nam situation. In February of that year, he remarked on the Senate floor that Johnson was

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[32] Ibid., p. 96.

[33] His younger brother, Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy, was elected a United States Senator from Massachusetts on November 6, 1962.

"working in a vacuum in Asia"[34] and called for a suspension of the bombing of North Viet Nam. In September, 1967, his last book, To Seek a Newer World, was published, clearly stating his position on the Southeast Asia conflict: "Above all we need the will for a peaceful settlement; and once we go to negotiations, we need the wisdom and persistence that will be required to find a satisfactory solution."[35] As Kennedy continued to peck away at the Administration's policies and as Johnson's popularity continued to wane, speculation heightened that Robert Kennedy would not wait until 1972.

Reputation

When Robert Kennedy entered the Presidential race on March 16, 1968, his reputation on the national scene and in the state of Oregon was varied, an unusual combination of adulation and loathing. As the drive in California developed, one campaign reporter, Margaret Laing, made the following observation: "He changed before my mental eyes from the Big Bad Wolf, to the Ugly Duckling, the Baby Bear, Bashful (of the Seven Dwarfs), and back again."[36] Penn Kimball summarized this ever-changing personality when he wrote in 1966:

> Robert Francis Kennedy is a hard man to see whole. His character seems particularly susceptible to selective perception: the

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[34] "Robert F. Kennedy," Eugene Register-Guard, June 6, 1968, p. 2A.

[35] Robert F. Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), p. 218.

[36] Margaret Laing, "The Kennedy Personality," Coronet, July, 1968, p. 21.

> filters of the mind interpret new data on him in light of preconceptions from the past.[37]

These selective perceptions that Kimball spoke of were the result of viewing Kennedy in his various roles: as a father, a sportsman, a son and brother, a legislative counsel, a political organizer, a Senator, and a Presidential candidate. From each of these roles had developed an adjective used to describe Robert Francis Kennedy and often repeated as the years passed, by opponents and advocates alike: "warm," "competitive," "passionate," "ruthless," "skillful," "rebellious," and "opportunistic."

In personal interviews with 1,507 adults in a nationwide sample, a sensitive scaling device called the Stapel Scalometer was used to measure intensity of feeling toward the 1968 Presidential candidates by the Gallup organization. In the results announced ten days prior to the Oregon vote, Robert Kennedy projected these mental pictures:

> Favorable: hard driving . . . tough . . . aggressive . . . capable . . . intelligent . . . a live wire . . . plenty of potential . . . reminds me of JFK . . . dedicated.
> Unfavorable: immature . . . trading on his brother's name . . . opportunist . . . a rich hippie . . . power-mad . . . ruthless . . . will do anything for votes . . . teeny bopper . . . a schemer.[38]

Oregonians had had few opportunities to assess his speaking ability and style prior to the 1968 Primary. Selected appearances on

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[37] Penn Kimball, "He Builds His Own Kennedy Identity," Life, November 18, 1966, p. 43.

[38] "Intensity of Feelings Toward Presidential Candidates Is Lower Than in Past, Gallup Poll Reports," The New York Times, May 19, 1968, p. 70.

nationwide television interview and "talk" shows and his televised news conference announcing his candidacy had given little basis for judgment. Kennedy's visits to the state extended as far back as 1956 when, as a member of the Senate Rackets Committee, he investigated vice in Portland and called her mayor, Terry Schrunk, to testify in Washington, D. C. Later, he testified for the prosecution against that same mayor in a bribery charge from which Shrunk won an acquittal. His only other visit to the state prior to March, 1968, was a brief Portland stop in 1961 for a speech for the Portland City Club.

In spite of the scarcity of opportunity for personal evaluation, Oregonians had access to much printed material on the New York Senator. Newspapers often carried pictures of his ten attractive children and smiling wife; Kennedy's jaunts and athletic excursions from 1964 to 1967 had created a flood of journalistic coverage; and most Oregonians still recalled the barrage of publicity Kennedy received following his brother's death. Penn Kimball described this phenomenon when he concluded: "He [Bobby] enjoys two precious possessions seldom bestowed on a single individual. He lives in the prime of an active, healthy youth amidst recognition usually reserved to elder statesmen."[39]

Physical Presence

Bobby claimed to be five-feet, ten-inches tall, yet his slouched shoulders and neck gave the impression that he was, in reality,

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[39]Kimball, p. 144.

much shorter.[40] As he fought his way through frenzied throngs, he appeared nothing more than ". . . a face in the crowds."[41] For years, reporters had written about his long, tousled mop of hair, but Oregonians found it short by Kennedy standards and a curious mixture of gray and sandy brown. He played with it constantly, slicking down the top and pulling his forelock back into place, adding to his boyish image.

In spite of years and wrinkles, however, the Kennedy face had retained its youthful charm; "He flashes the chunky smile that seems to split his face in two--the sad-eyed top with those weeping brows, the extravagant mouth with the boyishly-outsize teeth."[42] When new words failed, national reporters returned to the safe cliche, "his Bugs Bunny grin."[43] Stories often described his blue eyes as being "opaque"--they were. Their penetrating quality made this writer wonder about the resting spot of their gaze.

His physique was slender, a scant one-hundred and seventy pounds, and his generally-grey, tailored suits appeared to barely hang on his hips as the campaign progressed. But his arms were muscular and his hands resembled the brawny hands of a construction worker.

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[40]This and following uncited statements about Kennedy's physical appearance are from the personal experiences of this writer during the Oregon Primary campaign of 1968.

[41]"Robert F. Kennedy: Victim of Violence," (Washington, D. C.: Metro Publishers Representatives, Inc., 1968), pp. 32-33.

[42]Laing, p. 19.

[43]"'It's Much Better to Win,'" Newsweek, May 20, 1968, pp. 34-35.

By May his hands were swollen and infected with tiny cuts, a sharp contrast from his trim appearance of March.

The Robert Kennedy stance had become a trademark: hands in both pockets, knees slightly bent with his weight all on one foot. As he waited on uncountable platforms to be introduced, he fidgeted: his hands played with his pocket flaps, a pen or a note hastily written and handed to him by an aide. In sum, he appeared as ". . . the grown-up version of the boy on the headmaster's carpet. . . . It's hard to resist, especially for the women."[44]

Kennedy's image in 1968 was based on his viewer's concept of the New Yorker's role, be it father, legislator, prosecutor, political campaigner or family heir. His name, the Kennedy name, was known by virtually every American and every Oregonian; notoriety was his. But handicapping his campaign for the Presidency was the negative quality of some of this fame; men had charged him with being ruthless, arrogant and opportunistic. To be sure, much had been written about Robert Francis Kennedy, but few could really claim to understand the complexity of this national political figure.

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[44]Laing, p. 23.

CHAPTER II

THE AUDIENCE AND THE OCCASION

As the new year opened, the editors of Newsweek magazine prepared a cover story for their January 8 issue entitled, "Politics 1968: The Big Show." It began:

> The bands were tuning up, the barkers were practicing their spiels . . . In his winter-quarters in Texas, Barnum Bird was rehearsing his own three-ring Democratic spectacular: juggling guns and butter, practicing his gravity-defying budget-balancing act, flexing his muscles to take on all comers in his strong-man routine. It was Presidential 1968--and the greatest political show on earth was getting under way.[1]

Indeed it was time for the Presidential hoopla to begin again, but 1968 was not to be the year for safe prediction and post-dated bylines. The Newsweek article, however, did contain one forecast that proved accurate as the Oregon Primary drew near:

> . . . as every Presidential hopeful knows, the best laid plans of Presidents and pretenders can be upset a dozen times before the Democrats and Republicans--and finally the American people--make their choice.[2]

The National Political Scene

The race for the 1968 Democratic nomination had appeared a

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[1] "Politics 1968: The Big Show," Newsweek, January 8, 1968, p. 17.

[2] Ibid., p. 22.

walkaway at its beginning; President Lyndon Johnson's only challenger was an insurgent Senator from Minnesota, Eugene McCarthy. Yet as anti-war sentiment revealed itself in McCarthy's strong showing in New Hampshire and Robert Kennedy announced his candidacy in early March, Johnson shocked the nation on March 31 as he declared his intention of not seeking re-election. Surprisingly, however, the contenders were not settled yet; as one analyst wrote:

> All at once, Hubert Humphrey, precipitator of one of the great rifts in the Democratic Party--the Dixiecrat walkout of 1948-- . . . had emerged as the great conciliator, the candidate best calculated to bind and heal the wounds in the body politic--not to mention the deeply divided Democratic Party.[3]

With the major participants thus determined, the primary races of 1968 continued.

Robert Kennedy announced on March 26 that he would follow state law and request that his name be placed on the ballot for the Indiana Primary of May 7, joining Eugene McCarthy and favorite-son, Governor Roger D. Branigan.[4] At stake were sixty-three delegate votes; Indiana delegates to the national convention are chosen by a state convention and must support on the first ballot only the candidate receiving the highest number of votes in the primary.

Warren Weaver of The New York Times' staff analyzed the state's approximately one-million Democrats when he described them as being

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[3]"Can Hubert Humphrey Stop RFK?," Newsweek, April 29, 1968, p. 23.

[4]John Herbers, "Kennedy to Enter Indiana's Primary," The New York Times, March 27, 1968, p. 1.

either: ". . . organization-oriented, conservative, hawkish on Vietnam, Southern in outlook, rural or resentful of Negro social and political advances."[5] In each of these concerns, conservative Branigan had the hometown advantage. In addition, the Committee on Political Education of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization was making a major effort to support Humphrey's Presidential campaign by backing the Hoosier governor.[6] Yet Kennedy had to challenge McCarthy and endeavor to show his vote-getting strength: as Weaver wrote: "One of the most important aspects of this primary will be the first 1968 test of the potential Kennedy 'star quality.'"[7]

The Kennedy strategy was to bedazzle the state's voters by a campaign unmatched in energy, expense and excitement, leading John Herbers to write:

> There is a constant traffic of Kennedy people from Washington, New York, and Massachusetts, applying the standard Kennedy technique. They all work very late at night, and in every waking hour they are either on the telephone or darting from one place to another.[8]

Kennedy rode the Wabash Cannon Ball Express through central Indiana, visited Lincoln's boyhood home and made a nine-hour drive in an open car

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[5]Warren Weaver, Jr., "Branigan's Appeal in Indiana is Strong on Surface," The New York Times, April 22, 1968, p. 18.

[6]"Dem Hopefuls Stump Indiana," Eugene Register-Guard, April 24, 1968, p. 4.

[7]Warren Weaver, Jr., "Forecasts Differ on Indiana Voting," The New York Times, April 27, 1968, p. 1.

[8]John Herbers, "Kennedy Outspends Rivals As Staff and Students Step Up Drive for Crucial Indiana Vote May 7," The New York Times, April 26, 1968, p. 28.

from South Bend to Chicago; in all, the Senator visited more than forty Indiana cities and towns and spent between $550,000 and $600,000 by modest Kennedy estimates.[9]

A Louis Harris Poll reported April 26 gave Kennedy forty-five per cent; Governor Branigan, twenty-eight per cent; Senator McCarthy, nineteen per cent, with nine per cent undecided; a National Broadcasting Company survey of the same date had Kennedy leading with forty-three per cent of the vote with Branigan and McCarthy following with twenty-six and nineteen per cent respectively.[10] Their predictions of Kennedy's vote-getting ability were unusually accurate: when the votes were counted, Kennedy led the field with forty per cent of the vote in a record turnout of Democrats. Branigan was second with thirty-one per cent, and McCarthy trailed with twenty-seven per cent.[11] Kennedy's Indiana victory was far from overwhelming; but, as Louis Harris contended, he ". . . went a long way toward establishing his claim as perhaps the likeliest Democrat in 1968 who can deliver both the Negro and the lower-income, white urban vote."[12]

Indiana was not Kennedy's sole victory on May 7; he also collected the twenty-three convention votes of the Washington, D.C. delegation. The nation's capital did not hold a Presidential preference election but did

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[9]"It is Much Better to Win,'" Newsweek, p. 36.

[10]Weaver, "Forecasts Differ on Indiana Voting," p. 36.

[11]"'It is Much Better to Win,'" p. 34.

[12]Louis Harris, "Part Way with RFK--The Price He Paid," Newsweek, May 20, 1968, p. 35.

choose twenty-one of the city's twenty-three Democratic convention delegates by popular vote. When the results were announced that evening, "Bobby's visceral appeal to black Americans was . . . confirmed . . . in Washington, D.C., where Kennedy's slate trounced two slates pledged to Vice President Humphrey."[13]

The third test of Kennedy strength came a short seven days later, May 14, in the Nebraska Presidential Primary, following a week's campaigning wedged in after the Indiana vote. The conservative Republican state was to choose twenty-eight delegates to the Democratic National Convention from among seventy-five names, many of whom were committed to McCarthy. Most surveys gave Kennedy forty to fifty per cent of the vote, and even higher, but Kennedy still waged an untiring effort. At the end of the campaign, he had barnstormed across two-thirds of Nebraska by automobile and chartered aircraft, visiting twenty-eight cities.[14]

His only opponents on the ballot were McCarthy and President Johnson, yet Democratic leaders organized a Humphrey write-in drive. The final vote total gave the New Yorker a relatively-solid victory: 51.5 per cent of the record vote and twenty of the national delegates. McCarthy garnered thirty-one per cent of the vote, with Humphrey and Johnson trailing with eight and six per cent respectively. As one editor wrote,

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[13]Ben A. Franklin, "Washington's Negroes Vote For Kennedy," The New York Times, May 12, 1968, p. 3.

[14]Richard E. Mooney, "Kennedy Pursues Nebraska Votes," The New York Times, May 13, 1968, p. 22.

"Mr. Kennedy won the Nebraska primary with a bare--but clear--majority."[15]

Unlike his earlier contests, Kennedy showed strength outside the urban areas, the working class and Negro communities; he won sixty per cent of the Nebraska farm vote, carrying eighty of the state's eighty-six farm counties. In addition, he carried all of the twenty-five counties where he campaigned and every one of the seventeen largest cities he visited. In discussing this victory, one Time editor wrote:

> Nebraska was a Kennedy victory tactically and strategically. In narrow terms, it demonstrated the growing efficacy of the Kennedy organization. . . . Kennedy himself seemed to be everywhere, and everywhere he went he wowed them. Nebraska was also the best vindication yet of his long-range design: to create such an impact in the primaries that Humphrey delegates from the non-primary states will be shaken loose.[16]

As the national candidates and press were about to focus on the Oregon Primary, political analysts were forced to agree that the Vietnam war was the focal point of nation-wide voter appeal. William V. Shannon wrote in late May:

> The Vietnam war remains the critical issue of the Presidential campaign. Although it has receded as the dominant theme in the speeches of the rival candidates, it exceeds crime in the streets, inflation, poverty and race relations in popular interest.[17]

In announcing his candidacy, Kennedy had claimed that, "the divisions

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[15]"Kennedy Wins Nebraska," (an editorial) Eugene Register-Guard, May 16, 1968, p. 8.

[16]"The Politics of Restoration," Time, May 24, 1968, p. 23.

[17]William V. Shannon, "Vietnam Issue: A Time for Fence-Sitting," The New York Times, May 19, 1968, p. E3.

that exist in this country--the divisions that exist in the Democratic Party--are there."[18] The New Hampshire Primary, indeed, had shown an anti-war sentiment ranging from positive opposition to a doubt whether the conflict was "winable." All of the discontent was sharpened by the costly Communist Tet offensive, the billions in new budget requests, and the end of graduate draft deferments. Yet, Kennedy and his dovish supporters had no accurate indication of the depth and breadth of this indictment of the Administration Vietnam policy. One New York Times editor verbalized this guessing game when he wrote:

> Does a majority of the American people still favor pushing ahead militarily in Vietnam? The President in his public appearances last week talked confidently as if the answer could not be in doubt. But it is a question to which no man, not even a President, could give a definitive yes or no.[19]

The Wisconsin, Indiana and Nebraska vote tallies had likewise indicated a renunciation of the war effort; the Oregon Primary was to be a battle of doves with only token opposition by the hawkish Administration backers. Yet, campaign rhetoric had had to find a new focus; the diplomats had upstaged the candidates, at least temporarily. Shannon speculated on the effect of the Hanoi-United States peace talks when he wrote,

> What happens in the peace talks in Paris is obviously more important than what the candidates say on the subject. Not until the trend of those talks becomes clear are the candidates going to commit themselves.[20]

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[18]Robert F. Kennedy, "Statement of Candidacy and Excerpts from News Conference," The New York Times, p. 68.

[19]"Johnson Weighs a New Escalation," The New York Times, March 17, 1968, p. 2E.

[20]Shannon, p. E3.

The new rhetorical focus became the causes of the downtrodden: poverty, slums and human dignity. The Johnson withdrawal deprived Kennedy and McCarthy of their prime target, but soon Humphrey filled the void by using "politics of joy" in a campaign speech.[21] As Kennedy retaliated in May, "If you see a small black child starving to death in the Mississippi Delta, as I have, you know this is not the politics of joy."[22] The new emphasis worked to Kennedy's advantage in Indiana and Nebraska with their large Negro and ethnic-group blocs respectively. Kennedy had long before associated himself with these groups; "His tactic was to identify with the yearnings of the great, centrist majority for both domestic tranquility and social justice."[23]

Other topics gained momentary attention: the Johnson-proposed surcharge and other tax reforms, nuclear control and disarmament, the balance of payments problem, the missile race, the containment of Communism and civil disorder. Yet each of these was, in the end, tied up in the campaign with the need to end the costly Vietnam war. As Kennedy asserted, "If we hadn't been so involved in Saigon, I think we could have dealt more effectively with our own cities, with inflation and all the rest."[24]

As the names of the candidates and the issues changed often during the early months of the 1968 Presidential campaign, so also did the results of sampling techniques of various national polling concerns.

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[21] "The Politics of Restoration," p. 24. [22] Ibid., p. 25.

[23] "'It Is Much Better to Win,'" p. 36.

[24] "The Politics of Restoration," p. 25.

A Gallup Poll conducted shortly before the New Hampshire Primary in March showed President Johnson and Kennedy with about equal strength among Democratic and independent voters in the nation; at that point, the President's support had fallen considerably since an early January survey, when he won fifty-two per cent of the sample Democratic vote to forty per cent for Mr. Kennedy.[25] After the President's withdrawal in late March, another survey, this conducted by Louis Harris, indicated that at that time both McCarthy and Kennedy were capable of defeating the Republican leader, former Vice President Richard M. Nixon. Harris' sample, however, concluded that McCarthy had achieved the greatest gain as the result of the March 31 surprise announcement, turning a nine-point lag into a six-point lead over Nixon.[26] By early May, this prediction was replaced by the headlines, "Poll Finds Rockefeller and Nixon Lead All Top Democratic Rivals;" the latest Gallup Poll, reported on May 12, indicated that McCarthy and Humphrey had about equal strength against their Republican rivals with Kennedy also winning, but by a narrower margin.[27] The last polling results announced before the Oregon Primary took away Kennedy's Democratic edge, installing Humphrey as the frontrunner. In the results announced on May 15 and May 17, Humphrey led Kennedy by as many as nine percentage

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[25]"Gallup Poll Before Primary Saw Kennedy as Strong as Johnson," The New York Times, March 17, 1968, p. 56.

[26]"Harris Poll Shows Kennedy, McCarthy In Front of Nixon," The New York Times, April 4, 1968, p. 64.

