CORDONING, COMPETING, AND CO-OPTING:

EXAMINING THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE THROUGH AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL SPACE

by

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Many have written about the rise of radical right political parties in Europe, but less is known about their impact. This is an investigation of these effects viewed spatially through the movement of political parties. The factor that most influences mainstream parties is the ideology of each particular radical right party. When confronted with an electorally relevant radical right party, mainstream right parties are more likely to cordon and differentiate if the xenophobic party is authoritarian, and more likely to engage with and co-opt the space of a neo-liberal xenophobic party. In other words, more-extreme radical right parties tend to produce a movement away from the radical right while less-extreme radical right parties tend to produce a movement toward the radical right. I establish this relationship through several cross-case expert judgment surveys, and then contextualize this data with qualitative evidence connecting more closely with actions of the parties themselves.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"the populist radical right is one of the few academic topics that one can study without having to defend the relevance of one's choice."

(Mudde 2007, 1)

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, few topics in domestic European politics have generated as much recent scholarly attention as radical right political parties. Most of this scholarship has been devoted to explaining the rise of the party family (either initial electoral breakthroughs, electoral consolidation, or both) through external socio-economic factors (Betz 1994; Ignazi 2003; Mudde 2007), external shifting political spaces (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Rydgren 2004; Schain et al. 2002), and internal party factors (Carter 2005; Mudde 2000, 2007; Schain et al. 2002; Taggart 2000). With these explanations often comes an (often unstated) underlying assumption that these parties are dangerous, or at least undesirable. Many books have been written on this process, but when (or if) they address the impact of the radical right, they do so in an (often underdeveloped) single chapter toward the end of the book. While there is a growing body of scholarship that is beginning to address the impact of the radical right (for example see Schain et al. 2002), the topic needs theoretical development. Although the effects of the radical right

are not yet well understood, unless these parties have an impact on politics, it would seem that the amount of scholarly attention that has been devoted to them is unfounded. This project is intended to defend the choices of scholars to study the radical right by focusing on the ways in which the radical right can alter the political system. A likely site for potential impacts within the political system may be in mainstream political parties (Mudde 2007, 282). I will therefore explore the effects of radical right parties on the positioning of other political parties spatially. I will do this through analyzing movements in party positioning over time on an overall right/left dimension, as well as on the issue of immigration.

This introductory chapter will first take some time to conceptualize the parties of the radical right and to discuss some potential effects these parties may have. I attempt to capture the core ideological features of radical right parties, but at the same time I acknowledge that while all of these parties share some important features, there is some ideological diversity within the radical right as well. After defining the parties this study is based upon, I discuss some potential effects. Certain scholars have suggested that there may be direct policy effects and potential broad social effects of radical right parties, but these studies have been relatively inconclusive since the effects are difficult to attribute directly the radical right parties themselves. Finally, I briefly lay out the plan for the rest of the project.

DEFINING THE PARTIES OF INTEREST

In *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (2007) Cas Mudde spends considerable time defining what it means to be a party of the radical right, and

categorizing empirical examples into his definition. Ultimately, he arrives at a hierarchical definition of populist radical right parties, based upon a ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970, 1991). Other authors have defined the radical right with emphases upon on different components. However, differences in emphases do not mean that these alternate definitions are not necessarily in direct conflict with Mudde's definition. This is aside from the place of neoliberalism. Some have argued that a neoliberal economic philosophy is a fundamental part of the radical right (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995) while Mudde suggests that neoliberalism is only secondary. Betz argues that radical right parties have "two faces". First, they espouse a neoliberal economic philosophy that is based on the idea that the welfare state has led to an oversized bureaucracy, excessive taxes, and unreasonable debt despite its promises of social justice. As a result, these parties propose less regulation, less state spending, and lower taxes. Anti-immigrant sentiment arrives in the story because immigration is blamed for these economic issues (Betz 1994). While Mudde would argue that the radical right is nativist at its core, which results in neoliberal policy preferences, Betz suggests that the radical right is first and foremost based upon a neoliberal ideology, that gets manifested in nativist policies because immigration is blamed for the economic problems of society. Kitchelt and McGann argue that the radical right is the political opposite of the new left. The "New Left stands for 'leftist' income redistribution by way of encompassing social policies in the economic sphere and 'libertarian' democratic participation and maximum individual autonomy in politics and the cultural sphere" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 2). It then follows that the radical right "advocates rightist free market economics and

'authoritarian' hierarchical arrangements in politics, together with a limitation of diversity and individual autonomy in cultural expressions" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 2). By constructing the radical right as a response to, and the opposite of, the new left, Kitchelt and McGann necessarily link it first and foremost to neoliberal economic policies. It has since been shown that the parties commonly included in the group thought of as being of the radical right take strong stances on the right with regard to social issues, but their positions vary widely and remain purposefully vague on economic issues (Rovny 2009). Ultimately, Mudde's definition seems to take this variation into account and most accurately captures the core sentiment of these parties as well as the main group of parties commonly considered to be radical right. I want to make clear however, that while these components are prevalent in the literature, they are not universally accepted and applied.

Mudde builds his definition of the radical right party family that is based upon the core ideological concepts of nationalism and xenophobia that in combination form nativism. These can be seen as "individually shaped coathangers on which additional concepts may be draped" (Freeden 1997, 5; Mudde 2007, 15). These ideologies form the core upon which more complete ideologies and political agendas are built. Nationalism is defined as "a political doctrine that strives for the congruence of the cultural and political unit, i.e. the nation and the state, respectively" (Mudde 2007, 16), but this alone does not capture the central sentiment of the radical right. For that, he in turn adds the concept of nativism, (which is formed by adding xenophobia [from the Greek *xenos* meaning foreigner and *phobos* meaning fear] to nationalism). It then follows that

nativism is "an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state" (Mudde 2007, 19).

With this emphasis on nationalism, natives, and nonnatives, the radical right is necessarily built around an agenda of identity politics that "is always based upon an 'us-them' distinction" (Mudde 2007, 63). Both the included groups and the excluded groups that form these identities are necessarily socially constructed, or, in other words, they are "imagined communities" (Anderson 1983). In order to construct the native identity, "one needs to delineate the boundaries with other identities, i.e. those of nonnatives" (Mudde 2007, 63). Such identity formation is especially important in the development of radical right parties because not only is the world divided based upon the distinction of "us" and "them" in which nonnatives are otherized, but it is also divided into "good" and "bad" where the other is demonized in a sense of morality (Taggart 2000). All political issues are then viewed through this lens.

Upon the core of nativism, Mudde adds authoritarianism to the definition of the radical right. By this he is referring to "the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely" (Mudde 2007, 23). The final necessary feature of the definition is populism, which refers to an ideology that sees society as being made up of two homogeneous and antagonistic groups; "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite" (Mudde 2007; Taggart 2000), fitting closely with the way in which the other is demonized in the formation of national identity. Thus, Mudde arrives at the term populist radical right parties. In order to be considered a member of

this party family, a party must have all three core concepts: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.

While other scholars do not necessarily define the radical right in a way that is in direct opposition to this definition based on essential ideological features, there are some instances of alternative emphasis. For instance, Piero Ignazi (2003) places more emphasis on what he has labeled the anti-system aspect of the radical right parties. I see this as included in Mudde's definition under the populist and nativist characteristics, but it is not emphasized in these terms. It is captured within populism because it reflects a distrust of the corrupt elite, and it is reflected in the concept of nativism so far as it is applied to European Union (which can be thought of as nonnative influence over national affairs). It is also more directly apparent in the anti-democracy element of the *extreme* right in Mudde's ladder of abstraction, but he does not view this as a necessary component of the *radical* right (Mudde 2007, 24). This means that while some parties that are considered to be radical right contain this characteristic, not all of them do, and it is not a core ideological feature. For Ignazi it is crucial to emphasize the anti-system nature of the radical right that seeks to undermine the democratic institutions because democratic pluralism is at odds with the harmony and homogenization these parties seek. Although not articulated in the same terms, this does not conflict with Mudde's definition. In fact, it can be seen as a manifestation of the nativist and populist features he describes. It is nativist because it seeks to homogenize the nation and the state, and it is populist because it seeks to locate the power within the pure people rather than the corrupt elite or the nonnatives. Similarly, Paul Taggart (1998) emphasizes a place for

Euro-skepticism as a key component of the radical right, but this can also be included in Mudde's definition. Euro-skepticism is merely a manifestation of nativism, or a reaction against a particular outgroup that is outside of the nation as well as outside of the state.

Elisabeth Carter (2005) seeks to broaden the group of parties included in her study in order to increase the soundness of the basis for generalization, and thus opts for a more inclusive definition. She includes parties that have been labeled as on the border or fringe of the radical right party family by other scholars (Ignazi 2003). Her definition is based on two anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements: "a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state" and "a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality" (Carter 2005, 17). This more general definition allows for additional parties to be included in her study than have been by other scholars. Carter acknowledges that borderline cases do exist, and establishing a dividing line between the mainstream right and the radical is less than obvious, but maintains that this "does not mean that parties of the extreme right cannot be identified and analyzed" (Carter 2005, 20). There "is a large number of political parties whose extreme right status is not debated" (Mudde 2000, 16; quoted in Carter 2005, 20).

I have settled on using the term radical right, and the definition of a radical right political party used throughout this project is based upon principles outlined by Elisabeth Carter and Cas Mudde. I will be including the more general anti-constitutional and anti-democratic components of Carter's definition, but will also emphasize core ideological features of nativism (made up of nationalism and xenophobia) and populism central to

Mudde's definition.[1] Doing so maintains an ideological core of the radical right party family, but allows for a certain level of relativism as the values, procedures and institutions included in Carter's anti-constitutional element are country specific. This relativism means that the radical right is "primarily a concept defined in relation to the particular version of the democratic constitutional order" in which it exists (Roberts 1994, 467; quoted in Carter 2005, 20). This allows for variation in particular ideologies of radical right parties, but still links them through a core ideology that is central to each party. Radical right parties are anti-constitutional and anti-democratic parties based upon the central ideological concepts of nativism and populism. They necessarily begin with a socially constructed "us-them" worldview based upon national identities, and tend to demonize the other. They have a fundamental respect for a strictly ordered society, but believe the power fundamentally lies with the pure people rather than the corrupted elite. It is the combination of these ideologies and how they are manifested in particular contexts (and reinforce or alter these contexts) that set these parties apart from other political parties and makes them of interest to this study. If these parties were to act upon their agenda, the resulting policies would be expected to reflect these key ideological features, which are in sharp contrast to many ideals of liberal democracy, and may be detrimental to these democratic systems.

[1] Since there is considerable debate on the dividing line between the mainstream right and the radical right, adding Mudde's core ideological components comes into conflict with the parties that make up the borderline cases in Carter's study, and her last category of radical right party ideologies (Neo-liberal populist parties). I will note this conflict again when it comes up; however, none of these parties play a central role in this project.

POTENTIAL IMPACTS

To situate this project with the existing literature, I will now review some of the most discussed effects radical right parties are thought to have. These effects are best thought of as direct effects on public policy, broad social effects, and effects on other parties and the party system.[2] As will be discussed later, this project will concentrate on effects that travel through other political parties, as the other types seem to be relatively limited and difficult to ascertain. Their political position on the fringe, as protest parties, and their relatively limited parliamentary representation, severely limit their chances of actually governing. The rest of this project thus seeks to explore the impacts of radical right parties on mainstream political parties (changes in their relative ideological positioning in particular).

Direct Policy Effects

Perhaps the most straightforward way of determining the effects of a political party is to look at the policies enacted when that party is in government. One would expect a party to enact policies that coincide with the issues most important to its manifesto. In the case of the radical right, this would mean policies that reflect the main principle of nativism. Examples include more restrictive immigration policies and a tightening on eligibility of social benefits to exclude nonnatives. Analyzing the impact of the radical right based upon directly enacted policies is problematic for many reasons. First of all, when in government, populist radical right parties are generally junior

[2] This framework is adapted from Cas Mudde (2007). His original framework also includes internal effects on the populist radical right parties themselves, but this category is not as relevant to this project as the others.

partners in coalitions at the national level. Even this situation, however, is quite rare. More often, these parties are in opposition to the parties in government, if represented in parliament at all.

In addition to rarely being in government to enact policies that reflect their agenda, parties that do enter coalition governments are sometimes required to sign a (symbolic) pledge to moderate their agenda. While these documents do not come with the force of law, they do demonstrate that other parties are not willing to enact radical policies even if they are open to working in conjunction with radical right for other reasons. For example, in Romania the PRM and the PUNR agreed to a protocol "forbid[ding] any manifestation of racism, anti-Semitism, extremism and totalitarianism" (Shafir 1996, 91 quoted in Mudde 2007, 181). The FPÖ in Austria signed a similar declaration stating that "The Federal Government reaffirms its unswerving adherence to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of the peoples of Europe and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy" (Schussel and Haider 2000, quoted in Mudde 2007, 181). As mentioned earlier, these declarations may largely be a symbolic act for the mainstream parties to reassure the public (and the world) that they will not concede to the radical right parties. However this places a very real limitation on the likelihood of radical right parties enacting policies that reflect their agenda. Even so, the vague language of the statements also lends itself to the rhetoric of the right, making it an agreeable proposition for both parties. Take the Austrian example. The FPÖ could use the language of this document to rally its supporters by arguing that they are the only

party that is fit to truly uphold such a pledge since the other parties are corrupt. They could also suggest that by referring to the "common heritage of the European people", the ÖVP is demonstrating that it is heavily influenced by outside forces and is not best suited to care for the needs of Austrians.

All these difficulties being noted, some trends in immigration policies have been discussed in reference to populist radical parties. Due to the way that immigration policies cross cut traditional partisan divides (Tichenor 2002), one would expect mainstream parties to seek consensual policies. Therefore, radical right parties could provide an outside impetus that may be responsible for change in immigration policy. Ted Perlmutter (2002) examines the role the Republikaner played in German asylum policy and the role Lega Nord played in Italian immigration policy. In both contexts, he finds that the parties were presented with opportunities to play a pivotal role in shaping policy reforms, but neither took the lead one might expect. He describes the role of the REP as a messenger while the LN showed a "less insistent focus and a less consistent restrictionism on immigration" than expected (Perlmutter 2002, 294-295). In addition to these examples of radical right parties not playing a leading role in increasingly restrictive policies, there is a trend toward more restrictive policies across Europe regardless of the power of the populist radical right in a given country. In fact, the radical right party family is very weak in the European Parliament and the convergence of immigration policies within the EU has been lead largely by the leaders of Spain and Britain, two countries with no real influential radical right parties to speak of (Mudde 2007, 281-282).

Broad Social Effects

Radical right parties may also have social effects in addition to political effects. An increase in exposure to xenophobic rhetoric may increase racial tensions, and perhaps spark an increase in racially motivated violence. On the other hand, the presence of a radical right party may serve as a legitimate outlet for xenophobia, and thus act as a mediating factor that reduces racial violence. Theoretically, the xenophobic rhetoric of the radical right could legitimize feelings of racial inequality and intolerance. Or, it could lead to a backlash effect of mobilizing opposition and increasing tolerance and acceptance of nonnatives (Koopmans 1996, for example). There have been some studies that have suggested that increased levels of violence are correlated with support for radical right parties, but these studies have not demonstrated causality (Eatwell 2000; Mudde 2005, 2007). As with the previous effects, it is difficult to determine whether any increase in xenophobia is influenced by the radical right parties, or if the same social factors that led to the rise of these parties also produce the xenophobic tendencies.

