

THE METAPHYSICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF WITTGENSTEIN'S *TRACTATUS*:
AN INTERPRETIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE NATURE AND
FUNCTION OF SIMPLE OBJECTS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S
EARLY THEORY OF MEANING

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If a "theory" of meaning is possible, what form must it take? This study of Wittgenstein's early work was undertaken with this question as its focus. My reinterpretation derives from a close study of the *Tractatus* and the *Notebooks 1914-1916* in which Wittgenstein explores the conditions necessary to representation.

The problem relation of language to the world should not be explicated in terms of concepts consequent on it- -description, truth and reference; neither should the theory adopt their presuppositions (concerning the form of reality). It is argued Wittgenstein eschews the practice of redefining those concepts in favour of explicating parallel ones. Propositions do not describe but show the conditions for representation which their forms are congruent with, not true of; for by showing those conditions propositions are not intentional (-ly representational), rather they make the intention to refer possible.

This fundamental semantic relation I reinterpret as a linguistic form of intentionality that makes conceivable the universality of languages' representational potential to apply to any world whatsoever (dubbed "blind referencing").

The standard realist and anti-realist interpretations of Wittgenstein's position are criticised throughout though elements of each contribute to the solution I argue for.

The conditions for representation Wittgenstein proposes- -a subsisting realm of simple objects- -are considered both directly and through an exploration of the notions of propositional analysis and of the context propositions provide for the meanings of names (part 1). The conclusion is that the core concept of "simple object" ("logical form", a variable) is infinitely analogically interpretable and phenomenological in character and in part 2 I explore parallels between Wittgenstein's views and Husserl's phenomenology with respect to their methodology and content- -the nature of "objects" and the essential intentionality of representation. This conception of semantics is found to substantiate the *Tractatus's* view of the common roots of logic and ethics.

My conclusion concerns three issues: distinguishing Wittgenstein's philosophical views from those of empirical linguistics; I draw out some epistemological and ontological implications; finally I argue the failure of Wittgenstein's theory from the hindsight of his later criticism of the (philosophical) notions of "objectivity" and language as rule-governed.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Preamble.....	1
The Problem of Meaning and Some Solutions.....	4
The Problem of Meaning: Wittgenstein's Solution.....	17
The Outline of the Thesis.....	29
Notes.....	32
PART 1	
THE FUNCTION OF SIMPLE OBJECTS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF MEANING	
II. SETTING THE SCENE: LOCATING THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF SIMPLE OBJECTS AND NAMES IN WITTGENSTEIN'S SCHEME.....	37
Introduction.....	37
Analysis.....	40
Form, Articulation and Structure.....	51
Linking Language and the World: Projection and Mirroring.....	52
The Logical Form of the World and Language: Internal Relations and the Dependence of Simple Objects and Names.....	62
Conclusion.....	68
Notes.....	71
III. ANALYSIS.....	78
Introduction.....	78
Kinds of Analysis and Wittgenstein's Grounds for Simples.....	82
Logical Analysis: of Meaning.....	85
Complex and Fact and the Analysis of Meaning.....	90

	Page
"Logical Manipulations": Contriving Foundations for Sense and Analysis.....	94
Complexes as Simples.....	101
Conclusion.....	104
Notes.....	106
 IV. MEANING AND CONTEXT.....	 109
Wittgenstein's Contextual Thesis.....	109
The Significance of Wittgenstein's Contextual Thesis for the Nature of Objects.....	115
Analysis and Context.....	118
Unravelling the Conditions for the Determination of Sense From the Demands for Precise Empirical Description.....	122
Notes.....	128
 V. HOW SIMPLICITY ARISES IN THE WORLD AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF MEANING.....	 133
Introduction.....	133
A Watch as a Simple Object.....	134
The Formal Conception of Simple Objects.....	141
The Relation Between a Name and Its Object.....	165
The Object of Reference.....	179
Conclusion.....	185
Notes.....	188
PART 2	
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF MEANING	
 VI. THE BACKGROUND TO CONSIDERING WITTGENSTEIN'S EARLY WORK AS LINGUISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY	 198
Introduction.....	198
The Focus of Wittgenstein's and Husserl's Philosophies.....	200
So Why <i>Husserlian</i> Phenomenology?.....	202
Wittgenstein's Early Phenomenological Interests.....	206
Notes.....	212

	Page
VII. PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD AND ITS OBJECTS: HUSSERL AND WITTGENSTEIN.....	217
Introduction.....	217
Phenomenological Methodology.....	218
What Phenomenological Methods Reveal.....	230
Notes.....	264
VIII. INTENTIONALITY: THE FUNDAMENTAL SEMANTIC RELATION BETWEEN THOUGHT OR LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD.....	272
Introduction: Husserl's and Wittgenstein's Solutions to the Problem of the Relation of Thought or Language to the World.....	272
The Intentionality of Consciousness and of language....	274
Notes.....	305
IX. THE AGENT OF REPRESENTATION.....	314
Introduction.....	314
Sense and Necessity as Evidence of Agency.....	316
The Nature of the Will of the Representing Agent.....	320
The Transcendental Character of the Representing Agent.....	326
Wittgenstein's Identification of the Self and the Limits of the World.....	330
Agency, the World and Values.....	334
Conclusion: the Harmony of Will and the World in the <i>Tractatus</i>	336
Notes.....	340
X. CONCLUSION: LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD.....	344
Introduction.....	344
Language.....	344
The World.....	354
Language and the World.....	370
Notes.....	385
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	392

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Preamble

The *leitmotif* of Wittgenstein's early philosophy (and, indeed, beyond) was the perennial problem of the determination of sense in language and its relation to the world. In this study I shall investigate these early views within the framework of a family of issues and theories that I will explore as the study progresses. For purposes of introduction I shall merely outline these and try roughly to situate the question of meaning in relation to them.

The related issues are the role of analysis in formulating a theory of meaning, the function of context with respect to such analysis and the relation of these to the crucial idea of reference. The various theories relevant to the central problem, within which I shall try to situate Wittgenstein's investigations, I shall introduce shortly. There I shall also provide a preliminary insight into some difficulties to be encountered in investigations into the foundations of language and their relation to the language they underpin.

So my concern is essentially with semantics although it will be important as always to see how one is to conceive of the syntax of language fitting that theory. The solution I shall argue for (and

which, of course, I think Wittgenstein is suggesting) proves especially successful in this respect by conceiving of the syntax and semantics of language non-reductively, as emerging as indistinguishable phenomena at the foundations of language leaving no difficulties concerning their priority or relation to be addressed.

I shall also be concerned to show why neither of the prevailing interpretations of Wittgenstein's views, realist or formalist, is satisfactory either as solutions to the problem in their own right or as representations of Wittgenstein's solution. However, certain virtues in both will prove important to providing a satisfactory account, so far as one is possible, by either of these standards.

The problem might be put, how is the world brought to expression? Or more generally, what is the nature of the phenomena we have come to call meaning? But readers familiar with these perennial problems who have learnt the lesson of philosophical self consciousness which Wittgenstein espoused, will already be concerned that this expression of the problem is the problem. Where in it is there any mention of the human agent? For I did not ask, "How in language do we bring the world to expression?" Does not the impersonal expression finesse all the intentional accounts of meaning which in a variety of forms have come to be relied upon in contemporary theories?

I don't want to be deflected at this stage, however, since the contemporary pragmatic view (that is, one that recognises the place of the language user in her context) is the one I shall, in part, come to defend on Wittgenstein's behalf; though, as we will see, the limitations of Wittgenstein's early conception of this context proves

to be its undoing. But, far from this making the study redundant from the outset, it is my belief that what is revealed in the process of my investigation are quite subtle and complex relationships between the two levels of correspondence which representation of the world by language seems to require.

The interpretation of the *Tractatus* I shall propose is voluntaristic and phenomenological and offers a single perspective on the foundations of language and ethics. But space will not allow me to work out in detail the consequences of my interpretation for matters of value in general.

I said above that the account I shall defend is only the most satisfactory one and I say this for two reasons. In the first place the one crucial issue of the nature and function of simple objects is not dealt with in the *Tractatus* at all exhaustively; this requires my study to make substantial excursions into Wittgenstein's notes of the period and to make some speculative explorations of its own. Secondly, as most commentators agree, for a variety of reasons the *Tractatus* is inescapably flawed. In this respect I feel that too little effort has been spent on damage limitation or on charitable interpretation of the work.

My interpretation will prove suggestive of continuity between the early and later philosophy (often superficially obscured by the starchy, formal vocabulary of the early 'analysis' in contrast with the freer expressive style of the latter). Again, because of space limitations, this aspect of the study will be evident only as a hidden agenda.¹ But I shall argue that many of the legitimate distinctions to

be drawn between these works are responses to one particular development in Wittgenstein's thinking about what constitutes the essential context of meaningful utterance (namely, what can be said to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for sense to be attained).

The failure of the early work lies, I believe, in its insistence on the objective nature of the determination of sense (represented by its focus on the proposition and sentence meaning rather than speaker meaning) which is based on the belief in an objective relation between language and the world. But this in turn will prove to be a corollary of the limited conception of context Wittgenstein inherited (uncharacteristically) uncritically from Frege.

The Problem of Meaning and Some Solutions

I have said that language corresponds with the world at two levels and I have made reference to the foundations of language. In order to explain these matters I will provide a schema of three theories relevant to the discussion:

(A) a metaphysical one, (B) a semantic one (in outlining this I shall consider the issues of foundations and correspondence), (C) a formal one. These three will require some mapping of each onto the others as the study progresses.

(A) The Metaphysical Theory.

Language possesses a remarkable adaptability, or "productivity" as it is sometimes referred to. We suppose there could be no new worlds or aspects of existing ones that we could not describe. We can, it seems, construct from a limited vocabulary an apparently unlimited

range of sentences which express new meanings (I did not say, "... by which we express new meanings"). And this does not of course include the varieties of expressions of any one sense (the supposed proposition). And such meanings can presumably be instrumental in "revealing" new phenomena to us. 'Homosexual' and 'Quanta' may have been unknown terms in the 18th century yet it is clear that, even then, these concepts could have been defined. So in what sense are we to suppose the "phenomena" are revealed by being named? Have we, so to speak, learned something of the world in having the concept brought to our attention? After all, some 18th century science fiction writer could presumably have imagined what homosexuality was and could have added it to their vocabulary even if the phenomenon had only come to be named in this century. As Locke would have observed it only required the conjoining of certain already existing ideas such as gender and affection amongst others.

Likewise we have no anxieties over the potential of our language to describe phenomena that in this century we have yet to encounter. Certainly, for the sake of economy of expression, we will expand our vocabulary. But even without lexical evolution we would still be capable of describing that future world. Even supposing, for example, that future inhabitants communicated in some sort of binary based language (it was found easier to educate humans to speak computer language without translation than develop computers to understand human speech), the situation is still only the familiar one of translating between languages.

Furthermore it is arguable whether there are any genuine examples of non-translatability between two natural languages despite the absence of synonymous names. Nuances of meaning in one language can be expressed in any other albeit in prolix phrases and expressions.²

Language, we might say treating the title generically, has therefore an enduring character and neology should be considered a superficial phenomenon of language use.

Of course shared experience seems to be an assumption behind this claim of the adaptable nature of language to circumstance. What does seem to be a more fundamental prerequisite is that the world, however it happens to be, possesses some underlying form which because of our shared physical constitution, needs and immersion in reality shapes all our languages. Thus the possibility of language, its foundations, lie with the nature of the world itself (provided we include in this the physical human agent). Or at least, that is how we might naively imagine it given our realist propensities.

Accounts of meaning in which these underlying conditions for representation of the world are argued to have ontological consequences are usually referred to as realist. Witness one such contemporary claim:

... by studying the most general aspects of language we will be studying the most general aspects of reality. (Davidson, 1984, p. 201)

In sharing a language, in whatever sense this is required for communication, we share a picture of the world that must, in its large features, be true. It follows that in making manifest the large features of our language, we make manifest the large features of reality. One way of pursuing metaphysics is therefore to study the general structure of our language. (ibid. p. 199, underlining added)
[and furthermore]

Successful communication proves the existence of a shared, and largely true, view of the world. (ibid. p. 201, underlining added)

More sceptical (though arguably no less metaphysical) views have been that whatever deeper order we suppose underlies the potential for any natural language to generate new senses for new circumstances with existing finite vocabularies, it is an order which is imposed rather than given. We might refer to this as a kind of linguistic idealism (a de-psychologised, linguistic version of Hume). It represents the belief that there is no correspondence between language and reality at this deeper level. By this account the very idea of reality becomes itself a linguistic construct. Such anti-realism will find some partial resonance in the thesis I shall be considering in this study. I shall refer to it as the antirealist or formalist thesis.

In our contemporary philosophical climate, in which there seems to be a resurgence of an almost Cartesian optimism with respect to scientific causal accounts, such idealists' views are often brought back into the realist's camp by denying their apparently arbitrary, conventional basis. The realist then accounts for our linguistic practices by drawing on developments in cognitive science, our increasing knowledge of brain physiology and, analogically, developments in computer sciences. Such theories, while realist in so far as they maintain that there is something corresponding to the world's order as language manifests it, are nonetheless anti-realist regarding the order of the metaphysical, objective world. For example, knowing that the order prevailing within language reflects so-called "hard wired" brain physiological structures of ours (essentially a

Chomskian position) allows us to draw no conclusions, at least directly, concerning the world which our statements purport to describe.

But realist theses possess one common virtue, real conditions of meaning, be they characteristics of the world or of the agent, can legitimately be the subject of scientific investigation. Of course there would still remain the epistemological question of coordinating the supposed fundamental phenomena (ultimate particles or cognitive patterns perhaps) with distinct meanings.

It has also been suggested that language itself generates the phenomena of which we speak. The phenomenon of homosexuality, it is argued, exists only for language users, because it is a higher order concept supervenient on simpler conceptions. But accounts like this, such as Charles Taylor's (1985), still call upon the notion of that which is linguistically primitive and its correspondence in some manner with what is real.

(B) The Semantic Theory.

Let me say what I meant earlier by two levels of correspondence between language and the world. Then we can characterise the foundations of language in terms of this distinction.

One level of correspondence is that entailed by a correspondence theory of truth (the correspondence between true proposition and fact). But prior to this (it is supposed) lies a deeper level of correspondence which facilitates the expression of what might be the case, indeed which makes expression a possibility. It underlies our conception of contingency. It is a relationship between language and

its truth conditions (the world is conceived as the truth condition of all propositions). To be able to say what the world might be like (to possess a content) requires that our language shares something in common with what it represents. That "something in common" may be called form. This distinction will become especially evident in a much later discussion (chapter VIII) of the distinction between intentionality and reference.

The relationship between these two levels of correspondence can be explained in terms of conditionals. Any claim that such and such is the case is essentially hypothetical, it has an underlying counterfactual nature which analysis of language reveals. Since Russell³ this analysis has been taken to be concerned with existence. Briefly, claims of how the world is are considered to take the form of (or be reducible to) propositions of the predicative or relational forms: $\exists x$ or $R(x,y)$. Under Russell's analysis both forms reveal a common existential presupposition that appears as the initial quantified expression $\exists x$. Thus the existence of the objects named (a, or a and b) is a necessary condition for " $\exists a$ " or " $R(a,b)$ " to possess a truth value. That is, it is a condition for the possibility that $\exists a$ or $R(a,b)$ and that is all that a proposition "pictures". So the deeper level of correspondence lies between the presuppositions of any proposition and the referent of the individual constant lying within the scope of the quantifier in its analysis.

But there is an ambiguity here, one that lies at the heart of the distinction between truth and sense conditions of a language, which realist theories often fail to take account of. What is it that is

said to exist, the so-called facts which are the truth conditions of our claims or the "objects" which constitute the subjects of those claims? In the true proposition, "Snow is white.", does the proposition's truth condition (snow is white, or white snow) exist in the same manner as the proposition's sense condition (snow) is presupposed to do? If we conflate these forms of existence (as Russellian logical analysis appears to do) we are left in the position of explaining what exists and is the truth condition of a proposition in terms of some further existence (the conditions necessary for it being a possibility). Clearly, because of the conflation of "existence" of fact and of object, this is an unsatisfactory, regressive explanation.

The preconditions of meaning I have outlined here represent the deeper level, form, which language is presumed to possess and possibly share with reality. It is here that the foundations of language lie. Do they correspond to anything or is the presuppositional nature of propositions merely a formal device of language? And what form do these phenomena take, whatever can be named (objects) or whatever can be described (facts)?⁴

Early in this introduction it seemed as if the procedure of giving names to phenomena ('homosexual' and 'quanta' were cited) was only a superficial linguistic procedure since despite the absence of the name for either phenomenon in some language (say, English prior to the 18th century), we would still be able to give the idea expression in the form of description. Thus description would be prior to naming. But now we have noted that descriptions possess a characteristic form

which requires the naming of objects which are the subject of the propositions of the description (e.g. 'a' in ' \emptyset ' or ' $R(ab)$ ').

This chicken and egg situation can be correlated with two notions in terms of which the relationship of language to the world is explained--sense and reference. At the foundation of meaning, according to Russell (at least with respect to language in its representing mode), lies the idea of the reference to something by a name or a phrase (a noun phrase or definite description) both which are logically prior to asserting what is the case. Something is picked out (identified) either by the association of a name with an object I gesture to, or by virtue of the sense of a phrase or sentence (a description) providing both necessary and sufficient criteria for identification. So whatever is the subject of some assertion that p can thus be identified either ostensively or by description.

Of course both procedures involve possibly insurmountable difficulties with respect to their potential for satisfying conditions of identification. For the present, however, I merely want to draw attention to these two procedures that have been held to fix language to the world. It is evident that even if these procedures were unproblematic, there would remain the problem as to which procedure had priority in an explanation of meaning. We assume that they can't both come first. (C) The Formal Theory.

We have noted a regress concerning what is said to exist - describing the subject of a proposition entails a further subject being named which can in turn be described and so on. Wherever the line is drawn, whatever is claimed as the referent of either a name or

description, clearly has to be held to be fundamental and primitive in some way in order for the regress to be avoided. This brings me to the formal options.

The theory of meaning suggested thus far is usually termed Logical Atomism. However, there remain two opposing theoretical positions which need to be distinguished. On the one hand it can be held that meaning arises constitutively--sentence meaning is composed from semantic elements (names) which separately and individually bring their meanings to bear on the overall sense of the sentence they compose. So to understand the meaning of some sentence is first and foremost a matter of grasping the meaning of individual "atoms" of meaning. This entails a theory of semantics tying the meanings of individual words to individual elements (atoms) in reality or experience. For this reason I shall refer to such a theory as a realist atomic theory.

The opposing view is the holistic atomic view. Here the individual meanings of words are a function of the overall sense of the sentence in which they occur (not constitutively but, so to speak, parasytically as fragments of sentence meaning, not discrete atoms of meaning). It is as if, analogically, the constituent molecules of water could only be described in terms of the emergent phenomenon of liquidity (arising from their relations). Thus all such properties would be essentially relative. Just as by this account it is difficult to get a handle on the atoms or molecules themselves, so analogically speaking the semantic theory supplementing this holistic atomic theory is less obvious since the only entities a word picks out seem to be

pseudo-entities suggested by the meanings of sentences rather than real individual, independent ones.

Put in terms of contemporary theories of reference the atomic realist view can draw upon so called causal theories of reference suggested by Russell, Kripke,⁵ Donnellan,⁶ *et al.* A name means its object directly, as a label attaches to its bearer. That the naming relation is primitive and unanalysable is supposed to be the virtue of such theories.

The holistic version conceives reference as mediated by some description. Frege held that a name possessed both a sense and a reference, the latter being mediated by the former. Strawson's⁷ and Searle's "cluster" theories⁸ represent more contemporary workings of the idea. We identify the object labelled by some name by means of some description we can provide. So one's understanding of the reference of a name is essentially a cognitive activity. One understands, rather than is acquainted anocetically, with the thing. Indeed such a theory is commonly held to deny ineffable, anocetic experience. One needs to bear in mind too that Frege did not subjectify the relation by calling on cognitive states of the referrer. Rather, he thought reference would obtain objectively in terms of the formal relations of signs (a name sign is identified with some description sign: 'Venus' means 'The Morning Star'). (Definite) Description provides the necessary and sufficient conditions (as a name cannot) some "object" fulfills in order to be identified as the referent of the description.

According to Frege's view, reference is therefore essentially an transitive relation of name to bearer and should not be considered primitive and unanalysable.²⁹ So Frege's view only takes us so far. It has the advantage over atomists' theories of providing a relatively painless account of how a name can be, and be understood as, part of a larger semantic unit (a phrase or sentence). Thus does Frege's account lend itself to a more pragmatic account of meaning especially if we recall his insistence on the necessity of a propositional context for meanings of individual words.

The two accounts I have outlined of the possible mechanisms by which language touches the world: naming and describing, both have their limits as explanations of meaning. Indeed because these are concepts arising within language itself, it is likely that Wittgenstein would dismiss them as unsuited to explaining its foundations. In addition, what are named or described in natural languages are often objects or facts which may not be phenomena speakers of other languages are acquainted with. This in itself would suggest that there should be an insurmountable problem of translation between two languages which, as I remarked at the outset, seems to be neither true nor plausible. So the question arises: at what level are the supposed semantic atoms (named or described) at the foundations of language, evident? How are the metaphysical, semantic, and formal schema to be mapped onto one another?

Superficially this mapping appears more obvious for realist theories than for holistic ones. But the obvious link between naming, real objects and meaning (as referring) seems to stall the moment we

try to account for the legitimacy or illegitimacy of particular combinations of names to provide meaningful sentences. One cannot simply substitute a name for every individual item in the world, not without some account of how these names for individuals are to be conceived as foundations of a language in which generality appears an essential aspect. That objects are types of objects and so can be described in general terms (using names that are categorially related) appears essential to the possibility of those names entering into meaningful combinations.

This problem of the relationship between the atomic and the molecular seems to be what a phenomenological conception of meaning allays. Holistic theories begin with what is already complex and evident in our experience so one's view of what is to count as atomic is already given a place, so to speak, within the complex. Objects are not apprehended in isolation but always in some context which betrays their identity without stating it. Correspondingly a name is already conceived as such with its syntax in place. A name is essentially a contextual element.¹⁰

The problem with this notion lies with explaining the origin of the grammatical-logical relations of names given that these relations are supposed to mirror contingent relations of the objects we perceive. The phenomenological solution to this lies, it is supposed, in the manner of our awareness of the object's context in the first place, apprehension, not merely perception.

But given this phenomenological solution, the problem of translation between languages re-emerges. If, for example,

'homosexuality' could only be analysed, for the benefit of members of a society unacquainted with the phenomenon, in terms of gender and affections which are themselves only conceptualised in terms of that higher order concept, then circularity will deny us the possibility of translation. That gender and affection are not so dependent for their description on this higher order concept at all, as might seem the case, merely returns us to the realist atomic theory's difficulties outlined above.

Furthermore, such a phenomenology seems to demand a distinctive relation between the so-called foundations and the language they support since the foundations do not seem to possess any stability of their own independently of their supporting role.

It seems as if our problem might stem from the fact that "gender" and "affection" are themselves not primitive (atomic) concepts but are further analysable. So in the process of analysis something unique occurs at its final stage. That is, the analysis leading to the final stage of what is genuinely simple and ungeneralised, must be quite unlike all the preceding stages.

What I hope will emerge from a close consideration of Wittgenstein's early investigations will be a third alternative to either naming or describing lying at the foundations of language and its relation to the world.

Anyone already familiar with the *Tractatus* and the mass of literature it has become buried beneath will know that fundamentally the work is considered to be, quintessentially, a realist atomic theory- -an account of meaning which gives priority to naming and

reference in the strictest (i.e., logically proper) sense. Consequentially my own approach will inevitably be two pronged, arguing for one account whilst at the same time referring to this rival orthodoxy.

The Problem of Meaning: Wittgenstein's Solution

There can be little doubt that Wittgenstein was struck by what I have referred to as the adaptability of language. By way of illustration only, we might note his remarks from the *Tractatus*' at 4.027 and 4.03:

It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us. (4.027)

A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new sense. (4.03a)

At 4.12 he claims "Propositions can represent the whole of reality." His fascination with this aspect of meaning continued throughout his career. He justified this belief in the universality of language's application by pointing out that one can't draw a line between what can be represented and what cannot because language simply is the totality of propositions (see PR VIII, §85). So language can "expand" (see PG VI, §71) but only in a manner which I can foresee the form of (though not of course the content).

We can readily see Wittgenstein's focus is also on what I have referred to as the contact between language and reality (marked I have said by a foundational correspondence between the two):

A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation. (4.03b)

In fact one might be tempted to propose three levels at which language corresponds with reality: 1. between a true proposition (description) and fact, 2. between a proposition true or false and what in the world makes that state of affairs a possibility and 3. the relation of name to bearer (naming). But the prevailing, realist view is that the *Tractatus* assimilates the latter two by reducing the second to the third, the sense conditions of a proposition lie with the existence of the simple objects which names name. With simple objects we are, in a stroke, given the whole of logical form which the use of names in propositions mirrors. So principally the first move in making sense lies with naming.

What is remarkable is that our use of language is achieved in ignorance of the actual meaning of each word. That is, Wittgenstein supposed that we do not know the correct analyses of the everyday names we do use in terms of the names of simple objects, nor are we acquainted with simple objects themselves.¹² In fact his proposal regarding the existence of simple objects as meanings of names is of the nature of a general principle established *a priori*. I shall argue that in positing foundations of simple objects and names for the world and language respectively Wittgenstein is offering not real foundations but rather conceptual (semantic) ones.

Throughout the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein is concerned not with our perceptions of the world (he has little or no interest in epistemological concerns) but with our apprehension of it. The former he viewed as strictly the purview of science; but only the

apprehending of the world is concerned with bringing it to expression.¹²

But in 4.03 he goes on to say:

And the connexion [between proposition and situation] is precisely that it is its logical picture.

A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture. (4.03c,d)

This is clearly tied to his previous remark that a proposition, like the state of affairs it represents, is essentially articulated (structured, 3.14 - 3.1431). There is no mention of names and objects here but only of structures. In addition Wittgenstein says repeatedly that it is the structure of the world that language mirrors, namely, that which implies distinguishability and relatedness. It is the relation between elements of the world, that language mirrors within itself *whatever* the nature of those elements might turn out to be.

David Ard (1983, p. 378) expresses succinctly just what Wittgenstein's concerns are and where he looks for his solution:

The *Tractatus* is an argument for an absolute isomorphism between language and reality. There is no debate amongst interpreters of the *Tractatus* about this purpose, but there is a lack of clarity concerning just what Wittgenstein considered to be the basis for this strict correspondence. What enables language to mirror the world? What enables a proposition to picture a possible occurrence in the world?

But immediately and incongruously (except to one who is already following the canon) he asks, "How is an object named?". I say incongruously because if Ard is correct in his assertion that the connection is isomorphic in nature (which I agree it is) it is certainly not obvious what the naming of simples has to do with structural concerns, the relations within complex items.

In a sense Wittgenstein's fundamental belief regarding the isomorphic relation of language to the world is based on the view that:

Propositions (which are symbols having reference to facts) are themselves facts: that this inkpot is on the table may express that I sit in this chair.
(NB 97, cf. 2.141, 3.14, 3.1431)

So our contact with the world through language is possible simply because the world actually lies within language as propositions, not with respect to what they represent, but more fundamentally and immediately for what they are in themselves essentially, structures. Our acquaintance with the determinate structure of a proposition amounts to an acquaintance with the form of a fact (a determinate relation of distinguishable things, a structure no less) and in that lies the essential and substantial nature of the world. In this respect extra-linguistic experience as a means to knowledge of the essential nature (as opposed to its contingent details) of the world is in effect redundant. Of course the relations between names in propositions are distinct from the relations between items in the world but only in the same way any relation between items in the world is distinct from any other. In this sense the world does not lie outside of language, thus are they connected. Only in so far as one fact is held to represent another are they distinct.

The essential character of propositions, that they are articulated, echoes Wittgenstein's view of the essentially complex nature of the world- -of facts. Not of objects (see 1 - 1.2).¹⁴ In the *Tractatus* the most primitive bearer of meaning (which is to say what least can

intelligibly be considered determinate) is an elementary proposition. Clearly the notion of determinacy cannot apply to names. Thus the *Tractatus* should be regarded as a sustained exploration of the structure of, and internal (that is logical) relations within, propositions rather than of the names we might suppose them to "contain."

But in the 3.2's Wittgenstein clearly says that propositions are fully analysed into names (simple, primitive signs) whose meanings are the simple objects comprising any situation. These passages are the main source of the impression that Wittgenstein is espousing a realist atomic theory of meaning and that impression, given the consensus of authority in its favour, can only be reconsidered from juxtaposing these passages with other, equally significant claims Wittgenstein makes. Which is to say that I am unable to simply offer some novel reinterpretation of the 3.2's and so dispel that impression.

As I have said, one issue I shall focus on will be the form of analysis Wittgenstein is espousing and the simples it gives rise to. He characterises these simples as being without properties and indescribable; as being only namable yet elucidations (see 3.263), not ostensive definitions, are required in order to explain their names' meanings; as the meanings of names, they can never be identified by virtue of their name (to which they have only a contingent relation); and that names can only possess a meaning in propositional circumstances (see 3.3). All of these will prove difficult to fit with the realist view.

So, although the 3.2's seem to suggest a very obvious and direct contact (one which eschews the mediation of senses that Frege suggested) between language and the world which might be foundational to meaning, my contention will be that, worked out in its details, the realist interpretation fails for the reasons largely internal to the rest of Wittgenstein's theory that I listed above. But I shall also offer some objections of my own that I think we might reasonably suppose sufficiently obvious to have been anticipated by Wittgenstein.

The thrust of my argument might be put by saying that simple objects (as Wittgenstein conceives them) do not exist within the world, nor is their existence required as a necessary pre-condition of meaning. And nor does Wittgenstein say it is.

Four alternative conceptions of simple objects will be considered at various stages: 1. Realist, 2. Phenomenalist, 3. Formalist. The first and second are species of the realist thesis. My various objections to these three will crop up throughout this study but I will here briefly outline my reasons for favouring: 4. Phenomenological:¹⁵ I shall argue that simplicity is apprehended in terms of our perceptions of the world as complex, and that objects are effectively seen-as simple in relation to those complex wholes (possible situations in the world).¹⁶ Seeing objects in terms of their relations appears to me to offer the only means of avoiding having separately to relate semantic and syntactic aspects of language.

That simple objects are phenomenological in character will turn out to be consonant with the ineffable nature of the actual things which are the real referents of names in elementary propositions (whatever

"it" is, complex or simple, that is *seen-as* simple). Seeing some thing as a simple object I shall speak of in terms of construing it, and I think of this as representing the essential mark of the transcendent agent (the metaphysical, non-psychological will) in determining sense.

The principle of propositional context (that only names in propositions name objects and possess a meaning), which I claim compromises any realist reading of Wittgenstein's claim that real objects are the meanings of names, will be closely tied to my investigation of the reciprocal dependency to be found within Wittgenstein's conception of simple objects and their relations (i.e. between what is simple and what is complex). States of affairs are conceived in terms of their constituent objects but the latter, in turn, can be characterised only in terms of the former they are logically predisposed to form. The context principle will turn out to be simply the linguistic counterpart of this dependency in the non-linguistic realm.

My denial of anything actually simple existing (Wittgenstein speaks of simple objects "subsisting" and I shall argue that this is not intended generically to mark merely two species, necessary and contingent, of the genus "existing") is an echo of Wittgenstein's opening remarks to the effect that the world, what exists, is always complex (and thereby describable). For Wittgenstein (see 2.01) relations of simple objects exist so that "exists" is to be understood to mean something like "obtaining" (of some contingent state) rather than "being" (of some thing).

The alternative level of correspondence between language and the world (to naming and describing) that is foundational, I shall argue, occurs between the structure (articulation) of elementary propositions and what can be said to exist. A misunderstanding by Baker and Hacker will illustrate an important misconception about the *Tractatus* and bring out a distinction between the structure of elementary propositions and the structure of complex propositions. They say:

... the direct lineage of truth-conditional semantics certainly includes Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. There we find clear definitions of logical constants in the form of truth-tables, definitions which are put to use to demonstrate that certain formulae are tautologies (logical truths) and that certain inferences are valid in virtue of their logical forms. There too is an explicit identification of sense with truth conditions in the case of molecular propositions. (1984, p. 122)

Most of this is of course accurate. But it misses the point of all of Wittgenstein's work with respect to molecular propositions which is to show how they are only logical functions of the truth values of their constituent elementary propositions. And it is with respect to the latter that he does his real work to show how sense is determined (how meaning is achieved). By accounting for molecular propositions in terms of elementary ones Wittgenstein thereby (with the supplementary aid of his theory of the merely formal character of the logical constants in molecular propositions) reduces the necessary scope of his theory of meaning to the meaning of elementary propositions. And of course it is my contention that this is the case too, so to speak, in the opposite direction- -the meanings of names are also to be related to the meanings of elementary propositions and so are covered by the same theory. This solution will be consonant with the holistic

and phenomenological aspects I shall argue characterise Wittgenstein's account of the foundations of meaning.

I began this section with identifying three possible levels of language-world correspondence. In arguing for the second of the three (in effect seeking the reverse of the reduction I claimed realists' theories seek) it will also become necessary to review the nature of the naming relation and the means by which a name (as Wittgenstein puts it in the 2.15's) "reaches out" to its referent in the world. If reference is a relation to what exists then the means by which names reach out to subsisting simple objects demands some alternative explanation.

Wittgenstein's idea of the isomorphism of a proposition and a state of affairs offers an original means by which this "reference" may be achieved between name and ineffable referent. Fogelin (1976, p. 17) was correct in claiming that Wittgenstein rejected Frege's "third-man" account of naming (a name's sense mediates its reference) but wrong in concluding that naming must therefore be immediate and as direct as the relation between objects in states of affairs (that of links in a chain, 2.03). Instead I shall argue that objects are picked out by names by virtue of the relations names enter into within elementary propositions and the isomorphic projections those enable us to make with states of affairs.

The solution I shall propose follows directly from Wittgenstein's picture theory whose foundations lie within his deeper claim about the isomorphism between language and the world. Put as briefly as possible, the correspondence between language and the world is a matter

of comparing shapes or structures of propositions and state of affairs. Or alternatively we could say that the two are compared analogically for we should recall that "shape" here is but a metaphor for logical forms. This analogical relation will prove to be the key to understanding two important claims in the *Tractatus*:

- a. that the referents of names are ineffable. These simple logical forms are only manifested, not stated, by propositions.
- b. that the foundations of meaning and logic are common with the foundations of valuations in ethics and aesthetics. Richard Brockhaus remarks that...

[the *Tractatus*] offers an accelerating series of remarks on the world, logic and the essence of language, suddenly and quite mysteriously blossoming into cryptic claims about the will, ethics, "God," and "The Mystical." (1991, p. 1)

Yet we know that Wittgenstein considered his closing remarks on ethics aesthetics. to represent his main purpose and motive rather than mere after the fact musings.¹⁷ So it seems fair to expect any interpretation of the work to secure some connection between these two major concerns.

I do not share the view that Wittgenstein's views on language should be understood merely as limiting the scope of language and securing for the ethical and mystical an untouchable, ineffable realm beyond the reach of Positivist dogma. Wittgenstein's abiding interest lay with the foundations of meaning. For the early Wittgenstein this meant the foundations of the propositions of natural science (6.53); only this perspective on language and science, their very possibility, was significant. And these foundations shared equal status with ethics

and aesthetics in the realm of what Wittgenstein termed, on account of its ineffable nature, the mystical. But at the same time as apparently undermining the consensus special status of science Wittgenstein effectively reasserts its profound significance which he felt had been lost in the same shallow thinking that characterised much of the contemporary attitude to religion, ethics and Art.

But I shall further argue that valuable those these insights may be Wittgenstein fails to establish such foundations as the objective foundations he believes (for other reasons) are necessary to language and ethics. In brief, the determinate relation of names in a true proposition (cf. 2.15) and the corresponding fact of determinate related simple objects constitute the sense conditions of the proposition yet the means by which the one is to be projected on to the other (cf. 3.1 - 3.12) cannot, finally, be demonstrated to obtain in an uninterpreted (that is objective) fashion.

I began with noting Wittgenstein's belief in the universal capability of language to represent, and with the question of whether such potential was grounded in some common quality language shares with reality. The Hintikkas' remarks here on language as a universal medium are especially apposite (see 1986, chapter 1). But I think my point can be understood more immediately simply by reflecting on Wittgenstein's insistence that propositions are themselves facts. So propositions exist in the world just as other facts; or alternatively one might express it thus- -the world is all that is the case (1.0) and propositions as facts themselves are thereby included in that ontology. But then the form of language and the world are thereby

identified, and Wittgenstein's enquiry inevitably becomes one whose scope is the logical form of all possible languages (and all possible worlds). The consequences of this are not always appreciated. For example, it provides an interesting comparison with theories of meaning which draw on the possibility of foundations of distinct conceptual frameworks (which could arguably follow from Wittgenstein's later views on language games and forms of life). In particular, in relation to my discussion here, if there was anything to Wittgenstein's early views of a single logical form to all languages then language's analysis into discrete conceptual frameworks would arguably represent a superficial and incomplete analysis. By Wittgenstein's early account there would be, at least in theory, no problem over intertranslatability of languages even if these could be shown to possess different conceptual frameworks. Donald Davidson, for instance, proposes a more contemporary version, so far as I understand it, of the view that languages are ultimately intertranslatable though he would also maintain that in fact they share in a single fundamental conceptual framework based on certain, shared fundamental "beliefs".¹⁸ However perhaps one would have to consider that everyday language possesses a logical quirkiness of its own that disguises the true logical form of thought (cf.4.002) which in practical terms may stand in the way of our perceiving all possible translations:

It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is. (4.002c).

Wittgenstein's position is neatly though unintentionally expressed by Ron Bontekoe's rebuttal to the claim of nontranslatability of distinct conceptual schemes:

Languages may well organise experience differently, [...], but they cannot be seen to organise experience at all and still be non-intertranslatable. (1992, p. 149)

This view offers the prospect of providing some characterisation of metaphysical reality (the form which provides the necessary conditions for the possibility of representation). I shall attempt, in conclusion, to say what this is without transgressing the limits of expression that Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing recognises.

The Outline of the Thesis

I begin my investigation in chapter II with a consideration of the crucial role of simple objects and names in the *Tractatus* and conclude that simple objects are actually only to be conceived in terms of the possible interrelations they can engage in. This later proves consonant with Wittgenstein's focus on language and reality sharing a structure rather than an ontology.

In chapters III and IV respectively I consider the significance of two issues concerning elementary propositions for the relations between simple objects: their analysis and their function as the context of names. I find both to provide important insights into the nature of simple objects that names name.

Chapter V represents an extended investigation of simple objects based on the premises I have argued for in the previous chapters. It takes the form of a consideration of a possible example of a simple object and draws extensively on Wittgenstein's remarks in his *Notebooks*. My criticism of certain aspects of the realist

interpretation leads me to adopt an essentially anti-realist view of simple objects but for two related reasons I find that this too requires qualification. Firstly it dislocates language from reality and so seemingly leaves still to be answered the central question of the capacity language possesses for representing the world. Secondly it runs contrary to Wittgenstein's express belief that the foundations of language are "mirrored" by reality. The significant qualification I shall introduce entails a distinctive form of reference inherent in Wittgenstein's metaphor. This qualification of the antirealist view is enlarged on and leads to a conception of simple objects which is significantly phenomenological in character.

In chapter VI I briefly document evidence that Wittgenstein was in fact already familiar with certain aspects of phenomenological thinking and in chapter VII and IX I explore certain resonances I detect within the *Tractatus* as a whole which I interpret as a response to this phenomenology. In effect, I shall be drawing certain parallels between Wittgenstein's work and certain themes in (Husserlian) phenomenology. In addition I find that this interpretation of his view on the foundations of language serves to provide the work with a greater unity both with its own closing reflections on the nature of ethics, aesthetics and the mystical and with the work he was to go on to produce in his so-called later period.

I conclude, in chapter X, by dealing with three separate issues: firstly I attempt to resolve an apparent ambivalence shown by Wittgenstein towards the reality or otherwise of simple objects that I think is significant for our understanding of both the realist

position and the view of simple objects I attribute to Wittgenstein. Secondly I undertake an explanation of some significant metaphysical conclusions that I think follow from the characterisation of simple objects that my investigation has yielded. And finally I briefly outline the grounds for rejecting Wittgenstein's early theory of meaning (the failure of objectivity) and say in passing how his later views represent a criticism of this position yet mark more a development of the early theory rather than its outright rejection.

Notes

¹ Anthony Kenny also advocates such a view, see his 1973, Chapter 12 and his paper "The Ghost of the *Tractatus*" in (1986, pp. 10-23). In the latter Kenny takes a number of topics and charts their continuity from the early work to the later: "Names and Definitions", "The Nature of Objects", "Fact and Complex", "The Picture Theory."

² Consider, for example, Wittgenstein's comments regarding various distinctive means of scientific representation of the world. He says:

[T]he possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics tells us nothing about the world: but what does tell us something about it is the precise way on which it is possible to describe it by these means. We are also told something about the world by the fact that it can be described more simply with one system of mechanics than with another. (6.342b)

³ B. Russell. "On Denoting," in *Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950*, R.C. Marsh, (ed), London: Allen and Unwin (1956).

⁴ The objection that objects too can be described applies only to complex unanalysed things, not to those objects which are considered the final analysans of the analysis. That objects and facts can be confused, ('The vase is green' and 'The green vase') is by this account to be considered a superficial and merely confusing feature of the way everyday language handles complex objects. I shall explore further the significance of the distinction between facts and complexes in Ch. III.

⁵ See S. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" in Davidson and Harman (eds) *Semantics and Natural Language*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel (1972) pp. 253-355, 763-769.

⁶ See K.S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions." *Philosophical Review* 75 (July, 1966) pp. 281-304.

⁷ See Strawson, P.F. "On Referring," *Mind* vol. 59 (1950), reprinted in Olshensky (1969), pp. 320-344.

⁸ See Searle, J. "Proper Names," *Mind*, vol. 67 (1958) pp. 166-173.

⁹ It is of course quite another matter to consider how a name and a bearer become associated initially.

¹⁰ This corresponds with the view that experience is always describable. The argument then goes that even if anything fundamental to experience were ineffable then it could not have a place in a theory of meaning. For example, either Russell's phenomenalist (ancestic) view that an ineffable sense datum (a "that") is ultimately the meaning of a name fails (at least in theory) because such names

cannot function in meaningful sentences or it succeeds only because we equate such sense data with particular describable experiences of which the sense datum is already a part (the blue of this mail-box etc.). Even so, how is, say, the sense datum of a blue (with other sense data) supposed to provide the logical construction of something as Russell and Moore supposed it would? We seem to have already surreptitiously fitted our sense data into a general conceptual framework of colours: colours as necessarily properties of material objects, colours as mutually excluding etc. In a nutshell it has already been situated into the logic of colour and has thereby received not only a reference but a sense too.

¹¹ All references to works by Wittgenstein will be abbreviated in the following way:

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1961)

Pears, D.F. and McGuinness B.F. (trans),
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Proposition number alone (e.g. 2.154b refers to the second paragraph of proposition 2.154).

"Some Remarks on Logical Form," (1966)

reprinted in Copi and Beard (1966) pp. 31-37
RLF and page number (e.g. RLF p. 34)

Zettel (1967)

Anscombe, G.E.M. and von Wright, G.H. (eds),
Anscombe, G.E.M. (trans), Oxford, Blackwell.
Z and passage number (e.g. Z §123)

Proto-Tractatus (1971)

McGuinness, B.F., Nyberg, T. and von Wright, G.H. (eds),
Pears, D.F. and McGuinness B.F. (trans),
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
P-Tractatus and proposition number (e.g. *P-Tractatus* 3.67)

The Blue and the Brown Books (1972)

Oxford, Blackwell.
BB and page number (e.g. BB p. 45)

On Certainty (1974)

Anscombe, G.E.M. and von Wright, G.H. (eds), Paul, D. and
Anscombe, G.E.M. (trans), Oxford, Blackwell.
OC and passage number (e.g. OC §34)

Philosophical Grammar (1974) Rhees, R. (ed), Kenny, A. (trans),
Oxford, Blackwell.

PG and passage and paragraph number (e.g. PG §123₅)

Philosophical Investigations (1974) Anscombe, G.E.M. (trans),
Oxford, Blackwell.

PI and passage number (e.g. PI §34)

Philosophical Remarks (1975) Rhees, R. (ed),
Hargreaves, R. and White, R. (trans), Oxford, Blackwell.
PR and passage and paragraph number (e.g. PR §123₁)

Notebooks: 1914-1916 (1979) Wright, G.H. and Anscombe, G.E.M. (eds),
Anscombe, G.E.M. (trans), Oxford, Blackwell.
NB and page and paragraph number (e.g. NB 89₅)

¹² Which is precisely the rich grounds on which revisionary theories of meaning (ones which hold that empirical data on the world will eventually uncover what should be the real meanings of words by uncovering the real nature of its constituent objects) such as Hilary Putnam's flourish.

¹³ In so far as science also conceives the world (under its various laws) then this "... tells us nothing about the world ..." (6.342) and represents "... *a priori* insights about the forms in which propositions of science can be cast." (6.34). And like all logical insights these matters are not included within what science speaks of but manifest themselves (6.36) within the forms of scientific expression. The law of causality, for example, is not some fundamental truth about the nature of reality (6.362, 6.37, 6.371). Hence, in so far as science concerns the apprehension of the world it is indistinguishable from logic and is better thought of as philosophy.

¹⁴ This of course is not necessarily intuitively the case and on this point Black (1964, p. 36) notes some interesting views claiming that ontology concerns objects not facts, most notably that expressed by P.F. Strawson ("Truth" in *Proc. of the Aristotelian Society*, a supplement, 24, 1950, p. 139)

¹⁵ I hope to show quite independently in what respects Wittgenstein's early work demonstrates certain approaches to philosophical problems which are characteristically phenomenological. I do not intend to simply adopt certain characteristics of phenomenology and apply them mechanically to Wittgenstein's work. After all both phenomenology itself and Wittgenstein's own work are highly mobile targets in this respect. Instead I hope that any phenomenology in Wittgenstein's early work will arise naturally from simply allowing my investigation and interpretation of the *Tractatus* to follow its natural course.

¹⁶ Of course, the later Wittgenstein attacked the idea that all perception and representation involved this kind of "aspect seeing" along lines parallel to ones he used to attack the view that all meaning was objective for example (see P.I. sect. XI). What Wittgenstein effectively does in these *Investigations'* passages is to distinguish the kind of aspect-seeing which would rightly be the purview of empirical psychology from aspects of meaning which are not. This stymies the incursions of psychology into theories of meaning. In a similar move he distinguishes the empirical and transcendental self in the *Tractatus* and asserts that it is only the latter which has any consequences for the limits of language.

¹⁷ See Ray Monk (1990) chapter 8, "The Unprintable Truth", especially p. 178.

¹⁸ Donald Davidson "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984) pp. 183-198.

PART 1

THE FUNCTION OF SIMPLE OBJECTS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S
THEORY OF MEANING

CHAPTER II

SETTING THE SCENE: LOCATING THE NATURE AND FUNCTION
OF SIMPLE OBJECTS AND NAMES
IN WITTGENSTEIN'S SCHEMEIntroduction

It is currently fashionable to consider Wittgenstein's early account of meaning as a realist atomistic theory of reference.¹ Propositions get their sense simply by virtue of representing the world we experience (2.221, 2.223) but only at an atomic level where names, which a correct analysis of language would reveal, have simple objects as their referents.

Sense is accounted for in terms of the logical function of words (their syntax) which in fully analysed propositions are simply the names of atomic objects (3.203). The interface between language and the world occurs at this atomic level by way of the propositions reaching out to the world through the relation between names and the objects named (2.151, 3.203, 3.22). The naming function of words, the relationship of logically proper names to their referents, is therefore to be considered fundamental to meaning. I shall dispute this and the central role of the atomic objects suggested by such an

interpretation. Even so, it is a consideration of such objects and their reconception that forms the core issue for this investigation.

In the world, atomic objects (which I shall henceforth refer to by Wittgenstein's terms- -"simple objects") are combined (related) and these combinations constitute the situations (states of affairs) which we represent in elementary propositions. Such representation is achieved by propositions in some manner copying the arrangements of simple objects by the arrangements of their constituent names (3.21).

Crucially Wittgenstein presents a very bare and general characterisation of these simple objects. They are necessary (2.02, 2.0231, but also note 2.02, 3.23), unchanging (2.027, 2.0271) and in some sense simple (2.02).

Being simple (in the sense of not possessing parts),² objects can "exist" necessarily without entailing any 'necessary facts' that we could describe (as we could objects that were necessary but also complex). The necessary "existence" (qualified in Ch. V) of simple objects is in turn required if propositions are to possess a sense and be capable of being judged true or false (consider 2.026, 3.22, 3.23). Finally, since Wittgenstein conceives of change as entailing complexity, simplicity in itself ensures that simple objects are changeless.

But despite the assurance of the above and the pivotal role ascribed to simple objects, everyone knows that Wittgenstein's notion of them in the *Tractatus* is limited and obscure at best and possibly unintelligible. Wittgenstein himself does little to relieve this difficulty in the work since, also as everyone knows, the bareness of

his characterisation of them is deliberate; it is all that he considers pertinent to his main concern (the determination of sense in propositions). And he eschews even the barest consideration of what, if anything, might be a contender for the title "simple object." Clearly he felt that he had said what was sufficient to his thesis and no doubt he realised it would not satisfy our curiosity. But, of course, Wittgenstein was explicitly not in sympathy with metaphysical speculation and we can perhaps sympathise with him resisting the temptation to try to say more. Wittgenstein's awareness of our pathological curiosity was not second hand--his own motivation in his philosophising was as often to get himself out of the fly bottle as much as to help anyone else.

But if we turn to the *Notebooks* of this era we find an entirely different character of work and a much richer source of material on which to base any speculation on the nature of simple objects. It will be an important task for my thesis to try to show how the skeletal outline of simple objects offered in the *Tractatus* could have been thought by Wittgenstein to be sufficient (and why he chose to leave out the more discursive material of the *Notebooks* as if it had never been a consideration of his). My account here will relate as much to Wittgenstein's intentions for the work as much as to any systematic doctrinal concerns.