[27]"Harris Says Polls Show Kennedy Lag," The New York Times, May 12, 1968, p. 56.

points, and McCarthy by a heavy majority of twenty-one percentage points.[28] A similar study limited the race to Kennedy and McCarthy and determined that Kennedy here still held a slim lead; the vote was forty-one per cent to thirty-eight per cent.[29]

The national political scene in 1968 was marked by chaos and upheaval. From the beginning, candidates were in doubt, issues were in doubt, and contenders were precariously announced as the frontrunner, only to be replaced within a short time by the ephemeral nature of voter preference. One Time editor described these unusual circumstances when he wrote:

> 1968 has been projected as the year in which the new politics would dispossess the old, in which the traditional deployments of blocs and bosses would be short-circuited by new-mold men and electronic eloquence. But events have bypassed such assumptions, dictating instead the politics of paradox . . . The second half of the campaign will doubtless be as unorthodox as the first.[30]

The Oregon Political Scene

Oregonian's reactions to the Vietnam war and the several candidates were as difficult to assess as the nation's reactions; John Corry of The New York Times wrote,

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[28]"Poll Shows Humphrey Leads Two Rivals Among Democrats," The New York Times, May 15, 1968, p. 28; and George Gallup, "Humphrey Takes Lead Over Democratic Foes," The New York Times, May 17, 1968, p. 21.

[29]George Gallup, "County Demo Chairmen Give HHH Wide Margin," The New York Times, May 15, 1968, p. 53.

[30]"In The 'New Politics,'" Time, June 7, 1968, p. 23.

> You can, of course, find all kinds of political opinion in the state; the citizens apparently share only a belief that Oregon is a good place to live and a talent for political convictions that would be zany anywhere else.[31]

Howard Apling, a former Secretary of State in Oregon who was running Nixon's state campaign in 1968, perhaps made the most valid judgment: "We're a state of political personalities. There's an old strain of Populism among the voters, and they look to the men, not the party."[32]

About two-million people live in Oregon, nearly two-thirds of them in the Willamette Valley from Portland to Eugene. The Cascade Mountain Range devides Oregon into two regions: the farms, timber and people on the west; the cattle and small towns on the east. Timber is the number one industry; farming is number two; tourists are number three. As they had been for some time, local issues in the 1968 campaigns were the preservation of the state's beaches and recreation lands, the low return from the Federal lands which comprise one-half of the state high property taxes and the need for improved higher education.[33]

On his May 27 evening newcast, David Brinkley of the National Broadcasting Company reported on the results of his network's survey of the 1968 Oregon political scene:

> It may be that there are no significant issues left in this election. There are personalities; there is a political beauty contest, and

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[31]John Corry, "Oregonians Put Men Over Parties, and Like Them Independent," The New York Times,

[32]Ibid.

[33]"Test for Kennedy in Oregon Tuesday," The New York Times, May 26, 1968, p. 61.

> if there are issues, most of the voters don't know how the candidates stand on them anyhow.[34]

Brinkley went on to cite the results of a survey made by the Oliver Quayle organization for NBC; the poll showed that when asked, for instance, whether Kennedy or McCarthy were hawks or doves, fully two-thirds of Oregon voters either said they did not know, or answered incorrectly. Brinkley concluded:

> Without issues, this Presidential primary may be like an election back in South Dakota in 1926 when the governor's challenger was asked, 'What are the issues?' He said, 'Oh, there are no issues. My opponent has a job, and I want it. That's all there is to it!' With such admirable candor which has yet to be matched this year, he won.[35]

Anti-war sentiment was prevalent, leading Time editors to conclude, "Oregon is dovish."[36] Republican Representative Wendell Wyatt of the state's First Congressional District attempted to test that opinion when he sent out a questionnaire to his 25,165 constituents. Of his fourteen per cent response, 56.5 per cent were opposed to increasing the commitment of American ground troops in Vietnam, with 26.8 per cent in favor and 16.8 with no opinion. In 1967, the same question was answered forty-seven per cent "yes," 38.9 per cent, "no." Wyatt also reported that, "Other questions on Vietnam showed a similar shift toward a dovish attitude.[37]

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[34] David Brinkley, "The Huntley-Brinkley Report," NBC-News, May 27, 1968.

[35] Ibid.

[36] "In the 'New Politics,'" p. 23.

[37] "Poll Shows 'Dove' Trend on Vietnam," Eugene Register-Guard, June 5, 1968, p. 12A.

Sander Vanocur of NBC-News chose to describe Oregon as an "issue-oriented state,"[38] but the issues he mentioned were not national in scope. Oregonians felt little empathy with the problems of the cities and poor, since Oregon is an overwhelmingly-white, middle-class state with no substantial minority blocs. About twenty-thousand Negroes live in Portland, but the Beaver State had experienced little racial unrest. Instead, ". . . the people talk more about rivers and mountains and worry more about pollution than they talk about politics or worry about who will win the Presidential primary on May 28."[39]

The Oregon Democratic Party organization is, by choice, weak. The state's four-time Senator, Wayne Morse, has often remarked, "There are no Democrats or Republicans on the Oregon Congressional delegation when it comes to Oregon issues. . . . We're against party machinery."[40] Time editors claimed prior to the May 28 vote: "Kennedy enjoys support from the regular Democratic organization in Oregon, but that is puny by any reckoning in that anti-organization state."[41] The State Democratic Party Chairman, Edward N. Fadeley of Eugene, never publicly announced his support of Kennedy, yet his political leanings were evident when he was among the first to board Kennedy's chartered airplane when it landed to begin his Oregon campaign in Portland on March 25. In addition, Fadeley rode in the Senator's car on that visit and helped to organize his mid-April appearance in the state. The hostile reaction to this open show

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[38]Sander Vanocur, "The Huntley Brinkley Report," NBC News, May 17, 1968.

[39]Corry, p. 60. [40]Ibid.

[41]"The Politics of Restoration," p. 27.

of partisanship was later to lead Fadeley to threaten to resign his party post.

The Kennedy organization in Oregon began with indications that it would turn out to be as weak as the party organization. By early May, McCarthy had forty-two campaign offices to Kennedy's ten.[42] The first Kennedy office to open was in Portland on April 18; the headquarters in the state's second largest city, Eugene, opened as late as May. The University of Oregon Kennedy group had five abortive attempts at an organizational meeting before it faded into near non-existence. By contrast, McCarthy had corralled a large student army who had canvassed each of the state's 500,000 registered Democrats, rating them on a scale from one to five for future contacts.

The only opinion poll conducted in Oregon concerning the Presidential Preference Primary was led by the Oliver Quayle organization on May 17, 1968. This group announced that Senator Kennedy was leading with twenty-nine per cent of the predicted vote; McCarthy would garner twenty-seven per cent; Johnson, sixteen; Humphrey, twelve; others, four; and twelve, undecided.[43] This large undecided bloc would decide the close Oregon Primary of 1968, a primary characterized by a clouding of the issues, weak party organization and an independent electorate. As one analyst concluded, "The decisions may well hinge on the last days of

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[42]Interview with Lee Fentriss, Kennedy advance man, May 17, 1968.

[43]David Brinkley, "The Huntley-Brinkley Report," NBC-News, May 17, 1968.

campaigning."[44]

The Kennedy Strategy In Oregon

The dominant theme in the Kennedy strategy in Oregon was exposure. Kennedy himself articulated this strategy when he stated, "I have to go into the primaries, I have to present my case to the American people."[45] As Lee Fentriss, a professional Kennedy advance man, remarked,

> Our main objective in this state will be to bring to the people the candidate--let them see this Eastern thing they marvel at. If we can only get this man to the people, let them see him. Let them see he's not so different: he can communicate with them, he has the same feelings, the same desire, the same wishes. Then I think we can do well.[46]

Most of the publicity for this exposure was handled by advance men; one such worker, Kevin Connell, described his duties:

> I came late Wednesday night to meet with the local coordinators and people who are working on it [the campaign] to find out what they've done. Our area is to make this visit 'work,' that means all the details of motorcades, arranging things at the airport or train station, facilities where he's going to speak--make sure people know he is going to speak, what time and everything.[47]

When Kennedy handled some of these same chores for his brother in 1960, local leaders often called him ruthless and arrogant as he took over their area of control; this same charge could be applicable to the advance men who worked for Robert Kennedy in 1968. To this observer, they appeared trim, energetic, sure of themselves, demanding and quick to anger. When Connell was asked to comment on a remark made by Richard

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[44] Warren Weaver, Jr., "Close Vote Seen in Oregon Ballot," The New York Times, May 19, 1968, p. 48.

[45] Kennedy, "Statement of Candidacy," p. 68. [46] Fentriss Interview.

[47] Interview with Kevin Connell, Kennedy advance man, May 17, 1968.

Kennedy, a local Eugene leader, he snapped:

> It's not up to Richard Kennedy to decide who can come into Oregon . . . Rich Kennedy is no authority on much of anything. I don't think he's in a position to criticize an advance man.[48]

In addition to physical arrangements, the professional men prepared campaign schedules for the national newsmen who travelled with Kennedy, wrote press releases to announce his visit and organized telephoning crews. Money was to be no object; "we charge everything to the national headquarters, 2000 L Street in Washington. I don't think we're spending more--we're spending it more wisely."[49] On the final weekend of campaigning, advance man Bill Foley organized ten girls for telephone publicity of Kennedy's arrival at the airport on May 27 in Eugene; the girls worked fifteen hours each at $1.65 an hour. Adding to that wage their six-dollar steak dinners and drinks, the venture cost the Kennedy campaign over $250.00; less than one hundred supporters appeared for his airport visit.[50]

Early Kennedy plans were to spend $200,000 to $250,000 in Oregon; Kennedy himself was to campaign seven to eight days in the state, devoting most of his time to the populous Willamette Valley.[51] The schedule included:

March 25: press conference at Portland International Airport

" " : reception, Memorial Coliseum, Portland

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[48] Ibid. [49] Ibid.

[50] This writer was one of the ten hired for the telephone work. The crowd estimation was based on the personal observation of this writer.

[51] Fadeley Interview.

March 25: strategy session, Benson Hotel, Portland

March 26: breakfast strategy session, Benson Hotel, Portland

" " : speech, Portland State College

" " : rally, University of Portland

April 16: speech, Eugene Airport

April 17: breakfast strategy session, Eugene Hotel

" " : stops at logging site and labor temple

" " : speech, shopping center, Springfield

" " : speech, Lane County Courthouse, Eugene

" " : speech, Coos Bay

" " : speech, Medford

April 18: brief rallies at Oregon City, Klamath Falls, Canby, Salem and Woodburn

" " : speech, Oregon State University, Corvallis

" " : open headquarters, Portland

May 17 : downtown motorcade, Portland

" " : speech, Portland City Club

" " : two factory visits, stops at a nursing home and two schools

" " : speech, mock political convention, Sunset High School, Portland

May 18 : "Beaver State Special," stops at Oregon City, Salem, Albany, Harrisburg, Junction City and Eugene

" " : Motorcade, downtown Eugene

" " : speech, Hayward Field, Eugene

May 22, 23: bus trip through Eastern Oregon including stops at Bend, Redmond, LaGrande and Ontario

May 25 : rallies at Tillamook, Astoria and Coos Bay

May 25: stroll down Oregon Beaches

May 26: television taping, Portland

" " : rally, Eugene Airport

" " : rally, Lane County Fairgrounds, Eugene

May 27: breakfast with Eugene-Springfield clergy

" " : speech, Roseburg

In addition, other Kennedys and Kennedy supporters helped fulfill the strategy of exposure. Sisters Jean and Pat travelled with him on his brief March visit; brother Ted spoke at Roseburg on May 9; mother Rose made several appearances in Eugene and Portland on May 23 and 24; Pat attended rounds of tea parties in Eugene and Portland on May 25 and 26; and wife Ethel joined her husband during the last hectic week. Jim Bohrenburg, former director of the United States Crime Commission, spoke on Kennedy's behalf before a private luncheon in Eugene on May 17; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. made two Oregon speaking appearances for the Kennedy candidacy; and numerous professional entertainers stumped in the Portland area for their candidate from New York.

Key members of the national Kennedy organization treked to Oregon as the voting day neared. Three speech writers travelled throughout the state with the candidate: Adam Walinsky, Peter Edelman, and Jeff Greenfield. Theodore Sorensen joined this group on election eve but had no direct hand in the Oregon work. Organization masters such as William vanden Heuvel, Fred Dutton, Herb Schmertz, and Hugh McDonald worked through the Portland office as key coordinators. During the final week, six advance men were struggling with publicity and crowd-seeking--two in Portland, two in Eugene, one in Oregon City, one in Salem and one in Albany--working under the direct supervision of their chairman,

Joe Gargan.[52] Connell best summarized their campaign philosophy when he said: "We don't relax a minute; we don't stop a minute until he leaves . . . This is what we do and we do it quite well . . . It's the greatest human organization."[53] The Kennedy workers were dedicated; Fentriss exemplified this loyalty when he stated, "When Kennedy announced, I quit [as a prosecutor for the Department of Justice.] This is what we've been waiting for."[54]

By the last half of May, the 1968 Presidential race had proven to be a challenge to even the finer political minds; candidates and issues had changed rapidly in an almost-domino effect. As the campaign scene shifted to Oregon, candidates found themselves wooing an electorate of an unusual blend of conservative and liberal leanings, an electorate with a distrust of traditional party machinery. To these people, Robert F. Kennedy brought his primary campaign machinery. In Oregon, as in other primaries of 1968:

> Bobby Kennedy was playing his dangerous game with the crowds, dangerous to his own safety and that of others. To be nominated, he must create a winner psychology. He was going over the heads of the delegates, to the people.[55]

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[52]Fentriss Interview.

[53]Connell Interview.

[54]Fentriss Interview.

[55]David Wise, "How Bobby Plans to Win It," The Saturday Evening Post, June 1, 1968, p. 27.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ALL-PURPOSE CAMPAIGN TALK

As Robert F. Kennedy moved about the United States from March to June, 1968, super-enthusiastic voters and future voters mobbed him. William Nicholas described a typical stump scene when he wrote:

> Out around the country--on college campuses and in supermarket parking lots, along curbstones and in airport terminals, from Chula Vista, California to Bangor, Maine--they step on each other's feet to get a glimpse of him. They leap off the ground and surge about like cattle, groping to put their hands on him, to rip off a coat button, to pluck at his necktie, his face, his hair. . . . And when he clambers up to stand above them on an auditorium stage or a wooden box or the hood of a car, they scream and whistle and smack their hands together until he quiets them. . . . The people gaze--full of curiosity, awe, even hero-worship.[1]

The people of Oregon felt the same attraction; one Eugene reporter wrote: "There were people--hundreds of them--lining the sidewalks, and they were cheering as the candidate rode by in his open-top convertible."[2]

At each rally site, Kennedy delivered a campaign talk that sounded very familiar to the entourage of newsmen who had travelled with the Senator since the announcement of his candidacy on March 16. The stump speeches varied in length and adaptation to local issues, but they always seemed to contain the same phrasing, the same jokes, the same national issues and the same delivery. Yet, the phrasing, the

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[1]Nicholas, p. 4.

[2]Henny Willis, "Eugene Visit was Bright Spot in RFK Campaign Swing," The Eugene Register-Guard, May 19, 1968, p. 3A.

jokes, the national issues, and the delivery were new to the crowds that sought their first glimpse of the Easterner at each stop in the Oregon Primary campaign.

It is the purpose of this chapter to develop a composite sketch of the audience adaptation, content, use of proofs, style and delivery of the Kennedy all-purpose campaign talks by specifically examining two such speeches: one delivered April 17, 1968, at the Eugene Civic Center; the other, at the Salem Train Depot on May 18, 1968.[3] From these generalizations, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Kennedy stump speech in the Oregon Primary of 1968 can be made.

Audience Adaptation

With many twelve-to-eighteen hour days and countless rallies, addresses and receptions the normal procedures for a political campaign, stump speeches are usually deemed to require little advance preparation. Kennedy's all-purpose campaign talks were seldom even outlined, but advance work and briefing of the candidate did allow some measure of audience adaptation at each campaign stop.

Kennedy's organized crews of advance men were responsible for determining the "feel" of a locality. One such worker, Kevin Connell, described his responsibilities when he said:

> We find out what the local issues are when we come into an area and we'll pursue them from a couple different

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[3]See verbatim texts, Appendixes I and II, pp. 126-144.

> sources[4] and then we'll sort of tie this in to what the community is like, what the people are interested in, what their dislikes are, and then we'll relay this ahead for more help for the speechwriter and his approach.[5]

When the Beaver State Special began its ride through the Willamette Valley on May 18, the advance men had done their job. The candidate was armed with a fact sheet that included specific historical references and statistics about each of the six towns to be visited. The Background Itinerary had the following citation for the second stop, Salem:

> Population: 66,200. State Capital. Leading city of Marion County. Newspapers: Oregon Statesman, Capital Journal (dailys). Radio: KAPT (Mutual); KBZY, KGAY (ind.); KSLM (ABC). Founded 1840. Second largest fruit and vegetable processing center in the U.S. Largest manufacturer in the nation of carnival equipment; Site of Willamette University, Oldest university in Northwest.[6]

In addition to this information, travelling speechwriter, Jeff Greenfield, wrote a note to remind Kennedy of his humorous pronunciation of "Willamette" before a Salem audience in April.[7] With all of this briefing, Kennedy said in his whistle-stop speech at Salem:

> We had such a great trip to Salem last time. I had such a good time and pronounced all the words exactly properly. [Laughter] I hear all my supporters have had a very, very difficult time. Willamette. [Laughter] I've been studying it. You know, before

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[4]Connell was very vague about what he meant by the term "different sources." When Bill Foley was advancing for Kennedy in Eugene on May 24-26, he obtained his information on local issues from Richard Kennedy, local campaign organizer, called it in to Joe Gargan at the national headquarters who, in turn, relayed it to Kennedy's personal staff travelling in Portland.

[5]Connell Interview.

[6]Background Itinerary obtained from Greenfield interview.

[7]Greenfield Interview.

> I arrived last time, I studied it in the car to make sure that I got it exactly properly, and then I blew it. [Laughter] But I'm very, very pleased to be here; this is an old town, community with a long, long history of which all of you are terribly proud. The oldest educational institution in the state of Oregon and all that you've accomplished in Salem and all that you stand for here in the state of Oregon. I'm proud to be here.[8]

Unlike his Salem appearance, Kennedy did use a small note for his Civic Center speech in Eugene; the scrap of paper contained three references: "Pres. Kennedy in 60; Edith Green; Jack Beatty."[9] These notes, scribbled in Kennedy's handwriting, became only brief comments during the actual speech:

> It's a great pleasure to be here, and I hope that we have as much success in the primary starting in Eugene, Oregon, as President Kennedy did starting in Eugene, Oregon, in 1960. I'm very pleased to be here. . . . So I come here to Oregon to thank those who have been supporters, such as Congresswoman Green and Jack Beatty and others, but also to ask for your support, . . .[10]

In addition to playing to the local pride of the Oregonians, Kennedy attempted to identify with state-wide issues. In his Civic Center speech, the Senator made passing references to three issues that William vanden Heuvel, a national campaign organizer for Kennedy, had determined were of concern to Oregon voters:[11] inflation, water pollution, and the loss of recreational areas.[12] The Salem stump speech contained even more references to these audience-oriented topics;

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[8]Verbatim text, p. 135.

[9]The notes were shown to this writer by Senator Kennedy just prior to the Civic Center talk.

[10]Verbatim text, p. 126 and p. 133.

[11]Brinkley, "The Huntley-Brinkley Report," May 17, 1968.

[12]Verbatim text, p. 130

Kennedy referred again to the high inflation rate and pollution and to the high interest rates, hospital costs and university expenditures.[13] Yet in each of these speeches, as with nearly all of Kennedy's all-purpose campaign talks, the local issues were greatly overshadowed by the Senator's emphasis on the national issues in the campaign.