Outlining the Project

Following this introductory chapter that defined the boundaries of what is included in the radical right party family and discussed some potential impacts, the Chapter II will offer a review of some of effects on mainstream party positions that are discussed in the academic literature. While this review is by no means exhaustive, I do believe that it captures the main thrust of the literature and attempts to place it within a framework. In addition to looking at several potential patterns across party systems, I also consider the implications of individual party movements. Finally, I will discuss the

methods and data used to analyze the effects of the radical right on the positioning of mainstream political parties.

Chapter III analyzes the relationship between radical right parties and the movement of mainstream parties across cases. It begins by looking for broad patterns of movements among party systems. I present evidence that suggests radical right parties may cause convergence, as well as divergence, among the mainstream parties. There is also evidence of radical right parties shifting the party system to the right and to the left. However, along with the evidence of these patterns, there is also counterevidence that suggests these movements are not necessarily attributable to the radical right parties. From here, I look more closely at the movements of individual mainstream right parties in response to an electorally influential radical right party. I find that the actions of the mainstream right parties seem to be connected to variations in the ideology of the radical right party. Mainstream right parties tend to move toward less-extreme radical right parties and away from more-extreme radical right parties. If the radical right party is neo-liberal and xenophobic, mainstream right parties tend to co-opt the political space of the radical right, or compete with the radical right by engaging with it. In contrast, if the radical right party is authoritarian and xenophobic, mainstream right parties tend to cordon off the radical right party or compete with it by differentiating their positions. I also find that although the differences in ideology are based on different perceptions of the state, and that both groups are xenophobic at their core, the reactions of the mainstream parties are manifested most strongly in the issue area most clearly associated with the radical right, immigration.

In Chapter IV, I contextualize the cross-case framework in order to present qualitative evidence from a handful of cases. The chapter serves two main purposes. First, it is designed to examine the validity of the data this project is based upon. The main source of data used to examine the impact of radical right parties in this paper is political space diagrams that have been constructed from several expert judgment surveys conducted since 1982. Since these diagrams involve converting the results of surveys of individuals' opinions into compatible scales, there is potential for error. The first part of Chapter IV looks at some of the movements of political parties in two cases in order to show that these diagrams do, in fact, seem to match fairly well with the historical changes in policy positions, philosophies, and strategies. The second purpose of this chapter is to look at some of the movements seen in these diagrams in slightly more detail. I discuss movements that are found in two cases, and explore potential ways in which these movements could be connected to the radical right. I again present qualitative evidence, this time to demonstrate that the rationale behind some of the party movements visible in these diagrams is the result of the radical right.

Chapter V is a breif concluding chapter that recaps the main findings of the project and suggests possible future research. Also included are tables of the raw data used to construct the political space diagrams (Appendix A), a left/right and an immigration political space diagram for each country (Appendix B), and a country-by-country list of party abbreviations (Appendix C).

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a review of the relevant academic literature. It is intended to situate this project within the existing themes of this literature, and to develop a theoretical framework for the remainder of the project. I have already defined the central characteristics of radical right parties and reviewed a few different types of effects that the parties may have. Some scholars have suggested that there may be direct policy effects and potential broad social effects of radical right parties, but these studies have been relatively inconclusive since the effects are difficult to attribute directly the radical right parties themselves. Others have pointed to changes in the mainstream parties, suggesting that even if radical right parties do not have a direct impact on policy or society, they alter the political system through other parties. This project focuses on impact that the radical right might have on changes in the positions of mainstream parties in political space. This particular chapter lays out potential patterns that we might expect to find in party systems (convergence, divergence, shifting to the left, and shifting to the right) as well as discrete movements of individual parties. In addition to describing the patterns and movements, I also theoretically develop rationales as to why these movements may be expected to occur, and how the may be connected to radical right parties. Some potential pathways include altering the political agenda, changing policy

priorities, and reframing or redefining existing issue areas. Finally, I will discuss the data, methodology, and cases that will be used throughout the study.

Orientation of this Project: Parties in Space

For all of the reasons mentioned above, not only is it difficult for radical right parties to have direct policy influence, any influence that one of these parties does have is difficult to determine. However, the "importance of the populist radical right in contemporary European politics is probably through their impact on other parties" (Mudde 2007, 282). Elections are zero-sum, so an increased percentage of the vote for a new party necessarily reduces the percentage of votes for established parties, unless they are able to mobilize new voters. Therefore, the breakthrough of radical right parties likely has some effect on the support of mainstream parties. However, the more important influence these parties can have is on the party system, the political ideologies, and the manner in which politics is conducted. "The success of a [radical right] party in one country may make it more likely that a similar party would emerge elsewhere, even in the absence of the same facilitating conditions present in the first country" (Schain et al. 2002, 16-17). Through emulating political strategies, direct political assistance, and/or issue cooptation, other political parties may be affected by the success of a populist radical right party. Much of this can be seen through the FN in France. Leader Jean-Marie Le Pen's party has been seen as a model for others to follow and has offered direct assistance and support for other emerging parties, like the National Front in Belgium. The party's organization and strategy have also been emulated by the Danish People's Party (Rydgren 2004). In Germany, the CDU/CSU seemingly co-opted immigration and

law and order policies, but it is difficult to tie this effect directly to the Republikaner. The CDU/CSU "spread statistics on crime, on the rising numbers of illegal aliens, and on the exploding costs of immigration and asylum which suggested [...] that a dramatic increase of crime and violence was the result of foreigners in the country" but they began stressing the issue before the rise of the REP (Mickenberg 2001, 6). While it is likely that the CDU/CSU was in some way reacting to the radical right, it is difficult to determine the degree to which their actions were shaped by underlying social changes and the degree to which they were shaped by the competition with the radical right.

Theoretical Expectations

The main premise of this project is that radical right parties may indeed have impacts on party positioning, but that these effects have been difficult to isolate. While I cannot disprove other possibilities at this time, my central theory is that the effects of radical right parties tend to flow through the issue that is central to the identity of the parties. I will later compare party positioning on the central issue area of radical right parties (immigration) with an overall dimension, and attempt to isolate the impact these parties have on shaping the political environment. I will treat the party as factor that can shape the environment within which it exists. The rise in popularity of radical parties on the fringe of mainstream parties can alter potential coalition partners, and thus the overall party structure (Bale 2003), and the actions taken by the parties can influence this process. By viewing and presenting political issues through the lens of identity, these parties have been able to politicize the items most closely attached to their core ideology. This can occur through the use of rhetoric and images that reflect an "us-them"

worldview. While populist radical right parties generally concentrate on issues central to their agenda, these political strategies are reflected in much of their propaganda, regardless of the issue, which in turn can increase the salience of their core issues. The focus on issues of identity can disrupt previously coalescent elite behavior, homogeneous societal opinions, and/or entrenched party positions on immigration and other areas.

It is possible that the increased influence of a party on the radical right could cause shifts in the positions of mainstream parties. The debate over immigration contested by the populist radical right (as well as other issues) may shift to the right, become more polarized, become condensed, or shift to the left as a reaction. Parties may change their political strategies in an attempt to either limit the influence of the radical right or reassure their own position. They may treat the radical party as a pariah, attempt to co-opt issues, attempt to appease the party, or see the party as a potential coalition partner. The choice of strategies will likely vary on the particular context, current political environment (both domestic and international), and the relative extremeness of the ideology of the radical right party. These strategies can alter the effects of the radical right party, as well as have an effect *on* the party (Mudde 2007, 287-290). Evidence of such processes will necessarily require contextualization in order to render it meaningful. Due to time, resource, and language constraints, I will not be able to get into each case in as much detail as I would like, but I will be able to use this information to illustrate the types of relationships that exist in order to connect the cross-case comparisons more directly to the actions of the parties.

Converging and Diverging Parties

Two main theoretically expected effects of radical right parties are convergence and divergence of the political space. Some scholars have argued that a radical right party could lead toward a homogenization (convergence) or a polarization (divergence) of the mainstream political parties. Some of these expectations are derived from analyses of the circumstances that can allow for the opportunity of a radical right party to have an electoral breakthrough. Yet I have tried to structure them in a way that looks for what one might expect to see in terms of party movement influenced by the electoral success of a radical right party. Given the segmented nature of the available data, it will be difficult to isolate these factors temporally to determine the direction of the causal arrow. Therefore, these are some of the theoretically expected movements that I will be looking for in conjunction with electorally influential radical right parties.

From a Downsian (Downs 1957) perspective, Hainsworth (1992) and Kitschelt and McGann (1995) have argued that electorally successful radical right parties will be accompanied by a convergence among the mainstream parties. The most "favorable terrain for the extreme right has often been situations where the ideological distance between the major parties was reduced, thereby creating a vacuum on the right conductive to extreme right success" (Hainsworth 1992). In addition, when there is substantial convergence between the mainstream parties, political "entrepreneurs should be able to broaden their electorate beyond the right-authoritarian core through populist anti-statist messages and actually build a very strong 'cross-class' alliance against the established parties" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 53). Elisabeth Carter has tested this

premise statistically over time and space and found that, as expected, convergence between the mainstream right and mainstream left is associated with higher electoral results for radical right parties (Carter 2005, 136-141). This project is looking at the effects of radical right parties, so the causal arrow would be reversed in these scenarios, but there would be the same expected correlation between party movement and electoral success, except with a distinct time lag that may be visible. In addition, there are theoretical reasons to expect that a radical right party may, in fact, cause convergence among the mainstream parties. It has been demonstrated that the electoral success of the FN in France has led to an effort to build consensus around an explicitly centrist approach to immigration in an attempt to isolate the radical right party (Schain 2002).

Tim Bale (2003) has taken Peter Mair's (2001) analysis of the rise and normalization of the Greens and applied it to the radical right. Mair argued that the most significant result of the electoral success and acceptance of the Green party family was to boost the fortunes of left party blocs across Europe. The parties had become thought of as mainstream and as potential coalition partners, which resulted in an increase in left bloc governing coalitions (Mair 2001). Bale, in turn, argues that a similar phenomenon can be seen with the right party bloc and the rise of the radical right parties. These coexistent trends have led to competition among bipolar blocs of parties. The resulting pattern would be a polarization of the political space. This could appear as convergence within the right and left (solidifying the party blocs) and/or overall divergence of the political space.

Directional Shifts

In addition to accepting radical right parties as potential coalition partners, mainstream right parties have picked up some of the themes of the radical right (Bale 2003). Incorporating the core themes of the radical right would show up as a shift toward the right in the political space. By interpreting Bale's argument into the framework of my data, I would expect to find that in addition to polarization, radical right parties would cause a shift to the right by the mainstream right parties. In a similar vein, Minkenberg (2001) has linked the perceived turn to the right in European politics as an attempt by mainstream parties to compete with the radical right and Schain (2006) has argued that there are direct and indirect connections between radical right parties and more restrictionist immigration policies. Each of these is suggesting that radical right parties are causing mainstream parties to shift their positions to the right. Such a movement should be observable in the overall political space, and be more pronounced in on the issue of immigration if, in fact, they are directly related to the radical right.

It is also well established that the VB in Belgium has enjoyed continued electoral success in conjunction with a *cordon sanitaire* by the mainstream parties. The mainstream left and right have made an agreement to refuse to work with the radical right party. By doing so, it is reasonable to expect that the mainstream parties would clearly distinguish their policy positions from those of the radical right. This would appear as a shift to the left in the political space. While shifting to the left may be a counterintuitive impact of a radical right party in some sense, it is plausible (and empirically supported) that in some instances an electorally successful radical right party could produce such a

movement. One might expect that the reactions of mainstream parties may be "structured by ideas about the legitimacy of right-wing populist movements and perceptions of the threat they pose to the quality of democracy" and, in particular the manner in which a nation has dealt with the legacy of Nazism and World War II (Art 2006, 8-9).

As discussed above, there are several patterns that we might expect to find when looking for impacts of radical right parties on party positioning. In the following chapter, I will be looking for patterns of convergence and divergence, as well as directional shifts and analyzing any potential connects to radical right parties.

Smaller Alternatives: Individual Strategies

David Art (2006) has contended that mainstream parties are likely to refuse to work with radical right parties while at the same time take up the issues and policy positions raised by the radical right parties into their own agenda. "Established political parties seize on the themes of right-wing populist parties [...] while simultaneously denouncing them as enemies of the system [...] and refusing to cooperate with them, or even speak with them, on any political level" (Art 2006, 8). In this sense, each of these movements may better be examined as a choice confronted by individual parties. Art suggests that existing political parties can choose to either cooperate with the radical right in an attempt to "tame" them and integrate them into the political system, or to combat the radical right by undermining its electoral appeal by "denying the far right any hope of participating in coalitions or passing its own legislation" (Art 2006, 8). There are variations of each of these strategies, but an important take away point is that these are choices made by the established parties - choices made by each individual established

party. For this reason, in addition to looking for patterns of impacts on party systems, I will also look more closely at actions taken by individual parties when confronted with an electorally successful radical right party.

Methodology

This project will consist of two interrelated parts – a cross-case comparison and a close examination of a small number of cases. The comparative portion will be intended to establish the existence of potential relationships and the case studies will be allow for the examination of the mechanisms through which these relationships flow. According to conventional cross-case logic of inquiry, comparing a few cases or analyzing independent case studies may not allow for broad generalizations to be confidently made; however, "case studies do provide an ideal – perhaps the best – soil for conceiving of generalizations" (Sartori 1991, 249). Although some have suggested that a researcher ought to increase the number of cases whenever possible (King et al. 1994), many others have suggested that analyzing a single case can serve a valuable purpose within the social sciences. Some have created a place for case studies as theory testing or theory generating exercises in part of a larger research project (van Evera 1997) while a growing body of qualitative methodologists are creating a distinct causal logic for case studies based upon within case evidence rather than cross-case evidence (Brady and Collier 2004; Gerring 2007, for example). This project seeks to be acceptable to both camps. First, I will compare variation across time and space in order to demonstrate the presence of a relationship. Then I examine a handful of cases in order look for evidence that can fill in the gaps between the parties and the outcomes. Due to the relatively small number

of cases, and large number of influential factors being considered, I will not run rigorous statistical analyses. Instead, I will parse the data into individual countries, and analyze the changes in party positions over time in conjunction with election data and qualitative evidence.

Political Space Diagrams Created from Expert Judgment Surveys

Following the work of Elisabeth Carter (2005) and Sarah de Lange (2008), the main analysis of this project is based on several expert judgment surveys conducted between 1982 and 2006. I will use these surveys to plot party positions on a two dimensional left/right scale, and track the changes in these party positions over time. I have constructed political space diagrams for several Western European nations with this data that shows how parties have altered their positions over time. I will also analyze similar diagrams constructed from these surveys for the issue of immigration. These diagrams are made up of five comprehensive studies: Castles and Mair (1984) - questionnaires sent out in 1982, Laver and Hunt (1992) - questionnaires sent out in 1989, Huber and Inglehart (1995) - questionnaires sent out in 1993, Lubbers (2000) - questionnaires sent out in 2000, and Benoit and Laver (2006) - questionnaires sent out between 2002 and 2004. When available, I have also included the results from country specific surveys: Laver (1995) on the Netherlands - questionnaires sent out in 1994, Laver (1998) on Britain – questionnaires sent out in 1997, Laver and Mair (1999) on the Netherlands – questionnaires sent out in 1998, and Ray and Narud (2000) on Norway – questionnaires sent out in 1998. The diagrams depicting the political space surrounding immigration are based upon two of these surveys that asked respondents to place parties

on several issue areas, including immigration: Lubbers (2000) and Benoit and Laver (2006). I was able to construct an additional data point from the Lubbers survey from a question that asked the experts to place the parties on the same scale in 1990.[3]

There were several initial problems that had to be overcome in order to use these surveys. First of all, some of the studies asked respondents to place the parties on an overall left/right scale, but others (Laver and Hunt and the two country level surveys by Laver) included only issue areas, not a generic political space scale. In these instances, the overall political space was constructed using the most salient issues of socio-economic and social policy (Carter 2005; de Lange 2008).[4] In addition, each survey used a different numerical scale to represent the political space. These differences had to be normalized into a consistent scale that could be used across each survey. I have chosen to use a 0-100 scale with 0 being the extreme-left and 100 being the extreme-right.