For the present however, I want to try to present what is to be said about the notion of simple objects from the published material of the *Tractatus* and to less an extent, the *Notebooks*. Later my account will focus mostly upon his speculations in the latter. It will also be

important to show how, on this issue if no others, the little Wittgenstein does say in the *Tractatus* is not in contradiction with what we can glean from the earlier *Notebooks*. So what follows in this chapter is more or less descriptive, though not uncontroversial, and merely intended to set the scene. But I shall set it in a way intended to anticipate my later discussion and in passing I will indicate what claims or issues I intend to return to in more detail and where.

Analysis

Analysis and Determination of Sense

The entire point of Wittgenstein espousing the notion of a world subsisted by objects that are necessary, unchanging and simple is to support what has been referred to as his "brute commitment" to the determination of sense (Fogelin, 1976, p. 14), and in my view, its correlate, analysis (see 3.23, 3.25, 3.2, 3.201). From the outset we should bear in mind the distinction between an (formal) analysis and a mere (material) division (a whittling down) of anything, for only in the former is there the necessity of relating the determinate whole to the parts (analysans). I shall argue that analysis of sense should in effect follow the route of its determination (its "construction").

An important point raised by my interpretation of "simple objects" is indicated by the significance Wittgenstein awards the gross observable facts (the whole) in the world which simple objects subsist for our understanding of those parts themselves. There is a correlate of this in language, namely, the importance of the sense of

propositions for the meanings of names they are ultimately constituted of (3.3, see Ch. IV). But in noting Wittgenstein's identification of the necessity of names with that of the necessity for determinate sense (3.23) it would be a mistake to give any priority to explanations of either in terms of the other. To anticipate further, I shall argue the strong thesis that both simple objects and their names are unintelligible outside (independently) of the unity or coherence of the facts and propositions respectively that they support and constitute. It will be my task to try to unpack the nature of this (mutual) dependence (between name and proposition and between simple object and fact) and the consequences such a claim has for their natures.

Analysis and Its Ineffable Products

In large part Wittgenstein accepted the Theory of Descriptions in which Russell rejected the paradoxical conclusion that a proposition about a complex that failed to refer to anything in the world must thereby be nonsense. Russell and Wittgenstein both considered it entirely within the bounds of sense (if only on intuitive grounds) to speak of objects which did not in fact exist; that is, without resorting to the realm of fiction, or more plausibly, the mental realm of the author. Take, for example, "M.W.'s book on Wittgenstein and phenomenology." We might say:

(A) "M.W.'s book on Wittgenstein and phenomenology concerns only Wittgenstein's early philosophy." (Said at the present time of writing before the book came into existence.)

i. This proposition can be straightforwardly false, perhaps the work will stray over into matters later than Wittgenstein's pre-1920 work. Russell's theory does not concern itself with falsity in this sense.

ii. The question Russell's theory addresses is how we are to think of the sentence (A) should the work in question never come into existence. (Below I shall refer to this as false-by-analysis to distinguish its truth conditions from those of the falsity described in i above.) Later still (Ch. V), where I qualify both the notion of an object's identity and the existential quantification supposed to lie at the endpoint of analysis, it will become apparent why this phrase "false-by-analysis" can be somewhat misleading.

The conclusion that only nonsense results from speaking of non-existent objects seems unavoidable if one accepted that, should M.W's book not exist, then (A) is neither true nor false. For Wittgenstein this ties the sense of (A) to the truth of some prior claim and this he explicitly rejected (cf. NB 117_ε and 2.0211). Intuition would seem to support Russell's and Wittgenstein's view here since (A) is clearly understandable despite the hypothetical (and thus possibly non-existent) nature of M.W's book.³

Russell's analysis revealed that all complex propositions are tacitly existential and conditional being truth functions of two or more distinguishable propositions. Analysis of (A) reveals it consists of the existential claim: (A1) "There is one and only one book by M.W. on Wittgenstein and phenomenology." and (A2) "The book by M.W. on Wittgenstein and phenomenology concerns only Wittgenstein's early

philosophy." (A) is then truth functionally a conjunction of the truth values of (A1) and (A2). If, as is the case, (A1) is false (the definite description, "M.W's. book on Wittgenstein and phenomenology" fails to refer for one of any number of possible reasons) then, indirectly, (A) is false too (but false in a significantly distinct fashion from its plain falsity described in i. above).

There may of course be many more prior claims whose truth the truth of (A) is conditional on that can be analysed out of (A1) and (A2). (A1) and (A2) may not be primitive or elemental in this analysis. But an important general question for my purposes is could (A1) and (A2) be considered primitive? I.e., could the definite description "M.W's book on Wittgenstein and phenomenology" be considered to be unanalysable?

Sentences such as (A) are complex because their truth is constituted truth functionally of, in some way, simpler propositions. The manner of their being simpler is just that as the analysis of the complex proposition (A) proceeds each proposition thereby uncovered will be analysable into fewer propositions than the original out of which it is excavated. The precision by which we can fix what are the many, necessary conditions of (A) illustrates the determinacy of its sense and (as will become clearer in chapter III) the reciprocal dependency of the senses of analysans and analysandum. It also indicates how the sense of a complex proposition is to be thought of as being related to the truth values of its constituent propositions. Yet who can say (or better, what will show) and why, that such an analysis can be so prescribed? And perhaps more importantly, what will

indicate the correct endpoint to such analysis? These questions will, I hope, find answers in the interpretation I suggest is to be found amongst Wittgenstein's discussions of the nature of simple objects in the *Notebooks* to which I turn later (Ch. V).

Anticipating what I argue to be Wittgenstein's answer we must look to the sense of the original proposition (A) (the analysandum), that is, to my original meaning of (A). That, it seems, is all that could make the final analysans (primitive propositions) the analysans of (A).

It must be clear in the proposition how the object is composed, so far as it is possible for us to speak of its complexity at all. - The sense of the proposition must appear in the proposition as divided into its simple components -. And these are then actually indivisible, for further divided they would not be THESE. In other words the proposition can then no longer be replaced by one that has more components, but any that has more components also does not have this sense. (NB 63_E)⁴

It would thus seem that we must first already know the meaning of (A) before any analysis can be completed. This echoes Wittgenstein's assertions to the effect that there are to be no surprises in such logical analysis (cf. 6.124, 6.1251). The analysis could not be done from, so to speak, outside the confines of my original meaning. The analysis makes my meaning perspicuous, it does not establish what its meaning is. Logical analysis is not analogous to some objective method like chemical analysis by which we come to know of the parent compound by subjecting it to some predetermined (and supposed objective) chemical analytic method. Such a method would presuppose some prior theory (in that would lie its objectivity) external to the meaning of (A), a theory about what are to count as authentic primitives

(endpoints). If this had been the case Wittgenstein would have been far more sensitive to his inability to cite examples of primitives than he was. Indeed, providing such examples would have been crucial for such a theory. Instead it is the task of analysis to reveal their character and lead to the formulation of a theory.

Most immediately the end products of thorough analysis are elementary propositions. These are propositions constituted of terms which are essentially not definite descriptions but names. Names are indefinable (they may be elucidated but never defined, cf. 3.263 and 3.26) since any definition would suggest some further proposition the truth of which would provide a truth condition for the supposed elementary proposition they compose. (We have already noted Wittgenstein's rejection of this above in NB 117_e and 2.0211). Effectively, a test for some proposition's elementary status would be whether or not we could say anything about the names involved describe their referents.

Most importantly, for Wittgenstein, Russell's solution points the way to detaching the conditions necessary for the sense of the proposition from any considerations of truth value by showing the necessity of elementary propositions consisting entirely of names which are guaranteed to refer. We can understand the proposition (that is, we can know its truth conditions⁵), before knowing its truth value because at the ultimate level of its analysis simple objects "exist" necessarily.⁶

Wittgenstein's concern is that language's potential to unambiguously represent the world⁷ should be independent of how the

contingent world happens to be (2.0211). If this were not the case then language could not get off the ground for it would require us to have knowledge of the world, indeed be omniscient, prior to the establishment of any means of representing it (a language).²⁸

Simple objects are not merely remarkably non-descript, they are literally unremarkable. I very much confer with Carruther's (1990) remark:

Simples are 'colourless, [2.0232] I interpret to mean that their only properties are relational ones. (1990, p. 87, underlining added)

Propositions, as pictures, show their sense and cannot ascribe properties to the objects they name. That a is related to b is not stated but shown by the fact that 'a' is related to 'b' in the propositional sign 'aRb' (3.1432). Thus Wittgenstein's account (including his later work) entails the idea of our possessing knowledge of an ineffable kind about which I shall say (sic) more later. What is being denied here is specifically that determining sense must necessarily wait upon our acquisition of certain details (facts) about the world, this too will be qualified as the thesis develops.

The most consequential outcome of this is Wittgenstein's abiding view that, and how, the philosophical account of the determination of sense, in some way, must remain "descriptive"-- a belief which is to be found expressed by him not merely in the well known passage of the *Investigations* (§109) but as far back as his 1913 *Remarks on Logic*, (NB 106_{e-e}) and as late as OC §126. I qualified "descriptive" ("in some way") since descriptions are precisely what Wittgenstein is

denying us regarding these fundamental conditions of sense. In a nutshell Wittgenstein believed that philosophy can have no special use of language nor any unique (meta-) language by which to express an account of meaning (i.e., of "logic", in Wittgenstein's broad sense). Ignorance of this point he considered to be the source of traditional philosophical nonsense. It is also the source of the mistaken view that Wittgenstein thought of ordinary language as the only vehicle for all, including philosophical, expression. Both views are contrary to the idea of the ineffability of matters concerning the determination of sense to which Wittgenstein subscribed. The solution to this problem of philosophical description and ineffability lies with construing "description" as presentation and with Wittgenstein's idea that language itself shows its own form (its foundations).

Analysis and the Attachment of Language to the World

So Wittgenstein considers that sense is determined independently of anything true about the world. If this were not the case analysis would run into propositions about the world which were necessarily true merely on account of them making sense.

At the same time Wittgenstein wants to be able to account for the potential of language to describe the world determinately and he supposes this to be in virtue of their sharing a common form. Language must, it has often been said, hook into the world and in some way share its nature. In fact there is one obvious sense in which this is the case. Wittgenstein maintains that propositional signs are facts in

themselves (3.14).⁹ As such they are quite in the same world with all other facts which constitute it (1.1). In a nutshell this amounts to denying a separation of language (meaning) and the world at all. This point will be enlarged on in my consideration of the metaphysics of the *Tractatus* in chapter X. But there remains to be uncovered that relation which exists between these two distinct sets of facts- - propositional signs and the facts they represent.

Two claims in the previous paragraph (1. that language represents the world determinately by 2. hooking into it) manifest three fundamental assumptions- -firstly sense is indeed determinate and unambiguous.¹⁰ This position of Wittgenstein's, I shall argue later, issues directly from the very limited notion of context with which he works in his early philosophy (compared with his later writings). Secondly that language, at the elementary level, is securely hooked into the world and so can represent it as it is.¹¹ And thirdly, but less obviously, there is the assumption that reality does indeed take a determinate form which it makes sense to speak of language manifesting. Though Wittgenstein seems to imply that this is what we mean by "the world" the claim clearly has more than a merely definitional significance. So far as I can see, in his early work at least, these assumptions remain just that.

This hooking into the world by language is both a prerequisite to the sense of any claims about the world and it secures reference of a kind, to what is necessary and subsisting (in contrast with the contingent nature of the complex, existing referent of a definite description).

Much later in my account (Ch. IX) I shall qualify this but it is sufficient for the present to note how this is a significant gloss on the cruder, simple notion of hooking in terms of names connecting as labels to objects (which seems to be Anscombe's (1959) view, see for example pp. 49-50).

Speaking of subsisting referents carries two meanings both applicable to Wittgenstein's account. Firstly, formally, they can be considered to subsist the sense of our descriptions of the world as its foundations. Secondly, metaphysically, they subsist the changes (rearrangements of elements) of the contingent world (2.024, 2.0271). But for my present purposes it is sufficient to note that referents (of the names in elementary propositions) are the so called simple objects that Wittgenstein considers constitute the substrate of the world (its substance). Wittgenstein does not speak of the referents of elementary propositions.¹²

The Function of Simple Objects in Relation to Analysis

For my purposes it is important to note the thrust of Wittgenstein's account. He does not begin by positing the idea of simple objects and develop a theory of the determinacy of sense from that. Rather, his theory represents a deduction about the world from the form of language and merely posits simple objects as necessary from the prior claims of determinacy and analyticity which I alluded to previously (in Ch. II).

A natural question to ask at this juncture concerns the species marking the terminus of analysis, elementary propositions or names? Since Wittgenstein says that the world is the totality of facts, not things, it seems natural to suppose he intended elementary propositions to be analysis's endpoint.

So it would be a mistake of the traditional account of the *Tractatus* to view simple objects and names as lying at the heart of Wittgenstein's account (except in so far as one identifies this with the determinacy of sense as opposed to a means to determining sense¹³). This mistake generates certain misunderstandings of the determination of sense such as envisaging it being composed, atomistically so to speak, by combining names which in some way bring their meanings with them, usually through our acquaintance with their objects, to the proposition. (This is the view I criticise in chapter IV). It is also a view which puts far greater importance, certainly than Wittgenstein himself felt necessary, on the "discovery" of the nature of simple objects (in themselves).

The essential form of language and the world in fact relies not at all on the naming connection (tying propositions to particular objects). Instead, in a remark left out of the final version of the *Tractatus* (*P-Tractatus* 5.0054) Wittgenstein says:

It must appear from the variable itself what it stands for.
- There must be a quite definite resemblance between it and its values.

And in a similar vein, in the *Notebooks* he remarks on a picture of two stick-figure sword-fighters fighting that:

It can be said that in our picture the right-hand figure is a representation of something and also the left-hand one, *but*

even if this were not the case, their relative position could be a representation of something. (NB 7e, underlining added)

So what is fundamentally expressive in the "proposition-picture" is the relation of signs and not at all the relation of each sign to an object. This vital connection is what my thesis is in part concerned to account for.

I shall argue that it is elementary propositions (names in relations) which are the still-point around which Wittgenstein's account centres itself. From these Wittgenstein can look outwards, truth-functionally to the compounding of complex propositions and the representation in language of the world or inwards to their necessary constitution (their articulation) into names.¹⁴ But in the latter, as chapter 5 will show, where elementary propositions are given so too are the identities of the constituent objects in the reported state of affairs. So, in so far as these propositions are of a piece with the objects' identities, then the dichotomy suggested by the question whether analysis ends with names or elementary propositions is shown to be false.

Form, Articulation and Structure

It will prove useful to be clear on the notion of "structure" which is a term Wittgenstein himself uses somewhat generically. Despite the simplicity of simple objects Wittgenstein posits a kind of complexity to them in terms of their multiple capability of combination. This he refers to as their (internal) logical form and I shall respect this terminology.¹⁵

The "structure" of elementary propositions is to be distinguished from the structure of (the truth functionally) complex propositions. The former Wittgenstein often refers to as articulation (cf. 3.141, 3.251, 4.032).

Eventually, in my account, the distinction of logical form of simple objects and the articulation of elementary propositions collapses in important ways (which possibly accounts for any confusion felt over my note above concerning Wittgenstein's reference to the form of 'aRb'). In particular, where Wittgenstein speaks of form (he means logical form) being the possibility of "structure" (2.03) he means "articulation". In fact, I shall argue that articulation is not only the manifestation of form but also constitutes it.

The structure of complex propositions as a truth function of its constituent elementary propositions I shall almost never be concerned with. So, generally, wherever I speak of structure I mean the "structure" of elementary propositions, i.e. articulation; exceptions to this are contextually obvious.

Linking Language and the World:
Projection and Mirroring

Picturing and projection: Relations Between
Facts and Propositions

That elementary propositions and not simple objects lie at the heart of Wittgenstein's account is in part evident from his opening focus on facts (1.1) as the ontological constituents of the world, not objects.¹⁶ James Morrison (1968) has expressed this succinctly

remarking that Wittgenstein rejected the realist-empiricist view of atomic simples ...

... by denying the identity between logical and ontological simplicity, and by grounding being in complexity. Knowledge (in the sense of that which is knowable) [which Wittgenstein was not very much concerned with] and being are both in the realm of the complex. (p. 21)

Uncontroversially, we can say that simple objects constitute states of affairs (2.01) by combining directly with one another as links of a chain (2.03). Correspondingly, in the representation of such situations in elementary propositions, simple objects are replaced by names with no terms explicitly announcing relations between the objects.¹⁷ Thus, if some state of affairs is constituted of simple objects a and b in some relation to one another, the elementary proposition representing this will read 'ab'.¹⁸

It is not uncontroversial whether the language Wittgenstein is considering in the *Tractatus* is some idealised language.¹⁹ My impression is that his early position on this is not different from what he argued for in 1930:

How strange if logic were concerned with an 'ideal' language and not with ours. For what would this ideal language express? Presumably what we now express in our ordinary language; in that case, this is the language logic must now investigate. (PR §3₁)

However, we can be certain that in speaking of fully analysed (elementary) propositions we are dealing with a species of linguistic entity which is not evident in everyday language. But in an important sense they are derived from ordinary language and seem, according to Wittgenstein, to simply possess the same logic as that language, only more perspicuously.

The characterisation of elementary propositions I have given so far amounts to an outline of Wittgenstein's picture theory of how propositions stand to their corresponding facts to represent them. Elementary propositions represent by picturing situations and by asserting that what is pictured is the case.

A proposition asserts the existence of the situation whose possibility it represents. (*P-Tractatus* 4.11)

The picture merely presents the state of affairs (a possibility) and since it neither asserts nor denies what it presents to be the case it has no truth value. By contrast, a proposition proposes that the situation it presents (pictorially) is or is not the case in the world. So in Wittgenstein's early work picturing is more fundamental than proposing.

Picturing simply consists of using entities (elements) to deputise for simple objects. Essentially though, the relations between these entities in the picture, are somehow taken to symbolise (model) the relations of entities in the state of affairs; a procedure Wittgenstein refers to as "projection." As Irving Copi (1966) points out, this does not necessitate the replication of the relations between objects in the state of affairs by the relations between elements in the picture as 'L(a,b)' does literally replicate (as well as symbolise) the represented state of affairs of a being left of b. Rather, it is by symbolic means:

Once it is understood that the picturing relation need not be the same as the relation pictured it is easy to see how the picture theory of meaning can apply to relational properties in general. (Copi, 1966, p. 179)

For this to work, however, it seems necessary that there is some convention by which the relations between the signs 'a' and 'b' stand for the corresponding relations between the simple objects a and b. But this certainly seems to be what Wittgenstein has in mind:

[We are certain that we can portray all logical properties of situations in a two dimensional script.
(NB 7_ε)

It is this universal applicability (productivity) of language that Wittgenstein is intent on understanding.²⁰

However, it is clearly Wittgenstein's view that there is also a sense in which the proposition and the state of affairs do share something in common, namely what he refers to as logical form, the form of the simple objects whose names compose propositions. We can return to the nature of this similarity only when we have considered this notion of logical form in more detail.

The notion of "projecting" a picture onto the world (a shadowy connection drawn in the mind?) clearly invites a psychologistic account of how the two facts (propositional sign and state of affairs) come to be related. I will criticise this view of projection (as an external relation between two facts) but only after I have explored the notion of intentionality with which I think it is better compared. But Wittgenstein does say that:

The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition. (3.11)²¹

Regarding this I would agree with the Hintikka's view that Wittgenstein conceives of language in some way as a universal medium of which writing, speaking and thinking are merely manifestations or

modes. But manifestations of what? Simply, they all manifest the same underlying logical form.

For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought too is, a logical picture of the proposition. (NB 82_{1,4})

It is possible that the problem of the nature of projection is also a function of Wittgenstein's notion of propositional context (3.3). As Rush Rhees points out (1969, pp. 53-54), thinking of names and their combinations as combining tokens of physical marks is fundamentally mistaken. He quotes Wittgenstein (from the notes he dictated to Moore, NB 111₃) as saying "... in our language names are not things, though, of course, a name-mark is. That is, a mark (what is used as a name and becomes a sign) is itself a physical thing. But names are words and should not be confused with these physical tokens. The name-mark 'Wittgenstein' appears on numerous (numerically distinguishable) occasions in this text. But each occasion is an occurrence of the name word (name) and it is only in this sense that Wittgenstein considers words constitute a proposition. Names are marks taken along with their syntactical deployment. (3.326, 3.327). This syntax then functions both as the means of projecting of a picture onto the world and as the linguistic medium for logical form. Which is to say relations of names in the context of some proposition and not mere names, are the vehicles of meaning. It is to this view that I now turn.

Mirroring: (Internal) Relations Within
Facts and Propositions

Within each fact (propositional sign and state of affairs) are elements (names and simple objects) in certain determinate, internal relations (see 4.122). Wittgenstein analogically speaks of the elements existing within a certain logical "space." By way of illustration we should note the ambiguity of 2.11: "A picture presents a situation [which is] in logical space." or "A picture presents a situation [by presenting it] in logical space." By my account both of these readings are correct and significant so that we could say that the picture, which is itself in logical space, presents the situation as it is in logical space. Logical space is what the state of affairs and the proposition representing it have in common. So far as I can tell Wittgenstein intends the stronger claim that they both exist within the numerically identical logical space and are thus in some crucial manner indistinguishable in the way in which the meanings of different uses of the same words are identical. All of which is (again) an alternative way of saying that, regarding what is essential to both (their logical forms), as facts themselves, propositional signs exist in the world as do the facts they represent.

I noted that Copi's observation that the picturing relation need not be the same as that which is pictured suggested a conventional basis for their connection. Propositions and states of affairs possess no common form such as colour, physical spatiality, etc. (except in the kind of accidental manner noted- -'a' lying to the left of 'b' in 'L(a,b)', consider 2.182). The notion of "logical" space is intended

to preempt the conventionalist solution by providing an objective relation between the two. But this, of course, only displaces the problem regarding the nature of projection onto one regarding the nature of logical space- -what is its ontological status? This is identical with the traditional question of the existential status of "the proposition."²² On a realist's interpretation Wittgenstein seems to be saying that propositions connect to the world by way of linking up to certain necessary, existing elements, simple objects. But we are told that this sense arises by way of the determinate arrangement of names, corresponding to the determinate arrangement of simple objects (the internal relations of elements in each "fact" within logical space). Is logical space a purely formal construction or is it a characteristic of the world itself?

So far, nothing in Wittgenstein's account offers a solution to this Kantian question despite his remarks about a form shared by language and the world. For looked at more closely we can see that it boils down to the question of the nature of the simple objects which he argues are the point of contact between language and the world and whose logical form constitutes logical space. It is not the contingent world (of the facts cited in 1.1) that language connects to most immediately (i.e., not the truth relation) but this realm of simple objects, the substance of that world.

In a sense it is these which constitute Wittgenstein's shadowy intermediary between language and the empirical world of facts and indeed he employs a second visual metaphor for this relation-

- "mirroring." Wittgenstein says that language mirrors forms of the world, (4.121, 6.13).²³ but nowhere does he develop the metaphor by identifying something as image and object as Kantian representations of the world, phenomena, are held to reflect our own forms of thinking.

My main objection to the idea that in mirroring Wittgenstein (in his references to the logical form of the world) is offering us the possibility of an explanation of the origins of the logic of language is that in all other respects, as I have argued above, it is clear that the subsisting realm of logical space is the same space for both the world and for language. That argument was premised on Wittgenstein's assertion that propositions, as propositional signs, are themselves facts and involve relations of elements in just the manner that the represented facts do. At first sight this might seem to suggest a reduction of propositions to facts in the world, as the facts are in the world which they represent (by reducing them to scratches on paper, pressure patterns in air and so forth). In fact the opposite reduction is Wittgenstein's intention, he is absolutely clear that it is not as scratches that words and expressions have meaning.²⁴ They only become signs when taken along with their appropriate syntax (their use in propositions). Only as signs are their relations in propositions significant (i.e., determinate, and only then is the proposition a fact). Instead, Wittgenstein speaks of facts "containing" elements (simple objects) in determinate relations and of them thereby possessing a sense. No mere motley of words can constitute a proposition.

Only facts can express a sense. A set of names cannot.
(3.142)

All of this reduction, of course, takes place not at the contingent level in the world but at the subsisting (necessary) level of logical form where sense arises equally for facts and for propositions and their respective, determinately related elements. If I am correct in representing Wittgenstein's view in this manner it becomes clear that the mirror metaphor²⁵ must be interpreted without prejudice giving priority, ontologically or epistemologically, to either the logic of the world or the logic of language.

So I think any directionality suggested by the mirroring metaphor, as if language is moulded onto the form of the world, is purely conventional. Under contrived circumstances it can be imagined to hold in the opposite direction- -imagine someone showing me what some sentence in a language foreign to me meant by making a model of it. The model, a fact in the world, would thus represent the proposition expressed by the foreign sentence. So I do not think that we can take Wittgenstein to be giving a clue (as a short-cut) to his answer to the Kantian question by his use of the term "projection", as if we project (à la Kant) sense onto the world (make sense of the world).

Yet these forms, in the guise of simple objects, do not subsist in his empirical world as noumena subsist in Kant's empirical world of phenomena (i.e. causally, a view that Schopenhauer was subsequently to criticise so justifiably). For Wittgenstein, language mirrors the realm of subsisting simple objects, not the actual, contingent world of facts. Otherwise mirroring would ensure the truth of all well formed

propositions. Instead it only ensures the possibility of their truth or falsity. So Wittgenstein does not fit the Kantian model in any obvious parallel fashion. Yet nor is he a logical realist since the world which language mirrors is not the empirical world.²⁶

Of the two connections of language to the world, projection and mirroring, the latter is more fundamental. Mirroring provides the objective condition for projection. Since my focus is on the ontological status of simple objects (logical forms) mirroring will be more significant than projection. In discussing much the same point Peter Carruthers (1990) remarks that since he fails to see any way in which metaphysics is explanatorily prior to logic,

[I]ts point [the metaphor of "mirroring"] is to insist upon a realist attitude to metaphysics, claiming that there really are essential features of an independently existing reality which correspond to the essential features of reality. (pp. 25-6)

The problem with this is that it runs contrary to Wittgenstein's clear separation of the world's ontology (facts) and its structure (which is essential, necessary). Nowhere does he consider essential features of the independently existing reality.

My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition.

That is to say, in giving the nature of all facts, whose picture the proposition is.

In giving the nature of all being.

(And here Being does not mean existing - in that case it would be nonsensical.) (NB 397-10)

How can logical form be identified with simple objects and be conceived so as not to entail, as Carruthers supposes it does, the idea of real simple objects? Only, I shall argue, by a shift of focus away from simple objects as entities and towards conceiving of them in

terms of their possible combinations (relations). *Ex hypothesi* that does not reveal to us any independently existing entities, building bricks of facts.

The Logical Form of the World and Language:
Internal Relations and the Dependence
of Simple Objects and Names

The internal relations between elements within facts and within propositions are said by Wittgenstein to constitute and exhibit their logical form. It is certainly controversial, but crucial to my thesis, whether it makes any sense on Wittgenstein's account to imagine objects as bearers of this logical form or whether the logical form constitutes the objects with no remainder. The latter identity seems to be suggested by Wittgenstein's remarks in 2.0123a and 2.01231 (concerning the epistemology of simple objects) and by his description of what is essential to them in 2.011 (their possibility of forming relations with each other). What is the nature of the "is" in Wittgenstein's assertion that the possibility of its occurring in states of affairs "is" the form of an object (2.0141)? Is this a case of identity or of predication? Should Wittgenstein's form of speaking here have any ontological implications?²⁷

Wittgenstein says that objects are indescribable (3.221) and their names indefinable, primitive signs (see NB 96_{1,2}). Is there not some other way of conceiving simple objects which does not posit them as subjects of elementary propositions (about objects' relations) and bearers of logical form? Clearly Wittgenstein thinks that they cannot be the subjects of propositions or meaningfully have anything

predicated of them though we may not be able to think this (i.e., escape our ordinary modes of expression).

Wittgenstein distinguishes the content of a proposition from its form (see, for example, 3.13e).²⁸ He speaks variously of the form of the simple objects we name and of the elementary propositions constituted of their names (cf. for example, 2.014, 4.0031 passim. In the interpretation I shall give this turns out to be a quite natural assimilation since names and the sense they constitute in elementary propositions are inextricably entwined.

Logical form is not represented in language (cf. NB 108₃). The relations between name-marks in propositional-marks can only be held to stand for the relations between objects in state of affairs when taken alongside their syntactic application (i.e., taken as signs). In a sense there is a similarity in the functions of names and of propositions as signs which Frege was aware of in speaking of the reference of them both. In the projection of the propositional sign (i.e., the picture) onto the world (the proposition is thereby held to represent some fact) both the name-sign and the propositional sign stand in for something else—objects and relations between objects respectively. Yet Wittgenstein also recognised that in a proposition there is a sign (the name) which stands in (deputises) for simple objects in state of affairs but there is no such representative for the relations between simple objects. There are only the relations themselves of names. This is certainly one important sense in which language appears to treat the reality of objects differently from that of their relations. Wittgenstein remarks in the *Notebooks*:

We want to explain the relation of propositions to reality.

The relation is as follows: Its simples have meaning = are names of simples; and its relations have quite different relations to relations; and these two facts already establish a sort of correspondence between a proposition which contains these and only these, and reality: ... (NB 112₆₋₇)

For example, note how a proposition can be said to "contain" relations in a way that it does not "contain" names. The nature of a name sign as a physical mark is quite accidental (i.e. conventional) whereas,

For a proposition to be true does not consist in it having a particular relation to reality but in its really having a particular relation. (NB 24₇)

Which is to say that relations of names in propositions are expressive (as names alone can never be). In particular this expressiveness is not a statement of a form but a manifestation of it. Names neither say nor show anything in themselves. In 'aRb' that 'a' is related to 'b' manifests (i.e., shows, in Wittgensteinian terms) that a is related to b (see 3.1432). Thus the relation of 'a' to 'b' in 'aRb' (or better - 'ab') is essential to a proposition being an expression of something else. A relation in the proposition stands for a relation in reality. But for Wittgenstein names are not objects standing in for objects in reality because the mark itself is not a name and only as a name does it proxy for an object in reality, i.e., only in its propositional context (in its relations to other name signs). In this manner, in the *Tractatus*, objects are secondary to relations and must be related to other names before they can be considered to be related to their objects, that is, considered to be names of objects at all. That the nature of the name mark is inconsequential to its meaning (it has no

signifying potential of its own) shows how it serves only to mark relations between it and other marks. Such is the dependence of the meaning of names on the role of relations in Wittgenstein's account.

If a simple object could be considered as an entity separate from any combination with others then this should seem to exclude the identification of them with their possible combinations. Certainly if simple objects could exist independently of any state of affairs, that would support the idea of simple objects as discrete entities, bearers of their logical form. But Fogelin (1976) rightly points out that simple objects can never be eligible bachelors. All simple objects are, by their nature as part of the substance of the world, necessarily bound up in some state of affairs or another.

Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with states of affairs, a form of dependence. [which is analagous with:] It is impossible for words to appear in two different rôles: by themselves, and in propositions.) (2.0122)

In the *ProtoTractatus* Wittgenstein put this contextual claim in a somewhat stronger form:

If I can imagine a thing in a situation, then I cannot imagine it outside the situation. (2.013, it is clear that by "thing" he means a simple object in this context).

Since a simple object's identity necessarily entails its combinability, indeed is given only in those terms, then no other conception is possible.²⁹ They are not, as a literal interpretation of the atomistic metaphor might suggest, only contingently combined with other simple objects. What is contingent is which simple objects any one simple object is combined with. This is what it means to be part of the

substance of the world. I think this point stands on its own apart from anything Wittgenstein says explicitly. Fogelin quotes Wittgenstein from 2.011:

It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of state of affairs .

Fogelin wants to establish the further thesis which might be expressed in the following: it is essential to things that they are constituents of some possible state of affairs. He argues that at 2.0121:

(It would seem to be a sort of accident if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own.)

Wittgenstein is arguing: i. that it cannot be by accident that a simple object is combined in some state of affairs in the world just as, ii. it is not by accident what states of affairs it is combined with. Now I am not sure this is correct; Wittgenstein seems to me to be arguing about the concern of ii rather than i. Nonetheless I think his (Fogelin's) conclusion is correct; to site simple objects in logical space (they are conceived in these terms just as physical atoms are conceived in spatial terms and sited in physical space) is already to place them in relations to other simple objects. The analogy with physical space seems to hold good here, no two physical objects can both exist in physical space without in some manner being related to another (right and left of each other perhaps).

So I think it is clear that Wittgenstein's account of simple objects as the substance of the contingent world and his denial of the possibility of our predicating anything of them does not allow them any ontological independence. And here the analogy with real, physical

atoms does fail since whilst I can speak of them independently of what relations they do happen to enter into there are no other features of Wittgensteinian simple objects except their logical position relative to other objects. The upshot of this is that elementary propositions are not only the epistemological primitives of the *Tractatus* but also represent the ontological ones. And analysis of propositions ends at what can be said (in elementary propositions) even though something more is shown (namely the logical form of its constituent names).

Correspondingly, the world consists of facts which fundamentally are existing states-of-affairs (atomic facts). These are the true ontological "atoms" of the world and their constitutive simple objects are to be understood only in terms of them.

Objects are necessarily combined (dependent) but combined contingently (independently). Consequently names in elementary propositions are semantic and logical simples only in so far as they are conceived as parts of the simple senses of elementary propositions. Simple objects are merely their formal counterparts, referents of those names, and suffer a dependency parallel to that of the dependency of names on elementary propositions.

So the means to our conceiving simple objects is, as Aristotle would have it, a process of abstraction which is none other than what Wittgenstein, through Russell, described in more detail under the label of analysis. Both processes are essentially logical and reveal forms of representation whose counterparts in the world, simple

objects, are merely functions of the relations which characterise the real nature of the world: complex, contingent and transitional.

Conclusion

In this introductory survey I have tried to convey a new perspective on the notions of names and simple objects and their role in Wittgenstein's system. That perspective plays down both the notion of simple objects as "things" in themselves, bearers of a logical form, and the notion of names as elements of meaning in themselves. My intention has been to emphasize how Wittgenstein's notion of a simple object is of a thing with no independent existence and which is a necessary part of the true elements of reality (facts).

Correspondingly I have suggested the function of names as only comprehensible in Wittgenstein's account as arguments in propositional structures. The overall effect of this is intended to turn our focus away from such entities and towards their relations (what in fact is determinate in both the world and language). It is my belief that, for Wittgenstein, all that can meaningfully conveyed arises because of these relations rather than as a consequence of what "they" are that are related. My general impression of the *Tractatus*, if such gut reactions have any place here at all, is of the significance of structure (of states of affairs), the articulation (of elementary propositions), and the congruence (mirroring) of the two, for the determination of sense.

The related entities in themselves are incomprehensible and inaccessible (3.221) and therefore not things whose nature philosophy

can speculate on. But more importantly, and quite unKantian, what this investigation will show is that they are entities of no consequence in both our formal investigations into the function of language (how sense is determined) and our metaphysical quests into the nature of the world.

In particular I have begun to show why simple objects as bare logical forms are to be understood only in terms of the totality of their possible combinations with other simple objects. That is, they have content only in terms of the totality of states of affairs they constitute.

Now, of course, this leaves us with a puzzling situation. How are we to think of all that is substantial arising out of the relations of entities which themselves are effectively contentless, quite insubstantial? In less abstract terms, how are, for example, spatial or colour properties to emerge merely from the relations of otherwise propertyless entities? And we have to note how this difficulty is distinct from that of other emergent properties--the liquidity of water is not possessed by the constituent water molecules yet we can fully understand how that property arises given that water molecules possess certain other properties. It is precisely these other properties that Wittgensteinian simple objects do not possess. Wittgenstein is very clear on this point, cf. 2.0231, 2.0232.

On the abstract level again, our difficulty lies with conceiving how the idea of relations can possess any sense when what those relations are held to obtain between are strictly non-entities.

But if I am correct and the problem of conceiving of relations obtaining between non-entities can be overcome, then it will call for some new understanding of Wittgenstein's assertion that an object is the meaning of a name (3.203) which has led many interpretations towards realism. Instead we shall need to attend more to the point Wittgenstein stresses that names are dependent on their propositional context to function at all as names (as opposed to mere labels).

In what follows I shall try to focus these problems more precisely in terms of two questions which I think pose difficulties for a realist understanding of simple objects and names. Firstly, what is to count as the endpoint to the process of analysis (a process Wittgenstein cannot question given that it is a corollary of the very phenomenon he is investigating--the determinate nature of the sense of propositions)? That is the subject of chapter III.

Secondly there is the question over Wittgenstein's insistence on a context for both simple objects and names (states of affairs and elementary propositions respectively). What is the need for this contextual principle if simple objects are to be understood as real entities which names name as labels, as 2.131 and 3.203 seem to imply? These are the concerns of chapter IV.

Finally, of course, I shall want to say how these two issues are related and then provide an alternative interpretation which enables us to see how both of these difficulties are to be surmounted and how we are to conceive relations without related entities.

Notes

¹ See, for example, Baker and Hacker (1984), Bradley (1992), Carruthers (1990), Goddard and Judge (1982), Hintikka (1986), Malcolm (1986), Pears (1987), Peterson (1990), Specht (1963).

But this has not always been the way of things; Edwin Allaire began his 1963 paper remarking:

The *Tractatus* is nominalistic. This claim, designed by Anscombe and Copi is now the fashion. (p. 325)

Of course the equally nominalistic treatments of Ishiguro (1969) and McGuinness (in Block, 1981) were still to follow.

It is significant however that Allaire, whilst claiming that the *Tractatus* looked foolish in a nominalistic guise admits that his own realist interpretation hardly fitted exactly either. Working out exactly how Wittgenstein's account avoids this false dichotomy is the task I have set myself in this work.

² Cf. Hintikka (1986) pp. 39-41. where there are distinguished three senses of objects being simple:

- i. They have no structure, they are "of a piece."
- ii. They cannot be analysed further into anything more fundamental.
- iii. They are logically independent of each other.

I agree with their judgement that most immediately Wittgenstein intends ii. I shall argue that simple objects are, whilst logically independent in the sense that none implies any particular other, still they are dependent on each other to the extent of being necessarily, that is logically, combined with some others (this ambiguity is also evident in Wittgenstein's own conception, see 2.0122).

As for i, this requires careful qualification, Wittgenstein speaks of the structure of propositions (or pictures, see 2.15 and also 5.13, 5.2) and only of the form of objects (e.g., 2.0141, 2.0233). But it is precisely this form that is held to determine their compatibility with other simple objects in the "structures" (articulations) of elementary propositions (cf. 2.033).

It is essential to any account of the *Tractatus* that it should make clear how Wittgenstein supposed it possible to conceive of something essentially simple (possessing no distinguishable parts) but having a potential and necessity for multiple combination. In particular, how is this conception possible when all that language is capable of expressing (and is therefore conceivable) are relations between distinguishable entities.

³ One important consequence of Wittgenstein's espousal of Russell's theory is that we are provided with a criterion for distinguishing elementary and complex propositions. One, that is, apart from the criterion of analysability although it is consequent on it. In the case of complex propositions, Wittgenstein can speak of truth conditions and sense conditions quite separately. Thus proposition (A) makes perfect sense but happens at the present time of writing to be "false-by-analysis". Sense conditions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the truth of (A). But this is not the case for elementary propositions where names' references are assured. In

elementary propositions sense and truth-by-analysis conditions effectively converge. An elementary proposition cannot turn out false by our analysis revealing some failure of a name to refer without it also proving to be nonsense. As Wittgenstein says, I would have failed to give a meaning to one of the signs of the proposition (see 5.4733a and 6.54).

A consequence of this is a certain ambiguity in the notion of falsity-by-analysis for complex propositions. The failure of (A) to refer because no book by M.W exists can stem from either the falsity of one of the analysans of (A) or from the failure to refer at the elementary level. It is then disputable whether in the latter case (A) is false or in fact nonsense.

⁴ This in turn reveals an interesting attitude of Wittgenstein's towards everyday uses of language. Despite his desire to see logical analysis clarify and make perspicuous the logic of ordinary language, still it remains our intuitive grasp of the sense of our everyday statements that should prevail and which analysis must remain consistent with. Unfortunatley Wittgenstein is not entirely consistent here since, on the other hand he does look to analysis to reveal illegitimate uses of language of ours, particularly in philosophy,

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science - i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy - and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his proposition. (6.53, underlining added. I think Wittgenstein has demonstration by logical analysis in mind here)

I don't think there is any simple way to escape the accusation of equivocation here.

⁵ Some commentators have identified Wittgnstein's "*Sinn*" with "truth conditions" rather than the more difficult or obscure "sense" (for example, Carruthers, 1990, and Anscombe, 1959). In her paraphrase of Wittgenstein's view Anscombe seems to put these two notions of sense and truth conditions together: "We can construct propositions at will, without enquiry into any facts at all, and know what is the case if they are true." (p. 49). 4.431a,b seems to support such a view. However, for my present thesis it is sufficient that the weaker relation holds, namely, that an understanding of the sense of any proposition entails a knowledge of its truth conditions.

⁶ Thus whilst Russell's theory had the virtue of avoiding having to speak of objects existing in various (eg. fictional, mental or mathematical) realms in order for propositions such as (A) to have sense, still it is clear that Wittgenstein foresees a limit to Russell's analysis. That limit is marked by Wittgenstein ironically (considering his criticism of Russell's theory of types) resorting to speaking of different levels (if not different types) of existence,

namely existence of facts, and subsistence of simple objects, (see Ch. V).

⁷ The task of language for the early Wittgenstein (see 4.11, 4.12, 6.53 and NB 107₁).

⁸ For a discussion of the impossibility of such knowledge see Hintikka (1986) Ch. 1.

⁹ But see also 2.141, NB 105₄, 97₁ and his illustration of the nature of a propositional sign as imagined to consist of real objects in 3.1431.

¹⁰ Space does not allow me to enlarge on my use of "ambiguity" here. For a useful discussion see Carruthers (1990) chapter 5.

Carruthers contrasts "determinacy" with "fixedness" and he equates "Sinn" with "truth conditions" and "sharpness" with "vagueness", "indeterminacy" or "ambiguity". He also distinguishes between the vagueness of concepts such as a "heap" of wood or colour concepts or the vagueness of sentences containing indefinite terms.

But all of these distinctions amount to an objection to Wittgenstein's idea of determinacy and can be replied to in general in (at least) three ways:

1. That these terms are inherently ambiguous but their vagueness in this respect is really just a way of failing to indicate which of two or more determinate senses one means. As Wittgenstein says of the reversing figure of a cube drawn in two dimensions, which he reproduces in 5.5423, what I perceive in "reading" such pictures is really two facts, both determinate. But also he says:

(A proposition may well be an incomplete picture of a certain situation, but it is always a complete picture of something.) (5.156d)

2. That such vagueness is a property of ordinary language use and of generality and that it will disappear under analysis at the elementary level.

3. That some propositions are vague does not detract from the fact that all are not and it is the latter that represent the possibility of language representing the world and are therefore the subject of Wittgenstein's enquiry.

But I don't think any of these objections are quite to the point. The mistake lies with continuing to assert any such absolute claims on the indeterminacy or otherwise of all propositions. This would be a solution which the later Wittgenstein would avail himself of in criticism of his earlier limited notion of the role of context in the determination of sense. Only where the context of an utterance is understood widely can we come to see that the notion of determinacy itself must be considered in the context of some enquiry. Only within that context (of what purpose a description or a command has to serve, for example, cf. Z §311) can we see that the command, "stand roughly here" or the description "a heap of sand" might be considered to possess a determinate sense such that a more precise location or

quantity would be deemed inappropriately overdetermined if not actually more confusing.

¹¹ Of course 'hooking' is not the term Wittgenstein uses but cf. 2.151, 2.15121, 2.1514, 2.1515.

¹² Thus Wittgenstein distinguishes the terms 'sense' and 'reference' in a manner quite distinct from that of Frege from whom the terms were borrowed. For Wittgenstein, propositions represent facts and do not refer to them. That manner of speaking precisely fits the view he opposes since it seems to tie the sense of the proposition to its truth value. Instead, names have referents (the ultimately simple objects) and propositions have sense (which is not the fact it represents). Much more about this will emerge later.

¹³ A mistake that I think Carruthers (1990) makes by, in effect, identifying simple objects with the notion of logical objectivism (see his chapter 12). Rush Rhees (in Winch, 1969) criticises Black (1964) too for just this error.

¹⁴ Precisely this view Wittgenstein expresses later in his (1929) *Some Remarks On Logical Form*:

But our analysis [...] must eventually reach the ultimate connection of the terms, the immediate connection which cannot be broken without destroying the propositional form as such. [...] [Elementary propositions], then, are the kernels of every proposition, they contain the material, and all the rest is only a development of this material. It is to them we have to look for the subject matter of propositions. (p. 32)

¹⁵ But it will prove necessary to distinguish the logical form of complexes which may be named and the simple form of objects which real names name.

In addition there are one or two lapses in Wittgenstein's use of these two terms, for example, in 4.012, "... a proposition of the form aRb ..." is best read as ... the structure of aRb ... (or better, the articulation of aRb).

¹⁶ Even that is not quite to the point since the immediate correlate of any elementary proposition is the atomic fact as Ogden (1922) translates *Sachverhalt*. We should recall that Wittgenstein's own use of the two terms *Sachverhalt* and *Sachlage* is not consistent, as Black (1964) remarks (p. 40). Perhaps the only option here is for one to adopt the most consistent gloss one can on these terms and then at least commit one's own errors systematically! I shall not try to be comprehensive here in this note but just give an outline of my interpretation and let the details emerge as they will.

There are facts which are complex situations in the world of the kind reported by complex propositions. But elementary propositions are analysans of complex propositions and they report the atomic facts that are the analysans of the reported complex facts. Atomic facts are

simple in that they consist of simple objects combined in single two, three etc. place relations. They are unanalysable and they are the actual (contingent, existing) "constituents" of the world. Finally there are states-of-affairs which are what any elementary propositions report be they true or false (i.e., they are the senses of elementary propositions). Thus all states-of-affairs are possible atomic facts and conversely atomic facts are existing states-of-affairs. Emphasis could be the only reason for speaking (pleonastically) of *possible* (2.0124) states-of-affairs since an impossible state-of-affairs is unintelligible (i.e., all states-of-affairs are possible ones).

On this account we would adopt the Pears/McGuinness (1961) rendering of *Sachverhalt* as "state-of-affairs" (against Black and his adoption of Ogden's translation, "atomic fact"). By Pear's and McGuinness's translation Wittgenstein would be intelligibly speaking in 2.04 of existing states-of-affairs and at 2.06 of existing and non-existing states-of-affairs (i.e., all states-of-affairs). This is I think consistent with Stenius's (1960, p. 31) thought that *Sachverhalt* is something possible and a *Tatsach* is something that is actually the case. It would be another pleonasm to speak, as Ogden's translation renders it, of existing atomic facts. See also note²² below.

¹⁷ Because Wittgenstein says so little about the nature of simple objects it has been controversial whether relations and properties would count alike as examples of simple objects and so become named in propositions. Clearly we can make, formally so to speak, relations into objects in the sense that we can make them objects of thought (and the subjects of propositions). And we obviously do do this, we can speak about the relation R reported by the proposition 'aRb.' But in such a proposition, when fully analysed, how should we think of the connection of the objects to the relation, or rather, we should say, the connection of the three objects a, b, and R? Wittgenstein argues that objects combine directly without the need for intermediates (relations) in elementary proposition. (2.03)

So it seems clear that 'aRb' is not fully analysed. In an elementary proposition the name for the relation is redundant, we simply do not need to speak about them for there is no thing to be spoken of. In fact naming a relation robs it of precisely that quality which I shall refer to again shortly and which might usefully be referred to as its expressiveness. For a name cannot show (manifest) anything as the actual relation of 'a' to 'b' does.

The positing of relations in the state of affairs we report in elementary propositions invites the regress of the middle term- -we can always ask what the nature of the relation is between the names (i.e., between a and R and b and R, and those new relations themselves are related to whatever they are the relations of and so on). Better, of course, not to enter the regress in the first place as Wittgenstein implies by his characterisation of simple objects as linking directly to one another.

All of this is just another way of saying that if we take the name of a relation (e.g., 'R') to operate as 'a' and 'b' do then we reify the relation and so invite the regress described. Wittgenstein seems to be saying that we should not imagine objects in the world as

relations are. That objects and relations can be formally treated alike is merely a misleading (superficial) grammatical device and not one that carries any ontological implications. In the final analysis we should not expect relations to be named in elementary propositions as objects are.

¹⁸ Of course, this has the consequence of denying elementary status to any predicate or relational proposition of ordinary language of the form $\exists x$ (no elementary proposition could mention only one name), or aRb . Also the generality of predicate and relational terms deny them object status (unless they are taken to name particular universals).

For a brief discussion of this point in relation to similar views held by Irving Copi and Elizabeth Anscombe see Ishiguro (1969) p. 41.

¹⁹ See Hintikka (1986) chapter 1 for some discussion of this.

²⁰ There is some retrospective discussion of this in BB pp. 36, 37 that supports this interpretation of picturing. Wittgenstein speaks of the shadow cast by the logic of representation, a reference, perhaps, to his own much earlier question in 1914:

That shadow which the picture, as it were, casts upon the world: How am I to get a grasp of it? (NB 307. See also NB 279-10. But for an interesting reflection on meaning as some shadowy accompaniment, a function of the projection of any locution, see Z §§233, 290-291.)

His own point in the *Blue Book* is:

If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself can serve as a shadow. (BB p. 37)

²¹ Perhaps, though not obviously, this might be construed as a matter of how the proposition is used since thinking, speaking or writing a picture or even recordings on magnetic tape, as propositions, are all on a level (4.011, 4.014). Which is to say that thinking a proposition has no special explanatory force for how sense arises.

Carruthers (1990, p. 11) also reads Wittgenstein's notion of projection in this manner criticising McGuinness's and Pears's (1961) translation of 3.11 and 3.5 and favouring Ogden's (1922) which he argues "suggests a quasi-Fregean use of the term "thought", to cover all significant uses of signs" (p. 11). By contrast, in the *Tractatus* "[T]hinking and language-using are being regarded as equivalent in status." (p. 12) and:

Moreover, there are a number of passages in [the *Tractatus*] which imply that what confers significance on our signs is not some sort of private mental process, but rather the rules and conventions determining their use - see, for example, 3.315, 3.342, 4.002 and 4.0141. (p. 12)

²² Similarly, the states of affairs which are what propositions most immediately represent (i.e., onto which they are projected) are

themselves merely hypothetical (possibilities) (2.06a, see also 2.04 and cf. 2.063) not the immediate facts. Which is to say states of affairs are the senses of sentences true or false and so are independent of how the empirical world is (see note ¹⁶ above).