Content

Four national issues appeared in each of the twelve stump speeches the writer heard Kennedy deliver in Oregon during the two month's prior to the May 28 vote; they were: the Vietnam war, the riots and lawlessness, the welfare system, and decent housing. One Time analyst gave a good account of Kennedy's glossed-over discussion of these issues in his short, impromptu speeches when he reported that:

> Not many of his proposals are original. His answer to poverty boils down basically to jobs, which is roughly what everyone else is saying, but unlike many other liberals, he opposes a guaranteed annual income. . . . He wants better housing and welfare programs. His ideas about how to finance all this are debatable. . . . The billions now being spent on the Viet Nam war are the key to the nation's fiscal and economic problems; he argues, perhaps too optimistically, that once the war is over, domestic needs can be met.[14]

On domestic issues, little of substance divided either the the Republican or Democratic candidates in the Oregon Primary. Harold Hughes, political writer for the Portland Oregonian, pointed out the similarity between Kennedy's and Nixon's proposals for tax incentives

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[13] Verbatim text, p. 140.

[14] "The Politics of Restoration," p. 25.

for private enterprises that enter the ghettos in an interview with the New York Senator aboard the Oregon campaign train. The Kennedy ire was immediately aroused as if he had been wrongly accused of a terrible deed. Temporarily forgetting his strategy of appearing kind and lovable, Kennedy shouted in anger at the shocked reporter:

> God, you know damn well that there is one big difference between us. I didn't just start supporting tax incentives. I've been talking about them for the period of the past few years. My book, To Seek A Newer World, came out last year. Have you bothered to read it?[15]

As the Kennedy strategists analyzed more carefully the composition and attitudes of the Beaver State's constituency, the Kennedy forces became worried. Theodore H. White expressed their fears when he wrote: "Oregon, a great white suburb, had no problems; he knew he frightened Oregon by what he spoke of and his visions."[16] In order to combat what Kennedy feared to be apathy on the part of Oregonians toward the national issues, the candidate used a different technique to introduce the urgency of the four national problems that he had chosen to emphasize. The new strategy was evident in the Civic Center talk:

> . . . when these riots and this lawlessness and this violence takes place, whether it's in New York, in Chicago or Los Angeles, it affects everybody's lives. You can't separate yourselves if you're in Eugene, Oregon. You can't separate yourselves; you're concerned about it. You're concerned about it as an American citizen. You're concerned about it because of what it does about our prestige and our position all around the rest of the globe.[17]

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[15] The interview was conducted in the presence of this writer.

[16] Theodore H. White, "The Wearing Last Weeks and a Precious Last Day," in Life: Special Edition, June 1968, p. 39.

[17] Verbatim text, pp. 128-129.

Likewise, the Salem campaign talk tried to arouse Oregonians to the tragedies in their nation; Kennedy said, "And that must be a matter of concern, whether it affects us personally in our own lives or whether it affects other American citizens. It has to be a matter of concern here in Salem."[18]

Use of Proofs

This determination of Kennedy's support for his arguments in a composite all-purpose campaign talk has been divided into the classic Aristotelian divisions of ethical, logical and emotional proof as a useful step in evaluating the Senator's campaign rhetoric in the Oregon Primary of 1968.

Of the three types of proof available to a speaker, Kennedy chose to stress ethical and emotional proof in his stump speeches throughout Oregon. In all, six different means of enhancing the candidate's ethos with the Beaver State's voters were used; Kennedy attempted to erase the charge of ruthlessness by employing humor and banter, to identify himself with his audience and their problems, to emphasize his own qualifications for the high office, to link his causes with the great minds of the past, to stress the role of the individual voter in democratic decision-making, and to attack the causes of his opponents with tact and consideration.

Most of Kennedy's humor was self-deprecating; the New York Senator chose to laugh with the crowds at his large family, his "opportunistic

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[18]Verbatim text, p. 136.

entry" into the Presidential campaign, and his "ruthless" image. Representative of all three of these topics was his story about the political poll that he had taken amongst his children.[19] Shannon concluded about the Kennedy humor that, "Many of the anecdotes may be contrived and the witticisms ghosted, but enough of them are his own to prove his impulse toward sardonic humor."[20]

Another stumping technique which Kennedy used frequently was banter with his surging crowds, both to keep his audiences interested and to appear "unruthless." At the proper moment, Kennedy would stop and lead his audience in a round of applause for what he had just uttered. After relating a sad, tearful scene that would take place in his Hickory Hill home if he lost in Oregon, Kennedy asked his Salem audience: ". . . now would you want that to happen?"[21] In unison the excited throng shouted, "No!"

A second ethos-searching tool was Kennedy's already-discussed attempts at audience adaptation. By identifying himself with Oregon's people, issues and history, Kennedy hoped to project the image of a man who could lead the people of that Beaver State.

Kennedy had two major experiences in national government; both of them were usually mentioned in his campaign talks throughout the state. The candidate told his Salem audience: "If I'm elected President of the United States with your help, I'm going to do all in my power, as I did as Attorney General, to see that we don't, to see

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[19]Verbatim text, p. 126.

[20]Shannon, p. 255.

[21]Verbatim text, p. 143.

that we abide by the law. . . . "[22] He went on: "I think that they [those on Social Security] need at least one-hundred dollars a month, and I've introduced legislation to that effect."[23] As well as relying on his own experience, Kennedy related his views with the opinions of great leaders of the past: Shaw, Bacon and Camus.

A fifth technique was the Senator's glorification of the importance of the Oregon Primary. Kennedy probably pleased his Eugene audience on April 17 when he said:

> This will be an important and significant primary. The eyes of the nation will be here. We can turn this country around. We can make a difference in the state of Oregon. We can make a difference in our position all around the rest of the globe.[24]

Yet Kennedy did not want their feeling of importance to end on May 28; thus, he stated to his Salem listeners:

> I'll return the Presidency, the control of government . . . to you, yourselves. And I'm going to work with you and I'm going to work for you and use the talent and the courage of the American people. The responsibility doesn't rest just in Washington: it rests in communities such as Salem and it rests across the state of Oregon, this great, great state.[25]

A final form of ethical proof was Kennedy's gentle attacks on his opponents; both Republicans and Democrats alike felt the jab of Kennedy's humorous and serious jabs. The humor was usually directed toward the Republicans; Humphrey and the Administration were attacked for their foreign and domestic policies. Kennedy said of Vice President

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[22] Ibid., p. 138. [23] Ibid., p. 141.

[24] Verbatim Eugene text, p. 133.

[25] Verbatim Salem text, p. 144.

Humphrey: "One of my major opponents says that we should have the politics of joy and the politics of happiness. . . . I don't think that we can say that we're joyous or that we're happy when 590 Americans were killed in Vietnam last week and if we have rioting in our nation's capital."[26]

Kennedy's establishment of ethos with his stump audiences was thus varied and extensive. The appeals were simple and direct; and of course, to add to these planned appeals was his antecedent ethos already established. As one analyst wrote, "Kennedy is still Kennedy. He has the capacity to make the past seem better than it ever was, the future better than it ever can be. He is lean and sinewy in a weight-watching society. He is dynamic. He is virile."[27]

The second most-frequent form of support was emotional proof or pathos; in all, four different means were used to appeal to the emotional nature of the average Oregon voter. They were: to evoke the memory of President Kennedy, to enforce man's drive for survival, to call for fair play by eliminating the injustices that exist, and to appeal to the voter's love of his country.

Robert Kennedy's references to his late brother, President Kennedy, becameless frequent as the Presidential campaign of 1968 progressed; yet, in both the Eugene and Salem campaign talks, the New Yorker included the late President's name, a name that has the power to evoke great feelings from many Americans. The references were casual,

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[26] Ibid., p. 142.

[27] "The Politics of Restoration," p. 27.

not strained as many reporters felt they once had been. Senator Kennedy said in Salem: "I'm proud of what was done under the Democratic administration of President Kennedy."[28]

The final three types of emotional appeal--survival, fair play and patriotism--are evaluated in detail in Chapter Four and thus need only to be mentioned here. Logos, or logical appeal, was minor in each of Kennedy's all-purpose campaign talks. No complicated reasoning was required; Kennedy simply said, "I'm glad to be here and I need your help."

Of the three forms of support for a logical argument, statistics, example and testimony from authority, only one was used regularly in the Kennedy stump speeches. Statistics were frequent and committed to memory by the candidate. In the representative speeches, Kennedy referred to the gross national product, school drop-out rates in the ghetto, costs of the Vietnam war, Indian literacy percentages, the number of televisions, hospital costs and Social Security benefits. The facts were always uncited and unexplained; their purpose seemed to impress the Oregon audiences with the candidate's familiarity with the issues and with the shocking nature of some of the country's problems.

The Kennedy all-purpose campaign talk in Oregon was thus characterized by little logical appeal. With good reason, Kennedy seemed most concerned about his image, and this concern was reflected in his emphasis on ethical proof. Emotion too played an important role

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[28]Verbatim Salem text, p. 136.

in encouraging the Oregon voters that Robert Francis Kennedy should be the next President of the United States.

Style

An evaluation of a composite view of Kennedy's stump speeches in Oregon for style of discourse must recognize the presence of three stylistic devices that were unusually effective--the rhetorical question, parallel structure and sentence variety. Yet, on the other hand, this critic is forced to also acknowledge the often awkward sentence structure, "run-on" sentences and repetition that hindered the effectiveness of that rhetoric.

In addition to the bantering questions he employed to loosen the audiences, Kennedy was able to word concise and effective rhetorical questions to force his audience to think critically of some more weighty topic; for example, the Senator asked his Eugene audience:

> What is our national purpose? What is our national goal? . . . We have enough military power to destroy all mankind all over the globe. But is that enough?[29]

Another stylistic device which Kennedy employed was parallel structure. Equating several desired actions, Kennedy said:

> I want to see them end the corruption and dishonesty that exists in their country. I want to see them put in a land reform program that will gain the support of the people. I want to see them put in a political reform program so that they gain the support of the people.[30]

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[29]Verbatim Eugene text, p. 127.

[30]Verbatim Salem text, p. 139.

A final admirable characteristic was Kennedy's use of sentence variety to sustain the interest of his audience; the Senator remarked in Eugene:

> I don't think that we have to accept that, and I don't think the black citizens of the United States want it, and I don't think that all of those that live here in Eugene, Oregon, or the State of Oregon want it, and I don't think it should be tolerated or accepted within our country. I think we can do something about it.[31]

But all aspects of Kennedy's rhetorical style were not to his advantage. He often changed thoughts in the middle of a sentence, let a sentence run on for several lines at a time, or repeated himself endlessly. Representative of these faults was the sentence:

> It could be used to provide, help our black people, but other minorities, minorities that I saw yesterday, and I've seen many times before, our Indians, the first citizens of the United States who suffer a drop-out rate in school of sixty-five per cent, whose unemployment in many areas of the United States goes up to eighty and ninety per cent, whose life expectancy is, is four times less than that of a white person.[32]

Finally, the candidate's concepts of local control and the importance of the Oregon Primary were repeated many times throughout his Salem talk, often using the same wording. This repetition did not add emphasis to his claims, but rather, probably lessened their impact on the voters' minds.

Delivery

If one's name were Robert Kennedy, delivering a campaign talk could be quite an ordeal with the crowds always surging to reach you, to steal some part of you to cherish after you had gone. In spite of the

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[31] Verbatim Eugene text, p. 128. [32] Ibid., p. 132.

handicaps of people and circumstances, Senator Kennedy was able to give ". . . an adequate stump speech. . . . Although the delivery itself is nervous. . . there is evident an eloquence that reminds onlookers of his older brother."[33]

The voice was eerily reminiscent of the 1960 campaign. Nicholas called it ". . . a hesitant, nasal, Bostonian monotone."[34] Hearing it, White wrote, "It is weird to hear that voice again;"[35] and further, Laing, in her account of the Western campaign, said, "His listeners often have a sense of déjà vu as they hear the New England accent, the wry humor."[36] Kennedy spoke in impassioned tones as he recounted this nation's woes; as Laing wrote, "The parts of them [his campaign talks] about which he feels fervently come across like a charge of electricity."[37]

His physical delivery was also familiar to the crowds that had come out to hear a Kennedy in 1960 and returned in 1968. One reporter compared the brothers when he wrote: "The emphatic downthrusting of his right forefinger evokes Jack's gestures."[38] The younger Kennedy's gestures jabbed and chopped the air in rapid-fire delivery; sometimes the jerky movements appeared to betray the taut nerves within. Even though the words became calm, his hands were still ". . . moving, reaching, pleading."[39]

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[33]Henny Willis, "Kennedy Tour 'Organized Bedlam,'" Eugene Register-Guard, April 21, 1968, p. 8.

[34]Nicholas, p. 4.

[35]Wise, p. 26.

[36]Laing, p. 15.

[37]Ibid.

[38]American Heritage, ed., Bobby (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1968), p. 51.

[39]White, "The Wearing Last Weeks, . . ." p. 39.

Another familiar gesture involved the pounding of his right fist in his left palm. Hal Higdon wrote: "When his older brother, the late John F. Kennedy, spoke, he chopped the air with his hands; Bobby is more--he's a clapper."[40] The claps were often poorly timed but the effect was pronounced.[41] The crowds appeared to sense the commitment of the man as evidenced by his physical involvement.

There were also the nervous gestures that served no purpose in the communication process. Kennedy pulled at his hair or his coat pocket flap and twisted the pen or scribbled notes in his hand. The crowds either didn't seem to notice or else squealed in delight at the little-boy image. As Wise concluded, "The crowds were, and there was no other word for it, happy."[42]

Effect

Following Kennedy's visit to Eugene in April, A Eugene Register-Guard reporter wrote:

> All in all, the impressions of the Kennedy visit leave one with the conclusion that it is part circus and Hollywood, always aimed at the TV camera, but that it is also a distinctive part of the political campaigning style of the 1960's. By the time Bobby Kennedy jetted out of Eugene last Wednesday, it was evident that a unique political phenomenon had been in town.[43]

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[40]Hal Higdon, "Indiana: A Test for Bobby Kennedy," New York Times Magazine, May 5, 1968, p. 32.

[41]This comment is based on the personal observation of the writer after hearing Kennedy speak many times in the Oregon Primary campaign.

[42]Wise, p. 26.

[43]Willis, "Kennedy Tour 'Organized Bedlam,'" p. 8.

Kennedy's all-purpose campaign talks were an important part of that phenomenon. As a method of fulfilling the over-all strategy of exposure, the stump speeches took little time, attracted significant crowds, and provided free publicity for the candidate. To be sure, Kennedy's stump speaking in the Oregon Primary brought maximum exposure and efficient use of candidate strength.

The crowds that fought to touch him at each stop were not chance occurrences, however. When Kennedy organizers decided to parade their candidate to Hayward Field in Eugene on May 18 by an open-car motorcade, signs were placed along the route which read, "Robert Kennedy will pass this point at 1:30 p.m." The "Beaver State Special" crowds were similarly organized; Kevin Connell, the Kennedy man advancing the Harrisburg and Junction City stops, said:

> I went out to Harrisburg and Junction City yesterday and it was really the first they knew about it [the Kennedy visit], and I went out today to check with different people--the school principal, the mayor, and the police chief--and everyone knows about it.[44]

Finally, a car equipped with a public address system paraded through the Eugene downtown area to announce that "Senator Robert F. Kennedy will speak at the Civic Center at noon" during the morning of April 17.

Crowd size varied from stop to stop, generally depending on the adequacy of the advance work; for example, approximately 1,000 waited at the Salem Train Depot, a town of 66,000, while an equal number of

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[44]Connell interview.

spectators gathered at Albany, a town of considerably smaller size.[45] The Civic Center crowd began gathering at 9:30 A.M. for the noon address; by the time Kennedy arrived, traffic for two blocks around the Center was halted and people filled the sidewalks and streets and perched in nearby office windows.[46] Yet, such was not always the scene. Reporters described the May 17 Kennedy campaign picture in Portland by saying:

> Friday somebody goofed. There were no crowds, there was no adulation, there was no magic. He rode through two dozen blocks of downtown Portland in an open car--and the sidewalks were empty. No signs announced that he would "pass this point at 4 P.M."[47]

Crowd response was usually encouraging. Harold Hughes, political writer for the Oregonian, wrote: "The whistle stop crowds generally were not as big as those that lined the tracks in Indiana and Nebraska, traveling newsmen thought, although in some cases they were a lot more enthusiastic."[48]

Kennedy's strategy of de-emphasizing logical proof in favor of ethical and emotional appeals appeared successful; the crowds seemed to love the Kennedy wit and banter. Day after day the local reporters filed stories which read, "The crowd roared with laughter . . ."[49] On

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[45]Harold Hughes, "Kennedy Pushes Campaign Via Train," The Oregonian, May 19, 1968, p. 1.

[46]The April 17 occurrence is described from the personal experience of the writer.

[47]Joseph E. Mohbat, "Kennedy's Charisima Upset in Portland," The Aberdeen Daily World, May 18, 1968, p. 5.

[48]Hughes, "Kennedy Pushes Campaign Via Train," p. 1.

[49]Willis, "Kennedy Tour 'Organized Bedlam,'" p. 8.

the other hand, the throngs grew restless when Kennedy became serious and mentioned the nation's ills; one analyst wrote: "He . . . won something of a reputation among the locals as an insatiable gloom merchant."[50]

Many political thinkers, however, questioned the importance of the content of the campaign speeches in determining election results. One Time reporter wrote: "At this stage of the campaign, the crowds seem to be looking at the runners more than listening."[51] If the reporter's analysis proved to be correct, Kennedy was employing the correct campaign strategy, for the all-purpose campaign talks, lacking depth of thinking, were an effective means of bringing the Presidential candidate to the voters of Oregon.

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[50]"'It is Much Better to Win,'" p. 34.

[51]"The Politics of Restoration," p. 25.

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CHAPTER IV

THE MAJOR ADDRESS

The major, prepared address delivered at Hayward Field at the University of Oregon in Eugene on May 18, 1968, followed a five-hour, tightly-scheduled ride from Portland aboard the Kennedy campaign train, "The Beaver State Special." Upon arrival at the Union Station in Eugene at 1:50 P.M., Kennedy and his large delegation of pressmen and campaign workers formed a motorcade to travel the few miles to the University field. The procession was, at that point, nearly an hour behind schedule: the train had left Portland twenty-five minutes late, Kennedy had given an unusually-long "stump speech" in Salem, and enthusiastic crowds at Harrisburg and Junction City had postponed departure times.

In spite of the delay, however, approximately seven thousand spectators were waiting for the Senator to arrive at the University.[1] The Saturday afternoon program was billed as a portion of a week-long conference on social problems, sponsored by the school's Department of Community Service and Public Affairs; yet the address was originally scheduled in March for that date, independent of the conference.[2]

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[1]Lee O'Connor, "RFK Says U. S. Failing in Vietnam," Oregon Daily Emerald, May 20, 1968, p. 1.

[2]Fadeley interview.

Early planning had been handled by State Senator Edward N. Fadeley and Bob Winnea of the Community Service and Public Affairs Department, Chairman of the University's Faculty-for-Kennedy Committee; later, State Representative Richard Kennedy, head of the local Kennedy headquarters, and Kevin Connell and Lee Fentriss, the Kennedy advance men in Eugene, had directed publicity and physical arrangements. Kennedy volunteers had been calling local residents for a week, reminding them of the candidate's speech; a paid-advertisement was placed in the May 17 issue of the Eugene Register Guard, inviting voters to bring their families to hear the Senator.[3] The emphasis was on numbers; the strategy was evident--expose Robert Kennedy to the people of Oregon.[4]

The ". . . predominantly student"[5] audience listened patiently as local leaders with varying degrees of political influence were introduced, including Fadeley and Richard Kennedy. In addition, University officials, Norman D. Sundberg, head of the School of Community Service and Public Affairs, and Dick Jones, Student Body President, were recognized. Finally, the Chancellor of the State System of Higher Education, Roy E. Lieuallen, introduced Senator Kennedy with a short, prepared speech that reviewed past appearances by other national candidates, beginning with John F. Kennedy in 1960, and outlined the younger Kennedy's background in public service. Lieuallen concluded:

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[3]Eugene Register-Guard, May 17, 1968.

