

ESSENTIAL SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS
THAT
SHOULD BE MADE UNIVERSAL
IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY DEMOCRACY

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Outline of Contents.

	Page.
The need for the selection and wider diffusion of the best sociological thought----	1
The influence of concepts in social advancement---	6
a. Evidence from social psychology-----	6
b. Evidence from history-----	13
The Criteria for selecting the needed concepts----	20
a. Those corrective of present unsocial concepts such as,-----	21
a. Individualism-----	21
b. A false and narrow nationalism-----	23
c. Materialism-----	28
d. Fatalism-----	30
b. Those adaptive to conditions in a process of change-----	34
c. Those scientifically assured and authoritatively evaluated as having the greatest social worth----	36
Some of the essential sociological concepts now needed-----	40
a. The mutability of human nature-----	40
b. The social construction of the individual-	42
c. The Solidarity of humanity-----	45
a. Developed by a common body of knowledge-----	47
b. Developed by a common ideal of mutual service-----	49
d. The ratio of influence of the different social factors-----	51
a. The physical factors-----	53
b. The psychical factors-----	56

How these concepts may be effectively diffused-----	56
a. By leaders-----	56
b. By socializing symbols-----	58
c. By an organized creative effort-----	58
d. By religion-----	59
e. By Education-----	60

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Introduction

Two things at present need to be done to increase the effectiveness of sociological thought. First, in order that sociological concepts may be of the greatest service as socializing and directing factors, there is need of a careful collaboration in the selection of the best sociological thought. There is also need for a wide diffusion of such selected sociological thought, until the greater part of the lump of society is leavened with it.

The need for

Selection is needed because of the great mass, the variety, and the unequal value of such concepts. While society remains broken up into conflicting camps, each organized about a pet platform of ideas, it presents the appearance of confusion and lacks direction. We need to be all going in the same general direction.

and that the best direction. That this may be the case, there must be essential and scientifically established concepts quite commonly held. Selection is needed also to weed out erroneous ideas and panaceas which lead groups off on fruitless tangents or into wasteful conflicts with one another. The dogmatism of the narrow mind plays havoc. It simplifies the world, then builds a philosophy on this simplified world, but when it comes to the application of this philosophy to actual facts and conditions, it fits only a part. (1) Yet because of the magnification of this partial fit, the philosophy is tenaciously held, hermetically sealed, and aggressively defended in combat with other like partial views. Though as long as the human mind remains finite there will be partial views, yet by the collaboration of many finite minds working inductively from a wide field of facts, erroneous views could be greatly eliminated and partial views fitted into a mosaic which would spell something with permanent meaning. It seems more imperative now than ever that this be done, with the

(1) Walter Lippmann: Drift and Mastery.

breaking up of "the cake of custom" (1), with the cutting loose from the old moorings, the reaching out in a thousand new directions for the best new course, and with many of the old concepts and many of the newer ideas unadapted to the changed conditions. "Civilized human beings cannot live together harmoniously without some mutually accepted scale of values by which they can measure and regulate conduct. They need not only the like-mindedness which springs from similar impulses, habits, emotions, and feelings, but also generally accepted ideas and ideals of life, if they are to achieve any social order worthy to be called civilized. A civilized social order must rest upon certain ideal values, which, at least in a democratic society, must be accepted by a large majority of the population. Now when we look out on Western Society we find absolute difference, if not hopeless conflict, between the fundamental beliefs and ideals of its members." (2)

The Need for

Diffusion

There is a need therefore, not only for the selection of the best sociological concepts, but the diffusion of these until they permeate the whole of twentieth

(1) Walter Bagehot: Physics and Politics.

(2) Charles A. Ellwood: The Social Problem.

century democracy. An agreement among sociologists as to what are the best corrective and directive social concepts will not alone suffice. These concepts must descend out of the academic atmosphere, through various layers of leadership, to the common soil, before the desired new life and growth can result. There seems to be a beginning of the recognition of this fact, or rather, after years of discussion and verification in the realm of the pure science of society, and the arrival at some commonly accepted fundamental concepts, there seems to be a turning with more confidence to the realm of applied sociology. As illustrations of this there is the statement of Professor Ellwood that "There is tremendous one-sidedness in many of the social programs of today; but all parties are practically agreed as to the need of influencing the opinions and beliefs of a considerable element of the population before desired social changes can be brought about," (1), and the statement of Professors Finney and Hayes: "But, social changes wait upon changes in the social mind. In fact, that is what they are. Blue prints of a better society are functionless so long as they exist only in the minds of social scientists.

(1) The Social Problem.

They must exist also in the minds of a large number of people. Only as ideas, ideals, and habits requisite to a different society are imparted to the members of the community, can a different society appear. To pour public opinion into the new moulds is quite as essential to telic social evolution, therefore, as to draft the blue prints. More concretely, our social problems can be solved only as the people are able to unite on scientific programs for their solution; and they can so unite only as they know what they are." (1)

Though of all scientists the sociologist should be among the first to desire a practical application of his ideas, yet if this view is too utilitarian for the pure scientist, there remains another reason for the diffusion of his ideas, and that is for the possible verification of their correctness, not so much an appeal to the popular judgment on his findings, as to witness the working of the principles arrived at, in order that he may make revisions in them where necessary:

There is need for the selection and diffusion of the essential sociological concepts now, in twentieth century democracy, because it is an opportune time for

(1) The Historical Outlook--December, 1922.

the effectiveness of concepts. When the grooves of social custom have been broken up by tremendous upheavals there is a period of hesitation, of thought, of the weighing of concepts, and of readjustments to the changed situation.

The Influence of
Concepts in Social
Advancement.

Thus far in the introductory statement we have been taking it for granted that concepts have an important role to play in social advancement. Before passing on to a more direct discussion of these sociological concepts it would therefore be logically in order to consult the evidence there is for the important influence of ideas in social advancement. There is evidence for this from social psychology, and evidence from history.

The Psychological
Evidence for This.

If we are to follow the latest and best psychological thought we can hardly go to the extent of Lester F. Ward, (1), in declaring the dual nature of mind, the dynamic side wherein all the nascent social forces are of the nature of impulse and

(1) The Psychic Factors in Civilization.

the cognitive side which is only directive. Yet Ward seems to have started a closer connection between psychology and sociology by making this theory one of his basic ideas, and to have been thinking in the same direction as modern social psychologists in regard to the relationship of the cognitive and conative phases of mentation(1) This is not to say that all modern psychologists have reached complete unanimity and a final grasp of the balance of psychical forces. For after translating their terminology into a common tongue and putting their definitions in parallel columns there is not complete agreement. But so far as showing the general function of ideas, concepts, and intellect, is concerned, they point very much in the same direction.

The service of ideas is seen all along the course of the impulsive flow of activity. This is because every thought tends to express itself in action, (2), and the continuous stream of impulse has its cognitive phase. (3), (4).