Taking up this aspect of propositions Bradley (1992) treats states of affairs as essentially hypothetical situations with the intention of uncovering a modal logical view which he thinks crucial to the *Tractatus*. I still think there is great merit in this, the senses of sentences are clearly not existing facts (for there are false propositions).

We should note Wittgenstein's remark in a letter to Russell replying to some query of Russell's, "Sachverhalt is, what corresponds to an Elementarsatz if it is true." (NB 130₃) Of course, even if this difficulty in the reading of Wittgenstein's text could be cleared up there would remain the question over the status of possible situations or senses or propositions.

²³ Note, nowhere to my knowledge does Wittgenstein say "reflects". It is true that at 6.13 he says "Logic [...] is a mirror image of the world." But elsewhere he also speaks of unanalysed propositions mirroring logical properties of its meaning (NB 10₇), the sign for negation mirroring its reference (NB 34₂, 5.512), of what is mirrored in language (is inexpressible) (NB 42₆), and of the use of language mirroring the way it signifies (NB 82₁₁). All of which suggests a rather unsystematic intention behind his use of the metaphor.

²⁴ See especially Black's (1964) discussion of this in terms of propositional signs as types or tokens, pp. 109-110 and Rush Rhees's criticism of Black's understanding in Winch (1969) pp. 53-55.

²⁵ Contra Carruthers's (1990) view (on pp. 25-6).

²⁶ Again, for a contrary view to this see Carruthers's (1990) p. 26. Also consider his chapter 4 discussion of this in relation to Wittgenstein's "logical objectivism."

²⁷ Is this not a further case of misleading (surface) grammar (an idea more prominent in Wittgenstein's later work but evident already in his early work, see 3.323 - 3.325, 4.002, 4.0031)?

²⁸ I think the distinction here is between a. the formal structure that any proposition (e.g., "Socrates is mortal") possesses in common with the corresponding prototype $f(x)$ from which it may be derived by substitution of arguments for the variables and b. the particular fact which the proposition represents if true and which a prototype which has no truth value cannot. Another way in which Wittgenstein might have put this is to point out that logical propositions (tautologies and contradictions) possess a form but no content.

²⁹ Black, too, seems to come down in favour of an argument similar to this regarding the necessity of objects' combinations. See 1964, p. 115.

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS

A proposition has one and only one complete analysis. (3.25)

IntroductionThe *Tractatus* and the *Notebooks*

In turning to the preparatory notes for the *Tractatus* we must bear in mind that these are not what Wittgenstein chose to publish. This does not mean that he rejected the views expressed there, many of these remarks, or substantially similar versions, were published more or less complete and we can speculate from reports of Wittgenstein's manner of working that none are first thoughts but represent worked material.¹

The *Tractatus* was written with a very specific conclusion in mind, one that is ironical and challenging, because it is paradoxical. We might think of it as Wittgenstein's final word on the cul de sac of the analytic tradition in philosophy. Wittgenstein's view was that philosophy was unable to express views concerned with the foundations of meaning, ethics or aesthetics (because, he argued, such matters lay outside of the facts which language is specifically formulated to represent). These concerns Wittgenstein thought of in terms of "the

mystical". Not their representation but their presentation he considered only within the scope of Art to undertake for that alone provided an external overview of the "limited whole" (6.54), the view *sub specie aeternitatis* (NB 83₄₋₁₁).

By contrast we can only think and express our usual way of looking at things perspectively (a view that will come to have increasing significance throughout my interpretation), as if from their midst (see NB 83₇₋₉). In light of this, crucially, the *Tractatus*, as a statement, demonstrates a particular internal inconsistency in the method of the analytic project.² Infamously, he concluded:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, ... (6.54)

So the *Tractatus* stands essentially as a judgement on rationalist, analytic ambitions from the standpoint of a certain view of the limits to thought because of the limits of expression. His attitude throughout these works is surely best captured rhetorically:

From Aristotle onwards - even from Hecataeus and Herodotus - the glum intellect of man has succeeded in constructing bolts and bars, fetters locks and chains. In a world of enchantment that glum intellect has nothing to say of the fairy prince and the sleeping beauty but much to say of the tower and the dungeon.³

Thus, though, in his introduction to the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein would claim on the positive side that he thought his work represented the "unassailable and definitive" truth on such topics as meaning and values, still, it represented a somewhat hollow achievement. So it was appropriate then that Wittgenstein put into abeyance the kind of discursive treatment of meaning he is found engaging in in the

Notebooks and which comes back into prominence again in his post-*Tractatus* work. The published early work might be considered as a decisive battle which is all the more convincing because it is fought on enemy soil, rather than from pre-established and entrenched defensive positions.⁴ In this light we can better see why Wittgenstein might leave out material that was not immediately to the point, the choice was made as much on strategic as philosophical grounds. Such is the case for the *Notebooks* passages I shall be considering here, none of which seem to me to contradict anything in the *Tractatus* though clearly they often go well beyond anything found there.

The *Notebooks* and Simple Objects

From May 5th, 1915 through to the long entry of June 2nd of that year⁵ (NB 45_e - 71_z) Wittgenstein engaged in a sustained inquiry into the crucial notion of simple objects and their nature and role in his account. Very little of these remarks finds its way into the *Tractatus* and Wittgenstein's ambivalence on the subject is controversial. His equivocation is evident from the start:

It keeps on looking as if the question "Are there simple things?" made sense. And surely this question is nonsense!
(NB 45_e)

Still he goes on to spend nearly thirty pages on the matter though his feeling is that his main task can go forward despite the absence of any solution rather than on the strength of one. Even so we cannot overlook the consequences of this issue for Wittgenstein's main focus on the determination of sense since:

The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense. (NB 63e)

These *Notebook* passages are speculative and free ranging. Anthony Kenny (1973, p84) remarks on them as constituting some of the most difficult passages Wittgenstein ever wrote, meaning, I think, from the point of view of interpreting them as much as from Wittgenstein's formulation of them. Many readers of Wittgenstein's early work are not as familiar with them as with the *Tractatus*. As always, it is especially important to be conscious of the textual context when treating and interpreting these notes^e for they can too often present themselves as a kind of dip-in resource so that their often rhetorical tone is lost. With this and many readers' unfamiliarity with them in mind, in this initial presentation I quote extensively from the text or give specific paragraph references where I occasionally paraphrase it. I think it is also crucial to demonstrate that certain ideas evident in particular remarks are characteristic and significant rather than singular and atypical. My exegesis of these passages is crucial if my development of certain less obvious views of Wittgenstein's and their consequences is to be persuasive.

This chapter is concerned with the question of the nature of analysis and its possible end products. Chapter IV will then deal with my second question raised in the conclusion of chapter II on the nature and function of Wittgenstein's notion of context in relation to analysis. I shall end chapter IV considering how these two issues are related. Both are prerequisites to considering a particular example of Wittgenstein's as a case of simplicity in chapter V.

Kinds of Analysis and Wittgenstein's
Grounds for Simple

As we know, Wittgenstein's crucial distinction between object and fact, name and proposition centres on the distinction between simpleness and compositeness (structure). The determinacy of the latter is explicated in terms of the former. He writes:

The great problem round which everything that I write turns is: Is there an order in the world *a priori*, and if so what does it consist in? (NB 53₁₁)

In short it consists in its division into simple objects. But there is a conflict here between his observation that,

[N]othing seems to speak against infinite divisibility. (NB 62_e)

and the requirements of the determination of sense for

[I]t keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is some simple indivisible, an element of being, in brief a thing. (NB 62_e)

These successive remarks neatly capture the two apparently conflicting thrusts of Wittgenstein's thought on simple object in the *Notebooks*. To anticipate his solution we only need to see that Wittgenstein has yet to clarify the notions of analysis and simplicity sufficiently. The kinds of analysis implied in these apparently conflicting views should be considered distinct. The first is an observation concerning empirical analysis with the conclusion that there may be, intelligibly, no discrete unanalysable metaphysical entities in the world that are beyond division.⁷ The second is a consideration of formal analysis (i.e., analysis at the most general, logical level).

Perhaps this distinction is even more evident just prior to these passages where Wittgenstein explicitly compares the concept of analysis with analysis itself:

Is it, A PRIORI, that in analysing we must arrive at simple components - is this, e.g., involved in the concept of analysis -, or is analysis *ad infinitum* possible? (NB 62₅)

His conclusion is that semantically speaking some meanings are logically irreducible, "logical" here corresponding to Wittgenstein's broad, essentially semantic-analytic notion of logical form. But then:

Let us assume that every spatial object consists of infinitely many points, then it is clear that I cannot mention all of these by name when I speak of that subject. Here then would be a case in which I *cannot* arrive at a complete analysis in the old sense at all; and perhaps just this is the usual case. (NB 62₁)

In which case by his own reckoning the world would essentially be unrepresentable because sense would be radically indeterminable, at least by any means he had up to then conceived of.⁶

We have seen that at one point Wittgenstein seems to have conceded that the analysis implied here does not end at simple points or parts which are existing simple entities; the "nature of all Being" which he is trying here to capture he says, is not of something existing (NB 39₇₋₁₀). Nonetheless he explores a number of possibilities: points of the visual field (NB 45₁₃), minimum sensibilia (NB 45₁₅), spatial things (NB 47₁₀), points of a coloured surface (NB 50₁₀), the visual appearance of stars (NB 64₆), spots (NB 65₂₁), a tune, a spoken sentence, "... a body apprehended as in movement, and together with its movement" (NB 49₁), a landscape or even "a dance of motes in the air." (NB 53₄) Later I briefly consider two possible cases of real

simples that have been argued recently to fulfill Wittgenstein's conditions of simplicity- -phenomenalistic simples and the simple entities of physical sciences.

The impression overall is that none of these examples will suffice or all will and this equivocation resides in the problem already alluded to- -nothing speaks against the infinite divisibility of any of these examples or any others we might imagine (material points or atoms for example, or whatever sub-atomic particles happen to be currently fashionable).²⁹

But Wittgenstein is inclined to say:

In spite of this the infinitely complex situation seems a chimera. (NB 50₄)

Meaning, I take it, that he cannot find the infinitely complex situation or object, or its correlate, analysis without end, intelligible in themselves especially given that that entails an inescapable indeterminacy in meaning.

In the *Notebooks* Wittgenstein is engaged with these difficulties in both a *Tractarian* and an *Investigations* fashion, namely, formally at the most general of levels and in the most specific of cases. In a number of places he casts off from an example such as the above into generality:

But it also seems certain that we do not infer the existence of simple objects from the existence of particular simple objects, but rather know them - by description, as it were - as the end-product of analysis, by means of a process that leads to them. (NB 50₅)

Which I take to mean that in the clear absence of any acquaintance with simple objects (otherwise Wittgenstein would have provided

examples) the only grounds for holding to the idea must be *a priori* which indeed Wittgenstein confirms:

It seems that the idea of the SIMPLE is already to be found contained in that of the complex and in the idea of analysis, and in such a way that we come to this idea quite apart from any examples of simple objects, or of propositions which mention them, and we realize the existence of the simple object - *a priori* - as a logical necessity. (NB 60₄)

In this manner,

{It looks as if in this way I knew a form without being acquainted with a single example of it. (NB 61₃)

Logical Analysis- -of Meaning

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein considers logical form as generic; all particular forms (spatial, temporal, material, even musical) are merely versions of one universal form which is the form, simplicity, of all simple objects. This is the form he supposes all language shares with what it represents in order to be able to represent it.

But what does it mean, for example, for a visual space to be considered not as a complex coloured surface but as logically complex? The answer lies in Wittgenstein's notion of "logical" which he takes very widely. A logical matter is one which concerns meaning and logical form. Thus can he say, resorting to the general again:

Are - e.g. - spatial objects composed of simpler parts; in analysing them, does one arrive at parts that cannot be further analysed, or is this not the case? ...

This question is a logical one and the complexity of spatial objects is logical complexity, for to say that one thing is part of another is always a tautology. (NB 62_{3,6})

Which is to say that it is a function of the meaning of "things" and "parts" to say that one thing is part of another. It is not a fact

that one thing is part of another. Similarly we do not discover the divisibility of space, rather, its divisibility is part of what we mean by space.

I have previously remarked how the analysis of any proposition should recognise "my meaning" for it, and that Wittgenstein considers such meanings as logically irreducible.¹⁰ He says, in the *ProtoTractatus* (5.41) that whether any sign is analysable "... makes itself manifest [...] in the sign's possessing a definition that analyses it and that has sense."

I say that this watch is not in the drawer, there is absolutely no need for it to FOLLOW LOGICALLY that a wheel which is in the watch is not in the drawer, for perhaps I had not the least knowledge that the wheel was in the watch, and hence could not have meant by "this watch" the complex in which the wheel occurs. And it is certain - moreover - that I do not see all the parts of my theoretical visual field. Who knows whether I see infinitely many points? (NB 64_a-65₁)

Wittgenstein does not envisage sense being more determined with the advance of our knowledge of the constituents of the world (a prospect itself which would seem to entail an infinite future, even supposing that its end-point, complete knowledge- -that Holy Grail of the Enlightenment- -were intelligible).

But this is surely clear: the propositions which are the only ones that humanity uses will have a sense just as they are and do not wait upon a future analysis to acquire a sense. (NB 62_z)

I see that the analysis can be carried further, and can, so to speak, not imagine its leading to anything different from the species of propositions that I am familiar with. (NB 61_d)

And this is the case only because this analysis is an analysis of "my meaning" (NB 63₂)'' and of my present everyday propositional forms, not some ideal forms a futuristic "science" of logic might propose.

But, this apart, Wittgenstein's concern lies with recognising that, as we have already noted, the propositions we already have possess a sense just as they are. Thus on this point we can surely be clear that so far as Wittgenstein is concerned, the enquiry into the nature of simple objects is to be identified with an enquiry into what we can possibly mean, rather than what there is or what we might know. In particular terms this amounts to what object we mean by virtue of its name's location in a proposition. In general terms it amounts to what we can possibly mean by such general terms as 'simple' and 'complex.'

Nowhere does Wittgenstein, to my knowledge, speak of resolving the problem empirically. It is true that he says complexity itself is something we are "acquainted" with (NB 50₆), we see that a visual field is complex for example. Yet he speaks elsewhere of temporal complexes (NB 49₆) which are clearly not to be seen as such and one has to be careful not to read 'seeing' and 'acquaintance' too literally. He says immediately after this that we can "see" that all the points of some surface are yellow without "seeing" any single point of it (NB 50₁₀, see also NB 65₁). And where he remarks,

The simple thing for us IS: the simplest thing we are acquainted with. - The simplest thing which our analysis can attain. (NB 47₅, underlining added)

... it is clear that in speaking of analysis he is speaking not of material analysis of some thing or substance but of propositional

analysis and of the simple object as a formal entity, a logical prototype or a propositional variable.

We portray the thing, the relation, the property, by means of variables, and so shew that we do not derive these ideas from particular cases that occur to us, but possess them somehow *a priori*. (NB 65₉)

To anticipate- -the acquaintance Wittgenstein speaks of in these passages concerns acquaintance with what propositions show us rather than what they say, that is, the logical forms that they manifest and we apprehend. "See" what I mean?

Emphatically, a question about complexity is to be resolved by appeals to meaning rather than by ostensive demonstrations around the referent or by "discovering" novel, supposedly objective, propositional forms (of the sort suggested by Carruthers, 1990, pp137-147). No analysis should make a proposition more complicated than its meaning was in the first. (NB 46_e)

The reality that corresponds to the sense of the proposition can surely be nothing but its [the proposition's] component parts, since we are surely ignorant of everything else. (NB 31_e)

[What we mean by "complex objects do not exist" is: It must be clear in the proposition how the object is composed, so far as it is possible for us to speak of its complexity at all. - The sense of the proposition must appear in the proposition as divided into its *simple* components -. And these parts are then actually indivisible, for further divided they just would not be THESE. In other words, the proposition can no longer be *replaced* by one that has more components, but any that has more components does not have *this* sense. ((NB 63_s, underlining added)

Here, Wittgenstein's awareness of the logical-empirical analysis distinction is most apparent. So is his insistence that the means to perceiving the essential simpleness that is the logical form of anything is by way of the proposition, not by further empirical

analysis of a thing's contingent complexity. From the remark I underlined above Wittgenstein implies such analysis is clearly possible but would not lead me to simples of whatever particular meaning my proposition possessed. His contention is that my analysis should reveal no more complexity than my original meaning intended.

Analysis makes the proposition more complicated than it was, but it cannot and must not make it more complicated than its meaning was from the first. (NB 46e)

or again:

Every proposition that has a sense has a COMPLETE sense, and it is a picture of reality in such a way that what is not yet said in it simply cannot belong to its sense. (NB 617)

This intuition of meaning Wittgenstein seems to take as primitive and capable of revealing the nature of the simple objects analysis reveals. But this suggests a form of circularity--meaning is dependent on simple objects yet we can only rely on our grasp of meaning to reveal the presence of simple objects. This circularity is only apparent for it is one thing to grasp a meaning and the means to its determination is quite another. But that a meaning seems to determine the appropriate path of analysis to simple objects and yet is itself a determinant of those elements revealed by that analysis is a curious feature of Wittgenstein's account. I shall refer later to it as a kind of reciprocity. It is also worthy of note that there is a certain credibility to this as an interpretation of Wittgenstein since it is recognisably a form of explanation he uses elsewhere where his "spade is turned" and he has reached the bedrock of explanation. *On*

Certainty §248 presents a striking metaphor expressing this tendency, "[T]he foundation-walls are carried by the whole house."

Complex and Fact and the
Analysis of Meaning

In developing this argument in favour of semantic analysis I have tried to indicate piecemeal how it fits with what Wittgenstein is saying. It is time to be more positive about this and maintain that it not merely fits but actually represents Wittgenstein's early views.

The issue of logical and contingent complexity lies behind a matter raised in Brian McGuinness's (1988) biography of Wittgenstein. McGuinness argues (pp. 162-4) that Frege led Wittgenstein¹² (as early as 1912) to appreciate the significance of a distinction between complex and fact.¹³

In his 1931 notes, Wittgenstein raises an interesting point concerning ostension--that when I point to a watch I do not point to it as a fact but as a complex (which just is a thing, NB 49_A). By contrast, if I were to point out the watch's complexity as a fact I could only "point out the fact that ..." (PR p302_e, underlining added) Wittgenstein doesn't use a watch as the example here, instead he has flowers and constellations in mind, but the point is the same. And it is quite a simple one I think. It is that a name when used as a logical proper name (for anything but a simple) does not name a fact (see also NB 96_e, 107_e). It is not an abbreviation for a proposition. This is consistent with his objection to that view of Frege's that a proposition names a fact (the fact is its referent). Wittgenstein's

point is that a name has a meaning and if that meaning is not simple then it will be an intension (although Wittgenstein does not express it so). To say, "This constellation consists of a collection of stars" is really beside the point since that is correct, not true, of all constellations, it is what 'constellation' means. It is a definition of a sort, not a proposition, for in fact in *Tractarian* terms it amounts to a tautology (see again note¹¹) revealing (showing) the form of 'constellation.'¹⁴

This distinction of complex and fact corresponds to what I have been referring to as logical and contingent complexity. It is my contention that in the *Notebooks* Wittgenstein sees these as indicating two distinct forms of analysis. Most significantly, whilst it seems possible (though this would itself be a contingent fact of this possible world) that empirical material analysis might go on without end, it is not the case for logical analysis which deals with meanings- -meanings which we not only know but which we know we mean in some exact or definitive way. In a word, a definition.

There are a number of ways the complex/fact distinction arises in *Tractarian* themes. Firstly, it can be stated in terms of Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing. Every proposition asserts something to be the case (a fact). A fact is some relation that obtains in the world. But any proposition also *shows* that what it asserts to be the case is a possibility. This is achieved syntactically by way of legitimate relations between signs. Take Wittgenstein's example from the *Investigations* (§60)- -a complex C is subsisted by two related objects aRb; just as the broom "consists" of

a handle connected to the brush. Wittgenstein's use of Russell's theory of descriptions leads him to maintain that the sense of a proposition mentioning C (such as, 'The broom is in the corner') cannot rely upon the truth of aRb (i.e. that the handle and brush are connected). Instead the sense relies upon the *rightness* of aRb as a definition of C (3.24b). And by it being the right definition Wittgenstein means the legitimate combining of the signs 'a' and 'b.' The possibility of a and b relating is thus shown. Wittgenstein expresses this point very clearly in his later work:

Of course, a definition is not something I can deny. So it does not have a sense either. It is a rule by which I can proceed (or have to proceed). (PR §163₉)

Where aRb is taken as a thing C (a complex of brush and handle) and 'aRb' is false (the handle and brush are not in fact connected) this means that any proposition in which C occurs (such as, 'The broom is in the corner') will be false and *a fortiori* not nonsense. This view amounts to saying that if you were to analyse 'C' into 'aRb' and take 'aRb' to be a proposition then you effectively say that the sense of the original proposition mentioning C depends on 'aRb' being true; as if it were necessary to mean (as I only on occasions might) by 'The broom is in the corner.' that the brush and handle are connected. But that would be to attend to what is being said rather than to what is shown. I.e., it treats 'aRb' as a proposition when all that is required for sense is a definition which legitimises the combination of 'a' and 'b', which 'aRb' shows. All that the sense of 'The broom is in the corner.' relies on is the possibility of the combination of the brush and handle and so it is independent of the contingency of this

combination. In Wittgenstein's words, if I point to the broom in the corner it is to a logical complex that I point. Whereas when I point to the broom as a contingent complex then I point out the fact *that* the handle and the broom are connected. I, in effect, point to (towards) things (which are perceived) but point out facts (to be apprehended).

In terms of another distinction drawn in the *Tractatus*, the relations within the broom as a logical complex are internal and alone are concerned with meaning. It is these which we need to attend to in our logical analysis. Thus does Wittgenstein maintain that, "A proposition about a complex stands in an internal relation to a proposition about a constituent of the complex." (3.24a).

Yet another means of expressing the logical or contingent character of the broom is to say that as a case of the former the broom possesses a form but as a case of the latter it has structure.

In saying that a logically proper name does not name a fact (is not an abbreviation of a proposition) and in also denying that a proposition is a "name" of a fact Wittgenstein underscores the point that propositions concern what is the case where as the function of a name in a determinate sense can never play that role, for that role is not fulfilled if the proposition it abbreviates is false. Instead, a name of a thing ('broom') in contrast with a description (this broom has a handle connected to a brush), though not a definition (a broom is a brush connected to a handle), merely deals with a possible, not

actual, combination and it functions intensionally, the only way in which it can logically contribute to determining a sense.

"Logical Manipulations": Contriving Foundations
for Sense and Analysis

Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favourable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavourable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (Z §352)

Wittgenstein seeks a means of representing the world that is neutral to the concern of the truth value of our assertions but which, in some manner, still connects with or "fits" that world. Our partial knowledge of the world might lead us to make false claims about it but they are still open to confirmation as nonsense is not.

In order for our present sentences to already be in logical order (cf. NB 62₂), then:

It is, e.g., not possibly *only subsequently to come upon* the fact that a proposition follows from [some other]. But, e.g., what propositions follow from a proposition must be settled before that proposition can have a sense! (NB 64₇, underlining added)

A proposition's meaning and its being constituted of simpler propositions are of a piece (are internally related). There is implied no priority to the parts over the whole such as might offer an explanation of the origins of the whole. As Bradley (1992, p74) rightly I think, points out, Russell gave priority to empirical simple elements (sense data) out of which, logically, complexes were

constructed, but Wittgenstein believed our initial acquaintance was with complex entities, facts.

In some way Wittgenstein imagines that the simple object and the form of our analysis is pre-judged in the complex (NB 63₅). Which is to say that to declare a thing complex is of a piece with knowing in advance, so to speak, what are its elemental parts. Or rather, of knowing the species of things it is a complex of. As, for example, when I analyse some new chemical compound I need to know it to be a compound (of elements) in order to discover what particular elements compose it. And as I have already indicated, for Wittgenstein, knowing the species of things amounts to possessing a prior grasp of the relations possible for their names. So the meaning on which our analysis relies can be imagined as a "construction" of ours, as if it were in some sense synthetic or contrived. And it seems to entail presupposition. Something is taken for granted (NB 70₃), a definition, which explains the sense in which each and every proposition is essentially hypothetical. The proposition 'aRb', (constituting the complex C and underwriting the sense of propositions using C), pictures only the possibility of the relationship R between a and b, in that lies its hypothetical essence.

Now this "construction" of meaning seems to begin right at the heart of sense at that moment of reification of anything as a thing:

We can even conceive a body apprehended as in a movement, *and together with its movement*, as a thing. So the moon circling around the earth moves round the sun. Now here it seems clear that this reification is nothing but a logical manipulation - though the possibility of this may be extremely significant. (NB 49₁, underlining added)

I have argued that propositions may state (assert) the facts of a flower's structure but that where a flower is named as such in a proposition, that complexity may take on the form of a definition and it is this which logical analysis must uncover if the determination of sense is to be made perspicuous. It is as if in meaning anything, facts, such as that this flower consists of petals etc. become elevated to the status of necessary "truths" which significantly seems to anticipate a much later remark of Wittgenstein's:

[O]ne can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm of description. (OC §167)

and again:

Isn't what I am saying: any empirical proposition can be transformed into a postulate - and then becomes a norm of description. [...] One almost wants to say "any empirical proposition can, theoretically, be transformed..." but what does "theoretically" mean here? It sounds all too reminiscent of the *Tractatus*. (OC §321, underlining added).

It is also reminiscent of another commentator's assessment of the foundations of Wittgenstein's later work:

Thus, ultimately the grammatical proposition is naturally, in the end, somewhere connected with "experience"; but it never brings experience to expression and is, therefore, in no way empirically verifiable. (Specht, 1963, p. 175, what is not empirically verifiable here is the proposition's grammatical status.)

[T]he possibility of *a priori* propositions rests ultimately on the fact that linguistic rules are not derived from objects but that linguistic signs are spontaneously introduced by man and this simultaneously completes the constitution of an object. (ibid. p. 165)

But crucially Specht qualifies the apparent arbitrariness and conventionality of this spontaneous rule formation, remarking that rules are drawn up in the closest connection with facts of nature though they "do not result from these facts necessarily." (p. 170)

Returning to *Tractarian* objects, by saying we "see" that objects are complex and we "see" also that they consist of simpler parts (cf. NB 65_e), Wittgenstein does not have in mind our immediate acquaintance of objects but our apprehension of them, an understanding of meaning is achieved.

It must be clear in the proposition how the object is composed, so far as it is possible to speak of its complexity at all. - The sense of the proposition must appear in the proposition as divided into its *simple* component parts -. And these parts are then actually indivisible, for further divided they just would not be THESE. In other words, the proposition can no longer be *replaced* by one that has more components, but any that has more components also does not have *this* sense. (NB 63_e underlining added).

The possibility of further division alluded to here is logical possibility. The apparent analysis that might suggest itself beyond this limit is that of contingent complexity. Wittgenstein goes on immediately to say that such logical analysis being limited by the sense of the original proposition leads to "objects in the original sense."

This "original sense" in which objects are simple is given in the *Tractatus* at 3.23:

The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate. (underlining added)

This remark occurs significantly differently in the *Notebooks*:

The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense. (NB 63_e, underlining added)

The connection between the simple signs of the *Tractatus's* remark and the simple things of *Notebooks* is made clear by a remark of the same date in the latter:

If there is a final sense and a proposition expressing it completely, then there are also names of simple objects.
That is the correct designation. (NB 64_{2,3})

What is remarkable of course is Wittgenstein's insistence that the access to simple objects is by way of their names in propositions simply because "simple object" is a corrolary of the idea of determinate sense and it is our apprehension of that sense in propositions, not our acquaintance with empirical evidence, that such determination is evident.

Again (and again) Wittgenstein makes this point in the *Notebooks* both formally (generally) and in the particular. Formally Wittgenstein's point is that *a priori* the very idea of determinate sense and analysis requires us to have a conception of simples: "'parts' are parts of 'wholes'" is a tautology. And at the particular level our meanings predetermine what is simple. For example, as a flower can be analysed into such simples as petals and sepals, logical parts of flowers, and those parts themselves are only to be understood as logical constituents of the parent whole, the flower (though they are obviously empirically, further analysable). For the contingent (chemical) constituents of such parts of plants as petals, e.g., water molecules, are not logical (semantic) constituents of petals or flowers.¹⁰

But this view requires qualification since we are left with the feeling that there are definitive meanings for words like 'flower' for all propositions and which would have to be respected by all analyses of propositions mentioning the name. I might in some other possible world, where perhaps I work on a botanical genetic engineering project

developing flowers without sepals, wish to deny the logical status of the definition of flower. Perhaps I would use some genetic or biochemical criterion instead. So, alternatively, the chemical constituents of flower parts could function as a determination of 'flower'. But the point is that this logical status, as Wittgenstein's remark from *On Certainty* above points out, is fluid, not fixed. What is an empirical truth can become a norm of description. And this need not be once and for all.

It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. (OC §96)

[T]he river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. (OC §97)

My point is that just this view is evident in Wittgenstein's earliest work for it is what inevitably follows if one takes seriously his contextual thesis, the role of the individual propositional context for the meaning of the terms mentioned in it (see Ch. IV).

This so called "logical manipulation" amounts to the settling in advance of the syntactic employment of names (NB 64-) and represents the basic connection between the semantics and syntax of Wittgenstein's account of meaning. It enables me to "foresee" (see NB 71-) both the analysis and what is to count as the simple elements of its end-point (names and their corresponding simple objects) because in some way it is a construction of mine: "[W]hat propositions follow

from a proposition must be settled before that proposition can make sense!"

In what way does a proposition "contain" the propositions that may be analysed from it and which constitute its sense conditions? The best way to conceive this has in part already been considered; a complex like aRb can be treated as a fact or as a logical complex defining the complex C . Respectively, we then regard ' aRb ' for what it says or what it shows. The shift from dealing with ' aRb ' as saying that aRb to showing that ' ab ' is a possible combination represents the shift from dealing with it as a fact to dealing with it as a norm of description. For Wittgenstein this duality is inherent in all propositions, they are pictures and assertions. His insight, as in Russell's case, is that this possible shift of perspective was normally overlooked when analysing a complex C into aRb . We mistakenly (since our concern lies with the meaning of ' C ' rather than C 's contingent constitution) regard only what ' aRb ' says (i.e. as a proposition with a truth value). Of course, with respect to what ' aRb ' shows it has no truth value and so the sense of a proposition naming C does not rely on the truth of ' aRb .' This, in fact, represents the end point of analysis. It sometimes terminates in definitions (as what ' aRb ' shows defines C). But what happens in cases where an object is simple and undefinable? That will become clear shortly.

Yet as Specht's remarks perceptively make clear, even though such logical manipulation does not follow necessarily from any facts, still it is drawn up in connection with them. It is after all, as *On Certainty* points out, empirical facts of our acquaintance which come

to be elevated to the status of norms. It is a fact that some flower possesses petals and sepals etc. but it is not as a fact that any such detail could serve as a foundation for sense. Still, in the *Tractatus*, shortly before commenting that we can only foresee what we ourselves construct, he speculates:

[I]s it really possible that in logic I should have to deal with forms that I can invent? What I have to deal with must be that which makes it possible for me to invent them.
(5.555c)

Here Wittgenstein seems to eschew a conventionalist solution to how our forms of representation arise and he seems to walk a subtle line between denying that such (inventions of) forms are necessitated by the nature of reality and maintaining, even so, that such forms are made possible by reality's nature.

In my detailed consideration of a possible example of simplicity I shall try to unpack the apparent ambivalence of Wittgenstein's position. I shall need to show exactly how the independence of forms of representation arises such that sense determination is possible independent of whatever is true of reality. But also it will be necessary to show what such forms share with reality in order to be capable of representing it. The answer will lie in clarifying exactly how Wittgenstein envisages reality partaking in the ultimate logical form -simplicity itself.

Complexes as Simple

We might still object that there is something awry with calling anything simple when what we are referring to is something complex,

irrespective of this complexity being internal, logical to the object (its form) rather than external and contingent. After all, though Wittgenstein's simple objects are said to possess an internal logical form that in itself does not indicate, so to speak, any internal diversity.

Wittgenstein also demonstrates this ambivalence towards calling named complexes simple:

What is my fundamental thought when I talk about simple objects? Do not 'complex objects' in the end satisfy just the demands which I apparently make on simple ones? (NB 59₁₄)

Obviously the circumstances that make it possible for certain forms to be projected by means of a definition into a name, guarantees of itself that this name can then also be treated as a real one. (NB 69₁₀)

What, Wittgenstein asks, is the source of the feeling that a name can be correlated with such diverse "objects" as landscapes or dances of notes as well as simple objects? Components and complexes seem to be both akin and opposed to one another he says (NB 53₂). If naming transformed an entity that is metaphysically complex into a semantic simple does that not dislocate language from the world? Would that not be contrary to Wittgenstein's belief that determinate representation goes ahead on the strength of the fact that reality and language share a common logical form (simplicity) and that:

[Names] link the propositional form with quite definite objects[?] (NB 53₉)

This discussion of the complex-fact distinction has served to illustrate Wittgenstein's awareness of the "logical" nature of the analysis required to uncover the mechanism of sense determination and its concern with logical, not contingent complexity. It will also

serve as a basis for my later denial that logical analysis will lead to what happen to be the real simples of this world and that Wittgenstein actually held that it would.

But in fact, finally, it is evident that Wittgenstein could not accept logically complex objects as the real simples that analysis is supposed to unveil. Such complexes are readily definable in terms of their logical parts but for Wittgenstein, "Names cannot be anatomised by means of definitions." (3.261b)¹⁵

Furthermore, meaning anything as a logical complex I imply that such an object has a plurality of possible "kinds" of combination, it has, so to speak, more than one face to turn to the world. Or in Wittgenstein's more technical jargon, the name of such an object could serve as an argument in different "kinds" of combinations. An analogy may serve to clarify this point- -a colour patch is a logical complex, there can be no colour that is not extended over some area and no area that is uncoloured. This renders it susceptible of combination with objects of these two "kinds" in terms, for example, of its shade in relation to another colour or its position in relation to another location. What is required, seemingly, for Wittgenstein's purposes, is some object which has only a single form of combination, perhaps an ideal, uncoloured spatial point. Such a thing would relate to other and only spatial entities. There would be no diversity in its form, it could engage in only a single "kind" of relation.¹⁶

Conclusion

This investigation has already gone some way towards uncovering a voluntaristic foundation of the determination of sense which realist (especially naturalistic) notions of meaning deny. Such agency on the part of language users arises from the drawing up of rules of use "in the closest connection with certain facts of nature." in Specht's phrase. It amounts to attributing a logical (definitional) status to certain facts. But such necessity concerns what is necessary for the determination of sense, not anything that exists necessarily. It marks a shift in the mode of employment of 'aRb' from something that says a and b are related to something that merely shows the possibility of that combination. It concerns not that a flower consists of sepals, petals etc. but rather relates to what is necessary for the determination of the sense of propositions about flowers. What is required is some intension for the name which both enables it to link directly with others (indeed, prescribes precisely that) and reflects the language user's place and experience within the world the language serves to represent. But, at the same time, this rule of syntax or definition must, if the name is to be indefinable (i.e., the name of a simple object), not identify any distinctive parts to the object. It is fulfilling these two conditions for a name that I explicate in chapter V.

Such is Wittgenstein's answer in general to the question whether a merely designated form might serve for purposes of representation. In chapter V I shall reconsider the question with respect to a particular

example. But first it is essential to get clear on the second issue raised in conclusion of chapter I--the nature and significance of Wittgenstein's demand for a context to names' meaning. This and its connection with the issue of analysis are the subject of chapter IV.

Notes

¹ See McGuinness (1988) p. 213, on Wittgenstein's method of working and editing his notes.

² This critique of philosophy as it was traditionally conceived, especially since the Enlightenment, finds expression both in these early notes and in his later reflections especially those directed at fields outside of philosophy itself but which the ills of traditional (reductionist) philosophical thinking had permeated (illustrated by his remarks in (1980) *Culture and Value* and (1979) on Frazer's *The Golden Bough*).

³ "Belief and Creativity" reprinted in Golding (1982) pp. 185-202.

⁴ Though I chose the analogy independently it turns out to be curiously apposite: "[S]tormed the problem in desperation. But I will leave my blood in front of this fortress rather than withdraw with nothing accomplished. The greatest difficulty is to retain captured forts long enough to sit quietly in them. And until the city has fallen it is impossible to go on sitting quietly in one of the forts." (Wittgenstein's notes of 31st. Oct. 1914. quoted in McGuinness, 1988, p. 221. Obviously, Wittgenstein's choice of the analogy reflected his circumstances - these notes were put down during his early war experiences on the Austro-Russian front.

⁵ This marks a settled period, relatively speaking, in Wittgenstein's war experience during which his ability to work recovered somewhat. Wittgenstein was at this time in charge of a forge in a workshop in Cracow near the eastern front. McGuinness notes that despite Wittgenstein's satisfaction at being able to work (on logic) once again he remained frustrated in his search for the one great solution which would make sense of all the detailed insights. (See 1988, pp. 233, 228.)

⁶ A good example of this is some dubious speculations of M.B. and J. Hintikka (1986) (which I shall remark on occasionally) on the notion of simple object, of their phenomenological nature and the consequences of Russell's influence on Wittgenstein's conception of them. For an evaluation of the work and its failure to recognise the significance of the context of some crucial passages see the disparaging, critical notice of it by Raymond Bradley and Lawrence Resnick (1990). There is further assessment of the Hintikka's book in Bradley (1992) Ch. 3, part 5.

⁷ A view which he was later to criticise when he began to turn his insights into the connection between meaning and context, self-consciously onto his own philosophical use of language. This point comes over well in his intermediate notes, the *Philosophical Remarks*, where he argues that the notion of infinity was wrongly attributed of the world when in fact it was merely a formal device.

Experience as experience of the facts gives me the finite; the objects contain the infinite. Of course, not as something rivaling finite experience, but in intension. (PR §138₂)

How about infinite divisibility? Lets remember that there's a point to saying we can conceive of *any* finite number of parts but not of an infinite number; but that this is precisely what constitutes infinite divisibility.

Now, 'any' doesn't mean here that we can conceive of the sum total of all divisions [...]. But that there is the variable 'divisibility' (i.e., the concept of divisibility) which sets no limits to actual divisibility; and that constitutes its infinity. (PR §139₁₋₂)

My point is that a view parallel to this one of infinity, but of simplicity and analysis, was held by Wittgenstein in this early work.

⁸ Thus Wittgenstein speculates whether there might not be something that could not be represented by a proposition or named (i.e. an object)- -in which case we could neither speak nor even ask about it (NB 51₁₁). But he does wonder later (NB 63₁) whether "the representation by means of unanalysable names" is the only system. Whether or not a spatial object of infinitely many points would of necessity be unrepresentable is considered in my final chapter.

⁹ Bradley (1992) presents a case for supposing simple objects to be the point masses of physics though he takes care to draw the distinction between these and particles. A useful discussion of the issue, to which Bradley also refers his reader, is in Goddard and Judge (1982), see especially chapter 4: "Conclusion: Are Objects Real?"

¹⁰ Though Wittgenstein deals with the formal logic of truth functional complex propositions and the logical constants involved, generally when he speaks of logic in the *Tractatus* he is most likely to be thinking of logical form which he considers to underlie the form of so-called logical propositions (tautologies and contradictions). These he thinks of not just in terms of (e.g.) $p \ \& \ \neg p$ but also with respect of such examples as 'Nothing can be red and green all over.' So Wittgenstein's conception of "logical" in this context is synonymous with analyticity and is a function of the meaning of terms (their logical forms).

The propositions of logic are tautologies. (6.1)

Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing. (They are the analytic propositions.) (6.11)

A case such as 'The red box is green all over' is thus a contradiction which manifests the logical form of colour (though it says nothing). Of course, this is consistent with the idea that the logical analysis of propositions should be in accord with my meaning of the proposition.

¹¹ E.F.Thompkins makes a similar point in favour of an intensional rather than extensional account of analysis and simple objects:

Kenny (1973, p. 6) speaks of analysing the sentence 'My fork is to the left of my knife' into a series of simpler statements which will end only with symbols that denote non-complex objects. But neither 'fork' nor 'knife' can be analysed into simpler symbols and still perform its function of identifying an object. Neither Kenny nor Pears (1971) takes the point that at an early stage of his proposed analysis all contact is lost with the ostensible subject of the discourse. (Thompkins, 1991, p. 226)

¹² Kenny (1984, pp. 18-21) argues that Wittgenstein was made aware of this issue but did not adopt Frege's view and that if these 1931 notes are taken as criticism of his early position (which they should be) then they represent another example of the later Wittgenstein's misinterpretation of the earlier since it is patently clear that he already held the correct view of the distinction between complex and fact.

For an alternative view of Wittgenstein's position namely, that although he correctly held that one could not name facts he did not fully appreciate the logical function of "thing" as a complex and not a fact, see Ishiguro (1969) pp. 37-40

¹³ Which Wittgenstein reviews much later under that title in his intermediate notes of June 1931, see PR pp. 301-3, also reprinted in PG pp. 199-201.

¹⁴ Of course all collective nouns have this property. It is a pleonasm to speak of a constellation of stars, a shoal of fish, a school of whales etc. These are all tautologous and manifest rules for the use of such nouns (except where terms like 'school' are ambiguous of course).

¹⁵ That is, names of genuinely simple objects, not names arising from definitional contraction. And where names do hide a definition then the proposition possesses a degree of indeterminacy (3.24c) which, of course, no elementary proposition can. That indeterminacy will become evident only in the proposition where the name's syntax is manifested (NB 53_s).

¹⁶ This is an analogy, not an example, so I don't mean to say that any such object is in itself spatial and it surely is not. I have already commented on the fact that objects are propertyless (or "colourless" as Wittgenstein remarks, 2.0232).

[It is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented - only by the configuration of objects that they are produced. (2.0231)

Even point masses (and certainly particles) cannot fulfill Wittgenstein's stipulations for simple objects for they already come with a property and would *a fortiori* constitute 'kinds' of objects of which we could speak.

CHAPTER IV

MEANING AND CONTEXT

But when there is a system by which we can create symbols, the system is what is important for logic and not the individual symbols. (5.555b)

Wittgenstein's Contextual Thesis

In some form or another Wittgenstein espoused the necessity of a contextual perspective on meaning throughout his entire philosophy. I have already alluded to the nature of the development of this notion as his work progressed. The idea became broadened from the formalised and limited statement of *Tractatus* 3.3 of what constitutes the context of names, the propositional context:

Only propositions have a sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have a meaning.

to the later works' wider horizons, the function of words in a "language game" and even a "form of life."

Firstly, my allusions arose by way of criticism; I consider that his early limited characterisation might account for many of the shortcomings of that work. At the least a view of language more grounded in other human practices seems to be what in part redirects his view of language in so many other subtle ways in his later investigations.

Secondly my anticipation of his contextual thesis has been intended to support my rejection of certain realist interpretations of the *Tractatus*, in particular the apparent support offered such views by Wittgenstein's remark at 3.203:

A name means an object. An object is its meaning.

Wittgenstein's view at 3.3 is reinforced in several places, 3.314, 3.326, 3.327, 4.23, (3.202?) and at 3.22 he also says "In a proposition a name is a representative of an object." (underlining added)

It is well known that Wittgenstein borrowed this idea from Frege (he remarks on the idea even in his later *Investigations* §49). Max Black (1964) suggests this is only a superficial similarity and that, Frege held the strong thesis that the meanings of names only obtained in some sentence, Wittgenstein held the opposite view:

[T]he sense of the proposition is a unique function of the meanings of its component words. (p. 117)

Before this Black has claimed that a name has, "as it were, lateral connections with its eligible partners as well as a forward connexion with the object that is its meaning." (p. 114) Furthermore:

We can say that a given name has a kind of 'meaning' outside a proposition, but this meaning is then, as it were, potential: it is the word's capacity, when used in propositions, according to standard conventions to stand then for a definite thing. (p. 118)

He also adds that he finds Frege's version barely intelligible. I offer this outline of Black's view because I find it mistaken in a manner significant for my account. In so far as he correctly characterises Frege's view, Black has in fact captured Wittgenstein's

too. As a consequence it will rest with me to make such a view of context intelligible and I don't think this is too difficult so long as the rest of my understanding of Wittgenstein's position is sound.

Black offers no textual support for his reference to the "potential 'meaning'" of names' outside of propositions and for good reason, there is none to be found. It represents an all too common desire to fit Wittgenstein's account into the British empirical tradition to which Russell belonged where the use of names in propositions is in accord with some ontological and/or empirical simples. That is, it fits conveniently within a realist framework.¹

Still, Black has a point, his interpretation does not have the consequence (as Frege's view might seem to) that, "the meaning of a name must shift with the senses of the various propositions in which it occurs" (p. 118) for this would be difficult to conceive, but only so long as one considers that the meaning of a name is (identical with) the object it attaches to, which is what 3.203 would convey without the qualification of 3.3. In fact Black's view amounts to giving priority to 3.203 read in isolation from 3.3 which in turn he has to contrive a reading for.²

The way in which 3.3 should, in my view, qualify our reading of 3.203 is that the manner in which a name means an object (the manner in which the object is identified by, and becomes the meaning of, the name in a proposition) must be mediated by the medium of the proposition. Indeed, all that Wittgenstein says regarding the lack of content of the notion of simple objects (that their only character is essentially simple and necessary, a logical form), the absence of any

acquaintance of ours with such entities (they are known of and only *a priori*), that objects combine in essential and necessary combinations (not accidental, contingent ones), all seem to me to not sit at all coherently with Black's view that objects, as the meanings of names, determine their possible combinations (and so account fully for the determination of sense).³

Now this account complies with the alternative interpretation of 3.3 suggested by Hidé Ishiguro (1969, pp. 20-50) which McGuinness (1981, pp. 60-73) summarises succinctly.

To understand the reference of a name is to know something about the truth conditions of some proposition. (p. 66)

By truth conditions I understand McGuinness to mean the proposition's sense.

Ishiguro suggests that the notions of "reference" (*Bedeutung*) and "refer" (*bedeuten*) (translated as "meaning" and "mean" respectively by Pears and McGuinness, 1961, translation of the *Tractatus*) are "intensional ones." Contrary to the metaphysical realism suggested by Black's account, such reference only implies simple objects "whose existence adds no extra content to the logical theory." (Ishiguro, 1969, p. 40). But those objects of reference are persistent and unaltering intensional entities and so in effect are designated rigidly (rather than extensionally by means of primitive labels on objects).

In the *Tractatus*, projecting names onto objects is possible because, as I earlier remarked, both name and object exist in precisely the same logical space, the framework of logical

possibilities. Only a proposition (as a picture), not a name, can fix any such position (2.202, 2.203, 3.4, 3.41, 3.42). Thus it is the relations of a name, not the name in itself, which "reaches out to reality" (cf. 2.1511) and connects language to what it represents. The possibility that things are related to one another, is how a picture is attached to reality (cf. 2.151, 2.1511). In so far as a name's possibilities of combination (as a totality of propositions it occurs in would give it) match those of some object's then the former serves as a name for the latter. But since no object of acquaintance exists in a logical framework but only a contingent one then it cannot be some existing object that a name unerringly attaches to. (This last point becomes important again in my comparison of reference and intentionality in Ch.VIII).

The point that it is the totality of a name's combinations that manifest the simple object also serves to answer Black's objection that meaning cannot surely shift with the differing senses of the distinct propositions a name occurs in. The meaning of a name, the object, is not given by a single proposition except in so far as "The force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space." (3.42c) The use of a name in one proposition somehow foreshadows all other uses so that:

If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.

(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)

A new possibility cannot be discovered later. (2.0123)

So any one propositional context is necessary but not sufficient to give the meaning of a name although one can still correctly say that

meaning arises only in the context of a proposition. And it is also true that an aspect of a name's meaning arises with each propositional context. But for Wittgenstein understanding any one aspect is internal to an understanding of all other aspects of its meaning so that no change of identity on the part of an object is suggested by the distinct senses of different propositions in which its name occurs.

This brings out an aspect of Ishiguro's view which I agree with but I think requires accounting for. She says:

The *Tractatus* view entails that it is the use of a Name which gives you the identity of the object rather than vice versa. (p. 34)

The obvious question this raises is if the identity of the object does not account for a name's function in propositions (Black's view) then what does?⁴ This brings to light a move which both Ishiguro and Black make which Wittgenstein's account does not support; they lean towards promoting the priority of either the referents of names (Black) or the syntax of names (Ishiguro) as a means to explaining the determining of sense. But Wittgenstein's account seems to me to eschew such prioritising and explanation in just the manner recommended so earnestly in his later work.

Fundamentally, I think the only way in which the demands set by 3.203 on the one hand and 3.3 on the other can both be met is by conceiving of the determination of sense, the meaning of individual signs and the identity of objects as aspects of a singular achievement arising out of the one act of deriving rules for the use of names "in

close connection with certain facts of nature" (as Specht puts it, see Ch. III) I shall continue to clarify this claim as my thesis develops.

The Significance of Wittgenstein's Contextual Thesis
for the Nature of Objects

We have seen that, for Wittgenstein, representation is possible because of the possibility of distinguishing parts of a situation and despite the fact that other pieces could be distinguished. One could say that a proposition's sense must be determined but not definitive of a situation, (if only that did not suggest, as I think it can be taken to do, the notion of the metaphysically correct situation, what is really the case).

In order to "see" the situation given by some proposition, a grasp of its meaning is not to be attained ostensively for as I have already remarked, Wittgenstein was well aware of the distinction between pointing out some thing and pointing out that something is the case. This is in part his point at 3.263--the meanings of primitive signs (names) can only be got from the elucidations that propositions including the signs provides. What we have to "grasp" is not some object (which would be the case on a realist reading) but the meaning of the sign which is, paradoxically, presumed in our understanding of the elucidation. This, as I have already noted, puts deep restrictions on our possible reading of 3.203; in particular it can't imply that names could be learned in the Augustinian fashion the later Wittgenstein took pains to criticise in the opening of the *Investigations*:

I grasp that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. (PI note¹, p. 2)

My conclusion was that Wittgenstein did not intend a purely extensional account of meaning in which the extensions for the title "simple object" fix, somehow naturalistically, the role of signs in a sense (their possible combinations with other names). Elucidations are intended, instead, to show perspicuously the kind of object any thing is by way of what other names some object's name may be combined with. This only mistakenly suggests a circularity in the identities of objects revealed by names' combinations. The meaning of a name is not fixed by juxtaposing it with its object, nor by knowing the meanings of the other names it is combined with (which would only beg the question), but by comparing relations of names (i.e., whole propositions) with relations of objects (facts).