[4]When the writer was making arrangements to ride the campaign train, Herb Schmertz, a national Kennedy organizer and the originator of the "Beaver State Special," expressed grave concern over projected attendance at Hayward Field.

[5]Henny Willis, "HHH 'Misstatement' Blasted by Kennedy," Eugene Register-Guard, May 19, 1968, p. 1.

"I am not insensitive to the high privilege accorded to me in presenting the Honorable Robert F. Kennedy, Senator from New York."[6] The introduction was restrained in its praise, but the speaker was greeted with enthusiastic applause as he approached the rostrum. Kennedy then commenced to deliver an address that relied on his own ability in extemporaneous speaking and, to a larger degree, the talents of his travelling team of speechwriters. Before evaluating the result of this combined effort, it is valuable to discover the method of preparation used to finalize the Hayward Field manuscript.

Preparation

Even though three speechwriters were travelling with Kennedy, the candidate had delivered only one, earlier prepared speech during his Oregon campaign. Twice his publicity team had announced a pending "major address;" only once had it materialized, March 26 at Portland State College. On April 18, Kennedy had also been scheduled to deliver an address of importance at Oregon State University in Corvallis, but local leaders were disappointed when no advance copies of the text were distributed and the remarks were nothing more than a "Thank you for coming--I need your help" stump speech.[7] Before his Eugene arrival, speculation arose as to whether this address would really be of the major significance it had been advertised. Advance man Lee Fentriss

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[6] Verbatim transcript of Kennedy speech at Hayward Field, Eugene, May 18, 1968.

[7] Interview with Marvin Olmstead of the Oregon State University Speech Department, April 22, 1968.

answered this question when he said: "Oh, it'll be prepared. Now whether the Senator reads it—that's a different matter!"[8]

The Hayward Field address was almost entirely the work of one speechwriter, Adam Walinsky. Writers have described Walinsky's relationship with the New York Senator in many ways: Shannon listed him as a "legislative assistant;"[9] de Toledano called him Kennedy's "chief aid;"[10] Schaap credited him with being the "chief staff speechwriter;"[11] and Wise reported he was simply a "speechwriter and adviser."[12] When asked to define his own role, Walinsky answered, "I guess you could call me the chief travelling speechwriter; yeh, that's it, chief travelling speechwriter."[13]

Thirty-one year old Walinsky began as a Justice Department aide following graduation from Yale Law School as Order of the Coif. After summarizing the credentials of Walinsky and other staff members, Shannon wrote, "Kennedy's bright young men have the outstanding academic records and evident high intelligence that he likes in aides."[14] But writers did not usually choose to emphasize the young aide's intelligence; as Wise

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[8] Pentriss interview.

[9] Shannon, The Heir Apparent, p. 97.

[10] de Toledano, p. 333.

[11] Schaap, p.21.

[12] Wise, p. 25.

[13] Interview with Adam Walinsky, chief travelling Kennedy speechwriter, May 26, 1968.

[14] Shannon, p. 97.

wrote, Walinsky is "at once young, committed, cynical, earnest, serious and witty."[15] Despite his lengthy list, Wise did, however, leave out the word most reporters used to describe the speechwriter--adamant. Even the Kennedy staff felt the sometimes-grating effect of his personality:

> The diverse crew is not without its frictions. There is something of a generation gap between the veterans and the youngsters, a certain amount of resentment that 'Adamant Adam' Walinsky gets the last word so often on rhetoric.[16]

Only a little more than one-third of the Eugene address was written specifically for that occasion; the remaining two-thirds, as handed out in advance copies to the press, was lifted from an earlier Kennedy speech on Vietnam delivered at the University of California at Berkeley in April, 1961.[17] When asked about the wisdom of this policy, Walinsky countered, "You can't write a new Vietnam policy for each of the fifty states! Why, you'd have the Senator stating fifty different solutions to that war."[18]

Both the lifted portion and the new first pages were the responsibility of Walinsky.[19] When the initial draft was completed and typed in its tentative form, it was proofread by Jeff Greenfield, another travelling speechwriter, before being sent to the typists for final copying.[20]

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[15]Wise, p. 25.

[16]"The Politics of Restoration," p. 24.

[17]Interview with Jeff Greenfield, travelling Kennedy speechwriter, May 18, 1968.

[18]Walinsky interview. [19]Ibid.

[20]Personal observation of this writer.

Secretaries aboard the campaign train typed one copy on a primary typewriter and placed the large-type draft in a black notebook for the Senator's speaking manuscript; they also cut a stencil to print advance texts for the press. Greenfield read the stenciled copies and found only one error: the copy read "for Sunday P.M.'s" instead of "for Sunday A.M.'s."[21] It was now nearly 12:30 P.M. Rather than having the stencil re-cut and run again, delaying the press from beginning their daily reports and, perhaps, preventing them from meeting their deadlines, Greenfield and Hugh MacDonald, an administrative aide, began passing out the incorrectly-dated copies, telling each recipient of the error.[22]

The speech as delivered was, in many respects, vastly different from the one which the two Kennedy workers distributed on the train. The first four pages of the seventeen-page verbatim text[23] contained introductory remarks conceived at the moment by the speaker. Even after Kennedy began reading Walinsky's text,[24] the Senator was not bound by his script. He constantly interpolated words, phrases and sentences. One of his longer insertions came after announcing the latest death totals in Vietnam:

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Minutes later, the astute national pressmen noticed the heavy reliance on the earlier California text, but no explanation was given to halt their grumbling.

[23] See verbatim speech text, Appendix III, pp. 145-160.

[24] Walinsky's text began with the words, "One thing is clear in the year 1968," p. 148.

Kennedy began, "We've gone to the negotiation table in Paris,"[25] and ended, a long paragraph later, with "We cannot be content until American soldiers are returned to the United States and this land is turned over to the people of Vietnam."[26] In addition, whole paragraphs were omitted at five points during the speech.

Kennedy's reasons for these variations will perhaps never be known. Walinsky claimed that Kennedy did no prior editing; all changes from the speaking manuscript were done at the rostrum.[27] The speechwriter went on to speculate that Kennedy either lost his place, noticed wavering attention in the audience, or simply chose to utilize his own phrasing. It would seem to this observer that some of the insertions were intended to create parallel structure; for example, Walinsky had written "domestic peace and progress," but Kennedy made the phrase "domestic peace and domestic progress."[28] Also, all but one of those paragraphs which were written but not delivered appear to have a common element: they provided historical background. One dealt with the Communist threat in Laos; another, with Soviet history; a third, with Chinese perspective; and the last, with threats in Korea and Thailand. The lone remaining paragraph that was eliminated was a philosophical treatise on our future alternatives in foreign policy; no reason for its exclusion appears evident.

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[25] Verbatim speech text, p. 149.

[26] Ibid., p. 150.

[27] Walinsky interview.

[28] Verbatim speech text, p. 152.

Thesis and Lines of Argument

In the opening lines of the Walinsky text, Kennedy stated the main thrust of his address:

> All this can be traced to the central fault of the Vietnam war: that we have attempted to resolve by American military might a conflict whose outcome depends on the will and conviction of the South Vietnamese people, and we must not repeat that error again in the history of the United States.[29]

This thesis was not new to Kennedy rhetoric. On February 8, 1968, in Chicago, Illinois, Kennedy charged:

> . . . We have misconceived the nature of the war: . . . we have sought to resolve by military might a conflict whose issue depends upon the will and conviction of the South Vietnamese people.[30]

On March 7, 1967, Kennedy addressed the Senate with these words:

> All we say and do must be informed by our awareness that this horror is partly our responsibility. . . . It is our chemicals that scorch the children and our bombs that level the villages. . . . We should move toward a final settlement which allows all the major political elements in South Vietnam to participate in the choice of leadership and shape their own future directly as a people.[31]

Finally, in his book, To Seek a Newer World, Kennedy wrote:

> Above all, Vietnam teaches that a government must command the willing allegiance of its people and make itself a vehicle for the satisfaction of their national and personal aspirations. Yet there is no sign . . . that the lesson has been absorbed.[32]

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[29] Ibid., p. 150.

[30] Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World, p. 223.

[31] Schaap, p. 31.

[32] Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World, p. 172.

Yet, in attempting to headline the foreign policy speech, reporters chose to emphasize portions of the address which would draw reader interest more easily or attack more directly the established administration solutions. For example, John Herbers of the New York Times titled his by-lined article, "New Peace Talks Urged by Kennedy;"[33] Henny Willis of the Eugene Register-Guard captioned his story, "HHH 'Misstatement' Blasted by Kennedy;"[34] and the political editor of the state's largest-circulating newspaper, Harold Hughes of the (Portland) Oregonian, chose to agree with Herbers when he wrote, "RFK Urges Saigon, Viet Cong to Conduct Own Peace Talks."[35]

Perhaps in an attempt to answer analysts who had charged that Vietnam was not the central campaign issue it once had been, Kennedy began by demonstrating the current reality of the war and its death statistics. He hoped to shatter any illusions held that negotiations, of necessity, bring peace; and in doing so, he would attack the "wait-and-see" attitude of the Administration. In discussing the lesson to be learned by facing these realities, Kennedy went on to preview his method for avoiding future catastrophes: "We must learn to make clear and discriminating judgments about where the national interest really lies."[36]

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[33] John Herbers, "New Peace Talks Urged by Kennedy," New York Times, May 19, 1968, p. 46.

[34] Willis, "HHH 'Misstatement Blasted by Kennedy," p. 1.

[35] Harold Hughes, "RFK Urges Saigon, Viet Cong to Conduct Own Peace Talks," The (Portland)Oregonian, May 19, 1968, p. 24.

[36] Verbatim speech text, p. 151.

He then pointed out that the national interest lay immediately in ending the Vietnam conflict. Here again, he attacked the Administration's contentment with the negotiations: "There is a major impediment to the early success of those talks: neither the government of South Vietnam nor the National Liberation Front are yet directly involved in the negotiating process."[37]

Kennedy next chose to offer a rebuttal to various arguments favoring continuation of the war. Instead of labelling them as such, however, he introduced these attacks as answers to the central question: "What is it about the war in Vietnam that we are determined not to repeat."[38] The first such straw-issue was that Vietnam would determine the future of Asia and the whole world; Kennedy argued, "Vietnam is only Vietnam."[39] Next, he attacked the charge that we must continue to aid developing nations; Kennedy answered, "We should give no more assistance to a government . . . than that government is capable of using itself."[40] Third, he addressed himself to the threat of Communism; Kennedy pointed out that " . . . the most potent force in the world today . . . is the force of nationalism."[41] And finally, he looked at statements that said that American military

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[37] Ibid., p. 151.

[38] Ibid., p. 152.

[39] Ibid., p. 153.

[40] Ibid., p. 154.

[41] Ibid., p. 155.

might is necessary to deter Communist expansion; Kennedy claimed that this military intervention often abbetted the expansion it was meant to halt.

Kennedy's final argument dealt with the challenges facing America that have been increased by our focus on Vietnam: Russia, China, over-commitment, and domestic problems such as riots and poverty. In his conclusion, the Senator described the glory of his nation as it once was. Challenging his audience to seek the grandeur of previous days, Kennedy returned to his underlying and frequently-intimated proposition that the United States had to begin moving in the right direction again—that She had temporarily strayed off course—but that his leadership could reverse that disastrous trend.

In outline form, the Walinsky-prepared portion of the verbatim text might appear as follows:

I. Introduction: Americans want no more Vietnams:

A. Negotiations have not brought peace, for

1. Death statistics have increased, and

2. Americans have assumed a greater burden of the fighting.

B. America cannot be a policeman for the world, since

1. Discriminating judgments must be made, for

a. Sometimes, military might is the answer, and

b. Sometimes, the will of our allies is needed.

2. National interest must be first in our minds.

C. America's responsibility now is to end the Vietnam conflict, and

1. Bring the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese to the negotiating table, and

2. Avoid contradictions in government at home.

II. The question before us is how to avoid more Vietnams, since

A. Vietnam will not determine the future of the world.

B. Other developing nations may need our help, but

1. We can not automatically give military assistance, since

2. We should give only that assistance a nation is capable of using itself.

C. Communism is not equal to the force of nationalism.

D. The presence of American troops can help foreign domination, since

1. The local governments no longer feel any responsibility to aid the plight of their people, and

2. The people then seek Communism to overthrow the military intervention.

III. Greater challenges lie ahead, because

A. The Soviet Union can threaten the survival of the United States, and

B. China could hurt the United States in a land war, and

C. We could continue to overcommit ourselves through more Vietnams, and

D. We may continue to ignore problems at home.

IV. Conclusion: America has been, and must continue to be, strong through the strength of her people.

Use of Proofs

This analysis of Kennedy's support for his arguments has been divided into the classic Aristotelian divisions of ethical, logical and emotional proof; the classification, however, does not presume to advance the belief that the human mind is so compartmentalized. Rather, the system is merely a useful tool for the evaluation of Kennedy's campaign rhetoric.

Although Kennedy's May 18 address dealt with only one topic, Vietnam, the Senator never failed to recognize the primary goal of his rhetoric: to attack the present Administration and its policies and to further the Presidential campaign of Robert F. Kennedy. More specifically, the Senator chose to enhance his ethos by three means; using the terminology of Lester A. Thonssen and A. Craig Baird in their work entitled Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal, his three intentions were:

1.) to remove or minimize unfavorable impression of himself;

2.) to link the opponent or the opponent's cause with what is not virtuous . . . [or] to offer necessary rebukes with tact and consideration; and

3.) to identify himself properly with the hearers and their problems.[42]

Bobby began his address by confronting the ethos-damaging charge of ruthlessness that had marked his Presidential campaign. Nicholas claimed that the Senator always tried ". . . to create a friendly, good-

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[42]Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 387.

natured image in order to remove the notion he was ruthless."[43] His method of confrontation was a disarming wit that made him a ". . . charming comedian,"[44] and even though "Jokes alone are not enough to change an image, . . . they help a man handicapped by a reputation for toughness and ruthlessness."[45] Only one attempt at humor was as dry and self-mocking as that which characterized his Oregon campaign: "I'm glad to look out in the audience and see people who have longer hair than they said I used to have."[46] The rest of his wit was directed at opponents: Eugene McCarthy, Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon. Most of the jokes were not new; but Kennedy was considered to possess a ". . . quick wit,"[47] as evidenced by his Keating comeback and his "Somebody I brought from New York" quip after meager applause.[48]

The remainder of Kennedy's introductory remarks also enhanced his ethical appeal; he attempted to identify himself with his college-level audience and its considerations for the future. As Shannon wrote: "There is scarcely a limit to Kennedy's capacity for exaggerating and romanticising youths' role."[49] Bobby continued his introduction by remarking, "You [the youth] , I think, particularly have great at stake. . . ."[50]

A third attempt at ethical proof was the New Yorker's tactful and gentle attacks on the Administration: "That at least might help

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[43] Nicholas, p. 60.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Shannon, p. 253.

[46] Verbatim text, p. 145.

[47] Nicholas, p. 13.

[48] Verbatim text, p. 146 and p. 156.

[49] Shannon, p. 249.

[50] Verbatim text, p. 146.

to avoid the embarrassment and confusion of the last two days, the contradiction between the Vice President and members of the Administration"[51] and ". . . I think that's one of the lessons that we've clearly learned, the American people at least, if not the United States Government."[52] Finally, Kennedy revealed his sincerity by admitting partial responsibility for the Vietnam war when he stated that, "I was involved in some of the decisions that were made in connection with Vietnam, when I was a member of the Administration from 1961 to 1963."[53]

Ethical proof was thus an integral part of his extemporaneous remarks, confronting the negative aspects of his reputation, gently attacking his opponents, bolstering the ego of his audience and indicating his sincerity. Yet, to an even greater extent, Kennedy addressed man's emotional nature through appeals to self-preservation, preservation of the human race, fair play and patriotism and social approval.

To the writer, Kennedy's Hayward Field speech appeared to be an almost endless chain of motive appeals. The current death statistics and Kennedy's descriptions of the war photographs were appeals to self-preservation. Relating a sense of urgency to the drive for survival was the fact that we had more Americans ". . . killed last week in the war than we had in all the years of 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964 put together."[54] But Kennedy did not include only ego-gratifying appeals for the preservation of America alone; rather, he exhibited fear for the future of the entire human race: ". . . now we have the capacity to destroy all of

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[51] Ibid., p. 152.

[52] Ibid., p. 158.

[53] Ibid., p. 156.

[54] Ibid., p. 150.

mankind."[55] Both uses of pathetic proof--preservation of self and mankind--were central to the effectiveness of his May 18 rhetoric.

Considering the force of the drive for survival, it was not difficult for Kennedy to evoke an emotional response from his audience when he mentioned that "The American troops have continued to carry the burden of the fighting--and have borne the majority of the casualities. . . . This is their war; this is their conflict."[56] A sense of fair play seemed disturbed by the paradoxical nature of the Vietnam conflict, and Kennedy played upon that need for justice. He said, "We cannot be content until American soldiers are returned to the United States and that land is turned over to the people of Vietnam."[57]

It was necessary, however, to place the blame for this "endless quagmire of Vietnam"[58] not on his hearers, but on a nebulous third party, if possible. Kennedy's third party often became the government of South Vietnam who had failed to end corruption in administration or instigate land or social reform programs; thus, by not gaining the support of their people, the Vietnamese leaders had cast the major thrust of the fighting to the United States. It was a relatively simple task to convince his American audience that a great share of the fault for the increased conflict lay in South Vietnam and not at home. But Kennedy knew that some blame lay in the United States. Using quiet jabs at the Administration, the New York Senator was able to shift the focus

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[55] Ibid., p. 146.

[56] Ibid., p. 150.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., p. 151.

to the leaders of America and not her people. Kennedy said, "One thing is clear in the year 1968; the American people, in my judgment, and I think its been demonstrated around the country, want no more Vietnams."[59]

The conclusion of the Kennedy speech contained a strong appeal to the patriotism and pride of the American people. He questioned how this nation could hold the approval of the world when we were torn by strife. Kennedy claimed, ". . . if this is to be our country, we can doubt how long others will look to us for leadership, or seek our participation in their common ventures."[60] The past had held promise, and Kennedy sought to return to the strengths of prior days: "That's what I think America has always stood for the past. That's what I hope America will stand for in the future."[61]

In sum, one of the strongest sources of Kennedy's rhetorical effectiveness was his measured yet intense appeal to the emotional nature of his audience. At no point did his pathetic proof stand alone; rather, it always served to complement an appeal to understanding; and thus, Kennedy was never guilty of skirting human reason.

Evidence as support for arguments is generally considered to consist of examples, statistics and testimony from authority. Throughout his sixteen-page verbatim text, Kennedy relied most heavily on the example and did not once invoke a statement from authority. Many of

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[59] Ibid., p. 149.

[60] Ibid., p. 160.

[61] Ibid.

his examples were historical: the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Marshall Plan, Castro's takeover of Cuba, Che Guevara's revolution in Bolivia, and American involvement in the Soviet Union in 1917 and 1939. More often than not, however, the examples appeared to be thrown in, relying on extensive historical backgrounds in his audience; his assumption was, perhaps, a dangerous one to make since even a college-educated audience may not possess the in-depth knowledge to complete the comparison between the anti-colonial movements in Mozambique, Angola and Vietnam.

Kennedy's free use of statistics has also been questioned. One political analyst claimed, "He [Kennedy] shoots statistics that occasionally misinform but more often impress."[62] In a decade that exhibits much distrust because of the heralded credibility gap, Kennedy surprisingly chose to insert approximated and uncited statistics, such as the twenty per cent increase in combat deaths and the vague references to "thirty or forty years" and "the period of the past few years."

One such statistical fallacy was involved in Kennedy's conclusions that, "American troops have continued to carry the burden of the fighting--and have borne the majority of the casualities."[63] The New York Senator failed to extend his comparison to indicate the death-rate percentages of the total South Vietnamese and American forces. Such analysis would have proved significant against those opponents who have indicated that the South Vietnamese have lost more lives on a percentage basis of the entire population.