(1) Lester F. Ward: *The Psychic Factors in Civilization*.

(2) Wm. James: *Psychology*.

(3) Wm. McDougall: *An Introduction to Social Psychology*.

(4) Graham Wallas: *The Great Society*.

The Initiative

Function of

Concepts.

Concepts act first as initiators of instinctive and habitual actions. (1) Though among lower animals it commonly takes the presence of a particular kind of object to stimulate an instinct, among human beings ideas will start off a racing group of instincts and habits. But even among the more highly organized lower animals it is not the object in itself, but a certain kind of awareness of the object, more or less definite, a remote ancestor of a concept, which is the real stimulus. Granting this initiative function of concepts, a correlative function also would have to be granted, viz: that of the selection of lines of action, by serving as a stimulus to certain kinds of instinctive tendencies and by refraining to stimulate other kinds. This is not to say that stimulus or ideas precede impulse in the individual. In the individual, impulse is first, but it is set going, this way or that, by stimuli from the environment, which in the development of the human individual become more and more of the nature of concepts.

(1) Wm. McDougall: An Introduction to Social Psychology.

The Directive

Function of
Concepts.

This leads directly to a kindred function of concepts, that of directing or guiding impulse. An instinctive activity is not the same in its whole course each time it takes place. The affective phase of it is a constant, but otherwise it varies according to the character of the stimulus and the conditions under which it finds opportunity for expression. (1), (2). Therefore when concepts are concerned as a part at least of the stimulus, their character influences the direction taken by impulse. Consequently the impulse of the individual already given some direction by its hereditary structure, in the way of instincts (3), receives still more direction by the continual stimulus from a whole galaxy of concepts which come to it through the surrounding social atmosphere, until the habit of the individual conforms more and more to that of his social group. But these concepts are not merely directive. They are alive. They are of the nature of forces. (4). Their pedigree parallels that of im-

(1) John Dewey: Human Nature and Conduct.

(2) Wm. McDougall: An Introduction to Social Psychology.

(3) Leonard T. Hobhouse: Social Evolution and Political Theory.

(4) Charles A. Ellwood: Introduction to Social Psychology.

pulse. (1). They organize themselves into a mechanism which of itself has drive, (2). and into habits which are volitional, both means and ends (3). But to closely bind intellectual content with impulsive force, is not to say that this content does not have a directive function.

The Adaptive
Function of
Concepts.

Again, closely allied with this directive function of concepts is that of an adaptive or re-directive function.

This becomes operative when, after direction has resulted in habits, these habits prove to be inadequate to cope with an obstacle or a changed environment. Then the flow of impulse through habit is checked, its force accumulates, a new way out is demanded, the painful process of thinking, or "unrest," follows. The intellection, which results and the refreshing overflow of impulse, brings the individual mind to the fore. (4). It recollects, observes, criticises social habits, readily listens to new concepts,

- (1) Graham Wallas: The Great Society.
- (2) Robert S. Woodworth: Dynamic Psychology.
- (3) John Dewey: Human Nature and Conduct.
- (4) John Dewey: Human Nature and Conduct.

deliberates over these, and then hits on a new course thereby suggested, which is more adaptive, and impulse flows on more freely. With the recurrence of obstacles, changes in environment, and conflicts of social habits, appearing more and more frequently, this process of intellection becomes less and less intermittent. As it becomes the customary adaptive process, concepts have a more influential place. This reflective stage, wherein concepts function adaptively, though the most delicate, is also the most potent and promising for the progress of society, because it offers perennial refreshment, and prevents the necessity of the catastrophic breaking away from customs long after their adaptive value has passed. The free interchange of concepts by open discussion and improved means for wider communication, keeps the "cake of custom" broken up (1), (2), and stimulates the selection of the most adaptive concepts.

The three functions of concepts thus far mentioned, initiation, direction, and adaptation, comport with Baldwin's (3), three modes of collective life, the

(1) Walter Bagehot: Physics and Politics.

(2) Charles H. Cooley: Human Nature and the Social Order.

(3) J. Mark Baldwin: The Individual and Society.

instinctive, the plastic, (limited by custom), and the reflective, and the last of the three fits into Comte's, (1), positive stage, and into Ward's, (2), theory of a Sociocracy.

The Innovative
Function of
Concepts.

On the crest of these waves of intellection, when individuality in mind rises above and stands athwart the customs that would keep it imbedded in their current, there appear geniuses, to whom come conceptions which, on being voiced, articulate the general unrest, and offer a new way out, which is not a mere juggling of the older concepts for better adaptation. Not only are handicapping social habits discarded, but the nascent blind impulse is again clarified, (3), by concepts from a higher plain. The function of such concepts might be called that of innovation. When, in times of revolution, there do not appear such geniuses with concepts that renovate the old order by innovating a new one, the pull of the current of custom causes

(1) Auguste Comte: Positive Philosophy.

(2) Lester F. Ward: Psychic Factors in Civilization, and Pure Sociology.

(3) John Dewey: Human Nature and Conduct.

reaction and partial reversion.

Concepts as Finally, concepts furnish ends for
Ends of desire. To desire, is to desire some-
Desire. thing, and that something partakes of the
nature of the concept presented to the
mind. And where that concept is not too concrete, it
furnishes a perpetual end or ideal. Not only do con-
cepts furnish ends or aims or ideals, but they influ-
ence the final expression of these. The character of
the expression of impulse, as well as the direction of
its initiation, is conditioned by the nature of the en-
vironing atmosphere of concepts. (1).

Thus, throughout the whole course of actions that
have any social significance, concepts, or the intel-
lectual roots of concepts, have an important influence.
For twentieth century democracy this is especially true
of the adaptive function of concepts, because a contin-
uously changing world demands a continuous re-adaptation
to it.

The Evidence Turning from social psychology to
from History. history for evidence on the influence
of concepts in social advancement, one
finds an unlimited amount of data pointing in that

(1) Wm. McDougal: An Introduction to Social Psychology.

direction. It will suffice therefore to give a few illustrations indicative of such influence.

From General Movements. General historical movements have been organized about a group of concepts that have a re-directive influence, offering partial liberation from the established ways and freeing native forces for the refreshment, or the blighting, of the whole group.

World Religions. Among such general movements the great religions of the world are included. They have started with a few concepts organized in the minds of strongly individuated geniuses, and these concepts have been personalized in a way to raise their suggestiveness and assimilativeness to a high degree. Though such concepts very quickly become encrusted in the channels of tradition and custom, yet this very fact, together with the fact that such religious concepts have touched the deeper springs of action, give them tremendous historical significance.