So the sense that arises from the prescription of a name's possible combinations does not represent some enigmatic, intuitive recognition of types of objects on our part through our acquaintance with sense data or external objects directly. Rather, it is a function of a names's syntax or "logical grammar." (3.325) And only in the context of a proposition does a name have a meaning because only in the context of a proposition does a name possess and manifest a syntax. I believe Wittgenstein held this to be not only epistemologically the case (that only given some context can I know a name's meaning); he also held that a name had no meaning to be known except that constituted within some context (proposition). Thus, although he says:

Names are necessary for an assertion that this thing possesses that property and so on.

They link the propositional form with quite definite objects. (NB 53_{s, s})

he has already made it clear three paragraphs earlier that:

Names signalise what is common to a single form and a single content.- Only together with their syntactical use do they signalise one particular logical form. (NB 53_s, see also 3.327 and NB 59₁₂)

Wittgenstein supposes the entire possibility of a name's combinations is in some way fixed and determined before any use can be made of the name (if its use is to be the use of a name). To say, e.g., that I mean by 'flower' a complex of parts: (petals and sepals etc.) is to fix my future use of the term as well as indicating my present use. It represents a (tautological) presentation of the syntax of 'flower' drawn up in close connection with, but not necessitated by, the corresponding fact of nature (to adapt Specht's phrase).

The importance of a name's propositional context (as a manifestation of its syntax) becomes obvious once the accidental nature of the name's form itself is appreciated. It can be replaced by a propositional variable (3.313 - 3.314) in an elementary proposition (which thereby becomes a "prototype", a kind of template of a form, see NB 47_s) without affecting the simplicity of the argument place. The point is that no ordinary name can be replaced by a variable without losing its essential connection to its particular object.⁵ That that such a substitution is possible for the name of a simple object, Wittgenstein argues, shows that the proper name-bearer relation is not what is significant to names of simple objects. Instead they "signify holistically" by way of their syntax in the comparison of proposition and fact.⁶

And just as "the simple sign is essentially simple" so too, the function of the simple object is such that "[i]ts composition becomes completely indifferent. It disappears from view" (NB 69₂₋₄). Which is to say that a simple object is a variable marked only by its logical coordinates, it is otherwise entirely contentless, (NB 69₁, see also my characterisation of the "object-of-reference" at the close of Ch. V).

Analysis and Context

From the account so far it seems as if, paradoxically, knowledge of the world is redundant so far as formulating a representation of it is concerned. Perhaps we are mistaken over the facts our syntax is drawn up in close connection with, or must my present meanings become redundant (because they turn out in some way indeterminate) in the light of future new knowledge? On this issue Wittgenstein seems to work with two axioms, firstly that my present meanings are determinate (5.5563) and secondly that the "reference" of my propositions is not infinitely complicated (NB 46₉). (From what follows it is clear that by "reference" Wittgenstein, uncharacteristically on this occasion, means the corresponding fact of which, he says, we may devise different pictures (NB 46₁₀.)⁷

Wittgenstein considers a worse-case scenario, whether a possibly infinitely, contingently complex (and so, presumably, fundamentally unknowable), world would be excluded from the possibility of being represented. Such a world would seem to be a Kantian noumenal realm, an ineffable reality that was radically unthinkable because it was

possibly essentially formless and indeterminate. One, that is, that was without any final unanalysable elements in its make up.

If analysis could be carried on *ad infinitum* then the vagueness of everyday propositions would not become glossed, rather, it would become increasingly decomposed, just as, analogously, the physical analysis of a flower ceases at some point to be an analysis of a flower. It ceases to be a botanical analysis and becomes chemical analysis.⁶

The possibility of unending analysis (taking analysis as the mirror image of the determination of sense) burdens the concept of "sense" impossibly. That is why Wittgenstein turns away from leaving its endpoint as a matter for the contingent constitution of the world and why he looks to meaning for a "logical" solution to the question of its limits. How it is that this Kantian conclusion is not entailed by this logical solution will not become evident until my final chapter.

But this issue illustrates the connection between analysis and propositional context. Propositional context plays an important role in both the meaning of the names involved in a proposition and that proposition's analysis. It also explains the significance of Wittgenstein's rejection of Russell's second analytic tool, his theory of types. For Wittgenstein the type of anything is not, as Russell had supposed, to be spoken of metalogically in terms of higher orders of types (see 3.33, 3.331, 3.332), rather, it is ineffable (3.332) but manifested by what relations are possible for it. "E.g., in 'aRb', 'R' is not a symbol, but that 'R' is between one name and another symbolizes." (*Notes Dictated to Moore* in NB 109₁₀) Different types of

objects are indicated by "different kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one another's places." (letter to Russell, Jan. 1913, NB 121-122):

If, e.g., I call some rod "A", and a ball "B", I can say that A is leaning against the wall, but not B. Here the internal nature of A and B comes into view. (NB 70_e)

That we see Orion as a man striding across the sky (cf. PG §4_e) or as a collection of discrete stars will be evident from the meaning of the proposition in which 'Orion' occurs in combination with other names. The analysis we adopt should then respect the sense of this proposition, mythological or astronomical. To adapt a remark of Wittgenstein's we might say "Every proposition is the signpost for [an analysis]" (PR §150₁₁, the original reads "... a verification"). In a word it depends on intensions manifested by the name in its propositional context. The meaning, the form of analysis and the kinds of simples indicated are internally related.

This solution answers the question of which of the numerous, possibly numberless, varieties of empirical analysis we should engage in in any particular case. Should it end at physical atoms, minimum sensibilia, some kind of ideal point masses of physics or even fictional or mythological entities? The answer Wittgenstein gives is that the kind of analysis is indicated by the manner in which the names of objects are combined in propositions for that reveals the type of object named in the proposition.

Of course, none of the above forms of analysis correspond to the kind which Wittgenstein believes will reveal the logical form of the things analysed. Or, rather, all of them do in the sense that whatever

objects are products of these forms of analysis they will all possess the requisite logical simplicity.

So syntax lies at the very heart of semantics in Wittgenstein's account. It serves to explain his association of logical matters (of logical form) and semantics. But most importantly, it also serves to underline the significance of relations of names (and objects), rather than names (and objects) in themselves, as the point around which his account centres; that was the message of chapter II. We should also recognise a certain characteristic of the account itself which may be appreciated by way of a contrast with its alternative. That alternative view takes simple objects themselves to be fundamental to the determination of sense, their nature in some way is held to explain the possibility of the various combinations possible for their names. But in Wittgenstein's account, distinctive relations of names reveal distinctive "kinds" of objects. An object is merely to be identified by the totality of the possible combinations of its name. The meanings of names are established by taking possible combinations of them to the world to find (or not) a fit, which is to say that a name is first given a meaning and a hypothetical object an identity (or, better, an object is hypothesised) before any real object is thus identified (by fitting the form). A significant ambiguity, represented by the two uses of "identity" here, will be reconsidered in relation to a similar distinction to be drawn in the concept of intentionality in Ch. VIII).

Notably absent from this view is mention of any kind of acquaintance of real simples. It is our acquaintance with facts, not

things, which, so to speak, submerges language in the world and provides its content, though no contingent matter can satisfactorily explain the necessity involved in the logical determination of sense. In Wittgenstein's account, by contrast with the alternative, no explanations are suggested of what relations are possible (necessary) for any object so the determination of sense itself becomes opaque to explanation. In such an account we must let what is shown us suffice.

Unravelling the Conditions for the Determination
of Sense From the Demands for Precise
Empirical Description

Anticipating again, Wittgenstein asks himself (the question to which I shall keep returning until my consideration of certain metaphysical implications in chapter X) whether this mere designation of an unanalysable element does not dislocate language from the world. If whatever is named is not truly simple (i.e., a real simple object) then surely the determination of sense will be illusory since any sense to the world itself is illusory. This is the primary (sceptical) problem for any account of how language might represent the world if its very foundations are not given but only posited. It is why Wittgenstein was at pains to maintain that despite these "logical manipulations" language and the world do indeed share a common logical form.

Once again we can form Wittgenstein's answer generally and in the particular. Generally speaking he envisages that there is no reason why circumstances in the world might not necessitate vague representation. For example, locations within a circle (standing

roughly somewhere) or within a range (weighing exactly but approximately 2g. of a substance) are forms of everyday statements, but they do not represent any fundamental indefiniteness of meaning. In this respect he answers his own question over the pretensions of physics to be more precise representations than those of ordinary language use (NB 67₉₋₁₁) by remarking of propositions we use ordinarily:

But the sense must be clear, for after all we mean something by the proposition, and as much as we certainly mean must surely be clear. (NB 67₁₁ see also NB 67₁₁- 68_ε)

Wittgenstein's main point is that any sense that is determinate and representative must recognise (and the analysis reveal) only enough to make its point. A fact and the corresponding proposition are constituted of just the same number of parts, simple elements (NB 37₂, see also 4.04). They are equally articulated. The sense of a proposition is just as indeterminate if it goes beyond what is necessary as if it fails to mention sufficient detail. (In the vernacular, enough is enough.) Furthermore:

(A proposition may well be an incomplete picture of a certain situation, but it is always a complete picture of somethin.) (5.156d, see also NB 61₁₀)

The "certain situation" here should be thought of as the contingent situation associated with the utterance, which could always be represented as more or less complex than it actually is. That does not dispute the possibility of any utterance being as articulated as some situation. That is all that is required for the proposition to possess a sense. Its truth value, of course, is another matter.

So not only, as NB 37₂ states, must there be as many parts in a proposition as there are in the fact represented; there must, congruently, be as many parts to the situation as there are to be understood from the propositional sign. Or better, there is some situation that has just this many parts which this proposition represents and which serves as its sense (NB 61₁₀).

In so far as a proposition makes its point (asserts something to be the case) then its focus must be neither too wide nor too narrow. That I have stood within the Parthenon may be precisely what I want to convey such that to say exactly where I stood would seem a pointless elaboration. Indeed it could be entirely misleading. For example, the fact that some dot X lies within the boundary of some prescribed circle Y is not better stated (i.e., in more detail) by a proposition which states the precise position of the dot within the circle for note that for the same object at the same spatial coordinate, whilst,

a. "X lies within Y" is true,

b. "X lies at coordinates x,y that are within Y" may well be false. and where b. is false I cannot know that X is in Y even if not at x,y. By being too accurate in my description I fail to say what is true. The wider the target I give myself the more chance I have of hitting it.

There is a tendency to confuse precision and determinacy here. That I stand within a certain circle, however large it is drawn, is a fact in the world no less than that I stand precisely at some ideal geometric point within it. Correspondingly, propositions representing this fact are themselves determinate. The difference between

propositions giving such approximations of position and others more precise ones is just that, contingent precision, not determinacy. And the question whether or not I know more by the latter than the former is beside the point for certainly, if I can assume the question then I cannot question whether either proposition has a determinate sense.

This is Wittgenstein's point but it cannot satisfactorily answer the objections we can imaginatively raise concerning whether I am still within the Parthenon if my arms are outstretched beyond the outer wall. This kind of ambiguity requires a broader notion of context than that supplied by the proposition on which Wittgenstein relies in 3.3. It requires, for example, the context of previous statements and the point of the utterances to clarify suitably what is to count as a person being within a certain space. But I think Wittgenstein's account is correct within that limitation.

The questionable greater (ideal?) determinacy of sense achieved in physics to which I have already alluded gives a good instance of how Wittgenstein was later to broaden this notion of context to include distinctive meanings within varieties of human practices. He says:

The division of the body into material points, as we have it in physics, is nothing more than the analysis into simple components. (NB 67_e)

By "components" here Wittgenstein means parts of a (logical) complex, not parts of a (contingent) fact. "Material points", as parts of a body, are manifested by what physicists mean by "body." "Material point" and "point mass" are synonyms for "simple object." Physicists do not discover a fact that bodies consist of such elements for it is

not a fact. Rather they discover (or not) the particular entities which happen to be these parts of material bodies.

But the point I wish to make here is that in representing a situation (what can be ostensively picked out--that I happen to be at x,y within Y) by a proposition, one does not have to recognise the contingent situation in its entirety, even if one knew it in order for the proposition to possess a determinate sense. Nor need everything in the sign count in the representation. Hertz, whose theory of dynamical modelling had considerable influence on the young Wittgenstein (see 4.04),⁹ also recognised the accidental features of any sign system in speaking of the economy of the representational system. On both sides of the identity and congruence of parts (of fact and proposition) there is some contingent residue, matters inconsequential to both the situation and the representation.¹⁰

In brief one might say that the possibility of representing the world is both because of its complexity but despite it. Here another voluntaristic aspect of language becomes evident--that representing the world in propositions requires our judgment--in addition to the agency explored in the previous chapter (and named as such in its conclusion). Contingently there is always more complexity to the world than I wish or need to convey and the consequences of this for determinate representation of the world (as infinitely distinguishable) will be dealt with in chapter X.

What Wittgenstein gave to his account of meaning in the later work is some basis for our judgments of the complexities relevant to our meanings, its pragmatics. This in turn suffices to show our agency

within the activity of constructing propositions (determining sense). As Wittgenstein was later to say, in distinguishing the essential (necessary) features from the inessential (accidental, contingent) ones of meaning, we are forced to recognise the point of the game (cf. PI §564).

There is a further question that Wittgenstein raises in the *Investigations*:

[H]ow can I decide what is an essential, accidental, feature of the notation? Is there some reality lying behind the notation, which shapes its grammar? (PI §562)

And this too is foreshadowed in the *Tractatus* in the form of the problem of what is to count as the essential articulation of any fact or proposition? In other words, what is to count as the simple or unanalysable parts and their relations? By distinguishing logical and empirical analysis I have tried to account for the finite nature of propositional analysis. Again I must refer the reader to my discussion of the metaphysical aspects of this problem for the young Wittgenstein's answer to the ontological correlate of this question. But we can already say something of his view, namely that it is certainly not in any straight forward naive realist's (causal) manner that "reality lies behind the notation" (determining sense).

Notes

¹ A realist interpretation of the *Tractatus* is still possible even allowing the interpretation of name and simple object along the strong contextual lines I have argued. For example, Julius Weinberg's (1966) argues that the *Tractatus* is, as the Vienna Circle thought, a Logical Positivist thesis but he still maintains that:

Names and other ingredients of symbolism interest the logician merely as material for constructing propositions and not on their own account, because names, etc. have their sole significance as articulate parts of propositions. The same consideration obtains for objects and facts. Objects as such are purely formal entities which constitute the constituents of facts. They can only be conceived in the context of some facts or others. (p. 79)

Of course, the interpretation I argue for also represents an attempt to marry this contextual view of names and objects with a form of realism but not Weinberg's version.

² Black's position is supported by the case Norman Malcolm argues (1986), especially chapters 1-3. Malcolm provides a clear and persuasive argument for the extensional interpretation of the role of simple objects in Wittgenstein's early theory of meaning. (This is part of his wider view of the significance of the first 100 passages of the *Investigations* as a critical commentary on the *Tractatus*). I think Malcolm's view deserves a more than cursory remark at this juncture of my thesis though the context of a footnote will lead me to criticise only a few specific, though significant remarks of his in detail rather than attempt to address the wider issue. Also worthy of note is Anthony Kenny's (1984, pp. 10-23) which provides a contrary view to Malcolm's position.

Norman Malcolm takes issue with the idea that the meaning of a name arises specifically within the context of a proposition (p37). He too was considering whether "this watch" might satisfy "all the conditions for being a simple object" (NB 60_s) and even whether all names are genuine (names of simple objects):

When I say this watch is shiny, and what I mean by this watch alters its composition in the smallest particular, then this means not merely that the sense of the sentence alters its content, but also what I am saying about this watch straight away alters its sense. The whole form of the proposition alters. (NB 61_s, Wittgenstein's italics. Malcolm translates this italicised passage slightly but not significantly differently. I have used Anscombe's translation.)

Malcolm goes on to say:

This seems to be a paradoxical view. Consider the statement 'This watch belonged to my father.' This statement would have a different sense for every change in the watch. e.g. if the watch became less shiny. Would it even be true that this watch was my father's watch?

I offer this view precisely because it misses the most crucial element in what in my view is Wittgenstein's understanding of meaning and analysis. The view of meaning Malcolm is suggesting ties together the contingent state of any object to its meaning directly and thus incurs all the problems that any object's infinite contingent divisibility (and alterability) presents for the determination of sense. It lumps together all that is essential and all that is accidental to the watch in its meaning. The view Malcolm describes would certainly, paradoxically, rob propositions of the possibility of possessing sense, but it is not Wittgenstein's.

Let us compare Malcolm's view with Wittgenstein's thesis. According to Malcolm's view 'watch' has the same definitive meaning in all propositions it is used in because the meaning, in so far as it is supposed to function as a genuine name, is identical with some metaphysical subsisting referent. He wonders whether the changes in the watch would make it not his father's watch. Is it likely that such changes are pertinent to the meaning of the original proposition ("This watch belonged to my father")? Of course all sorts or changes in the watch seem to be quite accidental to this meaning of 'watch' - it would, for example, be most inappropriate to complain that this is not a watch at all since it no longer tells the time, has lost one hand, has gone dull etc. None of these matters - contingent facts of the watch and probably known to me when I make the claim - seem to matter to whether the sense of my claim is clear. We could say that in this case the criteria of identity for (my father's) watch do not include any of these inessential changes, its meaning is rigid with regard to them. This, of course is not to deny the pertinence for my meaning of some contingent states of the watch which my original statement does not mention (perhaps that it bears my father's initials). After all, as we have seen, such criteria are drawn up in connection with certain facts of nature. For example, if I mention the watch with a view to knowing the time, then it seems that many details of its mechanical or electronic state, likely even unknown to me, should be taken into account.

In fact Malcolm's misunderstanding is simply a misreading of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein here speaks not of changes in the composition "of the watch" but of changes in the composition of what "he means" by the watch. If indeed Wittgenstein had meant what Malcolm thinks, it would have been most natural to simply say: "the watch alters its composition" rather than be pleonastic. By Malcolm's account there should be no difference in Wittgenstein speaking of "the watch" or of "what I mean by the watch" since Malcolm supposes the meaning of 'watch' is identical with its object. I suggest that the subjectivity and intentionality implied by speaking of "what I mean by x" rather than just of "x" surely precludes such an identification. Wittgenstein here seems deliberately to eschew any suggestion of an objective relation between name and object named. (As we shall see, it is not this name-to-object relation which Wittgenstein held to be the objective correlation between language and reality but rather the relation between the isomorphic structures of propositions and state of affairs.)

Furthermore, Wittgenstein could not, without contradicting himself, have both hypothesised the watch as a simple whilst in the same breath speak of it changing its composition. And in so far as Wittgenstein's example concerns what he means by the watch, then this is not to say he cannot mean it differently. In fact this explains Wittgenstein's very next remark on this:

That is to say, the syntactical employment of the names completely characterises the form of the complex objects which they denote. (NB 61_e)

Clearly the compositional changes Wittgenstein is imagining here are formal, which is to say, logical (syntactical). And the manner by which what I mean by the watch can change its composition is shown by fluctuations in the syntax of 'watch.' That is how a name means (identifies) its object, not by itself but by means of its syntax-its propositional context.

So, like Black and others, Malcolm forces an extensional theory of meaning onto Wittgenstein's account, namely, what Wittgenstein means by "the watch" is the object named. Like Black, he seems to have read 3.203 independently of the qualification Wittgenstein requires us (in 3.3) to make.

With the reading I have suggested it is not at all unexpected that if, to put it rather awkwardly, I mean this watch differently, that the sense of the proposition the expression occurs in should shift its sense too. This reading also serves to illustrate Wittgenstein's clear awareness of the contingent/logical distinction which I have argued characterises his account of analysis and the determination of sense. Just because some name refers to ("denotes" he says) some (possibly infinitely) complex object then that does not mean that logically all that the object is constituted of is meant in all propositions in which it is named. If I say of my watch that it is in the drawer this does not mean that some wheel of the watch must be there too "for perhaps I had not the least knowledge that the wheel was in the watch" (NB 64_a,_e). I can make sense of a claim about the whereabouts of the watch without first ascertaining all sorts of facts about it (NB 64_e) since it "does not follow logically" that such facts are the case as it should so far as what counts for the meaning of my proposition.

Even if Malcolm's objection is mistaken it does indicate a second possible objection. The particularity of propositional contexts does seem to make the meaning of 'watch' shift with each use (which would seem to make hearer if not speaker meaning unintelligible) and that is clearly not Wittgenstein's view. Wittgenstein maintains that the meaning of 'watch', in so far as it is a simple name, is constituted of all the propositional contexts (all possible combinations) of the name. Any particular case of such a context (a single use) of a name is, rather, held in some way to capture all other possible uses of the name. We, so to speak, see the object in logical space and thereby simultaneously see all its other possible relations. Perhaps it may be thought of as analogous to the manner in which each sequence of two numbers is both an example of, and reveals, the formula from which the sequence was derived. Or more generally, each application of a rule is not only a particular case of its application but also manifests the

rule itself in its generality. But to say more than this would be outside of the scope of this study.

³ Neither do I think the view expounded in the *Theaetetus*, which Wittgenstein later quoted (PI §46), as a characterisation of his own early view, maintains it should. For a start it seems much more likely that Wittgenstein should provide this passage as an example of what it does explicitly reiterate of the *Tractatus* views: simple objects are primary elements, cannot be defined or described but only named, are the substance of everything else that is complex and, finally, they exist "in [their] own right" (i.e., are not dependent, as complex things are, on simples and so are not contingent but necessary).

Given all of the above it does not seem unlikely that Wittgenstein should either overlook what seems to be merely implied in the view explored by Socrates and Theaetetus (namely, that objects as meanings of names determine names' combinations) or even read it to not imply that at all. For certainly, that an object has no characterisation but is only named makes it difficult to conceive how the use of the name is fixed by such a reference. Nor does the *Theaetetus* description seem to imply that to mean an object by a name is always to be doing the same thing. Which seems to be precisely the point of the contextual thesis of the *Tractatus*.

⁴ Wittgenstein's assertion (which alone seems to support Black's position) that:

Like Frege and Russell I construe a proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it. (3.318)
is in fact only concerned with the truth functional nature of complex propositions, and the expressions to which he refers are themselves propositions (as 3.31 itself makes clear). (And furthermore, the sense of 'p', '- p', '-,- p' etc. are functions of the sense of 'p', see 5.234).

⁵ For a discussion of the nature of the simple object/name relation conceived as an act that is essentially intentional see Brockhaus (1991):

The meaning of a Name, then, is a function of two things: its logical form - its ability to enter into propositions of certain sorts - and the pure intending of the particular Object of that range to which the Name refers. (p. 172)

What is common to every Symbol that can be used as a Name for a given Object is that the user of that Name intends it to be the Name of that Object.

"Naming is like pointing" Wittgenstein writes (NB, p. 100), although I would add pointing *ad intellectum* rather than *ad sensum*. (p. 171)

This last point is what is significant, for Wittgenstein says:

[A proposition] is understood by anyone who understands its constituents. (4.024c, underlining added)

The meanings of simple signs (words) must be explained to us if we are to understand them (4.026a, underlining added)

Pears (1987) argues that Wittgenstein rejected Russell's notion of naming as labelling. Pears also rejects the views of Ishiguro (1969) and McGuinness (1981) as an interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of the role of propositional context for identifying and naming simple objects (see, for example, Ishiguro p. 26 and her note' on that page concerning the syncategorematic nature of names). Pears offers a third possibility on pp. 102-3. Very briefly he interprets the context thesis as applying only after some kind of Russellian procedure of reference has associated a name with its object. Thereafter the name continues to represent that object only in so far as its relations in propositions match the relations of its object's.

If taken in this way, it qualifies the direct attachment of names to objects but does not replace it with something completely different. The initial act of attachment is necessary but not sufficient. (p. 103)

There seems to me to be no explicit support at all in the *Tractatus* or the *Notebooks* for this initial stage of attaching names to objects although one can understand Pears's motive for suggesting it.

⁶ See, for example, Ishiguro (1969) on the transitive nature of the relation between names and what they signify:

We settle the identity of the object referred to by a name by coming to understand the sense, i.e., the truth conditions of the proposition in which the names occur. (p. 34)

This has important ramifications for how a name will unerringly reach its object which I explore in terms of intentionality, and compare with reference, in chapter IX.

⁷ One is reminded of the means in the *Tractatus* by which distinctive descriptions of the world are possible when viewed through different meshes, see 6.341, 6.342.

⁸ Of course biochemists could dispute this by means of their own distinctive set of criteria of 'flower' but this only serves to further illustrate the point that we are concerned here with what is meant by 'flower' rather than what a flower really is in itself.

⁹ See also Janik and Toulmin (1973) especially chapters 5 and 6.

¹⁰ This takes Wittgenstein's work one stage beyond the influence of Hertz's mechanics which recognised accidental features of a system used to model reality but not those of the reality itself. But, of course, Hertz was concerned with the ideal of scientific representation- -the complete representation of this possible world's reality; that implies the (metaphysical) notion of complete knowledge. In contrast, Wittgenstein is not doing epistemology and instead is dealing with what is more fundamental, the determination of sense by means of which knowledge and mistaken beliefs are expressed.

CHAPTER V

HOW SIMPLICITY ARISES IN THE WORLD AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
FOR WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF MEANINGIntroduction

Thus far my investigation into Wittgenstein's early view of meaning has found that it is in the common structures of elements, not objects in themselves or their names, that there is to be found the form shared by language and reality that underlies the possibility of representation. Consideration of the two relevant, seminal issues--the logical analysis of propositions into names and the context provided by the proposition for the meanings of those names--supported this conclusion.

So I have conceived of simple objects in terms of their simple relations and in conclusion to chapter II I briefly raised two obvious difficulties; firstly, how we are to conceive of relations between entirely formal, pseudo-entities? And secondly, how is the world and the properties associated with it to be conceived of as arising from the relations of such propertyless entities? (The latter, of course, being as much a problem for a realist interpretation as any other.) In this chapter I return to these questions.

The idea that the course of analysis and its products should be determined by my original meaning suggested that a merely designated end point might suffice to determine sense. This formalist view will receive closer scrutiny and qualification below where I consider the account set out principally by Hidé Ishiguro (1969).¹ That discussion will take off from an initial consideration of an sample simple object in the following section.

Despite my criticism of it, a realist account of meaning has many comforts, providing a common sense intelligibility and a certain intuitive satisfaction that alternative views ignore at their peril. Wittgenstein's "mirroring" conception of the "fit" of language and the world represents a response to these attractions. So it is necessary to show how simple objects can be conceived of as only formal entities without giving up some form of correspondence between language and reality at the atomic level. The rest of the chapter is given over to investigating how, by virtue of an ambiguity in the idea of a name "meaning" its object, the formalists' position becomes modified in Wittgenstein's account so that some form of real correspondence is restored.

A Watch as a Simple Object

The particular example of a simple object I shall take is one of Wittgenstein's- -a watch. In its strongest form my question is, is a watch a simple object? The example is chosen just because the negative answer seems so obvious.

I should preface my discussion with two warnings to the reader. The discussion will not end conclusively, more detailed consideration is required to make my conclusions complete and coherent. Secondly, for the purposes of my thesis we should pay at least as much attention to what Wittgenstein is doing here. It is unlikely that every leak in the notion of simples that Wittgenstein is espousing in the *Notebooks* could be convincingly sealed, but that in itself is of limited consequence for the question whether Wittgenstein is here engaged in some sort of phenomenology. His methods and the kinds of solutions he countenances are surely the more significant for that question.

The first move towards undermining the apparent obviousness of the watch's complexity takes off from accepting the conclusions of my discussion in chapter II, that an object is the meaning of a name (3.023) but the meaning of that name must in fact be an object whose identity, so to speak, arises within the context given by the proposition in which its name occurs (3.3). In the light of this the question can be reformulated as, is 'watch' the name of a simple object? I argued in chapter II that objects are dependent entities subsisting combinations (facts) just as propositions reporting those facts provide the context for, and are subsisted by, their names. So the question of the watch's complexity or simplicity can only be made sense of from the standpoint of what we might say about the it. That is, by considering propositions in which the watch is named. We can only get to the watch through its name for whatever experience (of the watch) we might draw upon for an answer will itself be expressed in propositions (for it is always some fact that experience reveals).²

That it seemed obvious at the outset that we could give a negative answer to the question of the watch's simplicity independently of this is evidence of precisely the preconceptions of meaning this contextual thesis marks a resistance to.

Thinking of the watch as a fact which is representable by some proposition (naming and relating its parts) certainly would be consistent with thinking of the watch as complex. But that thought is badly expressed since it fails to recognise the distinction, raised in chapter III, between contingent and logical complexity. If indeed I can refer to the watch by representing it in some proposition then what I report is some contingent fact about it, whatever happens to be the case with it. But the simplicity or complexity of any object concerns not its contingent but its logical form (what is necessary to it). It is logical form that language and the world are supposed to share and which facilitates our representation of the one by the other. That should not be confused with the contingent complexity of the world (what we represent of one by the other). That, at least, was the conclusion reached in chapter III.

So we must contextualise 'watch', for example: 'The watch is in the drawer.' (cf. NB 64_s) For convenience I shall refer to this proposition by the acronym 'TWID'.

Can 'watch' be the name of a simple object? At present we only have it that whatever 'watch' does mean, in some context, then that alone should determine the course of any analysis. But if 'watch' is a name of a simple object then its meaning will indicate that no analysis is possible in this case.

What Wittgenstein says of the simple sign being "essentially simple" (NB69₂):

[The simple sign's] composition becomes completely indifferent. (NB 69₄)

also applies, he says (op. cit.), to the simple object. Just as the simple sign can have features accidental to its signifying (3.3411) so, too, might any simple object possess features accidental to its being signified.³

And to the extent that [the simple object's] composition is not definitive of this sense [of the proposition], to this extent the objects of this proposition are simple. THEY cannot be further divided. (NB 63₇. See also NB 64₈-65₁, 65₄)

So what would be "my meaning" of 'TWID' such that 'watch' named a simple object and that no analysis was possible? I have already said that it may not be possible to give a definitive statement on this for it would draw on contextual concerns that are not recognised as such in Wittgenstein's early work (concerns beyond the immediate propositional context). For example, if 'TWID' is said in reply to the question, what is the time?. In that case, in my reply, my meaning of 'watch' would presumably adopt the meaning provided for it by the original question (which, given that it seems to imply that the watch will tell the time, seems to imply its complexity). Or again, in contrast to 'TWID', imagine that I assert that the watch needs winding up or, more obvious still, that a piece of the watch is missing. Now my meaning seems to demand analysis, my understanding of 'watch' (its intension) seems to be of something essentially complex and analysable

and could lead to a proposition proving "false-by-analysis" (see Ch. II).

Wittgenstein's position on these issues (consider especially NB 63₂-65₄) demonstrates the priority of the meaning of a proposition for deciding the route of its analysis and its terminus (what simples it is to yield), rather than the constitution any object might actually happen to have.

All I want is only for my meaning to be completely analysed!
(NB 63₂)

And if what I refer to is complex, but "nothing depends upon the way it is compounded" then a generalisation will occur for sure but its fundamental forms "will be completely determined so far as they are given at all." ((NB 63₉-64₁) Thus:

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components - no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous - and these are objects in the original sense. (NB 63₆, underlining added added)

The next day he writes further on this:

If the complexity of an object is definitive of the sense of the proposition, then it must be portrayed in the proposition to the extent that it does determine the sense. And to the extent that its composition is not definitive of this sense, to this extent the objects of this proposition are simple. THEY cannot be further divided. (NB 63₇, all emphasis is Wittgenstein's)

What is most evident from these remarks is how Wittgenstein clearly accepts something as complex whilst at the same time considering it, from the perspective of the proposition's sense, to be simple. And simple, as he makes explicit, in just those respects demanded by his theory of the determination of sense.

If, in 'TWID', 'watch' does signify as a simple name, that the watch has no hands, no internal workings or does not tell the time etc. is all accidental, what I have previously referred to as the contingent residue of the object. There might easily be imagined circumstances in which any of these concerns were inconsequential for what we were calling 'watch.'

I should say: "I know" what I mean; I mean just THIS", pointing to the appropriate complex [context makes it clear here that Wittgenstein is talking of some fact such as 'TWID' reports] with my finger. And in this complex I do actually have the two objects in a relation. - But all this really means is: The fact can SOMEHOW be portrayed by means of this form too. (NB 70₄)

And in so far as I can do this then:

This object is simple for me.
(NB 70₇, Wittgenstein's emphasis)

Might it not be the case that in uttering 'TWID' I am merely concerned to give the spatial location (i.e., "in") of some referent? I shall return to this suggestion in detail shortly. But if so, TWID reports a spatial relation between spatial objects and it might be argued that the watch can clearly not be simple because Wittgensteinian objects possess no such properties. But it is only possible to express in language what are contingent and empirical matters of the watch's nature. Such characteristics as the watch's spatiality are finally of no consequences for its logical character. For that we must attend in some way to what its propositional context shows. But perhaps it is sufficient for the logical simplicity of the watch that "in" is a singular relation (and that it is singularly

spatial is of no consequence). As, for example, 'aRb' shows the singular relation between a and b.

Assuming that 'drawer', too, named a simple object and that 'TWID' was therefore an elementary proposition, then 'TWID' is true if it is the case that the watch is in the drawer and false if it is elsewhere. As an elementary proposition 'TWID' cannot prove false-by-analysis.

But if there is no watch in or out of the drawer, is 'TWID' nonsense? This is what both Russell and Wittgenstein balked at for the proposition seems perfectly intelligible. But their agreement is merely coincidental here and masks a more fundamental distinction in their views. For Russell the simples named in completely analysed propositions are those necessary and indubitable elements of experience, sense data. But for Wittgenstein, resolving the paradox of apparently sense-making propositions which name simple but non-existing objects is achieved by foresaking the condition of their necessary existence. In the light of his conception of existence as entailing complexity and contingency, this paradox can be seen to issue from a prior contradiction, trying to conceive of the existence of what is essentially simple. For Wittgenstein, it seems entirely unnecessary that such entities persist in the world but only that they do so in the realm of meaning. And in case that sounds too Platonic and obscure this only serves to suggest that the syntax of the names in our language persists. And correspondingly, what persists in general in the world are singular, simple relations.

That syntax persists means that the picture that every proposition is, can be constructed. It may be nonsensical (non-felicitous) to

assert, as every proposition does, that picture to be the case, but the picture itself is not nonsense. And it is the proposition as a picture that Wittgenstein is concerned with, not the (illocutionary?) mechanics of its proposal.

So Wittgenstein avoids the paradox posed by taking the concept of "simple object" when set against the seeming infinite complexity of any object he can conceive, by pointing out the logical nature of complexes (see again NB 62_s) and the contingent complexity of facts. This distinction in itself indicates how and that Wittgenstein sees the meanings of names to be formal entities.

The basis of the logical-contingent distinction itself lies within the realm of what we mean, whether we intend by 'aRb' some fact or some norm of description. In the latter case 'aRb' would not function as a proposition but merely as a manifestation of an object's identity such as "The a that can be related R to b." That is, we attend to what the proposition, as a picture, shows.

The Formal Conception of Simple Objects

Elementary propositions consist of names. Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with different meanings, we are also unable to give the composition of elementary propositions. (5.55b)

(And if we get into the position where we have to look at the world for an answer to such a problem, that shows that we are completely on the wrong track.) (5.551b)

The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not an experience.

Logic is prior to every experience - that something is so.

It is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to the question 'What?' (5.552)

Does it make sense to ask what there must be in order that something can be the case? (5.5542b)

The Conception of a Simple Object
as an Intensional Identity

I shall not rehearse all of Hidé Ishiguro's view of the formal status of simple objects or its supporting arguments here. For my present purposes it is sufficient to note the following (mainly from pp. 44-47) - for Ishiguro, "simple object" is a concept applying only within the formal realm of Wittgenstein's (so-called) theory. Since the names which name simple objects are not functioning to pick out real items of the world's ontology Ishiguro dubs them "dummy names." Most notably she provides a seminal example of the kind of formal entity that she considers to fulfill Wittgenstein's conditions for being a simple object, namely, the centre of a circle.

It is important to defend the example against two obvious objections:

1. If simple objects are supposed to be propertyless then the centre of a circle self-evidently fails as an example, for is it not a property of this "object" that is used to identify it? Related to this is the condition of the non-describable nature of simple objects, thus,
2. Does not 'centre of a circle' function as a description of the object?

So far as I can see Ishiguro anticipates and criticises only the first of these objections but she might have considered the second is defused by a successful defense against the first. I shall consider

her position on these objections separately even though they are closely related.

Objection 1.

Ishiguro's argument (p. 45) is basically an pre-emptive maneuver - merely being an object is not, in itself, a property of anything, it is merely a pseudo (formal) concept (see 4.126 - 4.1272). But as a consequence, she claims. " an object necessarily has to have a property other than being an object." Now nowhere does Wittgenstein say that simple objects have properties other than that of being a simple object and recognising this Ishiguro does not attribute the property to the (supposed more primitive) object but is instead identifying the two (the object is the intension). x is not both the centre of a circle and an object. So, $Ex.fx \ \& \ (x = a)$ where f is 'the centre of a circle' amounts to saying simply that an object is (identical with) the centre of a circle; that is its identity (see p. 44).

So Ishiguro rejects the idea (cf, for example, Copi 1966 *et al*) of simple objects as "bare particulars" and holds them to be essentially intensional entities. In a similar vein it will become apparent that, by my account, the epithet "simple" is not a description of any existing entity (and I think a similar status is arguable for science's synonyms of "simple object"- -"material point" and "point mass"). These characterisations capture the singularity of the mode of combination which constitutes a simple object's identity.

If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. (2.0123a)

These occurrences constitute all of a simple objects essential nature (its internal properties, 2.0123b,c, 2.01231, 4.123).⁴ That certain combinations of simple objects obtain in the world and give rise to certain material properties (cf. 2.0231), and therefore those properties themselves, is accidental to those objects and does not contribute to their identity. It is with respect of these material properties that Wittgenstein claims simple objects are without properties.

Objection 2.

How does Ishiguro's assessment relate to the second objection I raised about the non-describability of simple objects? What has properties can be described and what has none cannot be. And what kind of description do we find Wittgenstein denying simple objects and what kind of definition is 'the centre of a circle?' In denying any description of a simple object Wittgenstein rejected attempts to say what are internal properties of a simple object. Internal properties are those inferentially supposed to be possessed by it and which represent its capability for combining with only certain other simple objects.

A proposition such as 'aRb' does not say that 'a' can be combined with 'b', it says that a is related to b (i.e., the possible relation of a to b which is only shown is asserted to be an actual realised combination in the world, a fact). The correct form 'ab' (rather than 'aRb'), however, represents this manifestation of the possibility of a combining with b. This is the basis for elucidating the names of simple objects which cannot be explained by definitions (3.263) so

that an object can receive a definition of a kind, its identity can be elucidated by means of showing what combinations are possible for it (albeit indirectly by the proxying of its name in the elucidating proposition). Putting it crudely, we cannot describe a simple object as it is in itself but we can characterise it in terms of what other objects it can combine with, (cf. "I don't know him at all, but he must be a bad lot, just look who he chooses as friends!", cf. also note ¹⁶ below). This, in effect, amounts to showing the nature of the logical space of an object which could be explored independently of any simple object being in place at the various coordinates of its relations to other objects. It is in this respect that the simple object is a pseudo-entity merely serving to mark a coordinate or limit of its relations. Just as, in fact, any point can be the centre of some circle. As Wittgenstein says, I can imagine logical space independently of any objects (i.e., when it is empty) though I cannot conceive an object independently of the space (2.013).

Now how does 'the centre of a circle' measure up as a legitimate definition of a simple object? The answer is surely that it measures up entirely satisfactorily. It possesses the requisite necessity:

If a point in space does not exist, then its co-ordinates [its identity] do not either, and if the co-ordinates exist then the point exists too. - That's how it is in logic. (NB 69.)

Which is to say that we cannot give the co-ordinates (the identity) of a point that doesn't exist (cf. 3.032). And the pseudo entity is only understood in terms of, so to speak, what surrounds it, in terms of

some other entity or entities to which it is related and which may be themselves pseudo or genuine (i.e., describable) objects.

Limitations of the Formalist's View: Formalality
of Intensions Need Not Imply a Denial
of Real Extensions

This is how Brian McGuinness (1981) outlines the formalist's interpretation:

A simple sign could be correlated with a state of affairs only by revealing or assuming the existence of the state of affairs. It follows that in order to make a statement which would have a sense, i.e. be either true or false, whatever the case in the world was, it would be necessary to suppose that in principle that statement could be made by the use of signs which could function in a proposition whatever the case in the world was. (pp. 64-65)

Which is correct so far as this goes, except that, as I have remarked, taken too far it runs up against Wittgenstein's express belief that language engages somehow with the world at the atomic level. Much is made by Ishiguro (and by Winch, see again note¹) of Wittgenstein's assertion that the concept of "object" (amongst others) is a formal concept only (see 4.126 - 4.1273). They seem to think that one cannot speak of such things as fall under these concepts because there are no such entities. But Wittgenstein says:

The propositional variable signifies the formal concept, and its values signify the objects that fall under the concept.
(4.127)

So what makes a concept merely formal is not that it lacks any extension but rather that its intension is merely formal (it has no non-linguistic basis in reality). Perhaps collecting people together just on the basis of their names' first letters illustrates this point

except that it poses a problem for how the name is then associated with the particular person. There is no comparable problem for simple objects since it is assumed that their relations reflect their internal form. Giving those relations, unlike giving an initial, locates its object without identifying it as it is in itself (except indirectly and by virtue of the assumption).

When John Dalton first proposed his atomic theory he mistakenly believed that atoms were indivisible (or, rather, only God who created them could render them asunder). The concept of the indivisible atom served a role within his theory of the behaviour of distinctive chemical elements and compounds but it turns out to have no basis in reality. Specifically, no particles existed that were indivisible and characteristic of particular elements. The concept was generated within the theory itself but it did not fix its extension (i.e., it did not serve to pick out real entities in the world), indivisible atoms.

If Wittgenstein's "simple object" is such a concept it is necessary to account for how that pseudo-concept refers (picks out) some items and not just indiscriminately. If 'simple object' is like 'indivisible atom' in that it characterises items in the world in a manner that applies only formally then they cannot be treated as definite descriptions of their extensions. This kind of "reference" is taken up again in more detail in chapter VIII.

So we cannot call upon the usual accounts of reference to explain how 'simple object' serves to fix its extension. Of course Daltonian atoms were identified by means of those criteria that Dalton

(mistakenly) believed showed that atoms were indivisible, namely criteria to do with conventional chemical (as opposed to nuclear) reactions and certain ideas about conservation. In fact Wittgenstein is clear how this reference is achieved in the passage quoted above (4.127); it is whatever value is substituted for the variable in a proposition. A sign is only a variable when it occurs in the context that a function like a proposition (that maps sentences onto truth values) provides. And those values "... signify the objects that fall under the concept."

So there clearly were, for Wittgenstein, objects which are the extension of 'simple object', but "simple" characterises only the mode of combination of these entities. That is, objects in states of affairs as their corresponding names in elementary propositions give them and not the objects in themselves alone.⁵

In criticising these formalists' views Norman Malcolm (1986) goes further than is required. His belief is that Wittgenstein was a thoroughgoing realist in these matters and that 'simple object' picked out a class of real entities that were in themselves in some sense simple. Malcolm's aim is to show how he sees Wittgenstein's account as explanatory of the syntax of names, syntax as it is "derived from the object" (p. 27), so he is critical of Winch's interpretation of the following passage:

The rules of logical syntax must go without saying, once we know how each individual sign signifies. (3.334)

namely,

'It is important that Wittgenstein writes "how" rather than "what" here. The "what" will already be settled once the

"how" is established.' (Winch, remarks quoted in Malcolm, 1986, p27)

The "how" is the syntax which indicates the "what", the object, that is the meaning of the name.

An object, Malcolm says emphatically (see p. 26, and again p. 27 and again p. 29), is not a linguistic entity but something which endures through change and whose configurations constitute the states of affairs which make up the world. All of which is true, but he is also careful to write of their "existence" rather than existence (p. 27) while failing to make clear what his reservations amount to in this regard (although see note³ below). In particular, where he writes of objects possessing a form he fails to relate this form to whatever "it" actually is that "exists" to possess such a form. Malcolm doesn't appear to notice himself slipping between speaking of the form of objects as consisting of their possibilities of combining with objects in states of affairs and speaking as if this essential simple form is a character of the object as it is in itself. As Dalton's early atomic theory nicely illustrates, one can speak about entities and refer to them successfully within a theory whilst remaining quite ignorant in essential respects of the nature of those entities (indeed, as in Dalton's case, one can harbour false beliefs about them and still refer).

Similarly Malcolm criticises Ishiguro's view that:

[W]hen the logical syntax of a name is settled, then the object that corresponds to the name will be whatever it is that satisfies that logical syntax.

[I]t is the use of the Name which gives you the identity of the object rather than vice-versa." Ishiguro 1969 p. 46. (in Malcolm, 1986, p. 29)

But much of the impact of Malcolm's view results from its epistemological weight. He certainly takes heed of Wittgenstein's (3.3) insistence that names' meanings occur only in the contexts of propositions but he seems to have supposed that once this context has furnished us with an identity for the object then the object can, so to speak, possess that identity independently. I.e., for Malcolm, the simple relations of its name means that the object in itself is independently simple. Hence he discounts the claim of 3.3 as merely a device for identifying objects (i.e., an epistemological issue). But in fact the identity 3.3 proposes in terms of an object's simple relations constitutes the object. The simplicity of an object lies in the fact that the (logical) syntax of its name is identical with, and does not merely match, its own logical form for both lie within the same logical space. Unlike everyday objects there is not more of the object to be known once the "description" has led one to identify and become acquainted with a simple object's name.

Developing Ishiguro's Geometrical Analogy

So far as a simple object is taken as a formal entity Ishiguro's example offers a very persuasive case. The phrase, suggested by my investigation in chapter II, that best seemed to capture the barrenness of this connotation of 'simple object' was that they should be conceived of as merely "the coordinates of relations."

Now I shall succumb to the temptation to improve on Ishiguro's example with another taken from geometry. The centre of a circle has one limitation as an example of a simple object, namely, it is not

clear what other simple objects it is related to though it is fairly obvious that it is in itself unintelligible apart from its relation to the circle. Perhaps one might suggest the relation of the centre point to that infinite number of ideal points which make up the circle's circumference. But rather than patch up the original example, let me suggest an alternative- -the points of a triangle. How does each such point conform to the conditions we find Wittgenstein stipulating for simple objects?

I should first of all say that I do not mean any points actually drawn for the triangle, just as Ishiguro does not mean by "the centre of a circle" some pencil point that marks it. The edges of the triangle meet at an ideal point and it is this bare, ideal location that I mean by "a point of the triangle." The connection, therefore, to my earlier example of 'TWID' as asserting the bare location "in" of the watch to the drawer hardly needs mentioning.

The analogy of the point of a triangle seems to support the following observations:

1. As with Ishiguro's centre of a circle these points seem to "exist" necessarily (as simple objects must). At the terminal stage of analysis simple objects are held to "exist" necessarily, so that it makes no sense to assert their existence.⁶ Of what is necessarily the case any proposition to that effect is redundant (a tautology). If 'triangle' has a connotation then points of a triangle are required entities subsisting it, they are analytic of 'triangle.' In terms of analysis of propositions mentioning triangles or triangularity such

points could serve as its end-products. Hence they delineate the triangle both connotatively and as a spatial figure.

So the names of particular points of a triangle are assured of a meaning and any proposition asserting relations between them is assured of a sense. This is consistent with Wittgenstein's contextual thesis for the reference of these names is achieved by way of the context afforded them by the figure, the triangle, relating them. Only in the context of the sense of any proposition about the triangle does 'point of the triangle' succeed in reaching its subject (or of even possessing one).

2. Following from my last remark, these points have no "existence" independent of their relations to one another or the figure. There are no other properties by which any point may be identified except that of the property of being a point of the triangle. So, in an unusual sense, not only are 'points of a triangle' part of the analysis of 'triangle', there is a reversal of this analysis in the identification of the point in terms of the triangle. (This represents the kind of reciprocity of identity characteristic of foundations that I explored in chapter III.)

3. So, again, following on, being a "point of a triangle" is not itself a property of the object. Rather, it is a means of expressing the relation of one simple object (one point) to others such that "point of a triangle" merely identifies it by way of its relations to other points (an elucidation in fact). On the other hand such a relation of one point to another does provide an internal property of the simple object. But in all other respects the point appears to

fulfill the first of Wittgenstein's conditions for simplicity, its propertylessness.

Triangles and circles thus "exist" intensionally and it is a necessary property (i.e., is analytic) of any point that it is a possible point of a triangle, centre of a circle or an intersection of lines. That in fact there is no point except that which is a point of a triangle, centre of a circle, intersection of two lines etc. manifests the nature of the point in itself. That a particular point could be all of these shows how any simple object can have any number of possible relations simultaneously (and its name be a constituent of an equal number of true propositions).

4. Above all, these points only arise in the context of the larger (complex) figure. "Each thing is, as it were, in a [logical] space of possible states of affairs." (2.013) The possibility of the relation is the possibility of an object's conception. That is why no one point can be given independently of some relation (a point is always a point in logical space).

5. We can now begin to see from this model in what manner we should imagine simple objects to be only the coordinates of relations (and thereby, the coordinates of complex objects). It became apparent above that any identity for an object is given purely in terms of the formal relation within logical space itself irrespective of there being any object at those coordinates.

6. So only in its relations can the point of a triangle function as the substance of the world and in quite a different manner from either the way we might imagine solid particles constituting a solid object

or from how non-liquid water molecules collectively give rise to the liquidity of water itself. The points of a triangle cannot function as the limits of the triangle spatially, only their relations do that. Analogically speaking these relations are represented by the unidimensional edges of the triangle, an ideal point in itself being essentially non-spatial or non-extended (though still of course "in space").