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[62]"The Politics of Restoration," p. 26.

[63]Verbatim text, p. 150.

In his attempts to destroy the arguments of those who favored a continuation of the struggle, Kennedy's logic was weakly supported. By pointing out the force of nationalism in the world today, Kennedy did not negate the fact that Communism is indeed an explosive force. In fact, he had to return and admit this inconsistency when he said that the Soviet Union was ". . . still the only nation able to threaten the very survival of the United States."[64] His refutation of the domino theory in Southeast Asia was the contention that this theory had not proven valid in other areas of the world; the analogy was incomplete, however, as Kennedy failed to correlate the two examples.

Kennedy's interrelation of logic, persuasion and ethical enhancement was thus generally proportionate, although emotional appeals were sprinkled throughout the speech while the logical and ethical proofs were localized. The attempts at improving ethos appeared most often in Kennedy's extemporaneous remarks; the logic was more prevalent in the organized Walinsky text. To be sure, the Hayward Field address lacked the logical integrity of an argumentative brief, but its impressive utilization of tempered emotional appeals provided a good example of rhetorical effectiveness.

Style

In their joint effort entitled Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal, Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird wrote: "There is no such thing as a style for a particular speaker. . . .

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[64] Ibid., p. 158.

Style becomes a function of the elements in the speech situation; thus the language employed in a speech is variable."[65] Robert F. Kennedy's major address at Hayward Field was a corroboration of this point of view. As he moved from his prepared script to extemporaneous additions and back again, the Senator displayed an equally-variable style of expression that proved to be both helpful and hindering in his attempt at communication with Eugene-area voters.

Rhetorical studies of political speeches often question the value of analyzing what purports to be the style of the speaker but, in reality, may be the style of the ghostwriter. This question would appear applicable in this particular study since such a large portion of the Hayward Field address was the work of Kennedy's chief travelling speechwriter, Adam Walinsky. When asked to comment on the dominance of his own style of expression in Kennedy's rhetoric, Walinsky admitted that his speechwriting for the Senator did reflect his own "Walinsky eloquence" early in their association. The young aide explained this difference in style when he said: "Kennedy's is simple--very simple; mine was more complex. I wrote and spoke like music--with embellishment."[66] However, continued experience and contact with Kennedy, in his opinion, soon caused him to emulate more and more the rhetoric of his employer. By the spring of 1968, Walinsky felt that, "There is no longer a Walinsky style. I can only write like the Senator."[67] Following Kennedy's death,

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[65] Thonssen and Baird, p. 430.

[66] Walinsky interview.

[67] Ibid.

the speechwriter repeated his views: "I'm pretty narrowly programmed. All I can do is research and write speeches for a Senator named Robert Kennedy."[68]

A close evaluation of the May 18 address, however, appears to contradict Walinsky's united-style theory; the prepared paragraphs do not reflect the style of Kennedy's interpolations. Granted, a Kennedy-prepared speech and a Kennedy-impromptu speech might differ somewhat in style, but the differences in the Walinsky and Kennedy texts were not minor. Rather, the former sections were composed of strong, compact sentences with little ornamentation; the latter additions were marked by long and involved sentences and embellishment. Walinsky wrote, for example, "We have to meet our responsibilities in the world;" Kennedy, in contrast, said, "We must meet--we must recognize that we must meet--our responsibilities in and around the world."[69] Because of these differences in style, Kennedy's University of Oregon address must be evaluated for correctness of expression, clarity, ornateness and propriety as if it were two speeches.

The Walinsky-developed rhetoric was indicative of its author's concept of the candidate's style. Along with evidence of generally-terse sentence structure, the manuscript revealed discerning word choice. The vocabulary exhibited variety and appropriateness; for example, the line, "Seemingly illusion still lives and wisdom is yet to come,"[70]

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[68]"The Race after RFK," Time, June 14, 1968, p. 23.

[69]Verbatim text, p. 151.

[70]Ibid.

indicated Walinsky's ability to summarize a concept in compact terms.

His perspecuity did not inhibit his imagery, however, The most evident device for emphasis was a variable yet pleasing rhythm; Walinsky's text often achieved this rhythm through either parallelism or antithesis. Typical of the parallel structure were the sentences:

> It does not prevent us from aiding any nation against truly external aggression. It does not prevent us from extending reasonable assistance to developing nations. It does prevent us from taking over an internal struggle from a minority government or a government too ineffective or corrupt to gain the support of its own people. It would allow the future of each country to be settled, essentially, by the people of that country. . . .[71]

In setting two or more items in opposition, the speechwriter was able to portray contrasts more vividly; Walinsky wrote:

> That power has come to us and we cannot renounce it, but neither can we afford to forget that the real constructive force in the world comes not from tanks or bombs or napalm or bullets, but from imaginative ideas, warm sympathies and generous spirit of her people.[72]

Walinsky's text, on the other hand, did not involve a reliance on figures of speech. The most effective metaphor in terms of audience response was not unique with Kennedy's writer: "We cannot be, and must not try to be, a policeman to all the world."[73] Finally, a figure of speech utilized more extensively was the catachresis, a borrowing of one name to express another as in "demands for social justice that have been awakened"[74] and "whose ideals for others are firmly rooted in the realities of society."[75]

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[71] Ibid., p. 155.

[72] Ibid., p. 160.

[73] Ibid., p. 151.

[74] Ibid., p. 153.

[75] Ibid., p. 160.

The prepared section of the major address thus demonstrated a simplicity, clarity and lack of ornateness that helped further the communication of Kennedy's beliefs. In contrast, the Senator's extemporaneous remarks were rambling, awkward, and often repetitious. Representative of the disjointed style of this portion of his address was the complex sentence:

> All one has to do is look at the front page of the paper this morning to see that picture of that woman--and the agony that's in her face--and look at the paper three days ago and see the picture of that young boy--girl--twelve years of age--who had been killed by sparks from an American helicopter and see her six-year-old brother leaning over her body with tears, and realize that this was is going on, the devastation is still taking place.[76]

Sentence structure in these additions to the manuscript often proved ungrammatical; the following sentence exhibited a confusing interchange of pronoun number:

> They have said to themselves, those who are the leaders of the government, they say to themselves, we of the United States have committed their prestige and their position, they can't possibly withdraw, so we don't have to do anything ourselves.[77]

If the Walinsky rhetoric focused on clarity, the distinctly-Kennedy rhetoric must be recognized for its heavy reliance on parallel structure; the Senator even added parallelism to the previously-prepared lines during delivery. This stylistic device was used to add rhythm and equate words, phrases, clauses and sentences. To add variety to that rhythm, Kennedy injected short sentences, such as, "That's what has happened in that part of the world."[78]

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[76] Ibid., p. 149.

[77] Ibid., p. 157.

[78] Ibid., p. 150.

But from a larger perspective, word choice tended to become repetitious; several words and phrases--"devastation," "over the period of the last year," and "the world today"--were used so often that their repetition appeared to lack purpose. Finally, the Senator's addition of adverbs created awkward structure, as in the phrase, "tremendously fiercely."[79]

An over-all estimation of the Kennedy style in his Hayward Field address must acknowledge the presence of two styles of expression: one, simple and clear; another, verbose and often confusing. The extemporaneous segments of the May 18 speech were not representative of speechwriter Walinsky's claims that, "Kennedy speaks in short, simple sentences. . . . His spoken English is close to written English."[80] Rather, William V. Shannon's description proved to be more accurate when summarizing Kennedy's interjections: "He tended to ramble and repeat himself or, what was worse, fall into short, awkward silences and then resume abruptly on a different track."[81]

Delivery

Just as Kennedy's style varied with the source of his words, his manner of physical and vocal delivery was not static throughout the major address. But, in contrast, the Senator's delivery appeared to improve when he veered from the manuscript, rather than degenerate as

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[79] Ibid., p. 153.

[80] Schaap, p. 48.

[81] Shannon, p. 28.

his style of expression had. Since Bobby's oratorical delivery during unprepared remarks was described in detail in Chapter III, this section will deal only with an evaluation of the speaker's delivery of the Walinsky-prepared text.

Shannon described Kennedy's vocal delivery of manuscript speeches when he wrote, "He droned monotonously when he got into the middle portions of a long, prepared speech."[82] Validating Shannon's observation, Kennedy's vocal skill on May 18 was certainly not electric. As a reader, the Senator moved forward impassively and monotonously with an unusually-rapid rate.[83] One political analyst, Henny Willis of the Eugene Register-Guard, reported that Kennedy read the text ". . . in an uninspired way."[84] In sum, he appeared in a rush to complete the scheduled speaking appearance in Eugene.

Yet, in his interpolations, Bobby emerged as the sincere orator of his all-purpose campaign talks, even though the hesitant, tentative delivery was still present. The transitions which resulted from his shifting from his text to impromptu comment and back were awkward, providing still another challenge to his sincerity.

Bodily action and gestures all but disappeared when Kennedy found himself confronted with a speech text. His hands either rested on top of the rostrum or prepared to turn the next page of the large-type manuscript. When extemporizing, however, Kennedy embodied the same gestures

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[82] Ibid.

[83] The writer has listened to a tape recording of the speech many times in the analysis of the content, style and other attributes.

[84] Willis, "HHH 'Misstatement' Blasted by Kennedy," p. 1..

and nervous actions prevalent in his stump speeches throughout Oregon.

The speech text seemed to stifle Kennedy's at once emphatic and halting delivery. His vocal pattern lost its variety; his physical action was lost in his absorption with the printed words. There can be no doubt that this inhibition interfered with the communication of his views on the war in Vietnam; the crowd moved restlessly whenever Kennedy droned on in an attempt to get through the manuscript in front of him. As if sensing the dissatisfaction, Kennedy would begin another insertion that served to further disturb the continuity of his content but added to the effectiveness of his delivery.

Effect

Kennedy's Eugene address on May 18 was generally received warmly by the large audience that waited in Hayward Field for the New York Senator's speech. One reporter wrote: "The Democratic candidate for President directed most of his remarks on U. S. involvement in Vietnam and was interrupted nineteen times by applause from the audience as he told them 'people want no more Vietnams.'"[85] Most of the favorable reaction came when Kennedy spoke the words his dovish and predominantly-young audience wanted to hear; for example, the heaviest and longest applause came when Kennedy stated that, "We cannot continue to deny and postpone the demands of our own people while spending billions in the name of the freedom for others, twelve-thousand miles away."[86]

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[85] O'Connor, p. 1.

[86] Verbatim text, p. 160.

Beyond his immediate audience, there was little reaction around the state and throughout America. Much of the responsibility for this lack of publicity must rest with the "borrowed-text" philosophy of the Kennedy speechwriters. Little of the speech content was new; there was seemingly nothing unique on which to enter a detailed news story. Another reason for the publicity failure was the timing of the speech; when the national television networks reported on the total political weekend campaigning on Monday evening, other sites and other speeches had already stolen the scene from the Eugene address. The Sunday New York Times did include a column by John Herbers on page 46 which mentioned the only really new thrust of the Kennedy rhetoric--the "contradiction and misstatement" of Vice President Humphrey.[87]

The major address, as it was billed, thus lost some of its import by its re-hashing content and poor timing for advantageous publicity, yet it did provide a good example of Walinsky's speechwriting style and Kennedy's platform manner when confronted by the rigors of a prepared text on a weighty topic. Further, as one of only two such addresses in the Beaver State, the Hayward Field speech holds a place of even greater significance in the rhetoric of Robert F. Kennedy in the Oregon Primary of 1968.

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[87]Herbers, "New Peace Talks Urged by Kennedy," p. 46.

CHAPTER V

ADDITIONAL CAMPAIGN RHETORIC

The rhetoric of any political campaign is not limited exclusively to the prepared addresses, stump speeches and personal appearances of the candidate. In realizing the limitations of timing, distance and candidate strength, campaign strategists have turned to other forms of rhetoric which do not involve the personal appearance of their candidate to publicize his name, desired image and stands on major issues. No accurate judgment could be made as to how many voters either saw or heard Robert F. Kennedy in his exposure-seeking 1968 Oregon campaign, but it is probably safe to conclude that this number does not constitute a majority of the state's registered Democrats. Accordingly, Kennedy strategists relied heavily on other forms of intended persuasion, such as press coverage, newspaper and television advertising and printed hand-out rhetoric.

Press Coverage

In any election, either national or local in scope, favorable newspaper reporting is vital to the building of campaign momentum. In his book, The Making of the President, 1960, Theodore H. White was struck by the remarkable diversity of treatment the national press received

from the two Presidential nominees:

> To be transferred from the Nixon campaign tour meant no lightening of exertion or weariness for any newspaperman--but it was as if one were transformed in role from leper and outcast to friend and battle companion. . . . He [Kennedy] has an enormous respect for those who work with words and those who write clean prose. He likes newspapermen and likes their company. . . . The attitude of the candidate controlled his staff. . . . It was not only that they respected the press, but somehow as if they were part of the press--half-hankering to be writing the dispatches and claiming the by-lines themselves.[1]

White went on to indicate that this feeling of mutual respect was an important factor in the outcome of the campaign; he claimed, "There is no doubt that this kindness, respect and cultivation of the press colored all the reporting that came from the Kennedy campaign."[2]

As his brother had done in 1960, Robert Kennedy courted the affection of the enormous entourage of reporters and cameramen who travelled with him during his 1968 campaign. They rode on his special chartered airplanes and covered his motorcades and rallies with Kennedy-provided buses and cars. Once, when one of the press buses developed a flat tire on a logging road near Marcola, Oregon, Kennedy halted the entire procession so that no reporter would miss the next scheduled campaign stop.[3] Other physical arrangements were handled by the various advance men under orders from Joe Gargan: all reporters were pre-registered

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[1] White, p. 404.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Interview with Charles Quinn, chief NBC-News reporter travelling with the Kennedy campaign, April 17, 1968.

at hotels, trucks were arranged to move press luggage to and from airports and train stations, press rooms were established in each hotel with an abundant supply of phones and typewriters, and special background press releases were prepared by the Kennedy Press Staff.[4]

The Kennedy campaign train in Oregon, "The Beaver State Special," exemplified the candidate's concern for the working press. The car immediately in front of Kennedy's private car was reserved for the national reporters; three times the candidate came out to chat and grant requests.[5] In addition, Kennedy funds provided beer, soft drinks and juices, and a resplendent lunch served by female Kennedy volunteers.[6] In order to facilitate the handling of their job responsibilities, a special press car with a public address system outlet was included on the train so that reporters could remain inside and record the Senator's remarks more easily. Members of the Kennedy Press Staff were available to provide assistance; for example, Jim Dunn moved about the press car providing background stories and setting up tape recorder jacks. Press phones and Western Union service were also located at each stop, and two press booklets were distributed, one on the "Beaver State Special" and one

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[4]Interview with Bill Foley, Kennedy advance man, May 25, 1968.

[5]An ABC-News reporter asked Kennedy personally for permission to conduct an exclusive interview on the rear platform, and Kennedy gave his approval. In addition, the wife of one cameraman needed a ride back to Portland; Kennedy wrote her a brief letter of introduction for the return trip.

[6]This and following observations about activities aboard the campaign train are cited from the personal experience of the writer.

on campaign trains in general. Finally, local press were not ignored, even though they were often overshadowed by their national counterparts. Special press tags were distributed and the final car of the train was reserved for them. Kennedy attempted once to reach their car, but the approach of the next rally site forced his hurried retreat to the rear platform.

In response to Senator Kennedy's warmth, the newspapermen openly showed their partisanship. White described the comparable relationship in 1960 when he wrote, "They had become his friends and, some of them, his most devoted admirers."[7] After hearing Kennedy tell the crowd that their town, Albany, Oregon, was the namesake of the capital of his home state, the press waited until the Senator stepped inside the press car to bombard him with the question, "Is Albany the capital of Massachusetts?" He appeared, to this observer, to love the banter they provided.[8] His oft-repeated George Bernard Shaw quotation[9] became their "'Head for the buses!' line;"[10] and Kennedy returned their teasing when he told a

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[7]White, p. 405.

[8]When one cameraman nearly fell off the rear platform attempting to get a better shot of the New Yorker, Kennedy made a special trip to the national press car to kid the cameraman and say, "I appreciate your loyalty —but don't ever upstage me again!"

[9]"Some people see things as they are, and say why; I dream things that never were, and say why not."

[10]Quinn interview.

Coos Bay audience, "The people who are with me who seem to be hippies are really the national press."[11]

It would be impossible to measure the impact of this close relationship on the stories they churned out and on their printed estimates of his political strength. Even Robert F. Kennedy could not have estimated the effects of his own warmth; but as a veteran politician, he realized that he had to cultivate all the available means of persuasion in his campaign rhetoric. The press corps was one of these means. After Bob Kennedy's death, two reporters who had travelled with him during those two and one-half months wrote:

> As a news source he was just about ideal. He almost always found time to talk to people in our business, although he was so on-the-go that talks frequently were in the car, driving back and forth to the airport. . . . He trusted newsmen and they trusted him. He used them as a channel of information and source of criticism that provided an independent check on his own and his staff's analyses and interpretations of events. . . . If there was no external excitement, as with a motorcade, he was always ready to discuss or argue. . . . He was, in short, a giver and not a taker.[12]

Newspaper and Television Advertising

Even though most campaign spending is difficult to pinpoint, it is possible to determine with a high degree of accuracy the money involved in purchasing television and radio time or newspaper space. Rates for goods and services such as these are public, and monitoring

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[11]"Getting Snappish," Time, May 31, 1968, p. 11.

[12]Warren Rogers and Stanley Tretick, "The Bob Kennedy We Knew," Look, July 9, 1968, p. 31.

will reveal the blocks of time or space purchased by any given candidate. Although such disclosures require considerable effort by Manhattan-based organizations and timing has not yet permitted this scrutiny of the 1968 Oregon campaign, intellegent guesses as to the amount, nature and effect of this form of Kennedy rhetoric have already been hazarded by political analysts.

One specific advertising method used extensively by the New York Senator in Oregon was the documentary film, which usually costs about $1,000 per projected minute.[13] Each of Oregon's twelve television stations was provided with a thirty-minute film entitled "The Bobby Kennedy Story." Played throughout the state during the ten days prior to the May 28 vote, the nationally-prepared film was definitely image-building in intent. The presentation portrayed Kennedy as a crowd pleaser, friend of Oregon, devoted brother and son, loving husband and father, concerned citizen, President's adviser, and "leader of men and young people."[14] No attempt was made to initiate a discussion of either state or national issues; rather, the emphasis was on emotional appeal. One particularly-poignant scene portrayed Kennedy playing touch football with his numerous children and dogs. Obviously, "The Bobby Kennedy Story" was still another implement in the over all strategy of bringing Kennedy, the man, to the people of Oregon.

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[13] Levin, p. 259.

[14] Taken from a tape recording of the audio portion of "The Bobby Kennedy Story", provided by KEZI-TV.

Television campaign advertising also took the form of the one-minute spot announcement. One Oregon station, KGW-TV of Portland, reported that in these spots alone in the Oregon Primary, Kennedy bought fifty-eight, compared with forty-six by McCarthy and none by President Johnson or Vice President Humphrey-supporters.[15] As an indication of the total cost, that Portland station charges $400 per minute for a political spot in prime time (7:30 - 11:00 p.m.), $300 in Class A Time (6:00 - 7:30 p.m.), and $110 during the daytime.[16] Rates and purchasing patterns such as these led one Time analyst to conclude that the "Most expensive item for any campaign is television time."[17]

The short Kennedy presentations were varied in content but often emphasized the issues of the campaign or the experience of the candidate. One such film was a dialogue between Kennedy and several young people with the Senator answering their issue-oriented questions; another showed Kennedy diligently at work preparing reports as Attorney General of the United States. The size of Kennedy campaign funds allowed strategists much freedom in changing the content of these spots. When William vanden Heuvel, chief Kennedy-staff organizer in Portland, learned on May 17 that water pollution was a great concern of Portlanders, he ordered a new spot quickly produced and broadcast over that area's radio and television stations.[18]

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[15] "The Checkbook Factor," Time, June 7, 1968, p. 25.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Brinkley, "The Huntley-Brinkley Report," May 17, 1968.