The Renaissance. Again such a general movement as the Renaissance finds its roots in older concepts newly tapped and reorganized in a way to constitute a renewing force. Joined with one

group of concepts the result was a paganizing influence. Joined with another group of concepts the result was a protest, a revolt, and a reformation in the church itself. In both cases it resulted in the refreshing tide of humanism which began to break up the ice of scholasticism. Joined with still another group of concepts of a political nature the result was a democratizing influence which has proved to be of perennial adaptive value. To point out the influence of a group of concepts in such a movement as this is not saying that there were not many elements which found their focus in it, nor to deny the continuity of the main body of tradition and custom. And it should be taken into account that in this, as in similar general changes in history, there was considerable diffusion of the new concepts. The translation of the Bible into the vernacular, the production of some of the new literature in the vernacular and the preaching of the newer concepts in the vernacular by leaders, vested and unvested, who were of the common people or close to them, were some of the ways in which this diffusion took place.

The French

Revolution.

Then one must recognize the part which ideas played in the social and

political upheaval known as the French Revolution. The newer concepts contend with the older for mastery of the situation, then the newer contend among themselves. First one and then another is in the ascendancy. Here, there is a holding on to the traditional ways for aggrandizement or through blindness to the need for a change to meet changed conditions, there, there is a disagreement as to what is the most adaptive new way. As the different newer concepts become the organizing centers of separate conflicting groups, before they, themselves, become organized into one body of concepts so propagated as to articulate the whole general unrest, there is reaction. This reaction is not so much in the minds of those struggling for a new way out as it is the result of the advantage taken of the situation by reactionary forces. The newer concepts do not fade away but are only repressed in their expression. They accumulate force which periodically and more and more successfully in the revolutions of later years, lifts the lid by which they are being held down.

The Industrial
Revolution.

The industrial revolution, which is still having so much influence and producing so many problems in all strata of society and all phases of life, was a revolution re-

sulting from the appearance of new concepts. Though the industrial revolution is usually thought of in terms of steam, coal, iron, mechanical appliances, increased output and variety of commodities, etc., just as the French Revolution is thought of in terms of bloody conflicts, yet the transforming and re-directing agencies behind the scenes were concepts, so organized and combined in a way with discovery as to make possible the concrete changes.

Japan and China. Again in recent history the wonderful transformation that has been taking place in Japan and China is recognized as being due to the stimulus of western concepts and cultures, and the extent of this transformation has been measured by the extent of the diffusion of these concepts and their promulgation by native leaders.

Summary of Historical Movements. Thus, a view of the general movements and transformations revealed in history, indicates that they have been due in no small measure and quite directly to fresh concepts or new combinations of older concepts, either arising within the group itself in the minds of geniuses, or coming from without the group by contact with

a new culture of concepts. Whether it is the crossing of the cultures that developed in the fertile valleys of the ancient world, whether it is the new contact of western Europe with concepts from the East, or contact of the Orient with Occident, or of an island nation, like England, with the continent, the digging up of concepts from a long buried past, or the cosmopolitan flood of concepts coming from all directions because of multiplied means of communication, the effect has been the same. There has been a breaking away from the old ways, and a change toward new ways as a result of the initiative, directive, adaptive and innovative functioning of concepts, which operate both as means and ends.

Specific Concepts.

In addition to these illustrations of general movements in history, it would be well to call to mind also, in a more specific way, a few of the concepts and groups of concepts closely organized and highly generalized into ideals, which have acted as real forces in history.

The concept of empire or imperialism has from the dawn of history gripped the minds of the strongest leaders of men and have accepted, sometimes with a most bewitching effect, by the bulks of their group. Appearing in the ancient east it has taken its course

westward, at times taking specific forms, such as that of the Roman and Holy Roman Empire, again, being revived and grafted onto the concept of nationality. In the latter case the result has been the conflicting imperialistic ambitions of modern states which explains so much of modern history. The concept of freedom also has been one that has gripped the general mind, destroyed despotism, slavery, and serfdom, and is breaking up the older concepts of authority, privilege, and vested interests. Another group of related concepts, the struggle for existence, and the survival of the fittest, laissez faire, competition, etc., have constituted some of the main threads that have been effectively woven into our economic and political thinking. Closely akin to these, but perhaps more permeating and therefore unconsciously held, is the concept of private property. Such concepts and clusters of concepts as the mercantile theory of trade, the balance of power, state sovereignty, and the right of self determination of small nations have a great directive influence in shaping the policies of states. In American political history the concept of states rights, is an illustration to the same effect. There are a multitude of scientific concepts having varying degrees of influence. One of these, evolution, while acting as a red rag to the traditional mind, has had a clarifying, and sometimes a

materialistic effect, on the more open-minded. The concept scientific, itself, though, like the concept business, often conjured with, plays an important role in the popular mind. Of like effect on the general mind are such concepts as efficiency, preparedness, federation and service. Among these concepts, those which lie most nearly parallel to the instinctive trends that carry the momentum of long social habit, are the most easily induced and readily expressed. Also, no concept exists unto itself, but is always connected with others, and very quickly organizes many of them in a group under its leadership, so that really, in many cases, it is a composite group of concepts that does the work while one gets the glory, or all share the glory under a composite name.

The Whole

Trend of

History.

There is also another historical consideration from the standpoint of the whole trend of history and pre-history, that shows the increasing effectiveness of concepts along with the development of society. This may just be indicated by referring again to Baldwin's three stages or modes of collective life, the instinctive and gregarious, the spontaneous or plastic group controlled and limited by

custom, and the reflective or social group, and to Bagehot's(1) idea of the increasing role of discussion, or the free interchange of concepts, as a liberative and progressive process.

Conclusion of Therefore the whole course of history
Historical illustrates the transforming and
Evidence. directing power of concepts and ideals.

This is more especially true of recent times, when intellect has been allowed freer expression, and the means for spreading ideas have been so greatly improved, when we are becoming more aware of the fact that intellect is more valuable than custom as a guide to better adaptation, and when it is becoming more imperative that we use the best adaptive means possible to meet the more frequently shifting conditions of our environment.

Criteria for But, if concepts have such a vital
Selecting the place in twentieth century democracy,
Best and if there is need for a selection of
Sociological the best sociological concepts and their
Concepts. wide and thorough diffusion, it is important
 that we have the proper criteria for
the selection of these concepts.

(1) Walter Bagehot "Physics and Politics."

Corrective of
Present Unsocial
Concepts.

It would seem, in the first place that one basis for this selection would be that they should be such as would correct and counteract present unsocial concepts, not, however, in a way which would cause the firmer organization and intrenchment of these concepts for defence. These unsocial concepts can be indicated in groups and by their group names.

Such as
Individualism.

Under this category would come individualism. It is so prevalent, so much a part of the very social atmosphere we breathe that we have scarcely been conscious of it. It manifests itself in all phases of social life, the political, the economic, the ethical, etc.