7. Now I am not saying that these relations are spatial. Spatiality is a property of the ordinary world of experience which arises out of configurations within the underlying substance. We have to be careful not to construe this atomic realm along the same lines as the unanalysed world. This brings me to the question of how my example of a point of a triangle compares with my characterisation of a simple object as a coordinate of a relation. In speaking of my earlier example of the possibility of a watch as a simple object (to which I shall return shortly) I spoke of the relationship asserted by 'TWID' ("in") as being essentially simple if the watch itself is to be considered a simple. Other (most) relations by contrast seem complex, the relation of the winder to the watch for instance seems to entail not only a material relation of one piece connected to others but also certain functional and mechanical relations too.

For Wittgenstein, simple objects relate to one another in essentially simple ways, in fact, in one way only, by combination, the second of Wittgenstein's conditions for simplicity.⁷ He is very careful not to further characterise these relations which would surely be

unintelligible given the first condition for simplicity, objects' (external) propertylessness.

At most, all we can say regarding the simple relation (combination) of the three points of a triangle and the spatial figure they give rise to is, perhaps, that some relation between these simple objects can be inferred from the existence of the spatial relation inherent in the perceived figure. It will prove a sufficient condition for the simplicity of this relation that it is singularly spatial. Thus, for example, although a point could be, simultaneously, the point of a triangle, centre of a circle and a point on any other number of geometrical figures, still it is a simple object in that singularly spatial respect, its combinations give rise to only spatial states of affairs.

Existence and Subsistence and the Ontological Status of Simple Objects

What I once called 'objects', simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk of their possible non-existence; i.e. that for which there is neither existence or non-existence, and that means: what we can speak about no matter what may be the case. (PR §36₂)

I found that particulars held a central position among logical subjects because the particular was the paradigm of a logical subject. (Strawson, 1959, p. 246).

What most notably marks off the final stage of analysis from all subsequent stages is the ontological status of their analysans. Up to and including the penultimate stage the products of Russellian analysis are propositions (what have truth values) representing states

"necessary existence" to characterise the status of simples but no where does Wittgenstein do so. This habit quickly deteriorates into conflating the contingent and the necessary as merely species of "existence." That is a gross misrepresentation of Wittgenstein's position. Facts and objects could not be more unlike and Wittgenstein could hardly have made a greater effort than he did to make this clear.²⁹

Speaking on occasion of the "existential presupposition" of elementary propositions can be misleading in much the same manner as talk of the "necessary existence" of simple objects. Just this conflation under the heading of "existence" is apparent in the convention whereby Russellian analysis is represented through all its stages, including its terminus, as involving quantification of the form $\exists x$. $\forall x$ etc. Where this analysis is supposed terminal, in Wittgenstein's view, $\exists x$ is misleading.³⁰ An alternative formulation would be that employing the iota operator. This, as I shall shortly argue, need not lead to the presupposition of anything existing or, as $\exists x$ can be imagined to do, to a sentence that has a truth value, but merely to the formulation of a term; that syncategorematic expression to which I have already referred.³¹ But before that, let us see how this idea works out for those two basic forms of propositions, the predicational and the relational.

In the predicational case use of the iota operator yields the term ' $\iota x (Fx)$ ' which roughly translates as "The x which is F " (as opposed to the quantified version which yields the sentence 'There exists one and only one x which is F .' But I have already remarked how elementary

propositions are all essentially relational, a concatenation of names only, such as instanced in 'ab.' Now, recalling that a simple object is "definable" only in terms of its possible relations, the use of the iota operator for a and b brings us to a curious expression:

$$;x (xb) \ \& \ ;y (ya)$$

or roughly:

the x which is related to b and

the y which is related to a

The conflation of subsistence and existence becomes apparent in the tautology that arises for each individual, in the case of a in the proposition 'ab' we get:

The a that is related to b is related to b.

Unravelling the confusion generated by this ambiguous use of "is" (by "defining" 'a' more accurately, modally, as that which can possibly be related to b) we get the better reading:

The a that can be related to b is related to b

If Ishiguro is correct and the identity of a is purely formal (i.e. is the identity of 'a'), is it pure serendipity that such an object identity we construct is indeed the identity of something also existing? How, in the first place, could it fix its identity? And how could we avoid the need for some existing thing as a starting point for all description and representation? Ishiguro seems to suppose that in stipulating a formal identity one then has to take it to reality to find a match; which is the reverse of Malcolm's view of Wittgenstein's position that we are first acquainted with objects, presumably in some primitive, non-verbal manner, which leads us to the construction of

the identities of objects. The most pressing problem for Malcolm's account, amongst others, is that it would seem to suppose our use of language (naming and the combining of names), in order that we could copy combinations of an object's name with the object's combinations (that is, construct a syntax in accordance with our experience of the object). But since I have already dismissed Malcolm's view as not representing Wittgenstein's position I shall not consider the technical problems it poses anymore here.

I do think Ishiguro's position follows Wittgenstein's more closely, but it has both technical problems and problems of interpretation. (The latter I have already mentioned, namely that it seems not to recognise Wittgenstein's insistence that *a priori*, not contingently, language and the world share a common form.)

But what are the technical problems? I think there are two. Ishiguro implies that we could construct identities for objects (by way of proposing syntax for signs) which failed to find a "match" (i.e. were not "satisfied") in the world. The sign would then be without use or application and presumably become redundant. This is where the two difficulties arise. Firstly the procedure Ishiguro suggests seems to me to be no different from that of deciding the truth of, for example, 'aRb' from which the identities of a and b are derived as norms of description. But such identities are supposed to be the foundations of truth (as the foundations of the senses of propositions, what have truth values) so we cannot base the possibility of representation itself on the notion of truth.

Secondly, to discover that such object-identities do possess a match in the world would not comply with Wittgenstein's assertion that what he has to account for is not any forms we could invent but rather of what makes it possible to invent them (5.555). Wittgenstein supposes that whatever forms we might invent, then they must find a correspondence in reality, otherwise we could not invent them. Now that is a very strong claim but it is one that seems consistent with the idea of objects' necessary "existence" and the claim that language must share these forms in order for representation to be possible at all. So how can such a condition be fulfilled? Quite simply I think; Wittgenstein supposes that propositional signs are, in themselves, facts and that representation is a process of projecting the form of one fact (the propositional sign), onto another (the state of affairs). 'aRb', written, spoken or thought is manifest in respectively different forms, but all those forms are manifest in their way in the world. They are facts just as is the fact they represent. The insight is then that whatever we can possibly do with those signs cannot possibly be anything the world does not allow. Any fact such as the propositional sign 'aRb' shows what are the primitive forms of reality (the forms of the facts we represent by those signs). It is those forms that underlie the identities of primitive simples. I have suggested that a simple relation of two (or more) individuals, 'ab', plausibly exemplifies this form.

This explanation also serves to counter an objection to my use of the iota operator, namely that its employment should be conditional on there being some unique individual satisfying the terms falling within

its domain. How can we be sure that there is such an individual to justify the use of the operator? To answer this lets us note two alternative ways of understanding the implications of my use of it. Either firstly, the term 'The a that can be related to b' only gets a meaning if there is such a individual. Or secondly, that so long as 'The a that can be related to b' is apprehended as meaningful, then there must be such an individual. Clearly the second is the understanding to take in the case of Wittgensteinian objects. Note that the first implies understanding the term 'The a that can be related to b' for what it says and it would be true of the individual that satisfies it (if the term was converted into a sentence). Taking the term for what it says will not serve as an identity for a simple object. How can the second alternative serve to answer the question whether a individual does satisfy the term? Well, simply, 'ab' shows the identity of the individual (as the a that can be related to b) because here is an 'a' (the mark) and likewise, here is a 'b' and here is an a related to b- -'ab.' Note that in this explanation, 'a' does not serve as a name, nor does 'ab' serve as a proposition. 'a' is an entity itself and 'ab' is a fact (of two related entities). Indeed, in any case where form is *shown*, then the variables in that proposition or prototype always serve as entities. By this means the device of showing can be used to account for the conditions of meaning without the circularity of (implicitly or explicitly) calling on the meanings of the terms it uses in its explanation of meaning.¹²

Interestingly, this explanation maintains the prominence of facts over objects in our account. It will be very important to relate this

explanation of the origins of object identities (of signs and their syntax) to some form of experience, a form, that doesn't entail the concept of truth, as I have argued Ishiguro's view seems to, or more generally entail the kind of circularity it and Malcolm's view involves. In chapter X I shall try to explicate a possible foundational, primitive form of experience that I think plausibly underlies the procedure I have argued for. That is, one that might lead to the notion of an elementary proposition such as 'ab' from which an object's identity might be derived (as a norm of description). It is an experience that gives a kind of factual basis to objects' identities without itself resulting in any kind of description that possesses a truth value for it would entail the elementary proposition only in so far as it shows the identities of its named objects (and so avoids calling on the truth value of what the proposition says).

In addition what this treatment highlights is the notion of dependency and modality attributable to subsisting entities to which I have already alluded (especially in chapter III) where I speak of a kind of reciprocal dependency between names and elementary propositions). Simple names can only be elucidated, which is to say they can only find definition and their objects identified in terms of those elementary propositions in which their names hang together (and what states of affairs are possible relations of them). The object is thus only identified in terms of its possible relations, a is conceived intensionally (i.e., as what ever may be related to b etc.), not extensionally.¹³ The point that is the point of a triangle is

identified by its location and the proposition asserting this can serve as its definition.

Thus the syncategorematic expression yielded by application of the iota operator with respects to names of simple objects is not a definite description in the conventional sense. Instead it is an expression which (reciprocally) refers back to the proposition it is intended to be an analysis of. It is by this means that the supposed simple object crops up in our experience, not as any identifiable object in the world, but as an essentially linguistic entity already enshrined within the forms of our representations. That is what Wittgenstein means by speaking of the subsistence of the logical forms which are simple objects.¹⁴ Where my analysis ends and I reach the subsisting bedrock, my spade is turned back to the final elementary propositions I uncovered, that alone is how I can characterise the bedrock, in terms of what covers it.

Conclusion

1. In the manner that 'TWID' presents the watch as a simple object (means it as the variable of a simple relation), then it seems as if, in effect, the thing is "seen as" a simple object. Its essence lies in its logical simplicity (i.e., not its spatial form but that its relation to another object is singular and its combinations manifest that spatial form alone). It represents, as I shall later argue in chapter X, a single distinction in the world.

Realist's accounts of *Tractarian* objects inevitably struggle to explain for how such objects come to have the logical consequences

their proxies (names) are held to have in propositions. How can experience of the contingent world and the things composing it reveal the logical form of these constituents (i.e., determine how names must hang together, possess a syntax, as Norman Malcolm proposes).

For the question arises: if the individual forms are, so to speak, given me in experience, then surely I can't make use of them in logic. (NB 65₁₀)

2. On the other hand, anti-realist accounts fail to provide a satisfactory role for experience in the foundations of meaning. That is, they fail to provide the kind of gloss supplied by Specht's observation that forms of representation are drawn up in connection with certain facts of nature. Experience, it seems, is confined to the matter of the truth value of a proposition and not at all to its truth conditions. If there is indeed no role for experience in the foundations of sense how are we to support Wittgenstein's claim that representation of the world goes forward on the basis of language and the world sharing (mirroring) a common logical form? (Of course the *a priori* grounds for simples, cited by Wittgenstein, support only the concept of simplicity.)

I think that Wittgenstein's account of simple objects in the *Notebooks* addresses both issues, 1 and 2. The key lies in that simple statement, addressed as it is in the *Notebooks* to a particular claim that something is the case, that this thing is to count as simple for me (that this, as a simple, can surely be taken for granted).

It will be part of the task of the remainder of this chapter to explore this aspect of "seeing" a referent as a simple. How are we to conceive this act or judgement?

The Relation Between a Name and Its Object

Starting with the category of substance [Aristotle] interprets the remaining categories in such a way that even in their case a specific word always signifies a definite "thing", although the expression "thing" changes its meaning analogically. As a result the schema: word-preexisting thing becomes flexible and makes it possible to give a homogenous explanation of the signification function of all categorematic linguistic signs. (Specht, 1963, p. 34)

Introduction: The Dual Function of a Name:
Referring and Meaning

Despite my considerable agreement with the formalists' interpretation its failure to secure a necessary connection between language and the world at their atomic foundations seems mistaken both as an account of the possibility of descriptive meaning and as an interpretation, of Wittgenstein. If the syntax of Ishiguro's "dummy names" was to be entirely arbitrary then it would seem that the categories of objects dealt with by language and the nature of the relations between those individual objects might bear no resemblance to the world we supposed language represented. That is, except by virtue of some profound serendipity during language's development. Our problem arises because it is supposed that language can represent the world by mirroring its form but analysis reveals that it relies on the use of names which name, so it seems, only ideal (formal) entities. What is required it seems to me is the reinstatement of a notion of reference in some form or another. In what way, we must now ask, is the ideal manifest in the real?

In outline the solution lies with that correspondence between propositions and states of affairs consisting in their congruence of structures. I shall argue that this correspondence accounts for the possibility of naming but leads to names in effect possessing two roles. On the one hand, by virtue of the proposition's congruence with perceived reality it reaches through to a situation in the world and identifies a referent, individual and unique, for each of its names (of which I shall say a little more shortly). On the other hand, by virtue of their syntax within the proposition alone, names serve to identify formal entities which are elements of meanings. Since signs' syntax could resemble each other (compare 'ab' and 'ac') this must represent the wellspring of generality. How such generality or categoriality comes to bear any content is, of course, tied with the notion of "primitive experience" underlying the use of names in elementary propositions which I explore in chapter X.

Corresponding with these two roles names possess I shall speak of the "object-of-reference" which, by means of its name's use in a proposition is "construed" as a particular form, an "object-in-meaning". Hence although this account is extensional in one respect, still the use of a name in a proposition (as it is manifest by its syntax in propositional contexts) is not rigid for I can mean something in different ways (construe it differently). So these two terms, 'object-of-reference' and 'object-in-meaning', are not co-extensive.

The process of referring to some object by a name whose meaning is a function of its propositional context is not by recognition of any

characteristic stated by the proposition and essential to that object-of-reference. So reference is independent of the process of providing a simple identity for an object any name names in an elementary proposition. Instead a name has two independent functions - referring to an object and the manner in which it proxies for that object. Both of these I shall return to consider separately shortly.

Crudely, there is a thing to which I refer but I can mean it variously. In this respect Wittgenstein's account follows a middle road between direct (causal) theories of reference like Russell's (naming is aimed directly at objects of our immediate experience), and Frege's indirect (descriptivist) theory of reference (names relate only indirectly to this world via their senses). Wittgenstein attempts, largely satisfactorily I think, to embrace both of these insights.

How the object-of-reference is construed as a simple by a name in a proposition shows not, so to speak, a half truth about the object though neither is it the whole truth. To construe the watch as a simple object (in terms of its spatial relation alone) in 'TWID' does not misconstrue the watch, though relegating the entirety of its other aspects to the status of "contingent residue" means that the watch is not, so to speak, fully represented in the proposition.

Any object-of-reference has few actual relations in the world but it has a multitude of possible ones and herein lies the basis for this distinction in its name's function. Propositions show some possibility of an object-of-reference's relations and say that that possibility is in fact the case.

I have attempted several formulations of the question how the *a priori* order of objects, by which alone the world becomes representable, arises in the world. I have asked what the relation is between the contingent realm propositions describe and that which subsists it and I also asked in what way the ideal is manifest in the real. These questions can be reformulated- -how are we to conceive real objects, so to speak, passing into meaning? Or, in what form does the ideal of simplicity and necessity (what subsists) arise within the reality that is the watch? And does that mode of being of the watch as a simple manifest itself in any way in our experience of the world?

Wittgenstein's Middle-Road Solution to the
Reference of Names of Simples

Only the possibility of an object's relations are conditions for the sense of some proposition and names can proxy for objects with respects to any one or more of these. And in so far as they also refer to objects then that reference can only be achieved because the proposition "truely" (correctly) shows some possibility for the object referred to. The problem for all of this is obvious- -how is an object referred to by its name unless the relationship shown to be a possibility by the proposition uniquely picks it out?

But this objection overlooks the fact that it is not objects but facts which form the content of our experience. Our experience, according to Wittgenstein, and contrary to Russell, is only of what is the case. And correspondingly, the fundamental relationship between language and the world is not between a name and its bearer but between proposition and fact. So although Wittgenstein remarks,

(Names) link the propositional form with quite definite objects.

And if the general description of the world is like a stencil of the world, the names pin it to the world so that the world is wholly covered by it. (NB53_a-10, which is recalled but rather differently expressed at 2.15 - 2.1515 with respects to pictures and reality.)

the question still to be answered concerns how an object is identified in the naming relation. How are the objects manifest in the world such that the labels get pinned correctly to them? What we recognise is the congruence of a proposition ('ab' for instance, looked on as a fact in its own right, that 'a' is related to 'b') and the fact that a is related to b. Only by way of the context of the object in the fact and the name in a proposition can the name "reach" its object (-of-reference).¹⁵

So such "reference" is not (*à la* Frege) by virtue of any description gleaned from the proposition (the description stated in the proposition) and compared with some perceived fact involving the object. Instead, a congruence of the form of a proposition (as a fact itself) and of (the represented) fact enable me to identify each referent by virtue of its place in the structure of the state of affairs corresponding to that of its name in the propositional structure. Thus do we both pick out the object in the fact and "see" it (apprehend it) in terms of the relation manifest by its name with others in the propositional sign.

Such a view as I am attributing to Wittgenstein here results from working out the consequences of his idea that names name only in propositional contexts. These consequences are two-fold. The logical relations between names provide their meaning (their logical form or

identity is, so to speak, syntactically disclosed), so what we understand from a name is a function of the overall meaning of the original proposition. Secondly, the relationship of the name to reality is by way of its location in the proposition, the congruence of the proposition and the state of affairs enables some entity, however "it" is in itself, to be identified and associated with the corresponding name and its logical form. Just as a treasure map may not tell us what to look for and gives us no indication of the nature of the treasure itself (mark it as a variable X) and instead, obliquely and literally circumnavigationally, refers us to it by way of its location and what surrounds it. The treasure (object-of-reference) then becomes identified in this circuitous fashion (as the object-in-meaning) in terms of its location. Of course, the analogy is significant in that it fails because, unlike the name of a simple, 'treasure' itself can be defined at least minimally to give us some notion of its content. It also fails in so far as "what we find there" has no describeable answer in the case of simple objects.¹⁶

Now whilst the two functions of a name are essentially distinct and give rise to two "entities" (of meaning and reference), still it is clear how they become associated and how the ambiguity and confusion of speaking of "the meaning" of a name arises. Speaking of the object being simple for me does not disambiguate between speaking of the object-in-meaning and the object-of-reference. In the first case it is simple and in the second it is what is taken to be simple. But in both senses the object is identified uniquely by virtue of its position in logical space alone.

The point is, however, that sense is thereby determined without requiring that objects in themselves be simple. The mirroring condition for representation is thereby conceived to require only singular relations in the world that are simple and things corresponding to names in language. These conditions are satisfied if ordinary things do engage in simple relations and if names deputise for them in those circumstances where their role is as coordinates of these simple relations.

This makes being a simple object more like a mode or aspect of the being of ordinary objects which by dint of their complexity do exist. That mode of being simple is, crucially, "described" in terms not of the object in itself but in terms of what surrounds it, its possible relations (the true "objects" of our acquaintance, facts). That such reference can be independent of anything attributed, in the manner I have described here, would seem to be a condition of a language's adaptability or productivity, its potential to represent not only this world but any and all other worlds, provided that is, that they consist of facts (or, we might say, of which there are facts to be known or represented). Thus I can make sense of 'the a that can be related to b' independently of referring to it ("it" being the a that is related to b).

Referring To and Meaning an Object in Wittgenstein's Text

The solution I have proposed above is not only the best resolution of the apparent conflict between 3.3 (the role of the propositional

context for the meaning of a name) and 3.203 (that the meaning of a name is an object); it is, I shall argue, also implied by Wittgenstein's claim that in propositions names stand proxy (are the representatives of) objects.

To begin with, the duality in a name's function- -1. referring to and 2. meaning, its object- - is clearly apparent in Wittgenstein's thinking:

[1] It is quite clear that I can in fact correlate a name with this watch as it lies here ticking in front of me, and that this watch will have reference outside of any proposition in the very sense I have always given that word, and [2] I feel that that name in a proposition will correspond to all the requirements of the 'names of simple objects'. (NB 60_a, underlining added)

The next day in his notes Wittgenstein takes up this example and speculates whether the watch then "corresponds to all the conditions of being a 'simple object'." I have remarked that the reference of a name to its object in the world and its proxying for it as a simple object are tied together by virtue of the congruence of names' and objects' positions in their respective structures. A realist might respond that, of course, the syntax of the name in the proposition is what we mean by the name's position in the proposition and that is determined by the corresponding position of its object in relation to others. Thus does the object (or at least its actual relations) provide the syntax for its name. But, like Ishiguro (ibid. p. 34), I have interpreted Wittgenstein as holding the reverse relation to be the case, namely that it is "the use of the Name which gives you the identity of the object." Following his question quoted above Wittgenstein enquires further:

The question is really this: In order to know the syntactical treatment of a name, must I know the composition of its reference? If so, then the whole composition is already expressed even in the unanalysed proposition ...
(NB 60_{1c})

Note that Wittgenstein speaks here of the unanalysed proposition rather than of any hypothetical analyses of the proposition. I think we must be expected to retort that we clearly do not know, and even less can we be held to be expressing, the whole composition of the reference of a name (in this case, the watch). As I have argued above, I can be ignorant of horology and still not compromise the determination of my meaning. All (of its contingent composition) that I do not mean is merely accidental to my meaning and constitutes that contingent residue to which I have already referred.

The actual relationship between the object-of-reference and the object-in-meaning (what it is about the former that enables it to be construed as the latter, which is to say, in what sense the latter is grounded in reality) I will return to in the remaining half of this chapter, but the whole picture will not become clear until I consider certain metaphysical implications in my final chapter.

Besides this somewhat discursive evidence for Wittgenstein's notion of a dual function of names the idea seems also to be evident in his choice of vocabulary. In 3.203 an object, Wittgenstein says, is the *Bedeutung* of a name. Pears and McGuinness translate 3.203 as a name means its object. But we have noted an ambiguity in this which begs the question concerning the role of names and simple objects in meaning. Certainly it is very natural to speak of objects being what names mean. It is natural enough ("to confound the meaning of a name

with the bearer of the name", cf. PI §40) that Wittgenstein might have thought, in reconsidering his early work many years later, that this was what he had supposed.¹⁷ Furthermore, it is, arguably, how proper names in ordinary use function. But the status and function of names in elementary propositions in relation to simple objects is too distant from that of ordinary name's relation to their objects for it to be taken for granted that such ordinary use might satisfactorily model the naming of simple objects. And is it really what Wittgenstein maintains in the *Tractatus*?

Implicitly it seems clear that a name of a simple object could never refer directly to its referent. Being essentially simple a name has no mechanism for such signifying (no way of "pointing out" or "hooking into") its bearer, not as a description has for example, or perhaps more appropriately, a hieroglyph. The form of a name sign is entirely accidental and bears within itself no resemblance to its bearer. Only in so far as it occurs in relations with other names does a name resemble its object. And besides, the name's simple bearer possesses nothing in itself by which it could be recognised. So I would agree with Black (1964, p. 108) that 3.203 should not be taken to mean that the name refers to its bearer, the simple object, in the sense of denoting it or picking it out.¹⁸

This brings me to the second function of a name in a proposition—to mean the object it refers to. Here Wittgenstein's term is "vertritt", a name (he says, following on shortly from his remark at 3,203) is the representative of an object in a proposition (3.22). Alternative translations of "vertreten", that Black proposes and which

Pears and McGuinness also use (in the *Notebooks* also) are "to stand for", "deputise for" or "go proxy for."

The possibility of the proposition is, of course, founded on the principle of signs as GOING PROXY for objects. (NB 37_a, see also 4.0312)

In a proposition a name is a representative of an object. (3.22)

But there is ambiguity here too regarding the notion of a representative. Does a name represent an object as a newspaper is supposed to represent the facts? We know for sure that Wittgenstein did not mean this and given the simplicity of what it is (the simple object) that is "represented" that interpretation would not make sense anyhow. The alternative, surely the correct one, is that a name represents its object analogously with how I might represent a company. Or, better, how I might represent someone else. I shall develop this analogy in the next section.

We have already seen how Wittgenstein's system deals with the problem of how a name reaches out to its object given that nothing in the name alone gives it such a capacity and that it cannot be by means of ostensive or verbal definitions. Instead propositions serve as functions mapping (Wittgenstein actually speaks of "projecting", 3.22¹⁹) sentences onto states of affairs by virtue of the congruence of their structures. Consequently, as parts of propositions, names thereby locate their objects in logical space analogously with how an orienteer might orient and locate herself as a point location in geographical space. But let us also recall, a simple object is only identified as a place in logical space, a possibility of a relation.

To locate a simple object in logical space is, in effect therefore, to identify it too.

The duality I have been discussing in a name's function implies a relation between it and two distinctive entities. The "object" meant by virtue of the name's propositional context, a formal, intensional identity, the object-in-meaning. The "object" the name separately refers to I have called the object-of-reference. These two functions and their related expressions I shall consider separately below. Neither "object" can be thought of in the ordinary sense of object as what can be described, exist independently, etc. Therefore, not only will it be important to say how they are different but also it will be essential to distinguish the means by which such "objects" are "referred to" and to distinguish that from correspondingly ordinary forms of reference.

Names Mean Their Objects: an Analogy

Wittgenstein imagines states of affairs adumbrated by propositional form something like cut-out figures are by their outlines in the leftover paper. We noted how such an idea cannot apply even analogically to simple objects in themselves outside of their relations within logical space. This in essence refers back to Wittgenstein's contextual thesis; but so too it needs to be appreciated, does the notion of proxying. Wittgenstein's choice of the notion of deputising or being a representative strongly suggests the analogy of deputies and representatives in human social affairs. I think the analogy is worth exploring.

Names only live vicariously through the lives of their objects. In so far as I stand in for you as your representative I always do so in respect of only some facet(s) of your (social) "being in the world", some social function of yours--father, husband, company director, friend, advisor or whatever. Which is to say that as a social entity you are a complex of a number of singular (simple) roles. For example, as I deputise for you in your role as company director I do not replicate you in your entirety. Perhaps I shall have to look like you in so far as I wear the same unimaginative director's suit but I do not need plastic surgery, I am not an impostor. Indeed it is clearly necessary for me as your deputy not only that that role is clear but that it is also clearly a role. That it will be clear so long as I replace you only in, so to speak, a certain socio-logical space. Taken out of this context it would not be at all evident how I am deputising for you. Indeed it would not be possible for me to be a representative for you outside of some such context. The facet(s) of you that I represent is not only not evident outside of this context, there is no such role outside of that.

By analogy I am the name and you are the object. But we can distinguish one other, a pseudo-object or person which is the role itself, the company director. Now only you and I exist here. So far as I stand as a name for 'the company director' I am only a dummy name.

But the question now is, what are you over and above all of your complexity of distinctive singular functions each of which has only the same pseudo-reality as the function of company director for which

I proxy? This is an old question and I shall return to it to say a little more shortly.

This analogy precisely matches the schema which I have sketched so far, there is you (the object) proxied for (as a name) by me (another object such as the written sign) but only in some propositional context which manifests that role of yours that I am representing. As a name in an elementary proposition it goes proxy for only some singular, simple aspect of the referent it replaces.²⁰ The pseudo-object corresponding to the (dummy) name in the proposition in this respect is not anything existing. There is no person who is only the company director (i.e., someone of whom that descriptor is exhaustive). This so-called entity I entitled object-in-meaning. It is the simple object. Meanwhile you as an existing person, a real object, are the object-of-reference, though the "old question" I raised above makes it certain that your ontological status is not uncontroversial.

It is worth noting that I can only refer to you through the medium of my function as your representative and only in so far as my representative function (my significance) is manifested (not stated) from the context of my role play.²¹ So, as an object and in your context, you remain the meaning of me as your representative (my significance). And although it is correct to say that you (the object to which I refer) are not simple (as the role of yours that I deputise for is) still it is also correct to say that there is a referent of me (you, that I stand in for) which does possess that requisite simple mode of relating (and others) in the (social) world.

One conclusion that we should take away from this is that what most immediately corresponds to a name in a proposition is not the object-of-reference but the object-in-meaning. What is meant by a name is some element or aspect of a sense, the object as it is construed by its name's propositional context. But note that a name does not refer to (pick out) its object by means of the identity (object-in-meaning) it describes (the proposition's content) but by way of the form the proposition shows projected onto the form of the corresponding state of affairs. Conversely, it can only be because of this projection and congruence that objects, albeit indirectly in terms of their relations, come to possess any (experiential) content. Thus a name's two functions are quite separate.

The Object of Reference

The analogy of deputising suggested the question what you are, as a composite of all of your singular "simple" functions. We will find that this is unanswerable since this supposed "object" is ineffable.

The object-of-reference is a metaphysical entity. Its mode of being is undefined since it does not fall under either of the ontological options that has emerged from this study- -existence and subsistence. Objects or things which exist are essentially complex and their contingent constitution is represented in propositions. What subsist are "objects" which are essentially simple and which I have argued are formal entities; identities no less but no more, and functions of Wittgenstein's *a priori* account of the necessary conditions of determinate sense. These entities I have labelled

objects-in-meaning on account of their arising only as elements of meaning, semantic simples.

Now clearly what I have referred to as objects-of-reference do not fit into this rubric. But that is a paradoxical conclusion considering that I have argued that a watch can serve as a simple object in so far as it can be construed as such because it behaves as such. The watch can seemingly be one coordinate of the simple relation ("in") in 'TWID.' Is not such construal a matter of treating what is in itself complex as a simple for purposes of representation? So does not the object-of-reference in fact exist as all complex objects do? But this is to compound the error of supposing that the complex/simple distinction is a contingent characteristic of (existing) entities. In fact complexity like its counterpart, simplicity, is entirely a formal conception, a pseudo-concept as Wittgenstein titles it. Complexity and simplicity are simple poles of the most general and amorphous of categories or forms. The formality of this simple/complex distinction is evident in its necessity- -any object that is not complex is necessarily simple and vice-versa (unlike, for example, the contingent distinction between two colours).

This mistake confuses the subsisting metaphysical reality with what can be said to exist. Wittgenstein's insight is that the only account we can give (the only sense we can make) of what it is to exist is what language allows (a curious reversal, characteristic of the foundational correspondence of language and reality, of the realist's view that it is what exists which provides language with its meaning.²²) Our understanding of what exists should partake of the

general form of the proposition- -this is how things stand (4.5).
 Logic, the forms of our representation, allows us to say how things are because it is prior to those combinations, but it cannot allow us to say what these things are for it is not prior to that.

Proposition can only say how things are [arranged], not what they are. (3.221, see again 5.552 and also 6.44)

So the things that stand in the relations propositions picture are to be understood in terms of that (their relations) or not at all. To understand them in terms of how they stand is to see them in relation to the sense of the proposition (i.e., as elements of meaning, as objects-in-meaning). In that respect they are understood as subsisting the states of affairs that exist. But to eschew characterising the substance of the world in terms of the contingent world itself is to eschew all possible forms of representation leaving only a metaphysical reality that is unrepresented and unrepresentable.

Another way to express this is by pointing out that, according to my interpretation, the naming of objects in propositions necessarily entails construing them as simple in order for sense to be determinate. But as we are here considering what it is itself that is so construed (the object-of-reference) then whatever we might try to say will be either indeterminate or just another construal.

Nor can we suppose that such arcane, metaphysical entities can be located in our experience of the world; for Wittgenstein the objects referred to by names are not ostensible. They are located as the referents of names only by comparison of their positions in states of affairs with names in the congruent structures of propositions. By

this means of comparing (metaphorically speaking) the shapes of states of affairs with the shapes of propositions, what serve as the coordinates of these shapes (simple objects in states of affairs and names in propositions) can be correlated. This is the basis of the "fit" between language and the world. Names cannot "fit" the world but rather become fixed to it because of this "fit." Developing the metaphor of "fit", this does not, thereby, enable us to see (through the stencil of the propositional form to) the object-of-reference of the name directly. That is, as if the proposition was a shape in an opaque surface overlaying reality that was outlined by drilled holes through which we could spy the real objects beneath. We only see the object-of-reference as a coordinate of something which has already been construed into the form of a representation. We see the point as a point of the triangle or as the centre of the circle. Again (emphatically) Wittgenstein does not suppose us to possess, as Russell or Moore did, an acquaintance with raw, uninterpreted phenomena-'objects' of experience. Rather, what we see always possesses some cognitive content. Once again I should refer the reader to the final chapter where I try to make this point more clearly and in more detail.

So, in a nutshell, we cannot say anything of the supposed "real" nature of what it is a name refers to. Which is to say we cannot say what it is about the watch in itself that enables it to function as a simple (or perhaps enables us to construe it as a simple).

In fact the object-of-reference is radically ineffable.

The reality that corresponds to the sense of the proposition can surely be nothing but its component parts, since we are surely ignorant of everything else.

If the reality consists in anything else as well, this can at any rate neither be denoted nor expressed [named or described]; for in the first case it would be a further component, in the second the expression would be a proposition, for which the same problem would exist in turn as for the original one. (NB 31₆₋₇).

By "radically ineffable" I mean that not only can we not say what such a thing is, propositions do not show it either. What language shows is only its own and reality's logical form, their structure, not what the elements of those structures are in themselves. It would require some further stage of revelation to establish what the nature is of the elements abstracted from such forms.

So the metaphysical referent must remain merely a kind of inference from our idea of forms of representation. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein identifies logic with the truth functioning of complex propositions and that of the more fundamental so-called logical forms of elementary propositions. This constrains logic within the bounds of what can be shown (the subsisting forms) or said (the existing facts). Simple objects are an *a priori* condition for the determinacy of sense but this necessity applies only to the formal entities, objects-in-meaning. Such a proof for simple objects does not carry us further into any supposed metaphysical realm of "real" simplicity (where the supposed object-of-reference resides). Logic should not be extrapolated beyond its domain, thus my equivocation over "inference."²³

Now this appraisal of my idea of object-of-reference clearly puts severe restrictions on our understanding of names as possessing real

extensions. At first it had seemed as if there really was an object, the watch, as the referent of the name (which in an elementary proposition was construed as simple). Something that we could get a grasp of, think about or speak of. But we find that we can only conceive of the referent of a name in terms of our usual forms of representation, much as we cannot think of an ideal point except as the centre of the circle or a point of the triangle, or non-ideally as a pencil mark or the intersection of two penciled lines.

Beyond these (phenomenal) conceptions we are left with, in effect, a "that", a pseudo-concept which consistently reflects back only the forms of our experience and representation of the world. It is an amorphous, Millisian-like "permanent possibility for representation" limited to the range of its propositional construals which, nonetheless amount to an inexhaustible range of simple or complex aspects of the referent. (The consequences of an infinite range of aspects for the determination of sense is explored in chapter X.) But, nonetheless, this still serves to ground the metaphysical referent in the world of experience. Thus is the ineffable, though neither to be shown or spoken of, concealed but still "contained" within the expressed.

Of course, all of this complies with Wittgenstein's belief, expressed in his introduction (cf. p. 3) to the *Tractatus*, that the limits to expression and thought are intelligible only from the inside since we can (literally) make no sense of what lies beyond that.

Conclusion

That Wittgenstein is indeed struggling within a Kantian framework here is evident from his analogy at 6.341-6.35. He compares the varieties of descriptions science can offer of reality with the differing descriptions afforded by different styles of meshes overlaying a common underlying surface of spots (the analog of reality). It is evident that these various forms of scientific description rely on varieties of empirical forms- -spatial or coloured for example, and that "simplicity" is yet a more fundamental (logical) form. It will be the task of my final chapter in part to reconsider what the metaphysical counterpart to this form might be. We should anticipate that such a characterisation of metaphysical reality will be profoundly minimal. It will also prove to be describable only in the same kind of pseudo-concepts Wittgenstein himself employed.

This Kantian issue centres around the question of the objectivity of these logical forms (surely the last bastion of superstition). This question becomes more significant given the voluntarism that I have argued is implied by Wittgenstein's view that the determination of sense requires that something in the world be construed as simple, not arbitrarily, but in a manner reflecting a potential for such construal on the part of whatever is construed (something that is an abstraction from it). The watch really can be held to enter into singular, simple relations with other objects which in turn can thereby be made the subject of elementary propositions. But it is a reflection of our

agency that a particular construal, within the richness of the thing's potential for construal, should be recognised in this way.

And in case this sounds too far removed and perhaps too metaphysical to be considered to represent anything Wittgenstein might have meant, we should recall that such construal on the part of the agent amounts to something as prosaic as providing a syntax for a name. It is in respect of this implied agency that I shall press on in the subsequent four chapters to argue that Wittgenstein's work represents a linguistic, phenomenological conception of meaning. In addition I shall argue that the agency at work in providing significance of names in propositions is identical with that which recognises significance (values) in ethics and art. Hacker (1972) remarks on just such a connection and (inadvertently, given that he espouses a realist interpretation of the *Tractatus*) succinctly captures the view I will propose:

The world or life only acquires ethical meaning or sense or significance (Wittgenstein's term is always '*Sinn*' (e.g. NB, pp. 73, 74)) through its relation to my will, and equally the signs that are elements of signifying facts only acquire *Bedeutung* through their relation to my will. (p. 47)

In brief, we can read my interpretation as recognising three kinds of relations involved in the representation of the world in language. Only the first two concern me here—logical and analogical.²⁴ Projection, the recognition of the propositional sign's congruence with that of some state of affairs (identical with just thinking the sense of the proposition, 3.116) entails both of the following:

1. Apprehending the (logical) relations between the elements within elementary propositions (names) or within facts (simple objects), and

2. Intuiting the (analogical) relations between the structures of the two wholes, propositions and states of affairs (by means of which names become associated with the objects-of-reference, things they deputise for).

But the analogical relationship does not carry us outside of language to a reality beyond (as a realist's conception of forms supposes it to). The so-called "necessary existence" of simple objects is what is supposed to make this possible provided 'simple object' is interpreted extensionally. By my interpretation this is not the case. Instead the formal, subsisting entities which I have proposed are to be thought of as referring nondescriptively (or as Specht puts it in the passage used as an epigram to this chapter, analogically) to objects whose nature is unknown and ineffable (that is, blindly, so to speak). Drawing such an analogy results in an object corresponding to the variable x in $;(xRb)$, the object-in-meaning. How such blind reference might be possible I explore in chapter VIII where I conceive of it as a linguistic form of intentionality.

Notes

¹ Brian McGuinness (1981) supports Ishiguro's view. See also Peter Winch's unpublished assessment (as Norman Malcolm gives it in 1986, chapter 2). Two other anti-realist interpretations of interest that are parts of wider investigations into Wittgenstein's work are to be found in Finch (1971), see especially pp. 27-31 and George Seifler's (1974) short exegesis in his chapter 5, especially pp. 50-54 and his conclusion:

The "substantiality" of the Wittgensteinian object does not refer to an unchanging or immutable metaphysical essence or nature. "Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case." (2.024) To exist independently of what is the case is indicative of a logical, not an ontological, status. (p. 54)

Anthony Kenny's (1973) position, too, is comparable:

[O]bjects belong to the method of representation which is more fundamental than the subject-predicate form. (p. 110)

² That we can imagine the watch alone only shows that we can abstract it from some circumstance that tacitly serves as a context. This point will need some qualification later since Wittgenstein does not dismiss the claim that I can indeed still refer to the watch:

It is quite clear that I can in fact correlate a name with this watch just as it lies here ticking in front of me, and that this name will have reference outside any proposition in the very sense I have always given that word. (NB 60_a)

³ In this respect Hertz, whose theory of mechanical modelling was influential on Wittgenstein, was only half correct. Not only is it the model that possesses features that are accidental to its function as a model, but so too can what is modelled possess features which the model need not possess in order to succeed. In constructing his childhood model of a sewing machine Wittgenstein need not have replicated every scratch and dent of the original.

Hertz (1956, p. 2) writes of comparing the "appropriateness" of models and remarks on how one model is better than another if, all other respects being equal, it "contains [...] the smaller number of superfluous or empty relations." Superfluous relations I understand to concern the way in which the model represents its subject in some inessential manner. But it is the empty relations that I am concerned with here, my point being that both model and object may possess features that do not and need not relate to anything in the other.

⁴ Internal relations are relations between simple objects that may or may not be realised in the world. An internal property of an object amounts to a possibility of such combinations, and propositions as pictures present these possibilities (they picture reality, 4.021). Such pictures are in essence hypotheses of the nature of the contingent world but, as models of reality, they show, non-hypothetically, how everything must stand (logically) in order that it can be true. (cf. 4.023d). For example, if reality "contained" only

the simple objects A, B, C, D, E (named a, b, c, d, e) and suppose the following were exhaustive of their possible combinations: AB, AC, AE, DE, DC, then only 'ab', 'ac', 'ae', 'de', 'dc' are propositions (i.e., 'ad' would not make sense for AD is not a possible state of affairs). And, for example, 'ab', 'ac', 'ae' provides the complete identity of a (even though perhaps only 'ab', was true in this world).

Also note that it is the list of internal relations that provide the sense conditions of the propositions for this world and not the facts corresponding to the three true propositions. Because the only properties of simple objects are relational, internal properties are co-extensive with internal (logical) relations.

⁵ I am not confusing instances of how such a relation between object and name is initiated with how subsequently any object is identified by someone learning the use of some name because I do not think these procedures will be different. If initially and subsequently what we are acquainted with in the world is relations of things rather than just things themselves (see chapter IX) then it seems to me that it can only be by way of these combinations that objects become identified in either instance.

⁶ Wittgenstein distinguishes the nonsense (*Unsinn*) of metaphysical claims in which we use signs without meaning (6.53) from the senselessness (*Sinnloss*) of logical propositions. Such tautologies and contradictions he considers the limiting cases for the scale of truth values although they are strictly limits drawn from the outside and actually say nothing whilst showing us, perspicuously, their logical form.

Senselessness is apparent from Wittgenstein's truth tabular means of presenting truth conditions for compound propositions (all logical propositions have an apparent complexity). In fact the interrelations of the constituent propositions of such (apparently complex) logical propositions prevents the table from being drawn up at all. Take, for example, the tautology 'Either $p \vee \neg p$ ': to determine the truth value of a proposition the procedure is first of all to arbitrarily award values to its constituents. This procedure is legitimised by Wittgenstein's insistence on the independence of elementary propositions. But the procedure cannot be carried out in this case since providing a value for p determines the value for $\neg p$. So a tautology is not in fact a legitimate logical function of two constitutive elementary propositions at all.

⁷ In fact combination is just one of three simple (i.e., primitive) relations to be identified in the *Tractatus* which I shall consider here and later.

1. The immediate combination of simple objects in states of affairs like links of a chain and the corresponding concatenation of names in elementary propositions.

2. The relationship of congruence between pictures (and propositions as pictures) and the states of affairs pictured. That is, the mirroring relation whereby the relations of names match relations of objects. It is my view that it is through this relation that objects

are to be correlated with a name. Thus ordinary facts perceived in the world are by inference indicators of the atomic objects whose relations constitute the fact. Put crudely, in terms of my present geometrical analogy, triangles I can see but the propertyless points that delineate their extremes I only "infer". Such indirect knowledge of these ideal points as "objects" does nothing to detract from our confidence in their "existence", our experience might be required to know of the existence of any particular triangle but our knowledge of the points of a triangle does not rely on that.

3. The naming relation, the immediate correlation of a name with an object is closely tied, at least epistemologically speaking, to the congruence of the forms of states of affairs and pictures. By my interpretation this relation finds no application at the foundational level.

²⁶ The distinction is marked in Wittgenstein's original German by speaking of the (*Bestehen*) of facts and the (*Bestehende*) of objects - the obtaining of some fact in the world compared with the persistence of objects. Though as Black remarks, talk of the "existence" of facts is awkward, still Wittgenstein was confronted with the obvious complication that it is not awkward to speak of the existence of complex objects which in the *Tractatus* are considered to be facts. But still, Wittgenstein has clearly distinguished these ontological categories.

As an aside, but relevant both to the present discussion and more obliquely to my future discussion of the parallels between objects and Husserlian phenomenological objects (of thought), Black notes the following remark of Russell's in discussing the term 'subsistent':

Every term is immutable and indestructible. What a term is, it is, and no change can be conceived in it which would not destroy its identity and make it another term. (Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 44). (Russell has previously defined a 'term' as 'whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one'. (op. cit. p. 43)

²⁷ Norman Malcolm appears to account for this distinction simply in terms of a difficulty of expression which Wittgenstein shared with Russell over this idea. This is partly correct for, as I have remarked, propositions asserting the "existences" of simple objects are tautological. Malcolm leaves this issue somewhat up in the air (see p. 51) but he doesn't seem to see any significance in the existence/subsistence distinction so far as it marks the difference in, so to speak, the "being" of contingent, complex situations and essentially simple objects, despite the fact that the latter's non-existence can receive no explanation such as the failure of some combinations of objects to obtain is an explanation of the on-existence of states of affairs.

In Wittgenstein's theory, the emphasis on the necessity of simple objects arises from the need to explain the factuality of the world and its changes (which simple objects subsist). But in turn, that

necessity leaves us with no possibility of these conditions being conceived of as themselves part of this world of facts.

But my point is that Malcolm's claim that Wittgenstein's talk of objects' subsistence:

[R]eally says that, "simple objects exist - though one is not supposed to say that." (Malcolm, *ibid.* p. 51)

-really only serves to beg the question and leaves Malcolm's own talk of simple object's "existence", not existence, as an unenlightening qualification (one that also serves to perpetuate the myth of the paradox of the *Tractatus* which a clear understanding of the saying/showing distinction resolves).

¹⁰ Rather than consider *Ex* as a separate proposition in its own right (asserting *x*'s existence) Wittgenstein refers the expression back to the original proposition it is part of the analysis of; an expression that is an analysis of a proposition, not a separate condition of the fact the (true) proposition asserts. He says:

Do not forget that (*Ex*)*fx* does not mean: there is an *x* such that *fx*, but: There is a true proposition "*fx*." (NB 75₁₄)

¹¹ In this regard, the presupposition the iota expression represents is categorial rather than existential. The watch falls within the domain of "spatial relations", i.e., what is presupposed is not that such an entity exists but that certain combinations are legitimised or excluded. The watch is such as can be in the drawer but not in a sentence for example. Which is to say that some particular syntax is allowed. Ishiguro (1969) remarks:

If the conditions of using a dummy name are the conditions of saying 'there is a so and so which', then dummy names cannot fail to refer to an object so long as the set of propositions in which they occur make sense. (p. 46)

But, to make use of the geometrical analogy again, since the two related objects possess no such properties by which they could be categorised, we must suppose that there can be no understanding in terms of categories or domains in the usual way. We can only say that the relations of objects are such as give rise to a singular category (of spatial figure, in the case of all such ideal points, for example.) It is again worth noting how those objects are reciprocally explicated in terms of what their combinations give rise to but which they themselves were originally cited to explain.

¹² Something like the principle for the mechanism I am describing here seems to be suggested by P.F. Strawson (1964):

[W]hen an expression which looks like it might be used to make an identifying reference to a particular [...] is followed in a sentence by the word 'exists' [...] we cannot coherently take the first expression as functioning in a particular-referring way, i.e., as making an identifying reference to a particular [...] To attempt to do so would make the sentence unconstructable. (p. 239, doesn't "unconstructable" here mean unsayable?)

¹³ But by being identified only in terms of possible relations, no object has to be presupposed, only presuming a proposition is true, not that it possesses a sense, entails such a presupposition.

It might be supposed that I could invent identities for objects by giving signs arbitrary syntaxes.

If I can imagine a "kind of object" without knowing there are such objects, then I must have constructed their proto-picture for myself. (NB 74₄, underlining added)

What values a propositional variable may take is something that is stipulated.

The stipulation is the variable. (3.316)

And the only thing essential to the stipulation is that it is merely a description of symbols and states nothing about what is signified. (3.317d)

Then we could take that "constructed sign" to the world to see if it is instanced there (as Ishiguro supposes we must). Graham Bird (1972, pp. 61-79) suggests such a procedure analogically in terms of constituting rules in chess. But if an object's identity is purely intensional, by proposing such an identity (such as 'the a that can be related to b') have I not in some way determined in language the possible nature of any reality I can describe? Bird rightly says:

The language may mark the official recognition, but only the independent facts determine whether there is anything to recognise. (p. 76)

Which is to say, if no such objects as Dalton's indivisible atoms are located, then the corresponding syntax will very quickly become redundant. But more importantly Wittgenstein says:

And anyway, is it really possible that in logic I should have to deal with forms that I can invent? What I have to deal with must be what makes it possible for me to invent them. (5.555c)

And whatever makes it possible for me to invent a particular form within language is what language shows about the world and which it shares with it. That is presumably something like the bare relation the written marks a and b can have to each other as other entities in the world can have too. In this sense, what language shows is not only as a conventional sign for but also as a natural sign of how the world is.

¹⁴ Quine's theory (see "Desigation and Existence" reprinted in Olshensky, 1969) draws much the same conclusion. Everyday language (as Wittgenstein would agree) manifests superficial and misleading ontologies to which Russell's theory apparently succumbs. A logically perfect language would avoid such "implication". Quine remarks, for example:

Elsewhere I have cited, by way of example, a convention of notational abbreviation introducing quantification upon variables which have statements as their substituenda. When such an abbreviation is adopted we are able to talk as if statements were names having certain abstract entities - so-called propositions - as designata. In so doing we do not commit ourselves to belief in such entities; for we can

excuse our new form of quantification as a mere abridged manner of speaking, translatable at will back into an idiom which uses no statement variables and hence presupposes no propositions, no designata of statements. (pp. 663-4)

¹⁵ Note that this congruence of structure exists only between elementary propositions, not ordinary truth functionally complex propositions, and states of affairs. "Truth functions are not material functions." (5.44a, but see the rest of that passage too). This highlights two important distinctions I raised earlier in chapter II between the structure (articulation) of elementary propositions and the structure of complex propositions and the associated distinction between logical form and logical structure. Briefly, the logical structure of complex propositions does not correspond to anything in the world so complex propositions mirror the world only in so far as their constituent elementary propositions mirror it individually. Thus does Wittgenstein hold that logical constants such as &, v, etc. do not correspond to anything in reality (4.0312). But the structure of elementary propositions and concatenation of names is consequent on a logical form, and, in some manner which is the subject of this investigation, are held to conform to the combination of objects.