I cannot take complete credit for the idea of transforming these surveys into political space diagrams. Elisabeth Carter (2005) used these surveys to create similar diagrams in order to investigate the political opportunities that were most likely to lead to the electoral success of radical right parties. I am following the lead of these scholars by making use of the same surveys, but I have added to their work in several ways. First, I have updated Carter's work to include a later survey (Benoit and Laver 2006), as Sarah de Lange (2008) did to use them to evaluate instances of radical right parties being

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[3] This is an imperfect measure of party positions in 1990, since it is based upon expert perceptions in 2000, but it does allow for some sense of how parties have altered their positions over the previous 10 years.

[4] The same process was used to create the French overall left/right scale from the Benoit and Laver (2006) survey because they did not ask respondents to place the parties on a generic left/right dimension in France, even though this was included in each of the other countries.

involved in governing coalitions. I have also increased the number of cases whenever possible. Further, I have created similar diagrams of the political space surrounding immigration from the available data.

If a clear picture of these political space diagrams has not been created via this description, they will become clear in the following chapter when I discuss several of them in context. In addition to these diagrams, I also use election results and qualitative evidence to look at them in another way. Rather that looking at them as showing an opportunity that could lead to the emergence of a radical right party, I look at them as potentially showing instances in which radical right parties may have altered party positioning within this political space.

A Key Initial Definition

At this time, I feel that it is necessary to define some terms that I will be using throughout much of this project. When looking at the potential impact of radical right parties on party position, it became evident early on that a decision needed to be made regarding some sort of cutoff for which radical right parties would be included, and which would not. Because I am looking at party position in addition to election results, I have decided to make this decision based upon electoral success. My initial inclination was to consider all radical right parties that have been elected into national parliaments as electorally successful, and including them as a group. However, electoral rules vary across cases. In other words, the same electoral results (as a percentage) could get a party represented in parliament in one country, but not another. For this reason, I decided to use Germany's electoral threshold of 5% as my definition of a radical right party being

electorally influential. In the interest of style and prose, I will at times also use the term electorally relevant. This is merely a stylistic choice, and in this study, these terms are synonymous and can be used interchangeably.

I do not argue that electoral relevance is required for a radical right party to have an impact on politics, or even on party positioning in political space. I did, however, need to make a choice that would define my case selection, and this 5% seemed to be the most reasonable. It can be universal across the cases, and earning this portion of the vote in a national election would lead to the party being represented in parliament in each case. In addition, in some cases, it also differentiates the party from other small parties that receive a minor number of votes, and have a representative or two in parliament. A 5% threshold for electoral influence means that that party has substantial support in the electorate, and can potentially be seen as a difference making coalition partner by mainstream parties.

Case Selection

In expanding the data set, I attempted to include as many countries in Western Europe as was reasonable. I was able to obtain data (though not from every survey for each case) for Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. I have excluded Greece and Italy from most of the analysis out of necessity because of the complex and inconsistent nature of the political parties and available data. This leaves 12 main cases, half of which have had at least one electorally influential party, as I have defined it (FPÖ in Austria, VB and FNb in Belgium, DF and FRP(d) in Denmark, FN in France, FRP(n)

in Norway, and ND in Sweden). Most of the analysis is drawn across comparisons based on all 12 cases, but some final conclusions are made from comparisons within this subset of cases that have had an electorally influential radical right party.

Conclusion

This chapter is intended to situate this project within an existing body of literature on the effects that radical right parties may have on political systems. I have shown that while the effects that have been discussed have been difficult to directly connect to the radical right, it is likely that effects travel through, and are most closely tied to, interactions with mainstream political parties. The following chapters are an investigation into these effects on mainstream parties. I will first compare across cases to identify distinguishable patterns of movement of political systems, and then examine movements of individual political parties. I will look for the patterns of convergence between the mainstream right and the mainstream left, convergence within each group, divergence or polarization of the party system, and directional shifts to the left or to the right that are suggested in the literature. Following this broad analysis of political space, I will look more closely the movements of individual parties since the patterns could essentially be the result of potentially unrelated strategic choices made by each party when confronted with an electorally influential radical right party.

CHAPTER III

COMPARING ACROSS CASES

INTRODUCTION

Upon an initial glance across Western Europe, it may seem that there is not a single clearly distinguishable effect that radical right parties have on the changes in position of other political parties. However, a closer examination does yield some significant trends, and provides plenty of evidence in support of the theoretical elements laid out in the previous chapter. Along with this evidence comes much counter evidence that, when coupled with a relatively small number of cases and a relatively large number of influential factors, makes it difficult to substantiate or deny any of these theories completely. One trend that does stand up well to scrutiny is related to the ideological make-up of the radical right parties. Large and secondary mainstream right parties are more likely to shift their position toward (by competing by engaging with and/or co-opting the space of) a less-extreme radical right party, while they are more likely to shift their position away from (by competing by differentiating from and/or cordoning off) a more-extreme radical right party. This chapter will proceed by first engaging in an analysis of some patterns that one might expect to see emerge as a result of the electoral influence of a radical right party. I will also provide counter evidence when available. It will look more closely at the actions of individual parties, and by examining the role that variation in party ideology plays, I conclude that this is the most influential factor in

determining how mainstream parties will respond to a radical right party. Further, these differences are accentuated on the issue area most closely associated with the radical right, immigration, even though the both groups of radical right parties are similarly xenophobic.

Empirical Evidence of Potential Patterns

In this section, I will provide empirical evidence that supports each of the theoretical possibilities outlined in the previous chapter, and, when available, I will also provide counter evidence that seems to contradict the expectation. Since radical right parties are not ideologically homogeneous, and they tend to be more similar on social issues (especially immigration) rather than economic issues (Rovny 2009), I make use of the expert studies that specifically address immigration as a check on the impact of the radical right. While it is not necessary for the influence of radical right parties to travel through the issue of immigration, if the same or exaggerated patterns appear, it would provide additional support to the idea that these movements could be connected to the radical right. Conversely, if similar patterns are not seen on the issue of immigration, it could mean that the overall movements on the left/right dimension may be due to other factors.

I will first discuss the patterns that could emerge on the party system and party family level. There is some support for each of these possibilities; however, there is also evidence that seems to contradict each outcome being directly linked to radical right parties. Following this discussion, I will then move onto a more promising discussion of the movements of individual parties. Please note that, in this chapter, the assertions of

party movements are mainly based upon interpretations of the expert judgment surveys and election results. These are generally uncontrolled correlations, so the movements and their connections to the radical right could be one explanation, but I am not able to control for every other possibility. I will provide some contextual evidence here, and develop this discussion further in the following chapter to suggest that in some cases it does seem as though there is a real connection between these factors.

As mentioned earlier, when looking at the party system and party families, the patterns that one might expect to see are convergence, divergence, a trend to the left, or a trend to the right. Each of these might be visible among the party system as a whole, or in individual party families (i.e. among "the left" or "the right").

Convergence and Divergence

In this section, I will attempt to show that there is empirical evidence behind claims of both convergence and divergence among party systems. There is evidence that suggests that radical right parties could cause a convergence of party systems and party families, however there are also cases of these same types of convergence evident in countries without an electorally influential radical right party. There is also evidence supporting the idea of divergence in party systems and party families. Unlike with the convergence thesis, there are not instances of strong divergence in countries without an electorally influential radical right party. For this reason, I cannot disconfirm a polarization of the party system as one possible effect of radical right parties.

Let me first start with the idea of convergence. One could argue that a radical right party could cause a convergence among the mainstream parties toward the political

center. Such an argument would suggest that in order to disassociate and distance their own stance from that of the radical right party, the mainstream party would adjust their positions and appear to be more moderate. Although this seems to more closely apply to parties of the mainstream right (as their positions are perceived as the closest to the radical right and therefore most likely in need of differentiation), such a movement could quickly elicit a similar movement from the mainstream left. In order to avoid losing votes to a moderating party of the right, a left party would then also move toward the center and appeal to median voters. It is also possible that the mainstream parties could explicitly seek a centrist, consensus building position in an attempt to isolate the radical right party (Schain 2002). The same basic formula can also be seen within party families. Parties of the right could be converging toward a center-right position while parties of the left are converging toward a center-left position.

Looking at the political space, it is easy to find evidence of convergence. In France, for example, there appears to be a clear trend, albeit slight, of convergence both within the right and the left, as well as between the right and the left. As illustrated in Figure 1, aside from a brief period between 1989 and 1993, the PCF and the PS have been moving toward each other, as have the UDF and the RPR. At the same time, the distance between the parties of the right and the parties of the left is decreasing. A similar pattern plays out in Figure 2 when looking at the issue of immigration. There is both convergence *within* the right and the left, as well as convergence *between* the right and the left. The FN in France is often considered the prototypical radical right party, and has been electorally influential since 1986. It would not be completely unfounded to

suggest that the convergence seen here may be linked to the presence of a powerful radical right party. However, one cannot make a generalization about all radical right parties from this information alone.



Figure 1: France Left/Right Political Space Diagram



Figure 2: France Immigration Political Space Diagram

Figure 3 shows that, like in France, there is convergence going on in Germany as well. However, there is not an electorally influential radical right party in Germany. Although Germany does have a radical right presence, and there has been radical right representation in state parliaments, no radical right party (not the DVU, the NPD, nor the Republikaner) has passed the 5% threshold in a federal election to be represented Bundestag. Therefore, the national level convergence *within* the right and the left and the convergence *between* the right and the left visible in Figure 3, cannot be accounted for through the presence of an electorally influential radical right party. In other words, in some instances (perhaps in France), a radical right party could have a moderating effect on a party system, causing the parties to converge; the strong presence of a radical right party is not a necessary condition for this outcome.



Figure 3: Germany Left/Right Political Space Diagram

Now that I have shown that an electorally influential radical right party is not necessary for a convergence of political parties, I will examine divergence. Theoretically, the rise of a radical right party could cause other parties to diverge their positions from one another, resulting in a polarization. Similar to convergence, this could occur *within* the left and/or the right, or *between* the left and the right. Such a result could follow from parties taking different strategies for dealing with the new challenger. If some parties moderate their position, in an attempt to seem more legitimate, and other parties adopt positions further to the right in order to avoid losing voters to the radical right party, or if they see the new party as a potential coalition partner, the resulting pattern could be one of divergence, or polarization.

Figure 4 shows the political space of Norway, where the FRP(n) has had strong election results and has been represented in the national parliament since 1989. While there has been significant convergence between the center party (SP) and the main Labour Party (DNA), there has also been significant divergence within the right. Since 1989, the same year as the electoral breakthrough of the FRP(n), the main party of the right, Høyre, has generally been moving further to the right, while the secondary right party, KRF, has been moving to the left, aligning closer to the centrists and labour. From this information, it would appear that these two mainstream right parties have taken different strategies to dealing with the challenge from the radical right. The KRF has decided to moderate and become more of a centrist party, while Høyre has decided to challenge the FRP(n) directly for that political space. The result is a polarization of the right, with the FRP(n) and Høyre on one side, and the KRF on the other.



Figure 4: Norway Left/Right Political Space Diagram

However, attributing this polarizing effect solely to the electoral influence of the FRP(n) might be unfounded. Figure 5 shows the party positions on the issue of immigration. Not only is there a very clear separation from the mainstream parties' positions and the position of the radical right, it is also clear that the mainstream parties' positions are relatively close to one another, and they are all trending in the same direction, to the left. If the polarization of the right visible in Figure 4 was a direct result of the radical right, one would expect to see a similar, and possibly more drastic,

divergence on immigration. Since this is not the case, the overall party positions may partly be attributable to the FRP(n), but are likely the result of other factors.



Figure 5: Norway Immigration Political Space Diagram

There are no instances of strong polarization *within* or *between* left and the right in a country without an electorally influential radical right party. There is some slight divergence in regard to immigration in Spain (see Appendix B for diagram), but not in the party system as a whole. Due to the lack of a counter-example, I am unable to disconfirm an argument that suggests polarization of the party system is caused by the electoral success of a radical right party.

Shifting to the Right and Shifting to the Left

Another possible impact that a radical right party could have is the shifting of the entire political system to the right or to the left. One might expect either possibility to be relatively equally plausible. When confronted with an increasingly popular radical right challenger, mainstream parties could adjust their own positions to the left in order to distance themselves from the radical right if they view these positions as dangerous or

illegitimate. Conversely, one could also expect mainstream parties to move to the right in an attempt to (re)capture any voters that may be considering voting for the radical right. In this section, I will examine a few instances in which there is evidence of parties' overall positions and positions on immigration shifting to the left and shifting to the right that may be caused by a radical right party.

The electoral success of the FPÖ in Austria is well documented. It has been represented in the national parliament since its founding in 1956 and has several stints as the junior partner in coalition governments. One might expect to find pronounced effects in such a case. Figure 6 shows the general political space in Austria. The first thing to note is that the FPÖ itself made a large shift to the right between 1989 and 1993 (shortly after Jörg Haider assumed the leadership role in 1986). More important, in this context, is the movement of the ÖVP and the SPÖ. Both parties have made gradual but substantial moves to the right over the period of time, visible in the diagram. This is consistent with the expectation that mainstream parties will shift their positions toward an increasingly popular challenger in order to (re)capture lost votes. It is also consistent with a radical right party having an impact on the rhetoric of political discussions and the framing of issues. Such an impact is subtler, but over time could cause a similar gradual repositioning of the parties.

Figure 7 shows that this same basic pattern holds in Austria on the issue of immigration. The drift to the right is less pronounced, and the SPÖ corrects back to the left (but not to their original position). While this does not represent the strongest evidence linking the shifts to the FPÖ, this does not suggest that the impacts are not

connected to the radical right party. An exaggerated version of the overall relationship would provide additional evidence linking the impacts to the electorally influential radical right party, and a contradictory pattern would suggest that the two are not directly related. Neither exists in this case. In this instance, the changes in positions on immigration do not contradict the previous evidence, nor do they add substantial weight of their own.



Figure 6: Austria Left/Right Political Space Diagram



Figure 7: Austria Immigration Political Space Diagram

The issue of immigration in Denmark provides a more visible example of the radical right shifting party positions to the right. In Figure 8, the main and secondary parties of the right both shift substantially to the right. The same is even more true for the main party of the left, and there is some movement of the smaller parties of the left, but not universal. However, this movement is limited to the issue of immigration. A similar pattern does not translate to overall party position; as can be seen in Appendix B, overall party positions are fairly consistent over time.