In
Politics:

In political life it is represented by no particular form of government or lack of government, for it appears in forms, all the way from anarchy to absolutism. Individualism may consort with any theory of government, so long as it conceives of that sort of government as the best for carrying out its aim, which is the good of the separate individual units only. Non-interference of the government except for protection of private rights is the main plank

in its political platform. It is just the opposite of the idea of the individuals acting as the servants of the public weal, each in his place working for, and himself lost in, the common good. The very thought of interference could arise only as a reflection of individualism. The contract theory of the state, whether it be Hobbes' interpretation of it as a foundation of absolute monarchy, or Locke's interpretation of it as a foundation of constitutional monarchy, or Rousseau's interpretation of it on the basis of popular sovereignty, is an expression of individualism in political science.

In In economics it has resulted, in theory, Economics. in the laissez faire doctrine and an extreme view of the right of private property, and it has resulted practically, in the competitive system in modern industry and commerce, including also trusts and other combinations where these are formed with the intent of furthering private interests. When the common interest of defense is imperative, competition is given up by the majority for a time. But only in recent times have other common interests been sufficiently strong to cause this change. This is to be seen most markedly in the larger municipalities where the fabric of the social group is most closely knit, but even here individualistic

motive is still more predominant, the usual view of the function of representative in congress being that he is to do what will be for the benefit of his constituency regardless of the benefit to the country as a whole. In international affairs individualism is still more predominate.

In Ethics. In ethics and religion individualism has
and also been all too prevalent. The picture of
Religion. Pilgrim in Pilgrim's Progress, is still a
good picture of much of the religious
thinking. He leaves his own city and family, seeking
only his own soul's salvation, not much concerned about
getting back to drain the Slough of Despond. There is
enough native sympathy, however, to prevent a complete
going over to this extreme position and a vital religion
and ethic sets free and develops this. But there is much
struggling for a place, etc., which consorts with the
theoretical profession of even the most social ethic and
religion.

The individual cannot be eliminated, but
his aims and motives, should be more social. It is enough
if society's aim shall be that of the interests of socialized
individual.

And a False Closely connected with individualism
And Narrow is a false and narrow
Nationalism.

) nationalism. It is very much the same thing raised to a group basis. It is based on an extreme view of the absolute sovereignty of the state which has developed along with the development of monarchical

states and the theory of the divine
False View right of kings. Nationalism of the
Based on right sort need not do away with the
Unlimited idea of sovereignty as a legal concep-
Sovereignty. tion, and as having no legal limitations.

) But it is the removal of moral limitations which produces the false and narrow type of nationalism. Legally, the state may do anything it wishes with an individual member, but should have many recognized moral limitations. Legally, the state may do anything it wishes, and can, with another state. Germany or any other state claiming absolute sovereignty is under no legal obligations to regard the life, property, or morals, etc., of any neutral or non-neutral country. But it is a narrow view of nationalism which does away with the moral obligations and limitations of the state. It is a case of the need of improvement in international morals not that of destroying nationalism as such. As Herbert Spencer indicates in his "Data of Ethics," each nation has two inconsistent moral codes, one for internal use, another for external use. Though this has

always been true of group life, social advancement has resulted from a reform in this dual ethic and further advancement awaits a more complete reform. A false nationalism with its basis in an extreme view of absolute sovereignty has resulted in destructive international competition, an overbalanced militarism, and war, and has been propped up by a philosophy which claims Social Darwinism as its support. It is opposed to federation. Bernhardt said "to expand the idea of the state into that of humanity, and thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individuals, leads to error, since in a human race conceived as a whole, struggle, and by implication the most essential vital principle, would be ruled out. Any action in favor of collective humanity outside the limits of the State and nationality is impossible.----- There never have been, and never will be universal rights of men." (1) Even if the legitimacy of inter-group and international conflict in early history were recognized, yet the recognition of its legitimacy as the way for world development now, under conditions much different, would not necessarily follow. In

(1) Bernhardt: Germany and the Next War.

) political and social development, inter-group conflict has played a part, but so has federation. Both have their instinctive roots, but the conditions of twentieth century democracy demand a change in the expression of the former and a re-direction of its instinctive currents into a combat with the obstacles and problems of the physical and social environment, and a freer development of the latter until the political phase of world relationships more nearly approaches the stage reached by the commercial, scientific, and other phases.

) The Narrow

View of

) Nationalism.

Besides this erroneous view of nationalism there is a narrow view of nationalism entwined with it, but perhaps more prevalent. This manifests itself in the puerile assumption of itself and its ideals as superior, looking on foreigners as inferiors, barbarians, who can not completely attain unto its own state of development. Its citizens excell in bravery and intellectual capacity. Its highest duty is to survive, and it has the right as a superior, to trample over the destinies of its inferiors in order to make way for its own expansion.

Materialism. Another group of concepts that has tremendous social drive in "the Great Society" is that denoted by the term Materialism, in the usual, and not in the philosophical, sense of that word. Materialism is given such force partly because it has become so well organized throughout the whole of twentieth century democracy, partly because it stimulates some of the strongest instinctive roots in the race, and partly because of the impetus given to it by the industrial revolution and all that has gone with this revolution in the way of material improvements and mechanical inventions. Production and transportation have been so accelerated that motive and desire, in most every direction they turn, have become objectified or materialized. Everything has its price. Even in cases where motive is not materialized, the vision of the social mind is so blinded by materialistic standards that it cannot understand or scarcely believe that such is the case. There is scarcely anything in the whole range of social values but what can now be, and is weighed in a materialistic balance. The concreteness of the mind, of such great adaptive value throughout the long ages of the past and still so, has however recently become over stimulated and over fed, as material things have become successfully advertised

through every afferent avenue thereto. The result is a materialistically overbalanced society. Materialism is also one of the chief sources of nourishment for individualism, and visa versa, and the two working together multiply our social problems. It also is a great intensifier of a false nationalism and a creator of international difficulties. It not only permeates our motives, and our standards of value, but it is having a dehumanizing effect, especially on certain classes in the whirl of industry, so that one of the diseases fastening itself upon the whole social body is that which Walther Rathenau sees tightening its hold on Germany and to which he applies the term "mechanism".(1) The great wave of scientific discovery, scientific verification, scientific application and organization, together with some materialistic philosophy of wide credence which has followed in the wake of the scientific wave, has carried us far ahead on the materialistic side, so that the social and moral side is behind and out of harmony with our materialistic development. It is not so much the stopping of the wheels of industry therefore which is needed, as it is the acceleration of social

(1) "The New Society."

development. In other words what is needed is a new set of social concepts that will function in a way to give more adaptive expression to the social instincts until they develop and organize themselves as the directive forces in society. As long as we are social beings our wellbeing depends on the proper socialization of our environment, along with ourselves, instead of being materialized by it. There is hope for us along this line in the fact that we are less completely geared to our material environment than in the earlier centuries, that we now are able to a greater extent to consciously take the direction of our bark into our own hands with less dependence on the winds of circumstance and less fear of its storms, and that there is a great instinctive side of our nature (1) which already has had tremendous development in the primary groups of society (2) and only awaits a fuller development and a freer expression on a wider and higher plane.