¹⁶ A similar example is provided by Paul Auster in his novel *Leviathan* in which Maria, a somewhat compulsive character, finds an address book which does not bear its owner's name. Certain clues suggest the owner is a man about whose identity Maria, in her characteristically arbitrary manner, begins to weave her own imaginings into, such that he becomes "a magical object for her, a store house of obscure passions and unarticulated desires. Chance had led her to it, but now that it was hers, she saw it as an instrument of fate." Maria, unknown to her, is about to construct her own Wittgensteinian object-in-meaning as an identity for her object-of-reference, the owner. So "She studied the entries that first evening and found no names that were familiar to her. That was the perfect starting point, she felt. She would set out in the dark, knowing absolutely nothing, and one by one she would talk to all the people listed in the book. By finding out who they were, she would begin to learn something about the man who had lost it. It would be a portrait *in abstentia*, an outline around an empty space, and little by little a figure would emerge from the background, pieced together from everything he was not." (p. 67)

Thus, rather as God, as an indescribable essence, has been defined negatively in terms of what properties He does not possess, similarly, the composition of a referent can be ignored in favour of defining it in terms of what surrounds it, the object then becomes a composite of all of its possible relations with other objects.

¹⁷ Norman Malcolm provides a very persuasive argument for supposing Wittgenstein was accurately interpreting his own views here in fact. See his 1986, chapter 1.

¹⁸ For a more contemporary view of this problem of the translation of *Bedeutung* see Peter Carruthers (1990). He agrees with Black (1964) but

qualifies his own understanding of *Bedeutung* by situating it within a wider context of issues concerning *Sinn* and *Satz*. Carruthers suggests (on p. 20) that *Bedeutung* should be translated as "semantic content: whatever is known by one who is to understand it; or alternatively, as whatever that expression contributes to what is literally communicated by statements containing it." If I understand this correctly it seems very similar to my own view that the meaning of a name is a function of the sense of a proposition. It also suggests that Carruthers believes, too, that Wittgenstein's account cannot easily be captured within the scope of the usual concepts commonly called upon: "meaning", "reference." My own use of these terms is heavily qualified, especially in terms of a name "meaning" its object by means of representing or deputising for it, in this chapter and in terms of names' references, qualified and reconceived as a form of intentionality (see chapter VIII).

¹⁹ No doubt Wittgenstein's insight owes much to his background as an engineering student at Manchester University where the idea of projections in blueprint plans provides a rich visual analogy for this procedure. In the *Notebooks* Wittgenstein associates projection with (Maxwell's) mechanical modelling and he would have also been familiar with Hertz's interest in the logical nature of such modelling.

²⁰ B.R. Tilghman (1976) makes a persuasive case for considering something like this as being analogous with seeing aspects (consider the distinction Wittgenstein draws between "seeing" and "seeing-as" in the *Investigations* (part II sect. xi). Tilghman says:

... that the concept of seeing-as is presupposed by, and lies at the very heart of, the *Tractatus* theory of language. (p. 530)

He is supposing here that Wittgenstein thought that the seeing of a sentence as possessing a sense is as immediate and primitive as the seeing of an aspect of a thing: seeing-it-as something. And he is critical of this because he thinks that perceiving the sense of a sentence is unlikely to be primitive in this way and indeed we could come to have insights into the process in a way which truly primitive and immediate processes like seeing aspects preclude. But I think Tilghman may have misplaced the role something like aspect seeing might play in the *Tractatus* theory. We have seen that the recognition of a proposition as signifying some particular state of affairs is by virtue of their congruent structures (projecting the one onto the other) and it does seem very plausible to me that our recognition of the similarity of their forms (comparable with seeing a likeness) might very well be comparable with the primitive and immediate nature of the seeing of aspects. It appears that Tilghman, rather as Russell did, has overlooked the role and significance of what propositions show and has instead continued to consider propositions only for what they say.

²¹ Norman Malcolm (1986, pp. 34-5) discusses the deputising of a name in a similar analogical manner but to a different end. He wants to point out, against the views of Ishiguro, McGuinness and Winch, that

the notion of deputising carries with it the implication that what is deputised for is ontologically distinct from its proxy. From which of course we are supposed to conclude that Ishiguro, McGuinness and Winch are mistaken in supposing names are really only dummy names of objects which possess only a formal "existence." Of course! But this is hardly the point. Malcolm fails to develop the analogy sufficiently to observe how as a deputy I do not need to replicate that which I deputise for. On either side of that proxying relationship there are distinct identities and our correspondence, *me* to you as your representative, is not at all compromised by that. In so far as someone sees *me* in that role then they become informed of that aspect of you, though not by empirical acquaintance. This is because the role I play here is to be interpreted *de re* not *de dicto* so to speak, I do not merely mean to play out the role of a (generic) company director, I am playing out the role of proxy for you (as company director).

So, the name in its relations reveals the object in its relations. No one can associate *me* with you as your deputy except in this social context.

And our distinct identities, that we are as Malcolm puts it, ontologically distinct, ensures that some facets of each of our identities will have no correspondence in the other. This, of course, cashes out in terms of the contingent residue that is evident on both sides of the name/object divide. Sign and signified can both possess accidental features which are without significance or influence for the function of the one as proxy for the other.

²² This position seems very close to that of Willard Quine (1969). In his paper "Designation and Existence" Quine argues that "to be" is simply to be the value of a variable (p. 663). Syntax provides the nature or type of a being (cf. "object-in-meaning") though not, of course, the beings themselves (cf. "object-of-reference"). Furthermore, Quine is referring to the "being" of entities, not of contingent states of affairs just as Wittgenstein is when he speaks of giving "the nature of all being [which] does not mean existing" (NB 39₉). In particular Quine says:

Variables can be thought of roughly as ambiguous names of their values. This notion of ambiguous name is not as mysterious as it first appears, for it is essentially the notion of a pronoun. (p. 663)

So the kind of object is given by the name's syntactical context resulting from its substitution for the variable within the domain of a quantifier and:

Quantification involving a new sort of variables, which ostensibly admit a new sort of entities as values, can often be introduced by a contextual definition - a mere convention of notational abbreviation. (p. 663)

(Note that the innovation Quine suggests here does not commit him to arbitrarily awarding "being" to just anything he chooses so to "introduce." I have already quoted the example he provides (see note¹⁴) in which he makes it clear that we use such abbreviations as eliminable shorthand in which we only act as if we believed in them.

²³ This criticism of Wittgenstein's of the idea of inferring a reality behind forms of our representation (as an illegitimate extrapolation of logic) interestingly parallels Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's idea that noumena are the cause of phenomena. Schopenhauer criticises that idea as an illegitimate extrapolation of causality, causality itself being confined within the realm of the phenomenal, it is a form of the phenomenal.

²⁴ The third relation I shall only be concerned with just so far as to distinguish it from the other two- -perceiving the describable, ostensible referent (a complex object) of a name. This relation between language and the world, in chapter 8, I refer for convenience, and because its possibility of success or failure, as pragmatic reference. It is most notably distinct from the other two language-world relations in so far as it entails the concept of truth by which its criterion of success is defined. (That is, the truth of my description of anything or the truth of whatever I would give as an answer to the following exchange, "Did you see that?"/"See what?"

PART 2

THE PHENOMENOLOGY
OF WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF MEANING

CHAPTER VI

THE BACKGROUND TO CONSIDERING WITTGENSTEIN'S EARLY WORK
AS LINGUISTIC PHENOMENOLOGYIntroduction

To what extent does Wittgenstein's work represent an engagement in some kind of (albeit linguistic) phenomenology? In part two I shall try to make explicit any phenomenological aspects of Wittgenstein's early account of meaning as I have given it so far. Given the lacuna between analytic philosophy and phenomenology and their distinct and distinctive vocabularies this could lead to the taking of too many liberties with both disciplines. So in anticipation of this risk I intend to restrict this part of my inquiry to a comparison of Wittgenstein's work with that of Husserl. I shall discuss the reasons for selecting Husserl's phenomenology as a standard, so to speak, in detail shortly. It is not an obvious choice since Husserl's views, like Wittgenstein's, developed over the course of time, from the *Logical Investigations* (1900)² to the *Cartesian Meditations* (first published in French translation in 1931) and beyond. Furthermore, his idiosyncratic mode of expression can prove resistant to definitive exegesis. But since Wittgenstein is in effect my target, to help ensure that at least my sights, if not the target, are steady, I will

further restrict my survey to work which is, as far as possible, not only uncontroversial and unproblematic but salient and characteristic.

Another tactic, also necessitated by demands of space, will be to restrict my survey of Husserl's considerable writings to what may be considered his distilled and mature view expressed in *Cartesian Meditations* (1964). Occasional references to some earlier remarks from *Logical Investigations* (1970, but first published in 1900) and in particular the phenomenology which developed out of that as expressed in *Ideas* (1931, but first published in 1913) and *The Idea of Phenomenology* (1964, but first delivered as a set of lectures by Husserl in 1907) may also prove helpful.

There seems to be two areas over which my comparison of these works should range:

1. Methodological issues are surely of primary importance.

Significantly for this study, I shall argue that Wittgenstein's analysis possesses characteristics comparable with Husserl's transcendental and eidetic reductions and that something akin to Husserl's imaginative variation can be uncovered with respect to the latter (Ch. VII).

2. The focus of attention for both writers includes the field to which their shared methodology is set up to explore--the nature and identity of both subject and object. But even if each can be argued to be working with a similar phenomenological method, correct philosophical conclusions do not arise algorithmically. However, I think there are startling analogies to be uncovered especially with regard to the essentially structured nature of objects (chapter VII),

the non-psychological nature of the (thinking, representing) subject or self (chapter IX) and to the fundamental, intentional relation between the two (chapter VIII).

The intentional nature of the relation between the representing subject and the world that I argue for in chapter VIII, and the transcendental character of the representing subject I argue for in chapter IX, will lead me to draw out the relation of Wittgenstein's statements on ethics and aesthetics to the theory of meaning.

The Focus of Wittgenstein's and Husserl's Philosophies

Now it cannot be overlooked that there is a clear distinction between Wittgenstein's focus on the necessary conditions of representation and Husserl's desire to continue the Cartesian tradition of providing a secure foundation for the sciences. Husserl's task, to provide indubitable descriptions of our forms of conscious experience, thus possesses an epistemological interest³ absent in Wittgenstein's enquiry.

Husserl bemoans the fact that natural science (within which he includes disciplines dealing both with real and ideal "objects", disciplines as diverse as "physics, psychology, sciences of culture and [...] the mathematical sciences and the sciences of numbers, classes, relations etc.") advances by progressively taking possession of reality and by positing a basis of cognition within just that same reality (see IP p. 14). In place of the "natural attitude" of these sciences (as he came to call it) Husserl proposed a philosophical attitude, a mode of reflecting on what the natural attitude took for

granted, namely the very possibility of thought (cognition). This would, he hoped, prove the absurdity of naturalistic explanations of meaning. So Husserl conceives that

[The positive task of the theory of knowledge is to solve the problems of the relations among cognition, its meaning and its object by enquiring into the essence of cognition. Among these, there is the problem of explicating the essential meaning of being a cognizable object or, what comes to the same thing, of being an object at all: of the meaning which is prescribed (for being an object at all) by the correlation *a priori* (or essential correlation) between cognition and being an object of cognition. And this naturally applies also to all basic forms of being an object which are predetermined by the nature of cognition. (IP pp. 17-18)

So, despite the difference in their starting points it can certainly be argued that Husserl's and Wittgenstein's quests quickly converge around the issue of meaning. Even so, there remains a considerable question over the distinction between what we thereby come to know, and its epistemological status, that is, between Husserl's phenomenological reflections and what he believed he could express of them and Wittgenstein's linguistic reflections and what he supposed his examples would show. That distinction does finally reflect the difference in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology from Wittgenstein's focus on language. That focus leads Wittgenstein to conclude certain limits to expression which, turned around, have consequences for his own efforts to express those conclusions. This self consciousness regarding the medium of his philosophical descriptions leads Wittgenstein's into the kind of paradox his conclusions to the *Tractatus* manifest, ("My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me

eventually recognises them as nonsensical" 6.54) and into adopting that unique form of philosophical expression (which he was arguably to maintain throughout his entire philosophy)- -showing. By contrast, Husserl's belief in the apparently infinite capacity of thought to treat any phenomenon as "object" led him to the conclusion that thought and language possessed an infinite reflexive capacity fully capable of expressing matters concerning its own constitution, that is, matters concerning meaning.

So Why Husserlian Phenomenology?

My whole task consists in [...] giving the nature of all being.

(And here Being does not mean existing-) (NB 397-9, underlining added)

[A] fact is the existence of states of affairs. (*Tractatus* 2, underlining added).

[Plure or transcendental phenomenology will be established not as a science of facts, but as a science of essential Being (as 'eidetic' Science); a science which aims exclusively at establishing "knowledge of essences" and absolutely no "facts." (Husserl, *Ideas* p. 44)

An answer to the title question of this part will serve to fill in some of the divide that has come between phenomenology and analytic philosophy in the present day but which was not the case to anything like the same degree during the period of their early development. I shall argue that three concerns common to both philosophers provide an initial grounding for their association:

1. A concern with the nature of propositions and, what comes to the same thing, the determination of sense.
2. A common background training and interest in logic.

3. A desire to objectify the basis of both of the above and to soundly reject the prevailing psychologistic explanations of turn of twentieth century philosophy.

Wittgenstein and Husserl essentially developed their philosophies within the same philosophical milieu. One central philosophical preoccupation of their contemporaries lay in giving account of "judgments", referred to by Husserl as "epiphantics" the "purely formal study of the structure of judgments":

Language has not only physiological, psychological and cultural historical, but also a priori foundations. These last concern the essential meaning-forms and the a priori forms of their combinations and modifications, and no language is thinkable which would not be essentially determined by this a priori. Every linguist, whether or not he is clearly aware of the fact, operates with concepts coming from this domain. (Husserl, *Logical Investigations*)⁴

The historical tradition leading up to this focused on judgements of fact. It was felt that some account had to be given of the so-called unity of propositions (the term that has come to replace 'judgment') and of their relation to what they are held to represent. The sense of a proposition also seems to rely on certain terms linking together not only in accordance with linguistic conventions but also in a manner commensurate with corresponding conditions in the world.⁵

As we have already seen, in the context of Wittgenstein's investigation, the idea of the proposition was that of the basic linguistic unit capable of conveying a complete meaning in and of itself. A proposition, as Frege had recognised, was capable of being grasped by different men. Which is to say that, though they might think various sentences such as 'It's raining', 'Il pleut', 'Rain is

falling', etc., what they all actually grasp is the same thought though only some further token sentence can be cited to express this meaning (the proposition).

In fact for Frege, Husserl and Wittgenstein the proposition itself as the meaning of any sentence (or, for that matter, any image, real or mental, such as might arise in imagination or perception, which might also express this same meaning) is not to be identified with any of the various signs, those mere token marks or sounds, which express it. So, though some sign is always given if some proposition is to be given, still the proposition cannot be (identified with) the actual written or spoken tokens. Thus a second problem for our conception of the proposition becomes its existential status.

Husserl's contemporaries, Wittgenstein, Russell, Frege and Brentano were all much preoccupied with these two issues especially in relation to false propositions. Without the possibility of being either both true or false propositions would seem to fail to be satisfactory tools for describing the world.

Wittgenstein's account of simple objects as the world's logical form was, in a single move, supposed to supply the solution to all of these difficulties. Likewise, in one move, Husserl offers a solution in the form of his conception of the "intentional object" and its logical structure.

But since Husserl's focus is on describing conscious experience rather than on language we can expect him to formulate these problems a little differently, though they are still clearly the same issues:

to solve the problems of the relations among cognition, its meaning and its object by enquiring into the essence of cognition. (IP p. 17).

Generally speaking Wittgenstein and Husserl developed their accounts in an atmosphere generally favouring various psychologistic explanations and this, too, is significant for what aspects of the issue each felt it necessary to emphasise. In agreement with Frege, both philosophers struggled to objectify their accounts of the proposition and to reject naturalistic explanations of meaning and logic. Husserl argues:

Accordingly, is it not the case that the logical forms and laws express the accidental peculiarity of the human species, which could have been different and which will be different in the course of future evolution? Cognition is, after all, only human cognition, ...

But at once another piece of absurdity arises. Can the cognitions by which such a view operates and the possibilities which it ponders make any sense themselves if the laws of logic are given over to such relativism? Does not the truth that there is this and that possibility implicitly presuppose the absolute validity of the principle of non-contradiction? (IP pp. 16-17)

And of his own investigation Wittgenstein remarks:

Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought processes, which philosophers used to consider so essential to the philosophy of logic? Only in most cases they got entangled in unessential psychological investigations, and with my method too there is an analogous risk. (4.1121c, underlining added)

Correspondingly, it will become evident that these rejections of any role for the empirical psychology of the agent with regard to the nature of judgements leads to rich parallels in their conception of a transcendental self.

Perhaps the most significant common ground between Husserl and Wittgenstein is their shared interest in the roots of mathematics and

in logic. Both saw the problem of the unity of the proposition to be a logical matter and its solution they thought lay with a correct account of logic and its objectivity. As we will see this did not mean a correct view of formal logic but rather of what may be most generally thought of as logical form.

In a nutshell, what Wittgenstein and Husserl have in common at the outset is an interest in the nature of meaning which is considered from a shared perspective of the objective nature of logic.

So it is not so much phenomenology itself that provides the basis for the favourable comparison of these philosophies that I shall argue for, but rather what leads each philosopher to their respective (transcendental) phenomenological positions.⁶ This in turn perhaps explains why the early (at least) Wittgenstein is not easily compared with post-Husserlian, existential phenomenology which is where, in large part, the hiatus most philosophers feel between phenomenology and analytic approaches to meaning, is to be found.

Wittgenstein's Early Phenomenological Interests

Finally, I want to mention a piece of evidence that might be considered to provide grounds for supposing that, even in his early thinking on the nature of analysis and meaning, Wittgenstein was exposed, to and influenced by, phenomenological trains of thought.

We know that on his return to Cambridge in 1929, Wittgenstein became interested in the psychology of William James (who serves as something of a stalking horse for his later reflections in the philosophy of psychology) and also in the Gestalt psychology of

Wolfgang Kohler (which has, of course, had much influence on phenomenology).⁷ Kohler's work also served as something of a stalking horse for Wittgenstein's remarks in part XI of his *Investigations* on the nature and psychological significance of "aspect seeing" (i.e., "seeing-x-as" compared with "seeing x") and its consequences for theory of meaning.

Now these interest lay many years into the future for the young Wittgenstein so, though we might speculate whether such channels and inclinations of thought might not have been natural even to the early Wittgenstein, still some quite separate evidence would be needed to support such an hypothesis. Just such evidence is I think presented in Brian McGuinness's (1988) biography (vol. 1) of Wittgenstein's early years. McGuinness documents how in the Cambridge of 1911-12, in other words very early in his philosophical development, Wittgenstein became interested in early psychological research into something already very dear to his heart, music.⁸ The studies were wide ranging including "the localisation of sound, on the perception of tone differences, on synaesthesia, on individual differences in musical appreciation, and so on." (ibid. p. 126). In particular, the researches of C.S. Myers revealed how, in cultures where rhythms predominated in music its members "showed a remarkable ability to regard many successively different intervals of time as a coordinated whole- -as a phrase." (ibid. p. 126). Perception of pitch, pitch difference, rhythm and the property of any passage to be musically meaningful (i.e., as constituting a phrase or tune) served to distinguish music from mere

noise, which is to say that music was heard as if it possessed, of itself, a structure.

Furthermore, parallels with language were obvious and recognised by Wittgenstein, as McGuinness records, especially in the "perception" of spoken sounds being heard as meaningful passages, in a word, as a "proposition". Most significantly, Myers's experiments demonstrated an early form of Gestalt; subjects "heard or read into a sequence of beats a rhythm which was not in fact there." (ibid. p. 127) In other words, a rhythm that resided in the relations of beats alone and led to them being apprehended as a whole of which alone the rhythm was a characteristic.⁹

Wittgenstein worked on these experiments jointly with his friend David Pinset (to the memory of whom the *Tractatus* was dedicated). They even led to Wittgenstein presenting a paper on the topic to the British Psychological Society meeting in Cambridge in July 1912 (ibid. p. 128).

Now perhaps, as McGuinness suggests, psychology was considered by Wittgenstein to be merely a hobby (though even so, it would be most out of character for Wittgenstein to have treated it lightly). But the question is whether Wittgenstein himself thought that these examples of hearing musical sounds as rhythms or tunes were indeed rightfully the study of psychology or whether instead they did not represent an example of the very phenomenon of meaningfulness which he was attempting to explicate in his own (non-psychological) account of linguistic meaning. After all, in his later years when Wittgenstein's interest in psychology deepened and matured it was not for the sake of

psychology itself but rather for the clarification of the subject domains of philosophy and psychology. In particular Wittgenstein's aim was showing which concepts were properly to be studied from a logical-grammatical standpoint.

Despite McGuinness suggesting that these interests of Wittgenstein's had no connection to his own work he does note that in fact Wittgenstein does draw out the analogy between music and language (or rather, as McGuinness rightly observes, between musical "themes" or "ideas", and propositions). Remarks to this effect extend through the *Notebooks* into the *Tractatus* and are to be found lingering well into the period of Wittgenstein's return to philosophy (as a career anyhow) in 1929.

Most notably, Wittgenstein makes it clear that this study of music was not a purely psychological affair but rather one that a correct view of logic itself would enlighten (cf. NB 40_b). He expressly considers tunes and propositions as alike in being, in effect, reifications (i.e., constructed wholes, NB 49₂, see also NB 40_c).

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein focuses on this analogy between expressions in music and in language, remarking on how neither consists merely of unordered sets of notes or words (3.141) and of how both, propositions and musical passages, are essentially pictures. That is, structured (or better, articulated) wholes. And following this Wittgenstein provides a gloss on his *Notebooks* remark on the essentially logical nature of musical structure by remarking how it is a fundamental logical form (the same logical form which in the

Tractatus was held to run through language and the world, see 4.014. 4.0141).

In later remarks from his "middle period" Wittgenstein considered the understanding of a sentence to be akin to understanding a piece of music and associates that, interestingly, with an aside, "To see a watch as a watch. i.e., as a dial with hands. is like seeing Orion as a man striding across the sky.¹⁰ Similarly he suggests that understanding a Gregorian mode is completely analogous with seeing ten strokes: IIIIIIIIII, as II II II II II or as IIIII IIIII or of seeing pictures perspectively rather than as flat patterns. These are later reflections of course, but in fact precisely such thoughts are provided in the *Tractatus* where he comments on how the same metaphysical reality (in this case, in 5.5423, lines diagraming, in perspective, the outline of a cube) can be seen as "two different facts." (5.5423) (in the manner of his later "reversing figures", the "duck-rabbit" for example, PI p. 194). This reversing of the cube (or whatever we suppose "it" to be in itself) is achieved by apprehending differently the relations between the "objects" (the corners of the cube). Or alternatively (and this entails not only reinterpreting relations of "objects" but also in reinterpreting what is to count as an "object") we reverse the figure by apprehending differently the relations of the objects which are this time represented by the cubes' faces (now one is in the front, now the other). Interestingly, in these two accounts we seem to deal first with logically simple objects (points, corners) and then logically complex objects (faces of the cubes).

So I am suggesting that Wittgenstein's interest in the phenomenon of Gestalt appearances and the attendant notion of seeing groups of elements as structured wholes was characteristic of his thinking long before his later opinions were written down as part II.xi of PI. This is not to conclude that Wittgenstein was consciously following any phenomenological program. But for that matter neither could Husserl be said to have had his program of phenomenological reflection from the outset. Husserl himself developed his phenomenology as a natural outcome of his researches into logic and his desire to describe the nature of consciousness and its contents. Similarly, I think we may with some justification suspect that Wittgenstein, though possibly ignorant of what phenomenology itself was, was naturally arriving at similar conclusions and so quite unconsciously doing phenomenology.

Notes

' The idea that there might be a phenomenology that was linguistic in orientation is not new in itself nor especially controversial. (See, for example, "Phenomenology and Linguistic analysis" I and II by Charles Taylor and A.J. Ayer and "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language." reprinted in Durfee, 1976). Nor is it a new idea that Wittgenstein's work may be an example. In fact there has been a minor, on-going though dispersed, debate around this issue. Since the greater part of this has centred on Wittgenstein's later work I have not felt it necessary to confront this literature head on. Besides, I felt it was important to let this thesis of an early Wittgenstein phenomenology develop naturally and independently in accord with my understanding of his views, rather than present it derivatively as a response to an existing opinion. At least I hope that I have managed to convey just how such an idea could arise provided the right questions are raised, irrespective of whether the reader happens to agree with my interpretation of Wittgenstein's early work.

Even so, it may be of some relevance to give some indication of the sources of this debate. A general historical presentation of the issue is usefully provided in Speigelberg (1968). A discussion largely in favour of the idea can be found in, for example, Munson (1962), Van Peurson (1959) and Ihde (1975). For a more complete oversight of the matter accompanied by a comprehensive bibliography of the literature see Gier (1981) and more recently, in response to views to the contrary from Harry Reeder, see Gier (1990, which is a useful and brief update on the debate and also gives some background literature sources) and (1991).

Reeder's contrary view arises in his 1989 paper. Another objection to the suggestion of Wittgenstein's phenomenology comes in an interesting and much earlier paper by John Hems (1960).

Most recently (and I think he is correctly showing us something important about the way Wittgensteinian exegesis has developed in saying this, when he admits to running the risk of offending conventional wisdom here) Jerry Gill has voiced support for the idea of interpreting Wittgenstein phenomenologically at the close of a paper concerning what Wittgenstein wasn't. Gill speculates whether:

(P)erhaps because of his Austrian background and British training, Wittgenstein was able to embody the synthesis of a feeling and concern for the depth generally associated with Continental thought, together with the clarity of analysis more common to British philosophy. In this way he exhibits the profundity of the former, as expressed today in the insights of phenomenology, and the sensitivity to the

crucial significance of language which characterises the latter. (p. 218)

Again, most of this concerns almost exclusively Wittgenstein's middle and later work. And Gier, for instance, suggests that Wittgenstein was experimenting with various phenomenological solutions during his middle period (marked roughly by notes published since as PR and Waisman, 1979) but did not persist along those lines. A recent addition to this aspect of the debate is Robert Alva Noë's March, 1994 paper which draws a conclusion early in the paper significantly supporting the thesis of a early phenomenology:

[We see that Wittgenstein's new interest in the phenomenology and the construction of a phenomenological language [during his 'middle period'] does not signify a break with his earlier concerns with the problems of logical analysis and the relationship between language and logic, concerns which lay at the very heart of the *Tractatus*. (p. 7)

So far as any literature exists on the subject of a phenomenological aspect to Wittgenstein's early philosophical method, a paper by van Peurson (1959) suggests some parallels but does so almost as if by accident for it seemingly runs together remarks from both the *Tractatus* and the later works with little attempt to justify this amalgamation. In contrast, Gerd Brand's *The Central Texts of Wittgenstein* (1979) intentionally and provocatively sets out precisely to work together Wittgenstein's early and later views (and to my mind succeeds) to almost seamlessly meld them into one and in the process strongly suggest a phenomenological streak throughout.

Finally there is the Hintikka's *Investigating Wittgenstein*. I have already remarked on this text (see note ⁶, chapter III). The Hintikkas thesis of Wittgenstein's treatment of language as a universal medium rather than as an ideal medium of representation I thoroughly agree with. However, their justification for a phenomenological interpretation of Wittgenstein's early views seemed to me contrived and too often over stretches their sketchy textual evidence. For a more considered criticism along these lines than can be justified in this note see Bradley's and Resnick's (1988) evaluation of the work.

In particular I find the Hintikkas amalgamation of a phenomenological and a phenomenalist interpretation of Wittgensteinian objects simply difficult to follow and, so far as I do understand it, implausible. Charles Taylor expresses the implausibility of the phenomenalist's view succinctly:

But this original mute layer of perception [phenomenalists' sense data] can only be made sense of, if we conceive the objects it contains as being radically separate from the world of things which we infer from them, for in so far as sense data announce no more than they contain, there is nothing more to be found out about them which is not known by the very fact of their existence. We cannot build a world out of them, we can only project one behind them, as it were. (p.220, underlining added)

In particular it is difficult to conceive of how the structured world, as it is conceived in Wittgenstein's idea of its logical form or in

Husserl's view of the essentially structured identity of his "objects of consciousness" (noemata), can be developed out of this "silent" world of perception (sense data). At least, that is, without radically modifying our idea of sense data to the point where they can no longer do the work they were originally conceived to do in a causal theory of perception.

In addition to this implausibility I think Gier (1990, p. 274) is correct in his assessment that the *Tractatus* just does not support an interpretation of "objects" as data of immediate experience (and he goes on, again correctly I think, to suggest that J.N. Findlay is more on the right track in construing "objects" as "atoms of significance" possibly comparable with the objects of meaning of the "Brentano school of Stumpf, Meinong, Husserl and Marty." For an interesting historical-philosophical overview of this possible connection see also Barry Smith's (1989) "Logic and the *Sachverhalt*").

² References to works by Husserl will be in accordance with the following key:

(1931) *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. Boyce Gibson, W.R. (trans), London, Allen and Unwin.
Ideas followed by the page number, (e.g., *Ideas* p. 56).

(1960) *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Cairns, D. (trans) The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
CM followed by the page number, (e.g., CM p. 31).

(1964) *The Idea of Phenomenology*. Alston, W.P. (trans) The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
IP followed by the page number, (e.g., IP p. 56).

(1970) *Logical Investigations*. (in 2 vols.) Findlay, J.N. (trans) London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
LI followed by section and page numbers as appropriate.

³ In IP (p.18) Husserl makes it clear that in speaking of epistemology he is actually wishing to distinguish sciences, in his broad sense of the term, which range from the deductive "sciences" to the empirical sciences all of which naively operate under certain existential presuppositions, and his own "science" which uniquely addresses the epistemological question begged by these presuppositions of the "natural standpoint." His own phenomenological "science" he calls "epistemological" whilst the rest are "pre-epistemological." Epistemology, phenomenology and philosophy, as Husserl thinks it should be carried out, are all one and the same.

⁴ Translated by James Edie for his 1987 book (p38), from *Logische Untersuchungen*, Tübingen, M.Niemeyer (1968) vol.2, p.338.

⁵ For example, Russell's attempt to explain the linkage or cohesion of terms in propositions involved him in accepting the reality of relations (as well as of objects) as the cement, so to speak, of the world. Wittgenstein criticised this view of Russell's, the so-called "Multiple Relations Theory of Judgments", for failing to give satisfactory account of why we could not judge "This table penholders the book" (cf. NB 103_a, see also 5.5422) and for failing to avoid the obvious regress of necessitating a further explanation of the linkage of relations and objects.

⁶ Thus it is this shared philosophical tradition, rather than any shared phenomenology or phenomenological method that I think explains the "striking analogy" which Max Black (1964) speaks of (p. 136) between his notion of a logically explicit and unambiguous language and Wittgenstein's idea of logical form which all languages share though often in a disguised form (and which could be imagined to form the basis of the logically perfect and perspicuous language that Russell is speaking of in his introduction to the *Tractatus* p. ix). In other words, the possibility of a logically explicit language is a likely conclusion to be reached by anyone given the common set of issues and problems Husserl and Wittgenstein shared.

⁷ See Hallet (1977), Appendix: "Authors Wittgenstein Knew and Read" and Monk (1990) part IV chapter 24 especially pp. 508-9 and 512-515, and also pp. 477-8.

⁸ This is in addition to his participation in Moore's lectures on psychology over the years 1911-12 (see Monk, 1990, p. 63).

⁹ One is also reminded here of Wittgenstein's familiarity with the work of Hertz, in particular with his view of models and representation and of how according to Hertz, such representation is not of something we passively experience (as if the world shone its image, so to speak, as a given, onto the minds of receptive people). Instead, representations of the world are constructed schemes and models. Just as only the notes of music are given and the tune and rhythm are apprehended only as functions of the relations of sounds, structural features of the music taken as a whole, then so too, providing a representation of the world also entails seeing the elements of whatever is to be represented only relatively; that is, with respect of their position within the structure or the whole. One might also speculate how much of Goethe's views, which Monk (1990, p. 509) notes were so influential on Kohler in respect of his use of 'Gestalt' to mean not only shape or form but also to mean an independent whole, Wittgenstein absorbed from his lifelong, if not comprehensive, acquaintance with Goethe's writings (see Hallet, 1977, p. 765).

¹⁰ A view contrary to that mature view Wittgenstein expressed in PI II.xi in which he argues against the idea that all perception is a case of seeing-something-as as opposed to just seeing something. In the PI Wittgenstein wants to maintain the ordinary distinction between these

conceptions and is arguing against the typically metaphysical attempts to revise language and ordinary distinctions he and his earlier self considered to characterise many of the remarks in the *Tractatus*.

CHAPTER VII

PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD AND ITS OBJECTS:

HUSSERL AND WITTGENSTEIN

(T)he *Sachverhalt* is a truth making segment of reality [...] Setting out from Meinong's idea of a 'theory of objects', Husserl initiates a new discipline of 'formal ontology', within which the formal concept of *Sachverhalt* - 'formal' because it can be applied to all matters without restriction - comes to be ranked alongside the formal concept of object. (Barry Smith, 1989, p. 163))

What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs. (2)

A state of affairs (...) is a combination of objects (...). (2.01)

If I know an object, I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.

(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) (2.0123)

Introduction

For the purposes of my comparison with Wittgenstein, three aspects of Husserl's phenomenology appear significant:

1. Conscious experience (*cogitationes*) is constituted of particular experiences which manifest a polarity,
 - a. consciousness of an object (the object-for-consciousness, *cogitatum*, what it is that I think about) and
 - b. the mode of our consciousness of objects, whether I am perceiving, regretting, imagining, remembering, desiring them.

2. The transcendental' ego or self (*Cogito*) which is the subject of these experiences.
3. The relation between conscious experience and the transcendental ego which Husserl, after Brentano, refers to as the intentionality (or directedness) of the experience.

Also significant is:

4. Husserl's method of enquiry.

My comparison of Husserl and the early Wittgenstein will be centred around the four concerns 1a, 2, 3 and 4, the object, subject and their relationship. I will say little about concern 1b for reasons I shall make clear at the close of this chapter.

I will crudely subdivide my outline into the "how" and the "what" of Husserl's phenomenology, its methodology and what that method reveals concerning the object and subject. At the outset I shall say where I think Wittgenstein's work parallels Husserl's in method though I will return later to qualify these claims.

Of the "what" of Husserl's phenomenology, I shall provide an outline of his account to begin with and return to each topic separately- -to objects in the latter part of this chapter, to their relation to the subject in chapter VIII, and the subject herself in chapter IX.

Phenomenological Methodology

For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth - a universal significance. Logic lay, at the bottom of all the sciences. - For logical investigation explores the nature of all things. It seeks to see to the bottom of all things and is not meant to concern itself whether what happens is this or that. - It takes its rise, not from an interest in the facts of

nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connexions: but from an urge to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand. (PI §89)

Introduction: Philosophy and Description

Just as in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein saw the philosopher's task was to describe phenomena rather than explain them:

In philosophy there are no deductions: it is purely descriptive. (Wittgenstein in 1913, NB 106, cf. PI §109)

Husserl, too, believed that the philosopher's task was fundamentally descriptive and non-deductive. The danger, he thought, was simply to think too much! Phenomenology relied on "as little interpretation as possible, but as pure an intuition as possible." "The understanding is not to be allowed to interrupt and insert its unredeemed bank notes amongst the certified ones." (IP p. 50)

So for both Husserl and Wittgenstein, "description" implied a degree of neutrality. Philosophers were supposed, they thought, to bring no theoretical presuppositions to bear in their enquiry. I shall briefly say how I think each thought this neutrality was to be achieved although the distinctive means by which Wittgenstein supposed logical form was to be made perspicuous, showing, is too large a concern for inclusion here.

But this methodological distinction aside, both thought the phenomena they were to describe were in some way self revealing. The later Wittgenstein spoke of making matters perspicuous and this pretty

much describes Husserl's and the early Wittgenstein's views too. In his early work Wittgenstein spoke of revealing, manifesting, or, most commonly, showing (cf. 4.122 - 4.121) significant concerns. Husserl in his turn, speaks of explicating, unfolding or of a "becoming distinct" (CM p. 46). Here Husserl means an uncovering of matters that are implicit to meaning. Explicit sense, he says, delineates an implicit sense which the phenomenologist intuits by virtue of its selfgivenness in thought.

This implicit sense and our intuition of it concerns the essence of the phenomenological inquiry and it provides a criterion or standard by which Wittgenstein's work might be judged as phenomenology. I shall let Husserl's own expression of it suffice for on this point his view is unqualified and clear:

Our phenomenological sphere, the sphere of absolute clarity, of immanence in the true sense, reaches no further than self-givenness reaches. (IP p. 8)

And the task is just this: [...] to trace all forms of givenness and all correlations and to conduct an elucidatory analysis. (IP p. 10)

[Phenomenology] must rather base itself on the cognition which is immediately evident and of such a kind that, as absolutely clear and indubitable, it excludes every doubt of its possibility and contains none of the puzzles which had led to all the sceptical confusions. (IP p. 26)

Here, I think, the parallels in Wittgenstein's work are obvious. In Wittgenstein's view of analysis "my meaning" should decide the path and extent of analysis. The proposition and my meaning are here identified. Wittgenstein is eschewing the idea of any ideal meaning to a sentence and its individual terms such as scientific realism might insist on. If, in saying, "The watch is in the drawer" (see Ch.V) I mean my father's watch, one essentially bearing his initials, then the

analysis of the explicit meaning of that proposition must reveal some implicit proposition to the effect that the watch will bear these initials as a criterion of it being my father's watch. Likewise, for Husserl, though his examples have a more general logical character, to say anything about the colour of the face of a die implies further details, that it has five other faces which are square, coloured, of equal area etc. for instance. So, for both writers, the description concerns issues of meaning, but quite what that means we will see shortly.

I have alluded to the idea that Wittgenstein and Husserl believed philosophy should approach its subject matter without theoretical bias. For Husserl this was especially significant. The presuppositions that he thought had plagued philosophical enquiry up to that time had been those of realism. He considered the realism/idealism dichotomy to issue from presuppositions which neither position addressed. To safeguard his own philosophical descriptions from such error he therefore advocated an *epoché* -putting into abeyance both the questions of what exists and of how things might happen to be. That is, the existential and contingent status of objects and states of affairs. Husserl, who generally considered Descartes's method of doubt to be identical with his own initial reduction, his transcendental epoché, therefore considered Descartes and himself to be setting off from the same starting point:

the turn to the *ego cogito* as the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for judgments, the basis on which any radical philosophy must be grounded. (CM p. 18)

And they are headed for the same goal, namely, indubitable ("apodictic" as Husserl calls it) knowledge. But Descartes, Husserl thinks, failed to rid himself of the presuppositions underlying the realist and idealist positions and therefore mistakenly uses the insight of the *Cogito* as a means of reasserting the existence of the world. Descartes had thought of his task as that of identifying what indubitably could be said to exist or be the case without giving any justification for interpreting the question of what could be indubitably known in this existential manner. So at the outset Husserl distances himself from Descartes and thereby lays out the ground of his enquiry and its point of divergence from Descartes's position:

[By virtue of this initial epoché] I acquire my pure living, with all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them: the universe of "phenomena" (CM p. 20, underlining added)

It is, Husserl says, "naturally a ludicrous, though unfortunately common misunderstanding" of transcendental phenomenology, to treat Descartes's *Cogito* as if it was "a premise or set of premises from which the rest of knowledge [...] was to be deduced, absolutely 'secured'." Descartes's error lay in trying to deductively "secure objectivity" (which he mistakenly identified with what could be said to exist) rather than understand it. Merely deducing that the world exists does not amount to explaining it, Husserl goes on, "The only true way to explain is to make transcendently understandable."
(1970*, p. 189)

Likewise, for his part, Wittgenstein considered perspicuity was the goal of a true philosophy. What is significant for philosophy is

not deduced but shows itself directly. As we will see, for Wittgenstein as for Husserl, the phenomena philosophy attends to show not merely objects of our representations (thought, spoken or written) but crucially the representing agent too. This point is rarely appreciated with respect to Wittgenstein's early account, possibly because it threatens to compromise the objectivity he claims regarding the foundations of representation. We shall have to see if this indeed is an unavoidable corollary.

Methodological Steps Towards Philosophical Description:
Husserl's "Transcendental" and "Eidetic" Reductions
and Their Wittgensteinian Equivalents

Abstaining from acceptance of its being, we change the fact of this perception into a pure possibility, one among other quite "optional" pure possibilities - but possibilities that are possible perceptions ... pure of everything that restricts to this fact or to any fact whatever. (IP p. 70)

In contrast with Descartes's, Husserl's interest, like Wittgenstein's, lay with the sense of the world, how it is conceived. Not the truth but the possibility of my judgments of the world was the focus.

For Husserl this "realm of meaning" is prior to and presupposed by the realm of the natural world (what exists). Alternatively, applying Wittgenstein's vocabulary, we might say that the contingent realm of facts (what exists) presupposes a subsisting realm. In what manner (if any) Husserl's realm of meaning and Wittgenstein's realm of subsisting objects coincide we will see shortly.

Husserl's epoché is set up to uncover this realm of meaning, the conditions of sense. There are (at least) two stages to this epoché.

The initial transcendental reduction Husserl referred to as a suspension of the "natural attitude." The philosopher sets aside ("bracketts") the question of anything's actual existence.

[We now have neither a science we accept nor a world that exists for us. Instead of simply existing for us - that is, being accepted naturally by us in our experiential believing in its existence - the world is for us only something that claims being. (CM p. 18)]

But laying aside the matter concerning what it is that exists or is the case, still, as James Edie observes, this does not amount to abandoning it in favour of the unreal or ideal world of meanings. Instead, in distinguishing "the realm of meaning" from "the realm of things and events" the phenomenologist means only to elucidate them within "his ever-continued and uninterrupted experience of this very life-world." (Edie, 1987, p. 20) Their existential status becomes characterised, so to speak, rather than asserted or denied. This characterisation, as Husserl makes clear in the third meditation, is given, for example, in terms of the kinds of verification procedures, forms of evidence appropriate and the conceptions of truth that are applicable to the various ontologies being investigated.² The "mode of being² of dice or unicorns and the means of confirming facts concerning them are thus revealed without prejudice. Husserl envisaged that his method would not distort the very phenomena it is designed to uncover, nothing like form of a "Principle of Uncertainty" applies.

Whether or not the die exists, it can still be described, and within that field of described phenomena can be distinguished a second layer of reduced phenomena, what is necessarily the case from what happens to be the case. The dice might happen to have a red face, but

for sure, each of its faces will have some colour. To reveal this second layer of phenomena Husserl advocates a second, more fundamental level, of reduction. This reduction (or "abstraction" as he sometimes refers to it, IP p. 6) he terms the "eidetic reduction." It provides, he believes, the ultimate data of phenomenology, "inspectable universals, species, essences" (IP p. 6) It is performed as a kind of thought experiment by imagining what is possibly the case for the die and how it might be different. Our actual perception of, desire for, or memory of, the die is shifted-

-into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the as-if, which supplies us with "pure" possibilities, pure of everything that restricts to this fact or to any fact whatever. (CM p. 70)

Within this field of possibilities we might, for example, imagine desiring that the roll of the die comes up six, but we could not desire that it comes up any number larger than that. In other words, the experiment reveals certain limits of the imagination which, Husserl notes, coincide with the limits of possibility and necessity.

In imagination we intuit what is *a priori* for the die, the *a priori* is not (as psychologism would have us believe) a function of a contingent limit of the imagination.

The [imagined] variation being meant as an evident one, accordingly as presenting in pure intuition the possibilities themselves as possibilities, its correlate is an intuitive and apodictic consciousness of something universal. (CM p. 71)

The point is that Husserl supposes his method to be self-regulating. Its endpoint is not decided from any prejudged, theoretical position; rather no further levels of reduction are conceivable. Bedrock has been struck. That his method is "theory

neutral" and self-limiting is what is most significant. It is, for Husserl, what marks it off as a truly objective philosophical method, a science no less. Mining a similar vein, Wittgenstein too maintains that in attending to what propositions show ensures that the investigation of the logical form of language is self regulating; language itself, he says, "prevents every logical mistake." because illogical thought is impossible. (5.4731)

Now I think the development of Wittgenstein's investigation into "the proposition" maps neatly onto these two stages of Husserl's epoché. He begins by noting that in essence propositions are all pictures. This simple claim amounts to a linguistic version of Husserl's first reduction--the transcendental-phenomenological epoché. It means that in order to consider the possibility of a proposition representing some state of affairs we have to consider it independently of its truth value, it is treated as an "as-if", an hypothesis.

Recall that Wittgenstein is here speaking of elementary, not complex propositions (the truth functional structure of the latter bear no correspondence with anything in the world). Now, in the case of an elementary proposition, Wittgenstein is quite clear that the conditions for its sense cannot include its truth value, or for that matter, the truth value of any other proposition. So the consideration of the elementary proposition, in so far as it is a picture, amounts to considering it under transcendental reductive conditions. This first stage reduction leaves Wittgenstein with the entire field of all possible (i.e., well formed) propositions. Where Husserl declines to

favour existing things Wittgenstein declines to favour propositions which are true.

The second stage of Wittgenstein's reduction is not expressed in terms of the limits of the imagination but rather in terms of limits of a scale of truth values. All well-formed propositions possess a truth value, they express some possible state of affairs. In short, propositions possess a sense. But certain concatenations of terms, logical propositions (tautologies and contradictions), are without sense (*sinnlos*). This senselessness is paradoxical in that although such "propositions" do not possess a truth value (for to do so is to possess the possibility of being either true or false only), still it is at least awkward to deny that tautologies are true and contradictions false. Wittgenstein thought of logical propositions as representing limiting cases for a scale of possibility (see 5.143 and NB 45₁). This logical character of propositions is not a function of formal logical operators and a property of only complex propositions (as in, for example, 'p.-p'); Wittgenstein supplies us with examples where no such logical operators are in play- -a speck in space must have a colour, musical notes must possess pitch, an object some degree of hardness, and so forth (cf. 2.0131). Each of these cases is tautological and significant because each indicates (shows) us the character of the respective "logical spaces" of specks, notes, objects (their "logical form").

Logical propositions, OF COURSE, all shew something different: all of them shew, in the same way, viz by the fact that they are tautologies, but they are different tautologies and therefore each shew something different. (NB 114₂)

Logical propositions, merely by that salient characteristic, seemingly, of possessing a singular truth value (or better, of being significant despite not possessing a truth value) draw attention to certain necessary characteristics inherent to language and the world. But Wittgenstein also believes that all propositions reveal, though less perspicuously, that same logical character or form.

But what all logical propositions show is not anything which is necessarily the case (i.e., not a necessary truth or falsehood). Similarly for Husserl, having distinguished the imaginable from the unimaginable, he does not then go on to reinstate, as actually existing, those matters which could not be imagined to be otherwise. What cannot be imagined certainly cannot exist but what it is possible to imagine does not necessarily exist either. So conversely, even to say of what cannot be imagined that it does not exist is misleading for it is not then distinguished from what does not happen to exist but is imaginable and which might exist in some other possible world.

So Husserl preferred, as did Wittgenstein, to think of "existence", as such, as not applicable to the unimaginable, but only to what might be otherwise, the contingent. Here again we see the clear delineation between the realms of contingency and necessity which we uncovered in Wittgenstein's conception of object (in chapter V). Necessity and contingency are not two species of the one genus "existing." The objects picked out as instrumental to propositions possessing sense should be indicated in logical analysis as lying not within the domain of an existential quantifier but within that of an iota operator, the domain of which are linguistic terms, not supposed

existing entities. So only the first, transcendental, reduction brackets existence; the second, eidetic, reduction brackets possibility.

In imagining the face of a dice to be white, my imagination conforms to the intuition that the face must be some colour and the proposition that the face of the dice is white shows that same limit. It is the same logical nature of phenomena that is revealed by imagination for Husserl and by the logical "properties" of logical propositions for Wittgenstein. Both authors have conceived the philosophical method precisely to characterise this logical form since both view it as the key to understanding the coherence of thoughts and propositions.

Finally, I think Wittgenstein could especially be taken to be speaking for Husserl as well as for himself (in particular with regard to Husserl's method of imaginative variation and his Cartesian concern with validating the presumptions of science) when he adds this more general observation of his use of logical propositions:

Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science. (4.113)

It must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought.

It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought. (4.114)

Of course Wittgenstein, unlike Husserl, is interested more directly in what can be spoken or written, thus does he identify such limitations of thought with limits of language when he continues:

It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said. (4.115)

Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly.
 Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly.
 (4.116)

What Phenomenological Methods Reveal

Introduction: The Polarity of Consciousness, Object and Subject

Husserl's epoché was a philosophical device for circumventing certain presuppositions he thought had effectively and ineradicably tainted all previous philosophies. In rejecting the realist perspectives one wonders whether Husserl has not simply substituted a new (idealist) one. But he claims his method is uniquely agnostic regarding the realist/idealist dichotomy and he refers to his own philosophy not as transcendental idealism (which would be somewhat paradoxical given his understanding of 'transcendental') but as transcendental subjectivism. The sense of this title will emerge with the discussion that follows here and in the following chapter.

Husserl begins by noting two distinguishable poles of consciousness whose description he titles "noematic" and "noetic" and in passage 17 of his second meditation he gives "synthesis" as the "primal form" of consciousness. This synthesis is paradigmatically exhibited by the inseparability of these poles though I shall outline them separately, beginning with objects.

Noematic description implies a belief of Husserl's that all experience can be described as experience of some object. Developing Brentano's use of the scholastic notion of intentionality, Husserl

goes on to speak of the essence of consciousness, that it must have its object:

[despite the epoché] the perception of this table is, as it was before, precisely a perception of this table. In this manner, without exception, every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness of such and such. (CM pp. 32-33)

And this is independent of the object's existential status, though this necessitates us in understanding intentionality (the directedness of consciousness towards some object), in a particular fashion:

[E]ach conscious process, we may also say, "means" something or other, and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum [the object as it is meant]. [So] Conscious processes are also called intentional: but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something. (CM p. 33)

Furthermore:

Judging is meaning - and, as a rule, merely supposing - that such and such exists and has such and such determinations; the judgment (what is judged) is then a merely supposed affair ... (CM p. 10, underlining added)

Thus for Husserl what it is that is judged, the die and that it is being perceived or imagined as lying six up perhaps, is a merely hypothetical existent, one that might exist. It is a condition no less, of the possibility of the judgment.

