

A COMPARISON OF THE NICARAGUAN AND AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS

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
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A THESIS

Presented to the Department of History
and the Honors College of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment the requirements
for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts

June 1990

APPROVED:

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/ Dr. Matthew Dennis

An Abstract of the Thesis of
Peter C. Messer for the Degree of Bachelor of
Arts
for the Department of History to be taken June
1990
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REVOLUTIONS

In both the American and Nicaraguan Revolutions the armed forces appear to have served a dual purpose: to engage in armed struggle against the enemy and to socialize its members into the ideology of the revolution's leaders. However, the two revolutions had drastically different experiences once they established their respective governments. In the years after the Nicaraguan Revolution the country became embroiled in a devastating civil war, while the United States managed to escape such drastic conflict. Was the Continental Army because of its size and permanence a more effective socializing mechanism than the guerrilla force employed by the Sandinistas? In order to answer this question this paper examines three areas: how the Continental Army served as a more effective socializing mechanism than its irregular counterpart, the militia, the roots of the conflict between Nicaragua's Atlantic and Pacific Coasts and the similarities and differences between the two situations. The

comparison was somewhat superficial because of the nature of the material available on the two revolutions. The effect service in the Continental Army had on its members can be seen in numerous diaries and memoirs written by people who served in the Army. Unfortunately, this depth of first hand accounts does not exist for the Nicaraguan example. Consequently, the comparison can only be speculative in nature. In the end, it appears as if the two situations have as many dissimilar features as similar features. Hence, it is not clear that the presence of a standing army, similar to the Continental Army, during the Nicaraguan Revolution would have contributed significantly to easing the tensions that emerged after the war against Somoza. What does emerge from the comparison is the need for an effective mechanism to bring people into the revolution's dominant ideology in order to ensure a stable post-revolutionary society.

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AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

American Revolution

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1776 the United States became the first nation to successfully sever its ties with a mother country and establish a new nation. In large part, the success of this revolution depended on persuading the people of the thirteen colonies that Great Britain's colonial policies constituted a severe threat to their individual liberties. Two hundred years later, a group of revolutionaries in Nicaragua ousted the existing regime and replaced it with a new government that fundamentally altered the lives of the Nicaraguan people. However, the new Nicaraguan government soon discovered that the changes it had brought about did not have the support of the entire nation, and, as a result, civil war erupted. Both of these cases serve to highlight the importance of persuasion to a revolutionary movement. Revolutionary leaders must challenge existing chains of allegiances and create a new system of identities and structures. If the leaders of a revolution do not effectively create sympathy for their cause amongst the people they will often face great difficulty in establishing their regimes.

In the case of the American Revolution and the United States, we find one organization in particular that brought

people together and nurtured a sense of national identity and, in the process, communicated the ideas of the revolution's leaders to its members and, to a lesser extent, the people at large. That organization was the Continental Army. By placing people from various states in contact with each other, and by using symbols, rhetoric and rituals stressing national identity, the Army developed among its members a sense of national purpose crucial to the future of republicanism.¹ The Nicaraguan Revolution also used military institutions to persuade and to integrate people into the ideology and structure of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional²; however, these organizations excluded some members of the future Nicaraguan state. Specifically neglected were the people living along Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. This omission had a consequence: conflict between the new government and the people of the Atlantic Coast. And this intense struggle eventually created an opportunity for the United States to initiate a war against the Sandinista regime.

According to James Kirby Martin & Edward Lender the Continental Army created a sense of nationalism among its members that provided the framework for the eventual rise of the Constitution. This paper explores the various ways in which the Continental Army would have spread these values, illustrating how revolutionary leaders communicated their ideas to common people. In the case of Nicaragua, I hope to analyze how and why the exclusion of the people of the

Atlantic Coast from the Sandinista revolution preempted the FSLN's ability to incorporate them into the new government in other ways. Both the American rebels and the Sandinistas attempted to build a nation based on a set of relatively new ideas. They both charged the existing government with exploitation and promised a new government in which equality would replace existing inequalities. Each group elevated a prominent figure as a symbol of the new nation (George Washington and Augusto Sandino) and relied on a sense of martial pride to develop solidarity and unity of purpose. Unfortunately for the Sandinistas, they did not take into account the historical differences between the two regions of their country (Atlantic and Pacific); subsequently, when they brought their revolutionary ideology to the people of the East Coast they met with hostility. Without a mechanism to make their revolutionary ideas relevant and vital in this region, the Sandinistas faced the impossible task of trying to sell a revolution to people who did not want to buy one. Though substantial progress has been made since the early years, the Sandinistas are still attempting to win the people of the Atlantic Coast over to their revolutionary ideology.

The American Revolution managed, generally, to avoid, or at least postpone the sort of sectional conflict that racked Nicaragua. The different economic, social and ethnic histories of the East and West Coasts of Nicaragua make applying the American model problematic. Even if the

Sandinistas had included more people from the Atlantic Coast in the fight against Somoza the presence of a meddling power such as the United States and the historical differences between the two cultures could have allowed resentment to boil over anyway. However, United States faced similar problems early in its existence. Great Britain kept troops in Canada and occupied forts in the Old Northwest and from this position England could try to force the government into submission. Similarly, the advantages of the English mercantile system, especially the loss of naval protection, and the return of New Orleans to the French left many Americans without a safe and effective way to transport goods. Some genuinely feared that Americans might attempt to return to the colonial orbit of some major power, England, France or Spain. Given this experience, we can at least wonder if the Sandinistas' decision to fight their guerilla war primarily on the West Coast, and the consequent exclusion of the people of the Atlantic Coast from the army, played a decisive role in future events.

CHAPTER II

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

To many eighteenth-century Americans, nothing embodied a greater threat to individual liberty than a standing army. At the beginning of the war, the Continental Congress hoped that the various state militia, consisting of citizen soldiers, could adequately defend the new nation against the British. Unfortunately for these idealists, reality quickly demonstrated the need for a standing army, and in 1775 the Congress created the Continental Army. Despite the fears of many of the members of the Continental Congress, the newly formed army did not lead down the road to inevitable tyranny. In fact, by effecting the emergence of a stable national government capable of promoting and protecting republicanism within the United States the Continental Army played a more important role in creating support for a new republican nation than the militia.

Service in the Continental Army and the militia differed significantly in their personnel and their approach to the war. Since the Continental Army involved a full time commitment and put people from a diverse array of states in day to day contact with each other, it facilitated the emergence of a national identity. On the other hand, militia

service only required part time service and rarely required soldiers to leave their state; consequently, militia service did not provide the type of experience conducive to the formation of a national identity. These differences become even more pronounced if we examine the organizational structure of the two units. The hierarchical nature of the Army helped speed the transfer of views from the leaders to the troops, while greater sense of equality among the militia made its members less likely to be influenced by the rhetoric of their leaders.

Perhaps the most notable difference between the militia and the Continental Army involved the amount of time spent in service. The fragmented nature of militia service comes across nicely in an account written by James Stevens, a Massachusetts militiaman who participated in the siege of Boston. Stevens spent much of his time returning to his work in Andover, Massachusetts, and not in the trenches around Boston.³ Sergeant William Young's account of the Philadelphia militia's service with George Washington during the winter of 1776 illustrates the affect such sporadic service had on the formation of a national identity. Many of the soldiers in Young's militia unit seemed more anxious to go home than to remain and fight the British.⁴ Such an attitude reflected a concern more related to individual needs than to the greater interests of the country. While such an attitude is not surprising, it suggests that the short term of militia service

encouraged a regional outlook rather than cultivating a national identity.

The desire to return to one's home, farm or place of business also suggests that militia members did not react to patriotic rhetoric in the same way as the Continentals. Militiamen often ignored those who requested or commanded them to remain in the field.⁵ Under such circumstances, deliberate efforts to promote a sense of national identity among troops which relied on invoking the superior authority of officers, would not have the same force as similar efforts in the Continental Army.

Compounding this natural tendency to focus only on local goals, i.e. the desire only to finish the campaign, was the lack of information available to militia members when not in the service. While newspapers undoubtedly did their best to circulate news of the war to as many people as possible, these mechanisms could not spread such information to everyone. Though it is difficult to judge the amount of information available to people not in the service, from the accounts given it seems likely that news circulation was limited. In the diary of Amos Farnsworth of Groton, Massachusetts, covering his activities from April of 1775 until 1779, we find no references to important military events that occurred outside of New England. Farnsworth neglected to mention the end of the siege of Boston⁶ or the campaigns in June, 1778.⁷ John Goodwin's account of his service in a campaign in Rhode

Island reveals a similar pattern. Goodwin's account contained no reference to the rest of the Army, nor any sense of how the war as a whole had progressed to the point when his militia unit was called up.⁸ Goodwin's lack of knowledge concerning the war as a whole implies either a less than perfect information system or lack of interest.⁹ The recollections of Continental soldiers while on leave highlight the difficulty in keeping informed on the war effort. For the most part, soldiers did not record information about the rest of the war while at home,¹⁰ indicating that news of the Army did not spread throughout the colonies. The relative isolation implied by these accounts typified life in Colonial America. For the most part, newspapers of the Revolutionary period generally contained little valuable information,¹¹ and difficulties inherent in travel between colonies made it difficult to obtain accurate and timely information concerning events in distant places.¹²

Without news of the entire war the attention of the people remained focused on their local situation. While devotion to immediate affairs was necessary, it also contributed to a view of the war that down played the struggle's significance to communities not directly involved in the conflict. Such an attitude would not result in the development of a national identity but only reinforce views of identity based on states and localities.

But why was the militia so distracted by local events and

so apparently unwilling to adopt a national perspective? Much of the answer resides in the people who made up the militia. For the most part, the militia consisted primarily of land owners and artisans. In Sergeant Young's account of his service in the militia, he noted that most of the men in his unit were anxious to return to their shops,¹³ implying that the unit consisted of shopkeepers and other artisans. Similarly, the notes from the Committee of Safety of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, referred to the difficulties in getting the militia to turn out, because people did not want to leave their farms.¹⁴ The same pattern emerged in the North Carolina militia, who, according to Isaac Shelby's account of the battle of King's Mountain, consisted primarily of local farmers and merchants.¹⁵ Property owners, not surprisingly, tended to focus on preserving and protecting their property. Such an attitude would, naturally, require them to think in terms of local events and worry less about occurrences in far away places. This attitude would account for the eagerness of Sergeant Young's men to return to Philadelphia and for the difficulties encountered by the Bucks County Committee on Safety in recruiting militia members.

Isaac Shelby's account of the battle of King's Mountain reveals the effect property ownership had on militia members. Shelby noted that members of the Virginia militia hesitated to come to the aid of the North Carolina militia because they feared loss of their farms.¹⁶ Especially revealing is that

Shelby expressed no displeasure with the Virginians even though the enemy threat was substantially greater in North Carolina than in Virginia. The acceptance of such non-cooperation as a legitimate practice indicates that the value placed on the right to protect individual property outweighed any interest in the good of the nation or the surrounding states.

That the hesitation on the part of the Virginia militia to come to the aid of the militia in North Carolina provoked no anger from Shelby indicates that people perceived the militia as having, primarily, local obligations. If militia leaders possessed this attitude, as Shelby and other officers of the North Carolina and Virginia militia apparently did, no conscious effort would have been made to use the militia as a tool for developing a national identity. Without such a conscious effort, the general tendency of the militia to perpetuate, or even promote, a parochial viewpoint would have been unchecked, making the militia a bastion of the state centered mentality.

On the other hand, the soldiers in the Continental Army seemed to develop a sense of identity that transcended state and local boundaries. An important factor in the development of this mentality was the manner in which the Army isolated its members from their communities. Unlike the militia, the Continental Army required a long term commitment from its members, effectively removing them from their homes, families,

and places of business. Of course, in many cases the Continental soldiers were already isolated. Unlike their counterparts in the militia, members of the Continental Army generally did not own property. The enlistees were drawn from the poorest sections of colonial society and even included a substantial number of indentured servants and freed slaves.¹⁷ Having few or no ties to the community, members of the Continental Army perceived themselves less as protectors of a particular community and more as a servant of the entire nation. Joseph Plum Martin, a private soldier in Washington's Army, indicates the different attitudes possessed by militia members and members of the Continental Army when he noted:

They [the militia] would not have endured the sufferings the army did; they would have considered themselves free citizens, not bounded by any chords that were not of their own manufacturing and when the hardships of fatigue, starvation, cold and nakedness... began to seize them in such an awful array as they did on us, they would have instantly quitted the service in disgust.¹⁸

Apparently, the members of the Continental Army possessed an attitude that allowed them to persevere in situations which members of the militia would have found intolerable and would have left rather than endure. While large numbers of the Continental Army did leave,¹⁹ enough of them stayed to keep an army in the field for the entire war. That these people remained, despite the conditions described by Martin, implies the formation of a nationalistic mentality, one focused on the nation rather than on their own localities. If Martin is to be believed, by the end of the war the soldiers of the

Continental Army saw themselves as essential to the maintenance and preservation of the nation, protecting the rights and liberties of those who had remained at home:

These men [soldiers in the Continental Army] who they wish to die on a dung hill, men who if they had not ventured their lives... for their country to gain and maintain that Independence and Liberty that in the sunny beams of which they, like reptiles, are basking they would... be this moment in as much need of help and succor as ever the most indigent soldier before he experienced his countries benefices.²⁰

However, the question remains as to how and why the Continental Army developed this sense of nationalism in its members?

Given that the army as a whole faced many of the same problems and lived within the same general rules, inevitably service would affect the officers and the men in a similar manner. As Martin recalled, life in the Continental Army frequently meant inadequate supplies in almost every area of daily existence. While Congress was supposed to supply the troops, it could only rely on the states to give it the supplies required by the Army. A letter written by a Deputy Assistant in the Quartermasters Corps reveals that state refusal to supply the Army seemed to lie at the root of the supply problem:

Goods of all kinds very scarce and high; occasioned by and Embargo being laid on every article of Goods in the State of Massachusetts and in Pennsylvania the Committee stopping it. What the rulers of these two states mean I cannot conceive as they know we are blocked up and have no chance of getting anything but from them.²¹

Faced with starvation, such behavior from states would cause resentment on the part of the Army toward the localities that refused to provide supplies. An incident noted by Lieutenant Erkuries Beatty, while returning from General Sullivan's campaign against the Indians in 1779, illustrates the hostility soldiers felt toward people who mistreated the Army:

mistreated the Army:
an officer from each regiment was ordered to attend at head Qrs...concerning the high prices of Articles...[where] they came to this resolution that they would not purchase of any tavern keeper any liquor or provision while on the march to Head Quarters...I was very much pleased to see the resolution of the officers so strictly adhered to, as I did not see a single soul enter a tavern....²²

Identification of the states as the source of the supply problem reinforced the Army's sense of separation from any given locality and stressed its national nature. The hostility expressed by officers and men supports this idea: tensions arose because the soldiers assumed that states had a responsibility toward the larger nation, and that the Continental Army represented that nation.