Fatalism.

But this hope and this possibility still remains ungrasped by great numbers of the race, who feel that affairs are guided by cir-

(1) Kropotkin: Mutual Aid

(2) Charles H. Cooley: Social Organization.

cumstances almost wholly, or pre-determined by some sinister unseen, and capricious force. The group of concepts that thus is handicapping us might well be

Its Sources included in the term fatalism.

In. It is the great dark area of our social mind that has not yet been

thoroughly penetrated by science. This sort of thinking has become so deep rooted in the social mind by ages of superstition and ignorance that even the scientifically trained mind finds itself reverting to it at times.

Superstition Impressive displays of the forces
of the Social of nature, and catastrophes that
Mind. were not of man's bidding or under

his control have always overawed him and made him feel that his destiny was not in his own control. It is no wonder that great calamities like famine, or even a world war, still causes fatalism to vigorously appear. So many things happen to us that are undesired, death, suffering, and many other forms of ill adaptation to our environment, of which for so we have had but little control, that it

Environment is perfectly natural that fatalistic views of the destiny of the world and of the individual should be prevalent still. Though in many quarters the expression in a serious way of a belief in fate, luck,

or fortune, is inhibited by social environment of some enlightenment, yet there is a great undercurrent in this direction. It appears on the surface whenever there is the least substantiating evidence.

Religion This habitual bent of the social mind
and fed by deep rooted instinctive streams and
Instinct. substantiated by a strong instinctive
 structure, when nursed by certain religious
concepts, grows strong and assert itself. Fatalism may
be from the East but it is not all in the East. It has
even fastened itself upon the least fatalistic of all
religions, the one having the most hopeful social out-
look and which in its essential nature is best fitted to
stir the most effective social instincts. Given fear,
self-repression, and other instinctive roots, a strong
deterministic twist to the customary mind, and a stimulant
in certain eschatological religious concepts, there is a
tendency to resignation, a sickening toward fatalism, and
a deferring of hope to the cataclysmic ushering in of a
new age. Pre-millnarianism and the waiting for the
parousia instead of the working for it, is stagnating
the outlook and efforts of a great section of the Christian
Church, which is the very one through which a large part
of the needed social redemption should be coming.

And Also, a deterministic philosophy with a
Philosophy. materialistic range, quite prevalent in the
past generation, had made its contribution
to fatalism in certain types of mind. A determinism, however,
which takes into account the contribution of every element
from every phase of the cosmos, as seems to be a prevalent
conception of it, (1) is hardly determinism in the sense
we are speaking of it here. When out of modern deterministic
philosophy can come the statement that philosophy must "determine
the conditions under which the funded experience of the
past and the contriving intelligence which looks to the
future can effectually interact with each other" (2), we
can not call it fatalistic, even if we do not accept it
in its entirety. Fatalism draws its arguments from the
past which is fixed, and whose causal connections are
closely linked in continuous chains. But where it makes
its mistake and becomes a great hindrance to social progress,
is in its projection of this fixed and unalterable order of
things for the future.

Summary Individualism, a false and narrow
of Unsocial nationalism, materialism, and fatalism,
Concepts. represent only a few of the organized
groups of unsocial concepts, but the
mentioning of these will perhaps be sufficient to indicate

(1) John Dewey, "Human nature and conduct."

(2) " " "Reconstruction in Philosophy."

the general nature of the corrective concepts that should be selected to take their place. Like the host of a fungus, they penetrate and permeate the greater part of the social body. The corrective concepts must therefore have an equal diffusion if they are to be effective.

Concepts Should be

Adaptive to a

Changing

Environment.

Another criterium for the selection of the best sociological concepts should be that they be such as will have continuous adaptive value in conditions that are in a continuous process of change. There is a demand, to be sure, for concepts that have an immediate value for a passing phase of development or a peculiar situation in the environment, but the chief guiding concepts should be those that will maintain a degree of flexibility.

The Continuity

of History.

The continuity of history is due not only to the continuity of the same chief factors in the physical environment, and the continuous reproduction of similar biological and instinctive structures, but also to a considerable extent to the persistence of the concepts of social environment. They become firmly organized in the social mind and habituated in social action. The individuals of each succeeding generation,

following the bent of this social mind by which they are nurtured, form but living links in a continuous inflexible stream of thinking, unless there is some intellection on the part of a genius or near-genius, or such obstacles or changes in the environment as to force the intellect into re-adaptive thinking. It may be said that this persistence of concepts is due to the continuity of the biological and physical factors almost wholly and only in a very small measure to social suggestion, but the fact that concepts once well woven into the social mind continue a long time after changes in the environment have eliminated their usefulness, and result at times in action which runs counter to what would be that of a more direct instinctive action, shows that there is considerable persistence in the concepts aside from these other factors. The continuity of history and the persistence of concepts, though not an absolute law, is one to be taken into account in judging what concepts need to be injected into the social mind. They should be those which will decrease rather than increase the ossification of the social mind, and those that give flexible guidance to custom, so that the long continuance of unadaptive concepts and customs, and the social upheavals by which their termination is attempted, may be prevented, and a progressive possibility continuously present. This is especially needed in a democracy like that of the twentieth century,

which is not built on the rigid lines of an Eastern Monarchy, and it is, for the same reason, especially possible.

Concepts Should
Be Scientifically
and Authoritatively
Evoluted.

A more practical criterium
by which to judge the best sociol-
ogical concepts, and one giving
a concrete turn to the other
criteria mentioned, is, that these

concepts should be those which are scientifically assured and authoritatively evolved as having the greatest social worth. There are thousands of new concepts, and old ones exhumed, which are being promulgated as nostrums for the correction of existing social ills. With loud voice and glaring page they are thrust before us, while the concepts they would supersede are in like manner decried. Here and there groups of varying sizes are organized about, and led away by, these patent concepts. Though the major groups of society plod on in the customary ways, so far as their essential thinking is concerned, the very place on the unsettled fringe of society, where growth and progress have the freest opportunity, is where there is the most confusion. Even those groups which unite in combating some phase of the established order, disagree and separate in different directions when it

comes to the constructive part of their program. There should be a surer and more authoritative test for the concepts that are the best for guiding us together into a progressive future. There always will be differences of opinion in this matter, but there is too much difference and too many differences now. The trial and error method is too disastrous, inefficient, and unnecessary in our present stage of social development. Differentiation does seem to be a law of social development, but it is a specialization based on function and a co-ordination of functions for central purposes. Many of the divided groups that are clamoring for social control are either not functioning for the good of the whole, or, in their functioning, are conflicting rather than consciously co-operating with other groups. There must be, therefore, a more reliable verification of the concepts which should be the chief guiding forces in a co-operative system of functioning groups.

How Concepts

Should be
Selected.