The problem of what the essence is of conscious experience includes "explicating the essential meaning of being a cognizable object or, what comes to the same thing, of being an object at all." (IP p. 17) An object of thought is what our consciousness is essentially of. There is always an object of thought, some thing of which we are thinking, be it, as Wittgenstein noted, an atom, a watch, a dance of motes in the air, an entire solar system or galaxy or even

numbers, arguments, attitudes, or as is instanced here, intentionality itself. Intentional objects are thus objects of meaning, or in the earlier vocabulary of the *Logical Investigations* they are the "matter" of any conscious act or alternatively its "interpretative sense." So the concept of the intentional object, it soon becomes clear, is formal- -infinitely, analogically interpretable.

As we have noted, Husserl considers this directionality of consciousness to be two way, any consciousness is a consciousness of something and equally no object can be meant which does not indicate the consciousness it is the object of. Both aspects, we could say, possess a profound form of indexicality.

As for the second, noetic, pole of consciousness; it concerns the mode of consciousness under which objects are held. I can perceive, recall, imagine, reflect on the same object, though, given the synthetic nature of consciousness, the object of my thought is infected by the mode of consciousness which it is held under. In effect, no object can be fully described independently of this noetic mode and such a noetic mode cannot be fully given except in so far as it is understood in relation to its noema. Imagining loved ones does not possess the vitality of perceiving them and recalling their smile is not like recalling one's multiplication tables.

To anticipate and facilitate my later comparison with Wittgenstein, despite the intimate nature of this relation between noematic and noetic description, Husserl also believed that any particular object imagined, recalled, despised etc. does in fact possess a core that is common to all those varieties of noetic

appearances, a distinguishable but inseparable essence no less. Thus to be a Husserlian object is identical with possessing an identity in thought. It is, finally, the same dice that I earlier imagined, now perceive and might later recall.

The Realm of Meaning: The Identity of Objects
as Types and Our Apprehension of Them

But, when descriptive theory of consciousness begins radically, it has before it no such data [as empiricists' sense data of experience, "internal sensuousness"] ... except perhaps as prejudices. Its beginning is the pure - and, so to speak, still dumb - psychological experience, which must be made to utter its own sense with no adulteration. The truly first utterance, however, is the Cartesian utterance ... And the first descriptive generality is the separation of *cogito* and *cogitatum qua cogitatum*. (CM pp. 38-9)

In this section I shall try to shed more light on the notion of a "realm of meaning", especially with regard to the existential status of its inhabitants, objects' identities.

Now it is important to stress that the structure of the ego that Husserl is referring to, its essential synthetic character, should not be identified with either the empirical, psychological ego (particular token thoughts or the world and its structures that are represented in thought or language.³ Rather it refers to a structure internal to the idea of object itself recalling, of course, that the object is an object-in-meaning "existing" in the "realm of meaning." That is, a hypothetical entity. For example, Husserl rejected the empiricists' treatment of experience, in particular he would have objected to the way in which that experience becomes atomised into distinct sense data construed as token experiences. Tokens that at some later date science

might identify with certain empirical data. Any reference to one such datum, for example as a colour datum has already, surreptitiously, construed it as a type not a token of experience, a universal. That is, the experience, in so far as it is identified as a colour, is already understood not as an individual experience but instead in relation to other comparable or distinct experiences. The token experience itself announces, as Charles Taylor expresses it, no more than it contains, (see note' chapter VI). Husserl thinks that precisely this same confusion between token phenomena and phenomena as types is evident in all reductive accounts of meaning, accounts which reduce it to the very phenomena which thought or language are supposed to represent. This reduction amounts to a denial of transcendence and identity.⁴

Wittgenstein, likewise, does not confuse determinate senses (meanings) with particular propositional signs, their mental correlates or the states of affairs those propositions assert if they are true. Propositions are essentially "senses", the same proposition is expressed by different sentences, stated by different people and on different occasions. Words only possess the logical character of names (i.e., name the same object) so far as they occur as elements of such propositions and mirror in their interrelations the interrelations of their objects. Names are thus mere pieces of a sentence if taken as tokens, but as names they are syncategorematic elements. It is precisely this identity that marks names and propositions off from the token phenomena they are correlative with- -propositional signs, mental states or things in the world.

In fact the identity spoken of here is not evident in any singular entity taken alone, that is the significance of Wittgenstein's contextual thesis discussed in chapter III. In the context of a propositional whole, words as names are Husserl's "moments", logical parts of a thought or proposition. So, for Wittgenstein, to be an inhabitant of a realm of meaning is to possess the kind of identity naming presumes on. That identity is only evident from, and constituted within, structures (propositions and states of affairs). Husserl would say that objects are "transcendent", which is to say that they possess an identity which transcends both the particular thoughts of them and their instantiations in particular states of affairs. The analysis of names must be undertaken in the light of that name's propositional context. To say that Wittgenstein's "objects" are linguistic entities is to recognise the common logical (and ontological) status they share with their respective correlates, words and propositions.

So, in this vital respect Husserl's description of the phenomenological task compares closely with Wittgenstein's treatment of language. Consciousness and language are essentially structured and constitute a meaningful unity of ideas or names only by virtue of those being apprehended as types, not tokens, of experience or utterances.

The intuition in the *Cogito* serves as a model for all phenomenological thinking in that it is established not on any particular thought but on any and every one. The intuition of what is immanent in thought which underlies Husserl's treatment of conscious

experience other than as token experiences and the transcendancy of its objects are self-given and therefore require no further explanation. So far as I can see, other than by pure intuition, neither does Wittgenstein suggest any other means of accessing our meanings.

The Indubitable Nature of the Realm of Object Meanings

In setting out to establish a "science" of cognition Husserl is seeking indubitable foundations for it, not only for its own sake but because, like Descartes, he envisions it as the foundation for all other sciences both physical and deductive. Husserl's explanation here depends upon the two crucial concepts: "transcendence" and "immanence".⁵ He argues, as I have just described, that the apodicticity of Descartes's *Cogito* lay not with any surety of deduction but because it fixes on what is immediately given, the thought itself. Scepticism is only intelligible in regard to the contents of the thought.⁶

But Husserl also distinguishes a further level of immanence and transcendence in thought which concerns the status of its objects. This insight marks the point of the divergence of Husserl's investigation from Descartes's. Phenomenological reduction is not limited, he says, to the sphere of what is genuinely immanent (the immanent self as instanced by the *Cogito*). Rather, it extends into the sphere of things that are "purely self-given." (IP p. 48) That is, the sphere of things "given in just exactly the sense in which they are thought of ... in such a way that nothing which is meant fails to be

given." (IP p. 49) The thought I now have about the die (distinct from the immanent, token thought itself) I can be sceptical of. But what the thought concerns, the object, is immanent to the mind in the sense of its meaning. That is, the same identical die of past, present and future thoughts. Husserl speaks of essences in this regard but my more contemporary rendering in terms of identities here will suffice. These objects of thought are both genuinely immanent (in the sense of being "self-given", Husserl emphasises) in cognition but are also apprehended as mind independent entities, transcendent and universal. Immanent because they are immediately apprehended (uninterpreted) and transcendental in that they possess an identity that transcends each and every token thought of them. Husserl supposes that their immanence to mind ensures their indubitability and their transcendence accounts for them being objective. Or better, transcendence is objectivity. I shall argue this description of objects precisely matches Wittgenstein's description of substance in the §§2's of the *Tractatus*.

As George Nakhnikian notes in his introduction to IP, the appeal to intuition simply leaves phenomenology with no arguments (IP p. XXI) for this characterisation of objects. But then neither can it suffer the usual quandaries which beset argument at these foundational levels- -the dichotomy of circularity and regress

But there is still another transcendence whose opposite is an altogether different immanence, namely, absolute and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense. This givenness which rules out any meaningful doubt, consists of a simply immediate "seeing" and apprehending of the intended object itself as it is, and it constitutes the precise concept of evidence understood as immediate evidence. (IP p. 28)

And Husserl himself appears to admit this, though not as a weakness, in his account:

However it is obvious that the only one who can argue in this way against the sceptic is the man who "sees" the ultimate basis of knowledge, who is willing to assign a significance to "seeing." (IP p. 49)

What is most characteristic therefore of "the field of enquiry", the realm of meaning, being explored by Wittgenstein and Husserl is its ontological (and epistemological⁷) status which I shall characterise more fully at the close of this chapter.

Objects and Meanings: Wittgenstein's and Husserl's Common Conception of "Objects"

The initial distinguishing (without separation) of self (or Ego) and object provides Husserl with an infinite field to work with - the noematic field of "objects" that inhabit that realm of meaning I characterised in the preceding sections. This description of the unity or sense of consciousness in terms of the structure of its (logical) multiplicity gives us at the outset a very clear and obvious comparison with Wittgenstein's account of what underwrites the unity or sense of propositions, the substance of both language and the world, objects. But as a basis for favouring the comparison of the two philosophies it cannot be taken for granted. As we will see later a comparison of Husserl's and Wittgenstein's philosophies would be possible in so far as "object", in the case of each, is considered to function as the most general and amorphous factotem of their respective theories. But taken more literally, a brief survey of their ideas on objects quickly reveals profound differences.

For Wittgenstein, objects²³ are essentially logical simples that are for that reason indescribable, he can provide no examples and only arrives at the idea of them by circuitous *a priori* reflections on the conditions for the determination of sense and its analysis. By comparison, objects, for Husserl, are precisely what his transcendental phenomenology is intended to describe. And there is certainly no problem in providing examples, examples are everywhere. Or, more accurately, they fill consciousness with no remainder. Instead of struggling to find examples, Husserl's point is that anything ones thoughts may alight on will indubitably prove to be an object by virtue of the very nature of that search.

So, a principle distinction rather than a similarity may be argued to be suggested by a consideration of the idea of the "object". This might be put by drawing attention to how the logical simplicity of Wittgenstein's objects ends up in excluding all possible thought (reflection) on the idea 'object.' Metaphorically speaking his idea narrows the field to an ideal point which finds definition only in terms of the theory that gave rise to it though it lies at that theory's very centre. In contrast, Husserl's idea of object seems so utterly broad and all encompassing (he speaks of the "empty universality of the intentional object" CM p. 50) that it fails to distinguish anything. Of course Husserl knows this, he would retort that whatever is uncovered as an essence of all consciousness cannot be expected to be distinguished from what is not. But with this remark one is reminded of one of Wittgenstein's to the effect that one cannot distinguish sense from nonsense in any ordinary fashion since one

cannot think sense's antithesis. As objects constitute thought without remainder for Husserl, so too for Wittgenstein does sense constitute language. Which is to say that neither Husserl's notion of 'object', not Wittgenstein's of "sense" have any antithesis (but see ahead to note 1°).

Now this last thought suggests a way in which the distinction being raised here between their ideas of "object", might be resolved--for Wittgenstein there is an exact parallel with Husserl's point that the notion has to be expressed absolutely since there is no consciousness that is not consciousness of objects. Wittgenstein's parallel thought is that there is nothing which determinate sense is to be contrasted with, there is no thought or expression that does not possess sense. The limits to both the set of objects and to the set of (possible) propositions must both be drawn from the inside. In fact Wittgenstein's belief in the infinite capacity of language for new expression (and so to represent any and every fact) is exactly marked off by Husserl's observation that there is no limit to the capacity of thought regarding what it can objectify (i.e., treat as an object).

But this is jumping too far ahead. Let me return to Husserl's idea of an object. Husserl's gives us an example which stands in stark contrast to Wittgenstein's bare and formal conception:

[If I take the perceiving of this die as the theme of my description, I see in pure reflection that 'this' die is given continuously as an objective unity in a multiform and changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing, which belong determinately to it. (CM p. 39)

and he concludes that:

[Each passing cogito intends its cogitatum, not with an undifferentiated blankness, but as a cogito with a describable

structure of multiplicities, a structure having a quite definite noetic-noematic composition [which] pertains to just this identical cogitatum. (CM p. 40)

Hubert Dreyfus, though he is for other reasons criticising Aaron Gurwitsch, quotes with approval Gurwitsch's definition of Husserl's "object" as "a homogenous unit, though internally articulated and structured." (1982, p. 110). In this (I think accurate) characterisation, however, do we not also find a very striking characterisation of a Wittgensteinian object? Wittgenstein's objects are in themselves undifferentiated entities whose internal structure (logical form) is apparent from the articulation of elementary propositions (senses) in which they are named. So it is only in as much as we attend to particular examples, as far as that is possible at all, that "object", as a source of comparison between Wittgenstein and Husserl, serves to dissuade us against the parallel.

Wittgenstein and Husserl insist that it is the identity of a object which they seek to describe, the identity that only attaches to objects-in-meaning. Indeed, no other characterisation seems possible. In this respect it is never the particular object alone that is significant but rather, it is the object in its generality, its character that transcends the range of particular thoughts or propositions. Rather, as an icon in itself is dead and without significance if taken out of all context, for both thinkers, to bring the object alive (to imbue it with meaning), is to speak in terms of its structure. We have seen that this is certainly the case with Wittgenstein, no object or its name is conceived as an object or name except in terms of their respective contexts (states of affairs and

elementary propositions). To be meaningful is to possess a sense or to be part of some sense. But so it is for Husserl, objects are meaningful wholes which in turn can themselves be parts of greater wholes (or "syntheses"). Indeed the whole (sic) of consciousness is likewise meaningfully constituted. I shall spend some time shortly describing in more detail the logical nature of Husserlian "object-structures".⁹

If indeed there is any substantial difference between the two conceptions of "object" it lies in Wittgenstein's emphasis on the role of simples in the determination of sense which in turn can be seen to stem from his analytic approach and his need to conceive of some terminus to that procedure. But it should not be forgotten that Wittgenstein's conception of simples itself entails the idea of internal complexity. In fact for both thinkers it is true to say that neither gets further than noting the inner structure or cohesion of the proposition or judgment. Neither gets to explain the source of the propositions's unity. Both writers reject reductive analyses of the sense of judgments in which more simple or primitive elements are called upon to account for the phenomena of meaning, such as the mental habits of thinkers or speakers or their (syntactical) manipulations, according to rules, of scratches or sounds. Instead, in "explaining" sense both define 'elements' in terms of the whole they constitute (a thought, proposition or judgment). Thus both defend a holistic, somewhat circular, conception of our apprehension of the world.

This holistic maintaining of the integrity and autonomy of the structure of whole propositions or thoughts is, finally, what Wittgenstein's metaphor of "logical space" concerns. In turn the coordinates of that space within which objects are sited (and for that matter, cited too) provide ideal, not real, identities for objects. In Husserl's case this ideality is expressly insisted on; James Edies puts this succinctly:

The object of thought itself, as the objective meaning-content of an act of thinking, thus has none of the characteristics of the real acts in which it is psychologically given, nor of the real, individual and particular things in the world to which it refers. It is not a "real" thing at all but something ideal. (1987 p. 10)

That this thought of the nature of objects is shared by Wittgenstein stems from the fact that both writers are struggling to understand the nature of the proposition when, as I have argued, it seems obvious to both of them that it cannot be identified with any collection of signs, nor with psychological or physiological states of thinkers and not with any real, contingent collections of objects in the world. But if it cannot be identified with any of these contingencies (which is all language can represent) then Wittgenstein is correct in maintaining that such identities are strictly indescribable. None of these contingent matters possess the kind of identity which is presumed necessary to the unity of propositions.

[The one identical, appearing die [...] is continuously 'immanent' in the flowing consciousness, descriptively "in" it: as is likewise the attribute "one identical". This being-in-consciousness is a being-in of a completely unique kind: not a being-in-consciousness as a really intrinsic component part, but rather a being-in-it "ideally" as something intentional, [...] a being-in-it as its immanent "objective sense". The "object" of consciousness, the object as having identity "with itself" during the flowing subjective process, does not come

into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself - and thus as an "intentional effect" produced by the synthesis of consciousness. (CM p. 42)

For Wittgenstein just this kind of ideal identity is provided for objects in terms of their locations in logical space. In fact Wittgenstein's conception of an object's logical simplicity and Husserl's of an object's sameness (its identity) amount to the same conception, namely that of the object's ideality. For both thinkers these constitute an absolute and fundamental datum.

All of the so-called realities- -of written or spoken signs, psychic elements or physical entities which propositions are reduced to in naturalistic explanations of meaning- -manifest a merely formal association, they are merely unordered sets of token items, conglomerations. No such naturalistic analyses can address the unity or identity of the sets or categories significant to propositions. In short, any analysis of the kind of phenomena (referred to above as "so-called realities") correlative with propositions provides mere collections of items. Of analysis Husserl writes:

[A]s intentional, the analysis of consciousness is totally different from analysis in the usual and natural sense. Conscious life, . . . , is not just a whole made up of "data" of consciousness and therefore "analysable" (in an extremely broad sense, divisible) merely into selfsufficient and non-selfsufficient elements - the forms of unity [...] being included then among the non-selfsufficient elements. (CM p. 46)

For Wittgenstein we have seen (chapter III) that such "usual or natural" analysis would be inherently unrestricted and possibly infinite, it would have no natural terminus. Husserl continues:

[E]verywhere [intentional analysis's] peculiar attainment (as "intentional") is an uncovering of the potentialities

"implicit" in actualities of consciousness - an uncovering that brings about, on the noematic side, an "explication" or "unfolding", a "becoming distinct" and perhaps a "clearing" of what is consciously meant (the objective sense) ... (CM p. 46)

Wittgenstein echoes this point in the manner in which, as we saw in chapter III, analysis can only attain a proper terminus (as opposed to an arbitrary, or a theory laden one) when it recognises the meaning provided for each name (what particular object is, non-ostensively, meant) in the original proposition being analysed.

So, for both writers what characterises the kinds of sets of phenomena underlying the holistic character of objects is their relations. But I have remarked already that this itself takes us no further into understanding this unity or cohesion, it merely restates it. In this respect Wittgenstein and Husserl are unsuccessful in accounting for meaning and this failure is admitted by both in effect by their claims to only describe and not explain it. Of course, it is not a real failure at all since it shows in itself something important about meaning, the limits of naturalistic or nomothetic explanation, and the nature and role of intuition.

Objects and Their Descriptions

As developed systematically and fully, transcendental phenomenology would be *ipso facto* the true and genuine universal ontology - not, however, just an empty formal ontology, but also one that comprised in itself all regional existential possibilities. (CM p. 155)

What kind of description can a Husserlian object for consciousness be given? What could possibly characterise something as infinitely

diverse as an object of thought when even something as diffuse as the problem I am now discussing here is one?¹⁰ Of course just this same point can be raised regarding Wittgensteinian objects, my epigraph to chapter V (from Specht, 1966) characterising the Aristotelian notion of "substance" as entirely amorphous and infinitely analogically interpretable was intended to apply equally to Husserlian or Wittgensteinian "objects."

The process or trick of the mind of "objectifying" all of its concerns I shall return to briefly later. For the present I shall consider an example of a description of an object foresaking Husserl's own example of the die in favour of continuing with my own from chapter V, a watch.

Husserl speaks of perspectives, and in my review of Wittgensteinian objects I spoke of various "profiles", of an object of thought. In both cases such meanings effectively (thematically) coalesce, they can be considered as part of a greater whole. For example, as a keepsake the watch still bears certain essential physical characteristics as well as bearing a certain social significance or certain physical marks such as an inscription. In effect, 'watch' becomes a locus of meaning, a logical complex no less. For Wittgenstein, any state of affairs shows an object's situation in logical space (simple or complex). Being in logical space means that all else that may possibly be the case for that object is potential or implied. An object need not actually engage in all the variety of its possible combinations for us to be cognisant of its significance in this respect. Of course, the richness of an object's hypothetical

combinations quickly becomes reduced when it is construed as being simple; then it can have only similar "kinds" of relations with other objects. But this categorisation of an object still does not detract from seeing its significance or potential for combination beyond what combination is presently true of it.

This significance of an object's profile Husserl thinks of as its "thickness", it is logically pregnant so to speak:

In the particularization of [a] type, and of its description, the intentional object (on the side belonging to the cogitatum) plays, for easily understood reasons, the role of "transcendental clue" to the typical infinite multiplicities of possible cogitationes that, in a possible synthesis, bear the intentional object within them (in the manner peculiar to consciousness) as the meant object.
(CM p. 50)

Looked on (in imagination, in perception or in memory etc.) as a physical object, a watch will be presumed ("seen") to possess a back as well as the face I presently perceive. As a timekeeper it will be presumed to contain unperceived workings. Of course, it is a contingent matter whether the watch actually has workings. But in "seeing" the object as a watch I am not, in effect, making claims on it (that it will tick, tell the time, have moving parts etc.) which are true or false. No experience, for example, could contradict these "perceptions" of the watch as a watch. Rather they are implied (logically, analytically anticipated) by the way that, in saying anything of the object, I call it (identify it as) a watch.

Husserl's "profiles" are discrete, each provides what can be considered a complete "picture" of a whole. But any number of profiles can also be considered together to constitute an even greater whole, a

wider profile. The possibility of such profiles, just as with Wittgenstein's possible meanings (construals) of "watch", are infinite. So, no matter how many profiles are unified, no such collection will, so to speak, "give it all." Just this point was illustrated by the analogy I explored in Ch.V between distinct aspects of a person and aspects of objects-of-reference. No set of aspects (social roles) of a person can exhaust the possible descriptions of her.

Just as Wittgenstein's "watch" can be logically complex but only "describable" as such in analytic terms, so too, each profile of any Husserlian object is analysable into its parts some of which will be mere "pieces", contingent bits. But some will be "moments" of that profile of it, moments of the whole. What distinguishes moments of an object from its pieces lies in the manner in which moments are apprehended as constitutive, synthetically¹¹ of the whole.¹² They "permeate" each other and so conjoin immediately just as Wittgenstein imagined was the case for names and simple objects in the wholes they constitute, elementary propositions and states of affairs.

For Husserl the die is "given" as "an objective unity" (CM p. 39) such that,

Once we have laid hold of the phenomenological task of describing consciousness concretely, veritably infinities of facts - never explored prior to phenomenology - become disclosed. They can all be characterized as facts of synthetic structure, which give noetic-noematic unity to single cogitationes, in themselves (as concrete synthetic wholes) and in relation to one another. (CM p. 41)

Given that all consciousness is of objects, then such a logical form becomes universal and constitutive of consciousness in terms of an

object's identity. The comparison with Wittgenstein here is obvious, no note can be without pitch, no surface spot without colour (2.0131b). These are a synthesis of structural properties, or, in Wittgenstein's terms, logical-analytic properties.

In the *Notebooks* Wittgenstein asks:

We single out a part of our visual field, for example, we see that it is always complex, that any part of it is still complex but is already simpler, and so on -.

Is it imaginable that - e.g. - we should see that all points of a surface are yellow, without seeing any single point of this surface? It almost seems to be so. (NB 50_{s,10})

Wittgenstein's wording here is critical, when we "see" that something is yellow it is the "seeing" of some fact, which is to say that this is really a case of apprehension, not simply perception (if there is such a process). I see the yellow surface, that is what I am looking at. But I apprehend that all points of the surface are yellow. The latter 'proposition' shows a unity which no mere reception of sense data could account for. In this and other remarks, especially in the *Notebooks* Wittgenstein illustrates a phenomenological sensitivity which Husserl would have applauded. For Husserl, surface, shape and colour "permeate" each other, they are moments of a whole (an object). And that this surface happens to be the face of a watch is of no moment (sic) for Wittgensteinian or Husserlian analysis.

To put my point most briefly, Husserl's notion of synthesis is the equivalent but in reverse of Wittgenstein's notion of analysis, both concern the logical constitution of objects. Husserl and Wittgenstein alike spend little or no time in discussing contingent matters of objects and when they do the matter is raised simply to

provide antithetical examples to the logical cases they are interested in or in order to point out how, for example, the fact that x is blue indicates a logical possibility provided by x being coloured, possessing a surface etc. "Every fact can be thought of merely as exemplifying a pure possibility." (CM p. 71)

In summary then, Husserl and Wittgenstein look on philosophical description and its correlate, analysis, as essentially guided and delineated by considerations of logical form in which precisely the same kind of unification (or "permeation" in Husserl's metaphor) exists between analysans and analysandum as obtains within the original whole. Their dissection, so to speak, is carried out in the context of a clear understanding of the organic nature of the propositional organism.

Analysis or Phenomenology of Meaning?

Now the discussion immediately above should sound familiar for it is in fact a replay of the issue of the nature of Russellian analysis raised in chapter III. In adopting Russell's view of analysis, as we saw, Wittgenstein struggled to provide it with some terminus other than Russell's idea of one based in direct acquaintance of perceptual atoms.

In Husserl's terminology, the "thickness" of an object is constituted of its innumerable "horizons" ("predelineated potentialities" as he also calls them, CM p., 45). As a metaphor "thickness" is intended, effectively I think, to convey the impression

of a thing's infinite potential within a profile to be (perceptually, imaginatively, in memory etc.) developed or enriched synthetically.

For example, there belongs to every external perception its reference from the "genuinely perceived" sides of the object of perception to the sides "also meant" - not yet perceived, but only anticipated [...] as perceptions we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise. (CM p. 44)

For example, the die leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already "construed" in advance as a die, in particular as coloured, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open. (CM p. 45)

In Wittgensteinian analysis such horizons figure as presuppositions. If the broom is in the corner and I mean by "broom": the "handle attached to brush" then both handle and brush are in the corner too, but not in addition of course, to the broom. In such analysis the analysandum and analysans "stay in touch" with each other, the broom, brush and handle are understood in terms of each other, they are reciprocally explicated.

At the fundamental level of objects and states of affairs, and names and elementary propositions, this reciprocity occurs in the manner in which, for example, elementary propositions are understood as functions of their constituent names but that each name is only definable in terms of the very combinations it can enter into and which only the elementary proposition manifests. This strategy in Wittgenstein's account significantly distinguishes it from Husserl's. What is presupposed in an object for Husserl is an infinite horizon, an object can be enriched "in our eyes" by a potentially endless possibility of new perspectives. Wittgenstein's assurance that sense is finally determinate would not allow him this, but Husserl is not

restricted by this preconception of the nature of meaning and analysis. Even so, Husserl appears to suggest that an object can in fact be so (finitely) delineated:

Thus, as consciousness of something, every consciousness has the essential property, not just of being somehow able to change into continually new modes of consciousness of the same object [...] according to - indeed, only according to those intentionalities. The object is, so to speak, a pole of identity, always meant expectantly as having a sense yet to be actualized; in every moment of consciousness it is an index, pointing to a noetic intentionality that pertains to it according to its sense, *an intentionality that can be asked for and explicated*. (CM pp. 45-6, italics added)

This is because, as we shall see shortly, the object of consciousness is thought of as identical with the idea of an object-in-meaning which, as I argued in chapter V, is what Wittgenstein intended by speaking of simple or complex objects. So it becomes apparent that in conceiving an infinity of horizons for any object Husserl has in mind what in chapter V I called the object-of-reference, that metaphysical source of infinite possible construals or meanings.

External perception too (though not apodictic) is an experience of something itself, the physical thing itself: "it itself is there". But in being there itself the physical thing has for the experiencer an open, infinite, indeterminately general horizon. (CM p. 23)

So in conceiving of Wittgensteinian analysis as essentially logical and concerned with meanings and in distinguishing it from (scientific) analysis of a thing's contingent make-up, it becomes immediately comparable with Husserlian phenomenological, or intentional, analysis.

Intentional analysis is guided by the fundamental cognition that, as a consciousness, every cogito is indeed (in the broadest sense) a meaning of its meant [...] but that any moment, this something meant is more [...] than what is meant at that moment "explicitly". (CM p. 46)

Most significant for my purposes here, Husserl recognises that the self-evident data of phenomenological investigation will objectively provide a terminus to intentional analysis. Unlike Russell's idea of the simple data of experience, the products of intentional analysis are founded on a simplicity of forms and so are directly comparable with Wittgenstein's view:

It now remains to trace step by step the data in all their modifications, those that are, properly speaking, data and those that are not, the simple and the compounded ones, those that so to say are constituted at once and those that essentially are built up stepwise, those that are absolutely valid and those that in the process of cognition acquire givenness. (IP p. 10)

Either way, Wittgensteinian or Husserlian, such analyses uncover hidden but implied senses to any object and all that follows from it. And most importantly, neither philosopher confuses such analysis with empirical (i.e., scientific) analysis of contingent states.

And as we have also seen, both Wittgenstein and Husserl accept the (metaphysical) implication of their ideas of meaning objects, namely they both suppose that to give sense to anything, though it is only that sense that we are cognizant of, still there is the thing that we thereby imply a "reference" to. Which is to say that both philosophers recognise the fundamental distinction between meaning and referring (that I discussed in the context of Wittgenstein's conception of a name in chapter V) to which I return in more detail below and again in chapter VIII.

Objects-in-Meaning and the Role of Experience:
The Distinction of Meaning From Referring

This account of objects also provides Husserl and Wittgenstein with similar views on the role of experience for meaning. In the conception of a reality of things which become construed as a realm of objects-in-meaning (whose logical consequences constitute logical networks of meaning) is again evident Wittgenstein's and Husserl's rejection of empiricists' accounts of meaning.¹³

At first glance both Husserl's method of eidetic reduction and imaginative variation and Wittgenstein's analyses of what any proposition presupposes (can the broom be imagined as a broom when it is without its brush?) might suggest a role for experience in the uncovering of meaning. Husserl's imaginative variation suggests "horizons" of objects which are anticipations of possible future perceptions. Seeing x as a cube when only one side of x is in view implies other possible future perspectives on it which experience surely might confirm if I were to move around it to other viewpoints. But this view precisely confuses my meaning of 'cube' with that thing (-of-reference) I perceive. It is indeed only contingent whether that thing will prove to have the requisite number of sides. But in so far as I do mean it as a cube then these other various characteristics follow. They are to be taken for granted. They are presupposed in "my meaning". If they are not, for example, confirmed in experience then I was not wrong about the cube possessing six sides, I was wrong in calling it a cube. In effect I located the object (-of-reference) in the wrong logical space. But whether or not it does so confirm my predictions has no bearing on my conception of a cube. If it proves to have only four other sides we should say, "This is not a cube at all"

or "Whatever this is, it does not have six sides' etc. I.e. I will speak referentially about "it" (i.e. "it" is an object-of-reference) and not about a cube or about the thing as a cube; that is, not about the object I meant (the object-in-meaning).

In this respect at least, experience and referring have no place in a theory of the determinacy of sense or the unity of propositions. (But that position will be argued more fully in chapter VIII.) That is why essentially referring terms such as "that" do not in an analytic sense unite with or permeate other words they are put with in sentences; one cannot say anything analytically using 'that' that is tautologically equivalent to "Surfaces are coloured" or "Dice have six sides."

The Forms and Status of Objects-in-Meaning

I want to conclude and summarise this comparison of Wittgenstein's and Husserl's "objects" by considering both under two headings intended as descriptors of a common status.

1. Ideal and Objective.
2. Fundamental and Universal.

In the process of discussing 2 I will consider two objections to the comparability I have been arguing for in their conceptions of objects.

1. Wittgensteinian and Husserlian "objects" are ideal and objective.

We have seen that for Wittgenstein objects are what account for the determination of sense, fulfilling this function by virtue of their essential simpleness. The objects names name are not constitutive of the world, facts are. Nor are these names themselves

reducible to the token sign-marks or psychological states of speakers and thinkers. What a name stands for is none of these things because if I speak about some object now or later and assert various things of it then, just as I cannot step into the same river twice, so too, none of these entities can provide the kind of identity that would satisfy my intention to speak of the same item. In short, meanings are not metaphysical entities, rather they are what I construe those entities as. Thus, ontologically speaking the simple objects named in a proposition and propositions themselves are both idealities.

Likewise, we have seen that, despite all of his references to "objects", Husserl considers himself to be similarly concerned with meaning.

Phenomenology proceeds by "seeing", clarifying, and determining meaning, and by distinguishing meanings. [I]t carries through no explanations in the sense of deductive theory. (IP p. 46)

Just as Wittgenstein's analysis has proved to be analysis of meaning rather than what is contingently the case for things named in the proposition, so Husserl's phenomenology is not concerned directly with an inspection of existing objects. Thus, talk of "objects" on the part of both Wittgenstein and Husserl is somewhat misleading.

In speaking of phenomenology's subject matter as meaning, and in his investigation of objects that transcend conscious experience and the shifts of the contingent world, Husserl argues that his objects are essential idealities. Of course I have called them objects-in-meaning in order to emphasise their common status with Wittgensteinian objects.

But the ideality of Husserlian "objects" does not imply that meaning is at all subjective. Husserl's argument is involved and so I shall quote it rather extensively. It takes off from first arguing for the ideality of objects and it presumes objectivity to be understood in terms of anything's independence and self-giveness.

Let us consider mere imagination. [...] An imagined colour is not a datum in the way that a sensed colour is. [...] The hovering of the colour before me (...) is a "now", a presently existing *cogitatio*, but the colour itself is not a presently existing colour; [...] On the other hand, it is given in a certain way, it stands before my gaze. [...] it can be reduced [...] so that it no longer signifies for me the colour of the paper, the house etc. [...] in that case I consider it just exactly as I "see" it, or, as it were, "live" it. But in spite of that, [...] it is not a present, but a presented colour. [...] But with all this, it is "seen" and as "seen" it is, in a certain sense, given. Thus I do not take it to be a physical or psychical existent. Nor do I take it to be existent in the sense of a proper *cogitatio*, [...] Still the fact that the imagined colour is not given in this or that sense does not mean that it is given in no sense. It appears [...] in such a way that "seeing" it itself in its presentation I can make judgments concerning the abstract aspects which constitute it and the ways in which these aspects cohere. Naturally these are also given in the same sense, and likewise they do not "actually" exist anywhere in the mental process of imagining. [...] We could therefore say that it is concerning the individual essence that we make judgments and not concerning existence. [...]

But the contrast of existence and essence signifies nothing else than that here two modes of being manifest themselves in two modes of self-giveness and are to be distinguished. (IP pp. 54-5)

Thus are we dealing in objective (i.e., self-given, subject-independent), though ideal, entities in the case of the Husserlian "object."¹⁴

In Wittgenstein's case simple objects are conceived in terms of the simple relations manifest in the world which their names mimic. Thus are they themselves, though objects-in-meaning, objective.

Because their determinate structure, logical form, is identical with the structure of reality then apprehending what propositions show amounts to an immediate apprehension of the structure of reality. To put this another way, that a proposition is congruent with its state of affairs is the basis of it representing that state of affairs. But congruence and representation are not the same relation. The latter is expressed in terms of truth but not the former. I comprehend a proposition as a representation of this fact by acquaintance with the latter. But the structure it shares with that state of affairs I can intuit directly (uninterpreted) from the proposition alone. The possibility of Wittgenstein's world of facts is conditional on there being such a structure which propositions and facts share.

Beyond this shared view of the objectivity of sense is a desire to draw attention to the necessity inherent in meanings. What Husserl means by speaking of meanings as being "given" or "self manifesting" and of the need for immediate intuition is of course closely comparable with Wittgenstein's hardly less enigmatic appeal to the veracity of logical propositions and what they show of the logical form of their terms. Such a form logical propositions "contain" in just the manner in which they do not "contain" (but only represent or express, cf. 3.02, 3.13) their senses. In Husserl's terminology, logical form is immanent (not as thoughts themselves are "genuinely" immanent but in the sense of being self-given) in propositions but transcendental of the marks or sounds which convey them, the world they are intended to represent and the thoughts which "contain" them. It is precisely parallel to those objects of consciousness which

constitute the field of enquiry for phenomenology. In fact, according to McIntyre and Smith¹⁵ they are to be identified because Husserlian objects are in essence linguistic in just the same manner Wittgenstein's are.¹⁶

2. Wittgensteinian and Husserlian "objects" are universal and fundamental.

Both Wittgenstein and Husserl "describe" their respective objects as ideal and objective unities or wholes that are internally, logically structured. Still there appears to be two clear differences in their conception of them:

a. Husserl, but not Wittgenstein, imagines his die, a common physical object, as an object which he describes using common, everyday terms. That is, Husserlian objects possess ordinary properties and can be described in everyday terms. As we have noted this is not the case at all for Wittgensteinian objects.

b. Husserl's objects (noemata) occur in conscious experience as part of a wider synthesis with noetic features, they possess in Husserl's jargon a "thetic" character. An object is held in consciousness as a certain mode of it, perceived, desired, imagined etc., and there it is imbued with a character distinctive of that mode, for example, an object in perception possesses a quality Husserl refers to as its "sensuous filling" or its "fullness" which will be absent from the same object entertained in the imagination (see again note ² above). By contrast Wittgenstein does not need to consider this aspect of an object-in-meaning since he is not concerned with consciousness as such. For Wittgenstein, whether we imagine or perceive that the watch

is in the drawer has no consequences for the meaning of 'watch' in that proposition.

Now both a and b above are correct regarding Husserl's view of objects but neither goes deep enough. In the first instance Husserl is not interested on descriptions of particular objects, he is not making an inventory of the universe, and in that regard he and Wittgenstein are in agreement. Instead, in his somewhat inflated style of expression, Husserl speaks of wanting to provide "the universal logos of all conceivable being" (CM p. 155) which is hardly likely to be identifiable with such prosaic items as dice. In fact Husserl intends us to regard such descriptions of the die not for what he predicates of them but for the manner in which these properties cohere with one another. We have noted that they permeate one another as moments, not contingent parts, of the entity. Furthermore, horizons of the object are to be anticipated which are no less moments of it for not being explicitly a part of this present consciousness of the object. That the perceived sides are coloured is not reliant on my perception of them and nor is the fact that other unperceived sides are coloured. All of the object's moments can be anticipated in imagination because of their essential logical character, they are analytically related (synonymously, they "permeate" each other or cohere)- -physical object to surface, surface to colour, colour to tone etc. It is this logical structure that Husserl is concerned to describe and that is precisely Wittgenstein's interest too, though his analysis places greater emphasis on the essential simplicity of logical form.¹⁷

So, taking the die as an example is itself not significant, certainly not a paradigm. For Husserl, any example of something "held before the mind's eye", an object of thought, can serve the same purpose. In the *Notebooks* Wittgenstein discusses just such a range of examples from watches to the dances of motes in the air and finds them significant as logical complexes. It is in this respect too, as universals, that Husserl pays them attention.¹⁰

Of thethetic character of objects Husserl says that the particular intentional object is present as a unity "belonging to noetically-noematically changing modes of consciousness" (CM p. 40-41) but in *Ideas* Husserl makes it clear that these noetic and noematic sides of consciousness are distinguishable, if not separable, and that it is thus possible to conceive the "pure" object, just as in fact Wittgenstein dealt with them. He says:

"In" each of these experiences [e.g. expectation, imagination] there "dwells" a noematic meaning, and however closely self related, indeed, so far as a central nucleus is concerned, essentially self-same, the latter remains in different experiences, it differs in kind none the less when the experiences differ in kind. [...] The object considered may be in every case a blossoming tree, and in every case this tree may so appear that the faithful description of that which appears as such necessarily uses identical expressions. Yet the noematic correlates are for this very reason essentially different for perception, fancy, imaginative presentation memory and so fourth.

We observe from this that within the *complete* noema we must separate out *as essentially different* certain *strata* which group themselves about a central "nucleus". The sheer "objective meaning", that which in our example was something that could be everywhere described in purely identical objective terms. [...] the "object *simpliciter*" [...] one central concept. (*Ideas* pp. 265-266, underlining added)

Thus essentially Husserl believes that we can bracket the "pure", noetically-unadulterated noema as an objective meaning itself, the

object's identity. This, Husserl believes, does not at all compromise the objectivity or authenticity of the object of meaning, it will still possess just those abstract aspects which constitute it and it will represent, in short, an essence, pure and self-given, a universal, phenomenological datum.

So despite the inseparable nature of a noema and itsthetic character it is clear that Husserl considers that the phenomenological description of an object is a fundamental form which is universal to distinct token conscious experiences of it.

In just the same way Wittgenstein considers his recognition of what is simple or complex to represent the most fundamental form of distinction within objects. Furthermore, such objects provide the basis for that fundamental form of all linguistic expression, the proposition.

Judgment, command and question all stand on the same level; but all have in common the propositional form (NB p. 107.)

And of particular interest, Wittgenstein makes clear (p. 96_s), is the unasserted proposition (the picture). Just as the particular object is described by Husserl only for the universal it manifests, for Wittgenstein, the particular elementary proposition manifest a universal form "quite apart from their particular logical forms" (5.555, see also 5.47-5.472); namely, "This is how things stand", the possibility for which resides completely within the notion of simple objects and names.

Now although it is evident that Husserl does not exactly share Wittgenstein's view of what is fundamental (namely, the distinction of

the simple from the and complex), both philosophers have alighted on the same notion of logical complexity as the chief concern in an account of meaning. Or rather, both have "described" meaning in these logical terms, for clearly neither has explained it since meaning and logical structure are identified in both of their accounts.

In their different ways, Wittgenstein and Husserl are both describing the phenomena they believe to underlie ordinary language and conscious experience respectively. Both offer these as foundations which are universal and ineffable as well as ideal and objective. And above all, both rely on the self-givenness of these phenomena (of meaning) in their philosophical methods. If not for any other reason, Wittgenstein's work should be considered phenomenological in these respects.

Notes

¹ We should note here at the outset that Husserl speaks of the "transcendental" nature of the Ego and of the "transcendence" of objects of experience (objects-of-reference). In the former, "transcendental" he means the Ego that is a condition of consciousness and experience. It is beyond and other than that consciousness. By the latter, "transcendence", Husserl is emphasising that such objects are beyond or independent of our perceptions and descriptions of them.

² Most conspicuously many of Husserl's examples are set in the noetic mode of perception. But the apparent relative veracity of perception, over memory for example, is not set up by Husserl as a paradigm of consciousness of objects. Rather, perceiving my watch (in contrast with imagining it for example) bears a certain phenomenological "quality" which he refers to as its "filling" and this in turn implies other characteristics not present in imagining that object--that it may yet receive "sensuous filling" (i.e., become confirmed in perception, for example). Even so, such filling is still a part of the synthesis of the object "... in which what was meant coincides and agrees with what is itself given; ..." (CM p. 11) -- "A merely supposing judging becomes adjusted to the affairs." (CM p. 10). Evidence, or the phenomenon of "filling" is thus conceived by Husserl as a "mental seeing" (CM p. 12), an experience of conflict or fit between objects of thought held in perception and in some other noetic mode such as memory or imagination. Which is to say that it too is a matter of apprehension, not mere perception. As such, existence, too, is itself phenomenologically investigable and perception and its epistemological significance as a case of conscious experience has no special phenomenological significance.

³ Husserl, anticipating the work of Chomsky, asks:

[I]s it not the case that the logical forms and laws express the accidental peculiarity of the human species, which could have been different and which will be different in the course of future evolution? (IP p. 16)

But he finds the view the question implies paradoxical. Any supporting arguments for that view could only be taken seriously if logic itself is not taken to be relative in this manner. Or, alternatively, if it is correct in its view of the relativity of logic then of course the arguments supporting that view are themselves only relatively correct (which, of course, they are never intended or taken to be).

⁴ Let me clarify this--Husserl does not suppose that conscious states cannot be dealt with as physiological experiences, token events of the subject's psychical life. What he is objecting to is the confusion of these two distinctive ways of dealing with either phenomenological objects or conscious states which he thinks is evident in all branches of science wherever meanings are surreptitiously introduced. For example, in psychology where token conscious states and their meanings (significances) are identified and dealt with interchangeably. My

present token thought of my father's watch is a singular mental event but to treat that event as identical with the thought in so far as it is a thought of my father's watch overlooks the attachment of significance to the thought such that it becomes a thought of the watch. Without that significance this mental event cannot be said to be the same as some later one as my present thought of the watch and, say, its colour, is the same as a later thought of the watch's colour. The treatment of consciousness (as token mental events) cannot explain the internal relations we suppose obtain between such a thought of the watch, later thoughts of the same watch and other thoughts concerning time, my father etc. (except, perhaps, in Humean terms of the illusions generated by association, habit and familiarity).

To be clear on this, Husserl marks the distinction between the idea and its content terminologically, "what is meant" and "the meant as such." All cases of the former are essentially token mental states (except where we speak or think of, for example, the act of imagining and thereby make it itself an object of our thoughts. Then imagination, too, becomes idealised and universalised).

"My idea of my watch" barely disambiguates between my conscious state and its subject or content. But it certainly equivocates on the status of my idea as either the unique mental event occurring in time and the idea considered as, for example, a piece of imagination. For Husserl, phenomenology's interest in my "idea" lies with it only so far as the latter sense applies, i.e., so long as the "idea" itself is taken up as the subject of some further thought. Only then does it become a phenomenon, an object of thought (that is, the subject of reflection). Only then is it a case of the "meant as such." Of course, this process, what Wittgenstein refers to in the *Notebooks* as a reification (NB 49,) and Husserl thinks of as objectification, can go on *ad infinitum* as this passage illustrates by taking up the objectification of "my idea" itself as a subject for thought.

⁵ See, for example, Husserl's opening summary, "The Train of Thoughts in the Lectures" to IP, especially pp. 8-10 and his second lecture in IP, especially pp. 26-28.

⁶ As an aside, it is worth noting that this distinction also serves Husserl with a further argument against naturalistic explanations of consciousness, all of which rely on matters that are transcendent and therefore open to scepticism (which of course, Descartes circumvented in his appeal to the veracity of God).

All cognition of the natural sort, [i.e. scientific thinking] and especially the pre-scientific, is cognition which makes its object transcendent. It posits objects as existent, claims to reach matters of fact which are not "strictly given to it", are not "immanent" to it. (IP p. 27)
And so, Husserl would conclude, such matters cannot be indubitable, thus the scepticism that surrounds these disciplines.

⁷ Regarding their epistemological status, it is clear that none of the common epistemological concerns apply; the character of "meanings" is most evidently their immediacy and veracity. What is most striking

however is both Wittgenstein's and Husserl's conception of them as both indubitable and objective. Wittgenstein does speak of the determinacy of my analysis of propositions as being according to "my meaning" but that meaning he considers as objectively determined in that it relies not on my relating name to object but in the congruence of propositional structures and fact structures. Names mimic objects in their relations. So the relation of name to object is thus derived from that (supposed, see chapter X) objective relation of congruence. Propositions mirror objectivity objectively!

Husserl in turn considers the objectivity of object meanings to be self evident and intuited. Their necessity, he thinks, must be objective because such necessity cannot be located in any other sphere such as the world, the subject's psychology, or our inductive procedures of investigating the world.

⁸ For the benefit of the discussion that follows, I offer the following review of Wittgenstein's notion of "object" as a summary of the findings of part 1.

Objects are conceived of in terms of the logical form manifest in their relations with other objects. An object and its logical form are identical. Logical form (and thus objects themselves) are ineffable, objects cannot be described and their names are indefinables. But an object's logical simplicity or complexity is shown in the "kinds" of relations (singular or complex) of the object's name in propositions. In unanalysed language both simple and complex objects alike are objectified (named, treated as if they were simple objects) because both manifest an internal logical form. An object thus revealed is an object-in-meaning, a "linguistic (or "logical") entity", whose logical character is most perspicuously (analytically) shown in logical propositions.

Metaphysically speaking objects-in-meaning are correlated with objects-of-reference through the congruence of structures of elementary propositions and states of affairs. But this is only a correlation, not an identity. Objects-of-reference are only construed as objects-of-meaning so that nothing of the "true" nature of the referent in itself is revealed directly either by what propositions state or show. Thus the nature of such referents is radically ineffable.

In so far as it is a Wittgensteinian object (simple or complex), a description of the watch analytically depends, Wittgenstein says, on "my meaning." Which is to say that any elementary propositions describing the watch must not mention anything that was not intended in the original (complex) statement. Now this is quite an unusual perspective on the idea of description. If I set a watch in front of someone and ask them for a description they will commonly make a number of claims true or false. That is to say, they will describe the contingent make up of the watch, its colour, location, whose it is, and so fourth. Now we know that this is not Wittgenstein's idea of logical-analytic description. That description is analytic of the original meaning of the proposition about the watch, not of the watch itself. By this means the analysis will have a terminus. If "The watch is in the drawer" is asserted in the context of some conversation

about my father's watch, which we understand to be the one bearing his initials, then the meaning of 'watch' will be analysable into propositions one of which will assert just that fact. This would constitute a logical analysis simply because it is analytic of my meaning of watch in this case that it bears these initials. By this means the unity of the original proposition is retained right into the analysis which is therefore non-reductive and holistic.

But we have also seen that Wittgenstein has an overview of this analysis which reveals, *a priori*, that in any complete analysis the unanalysable products are simple. This analysis proceeds despite any contingent characteristics of the object named in the analysandum which I referred to previously (chapter IV) as its contingent residue.

We also noted (chapter V) that quite different meanings can be ascribed to 'watch' whereby certain contingent details could become analytic of its meaning and that what was once analytic may become logically inconsequential. That the watch functions correctly will certainly figure in any meaning of 'watch' if I want to know the time but not necessarily so if I am only concerned about it as a family heirloom. Logical analysis in effect concerns distinctive perspectives of the same object-of-reference. Such perspectives can be considered to be thematically ordered- -I regard the watch from the perspective of it as a timekeeper, a physical object, a keepsake. The watch is looked on, in fact, for its significance in some respect. The construal of some object-of-reference as an object-in-meaning in Wittgenstein's account (providing it with a logical form), amounts to adopting such perspectives as "norms of description."

≡ Husserl considers his phenomenology to be an investigation of an *a priori*. But like Wittgenstein's use of "logic" he does not mean the *a priori* of formal logical operators. He says of it:

It is here that the talk of the *a priori* has its legitimate place. For what does *a priori* cognition mean except a cognition which is directed to general essences, and which entirely bases its absolute validity on essence. (CM p. 41)
At every point this analysis is an analysis of essences and an investigation of the general states of affairs which are to be built up in immediate intuition. Thus the whole investigation is an *a priori* one, though, of course, it is not *a priori* in the sense of mathematical deductions.
(IP. p. 46)

In particular, Husserl considers the concept of "similarity", crucial to the notion of category and type, to be a "general, absolute datum" (IP p. 45) of the phenomenology of noemata. Of course just the same claim can be made regarding that other "absolute datum"- -"identity". As the later Wittgenstein so persuasively argued, of both "similarity" and "sameness" there can be no empirical criteria. So of a phenomenological object Husserl says:

Isn't it true that in every representation or judgment we get a datum in a certain sense? Isn't each object a datum, and an evident datum, just insofar as it is intuited, represented, or thought in such and such a way? (IP p 57)

And how is this object evident as a datum of consciousness? It is evident in so far as any object essentially possesses an identity which is itself a fundamental datum directly intuited as such.