Figure 8: Denmark Immigration Political Space Diagram

In this instance, it is most likely that the radical right has changed how the political debate surrounding immigration is framed. The lack of overall movement suggests that the radical right has not reshaped the political system, and the relative distance between the radical right party and the mainstream right parties makes it unlikely that the movement to the right on immigration was an adjustment in position to reclaim lost (or avoid losing) votes to the radical right. This would be more likely if the parties' original positions were closer together. A movement as drastic as that in this case, by nearly all relevant parties on the issue of immigration, is consistent with the

radical right parties reframing the immigration debate into more xenophobic terms and rhetoric, but having little impact on other issue areas. In addition to radical right parties shifting the party system and the debate surrounding immigration to the right, it is also possible for these parties to shift party systems and immigration debates to the left. Although this is theoretically possible, there are not cases in which there has been a substantial shift of the party system to the left. However, Figure 9 shows that, in Belgium, mainstream parties' positions on immigration have showed significant movement to the left. The main parties on the left and on the right, as well as the largest secondary parties of the left and the right, have all shifted their positions to the left over the course of the available data. Some parties initially show slight adjustments to the right, but in the subsequent years these movements are overshadowed by larger movements to the left, resulting in a nearly universal pattern of each party's position in 2006 being further to the left than it was in 1990. This pattern of shifting to the left on immigration, but not overall, suggests that most policy positions are relatively unaffected by the radical right parties, and that by refusing to engage in the xenophobic tone of the radical right parties in the immigration debate the mainstream parties have clarified and distinguished their own positions relative to those of the VB and the FNb.

A similar pattern can be seen in Figure 2 below, depicting the political space of party positions on immigration in France, although it is limited to the UDF and the RPR (and subsequently UMP). Both mainstream right parties show substantial movement away from the radical right FN, and toward a more centrist position on immigration. Similar to the Belgian example, this push to the left seems limited to immigration.

Neither the RPR nor the UDF saw a similar movement to the left on the overall left/right scale (see Figure 1 of this chapter, or Appendix B). This again suggests that the FN has had little effect on the majority of their policy positions, and that the mainstream parties have differentiated their positions on immigration relative to the FN.



Figure 9: Belgium Immigration Political Space Diagram



Figure 2: France Immigration Political Space Diagram

All of the examples of party systems and immigration debates shifting to the right or to the left that I have discussed thus far have been from countries with at least one electorally influential radical right party. It is important to note that similar patterns can

be seen in countries without an electorally significant radical right party. This may be due to the fact that having an electorally significant radical right party is an imperfect proxy for really testing the influence of the radical right. There has been a gradual drifting to the right on immigration and overall in the Netherlands, on immigration in Portugal, and a sharp shift to the right on immigration and overall in Switzerland (see Appendix B). The existence of these counterexamples does not, in itself, render the connection of the previously discussed movements to radical right parties unfounded however. For example, the Netherlands has had an influential anti-immigration politician and party (Pim Fortuyn), though it was short lived and often not considered as radical right, and the mainstream right has seized many themes of the radical right in Switzerland, and in some ways may be fulfilling the same role. Without the strong electoral presence of a radical right party, mainstream parties could see an opportunity to gain votes by capturing the sentiment seen in other countries. It also may not be necessary for a radical right party to be electorally successful to have the kinds of effects I am discussing here. The use of xenophobic rhetoric and images in party propaganda can alter public opinion, the framing of the debate, and spur reactions from mainstream parties regardless of the electoral success of the radical right party, and these effects could easily travel across national boarders. This mechanism is particularly important with regard to the Swiss case, which will become more evident when the political space diagrams are put into some context in the following chapter.

Looking More Closely: The Actions of Individual Parties

The preceding section looked at patterns of movements across the party system as well as within party families. In this section, I will more closely examine the movements of individual parties during, and shortly following, successful electoral campaigns of radical right parties. In theory, these movements are the same movements that would combine to make up the patterns considered earlier, but the lack of a discernable explanation to the patterns led me to look at the actions of individual parties more closely. Upon reflection, any pattern may merely be coincidental or circumstantial, and not directly related to the radical right party at all since parties could determine their strategy of dealing with the radical right more or less independently. In this context, I will look more directly at more discrete actions taken by individual mainstream and secondary parties of the right in countries with an electorally influential radical right party during the time period of that electoral success. By allowing the ideology of the radical right party to make a difference in how other parties respond, I am able to conclude that more-extreme radical right parties tend to produce movements away from the right, while less-extreme radical right parties tend to produce movements toward the right.

Defining Some New Terms: Establishing Ideological Diversity

Before laying out the particulars of this argument, and the findings it produces, it is necessary for me to first define a few new terms that are introduced. All other terms are used in the same manner as they have been throughout the project. Even after having settled on a definition of the radical right parties I am discussing, this does not mean that

this is a completely homogeneous group. Not only is there diversity among radical right parties on economic issues (Rovny 2009), but there are also differences in the relative importance placed on the issue of immigration, racist attitudes, and attitudes toward democracy (Carter 2005, 13-63). Elisabeth Carter (2005) has created a typology in which she places radical right parties into five distinct categories. In addition to naming these categories by their ideological components, she also numbers them from 1 to 5 implying a more/less extreme nature to the categorization. This is indeed true with type one being neo-Nazi parties, type two being neo-fascist parties, type three being authoritarian xenophobic parties, type four being neo-liberal xenophobic parties, and type five being neo-liberal populist parties. These categories are based upon each party's attitudes toward the three dimensions mentioned above – importance placed on immigration, racism, and democracy.

According to Carter, neo-Nazi parties are radically xenophobic, adhere to classical racism, and completely reject the existing democratic system. In this category are the British National Party and the National Front in Britain, as well as the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) and the National Democratic Party (NPD) in Germany. Neo-fascist parties, the second type, are not xenophobic or racist, but outright reject the existing democratic system.[5] This type of radical right party is mainly found in Italy and Spain, including AN, Ms-Ft, FEA, and FEJons. The third group, authoritarian xenophobic parties, is radically xenophobic, culturist, and demand reform of the existing democratic

[5] The lack of xenophobia in this group makes it difficult to place these parties within my definition of radical right parties, but these parties do not play a large role in this data analysis and I have found no substantial effect of their inclusion or exclusion.

system by having less democracy and pluralism, and a greater role for the state. This group includes Austria's FPÖ, Belgium's VB and FNb, France's FN, Germany's Republikaner, and Switzerland's SD. The fourth category is neo-liberal xenophobic parties. These parties are radically xenophobic, culturist, and demand more democratic reforms and a more limited role of the state. Carter includes in this group parties such as the DF and FRP(d) (since the mid-1980s) in Denmark, LN (since the mid-1990s) in Italy, FLP and FRP(n) (since the mid 1980s) in Norway, ND and SDk in Sweden, and FPS in Switzerland. The fifth and final category is neo-liberal populist parties, which are not xenophobic or racist, and demand more democratic reforms and a more limited role of the state.[6] This type includes the FRP(d) (before the mid 1980s) in Denmark, EK in Greece, LN (before the mid 1990s) in Italy, FRP(n) (before the mid 1980s) in Norway, and LdT in Switzerland.

In the following analysis, I have generally adopted the same categorization of radical right parties, but concentrate on categories three and four. I use the terms more-extreme and less-extreme to refer to parties' relative position to one another (with the most-extreme radical right parties being Neo-Nazi parties, type 1, and the least-extreme radical right parties being neo-liberal populist parties, type 5). Implementing this typology presents two main challenges to this project. First, adopting a terminology of more-extreme and less-extreme might lead one to expect that these differences would be

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[6] Carter notes that the "fact that neo-liberal populist parties embrace neither xenophobic nor racist attitudes, and the fact that they have rather liberal views on democracy and individual rights, clearly raise questions over whether these parties should be considered party of the wider extreme [radical] right party family", but finds that these parties include enough anti-system tendencies to be included (Carter 2005, 53) This category is at odds with Mudde's core ideology of the radical right, and therefore with the definition of radical right parties used in this project. However, none of these debated borderline cases play a substantial role in this study.

reflected in the political space diagrams, when in fact they are not. Secondly, these categories are closely correlated with the electoral success of radical right parties, which presents a problem of equifinality. With this information alone, it is difficult to determine if any effects are the result of the ideology of the radical right party, or a result of the presence of an electorally successful radical right party. There are two potential causes for each given outcome.

While it may be disappointing that these categories do not show up in the political space diagrams, this is not entirely surprising nor does it discount any potential findings based upon party ideology. First, even though these diagrams are based upon expert's perceptions of party positions, these experts are still somewhat subject to normal theories of behavior. Whether one thinks of party position spatially (Downs 1957) or directionally (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989) it is not unexpected that there would be a condensed scale at the extremes of the spectrum. In addition, each diagram of political space is bound within a single country. In each context, radical right parties are placed at the far right end of the political space. Generally speaking they are the farthest party to the right. Since I am looking at relative positions within each case, and changes in positions over time, the fact that these diagrams do not capture subtle differences in ideology does not present a problem for this project.

The equifinality problem is more difficult to simply explain away. However, the most electorally successful radical right parties are from categories three and four (authoritarian xenophobic parties and neo-liberal xenophobic parties), and the following analysis will be comprised of only these two categories. Therefore, both groups under

consideration have roughly the same levels of electoral success. This does allow for differentiation between the impact of ideology and electoral success. Although it does not allow for analysis of the full ideological spectrum of radical right parties, it does allow for an analysis of an incremental difference between more-extreme radical right parties and less-extreme radical right parties, at least between these two categories. I have attempted to differentiate the effects of particular ideologies from the effects of electoral success with cross-case comparisons as well as within case variation whenever possible. I will also fill in some of these gaps with contextual evidence in the following chapter.

Exploring the Possibilities

As we have seen in the previous analysis, each party can respond in a number of ways when confronted with political challenge.[7] The first option would be to do nothing, and maintain their current positions. In a two dimensional context, aside from remaining unchanged, existing parties could either move to the right, or to the left. Since the challenges I will be discussing are presented in the form of radical right political parties, movement to the right can also be classified as movement toward the radical right party, while movement to the left can be considered movement away from the radical right party. It is important to note, though, that all movements in these respective directions are not equal. A drastic movement in one direction or the other is different than a slight

[7] I have intentionally avoided putting a numerical threshold on any of these movements in an attempt to view the movements holistically within their particular special contexts. Although most movements are easily distinguishable, there is room for debate at the margins. In these instances, I analyzed other information, such as time elapsed, proximity to the radical right party, electoral data, historical trends, and qualitative data, to determine the best categorization of the movement.

movement. These movements are distinguishable from one another, and can be interpreted as separate strategies. I am defining a drastic move away from the radical right as an attempt to cordon off the challenger. Such a move can be seen as an attempt to delegitimize the position of the radical right party, by clearly distancing one's own position. A slight movement away from the radical right is being characterized as competing with the radical right by differentiating. In such a scenario, the mainstream party is not attempting to delegitimize the radical right, but rather acknowledging their existence in the system, as well as their claim to their political position. Consequently, they adjust their own position slightly to compete with a legitimate opponent, but at the same time differentiate their own position. Like movement away from the radical right, movement toward the radical right can be either drastic or slight. I will characterize a slight movement toward the right as competing with the radical right by engaging. In this instance, the mainstream party is acknowledging the existence of the radical right and the issues it raises. Through this competition, their positions become closer to the radical right, and they could show a willingness to work and perhaps compromise with the radical right party. In such an instance, the mainstream party is engaging in a debate with the radical right and may adopt a portion of their rhetoric. A drastic movement toward the radical right can be seen as an attempt to co-opt that political space, those voters, and/or core issues. Such a movement demonstrates an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the issues raised by radical right parties, but not necessarily the legitimacy of the party itself or its ownership of the issue(s) or claim to that political space. In this instance, the mainstream party could be attempting to either take ownership of the issues

raised by the radical right party, close off the political space, and/or align themselves closely with the radical right party. Figure 10 illustrates these possibilities visually.



Figure 10: Possible Individual Movements in Political Space Diagram

Moving Away: Cordoning and Competing by Differentiating

As I have just defined above, cordoning and competing by differentiation are movements by mainstream right parties away from radical right parties. In these instances, the mainstream parties are attempting to distinguish and distance themselves from the radical right, but the key difference is that competing suggests an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the radical right parties' position and existence in the political system while cordoning suggests that the mainstream parties view the radical right parties and their policy positions as illegitimate, and attempt to clearly, and drastically, separate themselves and reassert the legitimacy of their own position in the mainstream.

Cordoning

The issue of immigration in Belgium presents an illustrative example of mainstream parties cordoning off the radical right. During the time period of the diagram, the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang (VB) has been electorally influential and the National Front (FNb) has been represented in the national parliament in every election since 1991. The electoral influence of each of these radical right parties is increased once region is taken into account. Nationally, the most successful election results for VB was just under 12%, but when just considering votes from Flanders and Brussels, this jumps to almost 17% (Carter 2005, 4-5). A similar story exists for FNb. While they are not electorally influential, as I have defined it, nationally (generally they receive about 2% of the vote), when just considering the results from Wallonia and Brussels, they have been, receiving between 5% and 7% of the vote on several occasions (Carter 2005). I mention this only to show that there is one radical right party (VB) that is electorally influential nationally in Belgium, and this influence is increased when only considering the areas in which they contest elections. In addition, there is a second radical right party (FNb) that is not electorally influential nationally, but has been electorally influential in the regions in which they contest elections.

As seen in Figure 9 below, the two main parties of the right, CVP/CD&V and PRL/MR have made substantial moves away from the radical right on the issue of immigration since 1990. Although the Christian Democrats did initially move slightly to the right, that movement has since been more than compensated for. The PRL/MR has consistently cordoned off the radical right since the initial electoral breakthrough, and the

overall result of movement of the CVP/CD&V has also resulted in a cordoning off. Although I am most concerned with the actions of the two main parties of the right, these movements are also coupled with movements away from the radical right by the main and secondary parties of the left. Taking all of these movements into consideration, as well as the distance between the radical right parties and the closest mainstream parties, demonstrates a strong tendency to clearly show the mainstream parties' positions on immigration are far from those of the radical right parties, and an attempt to define the radical right as outside the legitimate range of mainstream immigration debate.



Figure 9: Belgium Immigration Political Space Diagram

Competing by Differentiating

Denmark has had an electorally influential radical right party represented in the national parliament since 1988.[8] The Progress Party, FRP(d), was electorally successful from 1988 until 1998 (receiving 6-9% of the vote), and the Danish People's Party (DF) has been influential since 1998 (receiving 7-14% of the vote). The main party of the

[8] The Progress Party was also electorally successful from the first elections it contested in 1973 through 1981, receiving between 8% and 16% of the vote in each election, but Carter does not consider it a xenophobic party until the mid-1980s.

right, The Liberal Party (V) began competing with the radical right since the initial electoral breakthrough, and began to compete by differentiation in between 1993 and 2000, as seen in Figure 11. The People's Party was founded in 1995, it contested its first parliamentary elections shortly after in 1998, and in that election won a substantial portion of the vote (7.4%). It would seem that the combination of some of the leadership of the Progress Party breaking away to form a new party, and the initial and continued increasing electoral influence of the Danish People's Party was enough to cause the Liberal Party to respect the legitimacy of the new party and their position in the party system, while at the same time competing with the party by differentiating its own position. The People's Party has also been a member of a governing coalition in Denmark since 2001 with the Liberal Party and the Conservative People's Party (KF). This does not translate into a movement of the Liberal Party toward the radical right, however. The People's Party was brought into the coalition as a minority partner, and not given positions in the cabinet. This allows governing cooperation among the three parties, but maintains the competition of the Liberal Party as differentiating, rather than engaging, the radical right party.

These two examples were intended to demonstrate when, why, and how mainstream right parties might be adopting strategies of moving away from radical right parties. In Belgium, the mainstream parties moved dramatically away from the VB on immigration, effectively cordoning off the radical right party. In the Danish case, the Liberal Party acknowledged the legitimate place of the radical right, following a

reorganization of the radical right and increased electoral success, and adjusted their positions to compete with it but at the same time differentiate its own position.