A method for the selection of the most adaptive concepts should be substituted, which will eliminate much of the personal equation which causes the conflicting differences. The concepts must be scientifically selected. The inductive method of arriving at conclusions, and the using of a wide range of reliable data, will

necessitate the unified collaboration of many individuals, representing all the related phases of inquiry.

Who Should
Select Them.

To still further limit the personal equation, the collaborators should be as far as possible removed from bias, and from a priori hypotheses, except in so far as the efficiency of their research demands it. These qualities and those of capacity and training should have brought these collaborators to a position of some authority, so that a dependence could be put upon their conclusions, which would remove the necessity of the verification of these by everyone who accepted them. The best authorities, working together by the positive method, and on an extensive factual basis, would be able to furnish the most reliable composite judgment, on what would be the best guiding concepts in a developing democratic society. The state might provide the opportunity for such a scientific and authoritative collaboration, and has begun to make such provision so far as certain lines of inquiry are concerned. But partisan differences and a cherishing of the arbitrary basis of judgment have prevented governments from doing this in some of those spheres of researches which are the most vital for social well-being and progress. When the people of one of our commonwealths, forbid, by

legislative action, the promulgation of a theory which has been quite well established scientifically and authoritatively, (1), and when a like condition of the public mind is generally prevalent, the limits of governments along this line can be easily seen. As it is now, the great universities approach most nearly to the desired condition, though even here this arbitrariness and dogmatism of certain layers of the public mind seeks to project its influence. (2).

Conclusion on
Criteria for
Selecting Con-
cepts.

Some of the essential criteria, therefore, which should be the basis for the selection of those concepts which are to have the best socializing influence, would be that these should be such as are corrective of the unsocial concepts, adaptive to changing conditions, and such as have been scientifically assured by authoritative collaborators.

(1) Anti-Evolution Bill in Oklahoma.

(2) James Harvey Robinson: The Mind in the Making.

Essential

Sociological

Concepts that

Should be Made

Universal.

Having noted the place which concepts have in social changes, and the tests which should be met by those concepts which are to have an influential place in the re-direction which social progress demands, some of these essential concepts should be referred to. A complete list of these could not be considered here, nor is it hardly necessary to show in detail how the criteria for selection have been met. A few will suffice to show, in a more concrete way than the criteria would indicate, what is the nature of the concepts that should have a wider diffusion in twentieth century democracy.

The concepts that are most essential for the curing of social ills and of the most direct value in social guidance are concepts which specifically purport to be of a socializing nature, rather than concepts of a more indirect socializing influence, such as those of the objects and aspects of the physical world. Eliminating here these indirect concepts, we are left therefore to a consideration of sociological concepts, and to some of the more essential ones among these.

The Mutability

of Human Nature.

The concept of the mutability of human nature should not go unmentioned in such a list, for it is

pivotal in a consideration of the role of the other sociological concepts. Social education centers about a new concept of the self. (1). Schemes for social betterment have always run up against the very prevalent concept of the fixity of human nature. But it is not human nature that is fixed. It is social habit. And the fixity which human nature appears to have is in no small measure due to this fixity of social habit. (2). Impulse is plastic, but this plasticity has been used to shape human nature to static customs. The instincts have been enumerated and classified by different authorities, which has given the impression that they are quite specific. But, as previously stated, they vary with each circumstance under which they are stimulated and expressed. To say, for instance that war is the natural expression of the instinct of pugnacity, or that the prevailing economic regime is a result of the acquisitive instinct is only a partial statement of the case. For the instincts referred to may also quite naturally lead to other forms of expression according as they are directed by the directive influences. The instinct of pugnacity has the possibility of taking on the hue of

(1) A. J. Todd: Theories of Social Progress.

(2) John Dewey: Human Nature and Conduct.

a strong sense of justice, and of being expressed in an aggressive working for justice, of a "fighting not against principalities and powers but against spiritual wickedness." Instinctive expressions of impulse therefore, instead of being specific, are rather dispositions (1) or tendencies (2) to action of a certain character. A general diffusion of this scientifically and authoritatively established concept of the mutability of human nature, would help in the elimination of some of the blighting concepts of fatalism, and in the breaking down of some of the walls which are quite commonly thought to be established between nations and races.

The Social Construction of the Individual. Directly linked in logical connection with the concept of the plasticity of human nature, is the concept of the social construction of the individual. There are other elements entering in, but the individual per se is socially built. By

(1) Wallas: The Great Society.

(2) Dewey: Human Nature and Conduct.

The Self. contact with other persons, and this by way of comparisons rather than by contrast, the personal consciousness of self is induced. (1)). Though it may have its roots in a somatic sense resulting from the coordinated functioning of bodily organs, and be developed by the unifying influence of a constantly recurring similarity in the physical environment, and by the resulting unity of perceptual experiences and impulsive responses, together with the memory of these activities, yet, these are rather the framework upon which the individual is built. By imitating the movements of moving objects, the feel, and the volitional or causal sense of the activity, induces an individuating process which finally brings on self-consciousness. It is a sympathetic induction of the sense of self by the imitation of the action of other selves. As the individual develops to the place where articulated symbols convey concepts of actions, imitation of actions, changes into the carrying out of suggestions, and later into the weighing of these suggested concepts by a process of intellection until the supposed most adaptive one is selected and acted upon. This

(1) Todd: Theories of Social Progress.

hesitating period of intellection has a further individuating effect. This is the process of the "dialectic of self" (1), and these are ways in which self-conscious individuality is induced.

The Concepts

and Action of

The Self.

But not only is the self thus socially constructed, but its habits of thought and action are in like manner socially begotten, so that the individual soon assimilates the ways of his social environment and becomes another link in the trend of custom, but not entirely so, intellectual activity may cause him to deviate in his course somewhat. But even this play of intellect is largely a simultaneous bringing up into consciousness, of the socially induced concepts of ways of acting, that they may be compared for selection, or a recombination of them formed to fit the needs of the circumstance which has arisen. The character of his action and mental outlook as well as his sense of self, therefore, is fashioned out of his social environment and by it. Whether we, with Baldwin, consider the individual and society as two foci of one social cosmos, or with Cooley, consider

(1) Baldwin: The Individual and Society.

them as two inseparable phases of the same whole, so far as social habits and the sense of self is concerned, they are injected by society into the individual.

It becomes very important for social progress then, what is to be the nature of that part of the social environment which comes into the most influential contact with the individual, whether it is to be the most select, essential, or adaptive, and whether it is going to have sufficient range to stimulate a continuous re-directive intellection. It may be said that the very fact that the individual is socially constructed argues for a persistence of custom and a continuity of history which fortifies the retention of existing unsocial concepts and ways of action. But this is assuming that society is to make no conscious selection of what the individual is to be nourished on, and that the individual is to make no intellectual readjustment, which in the case of intellectual and influential geniuses may amount to considerable. The concept of the mutability of human nature and that of the social construction of the individual, reinforce each other for the effective counteracting of many unsocial concepts, and give hope to both social continuity and social progress.