The Army's chronic supply shortages also helped create a national identity by increasing the sense solidarity among the soldiers. During the expedition against Charleston, South Carolina, toward the end of the war the troops were faced with their usual shortages of food and clothing. Under such conditions, a feeling of unity and respect seemed to spread throughout the Army. The conduct of certain parts of the Continental Army seemed to offer encouragement to other units

equally strapped for supplies. Apparently the Maryland Line served as a particularly good example, William Seymour of the Pennsylvania Line remarked that "the manly fortitude of the Maryland Line was very great,"²³ allowing them to function effectively despite lack of food and clothing. The example set by the Marylanders could help establish a sense of unity among the troops, a unity based on their common misfortune acting as an instrument of national policy in defense of their country. Their struggle to achieve a national goal, the cause of their suffering, cultivated their sense of national identity

Interestingly enough, facing these hardships may have affected the characters of the people involved. All sources refer to the large number of soldiers who deserted because of the poor conditions they were asked to endure. Perhaps the gradual elimination of those who would not tolerate such treatment created a body of troops who embodied republicanism. An earlier quotation from Joseph Plum Martin indicates that some if not most the members of the Continental Army saw themselves as defending the country's "independence and liberty." Perhaps the harsh conditions of Army life encouraged only those soldiers who truly believed in these values to serve out their entire enlistment. For example, William McDowell of the Pennsylvania Line remarked in his journal:

This morning six of the second Batalion [sic] deserted- A lamentable circumstance indeed that

desertion is like to continue in our army;- but what can we expect in their situation, without clothes and pay for two years. Every person must allow that there is still virtue in an army when we have any left.²⁴

While the loss of troops does not please McDowell, he does make an interesting point: those who remained had clearly proven that they possessed a sense of "virtue." An eighteenth-century definition of "virtue," provided by Charles Royster, involved "restraint and sacrifice," and call for a person to give "up private advantage for the welfare of others or the welfare of the community."²⁵ Since enduring the hardships of the war encouraged people to adopt a "virtuous" attitude, the Army appears, almost by accident, to have created a reasonably large body of "virtuous" citizens. These citizens had a sense of obligation that extended beyond the desire to defend their property; they were prepared to fight for the "independence and liberty" of the nation.

The Army reinforced the idea of the virtuous citizenship through religion. Many historians, such as Charles Royster, have argued that religion offered an especially effective means of addressing revolutionary soldiers because of the moral authority its message contained.²⁶ The experiences of John Gano, an Army chaplain for much of the war, confirm this hypothesis. The regularity with which Gano was called upon to preach to the troops indicates that the officers perceived Gano's role as chaplain as important, quite possibly because of the authority he could lend to the message of

republicanism.²⁷

Religion became a prominent feature of life in the Army in the immediately before or after campaigns, during periods of inactivity, or during national holidays. The content of the sermon's preached at these times indicate how religion was used to expose soldiers to republican values. Lieutenant Robert Parker makes an interesting reference to a sermon on the Fourth of July being "suitable to the occasion."²⁸ One can only assume that the minister had somehow managed to intertwine the gospel with the ideology of the Declaration of Independence. A second hand recollection of a sermon delivered to the troops besieging Boston serves as an indication of how this could be achieved:

He shew that Putting [sic] on the hole Armer of God was in its Several Peaces of armer. having our lions gurt about with truth: And having on the breast plate of Righteousness and your feet shod with the Preparation of Peace:²⁹

This rather simple adaptation of Ephesians 6:14-17 gives the Continental troops divine assurances of victory. From the perspective of the listener, the values embraced by the revolution, "Life Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness," became the will of God. The use of republican rhetoric within the context of religious ceremonies also appears in a sermon preached to the troops before the battle of Brandywine in 1777:

...a proud and merciless nobility adding wrong upon wrong and heaping insult upon robbery and fraud...royalty corrupt to the very heart and aristocracy rotten to the core, crime and want linked hand and hand and tempting men to deeds of violence and death...

You have taken up the sword for your homes, wives,
for your little ones You have taken the sword for
truth, justice and right....³⁰

This sermon brings out some potentially interesting possibilities for creating republican/nationalist sympathies among the listeners. Initially, one should realize that republicanism in the eighteenth century held that people formed governments to create an ordered society capable of protecting the personal property of its citizens.³¹ In the sermon, the speaker condemns the English nobility for their crimes against property, "robbery and fraud," and violating effort to form an ordered society by "tempting men to deeds of violence and death." Since the wrongs committed by the English represented violations of the republican ideals of good government, the sermon, implicitly, encouraged soldiers to place value on these ideals. In order to reinforce the values of property ownership and an ordered society, the sermon offers its audience, or "their little ones," inclusion in the land owning class, providing incentive to fight for these republican values. The combination of these two factors could explain the emergence of a truly nationalized republican ideology among the soldiers. Additionally, since the sermon came from a representative of God, the cause of national republicanism received transcendent importance. The fight for independence thus became a divinely sanctioned mission that held greater importance than individual concerns and united the soldiers in a way few other things could. Such rhetoric

certainly offers an explanation as to why soldiers became "virtuous," or why they were willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of others and the community.

Of course before sermons could transform individual ways of thought, the audience must be receptive to the message. It is not clear how many of the Continental troops were devoted Christians, or would have seen their role in the war as anything other than an attempt to gain enough money to survive. Accounts from early in the war, during the siege of Boston, imply a great amount of religious devotion among the troops.³² However as the war progressed devotion became less apparent among the ranks of the Army. Joseph Plum Martin recalled only that he attended the mandatory Thanksgiving sermon but of "what sort I do not know now, nor did I at the time I heard it. I had something else to think upon."³³ Whether or not Martin's views spread throughout the entire army is unclear; however, many of his fellows at Valley Forge apparently thought in the same way.³⁴ The recollections of John Gano also imply a high level of religious apathy among the troops, for example, the poor attendance at his services during the winter of 1778.³⁵ Gano also gives us some hint of the fickle nature of the troop's religious loyalties, noting that sermons preached before battles were usually well attended.³⁶ Some journals indicated that common soldiers were highly religious,³⁷ while others leave it up to the reader to determine the extent of the individual's religious

convictions.³⁸ Certainly among the religiously devote, the Army's deliberate use of the rhetoric of religion and republicanism would have contributed to the emergence of a nationalistic republicanism. Among the officers the depth of religion is equally difficult to discern. For example, although both Lieutenant William McDowell and Lieutenant John Bell Tilden of the Pennsylvania Line participated in the same campaign against Charleston, McDowell made no mention of religion while Tilden referred to it frequently.³⁹ In an equally ambiguous situation, Jeremiah Greenham made no mention of being interested in religion while a common soldier, but upon his elevation to the officer corps he frequently referred to religion.⁴⁰ The sudden increase in Greenham's interest in religion upon his promotion seems to represent a larger pattern: religion, apparently, played a larger role in the lives of officers than in the lives of common soldiers. Interestingly, Greenham's "conversion" occurred at the same time that he began to study republican writings, such as Cato's Letters.⁴¹ While the author mentioned no causal relationship between these two events, they do indicate the compatibility of republicanism and religion and, perhaps, that the Army facilitated exposure to these ideas. Greenham's exposure could have occurred through his relationship with other Continental officers or through listening to sermons preached on the subject.⁴² If nothing else, Greenham's experiences highlight the potential educating

and socializing influence of the Army's incorporation of republican rhetoric into religious sermons. In a less direct way, religion may provide a useful indicator of people's ability to subordinate individual concerns to the greater interests of the nation. In the Reverend Daniel Harper's remembrances of the siege of Boston, for example, he noted with amusement that many people from Massachusetts chose to go to war in order to protect their families from the threat of Catholicism represented by the Quebec Act. Additionally, Harper noted that the Continental Army around Boston also contained Catholics who fought to preserve their rights of worship from encroachments by the crown. Though it seems unlikely that the conflict between Protestants and Catholic's would take a back seat to the struggle for Independence, Harper's account suggests otherwise. Both groups working together against England for the same goal, religious freedom, implies that service in the Army encouraged people to think in national terms, obtaining religious freedom for everyone, rather than individual concerns, debating whose religion is actually "correct." The intermixing of religious groups and the shift, within the Army, of religious rhetoric toward republicanism and away from doctrinal issues, created an environment suitable for the germination of religious toleration under the broader goal of achieving independence. The ability of the Army to create such an atmosphere illustrates its power to alter the most personal individual

views, in this instance by reinforcing the general societal trend towards religious liberty that characterized the Revolutionary period.⁴³

Of course religion could embrace more than the worship of a divine entity. Hypothetically, it could include the worship of any object, for example the nation. Through the celebration of national holidays the Army may have effectively created a new civic religion, the cult of the new nation state. While this "cult" did not challenge its traditional counterpart for control over people's lives, it did have a dramatic effect on how individuals perceived their relationship to the newly formed nation. The Army celebrated national holidays, especially congressionally appointed days of thanksgiving and the Fourth of July.⁴⁴ On these occasions the Army would formally recognize the Independence of the United States.⁴⁵ Not surprisingly, the Fourth of July was the day most often used to celebrate the emergence of a new nation. The Fourth provided an opportunity to remind the soldiers exactly why they were fighting. Major James Norris illustrates how the "Anniversary of American Independence" adopted an almost religious nature in order to sanctify the motives behind the war:

After Dinner the following 13 Patriotic toasts were drank-1. July 4th. 1776 The memorable Erra [sic] of American Independence, United States; 2. The United States; 3. The grand Council of America, 4. Genl Washington and the Army; 5. Genl Lincoln and the Southern Army; 6. Genl Sullivan and the Western Expedition;...11. The Immortal memory of those Heros that have fallen in the defense of American

Liberty; 12. May the new World be the last Asylum for Freedom and the Arts; 13. May the husbandmans Cottage be blest with peace and his fields with plenty-

The whole entertainment seemed to be conducted with such joy and festivity, as demonstrated an independent elevation of Spirit on this immortal and interesting Occasion-⁴⁶

The toasts celebrate the emergence of a new nation, united under a single government, possessing all the traits of a republican utopia: liberty, freedom and a nation of self sufficient citizens. The toasts also reveal the reverence the day and its activities inspired among these officers. The author's description of the day "elevating the spirit," and possessing "immortal" qualities implies that the Fourth of July, and the ideas surrounding it, had become, in a manner of speaking, sacred. Given the semi-divine status accorded Independence Day by the officers, common soldiers probably shared their leader's reverence for the day.

In reference to Independence Day during the campaign against Charleston, South Carolina, Sergeant William Seymour noted: "The 4th of July being the day of our Independence declared throughout the United States of America, our Army was drawn up and fired a fudijoy [sic]...to the great satisfaction of a vast number of spectators."⁴⁷ Clearly, Seymour thought the event represented something of national significance. His reference to "Independence declared throughout the entire United States" indicates that he no longer viewed the colonies as thirteen separate entities but rather as a single nation. And Seymour's comments concerning the reactions of his fellow

soldiers indicate that they probably shared his views. If nothing else, the Army's celebration of Independence suggests that the leaders took the opportunity created by Independence Day to promote national unity among the troops. Certainly, the soldiers did not want for suggestions that independence represented something special, as a sermon preached during Sullivan's expedition against the Indians illustrates:

American exertions [sic] have hitherto been crowned with success; let us still under the banners of liberty and with Washington for our head go on conquering to conquer...Even so may it be with us, for the sake of Christ Jesus, who came to give freedom to the world.⁴⁸

Certainly, the Fourth of July was popular among the population as a whole. How and why did the Army create a unique experience? Perhaps the answer lies in the dual usefulness of the event to the Army. To civilians, the day might represent the triumph of American liberty or a chance to improve their position in life by the removal of British rule.

However, to the members of the Continental Army it would have represented even more. As the Reverend Rogers' sermon indicates, the Army used Independence Day as an opportunity to give soldiers a reason to "go on conquering." The importance of maintaining an army would give the officers of the Continental Army an important incentive to sanctify the event. Additionally, if soldiers believed that they fought to vindicate American liberty, the day would possess special importance because it represented a reminder of why they had chosen to subject themselves to a rather unpleasant

experience. In short, army life would have made the rhetoric of independence especially meaningful because it would have had a greater affect on how soldiers perceived and reacted to events in their every day lives.⁴⁹

Besides creating a "cult of nationality," the Army created a "cult of personality" around its leader, George Washington. As Roger's sermon and Morris' toasts indicate, General Washington had, in the minds of the soldiers, assumed an important role in the war. Washington transcended state boundaries and represented the sort of unifying figure necessary to build a sense of national identity. The depth of Washington's national presence appears in Captain John Davis' account of the siege of Yorktown. According to Davis, upon Washington's arrival at Yorktown, "the officers of the Infantry waited on the General to congratulate his arrival in the Southern States."⁵⁰ John Bell Tilden also captured the reverence with which the officers held Washington:

A very rainy Day which frustrated our intention of waiting on his Excellency [Washington]...[the next day] the officers of the Pennsylvania Line waited on the General who received them politely and shook each by the hand.⁵¹

This sort of respect implies that, as commander, Washington represented an important component of the war effort. The favorable reaction his arrival elicited from the troops signified the importance the approaching battle held for the entire nation. Even the usually cynical Joseph Plum Martin seemed to hold the general in especially high esteem. He

noted that "had we dared we might have cautioned him for exposing himself too carelessly to danger...."⁵² Martin expressed concern about Washington because he identified Washington as an essential component to the war effort. Both Martin and Davis imply that Washington personified the nation and its interests. Identifying one individual with the interests of the nation necessitated looking beyond one's immediate surroundings to determine the importance of events. Consequently, the emergence of this "cult of personality" around General Washington would indicate that soldiers had adopted a national perspective on the war.

Of course, Washington was tremendously popular among many people outside the Continental Army. Even amongst the militia, Washington held a place of special importance. For example, Sergeant William Young, of the Philadelphia militia offered prayers for the preservation of the General.⁵³ Despite this reverence for General Washington a sense of national identity did not develop as intensely among the militia, perhaps because they saw themselves as separate from Washington and his army. Apparently, Young's troops viewed themselves as distinct from Continental soldiers, placing their allegiance with themselves and their shops not General Washington.⁵⁴ Similarly, James Stevens held Washington in great esteem yet the Continental Army existed in a world different from his own.⁵⁵ To these people, Washington symbolized someone who offered a service that freed them to

concentrate on their own tasks. Such a viewpoint placed Washington's importance not in his personification of a single national purpose, but in his ability to accomplish something that helped individual states and localities attend to business as usual. On the other hand, since "business as usual" did not appear attractive for many soldiers, Washington's importance stemmed from the national crusade to bring "Freedom to the World" that he symbolized. Consequently, even though most people viewed Washington as crucial to the war effort, the Army offered an especially suitable environment to convert respect for the General into a national identity backed by republican ideology.

Additionally, the degree of importance Washington achieved among people outside the Army highlights the crucial role he and his army played in developing a national identity. To these people, success against England depended on one individual who did not represent a state but rather the entire nation. Since these people placed their hopes of success on the leader of the Continental Army, they must have perceived that the struggle was national in focus and required a national effort. That Young, and others, adopted such an attitude illustrates how the Army came to represent the nation and spread national identity to people through General Washington.

Washington's emergence as a truly national figure implies that the service in the Army provided a national perspective

on the war. That Captain Davis, and soldiers like him, who apparently had never served under Washington, could view him as central to the American cause suggests that the Army kept its soldiers informed about developments in other theatres of the war, breeding an identification with the national cause.