Figure 11: Denmark Left/Right Political Space Diagram

Moving Toward: Competing by Engaging and Co-opting

As in the previous section, I will now discuss a couple examples of when mainstream parties have responded to an electorally influential radical right party by moving toward the radical right, either by engaging with or co-opting the space of the radical right party.

Competing by Engaging

The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) has been electorally influential in every election since it was founded in 1956. In the first three decades of its existence, it received 5-8% of the vote in national parliamentary elections. It nearly doubled its share of the vote in the 1986 election (to 9.7%), the same year Jörg Haider took over as party leader. Support continued to rise through the 1990s, topping out at nearly 27% in 1999. This 27% place the FPÖ in second place nationally and was greater than the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), which had, up until this election, always come in first or second. Following this election, the FPÖ entered into a coalition government as a junior partner with the ÖVP. The FPÖ saw their support slashed in the next election, in 2002, to 10%, but they maintained their junior position in the coalition government. Haider left the party in 2005 to form the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), but the FPÖ was able to maintain some support in the 2006 election (11%), and increased it support to 17% in the most recent election of 2008. In addition, Haider's new party received 4% of the vote in 2006 and nearly 11% in 2008, putting the total vote share for the radical right parties at about 15% in 2006 and about 28% in 2008. From this information, at least electorally speaking, the FPÖ, and the radical right more generally, has been influential in Austria since 1986.

As seen in Figure 6 below, the ÖVP has shown a consistent tendency to compete with the FPÖ by engaging, aside from the 1989-1993. Since Haider's rise to party leader in the 1980s, the ÖVP has been competing with the radical right party, mostly by engaging, but with a stint of differentiation in the early 1990s. The FPÖ moved further to

the right (following Haider's lead) while the People's Party shifted its position to the left. However, from 1993-2006, the ÖVP has shown a consistent trend of engaging the radical right party. For much of this time the FPÖ has had electoral results in the 20% range and/or the two parties have been in coalition governments together. Taken together, these two factors both provide rationale for and evidence of the ÖVP competing with the FPÖ by engaging. With this movement, the People's Party has acknowledged the existence and legitimacy of the Freedom Party and has shown its willingness to work with the FPÖ and its radical right policy positions by taking them in as a junior partner in a coalition government.



Figure 6: Austria Left/Right Political Space Diagram

Co-opting

Like competitive engagement, co-opting is a movement toward the radical right by mainstream right parties. However, the movement is more dramatic in these cases. The rational is similar, but not identical. It seems that the mainstream parties are acknowledging the legitimacy of the radical right party's positions, but not necessarily the legitimacy of the party itself, or at least not the ownership of the radical right party of these positions. In Switzerland, for example, two radical right parties, the Freedom Party of Switzerland (FPS) and the Swiss Democrats (SD), were represented in parliament for much of the 1990s. However, neither party reached the 5% necessary to be electorally influential, as I have defined it. The Swiss Democrats best election results were in 1991 and 1995 when they received about 3% of the vote, and the FPS topped out at 4% in 1995. Neither party has had substantial electoral success since then, nor has either party been represented in the national parliament since 2007 (the SD won one seat in 1999 and 2003, and the FPS fell out of parliament in 1999).

This does not mean that the ideas and principles of the radical right are not influential in Switzerland. Figure 12 shows that, since the time period following the initial, albeit limited, electoral success of the SD and FPS, the political space of these radical right parties was co-opted by the mainstream parties of the right. During that time period, all of the mainstream political parties in Switzerland have shifted dramatically toward the radical right. The most dramatic move toward the radical right was made by the Swiss People's Party (SVP), the largest right wing party in Switzerland. This cannot only explain the lack of further electoral successes by the SD and/or the FPS (there were

no longer room to compete to the right of the mainstream right), but it is also evidence of the influence these parties and the positions of the radical right have had on the political space. It is arguable that the SVP has co-opted the space and ideas of the radical right parties reducing the electoral success of the parties themselves, but at the same time increasing the salience of the radical right positions. I will discuss this case with more attention given to qualitative evidence in the following chapter.



Figure 12: Switzerland Left/Right Political Space Diagram

An Example of Multiple Strategies

The overall political space in Norway provides an example of a party using multiple strategies in response to a radical right party having electoral success. The Progress Party, FRP(n), had modest electoral success (3%-4.5%) until the election of

1989 when it received 13% of the vote. It has been electorally influential since, and has steadily increased its share of the vote to its current position of almost 23% of the vote (although, there was a significant setback in 1993; dropping from 13% in 1989 down to just over 6%). In 1997 it overtook the Conservative Party (Høyre, H), as the second largest party in parliament, and the largest party on the right. Aside from the election of 2001, it has remained in this position.

Since the initial breakthrough of the Progress Party, the paths of it and the Conservative Party have generally moved together. While this could be due to them both reacting similarly to exogenous factors, a closer examination of these paths in Figure 4 below, in connection with election results, make it difficult to completely eliminate the possibility of Høyre responding to the Progress Party. Following the first major electoral success of the Progress Party in 1989, Høyre co-opted the political space of the radical right party by moving drastically to the right. This co-optation was followed by the substantial decline in the electoral success of the Progress Party.[9] Immediately following this decline, the Conservative Party competed with the Progress Party by differentiating its position slightly, and in the following election, 1997, the FRP(n) overtook Høyre as the second largest party. This prompted the Conservative Party to move back to the right, and to engage with the radical right party. The Conservative Party's trend to the right has continued through 2006, and, when coupled with a movement of the FRP(n) to the left, Høyre even appears further to the right than the Progress Party in the most recent expert survey.

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[9] It is important to note that these votes were not lost directly to Høyre. The Conservative Party also saw a decline in votes in 1993. The Center Party (SP) saw the most substantial increase in support.



Figure 4: Norway Left/Right Political Space Diagram

Analyzing the Role of Ideology

This chapter began by showing that there certainly are some patterns of change in political space, but many of these patterns are mitigated by counterexamples that seem to draw into question their direct connection to radical right parties. Then I began to look more closely at the movements of individual parties in cases during time periods of electorally influential radical right parties. Having shown some instances of cordoning, competing, and co-opting in some of these cases in the previous two sections, I can now discuss how these strategies vary across the available cases.

As mentioned earlier, the most electorally successful radical right parties have been of type 3 or type 4 in Elisabeth Carter's typology. These parties are authoritarian xenophobic parties and neo-liberal xenophobic parties, respectively. They are both xenophobic and culturist, but type 3 demand reforms of less democracy and more state intervention while type 4 demands more democratic reforms and less state intervention. This seems to be an electoral sweet spot of ideology for radical right parties – not as isolated as the crazy fringe of the neo-Nazi or neo-fascist parties, but not lost in the shadow of the mainstream right like neo-liberal populist parties. The following analysis will concentrate on this area of the radical right ideological spectrum. When I refer to a more-extreme radical right party or ideology, I will be referencing an authoritarian xenophobic party or ideology (type 3), and when I refer to a less-extreme radical right party or ideology, I will be referring to a neo-liberal xenophobic party (type 4). I will only be looking at countries with an electorally influential radical right party, and only during and shortly after this electoral influence occurs. I am not arguing this is the only circumstance under which radical right parties have influence on other political parties, but this is one situation that allows me to investigate a portion of the role party ideology might play. These criteria have limited the number of cases to three in each category. In the authoritarian xenophobic group, I will be looking at the impact of the FPÖ in Austria, the VB and FNb in Belgium, and the FN in France. The neo-liberal xenophobic parties I will be examining the influence of are the DF and FRP(d) in Denmark, the FRP(n) in Norway, and the ND in Sweden.

Due to the small sample size, I have not run rigorous statistical analysis on this data, but interesting findings do emerge with some simple math. First of all, mainstream right parties faced with a more-extreme radical right party are more likely to move away from the challenger, by cordoning or differentiating, than their counterparts in countries with a less-extreme radical right party. And, inversely, mainstream right parties are more likely to move toward a less-extreme radical right party by engaging or co-opting. In total, when faced with a challenge from an authoritarian xenophobic party, mainstream parties moved away, cordoned or differentiated, 60% of the time, while when faced with a challenge from a neo-liberal xenophobic party, mainstream parties moved away 46% of the time. This difference is almost entirely made up of differences in the drastic movements – cordoning and co-opting. Authoritarian xenophobic parties were cordoned off about 28% of the time while there were no instances of neo-liberal xenophobic parties being cordoned off. Similarly, mainstream right parties co-opted the space of neo-liberal xenophobic parties 15% of the time, while there was not a single case of mainstream parties co-opting the space of an authoritarian xenophobic party.

The majority of the movements that occurred were slight, competing either by differentiating or engaging. The movements took place both in cases with more-extreme and in cases with less-extreme radical right parties in total and on the overall left/right dimension, but a larger difference can be seen on the issue of immigration. In fact, the percentage of slight movements is nearly identical in each instance on the overall scale (87% for type 3 and 87.5% for type 4), but the difference is that the remaining drastic movements were movements away from type 3 parties and toward type 4 parties. A

larger discrepancy is visible on the issue of immigration. Similar numbers exist for the slight movements in cases with less-extreme radical right parties (80% compete by differentiating or engaging, and 20% co-opt), but the same does not carry over to the other category. More-extreme radical right parties are cordoned off on the issue of immigration 50% of the time. Table 1 shows how individual movements of mainstream right parties were characterized over time.

Finding that the response of mainstream parties is more drastic on immigration is an interesting finding because it is correlated with party ideology, but it does not necessarily stem directly from the ideological differences. Both groups of radical right parties are xenophobic and culturist, but differ in the role of the state. According to this evidence, it is not necessarily the radical right party's xenophobia that the mainstream parties are reacting to. Mainstream right parties are more likely to cordon off a radical right party if it is authoritarian and demands less democratic reforms, but this reaction is taken on the issue most central to the radical right party, immigration, even though it does not seem to be the most salient issue the mainstream parties are responding to. In other words, radical right parties are intrinsically linked to the issue of immigration, and the differences in how mainstream parties react to radical right parties are manifested in this issue area even if the different reactions of the mainstream parties result from disparities on separate ideological dimensions.

To sum up the findings of this section, mainstream right parties are more likely to move toward a less-extreme radical right party than a more-extreme radical right party and *vice versa*. This difference is almost entirely made up of differences in the drastic

movements of cordoning and co-opting, and is more apparent on the issue of immigration than it is in the overall left/right political space. This is true even though the ideological difference that distinguishes these radical right parties from one another, the role of the state, is not directly related to immigration (both groups of parties are equally xenophobic).

Table 1: Reactions of Individual Mainstream Right Parties

Reacting to Type 3 (Authoritarian Xenophobic Parties)		**Reacting to Type 4 (Neo-Liberal Xenophobic Parties)**	
Reacting to the FPÖ in Austria		**Reacting to the DF and FRP(d) in Denmark**	
Overall	Immigration	Overall	Immigration
ÖVP	ÖVP	V	V
Compete and Engage	*Compete and Engage*	*Compete and Engage*	*Co-opt*
Compete and Differentiate	*Compete and Engage*	*Compete and Engage*	*Compete and Engage*
Compete and Engage		*Compete and Differentiate*	
Compete and Engage		*Compete and Differentiate*	
		KF	KF
		Compete and Differentiate	*Compete and Engage*
		Compete and Engage	*Co-opt*
		Compete and Engage	
Reacting to the VB and FNb in Belgium		**Reacting to the FRP(n) in Norway**	
Overall	Immigration	Overall	Immigration
CVP/CD&V	CVP/CD&V	H	H
Cordon	*Compete and Engage*	*Co-opt*	*Compete and Differentiate*
Compete and Engage	*Cordon*	*Compete and Engage*	*Compete and Differentiate*
Compete and Engage		*Compete and Differentiate*	
		Co-opt	
PRL/MR	PRL/MR	KRF	KRF
Compete and Engage	*Cordon*	*Compete and Differentiate*	*Compete and Differentiate*
Compete and Differentiate	*Cordon*	*Compete and Differentiate*	*Compete and Differentiate*
Compete and Differentiate		*Compete and Differentiate*	
Reacting to the FN in France		**Reacting to the ND in Sweden**	
Overall	Immigration	Overall	Immigration
RPR	RPR	M	M
Cordon	*Compete and Differentiate*	*Compete and Engage*	*Compete and Engage*
Compete and Engage	*Cordon*		
Compete and Differentiate			
Compete and Differentiate			
UDF	UDF	KDS	KDS
Compete and Differentiate	*Compete and Differentiate*	*Compete and Differentiate*	*Compete and Engage*
	Cordon		

Conclusion

This chapter began by looking for evidence of the expected patterns of party movement that appeared in the academic literature. While the political space diagrams did provide some evidence for these patterns of convergence, divergence, and shifting to the left or right, the patterns are difficult to connect to the radical right because there is often counter evidence as well. This led us to look more closely at the movements of individual parties, and one way of interpreting these movements is that they are distinct strategies of cordoning off, competing with, and co-opting the space of the radical right party. I found that the choice of strategy taken by the mainstream right parties seems to be related to the extremeness of the radical right party's ideology. Mainstream right parties tend to move toward (by co-opting the space of or competing by engaging with) a less-extreme radical right party (a neo-liberal xenophobic party) while they tend to move away from (by cordoning off or competing by differentiating from) a more-extreme radical right party (an authoritarian xenophobic party). The final finding of this chapter was that these differences in strategy are most prevalent on the issue of immigration, even though the ideological differences of the radical right parties are on the role of the state. It would seem that these distinct strategies are manifested on the issue most closely associated with the radical right, immigration, even if the parties are responding differently because of ideological differences on another issue. Now that these relationships have been established abstractly, across a number of cases, the following chapter will attempt to put the political space diagrams into a bit more empirical context.

CHAPTER IV

CONTEXTUALIZING THE EVIDENCE

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter was based on a cross-case analysis of political diagrams and national election results with a touch of within case logic. This evidence was taken at face value, without much questioning. However, the conclusions drawn are only as reliable as the data. Thus, this chapter has two main purposes. The first is to examine the validity of the data I have been analyzing throughout this project and the second is to use qualitative evidence to investigate whether or not there are plausible connections between the movements of parties shown in the expert surveys and the radical right parties. Due to the limited nature of this project as a thesis, I will only be able to present a handful of cases, and in limited depth. First, I will revisit two political space diagrams to see if the movements match up to empirical evidence we know about the parties. In the following section, I will attempt to establish some mechanisms through which these effects can travel by filling in some of the gaps between the movements in the diagrams and the actions taken by parties in two additional cases. I will present evidence that suggests, at least in these cases, mainstream parties have indeed adjusted their positions, as reflected in the political space diagrams, in response to the radical right parties.

Ideally, not only would I be able to delve deeper into each case, I would also be able to provide additional small case studies for each of the individual party movements,

cordoning, competing by differentiating, competing by engaging, and co-opting, discussed in the previous chapter. Such analysis would provide a clearer insight into what each of these distinct strategies looks like in practice, and possibly further reveal the conditions under which each is more likely to be chosen. I would suggest looking at Belgium, and the *cordon sanitaire* of the VB, as an exemplar of mainstream parties cordoning off a radical right party. Looking more closely at changes in party positions on immigration in Denmark might shed some light on mainstream parties co-opting the political space of the radical right. The overall left/right political space in Demark could also make for a likely case study of competing. Each mainstream party of the right, the Liberal Party (V) and the Conservative People's Party (KF), has had periods of competing by differentiating as well as periods of competing by engaging. Such a case study could reveal the degree to which these reflect separate and distinct changes, and the motivations behind each. In addition, I would like to see a detailed analysis of the governing coalition of the Liberals and the Conservative People's Party with the support of the Danish People's Party that is reflected by a convergence of these parties from 2000 to almost identical positions in 2006 in the political space diagram.