The Solidarity
of Humanity.

Logically linked with the two
concepts already mentioned is the

sociological concept of the solidarity of humanity. It carries great promise for the replacing of destructive conflict with constructive co-operation. When it becomes thoroughly worked into the social mind. In speaking of the concepts, liberty, equality, and progress as having a tremendous moulding and directing effect on the national mind, Wm. McDougal also introduces this new one which is arising on the scene, by saying, "more recently still, and perhaps equally important, is the idea of the solidarity of the human race and the responsibility of each nation towards the rest, especially toward the weaker and more backward peoples. We no longer cheerfully and openly exterminate an inferior people; and when we do so, it is with some expressions of regret and even of indignation."

"But the moral idea is still in process of finding acceptance and illustrates well that process. It has been taught by a few superior minds and none dares openly repudiate it;" (1) The solidarity of humanity is psychical in nature. Though the basis of this racial unity is physical, the process by which it is attained is made up of psychical elements. It roots in the instinct of gregariousness which, in its more simple forms of expression, is largely biological in function, aiding in defense, in

(1) Wm. McDougal: The Group Mind.

the getting of food, and in widening the selective possibilities, but which does bring individuals together, and thus lays the basis for both social and individual development. (1) With the development of society, solidarity takes on more and more of a psychical nature and function. During the stage when custom reigns social solidarity is crystalline and inevitable within each group. With the increasing functional differentiation of society, it becomes more and more essential to the well-being and even the very existence of each functional group. In the later stages of social development when reflection and the exchange of ideas are taking the place of custom, it loses some of its crystalline and inevitable nature and becomes consciously desired and worked for. The solidarity of humanity begins then to have even some of that emotional flavor that existed within the smaller groups, and expressed in similar terms, as brotherhood, fraternity, etc. but with a richer meaning.

<u>Solidarity</u>	With concepts having the influence
<u>Developed by</u>	that has already been indicated, a common
<u>A Common</u>	body of essential knowledge, such as
<u>Body of Knowledge.</u>	H. G. Wells calls "The Bible of
	Civilization," would furnish the back-
	bone of the solidarity of humanity. With the old bases of
	authority crumbling and man wandering hither and yon, the

(1) W. Trotter. Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.

new unifying basis and guiding authority should be a common knowledge of the leading facts of life and nature. (1)

To just say that a common body of concepts would have a great unifying effect expresses only a static conception of its function. This body of knowledge should also be conceived of as having a directive effect also. "Common feelings, ideas, beliefs and valuations, in other words, must develop as controls of the common activities of the group.----- In modern nations, for example, unity of action and of life is secured largely through certain political ideas and beliefs shared by most of the people, and through certain sentiments, like patriotism and national loyalty. The unity, even of such small and relatively instinctive groups as the family, will be found in human society, if carefully examined, to depend largely upon certain feelings, standards and ideas accepted not only by the members of that special group, but also, perhaps, by the social life in general by which it is surrounded. ----- Especially must be mentioned, among the co-ordinating ideas, the ideas and ideals we call "moral."

(2) The term solidarity is almost too rigid. Community, though not a good substitute would add a needed sense of fluidity, yet even this does not express the sense of direction or dynamic. The energies of men conceptually united would not only have direction and guidance toward

(1) Walter Lippmann: Drift and Mastery.

(2) Charles Ellwood: Introduction to social Psychology: ps. 85-87.

common ends but this uniting of energies would result in a greater algebraic sum of energy driving in the same direction, which would result in the acceleration of development.

Developed by

The Ideal of

Mutual Service.

But a body of knowledge, however,

select and essential it might be,

would not alone produce a social

solidarity of humanity that is

dynamic. The knowledge must be kindled into attractiveness by sentiment and organized with the vital streams of social life. As substantiation of this, we quote again from McDougall a statement which comes out of his theory of the sentiments. In speaking of the idea of nation, he says, "we have seen that the idea alone as an intellectual apprehension cannot exert any large influence; that it determines judgment and action only in virtue of the sentiment which grows up about this object -- a sentiment which is transmitted and fostered from generation to generation, just because it renders the nation an object of value. The consideration should be obvious enough; but it has commonly been ignored by philosophers of the intellectualist school. They treat the individual mind as a system of ideas, they ignore the fact that it has a conative side which has its own organization;

partially distinct from, though not independent of, the intellectual side; and consequently they ignore equally the fact that the national mind has its con-
ative organization." (1) A solidarity of humanity, there-
fore, in order to have cohesiveness, must be developed by affective and instinctive factors along with the intellectual. Comte saw, in his later years, the ne-
cessity of using the instinctive and affective side as well as the intellectual side of human nature, if ideas were to function as progressive factors, and therefore capped his positive philosophy with a religion of hu-
manity in which the ideal was service. The ideal of mutual service will make the solidarity of humanity dynamic. It has sufficient instinctive and affective roots, in the gregarious and parental instincts, and in sympathy, to give it foundation, and has been suf-
ficiently developed in the organic superstructure of different primary groups, to prove its possibilities for a much wider unifying function. The developing of an "efficient imagination" would help to extend the bounds of its operation. And here is where a common body of universal knowledge would join forces with the ideal of mutual service in the development of a liv-
ing solidarity of humanity, especially when an essential part of that body of knowledge itself is the very con-
cepts of mutual service, and social solidarity.

(1) Wm. McDougal: The Group Mind, page 234.

Summary on

the Solidarity
of Humanity.

Todd makes a summarizing statement which almost fits the case in point here, and which at least meets the test of being authoritative, when he says, "What is 'the truth' (Ward) that generalized and spread throughout a population (Buckle and Ward) will make it free, will express the highest measure of human freedom (Hegel)? The truth that we are all one and that it is our business to serve (Comte)."

The Ratio of

Influence of

the Different

Social Factors.

In order to build better for the future, it is essential that we have somewhere near the proper conception of what the ratio of influence of the different social factors is. A conception of this ratio is only now in the process of being arrived at. A comparison of findings, and a mutual criticism of theories among sociologists, is revealing the fact that, though there has been over-emphasis placed on the role of different factors, there has been an unconscious collaboration which is revealing the relative importance of the different factors.

Geographical

Influences.

One school has emphasized the geographical factor and has been able

to collect an immense amount of data which show the tremendous influence of the various features of the physical environment. But when the findings in regard to other factors are compared with these, it develops that with the social advancement of the race there has gone a weaning away from this direct nurture by the physical environment. In stead of being unconsciously and passively moulded by our physical surroundings we are consciously taking nature into our own hands, refashioning it and making its forces work for us. With the decrease in the direct influence of the physical environment there has also been an increase in the moulding influence of the social environment so that the ratio has changed considerably.

Biographical
Factor.