Information, however, spread concerning all aspects of the war, not just the importance of General Washington. Major James Norris, while on campaign against the Indians in Western Pennsylvania and New York, offered an Independence Day toast to the success of General Lincoln and the Southern Army, indicating a knowledge of the war beyond his own expedition. From the very beginning of the war, members of the Continental Army received constant updates as to the progress of the war, generally. On the Lake Champlain campaign, during the fall of 1776, Phineas Ingalls received a running account of the defeats inflicted on Washington's troops around New York.⁵⁶ Likewise, while in camp in New York, Jeremiah Greenham receives constant updates as to the progress of the war in the South.⁵⁷

Perhaps the most salient feature of the information received from the other colonies concerned the manner in which it was conveyed to the troops. Sergeant Thomas Roberts noted that on the June, 14th, 1779, the Army "rejoiced for the good news of the Enemys [sic] Being Defeated at Georgia...."⁵⁸ Roberts does not refer to the English, or to the troops under

the command of a specific general, but rather to "the Enemy." By referring to the English, generally, as the enemy, he acknowledged that the war in the South held some importance for his future. Certainly, it seems reasonable that, by encouraging soldiers to think in this manner the Army helped entrench a sense of internal solidarity, national unity and identity.

While many different people could consider the English everywhere their enemies, the Army cast its victories in ways that others, apparently, did not, as the accomplishment of a single group. John Bell Tilden noted while besieging Yorktown, General Washington "congratulates the army on our success southward [specifically General Greene]." ⁵⁹ This sense of unity existed even when referring to losing causes as Greenham noted: "[We] are informed that the Enemy surpris'd a part of our Light Hors near Charleston..." ⁶⁰ While not every report was phrased in the collective, certainly, such references helped build the sense of one army throughout one nation, rather than separate armies fighting separate struggles.

The Army not only recognized news of battles but also news of more a more global nature. For example, Lieutenant Erkuries Beatty noted:

In consequence of Spain Declaring war against Great Britain...The General ordered a Feu De Joy to be fired by the army...and the following Toasts was given...The 13 Sisters and their sponers [sic]-The honorable American Congress- Genl. Washington & the American Army...May the American Congress and

the Legislatives of America be endowed with wisdom and be as firm as the Pillars of time- May the citizens and soldiers of America be Unanimous in support of American Liberty....⁶¹

The author not only recorded the actions of the Spanish Government but also described the reactions of the American officers. The response to Spain's entry into the war, joining the American cause, resembled the celebrations on the Fourth of July.⁶² The toasts recalling the national duty to preserve freedom, and create a nation governed by one Congress, reflect the dominance of republican ideology within the Army. These toasts imply that the Army utilized events such as these to remind soldiers of their duty to the nation and the cause of republicanism, as well as the immediate effect on the war.

The recognition of the French and Spanish alliances also placed the war in an international perspective. The war no longer concerned only Americans and their former rulers, but rather involved the entire world. Upon the entrance of Spain and France into the war, reports "that Spain had laid siege to Gibraltar & the French had taken the islands of Gurnsey [sic] and Jersey"⁶³ took on tremendous importance. Such reports served to remind the soldiers that they were involved in a war between nations, in effect emphasizing their national identity. Jeremiah Greenham hinted at this realization when he noted that "the French Court would not agree to any proposals 'till England had first declared America his Independence...."⁶⁴ The war would end when the United States

became a nation, not when the troops left a particular region.

The manner in which events in distant colonies affected members of the Continental Army made information about the war as a whole especially relevant to these troops. The members of the Continental Army continued to fight after a given campaign had ended. James Stevens, John Goodwin, William Young, and other members of the militia returned to their homes after the war moved out of their state or region. Soldiers such as Ebenezer Wild, Jeremiah Greenham, Joseph Plum Martin, James McMicheal and other members of the Continental Army moved from one campaign to another, even after victories such as Yorktown and Saratoga. Consequently, events in other theatres of the war would affect their lives in a more direct manner than the lives militia members or civilians.

The defeat of Cornwallis at Yorktown freed large numbers of troops to go to the aid of General Greene's army in South Carolina. This transfer of troops allowed some soldiers to go home and enabled the remaining ones to increase the pressure on the British garrison.⁶⁵ Clearly, the British defeat at Yorktown held repercussions for the troops around Charleston that differed completely from the effects it had on members of the Virginia militia or a Pennsylvania farmer. Likewise, the success of the French and Spanish overseas helped to determine the length of the war in America. For example, Greenham noted that after Yorktown the principal obstacles to peace concerned the losses and victories England incurred in other parts of

the world.⁶⁶ Events in Gibraltar did not influence the lives of civilians in the same way as they did members of the Army. To soldiers, the end of the war meant an end to service in the Army, to civilians, by this point, the end of the war only meant an official recognition of the status quo. Consequently, the direct manner in which such information affected the lives of Continental soldiers, probably, made the nationalistic effects of such news greater among members of the Army than civilians.

Service in the Continental Army also helped develop a sense of national identity through interactions between soldiers and civilians. Relationships between the soldiers and civilians determined how the two groups perceived each other, and, potentially, how they thought about the nation and its people. Interaction between soldiers and civilians frequently occurred in less than ideal circumstances; for example, the soldiers often confronted civilians in order to beg for food or shelter. These instances, both friendly and unfriendly, tended to reinforce a sense of national identity among the troops. When interactions were hostile solidarity among the members of the Army increased, giving them a sense of separation from communities and identification with the national organization they represented. On the other hand, favorable interactions with civilians could help break down sectional biases, reinforcing the similarities among the people of America.

Officers interacted with civilians on two levels: adversarial, generally with those of lower economic status, and constructive, generally with sympathetic members of the upper class. We have already seen how tensions between civilians and the Army over supplies created a feeling of unity among the soldiers. Not surprisingly, the officers treatment of people they suspected of being less than supportive of their cause led to some unhappiness among civilians. The existence of this reciprocal problem reveals more about how the Army perceived its role during the Revolution than the degree to which it created a national identity.

General Greene's reaction to the acquittal of a junior officer accused of harassing a civilian official during the siege of Charleston illustrates this problem:

Although the General does not disapprove of the sentence of the court. He cannot help observing that the words made use of by Capt. Jones with respect to Gov. Martin seem extremely indelicate, that expressions of such a nature applied to a Civil Official in high station or authority have a tendency to injure the service....⁶⁷

Tilden indicates that Greene urged the soldiers to behave because of the negative impact these actions had on popular perception of the Army. Apparently, Greene believed that the actions of the Army would define how people looked at national institutions generally, implicitly acknowledging that the Army served as a tool for developing a national identity. Additionally, Greene's rhetorical strategy tacitly

acknowledges that the Army expected service in its ranks to have created a sense of national identity, at least among the officers.

The constructive interactions between officers and civilians illustrates how service in the Army created a sense of national identity. Apparently, life as a Revolutionary War officer, even junior grade officers, involved a great deal of contact with friendly members of the colonial aristocracy. When faced with the rigors of army life, officers often turned to wealthy private citizens to provide food and shelter. During the Southern Campaign it appears as if Lieutenant William McDowell and his fellow officers survived by accepting the handouts of wealthy citizens:

when Maj'r Moore, Capt. Petterson Capt. Marshal, L't Moore and myself, was sitting down to our usual dish, a large plate of rice and a little salt, when Col. Lawrence and Mr. Izard came to us. We invited them to partake of our repast. They expressed a sorrow for our situation; they went home, Mr. Izard sent us a quarter of venison and a flitch of bacon, which afforded all the officers of our detachment a supper.

Certainly, the willingness of such citizens to help the officers created a positive image of people from other states. In the case of the Southern Campaign, such behavior could do much to alter perceptions of officers who generally perceived the region as having an overwhelming Tory majority.⁶⁸

Social exchanges between officers and leading citizens may also have had a levelling effect on both soldiers and civilians. In his travels with the Army, Captain William

Beatty frequently attended social functions put on by prominent individuals in honor of the officers: "In the beginning of April I went on a Detachment to Shrewsbury in Monmouth County. Here we continued very peaceably spent our spare time with a number of fine ladies."⁶⁹ These functions introduced people into social circles from which they had previously been excluded, creating a genuine sense of democracy between host and guest. While many officers hailed from wealthy families, many reached their position through promotion from the lower ranks. Amongst these people the effects of social intermixing would have been most profound. Jeremiah Greenham, who rose from the rank of private to lieutenant, found that as a commissioned officer he had access to people who belonged to a completely different social class. For example, he recalled that on March 25, 1781, he "came to Cituate to Land Lord Green where dined...."⁷⁰ Certainly the notion that one so above him in social rank (Greenham owned no property prior to the war) would invite him to dinner would help develop a sense of political equality and hope for social advancement. In the recollections of Ebenezer Wild (another individual who rose from private to lieutenant) we find a similar pattern. On his return from Yorktown, Wild noted that he "Spent the evening very agreeably with several gentleman of the town."⁷¹ The reference to gentleman implies that these people possessed social rank within the community. Interaction with a group of elites, even local ones, would

bolster the impression of greater political equality. Such notions of political equality and prospects for social advancement fit perfectly into the rhetoric of the Revolution's republican leaders.

The interaction between common soldiers and civilians also contributed to the development of a national identity among all people. Members of the lower classes, from whom the Continental Army drew heavily to fill its ranks, and with whom they most often dealt, often possessed strong sectional biases. Joseph Plum Martin recalled an interesting episode in which he and some of his fellow troops helped spread understanding among the people of the nation. According to Martin, while on a mission to get food, a woman began to make disparaging comments about "Yankees." Upon being informed that one of the soldiers she had fed, Martin, was a "Yankee," she replied, "Is he a Yankee? I thought he was a Pennsylvanian. I don't see any difference between him and other people."⁷² On campaigns, soldiers frequently stayed with civilians and would have had ample opportunity to mingle with them.⁷³ As Martin indicates, these situations could break down local and regional differences or prejudices and build a sense of understanding between different groups.

Another level of interaction between soldiers and civilians concerned encounters between upper class citizens and lower class soldiers. Just as the encounters between officers and elite citizens could have had a politically

empowering effect, so could the interaction between soldiers and their "betters." Sergeant Young of the Philadelphia Militia provided an interesting example of this phenomenon. While returning from the winter campaign in New Jersey, Young tried to house his troops in a large house owned by a prominent citizens of the area. Upon being refused admittance, Young used his position as leader of a unit fighting for American independence to gain entrance to the house.⁷⁴ Significantly, Young did not resort to force or threats, only rhetoric.⁷⁵ The reaction of the owner of the house implies that Young's position as a member of the army fighting against England gave him added influence with his betters because of his role in the war.⁷⁶ This experience, whether in the militia or the Continental Army, created a sense of empowerment and nationalism because the individual's power came from doing the work of the nation.

Of course not all such interactions involved confrontations. Martin notes that on one occasion "...we stopped at a large elegant brick house, to which the owner bid us welcome."⁷⁷ Among some members of the elite⁷⁸ the soldiers, because of their position in the Army, received privileged treatment, if not as equals at least as people deserving respect. Such interactions should have helped establish a sense of political equality and empowerment, just as in situations where soldiers forced concessions from members of an unwilling elite.

The willingness of soldiers to impose on civilians, both elite and "the lesser sort," stemmed from the perception that members of the Army were professional defenders of liberty, and consequently, deserving of respect. Conflict would arise whenever civilians did not perceive the soldiers as professional defenders of liberty, but rather as professional threats to their peace and personal property. The existence of a professional ethic had profound ramifications for the development of a sense of national identity among the troops.

If the soldiers possessed a sense of professionalism, it would manifest itself in, among other things, improved discipline and pride in the ability of the Army to fight. Certainly the discipline of the Continental troops improved as the war went on. Aaron Wright's account of the Continental Army's march from Pennsylvania to Boston in the spring of 1775 typifies the sort of chaos that surrounded the Army in its early days. Along the way, Wright notes the accidental deaths of numerous soldiers, mostly through the careless use of firearms, one arising from a squabble over a ripped hunting shirt.⁷⁹ While some brawls and death may seem inevitable, their prevalence in the early days of the Continental Army suggests a severe lack of discipline.⁸⁰

As the war continued the Army placed much more emphasis on training the soldiers and creating a professional atmosphere within its ranks. For example, after spending the winter of 1777 at Valley Forge, Ebenezer Wild makes many

references to the use of mock engagements as training for combat.⁸¹ As the Army began to perceive itself as a professional organization designed to fight for the independence of the colonies, it would more clearly demonstrate a professional ethic. The marked decrease in accidents and improvement of discipline as the war progressed supports the emergence of such an ethic.

Another indication of the emergence of a professional ethic among the members of the Continental Army concerns their perception of military competence. The descriptions of the military incompetence of the militia suggests such a transformation.⁸² For example, Sergeant William Seymour harshly criticizes the militia for their incompetence during the battle of Camden (1780) and praises the professionalism of Continentals who maintained order during the rout.⁸³ Regardless of the historical accuracy of the account,⁸⁴ it indicates that Seymour took pride in the ability of the Army to fight competently. Viewed in this light, condemnations of the militia indicate that the soldiers took pride in fighting well not just surviving, indicating a sense of professionalism in their pursuit of a national purpose.⁸⁵

Martial pride also appeared in the attitude that soldiers expressed toward themselves and their accomplishments. For example William Seymour took great pride in the performance of the Army at Guilford Courthouse. Seymour remarked that Lord Cornwallis "confessed that General Greene had the honor of the

field and likewise the best of the battle."⁸⁶ Curiously, the depth of the Army's professional pride emerged in the mutiny of the Connecticut troops during the spring of 1780.

According to Joseph Plum Martin:

They saw no alternative but to starve to death, or break up the army give all up and go home. This was a hard matter for soldiers to think upon. They were truly patriotic, they loved their country and had already suffered everything short of death in its cause; and now, after so much hardship to give up all was too much, but to starve to death was too much also.⁸⁷

The troops viewed themselves as members of a professional army and took pride in their accomplishments, and the indignity with which they lived compromised this sense of pride and forced them to mutiny. They did not fear death in service of the country in battle, but rather resented the fact that the country chose to treat them so poorly that they now risked death from starvation.

This sense of professional pride was encouraged by the conscious and unconscious acts of Continental officers. For example, at the end of General Sullivan's campaign against the Indians the Army faced severe supply problems. In order to motivate the troops to continue, the officers turned to the soldier's sense of professional pride. Nathan Davis recalled a captain asking that "every soldier willing to go forward in defense of his country" continue the campaign.⁸⁸ When encountering a soldier who appeared young the captain urged him to retire from the field; however, the soldier took exception to this, and, displaying more than a little pride in

his role as a soldier, responded, "I enlisted to serve my country," and refused to leave the ranks.⁸⁹ Of course the very attitude expressed by officers could help create a sense of pride among the soldiers. After skirmishing with a large detachment of English troops, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Dearborn attributed victory to the fact that the Continentals "had something more at stake than fighting for six pence per day."⁹⁰ If officers such as Dearborn influenced the attitudes of their soldiers, then certainly views such as these would instill a sense of pride among the soldiers. A more ambiguous case comes from the siege of Yorktown. John Bell Tilden noted that:

The Baron Von Steuben feels himself particularly happy...in presenting his warmest thanks to the officers and soldiers of his division for the great trial and alacrity with which they performed the several duties assigned them during ye siege against York. He ever entertained the highest opinion [sic] of ye troops, but ye spirit and bravery which was so conspicuous on the present occasion has given him additional confidence in them and secured his warm and lasting friendship.⁹¹

Such displays, regardless of their intent, would encourage the soldiers, junior officers as well as enlisted men, to perceive themselves as a professional organization.