VALIDATING THE DATA

To begin the process of examining the results of these expert judgment surveys, I will take a closer look at the political space diagram of Austria in conjunction with some things we know about the case to see if the diagram seems to portray a relatively accurate picture of real life. Following this description, I will present a similar analysis of the

British case to demonstrate how the movements of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party visible in the diagram map onto real changes made in policy positions.

The first thing I would like to call your attention to in Figure 6, below, is the initial positioning of the FPÖ in the 1980s. One might argue that this moderate position would call into question either the validity of the data or classification of the party as a radical right party. Since it is widely agreed that, along with the FN in France, the FPÖ is one of the prototypical radical right parties in Western Europe, it causes concern for the validity of the data source. However, this apparent discrepancy is easily understood and when put into context actually adds to accuracy of the diagram. Even though the FPÖ was founded in the 1950s and its predecessor (VdU) dates back to 1949, it did not match the definition of a radical right party until much later. In the early 1980s, the party was controlled by its liberal faction under Norbert Steger, and entered a coalition government with the SPÖ in 1983. It was under the leadership of Jörg Haider that the party took a turn to the right, and took its current position on the radical right in the party system. In fact, it was the same year that Haider assumed the leadership role, 1986, that Cas Mudde initially classifies the FPÖ as a populist radical right political party (Mudde 2007, 305). This movement to the right is subsequently reflected in the 1993 survey of Huber and Inglehart. In addition to the drastic shift of the FPÖ to the right, we also see a change in the direction of the movement of the ÖVP. In the early 1990s, the party was moving to the left, but between 1993 and 2000 it reversed directions and headed back toward the right. It turns out that this movement also matches up with historical events.



Figure 6: Austria Left/Right Political Space Diagram

Following the election of 1986, the ÖVP and SPÖ formed a grand coalition government, at least in part, due to the unwillingness of the SPÖ to continue to cooperate with the FPÖ with Haider as the leader (the two parties had formed a coalition government together following the 1983 elections when the SPÖ lost its absolute majority). Austria was governed by this grand coalition through the rest of the 1980s and the 1990s. While this grand coalition is not reflected as a universally consistent convergence between the two main parties throughout this time period, there is a trend of convergence. However, this trend ends between 1993 and 2000 due to the change in direction of the ÖVP. Following the election of 1999, the SPÖ and ÖVP were unable to come to an agreement on a coalition government, and when these negotiations broke down, an agreement was quickly reached between the ÖVP and Haider's FPÖ. The

ÖVP/FPÖ government was sworn in on February 4th, 2000. This coalition was renewed following the 2002 elections (and later inherited by the BZÖ, following its split from the FPÖ), and continued until 2006 when they lost their majority in parliament. The formation of the right wing coalition and the willingness of the ÖVP to work with the FPÖ are reflected in the political space diagrams in the movement of the ÖVP to the right in the 2000 and 2006 surveys.

The next diagram I will discuss in context is the British political space diagram. Since the radical right parties in Britain, the British National Party (BNP) and the British National Front, have not had substantial electoral success, I have not talked much about the British case much thus far. However, in the context of verifying the data, this case is as applicable as any other. The most striking trend in this diagram is the substantial and consistent movement of the Labour Party (L) from the left to the right. This movement fits with the general perception that many people have of the Labour Party since the early 1980s, but before I take a slightly closer look at the British case in context to verify this movement, please allow me to first mention the movement of the Conservative Party (C). The ideology of the Conservative Party moderated economically under the leadership of John Major, who took over as Prime Minister from Margaret Thatcher in 1990. The party toned down its approach to privatization, became less focused on a strict laissez-faire economic model, and due to high unemployment rates in the early 1990s, the party also took actions to intervene in the economy (Carter 2005, 138). Major also brought the party closer to the Labour Party with regard to Britain's role in Europe. In contrast to Thatcher, he wanted Britain to play a more active and central in Europe (Moar 1997).

These changes made by the Conservative Party are reflected in the movement to the left shown in Figure 13 between 1989 and 1998. Following a substantial electorally defeat in 1997, the party reverted back to the right under the leadership of William Hague, which can be seen in the diagram after 1998.



Figure 13: Britian Left/Right Political Space Diagram

Like with the Conservative Party, most of the movement of the Labour Party can be attributed to a reformulation of its economic philosophy. In the 1989 document *Meet the Challenge, Make the Change*, the party asserted that "the task of a Labour government would be restricted to stimulating the market economy, and that intervention

in the economy by the state would be limited" to market failures (Carter 2005, 137). Soon after, the party changed its stance on privatized industries and announced it would not reverse the privatizations that occurred under Thatcher (Carter 2005). In 1995, Labour removed the clause in its constitution referencing its desire to secure "common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange", thus ending its desire to pursue policies of widespread nationalization (Moar 1997, 227). This final transition to 'New Labour' was led by Tony Blair and continued under his tenure as Prime Minister. Further evidence is provided by Blair's close alliance with the United States, under the leadership of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. Translated to the political space diagram, these changes made by the Labour Party are seen as movements to the right during every time period, all but one of which are quite substantial.

Since the political space diagrams have been constructed based upon the perceptions of people, I felt that it was necessary to look a little more closely at some of these diagrams in connection with some qualitative elements to make sure they captured some of demonstrable changes in party positions. The preceding discussion of the party systems in Austria and Britain suggest that the diagrams do fairly accurately portray real shifts in party positions. In both cases, the movements of the parties seen in the diagrams can be connected to real changes made in party positions and attitudes and vice-versa. The final necessary step in this project is to look at additional cases in order to see whether or not there are possible connections between these visible movements and the radical right.

Connecting Movements to Actions

Although it will not be possible to eliminate other possible causes completely in this short final chapter, it is possible to demonstrate that there are at least plausible connections between some of the shifts in party position and radical right parties and ideas. Like the previous section, this section will discuss two diagrams and provide qualitative evidence. The evidence provided will focus on the rationale for changing positions in order to help determine whether these shifts are in response to exogenous factors or if they are related to the presence of a radical right party. The cross-case analysis conducted in the previous chapter necessitated a threshold for defining a radical right party as electorally influential when looking for effects on party positioning, but the same is not true when investigating this qualitative evidence. In addition to looking more closely at the French political space, I will use this section as an opportunity to explore alternative avenues of influence by looking at one case, Switzerland, which did not have a radical right party reach the 5% share of the vote to be considered electorally relevant in the cross-case analysis. By including this case here, I am able to explore another way that the radical right can influence political space. This is important because the limiting the influence of the radical right to cases in which a party has gotten more that 5% of the vote for the national parliament may have been necessary for a particular analysis but it is not reasonable to assume these are the only circumstances under which the radical right can alter the positions of mainstream parties. Before I do this, however, let me first begin with the French case, an instance where the National Front has been influential and electorally relevant for many years.

The first way that the radical right has had an effect on the mainstream political parties of France has been through altering the political agenda and policy priorities. Martin Schain has shown that "the issue priorities of the National Front and its voters appear to have influenced the priorities of those voting for other political parties" (Schain 2002, 230-231). In 1984, 26% supporters of the FN already placed a relatively high priority on immigration, but few supporters of other political parties did the same. However, by 1988, immigration ranked second in importance only to unemployment, was on par with social inequality, and was far more important than concerns over the environment, corruption, and the construction of Europe (Schain 2002, 231). Schain points out that the "issue priorities of voters changed after the breakthrough of the National Front [in 1986], rather than before, and the change was very rapid" (Schain 2002, 231). FN voters continued to place more importance on immigration than supporters of other parties, but the difference has diminished. He concludes that an effect of the FN has been an increased importance of immigration issues in the political system since the issue has become a "less important way of differentiating FN voters from supporters of other political parties" (Schain 2002, 231). Altering the political agenda is an important impact attributable to the FN, and radical right parties more generally, but this type of effect may not clearly show up on the political space diagrams as I have constructed them since they do not really factor in the relative importance or weight on any particular issue. However, there is also evidence to suggest that the FN has also changed the positions parties have taken on the issue of immigration, as seen in Figure 2 below.



Figure 2: France Immigration Political Space Diagram

In addition to immigration becoming a more salient issue across the electorate following the electoral breakthrough of the FN in 1986, mainstream political parties also subsequently adjusted their positions on the issue. In the late 1980s, there was some internal struggle within the RPR as to how to best respond to Le Pen and the FN. Charles Pasqua, RPR interior minister from 1986-1988, declared that the mainstream right shared many common values with the FN (Marcus 1995, 141), but Chirac, Prime Minister at the time, issued contradictory statements on immigration and indicating a lack of a clear strategy of how to deal with Le Pen (Goldey and Johnson 1988, 197). At this point, any changes seemed to be largely in rhetoric (Weil 2001) and the right-wing government of 1986-88 did not deliver on its promise of bringing forth a new nationality bill (Carter 2005, 117). However, this change in rhetoric resulted in a redefinition of immigration "from a labor market problem to an integration/incorporation problem; to a problem that touches on national identity; to problems of education, housing, law and order; to problems of citizenship requirements" (Schain 2002, 238). The increase in salience and the redefinition of the issue forced all mainstream parties to address immigration. In

1997, newly elected Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin formed a commission to study the subject. Shortly after its appointment, it recommended accepting most of the changes made to immigration and nationalization legislation made by the previous government of the right.

This centrist approach was designed to move toward policies of consensus among the mainstream parties while at the same time isolating the FN (Schain 2002, 238). This change in party positions and approach toward the center, looking to build consensus and isolate the radical right, is visible in the political space diagram of immigration in France above. Not only did the parties of the right need to moderate their respective stances on immigration in order to isolate the radical right, but the parties of the left also needed to moderate their positions on immigration in order to build consensus. Both movements are visible on the diagram, and both can be, at least in part, attributed to the electoral influence and rhetorical redefinition brought about by Jean Marie Le Pen and the Front National.

The previous discussion of immigration in France is a case in which an electorally influential radical right party altered the political space through its electoral success and powerful rhetoric. The following discussion will be from Switzerland, a case without an electorally influential radical right party, but a case that has shown a strong movement of political parties toward the right since the 1993. While the previous cross-case analysis did not allow the examination of this case due to the lack of electoral success of a radical right party, a qualitative discussion will allow me to examine the drastic shift to the right

in Switzerland shown in Figure 12, and to show that the ideology of the radical right ideology can be influential without substantial electoral success of a party.



Figure 12: Switzerland Left/Right Political Space Diagram

As can be seen above, each political party in Switzerland moved substantially to the right between 1993 and 2000. This occurred despite the fact that neither the Freedom Party (FPS) nor the Swiss Democrats (SD) has achieved electoral relevance, as I have defined it. Both parties were represented in parliament (with between 1 and 7 seats, and up to 4% of the vote) in the 1990s, but neither sustained this minimal electoral success. One might suggest that this shift was caused by an increase in immigration and/or the number foreign-born residents from Islamic nations, but this does not appear to be the case either. During this time period, immigration from Islamic nations and the number of

foreign-born residents from Islamic nations remained fairly constant (OECD 2008). If this change is not directly attributable to a strong electoral presence of a radical right party, nor a drastic increase in immigration, then what else may be at play here?

As I have noted earlier, electoral success is not the only way the radical right can influence the positions of other political parties. In Switzerland, it would seem that either the mainstream right party co-opted the issue and rhetoric of the radical right, squeezing out any room for political success, either out of a strategic calculation of political opportunity or an increased salience of immigration. I showed in the previous figure that across the board, the mainstream parties moved to the right on a general left/right scale, but Figure 14 shows that the same is not true on the issue of immigration. In this instance, only the main right party, the Swiss People's Party (SVP) moved substantially to the right on immigration. Not only that, but the SVP was also considerably closer to the radical right than the other mainstream parties.



Figure 14: Switzerland Immigration Political Space Diagram

This movement could be interpreted as a co-optation of the political space of the radical right, which prevented further electoral success. In addition to the political space

being co-opted, the SVP has also taken on the rhetoric and imagery of a radical right party on the issue of immigration. In various electoral campaigns, the party has focused on the use of xenophobic images in its propaganda. Images of a white sheep kicking a black sheep off of the Swiss flag, dark skinned hands reaching into a basket of Swiss public benefits, and black missile-like minarets protruding a Swiss flag with a veiled Muslim person have been included in its recent election posters. These xenophobic images would normally be associated with the core values of a radical right party, but in this case they are being used by the mainstream right party. Perhaps the SVP sees this as a calculated attempt to appeal to voters, or maybe it is incorporating the ideological components of a radical right party. The cases I have discussed in this project do not exist on isolated islands, and in fact are relatively close to one another geographically. This space is further minimized be electronic communications and interactions. Having seen the electoral success of radical right parties in other European countries, the SVP incorporating the issues and tactics of a radical right party can simultaneously increase its own electoral support as well as eliminate a potential challenge from a radical right party. Regardless of the rationale, the tactic seems to be working, as the SVP has been the largest party in parliament in the last two elections and the electorate passing a recent measure banning the construction of minarets.

While the Swiss case does not meet my initial qualification of having an electorally influential radical right party, the core principle of the radical right, xenophobia, is certainly influential in Switzerland. Perhaps precisely because there was not an electorally successful radical right party, the mainstream right Swiss People's

Party has adopted the rhetoric, images, and tactics of a radical right party. Regardless of whether this is attributable to a cross-national diffusion of ideas from radical right parties in other countries or an internal radicalization of party ideology, xenophobia is influential in Swiss politics. While there is not an electorally influential radical right party, the SVP has in many ways played the same role, but also has the legitimacy of being a mainstream party, and the largest party in parliament.

Conclusion

This chapter was intended to serve two purposes. First, though a discussion of changes in party positions in Austria and Britain, I attempted to show that the political space diagrams this project has been based upon do, in fact, match up to demonstrable changes in policy positions, strategies, and attitudes. Following this validation of the data, I discussed qualitative evidence in the French and the Swiss cases that shows that making connects between these party movements and the radical right does not seem to be entirely erroneous. In France, the mainstream parties sought a centrist, consensus building approach to immigration, at least in part, to isolate the radical right. In Switzerland, although there has not been a strong electoral presence of a radical right party, the mainstream right party has adopted many of the themes, strategies, and images often associated with the radical right. This suggests the possibility of electoral opportunism, preemptive co-optation, and/or an international diffusion of effects. Taken together, the two sections of this chapter show that these diagrams do capture real movements of political parties and that these movements could be connected to the radical right.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

This project has engaged in a process of defining the radical right, reviewing the academic literature for expected effects of the radical right, compared patterns of movements of party systems and individual parties across a selection of cases, and contextualized these movements with real changes in policy positions to verify the data and to connect the movements to the radical right. This final concluding chapter will review the substantive results of the research conducted in this project and suggest some areas for future research. I will finally conclude with some closing thoughts on the subject.

SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUSIONS

Despite substantial limitations on time, resources, and language, this project has produced several conclusions regarding the effects of radical right political parties in Western Europe. Some of these conclusions have been substantiated more than others, but all have some degree of empirical support. The cross-case analysis provided evidence of some broad patterns of movements in party systems that the academic literature suggested one would find. It also allowed for more substantive analysis of individual party movements. The contextualization done in Chapter IV demonstrated that

these movements do match fairly well onto real changes in party policy positions and provided evidence suggesting that some of these movements may be a result of the radical right.