A final form of campaign advertising featured the paid political advertisements placed in Oregon's newspapers. Two particular copies were run most often by Kennedy workers. One involved a scathing attack on Vice President Humphrey: "There is one candidate--Vice President Humphrey--who is not running in any of the primaries. He has not come to Oregon to discuss the issues with the voters. He is not taking his case to the people."[19] The second emphasized the insulting nature of Eugene McCarthy's remark that Kennedy ran best "'. . . among the less intelligent and less educated people in America.'"[20]

The intent of Kennedy's newspaper and television advertising thus varied with the media used: television filming emphasized image; spot announcements featured a discussion of the issues; and newspaper advertising contained references to Kennedy's Democratic opponents. Regardless of the media, however, the stress was on simplicity. Above all, Kennedy strategists hoped to saturate the Oregon electorate with the name of the New York Senator.

Printed Hand-Out Rhetoric

The free literature of Kennedy's 1968 Presidential drive was representative of the Senator's paradoxical campaign of serious issues amidst the carnival-like atmosphere of a movie premiere. For example, one hand-out prepared by the national Kennedy staff carried an "autographed"

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[19]Political advertisement in Eugene Register-Guard, May 27, 1968, p. 5.

[20]Political advertisement in Eugene Register-Guard, May 25, 1968, p. 3, citing The Oregon Statesman (Salem), May 22, 1968, p. 1.

glossy print of the candidate on the front with a seven-point listing of the "Kennedy Platform" on the back.

The materials distributed by the Kennedy supporters were varied in professional quality. The nationally-produced sheets more often featured a picture of the candidate, capitalized on the name "Kennedy," and reproduced statements on the need for Kennedy's election by known authors such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Joseph Kraft. In addition, the usual bumper stickers, this time simply stating "Kennedy" in red, white and blue, and the equally-unadorned lapel pins were available. On the other hand, state and locally-prepared literature favored campaign prose which discussed, for example, comparative voting records and Kennedy's political experience and made the best use of each sheet of paper. One Kennedy advance man criticized these locally-produced hand-outs when he discussed an advertisement for the Kennedy whistle-stop campaign train:

> No, if we had prepared it, the name 'Robert Kennedy' would have been much bigger. There's too much writing. The times [of the train stops] should have been bigger. Too bad we didn't make it.[21]

When asked if there was an intended appeal to Kennedy's father image in the line, "Bring the Family to Meet Kennedy," the same Kennedy worker answered, "No. We don't pay any attention to anything like that--just splash the name Kennedy and the time--let the people know the Senator will be speaking, and when.[22]

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[21] Connell Interview.

[22] Ibid.

One issue of the Oregon Campaigner, a statewide campaign newspaper was produced and mailed to known Kennedy supporters; additional copies were distributed through local Kennedy headquarters. The paper emphasized the breadth of the Senator's campaign, the variety of his activities and his dedication to the state: various headlines read, "Ethel Charms Voters on Road," "State Efforts Snowball; Retain Personal Touch," "Kennedy Women to Visit Oregon," and "Schlesinger to Stump the State."

Kennedy headquarters also acted as market places for various materials which were not free: paperback copies of the Senator's last book, To Seek a Newer World, Kennedy T-shirts, white boater hats and pictures of the candidate that resembled posters of the latest movie idols. In sum, Kennedy's printed hand-out rhetoric was varied, numerous, and indicative of the over-all Kennedy strategy, that of exposure. When Bill Foley, a national Kennedy worker, was jokingly asked why the Kennedy pins were so small, he countered, "Remember, we have to have enough to last until November 5! "[23]

These additional forms of campaign rhetoric--press coverage, newspaper and television advertising and printed hand-outs--contributed much to the quantity and to the cost of Kennedy's total campaign persuasion in Oregon. Simple lay-outs and clearly-stated content undoubtedly had some positive effect on the typical electorate. It appeared to the Kennedy staff that many voters have an aversion toward extensive reading or complex thinking; and with this in mind, Kennedy's total rhetoric in the 1968 Oregon Primary was characterized by simplicity.

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[23]Foley Interview.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

One Time reporter wrote, "By virtue of his expertise, diligence and money, and buoyed by a string of primary victories, Kennedy came into Oregon the odds-on favorite."[1] The confidence in the Kennedy camp was manifest by their candidate's statement during the week before the May 28 vote, "If I get beaten in a primary, then I'm not a viable candidate." Even when the Oliver Quayle poll projected the closeness of the Oregon voting, Kennedy workers exhibited a strong faith in the Oregon electorate.[2] By May 29, the workers had moved on to California, but they could not forget the Beaver State and what she had done to their candidate. Their confidence was now tempered by speculation as to why Robert Kennedy had lost the 1968 Oregon Presidential Primary.

Interpreted Election Results

At 8:14 P.M. on May 28, 1968, Frank McGee, a NBC-News reporter, dramatically announced over national television: "So you have it. NBC's projection is that Senator McCarthy will win the Oregon Primary."[3] The

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[1]"In the 'New' Politics," p. 23.

[2]Bill Foley, worker advancing Kennedy's final Eugene stop, was willing to bet that his candidate would capture over 50 per cent of the Oregon vote.

[3]Frank McGee, "Oregon Election Report," NBC-News, May 28, 1968.

final results were not in yet; there was still room for speculation. Soon after the announcement, McGee interviewed Larry O'Brien, a national Kennedy organizer, about the significance of the projected Kennedy defeat. O'Brien stated:

> And I would say at this point, that if your projection holds up, this means that we have had a setback in Oregon, but it is not in any sense a disaster . . . California is a big one, so is New York, and we shouldn't forget South Dakota a week from today also. We'll have, by June 18, a situation where we can evaluate Senator Kennedy and Senator McCarthy's successes or failures in the primary route; and at this point, it would appear we can move on vigorously and we have confidence in the future.[4]

But NBC-NEWS' projection was valid. With returns from ninety per cent of the state's 2,599 precincts, McCarthy had garnered Oregon's thirty-three convention delegates, capturing twenty-eight of the state's thirty-six counties, including the tri-county area of Portland. The totals showed:

Johnson	38,324	12 per cent
Kennedy	120,655	39 per cent
McCarthy	139,420	45 per cent
Humphrey (write-ins)	10,209	4 per cent
Wallace	454	0 per cent[5]

It was the first defeat suffered by any of the Kennedy brothers in the twenty-seven primary and general-election campaigns they had fought since the Congressional campaign of John F. Kennedy in 1946.[6]

Kennedy's concession telegram to McCarthy was delivered at about 11:30 P.M. that evening. In it, Kennedy said:

> We can both take some satisfaction from the overwhelming expression for change the voters have once again registered.

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Raymond Lahr, "McCarthy Jolts Kennedy Drive," Eugene Register-Guard, May 29, 1968, p. 1.

[6] "In the 'New' Politics," p. 23.

> We are all interested in trying to end hostility at home and abroad.[7]

The New York Senator then appeared before approximately five-hundred supporters at the Benson Hotel in Portland and told them that Oregonians had ". . . treated me fairly, studied my views and then they made their judgment."[8] The campaign in Oregon was over; the national Kennedy workers moved on to California, seeking a return to the primary victory trail.

The first Kennedy defeat gave political analysts a new area for speculation in the exciting 1968 Presidential race. James J. Kilpatrick of the Washington Star Syndicate quickly concluded that the loss would be a devastating one to the Kennedy cause:

> It was disaster. It was probably curtains. Kennedy's hope for the nomination had rested all along on building the invincible image. . . . It will take a small landslide in California, coupled with a collapse in Hubert Humphrey's happy coalition, for RFK to win the nomination now.[9]

Others echoed the same pessimistic view; Joseph Kraft of the Publishers-Hall Syndicate wrote:

> Maybe he will win in California. But the momentum has been interrupted. The spell of victories in Indiana and Nebraska which sent him up in the polls, and thus would have made it hard for Democratic leaders to go against him, has been broken. Robert Kennedy cannot now win unless, in some wholly unforseeable way, Humphrey stumbles or McCarthy caves in.[10]

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[7]"Surprise Defeat First for Bobby," Eugene Register-Guard, May 29, 1968.

[8]Ibid.

[9]James J. Kilpatrick, "'Curtains'"for RFK," The Daily Columbian (Vancouver, Washington), June 1, 1968, p. 18.

[10]Joseph Kraft, "Oregon Has Shattered the Kennedy Spell," The Daily Columbian, June 1, 1968, p. 18.

Even McCarthy commented on the significance of the Kennedy failure in Oregon: "If Bobby was not quite firmly knocked out yet, he was 'pretty well bloodied up.'"[11] Finally, Kennedy himself acknowledged, "'I am not the candidate that I was before Oregon.'"[12]

History will never really know the effect of Kennedy's loss in Oregon on the national convention delegates who would have been asked to vote for him in Chicago in late August, 1968. Senator Kennedy did score a significant win in California: the New Yorker gained forty-five per cent of the vote; McCarthy, forty-two percent; and an uncommitted slate of delegates, twelve per cent.[13] But the assassin's bullets of June 4 ended his drive for the Democratic Presidential nomination and his life; and with his death, political speculation about the import of the Kennedy defeat in Oregon seemed irrelevant.

Reasons for Kennedy Defeat

If the significance of the Kennedy loss had faded, interest in the reasons for that loss had not. Even before the tragic death, Kilpatrick carefully phrased the question that many Americans were asking, the question that had to be asked: ". . . why it happened, how the Kennedy machine with its infinite resources and ruthless customs

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[11]Shana Alexander, "'He Tried to Beat Me with a Dog and an Astronaut," Life, June 7, 1968, p. 36.

[12]"In the 'New' Politics," p. 23.

[13]"RFK Carries California," The Aberdeen (Washington) Daily World, June 5, 1968, p. 1.

let their man go down so visibly and dramatically."[14] Six answers might be projected: the nature of the state of Oregon, McCarthy's early candidacy and state-wide organization, Kennedy's failure to address himself to the Minnesota Senator, Senator Wayne Morse's "neutrality" in the Oregon Presidential Primary, national Kennedy workers' attitudes toward the primary and the voters, and the "style" of the Kennedy campaign.

Oregon was not in any sense representative of the nation. Kraft concluded: "It has an infinitesimal Negro population; it has almost no white ethnic groups. . . . Indeed, the whole state is a kind of suburb, offering no handles to a Kennedy."[15] To combat this, Kennedy tried to awaken a humanistic concern for the poor and deprived; his attempt was generally not successful. As White wrote, "It had been a cold state to him."[16] Kennedy himself felt this lack of warmth. In an interview on May 18, Kennedy stated: "The campaign here isn't going well. They [the voters] just don't seem to care. It almost frightens me."[17]

Second, McCarthy's forces had begun organizational steps before the 1968 Primary races even began. All Democratic voters were contacted before McCarthy himself entered the state; in contrast, Kennedy's extensive telephone campaign began on May 25 and involved, for the most

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[14]Kilpatrick, "'Curtains' for RFK," p. 18.

[15]Kraft, "Oregon Has Shattered the Kennedy Spell," p. 18.

[16]White, "The Wearing Last Weeks and a Precious Last Day," p. 39.

[17]Kennedy interview.

part, paid canvassers, not dedicated volunteers. A Time reporter wrote, "Oregon is dovish, and McCarthy as the first anti-war candidate in the race was much better known there than in Indiana and Nebraska."[18] Kennedy's late entry into the race was indeed a handicap; many Oregonians had already come out for McCarthy and were hesitant to forsake him. In spite of the Minnesota Senator's courage and New Hampshire vote total, however, Kennedy had already overtaken him in the national scene by his Indiana and Nebraska victories, and "Oregon enjoys cutting front runners down to size."[19]

In spite of McCarthy's known strength in the Beaver State, Kennedy all but ignored him and his challenges during the Oregon campaign. One Time analyst remarked:

> Bobby dodged Gene's challenge to debate; he ignored taunts about his own record concerning Vietnam; he seemed not to be listening at all as McCarthy sharpened his anti-Kennedy rhetoric.[20]

Rather, Humphrey became the focal point of Kennedy's jabs, yet Humphrey had ". . . meager popularity"[21] in Oregon and wasn't even on the primary ballot in that state.

A central political figure in Oregon in 1968 was her long-time Senator, Wayne Morse. Morse had been recognized as a supporter of Kennedy ideals for several years, but his own impending election challenge by Robert Duncan apparently constrained him to remain neutral in the Presidential race. One Kennedy worker claimed that this announced

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[18]Kraft, p. 18.

[19]"In the 'New' Politics," p. 24. [20]Ibid., p. 23.

[21]Kraft, p. 18.

impartiality in light of past attachments had the effect of appearing as an unannounced McCarthy endorsement.[22] Perhaps thinking such as this did lead some Morse supporters to lean toward Senator McCarthy in Oregon.

A fifth reason for the Kennedy defeat may lay in the overt attitudes of national Kennedy workers toward Oregon and her primary. Kilpatrick wrote:

> Kennedy's people descended on Portland in an opulent jet-plume spray. . . . Somehow they left an impression of a company of New York actors playing a hick town stand. They were brilliant birds of passage, spreading credit cards and tropical feathers. When they asked a favor, it seemed a demand. Was a chandelier in the way? Have it removed.[23]

The advance men that this writer interviewed may have left this impression with Oregon voters; they were demanding and extravagent--but above all, they were devoted.

Finally, the victor in the Oregon Primary concluded that the mistake in the Kennedy campaign was the candidate's failure ". . . to distinguish himself from the larger Kennedy image." McCarthy continued:

> Bobby should have stayed up on the high ground. He might have been better off to make the case for himself, all the way. What happened in Oregon was that these voters were the first ones to see him clearly as the Senator from New York, rather than as some sort of general configuration involving his brother. He used things like the dog and the space man and his mother to try to condition people to see that configuration.[24]

Of course, adding to each of these six answers, were the unfavorable aspects of the Kennedy image--the ruthlessness, the youth, and the arrogance of wealth. By May 29, Kennedy knew that he had fought

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[22]Foley interview. [23]Kilpatrick, p. 18.

[24]Alexander, p. 37.

a difficult battle in Oregon with an opponent who had organization, an early candidacy, a reputation for sincerity and courage and forceful ideas as his weapons. Senator Robert F. Kennedy did not match McCarthy in these areas and, consequently, lost the 1968 Oregon Presidential Preference Primary.

The Role of Rhetoric in the Oregon Primary

It would be impossible ever to know the complete role of rhetoric in determining the results of the 1968 Presidential Primary of Oregon. Yet, it is possible to compare the rhetorical strategies of the two major Democratic candidates, Robert F. Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy, to evaluate these strategies in light of knowledge of the Oregon electorate, and to conclude reasonably on the significance of this persuasion in McCarthy's victory.

In brief summary, Kennedy's Oregon campaign was marked by all-purpose campaign talks with heavy reliance on ethical and emotional proofs. The style of discourse was often rambling, and the content discussed the grim realities of war, pain and hunger and attacked the Administration and Vice President Humphrey. Only two prepared speeches were delivered; both dealt with the war in Vietnam. The other forms of campaign persuasion--press coverage, advertising, and hand-outs--brought the name of Kennedy to the people of Oregon. Finally, statewide Kennedy forces were, in general, under-organized and behind schedule for the May 28 vote.

On the other hand, McCarthy's forces ". . . outorganized and

outspent the Kennedy camp."[25] The Minnesota Senator was convinced that the only way to reach Oregon's voters was ". . . to speak to them directly, to deal plainly with the issues and to make a total and open personal commitment."[26] McCarthy recognized that his only real opponent in Oregon was Kennedy and set out to ask the Beaver State's voters to evaluate McCarthy and Kennedy, not McCarthy and Humphrey. His other forms of persuasion nearly always linked three words, "McCarthy, courage and conviction." Personal appearances were not as frequent as Kennedy's; for example, McCarthy visited the city of Eugene once, while the New Yorker made three separate appearances. However, a great majority of the Oregonians were exposed to the views of the victor. As McCarthy paraded through the populated areas, his youthful workers volunteered days of their time to canvass farmhouses and small towns of Oregon; each vote was ". . . wooed but never bought."[27]

The effect of these two campaigns on the Oregon electorate was evident in the final vote. McCarthy's antecedent ethos, as determined by his seemingly-disastrous challenge of President Johnson in March, was greater; he did not have to combat charges of ruthlessness and opportunism with ethical proof of his sincerity. The Senators' views on Vietnam were nearly similar; on this issue, most Oregonians agreed with the two candidates. Yet, Kennedy continued to spend his speaking time sniping at the war and the Administration. McCarthy chose to snipe at Kennedy,

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[25]"In the 'New' Politics," p. 23.

[26]Alexander, p. 38.

[27]Kilpatrick, p. 18.

and the Oregonians listened. As the underdog, McCarthy was almost at an advantage in the maverick state. The huge block of "undecideds" flocked to McCarthy, and the Oregon delegates were his.

Kennedy's rhetoric in the Oregon Primary had, thus, a significant effect on the final vote tally. His strategy of exposure was not geared to the independent, middle-class Beaver State. To be sure, the people surged to see him, as they would come to see any nationally-prominent celebrity. But, Oregonians were choosing a President, not a national idol. As Alexander wrote, "Bobby's misconception was to assume that his outworn style of politicking still would work."[28] Instead, the voters of Oregon wanted logic, conviction and an avenue for new policies, namely McCarthy. Kennedy's rhetoric may have conceptualized the torrents for change in Indiana and Nebraska, but he was not successful in persuading the Oregon Democrats that he should hold the highest office in the land. Robert Francis Kennedy accepted temporary defeat and moved on to California, to a hard-fought victory there, and to the fateful end of his campaign.

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[28]Alexander, p. 38.

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APPENDIX I

Remarks by Senator Robert F. Kennedy at the

Eugene Civic Center, Eugene, Oregon

April 17, 1968[1]

Thank you very much, Mrs. Green. I'd like to take her with me every place I go. It isn't everyone that gives those kind of introductions. It's a great pleasure to be here, and I hope that we have as much success in the primary starting in Eugene, Oregon, as President Kennedy did starting in Eugene, Oregon, in 1960. I'm very pleased to be here. I'm very grateful to see all of you. My campaign seems to be going along reasonably well. I took a poll amongst my children, [laughter] and I got four of their votes. [Laughter] And then, my sister Pat got two votes, [laughter] and my brother Edward got two votes, and there were two who were reconsidering and reassessing their positions. [Laughter] But they said if I did well in Eugene, Oregon, they'd all be for me when I got back home. [Laughter]

So I'm pleased to be here. I think this campaign is very vital and a very important one. It's going to be really the year 1968 that's going to make the determination as to what direction the United States is going to move in. Just as Mrs. Green said, it's not going to be

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[1]This is the exact text of the speech as tape recorded in Eugene. The comments in brackets and paragraph divisions were supplied by the writer after listening to the tape.

1969 or 1970 or 1971, 1968's the year. 1968's the year in which we're going to debate the great issues, the great questions involving what we're going to do here at home, what we're going to stand for here in the United States, and what our relationship is going to be with other nations, elsewhere around the globe. What we're talking about really is the leadership not only of the United States, but of the free world and really, in the last analysis, what direction the United States wants to move in. What is our national purpose? What is our national goal? What are we trying to achieve? It's not just that we're trying to achieve material wealth; we've already done that. The gross national product is 800 billion dollars here in the United States, a gross national product that grows by forty or fifty billions of dollars every year, more than twice it grows, almost twice as much as the whole gross national product of all of black Africa. We have that kind of wealth. Certainly we have military power. We have enough military power to destroy all mankind all over the globe. But is that enough?