If the Army encouraged its members to feel as if they belonged to a professional organization it would have instilled a sense of belonging to a group of people who had often been excluded from society. The soldiers of the Continental Army represented the poor and non-property owning classes of American society, and as such were excluded from

the political process. The service these soldiers rendered their country through participation in the military should have changed that. To the extent service in the Army created a sense of professionalism; members of its ranks would have perceived themselves as having an advanced role in society. As soldiers they had adopted a profession and as such deserved the respect of society, not just of their communities but the entire nation.

While many may have perceived the professional soldier as a threat to society, they did not emerge as such. Service in the Continental Army reinforced the republican values held by many of the revolution's civilian leaders who feared that the Army would destroy liberty. Quite to the contrary, participation in the Army allowed the soldiers to perceive themselves as the guarantors of American liberty. Years of service had encouraged them to think of the struggle in terms of its national not local implications. The rhetoric of their leaders and their own sense of pride reinforced the need for republican government. They were told that they fought for their rights and the rights of their children, and the development of a professional ethic implies they took this task seriously. By serving as a tool for political empowerment, the Continental Army created a sense of republican nationalism that dovetailed with the ideological base of the American Revolution. While the militia may have epitomized the citizen soldier, it did not form an effective

mechanism for developing a sense of nationality, nor did it empower its members in the same manner as the Army. By broadening the base of those who felt included in the system, the Army may have helped provide a stronger, more stable country than otherwise might have arisen.

CHAPTER III

THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION

A recurring problem among nations concerns divisions between governments and minority groups within the boundaries of that country. Efforts by governments to integrate these people into the state can breed feelings of resentment, as "integration" often seems to resemble cultural extinction. In Nicaragua, these issues have taken on an added dimension, as the conflict between state and indigenous people and ethnic minorities has become part of a global East-West power struggle. The roots of the conflict stem from the different ways in which the Pacific and Atlantic regions developed. In order to understand why conflict erupted between the two regions one must examine their respective histories. By understanding the different geographical, ethnic, economic and political backgrounds of the two regions it should become obvious why the Sandinistas encountered difficulty in their attempts to win over the population of the Atlantic Coast. Lacking an effective mechanism to socialize these people into the revolutionary ideology of the FSLN, the two groups could not effectively work together. Subsequently, misunderstandings created by the fundamentally different types of development experienced

by the two regions ensured conflict.

Before commencing on a detailed analysis of the conflict between the two coasts, it seems important to offer a demographic perspective on the Atlantic Coast. Of the indigenous people on the coast the Miskito are the most numerous, numbering approximately 80,000 in 1980.⁹² Other indigenous populations include the Sumu Indians (10,000), Rama Indians (1000).⁹³ Non-indigenous groups include the Creoles, Afro-Americans descended from escaped slaves or imported slaves, the Garifono, descendants of native Caribs and escaped slaves.⁹⁴ Although a large number of Mestizos have immigrated from the Pacific Coast in the last forty years, they do not represent part of the "traditional population," and, consequently, probably, did not have the same perspective on the revolution as the other inhabitants.⁹⁵

In many ways, the conflict between the two Nicaraguan coasts has its roots in the geography of the region. A mountain range running through the middle of the country divides Nicaragua into two very different geographical regions. The Pacific Coast, because of ancient volcanic activity, possess some of the best soils in world.⁹⁶ In addition, the climate on the Pacific side of the country has two distinct seasons, wet and dry.⁹⁷ The combination of good soils and somewhat favorable climate have made the Pacific region a site in which agricultural and,

subsequently, industrial development could take place. In Contrast, the Atlantic region, lacking the volcanic past of the Pacific region, possesses soils that have little or no agricultural value.⁹⁸ Additionally, the climate of the East Coast has only one season, wet.⁹⁹ This hostile environment has served as a permanent road block to development.

These climactic differences have influenced the development of these two regions from the earliest European involvement in Nicaragua. The primary interests of the Spanish, the first colonizing power in the region, lay in obtaining the wealth of the native inhabitants and in establishing large scale agricultural ventures.¹⁰⁰ Since this was difficult in the East, the Spanish by-passed the large tropical rainforest that constituted the Atlantic Coast and settled on the Pacific side of Nicaragua. That the Spanish by-passed the Atlantic Coast did not mean that the area did not become involved with a colonial power. The British, competing for power with the Spanish, emerged as the dominant power in this part of Nicaragua. The primary interests of the British lay in establishing a base for their privateers to operate from against the Spanish treasure fleets.¹⁰¹ The rainforests of the Atlantic Coast offered the essentials for such a base, lumber for repairing ships and a native population that could be used to harass the Spanish.¹⁰² The geography of Nicaragua determined the

type of development process each coast would undergo, the fertile West Coast developed by the Spanish and the forested East Coast by English privateers.

In this early division between east and west the future conflict between indigenous elements and Sandinistas became almost inevitable. In order to understand why, the type of development strategies employed by the two colonizing powers requires examination. The Spanish style of colonization utilized a slave labor system based on the exploitation of native groups.¹⁰³ This exceptionally brutal system required constant supplies of workers, and, subsequently, most of the indigenous population on the Pacific Coast disappeared.¹⁰⁴ Any surviving native peoples became incorporated into a Spanish society which stressed the "backwardness" of all indigenous cultures.¹⁰⁵ This policy, amounting to genocide, created an inevitable racial gap between the two coasts. The destruction of indigenous people meant the death of any understanding or appreciation of indigenous culture. Subsequently, the Pacific population, from the time of the Spanish until the time of the Sandinistas, perceived the people of the East Coast as less "advanced," and adopted an insensitive and even paternalistic attitude toward the people and ethnic concerns of the Atlantic Coast.

The primary goals of British colonization, on the other hand, depended on having friendly relations with the native

peoples.¹⁰⁶ The British hoped to utilize the indigenous population, especially the Miskitos, as a base of supplies and as an irregular army against the Spanish settlers to the west. The British thus cultivated good relations based trading arms and tools for raw materials and help against the Spanish.¹⁰⁷ In order to further bolster their claim against the Spanish the British established a "The King of Mosquitia" to govern the Atlantic Coast.¹⁰⁸ The "king" served not only as a dummy government upon whose rights the Spanish were infringing, but as a galvanizing point for Miskito nationalism. Not surprisingly, the use of the Miskitos against the Spanish and the surge in nationalism promoted by English policy resulted in a great deal of resentment between the people of the two coasts, a resentment that exists today.¹⁰⁹ The creation of a "king" also created a sense of autonomy among the Miskito people, a sense, real or imagined, that serves as the basis for the peoples desire for autonomy today.¹¹⁰ The colonization policies of the British and Spanish served to divide the population of Nicaragua, shaping the battle lines for existing problems.

After this initial stage of development the paths of the two areas continued to diverge. Separation from the Spanish on the Pacific side made increasing British and United States involvement in the Atlantic Coast inevitable. The need for resources led the British to expand their

interests in the region, until by the eighteenth century British interests in mining, lumber, bananas and fisheries had become well established in the region.¹¹¹ In the nineteenth century, the United States replaced Britain as the region's dominant power.¹¹² Originally motivated by the desire to build a canal through Nicaragua, the United States slowly forced Great Britain out of the area and emerged as the dominant player.¹¹³ After Panama replaced Nicaragua as the preferred site for the canal, U.S. interests remained in the region, emphasizing the same extractive economy initiated by English.¹¹⁴

As United States involvement on the Atlantic Coast was peaking, nationalism was growing among the people of the Pacific Coast. Nicaragua gained independence from Spain in 1821 and with protection provided by growing U.S. power began to consolidate its power.¹¹⁵ The Treaty of Managua, signed 1860, between Great Britain and Nicaragua represented an important milestone in both Nicaraguan nationalism and the beginnings of the current conflict between the Sandinistas and the people of the Atlantic Coast. The treaty required Great Britain to abandon the Miskito monarchy to Nicaraguan control in exchange for the creation of an autonomous "Miskito Reserve."¹¹⁶ While this acquisition, theoretically, gave Nicaragua control of its "natural" boundaries it also set the stage for increased alienation between the East and West Coasts.

In 1894 general Rigoberta Cabezas acting on the orders of President Jose Santos Zelaya occupied Bluefields, the principal city in the "Miskito Reserve," taking political and military control of the region.¹¹⁷ Once in power, President Zelaya tried to consolidate power in the area, making Spanish the official language of the Atlantic Coast and ending all vestiges of Miskito self rule.¹¹⁸ Given the general dislike the people of the East had for the "Spanish" on the West Coast these actions only served to heighten tensions between the two areas of the country and increase indigenous desire for complete autonomy.¹¹⁹ An interesting pattern emerged from the events of the nineteenth century. From the Miskito perspective, rising Nicaraguan nationalism led to decreased Miskito autonomy, a perception that shaped their response to the Sandinistas' nationalist revolution.

Another important change that took place in the Atlantic Coast region during the nineteenth century related to the rise of the Moravian church. The Moravians began to arrive in the 1849 and converted large number of the indigenous people to their faith.¹²⁰ In the process of conversion the Moravians allowed the Indians to maintain a degree of their own culture, creating the image of a culturally sensitive foreign presence.¹²¹ When a series of natural disasters struck in the late 1870's and early 1880's, many more indigenous people lost faith in their traditional religion, resulting in a massive conversion to

the Moravian faith.¹²² This "Great Awakening" increased both the importance of the Church in the community and the ties between the people of the Atlantic Coast and the United States, where most of the missionaries originated. When the church became dominant in the people's lives its ideology permeated the community. Subsequently, the people adopted church doctrines emphasizing the importance of private property, making them more vulnerable to exploitation from outside.¹²³ Additionally, the anti-Catholic rhetoric of many of the pastors increased the already pervasive hatred of the "Spanish" on the Pacific Coast. The attitudes of the Moravians, adopted by many of their converts on the Atlantic Coast, would go a long way toward defining the future development of the region.

As far as the economy of the Atlantic Coast was concerned, ties between Britain and the inhabitants of the region drew the Atlantic Coast into the world trading system. In order to run their plantations the British, and later the Americans, relied on the population of the Atlantic Coast, including the Miskito, Sumu, Rama and Creoles.¹²⁴ The incorporation of these people into the plantation system had a drastic effect on the way they viewed the world. The emphasis placed by the Moravian religion, as well as important members within the indigenous community, on the importance of employment created an important link between the costal population and the foreign

companies.¹²⁵ The people of the region grew to identify having a good job and possession of foreign goods as essential to their sense of self.¹²⁶ With this new emphasis placed on earning a wage, old traditions became less important.¹²⁷ Instead, an crucial relationship developed between the population and the outside world. Unlike the people of Western Nicaragua, the people on the Atlantic Coast did not identify the United States and its large multinationals as threatening their well being.¹²⁸ Generally, the costenos, people of the Atlantic Coast, looked favorably upon the times of prosperity brought about by the fluctuations in the global market. Consequently, these people saw their future prosperity, defined in terms of obtaining consumer goods, as dependent on having a strong foreign presence in their economy.¹²⁹ However, Sandinistas based their struggle against Somoza upon the precept that exploitation by external actors had led to the development of political consciousness.¹³⁰ In the case of the Atlantic Coast, the people did not feel exploited by the multinationals; consequently, the Sandinista program and ideology, lacking a mechanism to transform indigenous viewpoints, did not offer anything to the people of the region.

The absence of a strong anti-foreign viewpoint also had its roots in the style of business practiced on the Atlantic Coast. Unlike the Pacific region where

agricultural development forced people off the land, business strategies on the Atlantic Coast focused mainly on the stripping of natural resources.¹³¹ This allowed the companies to respect traditions of communal life and have only a minimal impact on the indigenous people.¹³² Thus, people identified the foreign companies with money and a higher standard of living, not as agents of exploitation. In the absence of harsh repression, such as that which occurred on Nicaragua's Pacific Coast, no catalyst existed to tarnish the image of foreign companies as providers of benefits. Given this attitude, the people of the Atlantic Coast identified as repressive those who they perceived were forcing the companies to leave, such as the Sandinistas.

The first indication that the Sandinista revolution would not have the support of the peoples of the Atlantic Coast came from the costenos tepid response to the attempted revolution of Augusto Sandino. Sandino's movement rejected foreign involvement in Nicaragua and advocated the establishment of a truly independent Nicaraguan state.¹³³ His rebellion attracted some support from the people of the Atlantic Coast; however, those who joined his forces did so because of strong separatist leanings.¹³⁴ The separatist nature of the costeno involvement in Sandino's revolt indicated more of a hatred of the "Spanish" on the Pacific Coast than a rejection of foreign domination of the Nicaraguan economy. In fact, most Atlantic Coast people

viewed Sandino and his band of rebels as "bandits."¹³⁵

Sandino primarily attack vestiges of American domination over Nicaragua, and on the Atlantic Coast this took the form of assaults on Moravian missionaries and the factories of companies such as Standard Fruit. Given the importance of these two institutions in costeno society it is not surprising that the people did not run to join Sandino's forces.

The story of a raid staged against a Standard Fruit Company installations at Puerto Cabezas in 1931 illustrates the reaction to Sandino's movement among coastal people.¹³⁶ From a military perspective, the assault succeeded, the guerrillas defeated the National Guard troops stationed in the city and destroyed much of Standard Fruit's operational base. However, the attack occurred during the height of the global depression. Rather than rebuild the operation, Standard Fruit laid off all of its employees in Puerto Cabezas. Given the importance the Atlantic Coast people placed on work and the acquisition of American consumer goods, the loss of these jobs represented a tremendous blow to their economy and self esteem. It was Sandino and his soldiers who received the blame for Standard's pullout, indicating the general dislike of Nicaraguan nationalist tendencies and support for foreign corporations.¹³⁷ Consequently, those who fought with Sandino did not receive much thanks on their return to the area, and most of them

chose to settle on the Pacific Coast.¹³⁸

After 1933 costeno indifference toward Sandino manifested itself in the people's apathy regarding the Somoza regime. The explanation for this reaction to Somoza stems from the local belief that contacts with the "Spanish" brought destruction, while contact with English speaking foreigners benefitted the region.¹³⁹ The policies of the Somoza dynasty continued to encourage the economic exploitation of the region, allowing American companies virtually unlimited access to its resources.¹⁴⁰ While such policies contributed to the destruction of the environment and to the erosion of Nicaragua's long term economic strength, the people of the region saw only continued prosperity, access to work, and the availability of consumer products. Hence, when, under the Sandinistas, the last of the major corporations on the Atlantic coast pulled out, it was not seen as liberation from economic exploitation but as the loss of essential employment.