Though we continue to be on the basis of a biological organization which is a part of the physical world, and which has been quite directly connected with the physical environment, the psychical factors are here also increasing their control and breaking this almost complete connection which formerly existed. Many of our social problems however, root in the biological factor and its maladjustment with its physical surroundings. Problems of race, sex, food, health, protection and

various demands for physical comforts, protrude continually for consideration. But many of the problems arising are caused by social maladjustments and await a solution that is dependent on social changes. Therefore, though the biological, as the geographical, will always remain an important factor, it also, in an efficiently constructive society that is controlling its own course, need only remain as a great basic factor.

Impulse.

Among the psychic factors impulse, with its energies derived from the basic factors, functions in social activities as the great dynamic agent. It is a persistent tendency to act. But it is blind. It therefore needs guidance if it is going to work for the good of the individual and society.

Instinct.

A beginning of guidance is given for it in the hereditary structure, which causes it to have a tendency to act in a certain way under a certain stimulus, and a way which on the whole has proven to have adaptive value.

Habit.

But the hereditary structure does not furnish tendencies that are sufficiently adaptive for the more complex organisms, under all the

circumstances with which they meet. These instinctive tendencies therefore need to be guided by experience, the experience of the past, whose findings, correct or incorrect, are embodied in social traditions and customs, and the experience of the individual himself. These two sources unite in producing more explicit ways of action, or habits. To the innate, is added an acquired tendency. A similar physical environment and a common body of traditions and customs, produces a similarity of habits, which all the more firmly re-in-trench social custom, so that almost a closed system is effected.

Emotion. This would be the case almost entirely were it not for the influence of other factors, the emotional and intellectual, as well as for the possibility of coming in contact with the customs and traditions of other groups. Emotion either re-inforces or inhibits the instinctive and habitual, and it tends to raise the individual out of the meshes of his social milieu. It is the consciousness produced in the individual, of an instinctive tendency, when this instinctive tendency is under stimulation, and this consciousness influences the resultant action. Emotion plays, therefore, considerable

part in those group actions where instinctive tendencies have a minimum of guidance by the intellectual factor.

Intellect.

And, because the intellect is still more of an individual affair, it is less concerned in group action, than it is in group deliberation and discussion, or in individual reflection. Tracing the psychical factors thus in the order of increasing individuation, we come to that one which has the greatest possibilities for refreshing the more customary ways, and re-directing the more nascent energies that lie back of custom. The intellectual therefore is the most hopeful factor, if it is not the most sure. It needs the aid of a body of essential knowledge to insure its reliability as an adaptive and progressive agency.

Summary of

This is but a mere outline of Social Factors. the respective roles played by the leading social factors, but it will show in a general way what is coming to be the conception of their relative influence, the physical factors being basic, impulse being dynamic, with instinctive and habitual tendencies, and emotion and intellect

acting as individuating and guiding influences, intellect being the most hopeful factor when properly cooperating with the other factors and when properly furnished with fundamental concepts.

Conclusion We could discuss here only a few of the essential sociological concepts which should be made universal in our twentieth century democracy, but they illustrate the centrally important place which such concepts hold in the whole question of social well-being and progress.

Means of Diffusion. But, as said in the beginning the mere selection of essential concepts, however vital they may be, will not produce the desired results until there has been a general diffusion of these concepts and a vital organization of them into the acting social mind.

Leaders. One means of this organic diffusion is that of leadership. These concepts cannot be made effective without leaders. And not just leaders either, for there are leaders now. But they must be trained, all in the same essentials, so that

the combined leadership will result in a movement in the same direction. They must not only know the essentials, but be gripped by them, on fire with them, in a way that will kindle others. This makes mere concepts contagious and alluring. Leaders must be wise and tactful, that they may not antagonize and thereby reinforce the very condition they seek to remedy. They must be close to the group they are to lead, that there may be action and reaction between the two. If possible they should be felt to be of the group, of the same kith and kin, though not of the group in level of ideas; native leaders, but trained by contact with outside influences. But right here is one of the most difficult and often the most disastrous parts of the matter of leadership. Either the leader remains so much a part of the group that he does not get them anywhere, or his plain of thinking is so different from that of the main body of the group, that they will not follow. It is a delicate adjustment, and it is a happy circumstance when it happens to be hit upon. So much of the training received by well trained leaders is of an academic nature, that the voltage is too high for use in most groups. This necessitates either a gradation of leadership, or an ability on the part of the leader to adapt his thinking to his group. Never-

theless he must be a little way ahead of his following. Leadership furnishes that necessary personalizing of ideals which makes them most highly suggestive and furnishes a chance for imitation to lead to betterment.

Symbols. Another means for making concepts effective, is that of symbols of those concepts, charged with assimilativeness. These may operate in the absence of a leader, or they can be effectively used by a leader. In fact the leader himself should symbolize by his every expression the transforming ideas which he seeks to impress. Sentiments become organized about symbols, the flag, images, any representation in a concrete form of the concept to be conveyed. A slogan or catchy phrase, in the absence of concrete symbols, helps to make a concept vivid. Analogies or illustrations bridging from the familiar to the less familiar, according to the law of apperception, ever in the direction of the desired ideal, are at times even more effective than the concrete symbol.

Organized But the desired end is not
Creative Effort. reached merely by the pull of leaders and symbols. There must finally

come an organized, united, creative effort on the part of the group itself. And the wider the scope of this collaboration the greater the results. It should result in an art of government that is based on the science of society. Freedom of discussion and criticism of existing institutions should be allowed, to break up those whose adaptiveness has ceased, and a constructive effort at the same time put forth, to meet the newly arising conditions with mastery. The creative organized effort which is to result in progress requires an immense collaboration. But the choice is between drift, and a cooperative mastery.

Religion.

Whether we consider religion from the standpoint of its function of giving a supra-rational sanction for socially valuable action, or as a stimulant to the socially most valuable instincts, or as a living body of guiding concepts, or as some greatly cherished social customs, it has sufficiently proven its effectiveness in society, and is to be utilized as a most potent means for making essential social concepts a living part of society. But free discussion and healthy, constructive criticism must be allowed to invade this sphere of life, to break up its dogmatism and its encrusted conservatism, before the wells of living refreshment which it taps can flow forth for the greatest benefit.

to all.

Education.

The word education can be used to summarize the whole process by which the selected ideas and ways of one generation are built into the succeeding generation. But more specifically it is the bringing of this guidance to a focus on the individual in his most plastic years, by the most successful means and methods known. It is not exclusively an intellectualistic process, but also a widening of the range of intercourse, and a sublimating of instinctive tendencies in the presence of the best. It is a process of social selection, by the bringing to bear on the new generation the influence of only that which all previous generations have found to be of greatest social worth. It is also a process of social reproduction. It is society continuing itself, but bettering itself. This being the case, those essential sociological concepts that should be made universal in our twentieth century democracy should find a central place in the process.