Why is it, at the same time that we have all this material wealth, that we have all of this military power, is there a certain restlessness and uneasiness that exists within the United States; and the fact is, there does. The fact is that people are concerned; the fact is that we've done and we've taken all these steps, and we've made all this progress. And yet, people are concerned about the direction that this country is moving in. I think a lot of people are not satisfied that we've been moving in the right direction over the period of the last several years. I am not satisfied and that is why I run for President of the United States. [Applause]

I just think that we can do better within our own country. I don't think that, for instance, that we have to accept the riots and the violence and the lawlessness that affected our major cities over the United States over the period of the last several years. High admin--administration officials said lately that we can expect those violence--that violence, we can expect those riots summer after summer over the period of the next, maybe, perhaps the next decade. I don't think that's acceptable in this country. I don't think that we can tolerate that. And I don't think that we can tolerate it under our form of government or our system. In the last analysis, it requires the respect of law. I don't think that we have to accept that, and I don't think the black citizens of the United States want it, and I don't think the white citizens of the United States want it, and I don't think that all of those that live here in Eugene, Oregon, or the state of Oregon want it, and I don't think it should be tolerated or accepted within our country. I think we can do something about it.

I think there are going to be extremists on both sides, extremists on the white side, the ones that are responsible for the death of Martin Luther King and others, the extremists on the other side like Stokley Carmichael who preaches that violence and lawlessness and disorder is the only answer for the communities, for the future of this country, for our society. I don't think that's acceptable. I don't think that the vast majority of American citizens want this, and when these riots and this lawlessness and this violence takes place, whether it's in New York, in Chicago or Los Angeles, it affects everybody's lives. You can't separate yourselves if you're in Eugene, Oregon. You can't separate yourselves;

you're concerned about it. You're concerned about it as an American citizen. You're concerned about it because of what it does about our prestige and our position all around the rest of the globe.

How are we ever going to expect other nations to follow our leadership when we have this kind of violence within our own country? When we have a minority who won't accept or feel that they don't have any future under our form of government or under our system? It destroys and adversely affects our whole position, whether it's in the underdeveloped nations of the world or whether it's in Western Europe. So I don't think that we can accept that, but nor can we accept, nor can we accept the idea that we still have injustices based on the color of a man's skin. I don't think a man should be prevented from finding decent employment, at decent wages, because his skin happens to be black. I don't think we can ask a man to go 12,500 miles away and fight in Vietnam, and then when he comes back say we're not going to provide an education for his children, we're not going to provide decent housing, and we're not going to provide jobs. I think [Applause]

Again, I think that we can do better. I think that we can do better. I look at my own city of New York, or I look at any of the major cities in the United States. We see that only three out of ten of the children who enter high school ever graduate from high school; and out of those three out of ten that graduate from high school, they have a fifty-fifty chance of having the equivalent of an eighth-grade education. What's going to happen to them?

Again, they are American citizens. What's going to happen to them? They go on the welfare roles; they can't find jobs. They can't

find decent employment; they can't find decent housing so that they lose all affiliation, all association or identification with our society and with our government. I think we can do better in our educational system. I think we can do better in jobs. I think that we established a welfare system thirty years ago and felt that that was the end. I don't think it's satisfactory to those who pay the taxes to pay out the welfare, and I don't think it's satisfactory for those who receive welfare, either form them or for their families. I think that we should have, instead of welfare, decent employment and decent jobs and responsible wages. [Applause.]

And I don't think that we have to accept conditions. I don't think that we have to accept the fact that we have inflation. I don't think that we have to accept the fact that goods, the price of goods continues to go up here in Eugene or in the state of Oregon or across the rest of the country. Or, that our air becomes more and more polluted and we cut back the amount of money and the amount of funds that are being spent on it. Whether our waters become polluted or that we lose our recreational areas, I think we can plan and we can work for this over the period of the 1970's; and I think one of the major steps that we have to take in order to be prepared to do it is to bring peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. [Applause]

What I'm talking about is not unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam, but what I think that we've done over the period of the last few years is we've made this war, America's war. That's my objection to it. I think it's their war. I think it's the war of the South Vietnamese.

It's their country; it must be their effort. We can help them, but we cannot win it for them. And instead, we've gone in over the period of the last few years, and we've made this America's war. We've carried the major burden of the fighting. I don't think we can win it under those circumstances. They've got to end their corruption and their dishonesty of that government -- not put people in jail who disagree with them but place them in the political process of the future of that country; not permit some young men to buy his way out of the draft; not to refuse, as they have up until recently, to draft their eighteen-year-olds and nineteen-year-olds, and have a member of their General Assembly get up and say, "Why should we draft our young men to fight America's war for them?" How could we get ourselves in that kind of a position? That's what I don't think is acceptable in the United States. How could we get into a position that we're over there fighting that war and our casualties, our American dead, go up double in the year 1967 over 1966, during the same period of time the South Vietnamese casualties go down until they are less than the United States'? I don't think that's acceptable, and I don't think that it's unpatriotic to find fault with the policies that we pursue in that part of the world. [Applause]

So I think they, I think they should end their corruption; I think they should broaden their political base. They've taken the steps to draft their eighteen-year-olds and nineteen-year-olds. I think, if they feel the search-and-destroy missions where so many Americans are killed and so many innocent Vietnamese are killed, they think that's necessary, then it should be conducted by the Army of South Vietnam and not by the Army of the United States. [Applause] It's a reflection on

all of us. It's a reflection on all of us across this state and across this country. But the commander, the American commander, Ben Tray said, when he made the remark, "I have to go in and destroy that town in order to save it." That's a reflection on all of us, as American citizens, even those who aren't there. But particularly those of us, those who are not there and those of us who are government officials, those of us who run for office, that's, that's a direct reflection on all of us and our responsibilities, and I intend to do something about it if I am elected President of the United States. [Applause]

I think of the money that could be saved, thirty billion dollars, thirty billion dollars a year, about 350,000 dollars to kill each one of the enemy. That money could be used here to educate a child. [Applause] That money could be used here to provide jobs for our young people. It could be used to provide decent housing; it could be used to help our elderly people. It could be used to provide, help our black people, but also the other minorities, minorities that I saw yesterday, and I've seen many times before, our Indians, the first citizens of the United States who suffer a drop-out rate in school of sixty-five per cent, whose unemployment rate in many areas of the United States goes up to eighty and ninety per cent, whose life expectancy is, is four times less than that of a white person. I think we have a responsibility to those who are less well off here in the United States. We have a responsibility and obligation to those in the Delta area of Mississippi, where we have this great affluence, to insure that they have enough to eat. I don't think it's satisfactory in the United States of America in the year 1968 that we have young children by the tens of thousands who are starving to

death. I think this should be changed, and I intend to do so as President of -- [applause]

I have seen them, and I don't think it's acceptable. Camus said, "Perhaps this world is a world in which children suffer, but we can lessen the number of suffering children; and if you do not do this," he said, "who will do this?" I think that we will do this because I think that we are a compassionate and generous country. I think we will help those who need help, that we will provide meaningful jobs, instead of welfare, that we'll improve the quality of life for our citizens, that we'll provide a decent education for our young people, so that they can go on to college or a university, so that they can go out and find decent jobs, that will improve the quality of American life, that will bring peace to our own country and be the leader for peace all around the globe, and that's what I think we stand for. [Applause]

So I've, I've come here to ask for your help over the period of the next few weeks. This will be an important and significant primary. The eyes of the nation will be here. We can turn this country around. We can make a difference in the state of Oregon. We can make a difference in our position all around the rest of the globe. For the states that have the primaries are the ones that are going to make that difference. So I come here to Oregon to thank those who have been supporters, such as Congresswoman Green and Jack Beatty and others, but also to ask for your support, ask your support from those who are dissatisfied with what we've been doing over the period of the last few years, and feel we can do better, who feel that a change is needed, who feel that a change of direction of this country is needed, and will join with me in

that effort, I ask of you your help. [Applause]

Francis Bacon once wrote that, "In this theatre of man's life, it is left only to God and to angels to be lookers on." We have a responsibility, whether those, those of us in public life, or individual citizens; and this is the year we must discharge that responsibility. We can make a difference for this part of the country. We can make a difference for the United States of America. We can make a difference for the peace of the world. Fran -- George Bernard Shaw once wrote, "Some people see things as they are, and say why, I dream things that never were, and say why not!" It's on that basis that I ask for your help in the months --[applause]

APPENDIX II

Remarks by Senator Robert F. Kennedy at the Salem Train Depot, May 18, 1968[1]

Well, I'm delighted to be back in Salem. I'm delighted to see all of you, and I'm very, very pleased that Mrs. Green could accompany me. We had such a great trip to Salem last time. I had such a good time and pronounced all the words exactly properly. [Laughter] I hear all my supporters have had a very, very difficult time. Willamette. [Laughter] I've been studying it. You know, before I arrived last time, I studied it in the car to make sure that I got it exactly properly, and then I blew it. [Laughter] But I'm very, very pleased to be here; this is an old town, community with a long, long history of which all of you are terribly proud. The oldest educational institution in the state of Oregon and all that you've accomplished in Salem and all that you stand for here in the state of Oregon. I'm proud to be here. I'm proud to be able to participate in this election, because as Mrs. Green said, this election really is going to determine what direction the United States is going to move in -- whether we're going to take a different direction

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[1]This is the exact text of the speech as tape recorded in Salem. The comments in brackets and paragraph divisions were supplied by the writer after listening to the tape.

than we are at the moment, whether we're going to be satisfied with what we have. I think we're a great country; I'm proud of what was done under the Democratic administration of President Kennedy and many of the things that were accomplished under President Johnson. But the fact is that I think that we still have problems in the United States; I still think that we have problems that we have to face, and I don't think that the American people want to shove them under the rug and act as if they don't exist. Because the fact is, that they do exist.

We can take pride in the fact that we have seventy million television sets, but we can also watch what goes on on television and we see what goes on television. We see what goes on in the rest of the United States, and we see what goes on in the rest of the world. And that must be a matter of concern, whether it affects us personally in our own lives or whether it affects other American citizens. It has to be a matter of concern here in Salem; it has to be a matter of concern here in the state of Oregon that we have to bring twelve-thousand troops into our nation's capital. After all, Washington D.C. is not only a city; Washington, D.C. is not only the nation's capital; it's the capital of the free world. And we can't say that we have the politics of joy if we have rioting and looting and lawlessness that exists in our nation's capital. I travelled through Washington, D.C. on that Sunday after the riots broke out and saw building after building in flame, just after the looting had taken place. We can't accept that in the United States. We can't accept the fact that ninety cities in the United States erupted in violence. If I'm President of the United States, if I'm elected President of the United States with your help, I'm going to

do all in my power, as I did as Attorney General, to see that we don't, to see that we abide by the law, that we live by the law in the United States and that we don't give way to violence and lawlessness, rioting and disorder. [Applause]

And we're going to make a major effort to insure that everybody has an equal opportunity, that there is justice for all of our citizens. I'm going to do all in my power, for instance, to move away from the welfare, the idea of the handout, and the dole that we have accepted over the period of the last thirty years. We thought, I think we've accepted a philosophy in the United States that if you handed people money that that was all that was necessary. The result is that many of our large cities are slowly becoming bankrupt. It's unsatisfactory to the taxpayer who has to pay such a tremendous burden as welfare, and it's demeaning to the recipient. Why don't we change the welfare system to a system of jobs and system of employment, and not -- [applause] This is a new approach, perhaps one we should have accepted over the period of the last thirty years.

But there are many things we can do. It's not just to use the government and the employer as we had to in the 1930's. We might have to have some of that; but beyond that, let's bring in the private enterprise system in an active way. Let's give the private enterprise system tax credits and tax benefits if they go into areas, the rural areas, the urban areas of the United States, where there's unemployment or where people are on welfare, and say you'll have some special tax benefits, your taxes will be lowered, if you go in and take people who are presently on welfare and hire them, train them, and make them

taxpayers, instead of recipients of tax money. I think it makes much more sense than what we've done in the past, and I intend to do so. [Applause]

Let me just say also that one of the problems in the United States is that we don't have sufficient housing in many parts of the country, and it's had a major effect here in the state of Oregon because of the high interest rates and the high cost of money. So why don't we do the same thing with legislation that I introduced almost two years ago? It gives tax credits and tax benefits to the private sector to go in and construct housing in rural areas and in urban areas of the United States, giving jobs to people but also constructing the needed housing that exists across the United States -- bringing the private sector in and making it an active partner of government, decentralizing controls so that all these programs are not just run and operated out of Washington but are run by the people in the local communities, reaching the private sector in an active way, changing the philosophy of government and trying to move ahead, constructing houses and making jobs for our citizens. I think that makes much more sense than what we're doing at the present time, and that's what I expect to do if I'm elected President of the United States with your help. [Applause]

I think there are things that we can do. I think that there are things that we can do here in this country, and I think that there are problems that we have and we have to face. But I don't think that we're controlled by events. I don't think, for instance, that we're controlled by the events in Vietnam. What I want to see, as I know all of you want to see, is an end to the death and destruction in Vietnam. I'm glad that the policy of the United States Government has changed

and that we're now going to go to the negotiating table. But I think that still, as we're at the negotiating table, that we have to remember that there were more Americans killed last week in Vietnam than have been killed at any other time during the war. There were more Americans killed last week than there were Americans killed during the whole year of 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964 -- more Americans killed just last week than killed all during that period of time. That war continues to escalate. I'm not going to be satisfied until that war is ended. I'm not going to be satisfied until the Vietnamese take over the major burden of that struggle themselves, and not put it in the hands of the Americans. [Applause] And I'm not going to be satisfied while we draft a young man from Salem, while we draft a young man from the state of Oregon, that we send him to fight in Vietnam and recognize that a young man in Vietnam, if he has enough money, can buy his way out of the draft. I don't think that is acceptable to the American people, and it won't be acceptable to me if I'm elected President of the United States. [Applause]

I want to see them end the corruption and dishonesty that exists in their country. I want to see them put in a land reform program that will gain the support of the people. I want to see them put in a political reform program so that they gain the support of the people. We can't transfer with bombs and men and guns and bullets and napalm a desire for those people to fight on behalf of themselves. They have to do it. This is their war. This is their problem. We can help them, but we can't win it for them. And I think that policy must be accepted by the United States Government, and it will be if I'm elected President of the United States. [Applause]

And I'd like to bring back, ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to bring back the eighty-five million dollars, not only the American troops, but I want to bring back the eighty-five million dollars that we spend every day in Vietnam; the six-hundred million dollars that we spend every week in Vietnam. I'd like to bring that back here to the United States and start using it on behalf of our own people within our own country and our security around the rest of the globe. [Applause] I'd like to, I'd like to start putting our own budget closer into balance so that we don't have this tremendous inflation that has such as effect on all of your lives. Three and one-half per cent last year, a rate of five per cent and larger this year. We have tremendous -- we were the slowest growing nation of the large nations economically in 1960 and then we changed administrations; by 1963 we were the fastest growing of the largest, large nations. We were the fastest growing economically of the large nations in the world. And we had virtually no inflation. I want to return to those policies. I want men to have jobs. I want farmers to prosper and I don't want to have this inflationary period. Five per cent -- I don't want to have the highest interest rate that we have now in parts of the United States that they've been over the period of the last hundred years because it has a tremendous effect on all our citizens. Hospital costs now, in the state of Oregon, are up forty per cent over what they were three years ago; medical costs are up twenty per cent. It is estimated that over the period of the next seven years, hospital costs will go up another 140 per cent. It is extimated that college costs and university costs are going to go up another thirty-five per cent. It is going to cost an average factory worker a half-year's salary to send a child to

college in the United States. So, this is going to be a tremendous burden on all of our citizens.

I want to start focusing attention on the problems that we have here within our own country. I want to focus attention on the problems that are faced by our elderly people. I don't think a Social Security payment of fifty-five dollars a month is enough for a person to live on in the United States. I think that they need at least one-hundred dollars a month, and I've introduced legislation to that effect. But I think something can be done. As Mrs. Green said, "I think we have to start looking at our priorities." And I think our first priorities are our people here in the United States and the problems that they're facing, and I intend to focus on them if I'm elected President of the United States. [Applause]

You know that the problems of polution, what we need to do about that. You know that some of the companies here have done a great deal, and I congratulate them on the effort that's been made. But all of us have to work together; I think that's the great thing about the United States, that we can work together as businessmen, young people, older people, and the United States government. If I'm elected President of the United States, I'm going to bring back control of the government to the people themselves. If I'm elected President of the United States, I'm going back to the people themselves: I'm not just going to stay in Washington; I'm not just going to stay in the large cities of the United States. I'm going to travel across this country. I'm going to listen to what people think; I'm going to carry the Presidency to the American people. And I think that's the way it should be done, and I think that's

what the American people want. [Applause]

I'm going to make an effort to decentralize control, not just by bringing the private sector in too, but also making large grants to local communities so that they can decide whether they want to put their attention on pollution, whether they want to put their attention on more highways, whether they want to put their attention on job training. But I think that all the wisdom and all the knowledge doesn't have to rest in Washington; I think it rests with the American people in their local communities and in their cities and in their towns. And I intend to make that a philosophy, if I'm elected President of the United States, with the help of the people of Oregon. [Applause]

So, I've come here to ask for your support. As Mrs. Green said, "the attention of the nation is going to be focused on the State of Oregon." You could very well determine who's going to be the next President of the United States here in Oregon. That's how important Oregon is. Here in the State of Oregon you can decide which direction you want the United States to move in. One of my major opponents says that we should have the politics of joy and the politics of happiness. I want the politics of hope. I think that we can do better in this country, and I don't think that we can say that we're joyous or that we're happy -- if 590 Americans were killed in Vietnam last week and if we have rioting in our nation's capital. I think that we can do better; the American people can do better and that's what I intend to do with your help. [Applause]

And I'm very, very pleased that my cause and campaign in this state have been so effective that you people that have formerly

supported Ronald Reagan have decided to join us. Laughter and applause It gives one a really sort-of, heart-warming feeling. Applause You know, ordinarily you would have thought that -- it's a terrific -- something about Ronald Reagan. I was down in California. He promised that he wouldn't raise any, any new taxes, and I must applaud him for that. Very good. He tripled the old ones, but he didn't raise any new ones! Laughter But, I think it's marvelous that they recognize that we have to move in this country, that we have to start living, that we're gonna live in the Twentieth Century; and they've decided to come to our rallies, and they're going to join us, that they're going to take home their Reagan signs -- they've admitted that. They want to show that they have been for Reagan, but now they're going to go home and burn them. Laughter

And, anyways, you've got a lot of farm areas around here as well, and there's nobody doing more for the farmer than me. Laughter A lot of people come in and say they're doing things for the farmer or that if they're elected President of the United States, they'll do something for the farmer. But who's doing something for the farmer today? -- me! Laughter I do more at home -- but if you saw my breakfast table. Laughter and applause And, then, the other thing is, you wouldn't want me, when I go home and I see those little children and they say, "How did you do in Salem, Daddy?", and a little tear runs down their eyes, now would you want that to happen? Laughter, crowd shouts, "No!" No, you wouldn't do that, would you? "No!" When they say, "You did well in Indiana; you did well in the District of Columbia; you did well in Nebraska; how did you do in Oregon?"