The general dislike for all things originating on the West Coast allowed the population of the Atlantic Coast to interpret the Somoza government neglect in an apathetic rather than hostile light. In fact, the lack of direct government involvement in the region was often interpreted as the Somoza government's granting of a degree of autonomy.¹⁴¹ Additionally, since most of the coastal communities existed on the periphery of Nicaraguan society,

the token amounts of aid handed out by the government were generally appreciated.¹⁴²

Another reason the policies of Somoza did not seem particularly repugnant to the inhabitants of the Atlantic Coast was the absence of many of the particularly brutal aspects of his rule in the West. Given the rural and undeveloped state of the Atlantic region, the key instrument of Somocista repression, the National Guard, never became an established force.¹⁴³ Additionally, the "harmonious" development process occurring in the region did not set off the labor problems so common in the West.¹⁴⁴ Subsequently, without the need for an effective means of political repression none developed, and neither did the hatred that such measures usually evoke.

The Somoza regime may also have appealed to the people of the Atlantic region for other reasons as well. The fact that Anastasio Somoza spoke fluent English could not have hurt in a society that hated all things Spanish and respected all things English. The all powerful Moravian religion preached an anti-communist doctrine,¹⁴⁵ which coincided with the anticommunist rhetoric of Somoza. Additionally, Miskito society has always revolved around dominant "strongman" figures.¹⁴⁶ A culture based on the existence of a powerful coercive leader could identify sympathetically with a leader such as Somoza, respecting his ability to dispense favors if nothing else.¹⁴⁷

In short, while the Somoza government offered very little to the people of the area, what it did offer seemed to represent much of what the people desired, autonomy and unexpected but welcome charity. Simply put, the people of the Atlantic Coast did not participate in the Sandinista revolution because they had no reason to view Somoza as a large enough threat to warrant further "Spanish" encroachment on their lands. This does not mean that the people of the Atlantic Coast supported the Somoza regime. Rather it indicates that they simply had no reason to be especially displeased with it. Consequently, when the revolution arrived in the East, it did so without the sense of urgency that marked its arrival in the West.

The lack of participation by the region's inhabitants in the military struggle against Somoza established the precedent for costeno exclusion from the revolution. Since no widespread opposition to Somoza existed on the Atlantic Coast, the fight against Somoza, for the most part, occurred in the Pacific half of the country.¹⁴⁸ Without the presence of contending forces, the people of the Atlantic Coast did not face the realities of warfare in their own communities and, subsequently, did not take part in the war.¹⁴⁹

Given the importance the Sandinistas placed on developing a revolutionary consciousness, non-participation, especially by indigenous groups, became significant. The

Sandinistas felt that the only way to ensure the success of the revolution was to instill a sense of the importance of the struggle for liberation.¹⁵⁰ The FSLN chose to develop this consciousness through the military struggle. According to Jose Luis Coraggio, "the very way of arriving at power itself- combining armed struggle with a hegemonic behavior was able to incite the active and passive consensus of the broadest possible spectrum of Nicaraguan society."¹⁵¹ By creating a broad base of resistance the Sandinistas hoped people would identify with the revolution's leaders and support their programs. If people did not participate in the military struggle, they probably would not develop the same sense of loyalty to the FSLN's cause. Consequently, non-participation by members of the indigenous communities meant that they did not develop the required revolutionary consciousness and were thus excluded from Coraggio's consensus.

The lack of participation created a dearth of revolutionary leaders indigenous to the East Coast,¹⁵² which had two major effects: it denied ethnic support for the revolution and it left the Sandinistas with only a vague understanding of the needs of the people. The indifference that existed toward Somoza among the costenos required the Sandinistas generate native support for their program. Without leaders that spoke the same language and held the respect of the coastal people, the Sandinistas had no sway

over the populace.

In order to bring the people of Nicaragua into the revolution, the Sandinistas relied on mass organizations. These organizations were intended to give their members more direct input into the revolution. For example, the FSLN formed the Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (AMPRONAC) in order to help integrate women into the new Nicaraguan society.¹⁵³ However, in the case of the Atlantic Coast, the mass organization created by the Sandinistas served to widen the gap between the Sandinistas and the costenos. The organization used by the Sandinistas to represent the indigenous people, MISURASATA, consisted of traditional indigenous leaders who, having no ties to the revolution, tended to encourage separatist rather than integrationist policies.¹⁵⁴ Ironically, the creation of a mass organization intended to integrate the people of the Coast into Nicaraguan society had the opposite effect, fueling costeno desires for autonomy.¹⁵⁵ Prior to the revolution the people of the Atlantic Coast lacked an organization through which they could organize to promote their autonomy, but now MISURASATA provided that organization. Subsequently, Sandinista-costeno interaction tended to center on issues such as autonomy rather than the establishment of a united Nicaraguan state. The disagreements that arose from these discussions, and the power placed in the MISURASATA, left the people of the

Atlantic Coast, especially the indigenous populations, vulnerable to anti-revolutionary rhetoric.¹⁵⁶

To imply that the sole reason the Sandinistas failed to win support from the indigenous people stemmed from a lack of influence over the people seems reductionist. The lack of indigenous Atlantic leaders among the revolutionary elite left the Sandinistas with no understanding of the needs or desires of the people of the area. The contact that the leaders had with indigenous people consisted mainly of working with the inhabitants of the central highlands,¹⁵⁷ who lacked the long history of autonomy and racist attitudes toward the Pacific Coast characteristic of the Miskitos and other inhabitants of the Atlantic Coast. Without an understanding of these two basic precepts of Miskito history, the Sandinistas made a series of costly misjudgments.

A fundamental mistake in the Sandinista policy toward the costenos stemmed from their ignorance of the importance of ethnicity to the indigenous people in the region.¹⁵⁸ From the very beginning of European contact the English had used the sense of ethnic difference to foster hatred and mistrust between the people of the East and West. Subsequently, an issue of primary importance to a people such as the Miskito, who could point to the decedents of their "royal family," was preserving the unique aspects of their culture from the "Spanish." On their part, the

Sandinistas interpreted issues of ethnic differences as the product of elite efforts to maintain dominance over the lower classes.¹⁵⁹ Not surprisingly, the leaders of the Atlantic indigenous groups saw the issue of their ethnicity as transcending economic distinctions.¹⁶⁰ The gap in views concerning the importance of ethnicity exacerbated one of the most fundamental costeno stereotypes in the history Pacific-Atlantic conflict: the "Spanish" as the oppressors and the U.S. businesses and government as the liberators. The language of the Sandinista revolution stressed the importance of national sovereignty and unity, two forces that had historically meant assaults on Miskito and other indigenous cultures, while "Voice of America" broadcasts and the contras used the rhetoric of regional autonomy and self-determination, the fundamental desires of the costenos.¹⁶¹

Not only did the language of the revolution inflame the fears of ethnic domination by the "Spanish," so did many of the Sandinistas' new policies. Many of these policies offered services that had never existed in the region; however, the Sandinistas implemented these policies without regard for existing social institutions. The process of health care serves as a prominent example. Traditionally, the Moravian church offered schools as well as hospitals for the costenos. While these services may not have been extensive, they formed an important part of the social make up of the region. In places where these services did not

exist the people relied on native healers. When the Sandinistas offered medical services they came, initially, at the expense of these existing institutions.¹⁶² While the services offered may have filled a vital need, by eliminating entrenched social institutions the Sandinistas only exacerbated fears of the "Spanish" trying to eliminate indigenous culture.

Another example comes from an agrarian reform law that tried to regulate exploitation of natural resources. Again, while the intention seems admirable the action itself appeared threatening. The announcement of the reform policy coincided with MISURASATA's submission of its land claims to the Sandinista government.¹⁶³ The apportionment, into national parks, of large areas of land that the Miskito and Sumu Indians had claimed and the strict limits imposed on logging under the Environmental Resources Institute, seemed to represent an attempt to deny the indigenous people control over their traditional lands.¹⁶⁴ Given costeno concern over losing control of their region to the "Spanish," such fears, while most likely unfounded, seemed very plausible.

Unfortunately, this combination of inadequate understanding of the culture of the Atlantic Coast and lack of ties with established costeno leaders led to open warfare between the two groups. While the willingness of the United States to fund counterrevolutionary movements contributed to

the development of this conflict, the actions that triggered open warfare were extensions of the misunderstandings that plagued the relationship between the Sandinistas and the people of the Atlantic Coast.

In order to understand the manner in which these misunderstandings led to conflict, one must examine the differing positions of the Sandinistas and MISURASATA. Starting in the early 1970's MISURASATA had drawn its inspiration from the notion of "aboriginal rights," placing the rights of indigenous groups above the competing interests of nation-states.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, the Sandinistas viewed the idea of "aboriginal rights" as a primitive form of political awareness that would develop into class consciousness once freed from the oppressive capitalist regime.¹⁶⁶ Instead, the Sandinistas placed a priority upon restoring national integrity that Somoza had compromised.¹⁶⁷ To legitimate this conclusion the revolutionaries turned to the legacy of Sandino, and portrayed themselves as the heirs to the nationalistic ideas of the revolutionary martyr.¹⁶⁸

The inevitability of conflict between the groups now becomes obvious. The Sandinistas attempted to justify their revolution in terms contradictory to the ideas of the indigenous peoples, arguing that they should subordinate their interests to the greater good of the "Spanish" nation. Additionally, the Sandinistas chose as their example an

individual, Sandino, whose acts the Indians saw as antithetical to their best interests, i.e. driving out the foreign companies. On the other hand, the native desire for autonomy seemed to undermine the integrity of Nicaragua by dividing the country and leaving it open for continued foreign manipulation. Initially, both sides held positions consistent with the different historical experiences of their respective regions. Subsequently, actions and reactions to events that followed coincided with these experiences, and caused the ensuing misunderstandings.

Given these fundamentally different views, it is not surprising that when, in 1981, MISURASATA claimed an ancestral right to control the entire Atlantic Coast region the Sandinistas perceived this as a threat to their newly established regime.¹⁶⁹ The Sandinistas, identified what they perceived as a new "dangerous direction" in MISURASATA policy and responded by jailing thirty-three of the organization's leaders.¹⁷⁰ These jailings reinforced the ingrained costeno perception of the revolution as another attempt by the "Spanish" to impose their will on the inhabitants of the Atlantic Coast.¹⁷¹ The Sandinistas responded to growing protests by releasing all but one of the jailed leaders, Steadman Fagoth.¹⁷²

Interestingly, this act, that proved instrumental in bringing many indigenous people into the contra forces, was intended as a gesture of reconciliation. According to Tomas

Borge, FSLN Minister of the Interior, "we arrested him [Fagoth] after proving his connections with the Somozaist Security Office, thinking that the Miskitos would be very happy that we had discovered a security agent in their ranks."¹⁷³ However, the Sandinistas did not realize that the negative assessment they held of National Guardsmen was not shared by the members of MISURASATA. Subsequently, Fagoth's imprisonment appeared as an attempt to silence the leader most in favor of protecting traditional Miskito culture.¹⁷⁴ Once released, Fagoth fled to Honduras and used these perceptions to urge the Miskito, and other Atlantic Coast people, to take up arms against the government.¹⁷⁵ Regardless of Fagoth's actual intentions, the Miskitos placed their loyalty with him because of the perceived threat embodied by the Sandinistas, and the war began in earnest. As Tomas Borge explains, "And of course they believed those who spoke in Miskito and not us, who spoke in Spanish and did not understand a word of their language nor anything about their customs."¹⁷⁶

Arguably, the pivotal point in the war between the costenos and the Sandinistas came early in 1982 when the FSLN decided to relocate Miskito communities along the Rio Coco. In November of 1981, the revamped MISURASATA (MISURA) launched an offensive across the Rio Coco known as "Red Christmas."¹⁷⁷ In response to these attacks, the Sandinistas initiated their controversial relocation

program, destroying the Miskito communities along the river and moving the inhabitants to a new settlement, Tasba Pri.¹⁷⁸ This policy, initiated to protect the Miskitos, and improve their standard of living,¹⁷⁹ only served to further alienate the inhabitants of the region around the Rio Coco.

As with the other mistakes, the Sandinistas had simply failed to realize the importance Miskito culture placed on their traditional living areas. The Miskito considered the area on both banks of the Rio Coco their traditional homeland.¹⁸⁰ Subsequently, when the Sandinistas created a demilitarized zone where the communities used exist, it appeared as if they intended to cut off the Nicaraguan Miskitos from their relatives in Honduras. A drastic step considering Somoza had never even attempted to control the border.¹⁸¹ Now the Sandinistas appeared to be destroying the traditional homeland, something Somoza would not have done, contributing significantly to the Miskito presence among the contra. Tomas Borge, belatedly, explained the effect the decision to relocate had on the inhabitants of the Rio Coco: "They left the river because we removed them, but their hearts remained with their land, looking into the mirror of the river."¹⁸²

The relocation of these towns had repercussions far beyond illustrating the failures of the Sandinistas to comprehend the culture of the Miskitos. In the end, the

relocation became the primary propaganda tool for members of the Reagan administration bent on toppling the Sandinista government.¹⁸³ Even though respected groups such as America's Watch declared that relocation of the Miskitos did not result in significant human rights violations, the United States continued to use these allegations as justification for the war against the Sandinistas.¹⁸⁴ Additionally, such propaganda continued to filter into isolated communities of Indians, even after the Sandinista government had offered amnesty to the Miskitos who had joined the contra, commenced the autonomy process and allowed many to return to their homes.¹⁸⁵ Consequently, the Miskitos continued to believe that the contras best represented their indigenous rights long after the Sandinistas had changed their ways.

In short, the troubles experienced by the Sandinistas in integrating the people of the Atlantic Coast into their revolutionary system, and the effects this had on the contra War, had their roots in the historical animosity between the two regions. The problems resulted emerged when the Sandinistas moved into the region and acted in a manner that fed costeno fears of "Spanish" domination and paternalism.¹⁸⁶ Likewise, the Sandinistas did not understand how to effectively bring people into their revolution who had not participated in the legitimization process. The lack of understanding between the two sides

led to policies that simply exacerbated the fears of the region's inhabitants. Unfortunately, these fears, grounded in centuries of cultural history, became a tool for the Reagan administration to draw these people into their efforts to undermine the Sandinistas government.¹⁸⁷

However, recent developments have shown signs of ending the impasse between the Sandinistas and the costenos. In 1985, the Sandinistas initiated a process through which the indigenous people, and the coastal region in general, gained some measure of autonomy.¹⁸⁸ The process emphasized grassroots participation in developing a plan that met the needs and the desires of both the indigenous peoples and the Sandinistas.¹⁸⁹ As of the summer of 1989, the autonomy process had progressed significantly. The Nicaraguan Constitution recognizes the right of the people of the Atlantic Coast to exercise control over their lands and the use of their natural resources.¹⁹⁰ This process gained popular support as programs initiated by the Sandinistas began to bring benefits to the people. The positive impact of these programs has undermined the perception that they represented attempts by the "Spanish" to subjugate the people of the Atlantic Coast. As FSLN and costeno historian Ray Hooker noted, "After 500 years of oppression you don't gain loyalty of a people over night. You gain it through successful project being carried out."¹⁹¹

The elections of 1990 saw the Sandinistas removed from

the Presidency and replaced by a coalition headed by Violeta Chamorro and including Brooklyn Revira, a prominent leader among the people of the Atlantic Coast. What effect this will have on the Atlantic Coast is uncertain. The new government's plans stress private sector involvement in the economy, conceivably bringing multinationals back to the East Coast.¹⁹² Such a development would possibly create a semblance of the economic environment that existed prior to the Sandinista takeover, how these corporations will be greeted is an interesting yet unanswered question. The future of the autonomy law is equally vague. The new government's position concerning the Atlantic Coast does not address the issue of autonomy; however, given that they do not have the number of votes necessary to change the Nicaraguan Constitution¹⁹³ the parts of the autonomy process contained in the constitution should remain untouched.