The empirical research began by focusing on the potential patterns of party movements caused by radical right parties that one might expect to find based upon the academic literature. I looked for patterns of convergence, divergence, shifting to the left, and shifting to the right, and found evidence supporting connections of each broad pattern to the radical right. There is evidence of convergence both *between* the left and the right and *within* the left and the right in France on an overall left/right dimension as well as on the issue of immigration. Upon an initial glance at election results, it seems that this movement could be related to the presence of the Front National. However, there is also substantial convergence within the right, and between the right and left in Germany, a country without the strong national electoral influence of a radical right party. This makes it difficult to argue, based on this evidence alone, that the radical right is necessarily linked to such a pattern. Looking at the political space of Norway, I found evidence that suggested that the Progress Party (FRP(n)) may have caused a divergence, or polarization of the mainstream right as it appears that the two main parties of the right have responded differently, with the Christian Democrats (KRF) becoming more of a centrist party and the Conservative Party (Høyre) moving toward the radical right. A similar movement did not appear on the issue of immigration though, which one would expect if the movement was in direct response to the Progress Party since this is the issue most closely associated with the radical right.

In addition to convergence and divergence, there is also evidence that suggests that directional shifts (to the right or to the left) could also be an effect of the radical right. I showed that there is a fairly consistent pattern of drifting to the right in the Austrian political space, which seems to correlate with the electoral fortunes of the FPÖ. A similar, though less pronounced, pattern is found on the issue of immigration suggesting that it could be connected to the radical right. A more striking shift to the right is seen on the issue of immigration in Denmark, but the overall party positions are fairly constant over time, indicating that the radical right parties have potentially redefined the issue but have had little impact in a broader sense. There was a substantial, almost universal, shift to the left on immigration in Belgium across the political space, and among the parties of the right in France. Both of these movements seem to be correlated with the electoral successes of the respective radical right parties.

After analyzing the patterns of movement that the scholarship suggested one might expect to find, I looked more closely at the individual movements of particular mainstream right parties, which could be in response to an electorally influential radical right party. I have interpreted these individual movements as separate strategies of how mainstream parties could attempt to adjust their positions to address the rise of a radical right party. These movements were interpreted as cordoning off (a drastic move away), competing with by differentiating from (a slight move away), competing with by engaging (a slight move toward), and co-opting the space of (a drastic move toward) the radical right. The strategy chosen in a given instance seems to be related to the ideology of the radical right party in the political system. I found that mainstream right parties

were more likely to move toward a less-extreme radical right party (a neo-liberal xenophobic party) and away from a more-extreme radical right party (an authoritarian xenophobic party). This difference is made up almost entirely on the margins as most parties end up competing with the radical right party, either by engaging or differentiating. The mainstream parties, however, occasionally co-opt the space of a neo-liberal xenophobic party and cordon off an authoritarian xenophobic party. This distinction is stronger on the issue of immigration, as authoritarian parties are cordoned off on immigration roughly half of the time. This is true even though the ideological difference that the mainstream parties are seemingly responding to is not closely related to immigration. However, it is the issue most closely associated with the radical right party family.

Following the analysis based on cross-case comparisons of the movements of parties in political space, I looked more closely at a handful of cases. I traced the movements of parties in two cases to see how well the shifts in position matched onto real changes in party behavior. In Austria, changes in party position captured by the expert judgment surveys seems to map fairly closely onto changes in policy preferences and coalition strategies made by the FPÖ, ÖVP, and SPÖ. The shifts of the Conservative Party and the Labour Party in Britain also seem to match real adjustments in policy position, particularly with regard to economic policy, domestically and *vis-à-vis* the preferred role of Britain in Europe. I suspect that similar analyses could be done for each case. Once I verified that the data does seem to capture real changes in party positioning, I provided qualitative evidence from two cases to suggest that, in these instances, the

movements may be connected to the radical right. In France, the convergence toward a centrist position seen on immigration was, at least in part, out of an explicit effort to build consensus among the mainstream parties and to isolate Le Pen and the Front National. I also looked at the Swiss case, a case without an electorally influential radical right party, to explore the possibility of other avenues through which the effects of the radical right could flow. In this instance, there was a drastic shift to the right by almost every political party, but the most pronounced movement was from the main party of the right, the Swiss People's Party (SVP). The SVP seems to have taken on some of the characteristics of a radical right party either through a strategic vote maximizing strategy, a preemptive co-optation, an internalization of ideology, or an international diffusion of effects. While a more detailed analysis may be able to more accurately discern the actual mechanism, my exploration at least shows that there may be other ways in which the radical right can influence mainstream party positions, and politics, even without strong electoral success. It was important to note that there were also movements of parties and patterns of shifts in political space in countries without electorally influential radical right parties. While this does not help my argument, it does not eliminate the possibility that in these cases, the radical right parties are influencing the movement of the mainstream parties regardless of electoral success. It may also be indicative of the imperfect nature of using electoral influence as a defining parameter of this study. It is highly likely that the radical right has effects outside of these requirements through changes in rhetoric, redefinition of issues, altering agendas and priorities, and international diffusion. These

effects could be more thoroughly investigated in a more in-depth investigation of the context of each individual case.

Future Research

The next step I would like to take with this project is expanding the discussion of qualitative evidence in each of these cases. A path in this direction that could be immediately pursued would be to provide additional small case studies, like those in Chapter IV, for each of the individual party movements discussed in Chapter III, cordoning, competing by differentiating, competing by engaging, and co-opting. Such analysis would provide a clearer insight into what each of these distinct strategies looks like in practice, and possibly further reveal the conditions under which each is more likely to be chosen. I would suggest looking at Belgium, and the *cordon sanitaire* of the VB, to illustrate what it looks like for mainstream parties to cordon off a radical right party. Looking more closely at changes in party positions on immigration in Denmark might shed some light on mainstream parties co-opting the political space of the radical right. The overall left/right political space in Demark could also make for a likely case study of competing. Each mainstream party of the right, the Liberal Party (V) and the Conservative People's Party (KF), has had periods of competing by differentiating as well as periods of competing by engaging. Such a case study could reveal the degree to which these reflect separate and distinct changes, and the motivations behind each. In the future, I would like to see the results of additional expert judgment surveys, which would allow similar analyses to be conducted well into the future. I would be interested to see how recent developments in European politics would translate into movements of parties

in political space. In particular, I would like to see the changes in the parties of the mainstream right of France, and the initiatives of President Nicolas Sarkozy correspond to party movements. It seems to be the popular perception that Sarkozy has taken a strategy of competing with the FN by engaging the party, and I am curious whether this would appear as such in this context.

In addition, due to time, resource, and language constraints, I was not able to get as deep into the qualitative evidence as I would have liked. In particular, I would like to conduct more research on particular changes in policy preferences made by the mainstream parties, and to more deeply explore the rationale behind these changes. As this project stands now, it has shown that there are uncontrolled correlations between the factors being investigated and that there are plausible connections to the radical right party. Yet in order to more definitively make these claims, further in-depth analysis needs to be done to determine the motivation behind the party movements. Ideally one would, among other things, interview influential party leaders, analyze party propaganda, and read local news sources in order to understand the causal connections between the radical right and the movement of mainstream parties. This type of analysis could begin to uncover whether changes in party position were based upon exogenous factors, strategic calculations, adoption of or reaction to ideological principles, or a redefinition of particular issues.

Concluding Thoughts

This project stemmed from an interest in how immigrant communities were integrated into local societies. As I began to explore the subject, I came across literature

on radical right parties and their opposition to immigration. These parties, and their rhetoric, propaganda, and political style stood in direct opposition to, and presented a great obstacle for, the integration and social equity of immigrant communities. The more I read about the subject, the more fascinated I became. It seemed that media accounts, and even the academic literature, portrayed the radical right as a pariah, while at the same time, no one ever seemed quite sure what impact, if any, radical right parties actually had. Most of the scholarship was devoted to explaining the rise and electoral success of radical right parties with, what seemed to be, an underlying assumption that these parties were "bad". For quite some time, the ideology of the radical right was thought to be alien to, and run contradictory to, many democratic values and practices. However, it has been shown that it may be better to think of many of the principles as radical interpretations of mainstream beliefs (Mudde 2008). Why, then, is there an apparent fear, and need to explain, the limited popularity of radical right parties unless they have some sort of impact? This led me to want to explain what types of effects the radical right might have.

Without the ability to travel and conduct in-depth field research on the subject, I sought other ways to get at that question. I found that a likely way that the radical right parties could have substantial impacts was through other political parties. Still, I would ideally like to conduct more contextually based research into *how* exactly radical right parties illicit change in other political parties, but using the expert judgment surveys has allowed me to capture some of the correlations one might expect to find. Although I was only able to supply a few qualitative details to fill in the gaps, it does seem that these relationships are plausible. I would like to further analyze if and *how* radical right parties

have redefined issues, if and *how* they have changed the language of politics, if and *how* they have altered the coalition possibilities, and if and *how* they have changed policy priorities, agendas, and outcomes.

After trying to get at this question through this small cut into the subject, I have a sense the radical right parties *do* have an impact on politics, and one way this can be seen is through the positions of the mainstream parties in political space, and the changes in these positions over time. While they may not be mounting "a general attack on the parliaments", they have forced the mainstream parties to address their presence and change their political positions and coalition strategies accordingly (Fromm and Kernbach 1994, 9; quoted in Mudde 2007, 1). Although I still maintain that the underlying fear of radical right parties is unnecessarily exaggerated, we may be giving them too much credit, some apprehension is not completely unfounded.

APPENDIX A

COUNTRY LEVEL RAW DATA

Additional information, including questionnaires, can be found by consulting the original sources (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Laver 1995, 1998; Laver and Mair 1999; Lubbers 2000; Ray and Narud 2000; Benoit and Laver 2006).

AUSTRIA

Table 1: Austria Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982)	Laver and Hunt (1989)	Huber and Inglehart (1993)	Lubbers (2000)	Benoit and Laver (2006)
	1982	1989	1993	2000	2006
FPÖ	68	67	85	85	86
ÖVP	58	67	58	63	70
LIF	-	-	59	44	-
SPÖ	30	41	41	43	41
GRÜN	-	24	21	25	23

Table 2: Austria Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000)	Lubbers (2000)	Benoit and Laver (2006)
	1990	2000	2006
FPÖ	88	91	93
ÖVP	55	64	68
LIF	21	21	-
SPÖ	44	60	45
GRÜN	10	11	9

BELGIUM

Table 3: Belgium Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
FNb	-	-	-	95	94
VB	98	84	-	93	94
N-VA	-	-	-	-	70
PVV/VLD	78	58	-	68	71
PRL/MR	76	63	70	66	62
VU	68	71	61	51	-
CVP/CD&V	58	75	56	58	60
PSC/CDH	63	70	52	57	51
FDF	56	49	67	-	-
SP/SP.A	29	24	36	36	30
AGALAEV/Groen	45	36	27	27	13
ECOLO	45	36	28	21	13
PS	25	24	33	33	18
KPB	14	-	-	-	-

Table 4: Belgium Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
FNb	98.1	98	96
VB	97	98	99
N-VA	-	-	64
PVV/VLD	69	72	65
PRL/MR	70	61	49
VU	54	51	-
CVP/CD&V	55	59	39
PSC/CDH	50.1	50	53
FDF	-	-	-
SP/SP.A	40	50	26
AGALAEV/Groen	17	18	10
ECOLO	12	12	10
PS	35	33	28
KPB	-	-	-

BRITAIN

Table 5: Britain Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Laver (1998) 1998	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
BNP	-	-	-	-	95	-
C	78	80	75	69	71	82
SDP	46	-	-	-	-	-
Lib	50	34	47	28	40	40
SNP	44	36	-	33	33	36
L	23	26	38	44	44	55
PC	34	32	-	33	31	30
GP	-	-	-	-	28	-

Table 6: Britain Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
BNP	99	99	-
C	72	73	68
SDP	-	-	-
Lib	39	38	30
SNP	37	45	42
L	45	56	45
PC	39	41	41
GP	23	22	-

DENMARK

Table 7: Denmark Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
FRP(d)	87	83	90	87	91
DF	-	-	-	87	75
V	67	73	79	77	74
KF	73	67	73	72	75
KRF	62	76	58	59	54
CD	57	55	56	56	54
RV	48	42	52	48	44
SD	38	37	36	40	35
SF	19	19	21	25	19
EL	-	-	11	10	7
VS	8	7	-	-	-

Table 8: Denmark Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
FRP(d)	91	92	97
DF	94	97	97
V	66	75	76
KF	64	69	79
KRF	40	41	43
CD	35	40	31
RV	26	29	22
SD	34	53	57
SF	14	15	16
EL	7	9	13

FRANCE

Table 9: France Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
FN	98	93	100	95	89
RPR	82	70	76	75	72
UDF	66	61	63	64	65
MRG	38	34	42	-	-
PS	26	26	35	34	31
VEC	-	25	38	26	18
PCF	14	20	14	15	26

Table 10: France Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
FN	96	96	97
RPR	78	74	62
UDF	68	67	53
PS	31	37	32
VEC	16	11	12
PCF	20	19	29

GERMANY

Table 11: Germany Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
DVU	-	-	-	94	97
Republikaner	-	-	92	87	94
CSU	79	77	70	71	68
CDU	67	68	60	64	68
FDP	51	54	52	60	67
SPD	33	30	31	40	42
G	28	16	21	33	36
DKP	14	-	-	-	10
PDS	-	-	6	16	18

Table 12: Germany Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
DVU	98	98	98
Republikaner	93	94	97
CSU	76	80	73
CDU	65	68	73
FDP	44	46	40
SPD	37	42	39
G	17	18	14
DKP	-	-	29
PDS	29	27	26

GREECE

Table 13: Greece Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
EM	-	-	-	98	-
PA	-	-	-	79	-
ND	-	72	-	74	78
DKK	-	-	-	42	-
PASOK	-	32	-	51	52
SAP	-	-	-	37	-
KKE	-	28	-	16	32
Kkes	-	18	-	-	-

Table 14: Greece Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
EM	90	96	-
PA	75	75	-
ND	52	69	73
DKK	55	55	-
PASOK	52	49	47
SAP	30	34	17
KKE	28	31	44
Kkes	-	-	-

ITALY

Table 15: Italy Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
Ms-Ft	-	-	-	-	97
MSI	91	84	93	-	-
AN	-	-	-	82	84
LN	-	-	72	76	84
FI	-	-	-	67	77
PLI	59	58	70	-	-
DC	54	68	59	-	-
CCD/UDC	-	-	-	59	60
PRI	48	50	51	-	-
PSDI	54	44	47	-	-
SVP	-	-	-	-	48
PPI	-	-	-	45	-
SDI	-	-	-	-	40
PSI	31	35	44	-	-
DS	-	-	17	30	26
PR	23	20	-	-	-
V	-	21	18	26	16
PCI	16	16	-	-	-
PDCI	-	-	-	-	12
PdUP	6	-	-	-	-
DP	5	5	-	-	-
PRC	-	-	0	7	6

Table 16: Italy Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
Ms-Ft	-	-	90
MSI	91	91	-
AN	86	79	79
LN	94	90	97
FI	63	69	72
CCD/UDC	60	59	45
PPI	36.3	36	-
SDI	-	-	37
DS	-	-	22
V	13	12	17
PDCI	-	-	17
PRC	9	9	14