And, then a little tear comes down their eyes and -- no, you wouldn't do that, would you? [No!] And, anyway, it would be much less expensive, give us a house in which to live and don't put us on welfare. [Laughter]

Ladies and gentlemen, I come here to ask for your support. As I have said, this is an important primary. The eyes of the nation are going to be on it. We can win here in the State of Oregon. I don't promise that we can deal with all these things immediately. But, what I do promise, and what I pledge to you, is that we'll face them. I'll come to the American people. I'll return the Presidency, the control of government, not to some remote area three-thousand miles away, but to you, yourselves. And, I'm going to work with you and I'm going to work for you and use the talent and the courage of the American people. The responsibility doesn't rest just in Washington: it rests in communities such as Salem and it rests across the State of Oregon, this great, great state. And it rests here and around the rest of the United States. That is where our strength has laid in the past and that's where it lies now, and I would tend to return government to the control of the people themselves. [Applause]

George, George Bernard Shaw once wrote, "Some people see things as they are and say, why? I dream things that never were and say, why not?" I think that's what guides the people -- the people of the State of Oregon. And that's what will guide this campaign over the period of the next ten days. And I ask for your support. Thank you very much. [Applause]

APPENDIX III: THE MAJOR ADDRESS

Remarks by Senator Robert F. Kennedy at the

University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon

May 18, 1968[1]

Distinguished Chancellor; Dean Norman; Mr. Jones, the Student Body President; Ladies and Gentlemen:

I'm delighted to be here. I'm delighted to have an opportunity to speak here at the University of Oregon, which is located in the community of Eugene, which is the Eugene I like the best in the country. [Laughter, then applause] I'm glad to look out in the audience and see people who have longer hair than they said I used to have. [Laughter] I'm delighted that -- I'm very, very pleased to see so many of you. I understand that this university is not unanimous for me. [Laughter and applause] I'm glad that those who were formerly for Senator McCarthy decided to come to my rallies. [Laughter and applause] It's nice to be able to convert people, [Laughter] particularly when they bring their signs and want you to know that they [regret what they've done in][2] the past and they want to reform. [Laughter]

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[1]This is the exact text of the address as it was tape recorded at Hayward Field on May 18, 1968, with bracketed information provided by the writer.

[2]Distortions in the tape recording forced the writer to approximate this phrase as closely as possible to the original wording.

And I see signs for Ken Keating. I ran against Ken Keating in 1964 and I thought maybe that was behind me. [Laughter] That's a real die-hard. [Laughter]

I'm very, very pleased to be with you and I congratulate the effort that's being made here at the university in connection with focusing attention on the problems that face this country, face this world, face all of mankind. You, I think, particularly have great at stake, the fact that you have the least ties with the past and the greatest stakes in the future. In this election that's held here in the state of Oregon, it affects you really more than it affects those of us who are running for office, affects your lives more intimately and more personally and more dramatically, than it will affect those who are running for office or an older generation because the fact is that now we have the capacity to destroy all of mankind. Before, thirty years ago, forty years ago, we became involved in a war which everybody, in which large numbers of people were killed and now we can kill all of mankind.

There's a Chinese curse that says that "May he live in interesting times." We're cursed, [Laughter] because we live in interesting times, the most dangerous times in the history of mankind, because we have that capacity now. The United States and the Soviet Union and possibly Communist China in the decade or so to come certainly will have a delivery system where they can deliver a nuclear weapon by mid-1970, whether they have the capacity also to deliver -- have a delivery system that will touch all over the globe, of course, is something quite different. But, in any case, the Soviet Union and the United

States have that capacity, and so what we do is not to the quality of life, the decisions that are made are not just on the quality of life, the kind of lives you are going to lead, but really whether we are going to survive the century, whether we're going to survive this year. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, if it wasn't for the wisdom of the President of the United States and also the wisdom of Mr. Krushchev at that time to decide that he was going to take the steps to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, then we might have been involved in a nuclear holocaust which would have resulted in the deaths of a hundred million Americans, a hundred million Americans. Think of the figure, a hundred million Americans in this -- Krushchev said "the living will envy the dead." We're going to have to be involved in all of these kinds of problems, not just a mere thought that we could be involved in all of these kinds of problems for all of your lifetime, that there's a good calculation of our adversaries and their wishes and their desires and their actions that have been calculated and been misjudged by the United States and that's going to mean the destruction of new and the destruction of everything that -- of almost everything that lives on this planet. And the same thing for our adversaries, if they misjudge the will and the desires of this country, that also can have that result.

So that's why I think it is important that you take an interest, that you become actively involved. At the present time you disagree with one another, and perhaps there'll come a time when I'll disagree with the decisions you folks make; but the fact that you become involved in it -- not the fact that you feel strongly about some of these

matters -- I think that's the best thing for the United States. And the fact that you enter into political life--I like it better when you're on my side-- but even the mere fact that you enter into political life, even if it's for Ronald Reagan. [Laughter] It's possible, even with a college education, it's possible. [Laughter and applause] It's healthy for the United States to develop our country as a whole. I never understood, if I can tell you quite frankly, and I would like to have you think about it, because I'm moving around so rapidly I don't have much time to do some of these little things; but when they have these signs, "Nixon's the one," what is the rest of the sign? I mean, what is the rest -- the one what? [Laughter and applause] I can personally think of a lot of things to fill in, [Laughter] but if they're going to fill it in in August or something, [Laughter] Nixon's the one -- I can think of -- [Laughter] I couldn't say it. And then, what is he looking for in his briefcase? [Laughter and applause] I think it's the most marvelous sign. I think he's advertising briefcases, I don't know. [Laughter] I mean, I don't think he's a serious candidate; he's just associated with a briefcase firm. [Laughter] And the briefcase is bigger than he is! [Laughter] He keeps looking in it because Nixon's the one; now, if you think about it in the School of Public Affairs, let me know and send me the answer so that I'll understand it. [Laughter] I have people come now with signs that say, "Robert Kennedy's the one" and I know they're unfriendly! [Laughter] I don't know why he puts them up on billboards.

One thing is clear in this year, -- I'll be glad to answer questions at the end. I'm speaking on one subject; the subject is

Vietnam. And I'll be glad to answer questions at the end for a few minutes, if you have any questions on other subjects. -- One thing is clear in the year 1968; the American people, in my judgment, and I think it's been demonstrated around the country, want no more Vietnams. [Applause] The reality of events, the reality of events and the force of our people's desires are thrusting us at last toward the negotiated settlement which is the only responsible way to liquidate this war. Yet at the very time we hear -- from officials high in levels of government-- that we must be prepared for more Vietnams in the future. Seemingly illusion still lives, and wisdom is yet to come. Surely it is now too late to pretend that the war in Vietnam is a success -- or that the well-being of our country and our position in the world can be, can be committed to its repetition in future. Yesterday, it was announced that American dead for the last week had reached a new record during the war -- 562. We've gone to the negotiation table in Paris; we're all pleased the negotiations have begun, but it's a mistake to lose sight of the fact that the war goes on, that the devastation of Vietnam goes on. All one has to do is look at the front page of the paper this morning to see that picture of that woman -- and the agony that's in her face, and look at the paper three days ago and see the picture of that young boy -- girl -- twelve years of age -- who had been killed by sparks from an American helicopter and see her six-year-old brother leaning over her body with tears, and realize that this war is going on, the devastation is still taking place. It's not just the responsibility of those that are over there. It's our responsibility -- those of you who sit up there and those here that are running for political office.

It's the responsibility, the great responsibility, on the part of all the American people that we can't forget that with the idea that discussions and negotiations are taking place in Paris. That's fine. That's a step in the right direction. But that war, the devastation is still taking place and we must always remember that. We cannot be content until American soldiers are returned to the United States and that land is turned over to the people of Vietnam. Applause

Since the Tet offensive shattered the official illusions of serene progress, the terrible statistics of combat deaths have piled up at a rate twice as high as they were in 1967--which in turn were twice as high as they were in 1966. We had more men -- by twenty per cent -- by more than twenty per cent -- killed last week in the war in Vietnam than we had in all the years of 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964 put together. That's what has happened in that part of the world. During these weeks, despite renewed promises of improvement in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, American troops have continued to carry the burden of the fighting -- and have borne the majority of the casualties, and I don't think that's satisfactory for the United States of America. This is their war; this is their conflict. We can help them, but we cannot win it for them. Applause All this can be traced to the central fault of the Vietnam war: that we have attempted to resolve by American military might a conflict whose outcome depends on the will and conviction of the South Vietnamese people, and we must not repeat that error again in the history of the United States. Applause

We must meet -- we must recognize that we must meet our responsibilities around the world. At times -- as in the Cuban missle crisis, or in the Berlin crisis of 1962 -- there will be great risk and great danger. At other times -- as it was during the days of the Marshall Plan, when 10 percent of the Federal budget was devoted to the reconstruction of Europe -- there will be tremendous cost. And we must meet our responsibilities in the future -- even when that is dangerous or costly to ourselves. And I think the American people are willing to meet that responsibility.

But we must learn to make clear and discriminating judgments about where the national interest really lies -- about what kind of commitments should be made to protect the security of the United States. We can and we must help allies and our friends, but we cannot be, and must not try to be, a policeman to all the world. [Applause] Certainly the security of the United States has never before required us to entangle ourselves in an endless quagmire like Vietnam; and I cannot believe that it will so require again.

Now the first priority for America -- as it has been for more than two years -- is to bring the war to an honorable negotiated settlement. We are all hopeful that the Paris talks will be successful, that they will lead to serious negotiations, and bring an end to the destruction and killing. Still there is a major impediment to the early success of those talks: neither the government of South Vietnam, nor the National Liberation Front, are yet directly involved in the negotiating process. Perhaps it would be better for all concerned -- as it would have been better for the last two years -- if the government of

South Vietnam were to commence its own talks with the National Liberation Front. I think that's what should happen, as I have felt over a period of a number of years. That at least might help to avoid the embarrassment and confusion of the last two days, the contradiction between the Vice-President and members of the Administration. If such confusion can be created among members of the American government, agreement with the other parties will be difficult indeed. At any rate, let us hope that this untimely contradiction does not in any way hamper the negotiations on which so much depends -- the salvation of Vietnam, and our own hopes for domestic progress and domestic peace.

For the future, however, the question is how we are to avoid more Vietnams; and that requires us to debate and come to understand what it is about the war in Vietnam that we are determined not to repeat. What does it mean to say, no more Vietnams?

It is sometimes asserted that Vietnam is "the battlefield . . . where we must," and I quote, "make the decision which may well determine the future shape of Asia." But it is unlikely that whatever the outcome of the war in Vietnam, the dominoes will fall in either direction. Most of the nations, most of the nations of Southeast Asia, under the banner of their own nationalism, have successfully resisted internal communist upheaval, whether or not supported from outside their borders. And if we look beyond Southeast Asia, to the great powers that are in fact shaping the future of Asia -- Japan, India, Pakistan -- we see that the threat of communist insurgency in these nations is really insubstantial.

Is there a threat of Vietnam-styled insurgency beyond Asia -- in

Africa or Latin America? In Africa, the active anti-colonial movements, in Angola and Mozambique, are led by native nationalists, closer to the west than to communism. Latin America threw off colonialism shortly after we gained our own independence, and guards its nationalism tremendously fiercely. The one communist government in this hemisphere achieved power by over-throwing a government which was not only corrupt but repressive; applause it was a regime heavily identified with and protected by the United States; a regime which had made the name of Havana synonymous with gambling and vice dominated by American gamblers. Left alone, Cuba has committed its own mistakes, and the revolutionary appeal of Castro has faded correspondingly. Despite eight years of effort since he came to power, he has been unable to topple another Latin American government. And the utter failure of Che Guevara's attempted revolution in Bolivia shows how hostile the Latin American soil can be to attempts at exporting revolution.

All this is not to say that Vietnam is the last challenge that we will face abroad. That would be a terrible mistake if we thought that was true. It would be absolute nonsense. It is to say, however, that Vietnam is only Vietnam -- that is will not settle the fate of Asia or of America, much less the fate of the world.

But it is also true that the danger is not past. Almost all the nations of Africa are only recently emerged from colonial domination --from three-hundred years in which their entire structure of their society and culture was torn apart, degraded, and humiliated, and mostly by the nations of the West. We can expect that the nations of Latin America, which are western but not yet modern, will be plagued by

instability for decades to come.

For these nations we can hope that their progress will be humane and will be decent; hope that they avoid the excesses of violence which accompanied the development of so many of the nations of the West. And we should offer to their effort such assistance as we can, or will be effective.

But we cannot continue as we too often have in the past to automatically identify the United States with the preservation of a particular order within those countries, nor can we confuse our own national interests with the rule of a particular faction within any particular country. [Applause] Of course, those in power in these countries will often seek to preserve their position by requesting our help.

Faced with such requests, we must make calm and discriminating judgments as to which governments can and should be helped, which are moving effectively to defend themselves and which are moving effectively to meet the needs of their people. Where the central interests of the United States are not directly threatened, I would propose a simple, functional task: We should give no more assistance to a government against any internal threat than that government is capable of using itself, through its own agencies and instruments. [Applause] We can help them but we cannot go in and try to do their job for them. [Applause]

That limitation has, in fact, been forced to our attention. For one thing, Vietnam has proven that all the might and all the power of America cannot provide or create a substitute for another government, or

will for another people. But let us understand the full significance of the limitations I can suggest. It does not prevent us from extending reasonable assistance to developing nations. It does prevent us from taking over an internal struggle from a minority government or a government too ineffective or corrupt to gain the support of its own people. [Applause] It would allow the future of each country to be settled, essentially, by the people of that country themselves and not by an outside power. [Applause] This is not to expose all the world to the deprevations of vast communist conspiracies. The truth is that much as the Soviets and the Chinese might wish to capitalize on the instability and unrest now prevalent in the nations of the third world, their appeal is little compared to the most potent force in the world today -- and that is the force of nationalism, not the force of communism. [Applause] Even within the nations once ruled by Moscow, the forces of national independence and personal freedom are steadily eroding the Soviet's once unquestioned position. All we have to do is look at Czechoslovakia over the period of the last several months. All we have to do is look at Rumania over the period of the last year. All we have to do is look at the conditions and the situations and the eruptions that took place in Poland at the beginning of the year to understand that the strongest force in the world today is the force of nationalism. The people want to decide their own destiny; they want to decide their future, and that's going to be true as far as their relationship to the Soviet Union or Communist China and to the United States of America, and we're not going to be able to effectively interfere with that effort, and we should not. We should make efforts to try to capitalize on it, rather than to interfere

with this great force that exists throughout the world today. [Applause] The fact is that the force of nationalism can be our strongest ally in the world, if we respect and if we honor it. It can also be our nemesis, if we continue to ignore it. The worst thing we could do would be to take as our mission the suppression of disorder and internal upheaval everywhere in the world, everywhere we find it. [Meager applause] Somebody I brought from New York. [Laughter and applause] Thank you all for clapping. [Laughter] This is even more true if the means for this policeman's role is to be the indiscriminate introduction of American troops into the internal struggle of other nations. If we decide that in our own country every time there is an internal upheaval that the answer to it is to send American troops or American soldiers, we're going to be in nothing but trouble or difficulty around the rest of the globe for the rest of mankind. [Applause] It should certainly be one of the lessons we learn from Vietnam -- and I can speak from personal knowledge and personal experience. I was involved in some of the decisions that were made in connection with Vietnam, when I was a member of the Administration from 1961 through 1963. So that when fault is being assessed, when blame is being assessed in connection with Vietnam, I'm going to have to take my share of responsibility. I recognize that. But I think also I would hope that I learned something from that, and I speak of what I learned and of what I've been trying to say over the period of the last three years, of the difficult direction the United States must go if we're going to have peace and security around the globe. We cannot be the world's policeman; we cannot settle every problem throughout the globe. There are going to be internal upheavals

and internal changes all over the rest of the globe as long as you live. And we can't go in to all of those countries and send American troops in and feel that we are going to settle every problem. We must understand that; we must accept it in the United States and we must adopt our policies accordingly. [Applause]

Their presence, of American troops, can transform a factional trouble within a country into a nationalist struggle against foreign domination. Their introduction commits our prestige to the outcome of diverse struggles we here in the United States may barely understand. It may lead the government we protect to slacken its own efforts, ignore needed reforms and refuse essential sacrifices. Feeling that the United States is involved, that the United States can't extirpate itself, so that they themselves don't have to make the kind of effort that is necessary for them to be successful, they don't have to put in the kind of reforms that are necessary to gain the support of the people. They can go on being corrupt and dishonest and fail to make any kind of effort with their own people in their own country. And I think that is exactly what has happened in Vietnam. They have said to themselves, those who are the leaders of the government, they say to themselves, we of the United States have committed their prestige, and their position, they can't possibly withdraw, so we don't have to do anything ourselves. We'll let them take over the major burden of the struggle, and we won't end the corruption and dishonesty, let alone clear the land reform or social reform programs. I don't think that is acceptable for the United States for the future. And we must learn, our policy must not just be to end the war in Vietnam, but we must learn the lesson of the struggle

in Vietnam. And I think that's one of the lessons that we've clearly learned, the American people at least, if not the United States Government. [Applause]

Most ironic of all, ill-considered military interventions may well increase the very communist influence that they are aimed to prevent; for communism has gained its greatest strength allied with the national reaction to foreign intervention, invasion, or colonial domination. The Soviet Union in 1917, the Soviet Union in 1939, a perfect example. In 1917 and 1919 when we sent American troops to the Soviet Union, and 1939; in China, 1933 and 1945; and Vietnam, 1942 to 1954. All of them -- Cuba dominated by the United States -- all of these lands -- the lessons that we really must learn. We must also keep this entire issue in its proper perspective. For whatever American interests are involved in the internal affairs of the nations of the third world, they are very slight compared to the substantial threats which potentially lie ahead. These have not been conquered by Vietnam; indeed in many respects, it has made them far worse.

What are they, and how are they to be met?

One is the challenge of the Soviet Union -- still the only nation able to threaten the very survival of the United States. In recent years, many have come to think of the Soviets as a lesser threat than they once were; and there is no question that in some respects, the present direction of Soviet society is toward greater moderation in foriegn policy and greater internal freedom. But these are not the trends on which we can gamble the security of the United States. At this very moment Soviet intervention in the Middle East threatens our

interests and the peace of that region for years and decades to come. The Soviet Union -- not a world movement, but itself the second most powerful nation in the world -- remains for us, in many ways a potential threat of unknown magnitude.

The second great danger ahead of us is China, but for the foreseeable future, China can damage us only to the extent we make it possible -- by involving ourselves in a land war with her on the continent of Asia. Our policy in Asia should be to rely principally on the great powers of that continent -- Japan, India, Indonesia, and even the Soviet Union -- to contain Chinese expansion. In Asia, as elsewhere, we must come to see ourselves, where necessary, only as a strategic reserve against the most serious of threats.

The third great danger is not from an external enemy. It is from ourselves. This is precisely the danger that in seeking universal peace, needlessly fearful of change and disorder, we will in fact embroil ourselves and the world in a whole series of Vietnams. But that danger can only be of our own making. The way to avoid it is to use our power always with restraint; to avoid over-commitment in rhetoric and in action; above all to recognize that America's interest is not in the automatic use of military force in the attempt to preserve things as they are elsewhere in the world. The world is going to change. We must recognize that the world is going to change and must adapt ourselves to that change here in the United States of America.

[Applause]

For the fourth danger is here at home. It is the danger that absorption in the problems of others will cause us to neglect the

health and quality of our own society. We cannot continue to deny and postpone the demands of our own people while spending billions in the name of the freedom for others, twelve-thousand miles away. [Applause] A nation torn by injustice and violence, its street patrolled by army units -- if this is to be our country, we can doubt how long others will look to us for leadership, or seek our participation in their common ventures. America was a great force in the world, with immense prestige, long before we became a great military power. That power has come to us and we cannot renounce it, but neither can we afford to forget that the real constructive force in the world comes not from tanks or bombs or napalm or bullets; but from imaginative ideas, warm sympathies and generous spirit of her people. These are qualities that cannot be manufactured by specialists in public relations. They are the natural qualities of a people pursuing decency and human dignity in its own undertakings without arrogance and without hostility or delusions of superiority toward others and other people in other parts of the globe; a people whose ideals for others are firmly rooted in the realities of the society that we have built for ourselves. That's what I think America has always stood for in the past. That's what I hope America will stand for in the future and that's why I run for President of the United States. [Applause]

Typed by Gwen Clavadetscher