CHAPTER IV

COMPARISON

These two revolutions can serve as reference points in order to determine the effects of military participation on the formation of a national identity. The American Revolution illustrates how participation in a regular army created a sense of republican national identity. The Nicaraguan case reveals how relations among people within a revolutionary society can be determined by the past developments, and the need for an effective mechanism to bridge these gaps. Does the American model of military participation have any value for evaluating the reasons why the Nicaraguan Revolution ended in civil war between the people of the East and West Coasts? The answer to this question depends in large part on the similarities between the two revolutions and the role that the armies played in both cases. Both revolutions faced similar problems concerning the need to convert parts of their populations to the dominant revolutionary ideology, in the process uniting disparate people. And in both revolutions the emergence of a "Revolutionary Myth" played a crucial role in attempts to bring more people into the ideas of the revolution.

The leaders of both the American and Nicaraguan

Revolutions based their revolutionary movements on similar premises. Fundamental to both movements was the notion that the people of their respective countries suffered encroachments on their fundamental rights and liberties from an outside power. In the American case, the leaders of the revolution perceived that England had begun to encroach upon their rights of private ownership which formed the essential safeguard against tyranny. In the Nicaraguan case the Sandinistas felt that the Somoza regime, the United States and foreign economic interests had denied the people of Nicaragua control over their political and economic sovereignty.¹⁹⁴ While the cause of this infringement differed, the fundamental premise was similar, an outside force was conspiring to keep the people in a state of subjugation. The subsequent revolutions would attempt to overthrow the existing regime and replace it with one that better guaranteed the rights of the American or Nicaraguan people. However, both movements also faced the problem of people who did not share the same interpretation of the events leading to the revolution.

Since the American Revolution's ideological foundation consisted of every individual's right to control property independent from government interference, its broadest appeal would be among property owners. However, throughout the eighteenth century the colonies had begun to experience land shortages in many of the coastal areas. For example,

in his discussion of Pre-Revolutionary Concord, Robert Gross, notes that, as in most communities, land was becoming scarce, creating the possibility of an emerging landless class.¹⁹⁵ Likewise, in urban centers of early America a growing stratification of wealth was leaving an ever larger number of people excluded from the property owning classes.¹⁹⁶ These people, while perhaps having many reasons to revolt against Britain, probably did not share the dedication to the preservation of existing distributions of private property. Since these people did not possess large amounts of property, or wealth, it seems likely that they would not have perceived the actions of the British government as efforts to encroach on their fundamental rights. In fact, some scholars have suggested that the economic plight of the urban poor caused them to identify the source of their problems with the British mercantile system and with the elite of colonial society generally.¹⁹⁷ Such an attitude reflects discontent with economic exploitation and a desire for economic levelling, not a fear of the British government undermining their political rights through control of their private property.

People who shared these beliefs, a minority but a growing one, could pose a threat to many of the elite of colonial America. For example, growing scarcity of land and distorted land tenure systems led to riots in many of the northern-colonies.¹⁹⁸ These riots took the form of attacks

against wealthy land owners and their estates. While it could be argued that these disturbances represented a desire to own property consistent with republican ideology they differ in important ways. The land rioters' complaint stemmed from a system that excluded them from a secure living. The complaint was not that the government did not protect their property but that it did nothing to help them obtain any. The urban dispossessed also reacted to the problems imposed upon them by the unfair situation in a potentially threatening manner. Like their rural counterparts, the urban poor responded to economic hardship by rioting. These riots were focused against the mob's perceived enemies, the wealthy, and represented a challenge to the distribution of wealth and the existing social order.¹⁹⁹ Such actions may have helped to alter the way people perceived the possibilities of revolt against England and perhaps even contributed to a sense of crisis that led all people to become dissatisfied with the mother country. Despite this they posed a real challenge to the ideology of the Revolution's republican leaders. Why? Simply put, mob action was anti-republican. Thomas Paine, hardly a member of the property owning elite, recognized that because of the unruly nature of mobs they were contrary to the idea of an ordered society; consequently, republican leaders perceived mob action to be as much of a threat to people's liberty as the actions of the British Government.²⁰⁰

A similar problem faced the Sandinistas concerning the attitude of the people on the Atlantic Coast. The Sandinista Revolution had its ideological origins in the exploitation of the people by foreign governments and companies. In order to highlight this theme the leaders of the Nicaraguan Revolution constantly reminded the people of past interventions into their country. For example, slogans such as "Nicaragua is Latin America" and "The Latin American Revolution Lives in Nicaragua," were consciously designed to promote the image of Latin America at the mercy of outsiders.²⁰¹ The entire revolutionary strategy had at its base the need to end U.S. hegemony over the region and replace it with domestic control. As Jose Luis Coraggio explains, "In its struggle against Somoza, the FSLN combined the armed struggle with counterhegemonic methods in order to actively accumulate forces and to strengthen its legitimacy...."²⁰² Of course, in order for this attitude to be effective, the people needed to perceive the outside forces as detrimental to their best interests. As illustrated previously, the people of the Atlantic Coast did not perceive the foreigners as their enemies. As long as the costenos viewed the United States and its businesses as providing goods and services essential to their survival they remained excluded from the Sandinista Revolutionary program.

The Nicaraguan situation differed from the American

situation in several important respects. Perhaps most notably, those who did not share the same ideology as the American Revolutionary elite did share a fundamental dislike for the status quo. In the case of the American Revolution, the lower classes who held the economic and land tenure systems in contempt wanted the system altered so as to be allowed to be included. While they may not have shared the same views concerning natural rights as the elites, they did share a fundamental desire to change the system. On the other hand, those on the Atlantic Coast who did not share the ideology of the Sandinistas also lacked the contempt with which the Sandinistas viewed the Somoza regime. It certainly would be inaccurate to characterize the people of the Atlantic Coast as being content under Somoza; however, since Somoza had granted some de facto autonomy and occasionally provided aid the costenos probably viewed Somoza as a benign irritant. Consequently, while they probably would have welcomed change that brought greater autonomy and more Western consumer goods, they were not actively seeking to overthrow the system. The leaders of the American Revolution faced a group whose views differed only in the degree to which change was needed and how that change should be brought about; whereas, the Sandinistas had to convince a group of people of the desirability of change.

Despite these differences each group shared a fundamental need: to educate people concerning the

ideological foundations of the revolution. The fact that the two revolutions shared the need of incorporating excluded groups indicates that some merit exists in looking at the two situations comparatively. For example, the different experiences of the two countries might indicate the effectiveness of various types of armed struggle in creating an effective national ideology. The American Revolution, for various reasons, was fought between two "regular" armies, the British and the Continental. While "irregular" troops fought on both sides the primary struggles occurred between the two armies. Conversely, the Sandinistas fought a primarily guerrilla war and relied on irregular troops to support their relatively small army. This distinction becomes interesting because the Continental Army emerged as a mechanism through which the lower classes became exposed to elite nationalist and republican ideologies. While not everyone served in the Continental Army, the extent to which people who did serve were exposed to republican ideas illustrates how a standing army can contribute to the spread of a revolution's ideology. Perhaps the absence of such a wide ranging army inhibited the ability of the Sandinistas to recognize the different perspective held by the people of the Atlantic Coast and incorporate that perspective into their revolution.

The Continental Army emerged as the mechanism for creating a national republican mentality among the lower

classes quite by accident.²⁰³ The reason the Army took on this function was the very make up of its troops. As illustrated earlier, the Continental Army consisted primarily of member of the lower classes of American society, many of whom had demonstrated anti-republican virtues through their participation in riots. Given the nationalizing influence service in the Continental Army had on its soldiers, it becomes apparent how it served as a mechanism to incorporate an excluded sector into the republican mentality of many of the Revolution's leaders. Since the Army, through the use of religion and the celebration of national holidays, constantly reminded its members of the reasons for the war, and gave divine justification for the American cause, it created an atmosphere in which members of a potentially destabilizing group could become acclimatized to the republicanism that would emerge in the new United States. Further, the sense of professionalism that emerged among members of the Army would indicate that soldiers took their jobs as defenders of the republican mentality seriously. Certainly, it seems unlikely that the sense of military pride that developed in the American Army would have emerged without a belief in the rhetoric of the Army's leaders. In short, because of its nationalizing tendencies, the Continental Army effectively took representatives of a class of people who posed a threat to the society envisioned by the revolutionary elite and

incorporated them into the elite republican mentality.

This makes an interesting contrast with the people of the Atlantic Coast and the Sandinista government. As previously explained, the irregular army that made up the FSLN did not include many people from the East Coast. This represents a serious problem to a group that attempts to build its legitimacy through the "armed struggle" against its opponents. Without exposure to the Sandinista method of ideological indoctrination, armed struggle, the people of the Atlantic Coast continued to view events in Nicaragua from the perspective they had for years. Unfortunately for the Sandinistas, this perspective held that the Americans and their business had brought times of prosperity and allowed limited autonomy while the "Spanish" on the Pacific Coast brought unemployment and domination. The Sandinistas only exacerbated these problems when they chose to implement programs that heightened these fears. Under these circumstances the economic crisis that followed the revolution, would have been identified with the Sandinistas and not the acts of the United States, further alienating the two groups.²⁰⁴

Perhaps a similar situation would have emerged if the American colonists had chosen to rely on their militia rather than the Continental Army to fight the war. Since the militia consisted primarily of middle class citizens and did not provide the constant reminders of the national

nature of the war, it lacked the essential qualities that allowed the Continental Army to bring the excluded minority into the republican mind set. If the members of the lower classes had not developed these sympathies, it seems not altogether unreasonable that the American Revolution could have quickly degenerated into class conflict. This becomes even more likely when one considers the wide variety of conflicts that occurred among the colonies prior to the Revolutionary War.

Nicaragua was also divided along sectional grounds prior to the Sandinistas' accession to power. How the various revolutions dealt with these sectional divisions is a key factor in what happened in the years following the new governments' rise to power. While the situation in the two countries was not identical, the differing approaches to the problem might reveal something about the nature of revolutionary struggles generally, and the existence of a standing army in particular. As in the case of spreading revolutionary ideology, it seems that the existence of a standing army as part of the revolutionary movement in the United States may have helped overcome some of these sectional difficulties.

Before the Revolutionary War the American colonies were not especially prone to living in harmony with one another. In addition to the conflicts that erupted between the various groups within the colonies, the land owners and the

tenants and the rich and the poor, disputes arose between individual colonies. Frequently these disputes took the form of conflict over boundaries in the western reaches of the colonies.²⁰⁵ While such disputes may seem minor, the degree of sectional disagreement occasionally had rather drastic consequences. For example, when faced with an Indian uprising a colony could not count on receiving aid from one of its sister colonies. When New York faced an uprising on its western frontier it appealed to Massachusetts for assistance, Massachusetts refused citing financial difficulties.²⁰⁶ Under such circumstances it is easy to understand why the colonies and colonists did not always see eye-to-eye, leading James Otis to remark, "were these colonies left to themselves tomorrow, America would be a mere shambles of blood and confusion."²⁰⁷

If the war had been left to "irregular forces," the militia, it seems unlikely that many of these disputes would ever have been resolved. The incident at King's Mountain reveals how militia remained tied to their states and continued to adhere to the belief that one state did not owe another state protection even in a time of crisis. The provincial attitude expressed by many members of the militia also seems to reinforce this mentality. The desire to return home reflected in the various militia groups indicates that they did not develop a sense of nationalism comparable to what emerged in the Continental Army.

On the other hand, the regular army, the Continentals, seemed to promote national identity and break down sectional barriers. As General Greene's reaction to an incident involving an officer and a civilian official indicates leaders of the Army appeared to make a conscious effort to portray themselves as the representatives of an entire nation. Certainly the experiences of Sergeant William Seymour and Joseph Plum Martin, to name two individuals, had some effect on their sectional biases, as well as challenged some of the sectional biases of people they encountered. For example, that troops from Pennsylvania could establish professional respect for the troops of the Maryland Line implies the erosion of sectional biases. With the Army deliberately portraying itself as a national institution, and the contact between different people that an army fighting a national war entailed, it should not be surprising that the Continental Army helped overcome sectional biases.

The Sandinista irregular army, like the American militia did not create the same possibilities for integration between the people of the different sections of Nicaragua. Since the war occurred primarily on the Pacific Coast it did not affect the lives of the people on the Atlantic Coast. Consequently, it could not serve as a symbol for the people of the region to identify with the new Sandinista government. Additionally, it could not bring

people from the Pacific Coast into contact with the people Atlantic Coast and generate an understanding between the two. In short the use of an irregular army confined to the West Coast removed one possible avenue for the Sandinistas to expose people of the Atlantic Coast to their revolution.

When considering the United States and Nicaragua the comparison between a standing army and an irregular guerilla force in resolving sectional conflicts has severe limits. One reason for this concerns the different nature of the conflicts in the two countries. In Nicaragua the differences between East and West date back much longer than the differences between the American colonies. For example, the sectional conflict in Nicaragua dates back to the Spanish settlement of the West Coast and the establishment of bases for British privateers on the East Coast. From that point on the West Coast became Catholic and "Spanish" while on the East Coast Protestantism flourished among the indigenous population and the English speaking Creoles. By contrast most Americans who participated in the war and the post-war society shared a common background, spoke the same language, English, and shared a similar religious orientation, Protestant.²⁰⁸ Additionally, the American colonists shared the same basic economic past. Despite differences in amount of land owned most tended to own land, and those who did not saw their future as being tied to their ability to own property and enter the economic

system.²⁰⁹ Nicaraguans, conversely, had different economic world views. As indicated previously, the Sandinistas tended to view the foreign corporations as the exploiters, whereas the people on the Atlantic Coast viewed the foreign corporations as the providers of prosperity.

Another important factor concerns the presence of minority groups within the larger population. Interestingly, a minority group existed in the colonies that tended to drive the American colonists together despite their differences: African slaves. In colonial Virginia the existence of black slaves of the lowest possible socio-economic status enabled whites of all economic levels to band together in the name of equality.²¹⁰ In South Carolina the effect was similar, fear of slave revolt forced the people of the colony into political compromise in order to keep the peace.²¹¹ How much the racism of Virginia and South Carolina affected the other colonies seems debatable. Some have argued that by importing black slaves Southern planters stopped the migration of poor lower class whites into norther cities, allowing the North to remain predominantly middle class and land owning- demographic conditions favorable to the development of wide scale republican sympathies.²¹² In Nicaragua no such group existed, unless it was the people of the Atlantic Coast. The different ethnic background of the two coasts led each to believe itself to be superior to the other and inevitably

into conflict. Consequently, rather than having a tradition of joining together against the alien race, the different regions of Nicaragua had a history of superordinate-subordinate interactions with occasional outbreaks of violence. In America the Revolution brought integration with people from other states, on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua the revolution signified another attempt by the Spanish to subjugate the ethnically different East Coast.