THE NETHERLANDS

Table 17: The Netherlands Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Laver (1995) 1995	Laver and Mair (1999) 1999	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
LPF	-	-	-	-	-	-	87
CP/CD	-	-	94	76	-	90	-
SGP	92	88	89	83	89	79	82
RPF	92	88	89	81	76	-	-
GPV	90	84	87	80	77	-	-
VVD	74	57	59	55	73	67	81
CU	-	-	-	-	-	70	59
CDA	57	69	59	66	55	54	66
AOV	-	-	-	54	-	-	-
Unie 55+	-	-	-	52	-	-	-
D66	44	31	42	31	46	45	49
PvdA	26	21	36	28	38	37	40
GL	-	-	9	14	15	24	21
SP	-	-	21	21	11	14	11
PPR	16	8	-	-	-	-	-
CPN	8	7	-	-	-	-	-
PSP	6	4	-	-	-	-	-

Table 18: The Netherlands Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
LPF	-	-	92
CP/CD	97	97	-
SGP	77	78	68
VVD	73	78	78
CU	72	72	48
CDA	55	58	57
D66	36	41	37
PvdA	31	42	38
GL	14	20	17
SP	58	52	45

NORWAY

Table 19: Norway Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 1998	Ray and Narud (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
FRP(n)	94	73	91	81	88	78
H	77	59	78	74	80	82
KRF	61	69	62	55	54	53
V	40	41	54	66	60	60
SP	58	56	48	42	39	34
DNA	30	28	35	40	45	36
RV	-	-	5	20	5	5
SV	12	15	17	22	19	18

Table 20: Norway Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
FRP(n)	91	92	96
H	63	59	58
KRF	46.7	47	39
V	46	36	34
SP	49	50	47
DNA	60	59	47
RV	15	15	10
SV	19	20	17

PORTUGAL

Table 21: Portugal Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
PDC	-	93	-	-	-
CDS/PP	-	87	82	82	85
PSN	-	-	-	81	-
PSD	-	64	60	60	70
PRD	-	45	-	-	-
PSP	-	39	43	43	44
MDP	-	21	-	-	-
PCP	-	11	29	22	19
P.XXI	-	-	-	20	-
PEV	-	11	-	24	21
DI	-	18	-	-	-
PSR	-	12	-	9	-
UDP	-	11	-	10	-

Table 22: Portugal Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
CDS/PP	65	66	77
PSN	67.4	67	-
PSD	56	51	61
PSP	33	37	39
PCP	19	19	20
P.XXI	10.7	11	-
PEV	14	14	21
PSR	7	6	-
UDP	12	12	-

SPAIN

Table 23: Spain Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
UN/FN	98	-	-	-	-
FEJons	-	-	-	95	-
DN	-	-	-	92	-
PAR	82	-	-	-	-
AP/PP	84	78	72	69	85
UCD	71	-	-	-	-
PNV	67	62	57	61	73
CiU	66	51	57	57	69
PRD	-	45	-	-	-
PSA	45	-	-	-	-
CDS	-	38	49	-	-
EA	-	-	41	-	-
ERC	41	-	-	-	-
PSOE	36	28	33	40	41
PCE/IU	27	-	-	-	18
EE	24	-	-	-	-
UCP	7	10	15	25	-
HB	5	22	0	-	-
MUC	-	7	-	-	-

Table 24: Spain Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
FEJons	94	93	-
DN	96	96	-
AP/PP	75	69	83
PNV	58	56	65
CiU	-	-	63
PSOE	47	38	37
PCE/IU	-	-	17

SWEDEN

Table 25: Sweden Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
SDk	-	-	-	95	-
ND	-	-	90	90	-
M	77	72	81	80	85
KDS	-	71	67	73	79
CP	59	54	55	60	59
FP	55	48	55	57	70
MP	-	30	36	35	34
SdAP	29	32	34	40	30
V	12	15	18	22	29

Table 26: Sweden Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
SDk	97	97	-
ND	93	93	-
M	60	65	55
KDS	51	54	48
CP	56	60	50
FP	32	36	30
MP	28	26	26
SdAP	56	61	37
V	23	20	21

SWITZERLAND

Table 27: Switzerland Left/Right Data

Party	Castles and Mair (1982) 1982	Laver and Hunt (1989) 1989	Huber and Inglehart (1993) 1993	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
SD	-	-	-	91	95
LdT	-	-	-	90	-
EDU	-	-	-	88	88
APS/FPS	-	-	81	89	-
LPS	-	-	69	76	78
SVP	-	-	59	84	90
FDP	-	-	56	68	73
EVP	-	-	-	53	52
CVP	-	-	38	59	59
GPS	-	-	-	27	21
SPS	-	-	18	29	23
PdA	-	-	-	15	10

Table 28: Switzerland Immigration Data

Party	Lubbers (2000) 1990	Lubbers (2000) 2000	Benoit and Laver (2006) 2006
SD	96	97	99
LdT	94	96	-
EDU	91	92	84
APS/FPS	91	95	-
LPS	66	68	64
SVP	80	91	94
FDP	61	65	65
EVP	47	45	45
CVP	54	59	52
GPS	18	17	16
SPS	27	26	16
PdA	20.6	21	16

APPENDIX B

COUNTRY LEVEL DIAGRAMS

AUSTRIA

Left/Right Political Space



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

BELGIUM

Left/Right Political Space



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

BRITAIN

Left/Right Political Space



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

DENMARK

Left/Right Political Space



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

FRANCE

Left/Right Political Space



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

GERMANY

Left/Right Political Space



Immigration Political Space



GREECE

Left/Right Political Space



Immigration Political Space



ITALY

Left/Right Political Space



Immigration Political Space



THE NETHERLANDS

Left/Right Political Space



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

NORWAY

Left/Right Political Space



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

PORTUGAL

Left/Right Political Space



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

SPAIN

Left/Right Political Space



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

SWEDEN

Left/Right Political Space



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

SWITZERLAND

Left/Right Political Space



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

APPENDIX C

LIST OF PARTY ABBREVIATIONS

AUSTRIA

Abbreviation	Name	English Translation
BZO	*Bündnis Zukunft Österreich*	Alliance for the Future of Austria
FPÖ	*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*	Freedom Party
GRÜN	*Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative*	Greens
KPÖ	*Kommunistische Partei Österreichs*	Communist Party
LiF	*Liberales Forum*	Liberal Forum
ÖVP	*Österreichische Volkspartei*	People's Party
SPÖ	*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*	Social Democratic Party

BELGIUM

Abbreviation	Name	English Translation
AGALEV / Groen	*Anders gaan leven*	Live Differently (Flemish Greens)
CD&V	*Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams*	Christian Democrats & Flemish
CDH	*Centre Démocrate Humaniste*	Humanist Democratic Center
CVP	*Christelijke Volkspartij*	Christian People's Party
ECOLO	*Ecolo*	Francophone Greens
FDF	*Front Démocratique des Francophones*	Francophone Democratic Front
FNb	*Front National*	National Front
KPB	*Kommunistische Partij van België*	Communist Party
MR	*Mouvement Réformateur*	Reformist Movement
N-VA	*Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie*	New Flemish Alliance
PRL	*Parti Réformateur Libéral*	Liberal Reform Party
PS	*Parti Socialiste*	Francophone Socialist Party
PVV	*Partij voor de Vrijheid en Vooruitgang*	Party of Liberty and Progress
SP/SP.A	*Socialistische Partij / Socialistische Partij (Anders)*	Socialist Party

VB	*Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang*	Flemish Bloc
VLD	*Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten*	Flemish Liberals and Democrats
VU	*Volksunie*	Flemish People's Union

BRITAIN

Abbreviation	**Name**	**English Translation**
BNP	*British National Party*	
C	*Conservatives*	
SDP	*Social Democratic Party*	
Lib	*Liberal Party/Liberal Democrats*	
SNP	*Scottish National Party*	
L	*Labour*	
PC	*Plaid Cymru*	Party of Wales
GP	*Green Party of England & Wales*	

DENMARK

Abbreviation	**Name**	**English Translation**
CD	*Centrum-Demokraterne*	Centre Democrats
DF	*Dansk Folkeparti*	Danish People's Party
EL	*Enhedslisten – Die Rød-Grøne*	Unity List - The Red Breens
FRP(d)	*Fremskridtspartiet*	Progress Party
KD	*Kristendemokraterne*	
KF	*Det Konservative Folkeparti*	Conservative People's Party
KRF	*Kristeligt Folkeparti*	Christian People's Party
RV	*Det Radikale Venstre*	Social Liberal Party
SD	*Socialdemokraterne*	Social Democrats
SF	*Socialistisk Folkeparti*	Socialist People's Party
V	*Venstre – Danmarks Liberale Parti*	Liberals
VS	*Venstresocialisterne*	Left Socialist Party

FRANCE

Abbreviation	**Name**	**English Translation**
CNIP	*Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans*	Independents and Farmers
FN	*Front National*	National Front
MNR	*Mouvement National Républicain*	
MPF	*Mouvement pour la France*	Movement for France
MRG	*Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche*	Left Radicals
PCF	*Parti Communiste Français*	French Communist Party
PR	*Parti Républicain*	Repulican Party
PRG	*Parti Radical de Gauche*	

PS	*Parti Socialiste*	Socialist Party
RPF	*Rassemblement pour la France*	
RPR	*Rassemblement pour la République*	Rally for the Republic
UDF	*Union pour la Démocratie Française*	Union for French Democracy
UMP	*Union pour un Mouvement Populaire*	Union for a Popular Movement
VEC	*Les Verts*	The Greens

GERMANY

Abbreviation	**Name**	**English Translation**
CDU	*Christlich Demokratische Union*	Christian Democratic Union
CSU	*Christlich Soziale Union*	Christian Social Union
DKP	*Deutsche Kommunistiche Partei*	German Communist Party
DVU	*Deutsche Volksunion*	Germany People's Union
FDP	*Freie Demokratische Partei*	Free Democrats
G	*Die Grünen*	The Greens
NPD	*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland*	
PDS	*Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus*	Party of Democratic Socialism
REP	*Die Republikaner*	The Rupublicans
SPD	*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschelands*	Social Democrats

THE NETHERLANDS

Abbreviation	**Name**	**English Translation**
AOV	*Algemeen Ouderverbond*	United Old Persons' League
CD	*Centrum Democraten*	Center Democrats
CDA	*Christen-Democratisch Appèl*	Christian Democratic Appeal
CP	*Centrumpartij*	
CPN	*Communistische Partij Nederland*	Communist Party
CU	*ChristenUnie*	Christian Union (2000 merger of GPV and RPF)
D66	*Democraten 66*	Democrats 66
EVP	*Evangelische Volkspartij*	
GL	*GroenLinks*	Green Left (1990 from CPN, PSP, PPR, and EVP)
GPV	*Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond*	Reformed Political Union
LN	*Leefbaar Nederland*	
LPF	*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*	List Pim Fortuyn
PPR	*Politieke Partij Radicalen*	Radical Political Party
PSP	*Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij*	Pacifist Socialist Party

PvdA	*Partij van de Arbeid*	Labour Party
PVV	*Partij voor de Vrijheid*	
RPF	*Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie*	Reformed Politcal Federation
SGP	*Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij*	Political Reformed Party
SP	*Socialistische Partij*	Socialist Party
VVD	*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

NORWAY

Abbreviation	**Name**	**English Translation**
DNA	*Det norske Arbeiderparti*	Labour Party
FRP(n)	*Fremskrittspartiet*	Progress Party
H	*Høyre*	Conservatives
KRF	*Kristelig Folkeparti*	Christian People's Party
RV	*Rød Valgallianse*	Red Electoral Alliance
SP	*Senterpartiet*	Center Party
SV	*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*	Socialist Left Party
V	*Venstre*	Liberals

PORTUGAL

Abbreviation	**Name**	**English Translation**
CDS/PP	*Partido do Centro Democratico Social (renamed Partido Popular)*	Center Social Democrats (renamed Popular Party 1995)
DI	*Intervencao Democratica*	Democratic Intervention
MDP	*Movimento Democratico Partugues*	Democratic Movement
P.XXI	*Politica XXI*	Politics XXI
PCP	*Partido Comunista Portugues*	Communist Party
PDC	*Partido da Democracia Crista*	Party of Christian Democracy
PEV	*Partido Ecologista 'Os Verdes'*	Greens
PRD	*Partido Renovador Democratico*	Democratic Renewal Party
PSD	*Partido Social Democrata*	Social Democratic Party
PSN	*Partido de Solidariedade National*	National Solidarity Party
PSP	*Partido Socialista Portugues*	Socialist Party
PSR	*Partido Socialista Revolucionario*	Revolutionary Socialist Party
UDP	*Uniao Democratico Popular*	Democratic People's Union

SPAIN

Abbreviation	**Name**	**English Translation**
AP/PP	*Alianza Popular/Partido Popular*	Popular Alliance/Popular Party - AP & Liberal Party became PP

CDS	*Centro Democratico y Social*	Democratic and Social Center (successor to UCD)
CiU	*Convergencia y Unio*	Convergence and Unity
DN	*Democracia Nacional*	National Democracy
EA	*Eusko Alkartasuna*	Basque Solidarity
EE	*Euzkadiko Ezkerra*	Basque Left
ERC	*Esquerra Repulicana de Catalunya*	Catalan Republican Left
FEJons	*Falange Espanola de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista*	Spanish Phalanx of Committees for National Syndicalist Attack
HB	*Herri Batasuna*	United People
MUC	*Mesa per la Unidadad de los Comunistas*	Communist Party
PAR	*Partido Aragones Regionalista*	Aragonese Regionalist Party
PCE/IU	*Partido Comunista de Espana/Izquierda Unida*	Communist Party/United Left
PNV	*Euzko Alberdi Jeltzalea/Partido Nacionalista Vasco*	Basque Nationalist Party
PRD	*Partido Reformista Democratico*	Democratic Reform Party
PSA	*Partido Socialista Andaluz?Partodo Andaluz*	Andalusian Socialist Party
PSOE	*Partido Socilista Obrero Espanol*	Socialist Party
UCD	*Union del Centro Democratico*	Union of Democratic Center (became CDS in 1982)
UCP	*Coalicion Union del Pueblo Canario*	Canary People's Union
UN/FN	*Union Nacional/Fuerza Nueva*	National Union/New Force

SWEDEN

Abbreviation	**Name**	**English Translation**
CP	*Centerpartiet*	Center Party
FP	*Folkpartiet Liberalerna*	People's Party - the Liberals
KDS	*Kristdemokraterna*	Christian Democrats
M	*Moderata samlingspartiet*	Modern Unity Party
MP	*Miljöpartiet de Gröna*	Greens
ND	*Ny Demokrati*	New Democrats
S	*Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti*	Social Democrats
SDk	*Sverigedemokraterna*	Sweden Democrats
V	*Vänsterpartiet*	Left Party

SWITZERLAND

Abbreviation	**Name**	**English Translation**
APS	*Autopartei der Schweiz/Parti*	Car Party of Switzerland

	Automobiliste Suisse (renamed FPS)	(renamed FPS)
CVP	*Christlich Demokratische Volkspartei*	Christian Democratic People's Party
EDU	*Eidgenossich-Demokratische Union*	Federal Democratic Union
EVP	*Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz*	Protestant People's Party
FDP	*Freisinnige-Demokratische Partei der Schweiz*	Radical Democrats
FPS	*Freiheitspartei der Schweiz (was APS)*	Freedom Party of Switzerland (was APS)
GPS	*Grüne Partei der Schweiz*	Green Party
LdT	*Lega dei Ticinesi*	Ticino Legue
LPS	*Liberale Partei der Schweiz*	Liberal Party
PdA	*Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz*	Labour Party
SD	*Schweizer Demokraten*	Swiss Democrats
SPS	*Sozialdemokratische Partei der Scheweiz*	Social Democrats
SVP	*Schweizerische Volkspartei*	Swiss People's Party

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