Despite the Sandinistas' reliance on the army as a means of legitimization, it did not constitute their only effort to establish ties between their ideology and the bulk of the Nicaraguan population. In order to do this the Sandinistas created a "Revolutionary Myth" around the leader of the struggle against the United States Marines, Augusto Sandino.²¹³ Interestingly, the American Revolution also saw the emergence of an individual who attained myth like proportions, George Washington. In both of these cases a figure emerged who represented the cause of the movement, in both cases people's ability to identify with the individual shaped how they reacted to the "Revolutionary Myth."

The Sandinistas realized that in order to justify their revolution to the populace they needed to personify the historical struggle between Nicaragua and her foreign oppressors. Sandino represented just such an individual. Sandino had based his opposition to the presence of the United States Marines on the supposition that they

constituted a violation of Nicaragua's sovereignty. An oath sworn by a column of the "original" Sandinistas in 1927 illustrates this mentality:

Do you swear by your military honor to defend with loyalty and discipline the national honor against the invaders of our country until they are expelled, and also refuse to obey any directive from the traitor Adolfo Diaz [Nicaraguan President] and all those who collaborate with him.²¹⁴

This basic appeal to nationalism made Sandino extremely popular among most of the Nicaraguan people, claiming to represent everyone from the Indians to those who labored on plantations.²¹⁵ By claiming to be the inheritors of Sandino's revolutionary tradition the Sandinistas hoped to send the message that they, like their martyr, represented Nicaraguan nationalism, anti-imperialism and socially revolutionary visions.²¹⁶ Paradoxically, with respect to the Atlantic Coast efforts to establish ties with Sandino only reinforced the Sandinistas negative image. Sandino, unlike the Sandinistas did carry on part of his war on the East Coast; however, like the Sandinistas his army did not include many of the region's inhabitants nor did he understand the benevolent relationship between the costenos and the foreigners. Consequently, his attacks on foreign companies on the Atlantic Coast made him another symbol of attempted "Spanish" oppression rather than a liberator. Another factor reinforcing this perception was the rhetoric Sandino's movement. Sandino's rhetoric stressed Nicaraguan

nationalism; unfortunately, among the costenos Nicaraguan nationalism was associated with the end of Atlantic Coast autonomy and "Spanish" oppression.

The American Revolution also saw the emergence of a single figure who seemed to personify the struggle against Britain. Interestingly, George Washington was selected to lead the Continental Army because of the potential he had to draw the people of the colonies together. As the war began Congress feared that many Southern States would perceive the struggle as only involving the Northern States, to counter this impression Congress decided to appoint a Southerner to command the Army.²¹⁷ As the war progressed Washington slowly became identified with the war effort generally, and as essential to the victory over Britain. This perception helped people, especially the soldiers, to view the war from a national instead of local perspective. George Washington's most immediate impact on the development of a national mentality occurred among members of the Army. Illustrative of this mentality was his ability to put down the Newburgh Conspiracy. Essentially, the conspiracy consisted of an attempt by members of the officer corps to use the Continental Army as an instrument to force Congress into providing half-pay pensions for the officers after the war.²¹⁸ Washington's role in quelling this threat to the republic was to simply appeal to his soldiers not ruin the new republican nation that they had helped create.²¹⁹

In both the American and Nicaraguan Revolutions, a mythical figure emerged out of the armed struggle against the oppressing forces. In both of these cases the individual's influence extended beyond the military and into civilian life. However, even at their greatest level of influence, the sway they had over people depended on military identification with the individual. Sandino did not represent a national symbol to the people on the Atlantic Coast. Consequently, the myth of Sandinismo symbolized an effort to place the Atlantic Coast even more firmly under "Spanish" domination. On the West Coast, because of the peoples' identification with the nationalistic component of Sandino's armed struggle, he formed a suitable mythic figure. Lacking identification with Sandino's struggle for national integrity, a mechanism was needed to bridge the apparent gap between the nationalism of Sandino and the interests of the people of the Atlantic Coast. Washington achieved a tremendous level of popularity, twice elected President of the United States, yet he never completely transferred the image of national obligations that he instilled among his troops to the populace as a whole.²²⁰ While his speech concerning the national obligation of the officers made sense to a group of people socialized through years of military service, his attempts to convince the states and Congress of their national obligations to the soldiers failed.²²¹ The Army

was much more effective at creating a sense of national obligation because it constantly reinforced the national nature of the war and was, after all, a national organization. Congress's reaction to Washington's pleas for his soldiers' pensions indicated that without such constant reminders, a sense of national obligation did not emerge spontaneously.

Revolutionaries attempt to draw people into the ideology of the movement's leaders in many ways. Failure to do this often results in continuing social upheaval after the Revolution has finished. In the case of Nicaragua the failure to include a significant minority of the population in the military struggle contributed to the inability of the new government to avoid conflict. The Sandinista mentality assumed participation in the armed struggle against the enemy, or at least identification with the reasons for initiating armed struggle. Absent such participation the rhetoric and symbols of the Sandinista government served only to exclude various groups from the emerging state.

While it seems impossible to completely define what affect participation in an organized struggle against the government would have had in Nicaragua, the American case provides some insights. In the American Revolution groups that had shown no previous affinity for each other became socialized into the mentality of the revolutionary elite through participation in a "regular" military organization.

If the American case can be applied to Nicaragua, one might predict that had the Sandinistas attempted to include people from the Atlantic Coast in their armed struggle they might have avoided many of the troubles that emerged after the war with Somoza. However, one must use extreme caution when applying the case of the early United States to Nicaragua. For example, the nature of the struggle may have prevented the use of regular armies, making the American example much less applicable.²²² Additionally, independent of any external variables, the depth of difference between the cultures on the two coasts could have presented insurmountable barriers to easy integration even if the Atlantic Coast had been involved in the struggle. After all, Sandino tried to include the Atlantic Coast and fared little better than the FSLN. Even the Continental Army had limits on its nationalizing ability; for example, George Washington's symbolic effect was greater in the Army than on the populace as a whole. Even if the Sandinistas could have used military participation to legitimize the myth of Sandino, it is unclear how far outside the army this image would have held.

Despite these limitations, both cases seem to illustrate the need for some sort of mechanism to bring the people of a revolutionary society together, and that the military can have an important role in determining the success or failure of these attempts. Both societies used

the military as a mechanism to bring people into the revolutionary ideology. The Continental Army developed a sense of national identity among its members, this national identity helped establish them in the society that emerged after the war. Additionally, because of the prominent role the Army played in the fight for independence, it may have drawn non-participants into the nationalist ideology of its leaders. The troubles encountered by the Sandinistas may have developed because the people of the Atlantic Coast did not join the struggle against either Diaz or Somoza. Both cases illustrate how the presence of an effective mechanism to socialize people into a revolutionary ideology can contribute to the stability or instability of a nation.

ENDNOTES

1. James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic (Arlington Heights, 1982), p. xii.
2. Fred Judson, "Sandinista Revolutionary Morale," Latin American Perspectives, vol. 14 (Winter, 1987), p. 19.
3. James Stevens, "The Revolutionary Journal of James Stevens, of Andover, Massachusetts [April 1775-April 1776]," Historical Collections of the Essex Institute, vol. 48 (1912), pp. 68-9.
4. William Young, "The Journal of William Young," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 8 (1884) p. 268.
5. Members of the militia served for a standard period of time, during this time they usually would not disobey orders to fight; however, once their time had expired, as Young indicates, they did not remain under the jurisdiction of the Army.
6. Amos Farnsworth, "Amos Farnsworth's Diary," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 12 (1898), p. 91.
7. Farnsworth, p. 91.
8. John Goodwin, "Military Journal in 1777, during the Rhode Island Campaign, by John Goodwin of Marblehead Mass., First Lieutenant in Capt. Nathaniel Lindsey's Company in Colonel Thomas Pickering's Regiment," Historical Collections of the Essex Institute, vol. 45 (1905), pp. 205-11.
9. Of course it is possible that the people had full knowledge of the war as it progressed. If this was the case it only serves to strengthen the sense that service in the militia did not result in the formation of a national identity. Omissions of news concerning the broader war, which in this case would have been deliberate, would indicate that these "patriotic" citizens did not view the war with sufficient interest to merit comment. Such an attitude would represent a mentality set tied to individual localities not the nation as a whole, implying that service in the militia did not change the way in which its members viewed the country.
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13. Young, p. 268.

14. "Minutes of the Committee of Safety of Buck's Co., Pa.," Pennsylvania Archives, Second Series, vol 15 (1890), p.

15. Isaac Shelby, "The Battle of King's Mountain," Magazine of American History, vol. 5 (1880), p. 354.

16. Shelby, p. 353.

17. Martin and Lender, pp. 90-91.

18. Martin, p. 290.

19. References to desertions occur with regularity in all of the diaries and journals of members of the Continental Army.

20. Martin, p. 292.

21. Tennis P. Van Vachten, "Seven Letters of the American Revolution," Magazine of American History, vol. 2 pt. 2 (1878), p. 618.

22. Lieutenant Erkuries Beatty, "The Journal of Lieutenant Erkuries Beatty," in New York Secretary of State's General John Sullivan's Indian Expedition of 1779, 1887, p. 36.

23. William Seymour, "The Journal of the Southern Expedition," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 7 (1883), p. 292.

24. Lieutenant William McDowell, "Journal of Lieut. McDowell of the Second Penn'a Regiment, in the Southern Campaign [May] 1781-[Dec.] 1782," Pennsylvania Archives, second series, vol. 15 (1890) p. 221.

25. Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War (Chapel Hill, 1979), p. 23.

26. Royster, p. 18.

27. John Gano, "A Chaplain in the Revolutions," Historical Magazine, vol. 5 (1861) p. 332.
28. Robert Parker, "The Journal of Robert Parker 2nd Continental Artillery, [June-Dec.] 1779," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 27 (1903), p. 408
29. Farnsworth, p. 86.
30. "Revolutionary Sermon," Magazine of American History vol. 13 (1889), p. 281.
31. Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic 1763-89 (Chicago, 1977), p. 74.
32. Farnsworth notes that every Sunday someone preached a sermon and that people attended in large numbers. Additionally, the journal of Benjamin Boardman ("The Diary of Reverend Benjamin Boardman," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 7 (1892), p. 408) indicates that his sermons concerning the Biblical justifications for the Revolution were heavily attended.
33. Martin, p. 100.
34. Apparently at one point in the sermon the speaker was urging the soldiers to "Do violence to man, nor accuse anyone falsely," when the audience, somewhat sarcastically, added the concluding line, "And be content with your wages," (pp. 100-1).
35. Gano, p. 332.
36. Ibid. This becomes especially important because, if the speech given before Brandywine is representative, the sermons preached before the battles tended to be long on the republican rhetoric of the Revolution.
37. See, for example, Seymour.
38. See, for example, Martin.
39. McDowell, pp. 295-340 and John Bell Tilden "Extracts from the Revolutionary Journal of Lieutenant John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, [Aug.] 1781-[Dec.] 1782," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 19 (1895), pp.51-63 and 208-33.
40. Greenham, p. 201.
41. Greenham, p. 214.
42. The author mentions no internal change that prompted his interest in these subjects, so it seems reasonable that it arose as a result of external stimulus.

43. William G. McLoughlin, "The Role of Religion in the Revolution," in Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson eds., Essay's of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 1973), p. 198.
44. See references above to mandatory services being held on these days.
45. Usually the firing of a feu de joie, a volley of musket fire, and the distribution of spirits or extra rations.
46. Major James Norris, "The Journal of Major James Norris," New York Secretary of State, General John Sullivan's Indian Expedition 1779 (Auburn, 1887), p. 226.
47. Seymour, p. 392.
48. Rev. William Rogers, "The Journal of Rev. William Rogers," Pennsylvania Archives, Second Series, vol. 15 (1890), p. 263.
49. Civilian life does not seem to have produced the sense of importance concerning Independence Day. For example, Amos Farnsworth makes no reference to the Fourth of July being an important date and only records his usual daily activities (Farnsworth, p. 97).
50. Captain John Davis, "The Yorktown Campaign: Journal of Captain John Davis of the Pennsylvania Line [May-Dec. 1781]," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 15 (1881), p. 301.
51. Tilden, p. 57.
52. Martin, p. 231.
53. Young, p. 271.
54. See note 2.
55. Stevens, p. 49.
56. Phineas Ingalls, "The Revolutionary War Journal, Kept by Phineas Ingalls of Andover, Massachusetts, April, 1775,-December, 1776," Historical Collections of the Essex Institute, vol 53 (1917), p. 90
57. Greenham, p. 134-5.
58. Thomas Roberts, "The Journal of Sergeant Thomas Roberts," in New York State Secretary of State, General John Sullivan's Indian Expedition (Auburn, 1887), p. 241.
59. Tilden, p. 60.

60. Greenham, p. 171.
61. Beatty, p. 34.
62. see Norris, p. 225.
63. Beatty, p. 21.
64. Greenham, p. 259.
65. Seymour, p. 387.
66. See especially his reference to the British becoming less willing to grant independence after a victory over the French in the Caribbean (Greenham, p. 258).
67. Tilden, p. 224.
68. This general perception was illustrated by the comments of Sergeant Seymour who noted that the Irish were "remarkable for being true friends of their country" (Seymour, p. 377.).
69. William Beatty, "The Journal of Captain William Beatty [June] 1776-[Jan.] 1778," Maryland Historical Magazine, vol. 8 (1908), p. 117.
70. Greenham, p. 205.
71. Wild, p. 159.
72. Martin, p. 113.
73. See especially, Greenham, Tilden, Martin, and Ingalls, all of whom make extensive references to soldiers quartering with civilians and the interactions between them.
74. Young pp. 276-7.
75. While it seems plausible that the host feared an attack, Young received admittance to the gentleman's house only after he has begun to withdraw his men in search of a more willing host, making it less likely that the individual acted out of fear alone (Young, p. 277).
76. While this account involves the militia not the Continental Army, it still seems relevant. The incident took place outside the militia's home state, making them more or less analogous to the Continental Army in the eyes of the people involved, i.e. they were from a different state. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the similar situations would have had similar affects on members of the Continental Army. Additionally, this highlights how the militia could begin to develop a sense of identity but, because of the

short duration of their enlistment, and the lack of other mechanisms it never became established.

77. Martin, p. 154.

78. The description of the house implies that the individual in question possessed a fair mount of wealth. Additionally, Cornwallis used the House as his headquarters for the New Jersey Campaign of 1776-77 (Martin p. 154).

79. Aaron Wright, "The Revolutionary Journal of Aaron Wright-1775," The Historical Magazine, vol. 6 (1867), pp. 209-210.

80. John Nice, "Extracts of Captain John Nice of the Pennsylvania Line," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 16 (1892), p. 402. See also Harper, p. 85, Young, p. 274, Greenham, pp. 13-15 and Martin, pp. 20-21.

81. Wild, pp. 118-120. See also, Tilden, p. 221, Greenham, p. 119, 131, 139, 252, and 255, and Martin, p. 118.

82. The fact that the Army complained about the militia throughout the war, even in its early stages, does not necessarily deny the potential effects of training on the development of a professional ethic, but, rather, could suggest the gradual development of a professional ethic.

83. Seymour, p. 287.

84. Some scholars suggest the incompetence of General Horatio Gates of the Continental Army accounted for the loss at Camden. Martin and Lender, p. 157.

85. For an interesting contrast refer to Joseph Plum Martin's account of the battle of Long Island in which he noted that "every man I saw was endeavoring by all sober means to escape from death..." (p. 39). Certainly, the Army did not always possess the sense of pride alluded to by Seymour, indicating that the pride developed as the war progressed.

86. Seymour, p. 378.

87. Martin, p. 182.

88. Nathan Davis, "History of the Expedition Against the Five Nations Commanded by General Sullivan in 1779," Historical Magazine, vol. 4 (1868), p. 201.

89. Ibid.

90. Henry Dearborn, "The Journal of Henry Dearborn," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 11 (1886-87), p. 106.

91. Tilden, p. 208.
92. Philip Martinez, "Atlantic Coast Population Groups," Nicaraguan Perspectives, vol. 12 (Summer/Fall, 1986), p. 19.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Alison Rooper and Hazel Smith, "From Nationalism to Autonomy: the Ethnic Question in the Nicaraguan Revolution," Race & Class, 27 (number 4, 1986), p. 2.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. John H. Moore, "The Miskitu National Question in Nicaragua: Background to a Misunderstanding," Science & Society, vol. 50 (Summer 1986), p. 132.
101. Rooper and Smith, p. 4.
102. Ibid.
103. Patricia M. Ballard, "Toward Indigenous Liberation: The Sandinistas and the Miskito of Northeastern Nicaragua," Antipode, vol. 16, (number 2, 1984), p. 55.
104. Rooper and Smith, p. 3.
105. Rooper and Smith, p.3.
106. Jane Freeland, "Nationalist Revolution and Ethnic Rights: the Miskitu Indians of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast," Third World Quarterly, vol. 10, (number 4, 1989), p. 168.
107. Philip A. Dennis, "The Costenos and the Revolution in Nicaragua," The Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 23 (August, 1981), p. 276.
108. The "King of Mosquitia" did not just rule over the Miskito but rather over all of the indigenous people of the region. As a result of British support to the Miskito they obtained the ability to subjugate neighboring tribes and became the dominant group in the area (Ibid.).

109. Glenn T. Morris and Ward Churchill, "Between a Rock and A Hardplace- Left-Wing Revolution, Right-Wing Reaction and the Destruction of Indigenous People," Cultural Survival Quarterly, vol. 11 (number 3, 1987), p. 19.
110. Ballard, p. 55.
111. Moore, p. 136.
112. Rooper and Smith, p.7.
113. Moore, p. 136.
114. Ibid.
115. Freeland, p. 170.
116. Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, "Indigenous Rights and Regional Autonomy," Latin American Perspectives, vol. 14 (Winter 1987), p. 46.
117. Rooper and Smith, p. 5.
118. Ibid.
119. Ortiz, p. 47.
120. Dennis, p. 277.
121. Ibid.
122. Freeland, p. 171.
123. Ortiz, p. 46.
124. Moore, p. 135-6.
125. Moore, p. 135.
126. Dennis, p. 279.
127. Ibid,
128. Dennis, p. 284.
129. Moore, p. 136.
130. Judson, p. 22.
131. Rooper and Smith, p. 6.

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67. Tilden, p. 224.
68. This general perception was illustrated by the comments of Sergeant Seymour who noted that the Irish were "remarkable for being true friends of their country" (Seymour, p. 377.).
69. William Beatty, "The Journal of Captain William Beatty [June] 1776-[Jan.] 1778," Maryland Historical Magazine, vol. 8 (1908), p. 117.
70. Greenham, p. 205.
71. Wild, p. 159.
72. Martin, p. 113.
73. See especially, Greenham, Tilden, Martin, and Ingalls, all of whom make extensive references to soldiers quartering with civilians and the interactions between them.
74. Young pp. 276-7.

75. While it seems plausible that the host feared an attack, Young received admittance to the gentleman's house only after he has begun to withdraw his men in search of a more willing host, making it less likely that the individual acted out of fear alone (Young, p. 277).

76. While this account involves the militia not the Continental Army, it still seems relevant. The incident took place outside the militia's home state, making them more or less analogous to the Continental Army in the eyes of the people involved, i.e. they were from a different state. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the similar situations would have had similar affects on members of the Continental Army. Additionally, this highlights how the militia could begin to develop a sense of identity but, because of the short duration of their enlistment, and the lack of other mechanisms it never became established.

77. Martin, p. 154.

78. The description of the house implies that the individual in question possessed a fair mount of wealth. Additionally, Cornwallis used the House as his headquarters for the New Jersey Campaign of 1776-77 (Martin p. 154).

79. Aaron Wright, "The Revolutionary Journal of Aaron Wright-1775," The Historical Magazine, vol. 6 (1867), pp. 209-210.

80. John Nice, "Extracts of Captain John Nice of the Pennsylvania Line," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 16 (1892), p. 402. See also Harper, p. 85, Young, p. 274, Greenham, pp. 13-15 and Martin, pp. 20-21.

81. Wild, pp. 118-120. See also, Tilden, p. 221, Greenham, p. 119, 131, 139, 252, and 255, and Martin, p. 118.

82. The fact that the Army complained about the militia throughout the war, even in its early stages, does not necessarily deny the potential effects of training on the development of a professional ethic, but, rather, could suggest the gradual development of a professional ethic.

83. Seymour, p. 287.

84. Some scholars suggest the incompetence of General Horatio Gates of the Continental Army accounted for the loss at Camden. Martin and Lender, p. 157.

85. For an interesting contrast refer to Joseph Plum Martin's account of the battle of Long Island in which he noted that "every man I saw was endeavoring by all sober means to escape from death...." (p. 39). Certainly, the Army did not always

posses the sense of pride alluded to by Seymour, indicating that the pride developed as the war progressed.

86. Seymour, p. 378.

87. Martin, p. 182.

88. Nathan Davis, "History of the Expedition Against the Five Nations Commanded by General Sullivan in 1779," Historical Magazine, vol. 4 (1868), p. 201.

89. Ibid.

90. Henry Dearborn, "The Journal of Henry Dearborn," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 11 (1886-87), p. 106.

91. Tilden, p. 208.

92. Philip Martinez, "Atlantic Coast Population Groups," Nicaraguan Perspectives, vol. 12 (Summer/Fall, 1986), p. 19.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Alison Rooper and Hazel Smith, "From Nationalism to Autonomy: the Ethnic Question in the Nicaraguan Revolution," Race & Class, 27 (number 4, 1986), p. 2.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. John H. Moore, "The Miskitu National Question in Nicaragua: Background to a Misunderstanding," Science & Society, vol. 50 (Summer 1986), p. 132.

101. Rooper and Smith, p. 4.

102. Ibid.

103. Patricia M. Ballard, "Toward Indigenous Liberation: The Sandinistas and the Miskito of Northeastern Nicaragua," Antipode, vol. 16, (number 2, 1984), p. 55.

104. Rooper and Smith, p. 3.

105. Rooper and Smith, p.3.
106. Jane Freeland, "Nationalist Revolution and Ethnic Rights: the Miskitu Indians of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast," Third World Quarterly, vol. 10, (number 4, 1989), p. 168.
107. Philip A. Dennis, "The Costenos and the Revolution in Nicaragua," The Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 23 (August, 1981), p. 276.
108. The "King of Mosquitia" did not just rule over the Miskito but rather over all of the indigenous people of the region. As a result of British support to the Miskito they obtained the ability to subjugate neighboring tribes and became the dominant group in the area (Ibid.).
109. Glenn T. Morris and Ward Churchill, "Between a Rock and A Hardplace- Left-Wing Revolution, Right-Wing Reaction and the Destruction of Indigenous People," Cultural Survival Quarterly, vol. 11 (number 3, 1987), p. 19.
110. Ballard, p. 55.
111. Moore, p. 136.
112. Rooper and Smith, p.7.
113. Moore, p. 136.
114. Ibid.
115. Freeland, p. 170.
116. Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, "Indigenous Rights and Regional Autonomy," Latin American Perspectives, vol. 14 (Winter 1987), p. 46.
117. Rooper and Smith, p. 5.
118. Ibid.
119. Ortiz, p. 47.
120. Dennis, p. 277.
121. Ibid.
122. Freeland, p. 171.
123. Ortiz, p. 46.

124. Moore, p. 135-6.
125. Moore, p. 135.
126. Dennis, p. 279.
127. Ibid,
128. Dennis, p. 284.
129. Moore, p. 136.
130. Judson, p. 22.
131. Rooper and Smith, p. 6.
132. Rooper and Smith, p. 7.
133. Moore, p. 137.
134. Ibid.
135. Freeland, p. 172.
136. Moore 137.
137. Moore, p. 138.
138. Ibid.
139. Dennis, p. 287.
140. Rooper and Smith, p. 7.
141. Freeland, p. 172.
142. Dennis, p. 282.
143. Moore, p. 136.
144. Rooper and Smith, p. 7.
145. Freeland, p. 172.
146. Dennis, p. 283.
147. Ibid.
148. Moore, p. 139
149. Ibid.

150. Judson, p. 20.
151. Jose Luis Coraggio, Nicaragua Revolution And Democracy (Boston, 1985), p.5.
152. Philippe Bourgois, "Nicaragua's Ethnic Minorities in the Revolution," Monthly Review, vol. 36 (Jan. 1985), p. 23
153. Maxine Molyneux, "Mobilization Without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State and Revolution in Nicaragua," Feminists Studies, vol. 11 (Summer 1985), p. 227.
154. Ballard, p. 57.
155. Moore, p.139.
156. Martin Diskin, "Ethnic Autonomy in Nicaragua- The second Nicaraguan Revolution," Canadian Dimensions, vol. 19 (December, 1985), p. 24.
157. Moore, p. 139.
158. Bourgois, p. 24.
159. Dennis, p. 290.
160. Freeland, p. 174.
161. Bourgois, p.31.
162. Moore, p. 142.
163. Rooper and Smith, p. 12.
164. Freeland p. 176.
165. Freeland, p. 174.
166. Ibid.
167. Judson, p. 23.
168. Judson, p. 26.
169. "Revolution and an Oppressed Nationality: the Sandinistas Learn from Experience," International Viewpoint, vol. 80 (July 15, 1985), p. 23.
170. Charles Hale, "Ethnopolitics, Regional War and a Revolution's Quest for Survival: An Assessment of the Miskitu Question," Nicaraguan Perspectives, vol. 8 (Fall, 1984), p. 35.

171. International Viewpoint, p. 24.
172. Hale, p. 35.
173. "The Hard Lessons of the Atlantic Coast: Interview with FSLN Leader Tomas Borge," Intercontinental Press, vol. 24 (July 24, 1986), p. 111.
174. Bourgois, p. 25.
175. Hale, p. 35.
176. Intercontinental Press, p. 111.
177. Bourgois, p. 26.
178. Rooper and Smith, p. 13.
179. The new settlements promised better medical care, schools and employment (Ibid.).
180. Ortiz, p. 50.
181. Moore, p. 141.
182. Intercontinental Press, p. 112.
183. Ortiz, p. 50.
184. Diskin, p. 24.
185. Hale, p. 36.
186. Jane Harris, "Sandinistas Revolution Brings Gains to Atlantic Coast," The Militant, vol. 48, (March 23, 1984), p.18.
187. Diskin, p. 23.
188. Ortiz, p.55.
189. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, "Towards Reconciliation," Nicaraguan Perspectives, vol. 12 (Summer 1986), p. 18.
190. Freeland, p. 181.
191. Harris, p. 18.
192. Tim Coone, "The Sandinistas Lose Office but not Power," World Press Review, vol. 37 (April 1990), p. 24.
193. Coone, p. 22.

194. Coraggio, p. 3.
195. Robert A. Gross, The Minuteman and Their World (New York, 1976), p. 78.
196. Gary Nash, "Urban Wealth and Poverty in Pre-Revolutionary America," in Stanley N. Katz and John M. Murrin eds., Colonial America 3rd edition (New York, 1983), p. 453.
197. Nash, p. 481.
198. Edward Countryman, "'Out of the Bounds of the Law': Northern Land Rioters in the Eighteenth Century," in Alfred F. Young ed., The American Revolution (DeKalb, 1976), p. 41.
199. Gary B. Nash, "Social Change and the Growth of Pre-Revolutionary Urban Radicalism," in Young, p. 27.
200. Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New York, 1976), p. 98.
201. Judson, p. 26
202. Coraggio, p. 24.
203. Many of the attempts to create a national mentality among the troops were deliberate; however, the creators of the Army did not envision it as a place only for the lower classes. Interestingly, early in the war conscripts into the Continental Army included people from all parts of society, only as war progressed did it become a predominantly lower class institution (Royster, p. 49).
204. While the people of the Coast perhaps would have identified the loss of goods and jobs as a result of United States policies, these actions would have appeared to be the result of "Spanish" provocation, not the act of an imperialist power trying to overthrow a sovereign nation (Coraggio, p. 31).
205. Morgan, p. 4.
206. Morgan, p.5.
207. Ibid.
208. Morgan, p.6.
209. Morgan, p.7.

210. Slaves took up most of the jobs that would have been held by laboring poor, subsequently Virginia did not develop the type of extreme poverty among its lower classes that posed such a threat to the English political system. Additionally, elite whites needed to prevent poor whites from joining with the slaves and overthrowing the system, giving them the incentive to allow poor whites into the political process. Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery and American Freedom (New York, 1975), pp. 377-87.

211. Robert W. Weir, "'The Harmony We Were Famous For:' An Interpretation of Pre-Revolutionary South Carolina Politics," in Katz and Murrin, p. 431.

212. Morgan, American Slavery American Freedom, p. 487.

213. Donald C. Hodges, Intellectual foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution (Austin, 1986), p. 163.

214. Hodges, p. 74.

215. Hodges, p. 73.

216. Judson, p. 24.

217. Martin and Lender, p. 41.

218. Martin and Lender, p. 187.

219. This may seem an oversimplification; however, according to Martin and Lender, Washington was able to reconcile his officers in just such a manner (p. 193).

220. This does not imply that he was not tremendously popular, only that his popularity did not create a sense of national obligation among the people, especially Congress.

221. Martin and Lender, p. 196.

222. The Sandinistas on several occasions had attempted to launch a protracted civil war but had been decisively defeated. Hence, to talk about the formation of a large scale guerilla force in Nicaragua prior to the Revolution may fly in the face of the reality that faced the FSLN. Given that they chose to focus primarily on political education it would seem as if this may have been the case. Harold Jung, "Behind the Nicaraguan Revolution," The New Left Review no. 117 (September-October, 1979), p. 79.

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