¹⁰ An obvious problem suggests itself here which I should refute at the outset. If literally anything can be thought about then anything can be an object of thought. As the later Wittgenstein would note, this is a concept without antithesis (cf. BB p. 46). We seem to have distinguished nothing. Now this objection to the possibility of describing objects and even to their intelligibility overlooks what Husserl's has to say of immanence and transcendence. Thoughts themselves are not the objects of thoughts (identities which transcend particular thoughts) though they can be made so, but unless they are then they serve as an antithesis, albeit an ineffable one that cannot be reflected on or spoken of, to the idea of the object of thought. Husserl's notion of an object is thus not intended to distinguish objects from non-objects (such as events, values, passages of time etc. all of which in fact could indeed be Husserlian objects). Rather, it is simply a corollary of his immanence/transcendence distinction.

¹¹ In Husserl's sense of synthesis of course, not the Kantian sense.

¹² See Robert Sokolowski (1968) pp. 537-53. Sokolowski's paper provides a lucid overview of this fundamental aspect of Husserl's developing views and explains how the idea of (logical) "moments" is evident throughout Husserl's phenomenology and was considered by him to play a crucial part in his phenomenological method. Sokolowski comments on this:

Once one leaves the realm of general, formal description and enters into particular sequences of experience, one leaves the necessary logic of moments and wholes and enters the factual, contingent structure of pieces and wholes. An a priori is only possible for the former, never for the latter. Since Husserl wants to formulate phenomenology as a particular rigorous apodictic science stating necessary truths, most of his concrete, particular analyses are simply sketched briefly as examples of how to proceed in this area; his own interests are limited to the realm of necessary a priori laws about subjectivity and the world. (p. 546)

I am indebted to Sokolowski's paper for much of my understanding of this aspect of Husserl's work but also for initially drawing my attention to crucial sections of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (in particular LI, II, chapters 36-45 regarding Husserl's view of moments and logical analysis as an alternative to Berkeleyan and Humean abstractions and to Investigation III, chapters 1-20 and Investigation IV, chapters 1-15.

¹³ Logical Positivist's interpretation of Wittgenstein's early work imagined that that propositions made sense could be empirically confirmed simply because simple objects were (at least possible future) empirical data. Meanings were confused with real entities (elements of acquaintance or physical atoms). Thus experience could,

at least in theory, be expected to distinguish propositions with sense from nonsense. This (almost incredible) misconception (given, as I have already noted, Wittgenstein's identification of simple objects and logical forms and his explicit disavowal of any role for experience in logical matters) leads to the supposition that analysis of a proposition will reveal certain presuppositions on which its sense rests and which experience would confirm or deny.

In his middle period (see for example Waismann, 1979, p. 97ff and PR §150), in remarks such as:

Every proposition is a signpost for a verification. [...]

You can only search within a system: and so there is necessarily something you can't search for.

-Wittgenstein makes it clear that at least by then, if not earlier, he had adopted much the same view of verification, experiment and evidence that Husserl had. That Wittgenstein might already have envisioned a relation such as this between meaning and verification seems to be hinted at where he remarks:

The proposition must contain (and in this way show) the possibility of its truth.

Namely, where a verification, and what will count as a confirming experience, is suggested to me by my present hypothesis that what I have before me now is a cube (I speak of the thing as if it were a cube, that that is presently a presupposition of mine etc.) then that verification is a logical anticipation of evidence. I, for example, logically presuppose other faces to the cube, that they will have some colour, and this logically directs the experiments I perform and what I shall count as confirmation or denial. And imagining it could be otherwise is not possible.

For Husserl this is eidetically the path to uncovering the object-in-meaning. And for Wittgenstein's analysis, too, what I mean is only logically demonstrable (by logical propositions), not empirically confirmable. That this cube has six sides is a matter of meaning which no experience can effect though of course it might not prove to be a cube at all. Wittgenstein's focus, just as with Husserl's, is securely on what is eidetically bracketed, it is a focus on facts for what they show of possibilities, what is imaginable or thinkable (3.001, 3.02).

¹⁴ This view of the identity of object-meanings Husserl of course shares with Frege. There has been considerable speculation over the extent of Frege's influence on Husserl, an issue not without consequences for my discussion of the comparison of Husserl's and Wittgenstein's work given Frege's connections with both.

Certainly Frege seems to have been instrumental in steering Husserl away from the psychologism of his contemporaries, his criticism of Husserl's *Philosophie der Arithmetik* has been portrayed as decisive in Husserl's change of direction on this issue (see for example R.C.Solomon "Sense and Essence: Frege and Husserl" reprinted in Durfee, 1976, pp. 31-54).

For a view arguing a greater independence on Husserl's part in developing his view on this matter see J.N.Mohanty, "Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship", in Dreyfus (1982) pp. 43-56. In discussing Husserl's notion of sense Dreyfus (see "The Perceptual

Noema", in Dreyfus, 1982 pp. 97-123) pointedly makes use of Frege's famous analogy for explicating the objectivity of sense in terms of a telescope and its images (see below, chapter VIII, note²⁰).

I shall have occasion to return to the matter of Husserl's conception of the objectivity of sense in my consideration of intentionality and reference in chapter VIII. Also in that chapter I will have occasion to compare Wittgenstein's and Husserl's ideas of intentionality with, amongst others, Frege's account of reference and its relation to sense.

¹⁵ See "Husserl's Identification of Meaning and Noema." Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith, reprinted in Dreyfus (1982) pp. 81-92. In particular, we should note that part of the conclusion of this paper is that the "non-psychological intensional" (p. 88) character of the object for consciousness (the noema) is its expressibility:

The importance of expressibility [...] is that it is what finally identifies noematic Sinn and linguistic meaning.

(Though the authors are careful to note that Husserl is also aware that expressibility does not imply that the meaning is or has actually been expressed (see their quote, p. 88, from *Ideas* §35). They quote Husserl on their pp. 87 and 88 respectively (the translations are McKintyre's and Smith's own):

Originally these words ('Bedeutung' and 'Bedeutung') relate only to the sphere of speech, or "expression." But it is almost inevitable and at the same time an important advance for knowledge to extend and suitably to modify the meanings of these words so that in a certain way they apply to [...] all acts, whether these involve expressive acts or not [...] We use the word 'Sinn', in its wider application. (*Ideas* §124. By "acts" Husserl simply means any 'piece' of consciousness - 'acts' of thinking, imagining, recalling etc.

Furthermore:

Whatever is "meant as such," every meaning in the noematic Sinn [...] of any act whatsoever is expressible through "linguistic meanings" [...] "Expression" is a remarkable form, which allows itself to be adapted to all "Sinne" [...] and raises them to the realm of "Logos." (*Ideas* §124)

¹⁶ An alternative suggestion is provided by Aaron Gurwitsch in "Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness." By that account Husserl's objects for consciousness are objects of meaning interpreted as Gestalt images, aspects of perceived objects. This sits well with Husserl's imagistic example of the die and his talk of "profiles" etc. but not with much else as Hubert Dreyfus argues in "Husserl's Perceptual Noema." Both of these papers are reprinted in Dreyfus (1982) pp. 59-71 and pp. 98-123 respectively.

Husserl often seems to take perception as a paradigm (but see again note² above) but this is misleading and becomes clearly so once one has looked more widely at the kinds of more general remarks Husserl makes about objects. In particular the overwhelming emphasis

in his account lies with descriptions of objects as meanings, the "meant as such", and as essentially senses in which the description of the structure of the object is not pictorial or imagistic but logical. And, of course, such Gestaltian interpretation fits well only within the realm of perceptual noema but, as we have seen, Husserl's idea of an object is much wider than that. It becomes more difficult, for example, to envision such "objects" as emotions, social structures or a personality. In his fifth lecture, from IP Husserl develops an idea of "objects", in this case musical notes, and in particular their tones. The differences in tone, Husserl says, is developed within "seeing." The instances must "stand before our eyes" he says but adds -but not necessarily in the manner of facts of perception. For a consideration of essence, perception and imagination are to be treated as exactly alike; the same essence can equally well be "seen" in either, or abstracted from either (p. 53, underlining added)

So descriptions of objects can be images, especially in the case of objects in perception, but that is not what they are essentially. Their essence is something we abstract from any token description of a particular object, it is always general and logical, and the "seeing" involved in their description is an apprehension of such particular examples as types, an apprehension of meaning.

¹⁷ In fact Husserl does note the simple/complex distinction in LI, II, but does not put it to work as Wittgenstein does. I am indebted to Robert Sokolowski for drawing my attention to this point in his 1968 paper, see p. 538. Also, note Husserl's remarks on what are the genuine phenomenological data, "the simple", "constituted at once", and "absolutely valid." (IP p. 10)

¹⁸ This brings out a point concerning my agreement with the Hintikkas in their description of language as considered by Wittgenstein to constitute the universal medium of expression. My agreement requires some qualification- -Wittgenstein clearly did not intend to mean that all meaning was essentially linguistic. He broadens his idea of language by identifying what language is essentially, namely whatever partakes of what he calls logical form. And the non-linguistic media of perspectival or non-perspectival images, diagrams, pictures, models, mathematical or chemical formulae, musical notation are as legitimate propositional forms as written or spoken sentences. All are, in Wittgenstein's broad sense, "language" and "propositional". Likewise, Husserl identifies a "universal tissue" of forms (the "apodictically experientiable structures of the Ego", CM pp. 29 and 28).

CHAPTER VIII

INTENTIONALITY: A FUNDAMENTAL SEMANTIC RELATION
BETWEEN THOUGHT OR LANGUAGE AND THE WORLDIntroduction: Husserl's and Wittgenstein's Solutions
to the Problem of the Relation of Thought
or Language to the World

I said at the outset¹ that this thesis was concerned with the relation of language to the world (the conditions necessary for the representation of the one by the other). This chapter deals directly with the heart of the problem of semantics and with the phenomenology of Wittgenstein's solution to it.

Wittgenstein considered that any solution to this fundamental question would have to be compatible with two not obviously reconcilable, observations which he seems to have held from the beginning. On the one hand the determination of sense seemed to demand an objective relation between language and the world but on the other he thought that the agent (the representing subject) was somehow evident as a limit of the world and its representation (cf. 5.6, 5.632).

Neither insight is original. In philosophy's past they have led to different accounts of the possibility of representation depending on which observation was emphasised. For example, realism secures

objectivity through a reduction of the subject to her world. On the other hand, Kantian transcendental idealism asserts an irreducible form to the realm of phenomena such that representation carries, indelibly, the mark of the representing agent.

Wittgenstein resolves the conflict between these claims by separating and insulating their subject matters from one another. The world of facts is determinate, objective and unproblematic and the proper study of empirical science. But the world of the subject constitutes the limit of the world of facts; it is mystical and indeterminable both because its limits are unrepresentable (6.44 - 6.522) and because it can wax and wane (6.43 and NB 73,7). I will consider these issues more fully in chapter IX.

Husserl expresses the problem of the relation of thought and reality in terms of the connection between the two distinct spheres of immanence. Both are self-given, one in and one to thought. Of the former he asks how this immanent but transcendental ego (what is presupposed by our experience of the world) is connected to the latter, immanent but transcendent world of objects (what is supposed to lie beyond and independent of our experience of the world). How are we to be confident that thought does indeed reach out to its object? The solution, by the standards of Husserl's new science, must be non-empirical, universal and indubitable. That is, it must be a solution derived non-deductively from the "cognition which is immediately evident" but which in itself presents the problem how it can accomplish "the task of reaching the object." (IP p. 26) "[H]ow can we be certain of the correspondence between cognition and the object

cognised?" (IP p. 15). Thus transcendence presents "the initial and central problem of the critique of cognition." (IP p. 28) That Husserl's account of this relation of consciousness to its objects will not conform with how we commonly imagine our thoughts and statements relate to the ordinary world of things should be readily anticipated given his characterisation of objects as ideal and universal.

I have already briefly introduced Husserl's solution- -thought is fundamentally and universally intentional. Consciousness is essentially polarised towards its object at one pole and the transcendental ego at the other. Thoughts are always someone's and of something.² It will be necessary to enlarge on and clarify Husserl's notion of intentionality in the following section before I can begin to draw parallels between this solution and Wittgenstein's.

The Intentionality of Consciousness and of Language

[If you are looking for what is not self-evident, what is problematic, or perhaps entirely mysterious, consider the reference to something transcendent. (IP p. 40)]

Introduction: Husserl On the Problem of Intentionality

How are we to be confident that it is an external and independent world that our thoughts are thoughts of? How are scepticism and idealism to be refuted? Husserl's answer is that we can intuit a universal directionality in consciousness towards its various objects.

A scepticism of that, Husserl argues, would constitute an unintelligible denial of thought itself.

My task will be to point up exactly what Husserl's claim amounts to, how it fits with what we have already seen to be the nature of the objects of consciousness and, eventually, its implications for a conception of self, the thinker. I shall also be concerned to indicate parallels with Wittgenstein's view of propositions and say where these parallels are most characteristically indicative of a phenomenological train of thought.

Husserl often speaks of consciousness as universally and fundamentally "meaning" its object. It will serve my purposes in trying to lead into a conception of self (so far as a conception of a transcendental self is intelligible) to emphasise the voluntaristic nature of such "meanings" in consciousness, the extent to which it shows the mark of an agent. To do this I shall begin by drawing attention to an equivocation evident in the notion of "meaning an object." A similar equivocation is to be found in the associated notion of "identifying an object" both senses of which apply in Husserl's case.

Firstly, and this is the interpretation which commonly first springs to mind, it means picking out an object, as definite descriptions are imagined to do. But secondly, it can mean providing an identity for an object. Or, to put this more strongly, of constituting or constructing an identity. Similarly, "meaning an object" can suggest my meaning this object, or it can mean providing a meaning, sense, or even a significance for it.

I shall argue that, in so far as intentionality was conceived by Husserl to provide a fundamental link between thought and reality, undue emphasis on the first and most natural reading of meaning or identifying an object (perhaps even to the extent of excluding of the latter reading) leads to a significantly distorted view of that relation.

An obvious parallel here is between meaning (picking out) an object and my referring to particular objects. Husserl often does speak of referring to objects in thought but this seems to be in many cases just a casual mention. One must also recall that Husserl was working at a time prior to recent debates over the nature of reference and the denoting of proper names and definite descriptions and in particular its contrast with attributive uses of language.

The equivocation over "meaning" which underlies this comparison between intending objects and referring to them can serve well to bring out essential characteristics of intentionality. Ronald McIntyre's (1982) paper "Intending and Referring"²³ sets out to explore intentionality on just this model of reference. I shall use his view as a foil for my own interpretation of Husserl. I shall argue that McIntyre over emphasises the referring sense of "meaning objects" and so overlooks crucial aspects of Husserl's notion of intentionality. But I also think that McIntyre's mistake is characteristic of many accounts of meaning which consider reference and some notion of truth to be necessary to such an account.

Two Levels of Interface Between the World and Its
Representation: Intentionality and Reference

And the peculiarity of intentional acts is that their objects do not have to exist. (IP p. XIV)

[T]he object of cognition too, is within the cognitive process as a real actuality, [...] That the cognitive act can hit upon and find its object in the same consciousness and within the same real here and now, that is what is taken for granted. (IP p. 3)

I do not intend to reconstruct McIntyre's detailed considerations of reference here, I merely want to use the model he is exploring in order better to characterise intentionality itself. So I shall only raise specific objections to McIntyre's claims just in so far as they are pertinent to this end.

McIntyre begins his assessment of Husserlian intentionality by noting that:

[I]ntending, like referring, is a relation mediated and determined by meaning.

Understanding noemata as meanings - that is, as abstract intensional entities of the sort that are expressed in language - thus yields a "semantic" model of intentionality. (p. 215)⁴

Speaking of this as a "semantic model", in a stroke, links intentionality with Frege's account of reference which McIntyre dubs the "I.D.Theory" (Identifying Description). He proceeds to consider intentionality with this notion of reference as a model. With respect to his initial premise, McIntyre certainly has a correct reading of Husserl. For instance, (though McIntyre draws on other examples), Husserl remarks:

On the other hand cognition is essentially cognition of what objectively is; and it is cognition through the meaning

which is intrinsic to it; by virtue of its meaning it is related to what objectively is. (IP p. 15)

But McIntyre goes further than conceiving I.D. reference as just a model for intentionality and comes close to identifying the two. For example:

Referring by means of language, Husserl held, is then but the "public" side of intending, and reference, like intention, is defined in terms of sense, or meaning. (p. 221)

I shall go on to argue that it is a considerable error to confuse the external, contingent relation which, as Frege conceived, obtained between observer and observed (or better, between sign and what, if anything, it refers to) and the intentional relation Husserl is speaking of. The latter concerns what cognition is essentially--an internal relation between thought and objects (which do not have to exist). Conceiving that relation, Husserl concedes, is the great problem for the intelligibility of his notion of intentionality.

In the process of his comparison McIntyre makes considerable use of terminological distinctions drawn from the contemporary debate on the nature of reference. He thinks, for example, that intentionality can have *de dicto* and *de re* relations to objects and is intensional rather than extensional. This, so to speak, technical review of intentionality, serves to distract McIntyre from more fundamental distinctions between it and reference. Even so, the difficulties he finds in Husserl's account of intentionality using I.D. referring as a model might have served to alert him to the possibility that something was askew with the model itself.

What stands in the way of any obvious identification of reference and intentionality is Husserl's unqualified assertion that my thought's directedness towards x is independent of x's existence. This is not because I might be mistaken. All thought, mistaken or otherwise, is "seen" to be so directed and "seen" to be essentially so. That is a phenomenological observation of what is universal to consciousness (i.e., regardless of the existence of the thought's objects).

Bear in mind, too, that noematic descriptions are not descriptions of object's contingent states; they are descriptions of the essentially logical character of noema, of their parts and properties as "moments" of objects and their (logical) "horizons." With the universality of intentionality comes the universality of the object^s. This point is closely linked with Husserl's evaluation of noema as objects that are essentially identities and his claim that experience of the contingent world as such does not yield, in any direct fashion, these identities for objects in the way we think them.

With these two qualifications in mind--that the object that consciousness is a consciousness of is independent of both "empirical interpretations and existential affirmations" (LI p. 577), it becomes clear that there are considerable problems for interpreting Husserl's view of intentionality as McIntyre describes it, "a special, non-extensional sort of relation to a specific object." (p. 220)

This problem stems from that equivocation I began by noting, between speaking of "meaning" or "identifying" an object. In speaking of a "specific object" it is not clear whether some particular

existing referent is meant. If that was the case the contradiction in McIntyre's expression becomes conspicuous for intentionality is, he also says, non-extensional. If this is so, then one could only suppose that the object one is directed to is that given in the noematic description, the object in meaning that is immanent to thought (the "intentional object"). But then it would seem that cognition has not "reached out" at all to the world as Husserl himself notes.

An alternative reading of "specific object" is, rather clumsily, "the object as specified". The intentional relation would then have to be, somehow, a relation to an object only so far as it coincides with some specification. According to reference theory, McIntyre's model, these alternatives are commonly distinguished as *de re* and *de dicto* reference respectively. But, as I have already stated, there are problems with transferring such labels from reference to intentionality.⁶

McIntyre seems to be aware of the equivocation over "'meaning' an object." He speaks (p. 219) of noema possessing an internal relation to an object by determining which object is intended and of prescribing (as Husserl himself says, see IP p. 17) an identity for it. But the problem of the relation of such description to the world remains, for he is then forced into speaking of hypothetical objects ("which object is intended if such an object existed." p. 219) as the targets of such intending or referring relations. That can hardly serve as a satisfactory link to the world or a rejoinder to scepticism. It certainly does not fulfill the requirement that

reference be a relation to an object via a sense, for it falters at the sense and gets no further.

So clearly there are grave difficulties for McIntyre's reference model for intentionality which the juxtaposition of expressions like "special sort of non-extensional relation" and "one specific object" seems to betray. Is it intelligible to speak of a non-extensional relation to a specific object? By "one specific object" Husserl (for McIntyre is here quoting Husserl's own expression) must mean the second sense I have raised, the sense not of "particular object" but rather of a determinate specification or prescription. That would be consistent with his characterisation of this relation as intensional. My point is that the presumption that the reference model for intentionality can be developed beyond that simple formula--an agent is related to an object via some description--is mistaken.

We have seen that Husserl's noemata are logical not contingent in nature and that should alert us to the fact that speaking of intentionality as a relation to one specific object may not simply mean picking out one particular object. Picking out objects in the world relies on contingent details of the object, colour, location, time and so forth. Details of *one and the same* item may change and I can adjust my description accordingly but still pick out this same item on another occasion. That is why no empirical description can serve as the identity of the subject itself. Such a description would not specify that item in so far as it is that same item throughout. Rather, such an identity is presupposed in any description. But we know (from chapter VII) that noematic descriptions concern just such

idealities, essences or universals if you will, and I can thereby be directed to the same object in this and other acts.⁷ In fact McIntyre's reading of Husserl at this point is almost certainly suspect⁸ and is coloured by his reference model of intentionality, by his adoption of perception as the paradigm "act" and by the ambiguity of the phrase "specific object."

The Fundamental and Universal Nature of Intentionality
and the Pragmatics of Reference

It is difficult to see how a theory of meaning can hope to succeed that does not elucidate, and give a central role to, the concept of reference. (Davidson, 1984, p. 215. Or to the concept of truth, for that matter, Davidson might have added.)

This view represents the received opinion on the necessity of a role for reference (and/or truth too) in any (realist) account of meaning. In order to appreciate the significance of any view of meaning based instead on intentionality we need now to consider in more detail the distinction between intentionality and reference, between the pragmatic nature of the former and the fundamental and universal nature of the latter. It is a distinction that is evident in the debate over the nature of reference following Russell's theory of the role of definite descriptions. Viewing the problem from this perspective will usefully relate my present discussion with my earlier one of Russell's work and Wittgenstein's use of it (in chapter III).

Later I will return to consider the kind of relation intentionality must be and its consequences for Husserl's theory of meaning and identity.

In his account of referring in "On Denoting" Russell (1905) sets out his Theory of Descriptions which is intended to account for the denoting of noun phrases.⁹ In chapter III I considered Russell's theory in relation to Wittgenstein's analysis of propositions and the determination of sense. Phrases such as "The present King of France" could be said to possess a sense even though there was no referent corresponding to that description. By Russell's account, logical analysis reveals that such phrases imply an existential claim which is simply false (-by-analysis", as I termed it).

This analysis was argued to obtain for all propositions which in turn were considered fundamental to all meaning. So for Russell, referring (denoting) was a necessary condition of all meaning.¹⁰

It is commonly supposed that Strawson's (1950) "On Referring" is a refutation of Russell's account of denoting. But the case Strawson presents is a pragmatic one. He argues that phrases such as "The present King of France" only become true or false in use (i.e., in sentences). And he distinguishes two different uses, referring and attributing. There is not one sense to "The present King of France", instead the sense of the phrase arises, as the later Wittgenstein would have had it, with its use (to attribute, refer etc.). Both Strawson and the later Wittgenstein eschew the question of meaning *per se*; meaning for both disintegrates into a number of distinct issues concerning various uses, not only referring and attributing, but praising, gesturing and so forth; in other words, into various language games.¹¹

Thus, *contra* Russell, in so far as "The present King of France" cannot be used to refer since there is no referent, the question of the truth or falsity of, for example, "The present King of France is bald" does not arise. For Strawson, so far as meaning and use are identified, referring is a form of meaning and not a condition of it. But in Russell's case, referring is a fundamental condition of all meaning, the fundamental semantic relation between language and reality and therefore a condition of sense and representation.

So my point is that in a significant way Russell's and Strawson's accounts are not at odds because they deal with different relations of "reference". That both are relations between language and the world may be the basis of their conflation. But a criterion of success applies in Strawson's case; I can intend to refer to some object or state of affairs and fail. Russell's account has it that if there is anything of what I say that can be claimed to successfully refer or not, then I have, in some more fundamental manner, already referred.

But where there is a failure to distinguish these two notions of "reference" as I think there is in, for example, Donald Davidson's remark quoted as the epigraph to this section, then there is bound to be confusion over this relationship and, in particular, the nature and function of a theory of truth. It is my contention that McIntyre's view of intentionality also conflates these two distinct senses of "reference". In particular, much of what he wants to say about Husserl's version of intentionality he finds faulty, obscure or inadequate to its task because he brings to his judgement of it standards which actually only apply in the case of pragmatic

reference. Intentionality is, for Husserl, undoubtedly a case of "reference" conceived as a fundamental, non-pragmatic semantic relation. In particular, as we have already noted, he says categorically both that no object need exist and even if it does it is identified independently of its contingent state. Of course, Husserl would have to say this in order for intentionality to be universal to consciousness and cover cases of mistaken identification where no object existed or at least not in the condition described.

Pragmatic reference, in contrast, is essentially contingent on the existence of some object or state of affairs (i.e., on the truth of what I predicate of the referent). In pragmatically referring to the x that is red I identify a particular object but not by means independent of contingent detail (as Husserl's conception of intentionality requires).

That truth is not involved in the conception of intentionality, as it is for reference, serves to highlight that consciousness's directionality is towards a (logically) specified object, an identity.¹² These identities, to which consciousness is directed, its objects, are merely possible items in the world. As Husserlian phenomenological objects they are also the analogues of those Wittgensteinian objects whose identities I explored in chapter V (linguistic identities or intensional entities falling within the scope of the iota operator).

I cannot fail to correctly locate the object of my thought for the reason that in identifying x in thought Husserl means not only that I pick it out but that I also prescribe that identity. In effect, in the

case of pragmatic reference I have control only over the arrow of my intent. But in respect of intentionality I control both the arrow and the target and in a single act too, there are not two acts to synchronise. There must therefore be something facetious about Husserl's remarking on "[T]his *marvellous correlation* between the phenomenon of cognition and the object of cognition" revealing itself "everywhere." (IP p. 10, italics added)¹³

So the bullseye is wherever my arrow flies and whatever it strikes, which is just another way of denying that the notion of "fit" as it applies in the case of pragmatic reference applies in the case of intentionality.¹⁴

Compare this with the situation I interpreted Wittgenstein's account to imply--the metaphysical object which I termed the "object-of-reference" (see chapter V) for Wittgenstein is precisely whatever is picked out as engaging in the relation prescribed by some elementary proposition that its name occurs in. Thus it was possible to speak of identifying this object as an "object-in-meaning" without saying anything true about it in itself (recall that simple objects are indescribable and their names indefinables). The object was identified, so to speak, by a kind of "blind referring", the object named a (whatever "it" is in itself) being identified as that object that can be related R to b. So, again, as with intentionality, the bullseye is wherever my arrow flies and whatever it strikes. Thus no proposition fails to possess a subject; its sense becomes independent of the contingent world, every proposition "reaches" an object.¹⁵

For Husserl, the objects which need not exist and to which all consciousness is directed are identities which subsist the various contingent states possible for the world. As a condition of referring they serve exactly that role prescribed by Wittgenstein for his simple objects, logical forms that are the conditions of sense and which subsist the contingent changes which propositions (senses) report. They are the conditions or possibility of truth values and not themselves anything that could be true.¹⁶

So, just as for Husserl each and every thought has its object, so too for Wittgenstein, each proposition has its logical subject which, in the final analysis, is a simple object. Universally it is the case that a proposition directs us to some object though Wittgenstein offers a gloss on this, that that directionality is not only not to any existing object, it is not actually towards objects at all but to their possible relations by virtue of language mirroring the structure of the world.¹⁷

Intentionality, in Wittgenstein's propositional sense, is thus a function of propositional context or syntax (relations of names) and entails the projection of one form onto another (see 4.0141, 3.11), a mapping, so to speak, within logical space, of the world onto its representation. And, just as Husserl maintained that the sense that is a particular noema is constituted in but not of thought itself, so for Wittgenstein, the state of affairs and the simple objects and their relations constituting it are not contained by the propositional sign itself. The proposition's sense arises from the fact of its congruence

with a state of affairs, that is, in its projective relation to the world (3.12).

So, like Russell's "denoting" and Husserl's intentionality, Wittgenstein considers the relation of language to the world not on the model of pragmatic reference but as a fundamental and universal semantic relation which "picks out" or identifies ideal entities. Those identities and the entities themselves are indistinguishable. Just as Husserl's noema are constituted within consciousness, so Wittgenstein's logical forms are constituted (as terms within the domain of the iota operator) within language. And those identities are determinate, they cannot fail to connect with ("reach") their objects. Intentionality for Husserl is accounted for by virtue of the fact that "sameness" or "identity" is not to be found in the contingent world at all just as for Wittgenstein's "simplicity" (the simpleness of objects) is not to be found in the world, objects are not in themselves simple.

Intentionality as an Internal Relation

On the other hand, even if I raise questions about the existence and reaching the object of this relation to transcendent things, still it has something which can be grasped in the pure phenomenon. The relating-itself-to-transcendent-things, whether it is meant in this way or that, is still an inner feature of the phenomenon. (Husserl, IP p. 36, underlining added)

What is essential to intention is the picture: the picture of what is intended.

It may look as if, in introducing intention, we were introducing an uncheckable, a so to speak metaphysical element into our discussion. But the essential difference between the picture conception and the conception of Russell, Ogden and Richards, is that it regards recognition as seeing an internal relation, whereas in their view this

is an external relation. (Wittgenstein PR §21₁₋₂,
underlining added)

Pragmatic reference is judged by a criterion of success in the context of a correspondence theory of truth. If what I say or ostensively indicate of x is true then what I thought, said, or otherwise indicated has a reference to x. Such reference is a contingent relation that is empirically confirmable and it is conditional on contingent conditions in the world. Reference is thus a real, transitive relation linking a speaker or hearer to some object or state of affairs via a certain description provided verbally, ostensively or indexically. I cannot be said to have referred to an object or state of affairs if there was no such thing.

In contrast with pragmatic reference, intentionality is only (*contra* McIntyre) misleadingly to be thought of on this (Fregean) transitive relation model. What consciousness itself directs us to is not any object that must exist.

Nor, in intentionality, is some discernable self directed to objects. This transcendental self and the nature of its manifestation in the world will be dealt with later in chapter IX.

Intentionality is not a real (i.e., external) relation at all, it is an internal relation within the, metaphorically speaking, one dimensional sphere of consciousness. It is therefore not surprising that Husserl found the most pressing problem for phenomenology lay with explaining how one can, in effect, get outside of that sphere and reach objects without ever leaving it. What, in consciousness, serves as the metaphorical window on objects?

According to Husserl it is only the acts of cognition, what are immanent though not just in the sense of being self-given but in the sense of being real ingredients of consciousness, that we are indubitably in touch with (as Descartes's *Cogito* illustrates). Yet the essence of such cognition appears to be that it reaches beyond itself to some further indubitable realm of objects. For Husserl, it is a brute fact, of "seeing" (intuition), that consciousness does indeed reach its object. It is always a "consciousness of ..." This intuition however only describes the phenomenon and presents the problem. As always, understanding lags behind intuition although for Husserl that is as it should be.

Husserl wants a deeper analysis and description, one that enables him to "see" how such intentionality comes about. He makes three points significant for this problem in a single paragraph of the first lecture of *The Idea of Phenomenology* (p. 17-18) which, in quoting, I shall separate for the sake of clarity.

[1] [T]he positive task of the theory of knowledge is to solve the problems of the relations among cognitions, its meaning and its object by enquiring into the essence of cognition.

[2] Among these, there is the problem of explicating the essential meaning of being a cognizable object or, what comes to the same thing, of being an object at all:

[3] of the meaning which is prescribed (for being an object at all) by the correlation *a priori* (or essential correlation) between cognition and being an object of cognition. And this naturally applies also to all basic forms of being an object which are predetermined by the nature of cognition. (underlining added)

I have said in what sense cognition itself provides only a one dimensional (psychic) sphere (acts themselves) for the phenomenologist to work with. But I have also remarked on a number of occasions that

the identities or meanings which apparently fill consciousness without remainder are constituted in but not of cognition. They are not actual ingredients of acts. Thus, that cognition itself is one dimensional should not be taken to mean that the contents of a thought are so also. The figures represented in an oil painting are not themselves to be supposed to be constituted of oils even though the picture's marks or signs may be.

Speaking less metaphorically, we have already seen that Husserl conceives of the noematic constitution of thought as essentially a logically structured one, a whole constituted of (logical) "moments" and (logically) pregnant with other possible perspectives ("horizons"). He concludes that his whole phenomenological investigation is an *a priori* one.

So in describing intentionality as an internal relation two senses of "internal" can be distinguished--it is an internal relation in so far as it remains within cognition itself representing, in this restricted sense, a form of idealism (or subjectivism as Husserl prefers). It is also internal in the sense that the internal structures of consciousness which give rise to its directionality are, without exception, logical structures. Both senses of "internal" contribute to this phenomenological analysis being a holistic one.

[Phenomenology] entails a limitation to the sphere of things that are purely self-given, to the sphere of those things which are not merely spoken about, meant, or perceived, but instead to the sphere of those things that are given in just exactly the sense in which they are thought of ...

(IP pp. 48-49, underlining added)

So, true to the methods of phenomenology, Husserl considers that the phenomenologist's attention to either cognition itself or to its contents is an attention to what is immanent and absolutely given. The self is evident as the overall noetic-noematic unity of consciousness but what is immanent in itself, logically-analytically entails the objectivity or "otherness" of its objects.

It is only in cognition that the essence of objectivity can be studied at all, with respects to all its basic forms; only in cognition is it truly given, is it evidently "seen". (IP p. 58)

Now in what sense is Wittgenstein's investigation to be considered a linguistic analogue of Husserl's phenomenological one? Wittgenstein, too, identified a one dimensional sphere, language. As we have already noted, he interpreted this broadly enough to encompass all forms of notation and representation. That it is one dimensional can be seen from the fact that he supposes that theoretically a single rule would suffice for translations between different languages since all forms partake of, or are essentially, one and the same logical form (cf. 3.334, 4.0141). And that sphere itself, as with consciousness for Husserl, represents all that is immanent, nothing can be said or shown that it does not in some sense "contain". We must therefore track the lines of logical form and the limits of language from within it. Wittgenstein is not recommending a philosophical practice here, but is speaking of its limitations, we cannot observe language from without.

But the concept of a truth value, which can be identified with the possession by a proposition of a sense, implies that language by some means leads outside itself without leaving that single dimension of

logical form. This clearly presents the linguistic analogue of the enigma of intentionality. How, as a picture, does a proposition intend its subject? How are propositions essentially and universally pictures of ...? It is significant to note here that, rather than the truth relation being called upon to explicate meaning, the opposite is the case.

How Is Transcendence Evident In Consciousness? Or,
How Are Propositions About Something Else?

What is required now is to "see" how thought or language reach beyond themselves. The solution lies with the logical structured nature of thought and language that both Husserl and Wittgenstein recognised. That in itself will prove sufficient for ensuring they will furnish comparable, if not entirely similar, solutions to the problem of intentionality.

Now it almost seems as if, in arguing that objects of consciousness are but identities¹⁶, that we thereby manufacture the problem of intentionality that Husserl describes. This certainly is a point Husserl himself raises:

The *tree plain and simple*, the thing in nature, is as different as it can be from this *perceived tree as such*, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the perception, and that inseparably. The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning - the meaning of *this* perception, something that belongs necessarily to its essence cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties. (*Ideas* pp. 60-61, underlining added)

"No real properties", for real properties are contingent possessions. Identities themselves only possess "logical properties", a structure,

just as Wittgenstein's simple objects possess only an internal logical form and no other properties.¹⁹

But Husserl resists this separation of the perceived tree as such ("intentional object") and the tree itself, plain and simple (should it happen to exist).

In experience the intention is given with its intentional object, [...] What the experience intends, presents etc., is and remains with it, whether the corresponding "real object" exists in reality.

But if we try in this way to separate the real object (in the case of outer perception the perceived thing of nature) from the intentional object, placing the latter as "immanent" to perception within experience as a real factor, we are beset by the difficulty that now two realities confront each other, [...] I perceive the thing, the object of nature, the tree there in the garden; that and nothing else is the real object of the perceiving "intention". A second immanent tree, or even an "inner image" of the real tree that stands out there before me, is nowise given, and to suppose such a thing by way of assumption leads only to absurdity. (*Ideas* p. 263)

In fact the model Husserl is criticising here is just an older and more naïvely expressed version of the referential model for intentionality. There is the object, a perceiver and the perceiver's image of the object.²⁰ We might have expected from the tradition of scepticism invited by this schema that Husserl would reject it outright.²¹ But the distinction of object and image here is seductive and using perception as the example of the intentionality of consciousness only enhances the deception. "The objects I see are those I refer to", is an example of genuine pragmatic reference, not intentionality. In the context of discussing this, Husserl always speaks of "seeing", never seeing. Perception certainly answers well to

the "reaching out" metaphor of intentionality, but it singularly fails to account for the unerring aim of cognition at its objects.

Denying the separation of object-identity and object-itself accounts for the success of cognition in reaching its object, but it means that the relation of a perceiver to the perceived object outlined in McIntyre's reference model for intentionality (and the associated issues of perceptual fallibility and truth) is at best of limited application and at worst simply misleading.

There is a clear parallel here with Wittgenstein's account of propositions and their objects. An (elementary) proposition's sense is attained independently of its being true. That is because the objects which subsist the states of affairs such propositions report can not be distinguished or separated, from the identities we provide for them (which those elementary propositions show but don't say or report). 'aRb' shows, and doesn't say, that a can be related R to b and is to be identified as that which can be related R to b. That identity cannot be stated by a proposition however, since only what is contingent can be so reported.

Earlier I spoke of objects of thought as being but identities. This also reflects the prejudice that conceives of intentionality on the model of perception. It is as if identities, like images, are but poor representations of the real thing. Mere copies. Husserl appears trapped here in the horns of a dilemma. He escapes the scepticism concerning our knowledge of objects that is engendered by conceiving of them as (identities) separate from objects themselves only to invite a scepticism towards intentionality itself. If objects of

thought and objects themselves are identified then does consciousness reach beyond itself at all? Husserl makes two important points:

[W]e allow no judgment that makes any use of the affirmation that posits a "real" thing or "transcendent" nature as a whole, [...] As *phenomenologists* we avoid all such affirmations. [But for all that] They are there still, and belong essentially to the phenomenon as a very part of it. (*Ideas* p. 264, underlining added)

Or again:

[T]he real subsistence of the objective relation between perception and perceived is suspended; and yet a relation between perception and perceived (as likewise between pleasure and that which pleases) is obviously left over, a relation which in its essential nature comes before us in "pure immanence." (*Ideas* p. 259)

Underlying this is the clear implication that the transcendence of objects and their existence should not be confused. Affirmation, Husserl maintains, is subsequent to a description of that which is affirmed and it is rightfully the concern of natural science. Only in natural science, not phenomenology, is the question, whether I have in fact referred, an issue.

The phenomenologist's perspective goes deeper; it concerns the origins of our conception of "existence", of what it means for the cherry tree to exist or be in a certain condition. The "distinction between appearance and that which appears" (IP p. 9) no less than just the description of what it is that appears (our description of the tree as we look at it) must be given within what is immanent (self-given).

We can, from a phenomenological analysis, say both what it is for an object to be a cherry tree and what it is for that tree to exist. The transcendence of objects (that they are external to and independent

of thought) is itself part of the object's identity and can be gleaned from the immanent phenomena themselves. Transcendence itself can be made an object of thought and thereby understood. From consciousness alone we can identify (in Husserl's phenomenological sense) what it is for the cherry tree to be an object of perception, an object of fantasy, of fiction or of memory. Each of these separate mental acts posits its object in a distinctive fashion. In addition, each object can entail what noesis is intelligible to it--perceiving, imagining, recalling etc. It would be, as Gilbert Ryle pointed out, a category mistake to look for both the batsman and the team spirit without some categorial correction (analogical shift, if you will) being applied to the notion of *looking* and the existential status of the object. It makes little or no sense to speak barely of the objects of thought "existing" when quite distinctive means of, for example, confirming their existence, applies. I can go and check by sight that the cherry tree is there and is as you describe but not so your imagined cherry tree nor, for example, abstract or theoretical entities like political ideals or equilateral triangles.

In his otherwise critical review of the idea that Husserl's and Wittgenstein's views are comparable, John Hems (1960) makes two important distinctions:

[F]or Husserl the rationalization of experience entails that experience "constitutes" its own object. The call is "to things themselves," not, however, to "things in themselves." (p. 571, underlining added)

Consciousness is constitutive, not creative of being, clarifying it in the process of endorsing it: intentionality bestows meaning. Just as the identity of the perceived

object is constituted in consciousness, so likewise the ideality of the logical object. (p. 557, underlining added)

In effect, Hems' point is that our notion of, for example, the cherry tree's identity, phenomenologically speaking, will include all that is involved in that object's being an external independent physical object. That identity is not answerable to the world, it is an identity constituted within consciousness and is independent of whether there are such existences, which is to say only that the identity, not any particular (e.g. physical) object itself, is thereby produced.

Husserl's rejoinder to Kant's claim that things-in-themselves are beyond description is that, in so far as we have any intelligible notion to attach to such a label as "noumenon" we certainly are capable of describing what it is to be such a transcendental entity. To raise the question of the possibility of "reaching" (in thought) the transcendental object is to predetermine the possibility of an answer. If there is a problem over the intelligibility of any answer then the question itself is likewise flawed (cf. 6.5 - 6.51). Husserl says:

To be sure [the essence of cognition's] transcendence is doubtful [...] On the other hand, even if I raise questions about the existence and reaching the object of this relation to transcendent things, still it has something which can be grasped in the pure phenomenon. The relating-itself-to-transcendent-things, whether it is meant in this way or that way, is still an inner feature of the phenomenon. (IP p. 36, underlining added)

Phenomenology is the analysis of what it is for a world to be real, not an analysis of the real world.

Similarly, Wittgenstein's logical analysis of a proposition's sense was not empirical analysis of the contingent world reported by the proposition, but instead recognised only "my meaning". For example, unravelling the meaning of "watch" in my previous example: "The watch is in the drawer" reveals the identity of the object, not any contingent matters on which its meaning depends.

Wittgenstein's view of his simple objects with respect to viewing them as (Kantian) things-in-themselves parallels Husserl's; they may be indescribable but that is not to say they are ultimately unintelligible (because they are contentless) and mysterious. Wittgenstein's point is that the ineffability of simple objects lies in their fundamentally logical character which is not mysterious since it is shown by elementary propositions. But Wittgenstein insists that such logical qualities be clearly distinguished from those contingent properties of things which propositions say (represent).

A superficial and general answer then, to Husserl's problem of intentionality is given by that fundamental noetic-noematic structure of cognition. Each conscious act, perceiving, recalling and so forth, posits its object in its own distinctive fashion. So here, within each act, is the direction (by virtue of its structure) towards an object an evident fact. The identity of (e.g.) sensed sound, is not the same as for that sound merely imagined or recalled. The conditions I place upon a perceived sound include procedures of evidence and verification distinctive to perception but established in thought. The possibility of, for example, getting closer to the sound, of turning my ear in its direction, of asking you how you hear it, of comparing it to some

other sound and so forth does not apply to a sound I am remembering or imagining. A perceived sound thus has a distinctive set of "horizons" which no imagined sound can intelligibly possess and all this contributes to its (phenomenological) profile.

Conversely, phenomenologically, an object such as a sound may be described in terms common to it being imagined, perceived, or remembered--its duration, tone, pitch, volume and so forth. But it will also be described noematically and the kind of "object" the sound is will be clearly distinguished from other phenomena.

The point, which Husserl makes very clearly, is that the mode of an object's existence, even though the question of its actual existence is in abeyance, is still "within" the object as part of its phenomenological structure. We may not know whether x exists but we certainly know what it would be for it to exist. Thus does a Husserlian analysis reveal and make perspicuous (phenomenologically describe) not only that cognition directs us to its object but also how; the transcendental nature of objects is itself constituted within the immanent content of thought itself.

These elements of an object compose that aspect of it which the natural standpoint presupposes. This in no way prescribes what the physical world, for example, will be like, what it will contain. For it just might happen that, whatever object is being posited, nothing in the world will turn up that matches those existential conditions. The history of natural sciences' search for ultimate, atomic particles, John Dalton's original conception of an atom, for example, provides an example of just such an entity, a science fiction, no

less. Such prescription can only limit what a particular world, as it is represented in thought, can be like.

I shall not dwell long on the obvious parallels to be found with Wittgenstein's account. Of course Wittgenstein offers nothing paralleling Husserl's characterisation of objects according to the various acts they are appropriate to (their "thetic" character). But, for Wittgenstein, we have seen that objects-in-meaning represent construals (perspectives) of objects-of-reference and that the various "kinds" of objects are manifest by the "kinds" of relations evident in elementary propositions. The analysis of the meaning of any proposition should, analytically reveal how it might be verified. The Logical Positivists were correct thus far. My propositions about physical atoms (by contrast with ones about my pains) for example, would imply means of verification appropriate to external entities independent of me, my thoughts and my statements about them.

A refinement in Wittgenstein's case lies in the deeper level of formalisation of his account. Logical form is more fundamental than, for example, spatial, colour or temporal forms. So although relations of names in elementary propositions can manifest a variety of forms they are supervenient upon logical form. Only combinations of objects give rise to spatial, colour or temporal forms; simple objects themselves do not possess spatial or temporal dimensions or colour.

In comparison with Wittgenstein's highly formalised conception of objects, Husserl's view is easier to relate to ordinary experience. But perhaps the formality of Wittgenstein's account might answer more to Husserl's demand that the constitution of objects' identities be

fulfilled fully within consciousness itself without recourse to experience.

In my final chapter I will say how I see Wittgenstein's account of simple objects in terms of their relations as being necessarily correlative with some fundamental aspect of reality as we experience it. This will lead to the point at which Wittgenstein's attempts to objectively ground the determination of sense in the world, its mirroring of reality, fails.

Possible Kantian "Implications" of Husserl's and Wittgenstein's Notions of Objects

One final problem remains--we have noted that Husserl does not accept a distinction between appearance and that which appears, image and object. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, seems to imply just such a separation between the object and its construal into language, an object-of-reference construed as the object-in-meaning. If this is correct we could expect significantly different metaphysical conclusions from the two accounts.

It could be argued, as indeed we have already noted Husserl would have, that with this separation Wittgenstein's account is flawed. It is flawed in the sense that it would set an obvious limit to phenomenological enquiry. But even in Husserl's own scheme of intentionality there is a precedence set for some entity being "implied" but not manifest. The transcendental self (whose thoughts are these thoughts) is an entity "implied" by consciousness itself and parallels in this respect the "implication" by the notion of the

object-in-meaning of an object-of-reference. These so-called "implications" are problematic. We should bear in mind Husserl's caveat that the transcendental self is not actually implied by cognition; Descartes would have been mistaken if he had thought that the self was a deduction from the fact of thought (thought as the premise of a *Cogito* argument). Likewise, the idea of an object-of-reference is not an actual deduction from that of the idea of the object-in-meaning. Husserl terms the constitution of identities of objects "objectification" and insists that

[T]his is not to say that the things once more exist in themselves and "send their representatives into consciousness." (IP p. 10)

For even to speak in terms of there being "things" which send their representatives into consciousness is to suppose too much.

Objectification is the awarding of object status and "thing" here is just a synonym for object. What "it" is that we award object status to is clearly ineffable, it is merely whatever coincides with the identity we specify (and which we have "blindly" referred to).

Now in Wittgenstein's account "construal" of an object-of-reference into language (i.e., treating its name as a name of an object, providing it a syntax appropriate to a name) also amounts to awarding "something" ineffable the status of 'object'. But in fact there is no implication in Wittgenstein's account that what is construed is 'some kind' of object. Nor is there anything to suggest that something like an object is implied to exist to be construed. In that respect, my choice of the term "object-of-reference" is unfortunate and should be provisional except that nothing else seems to suffice and be less

misleading, (a "point-of-reference" perhaps?) It is, as I argued in chapter V, something that is "radically ineffable", being neither describable in, nor shown by, propositions.

We can say that the analysis of terms Wittgenstein employs in speaking of subsisting simple objects and existing states of affairs is directly analogous with the identities of Husserlian phenomenal objects which subsist their existences (which phenomenology brackets). And Husserl can also say that the apparent third category (the object-of-reference) is a pseudo-category for it receives no characterisation whatsoever, it is contentless. A more detailed survey of the consequences of this difficult issue must wait until my final chapter.

Notes

¹ See Ch. I "B: "The Semantic Theory."

² For a contemporary discussion of some of the historical antecedents to the issue of intentionality and its connection through to the present day and Wittgenstein's work, see Kenny (1984) pp. 61-76.

³ In Dreyfus (1982) pp. 215-231. In the same volume papers by Dagfinn Føllesdal: "Husserl's Theory of Perception" pp. 94-96 and "Brentano and Husserl On Intentional Objects and Perception" pp. 31-41 offer support for McIntyre's interpretation.

Most notably these interpretations are generally based on examples of perception rather than other "acts" such as imagining or remembering. I think this prejudice tends to distract us from the significance of Husserl's view that in intending objects there need be no such object (see note ², chapter VII). As a consequence it becomes too easy to overlook the fact that whereas it makes sense to think in terms of our intentions to refer to an object rather than some other (and possibly fail) it makes no sense in Husserl's scheme of intentionality to think in terms of, so to speak, intending to intend some object and not another. Also in the same volume see Hubert Dreyfus' "Husserl's Perceptual Noema" pp. 98-123.

For a contrary view to McIntyre's and Føllesdal's, see Aron Gurwitsch "On the Intentionality of Consciousness" reprinted in Kockelmans (1967) pp. 118-137. To give some general idea of the contrast between Gurwitsch's view and those referred to above we might note the following remarks of his:

To each act there corresponds a noema, namely, an object such, exactly and only such, as the subject is aware of it.
 [A] conscious act is an act of awareness, presenting the subject who experiences it with a sense, an ideal atemporal unity, identical, i.e., identifiable.
 [A]n experienced act bears a reference to a sense.
 In its most elementary form, this function consists in confronting the subject with sense, ideal unities, to which, as identical ones, he is free to revert an indefinite number of times. (pp. 135-136)

⁴ McIntyre, with David Woodruff Smith, argues for this linguistic interpretation of noema in their "Husserl's Identification of Meaning and Noema" reprinted in Dreyfus (1982) pp. 82-92.

⁵ It is this universality enables Husserl to reject the scepticism over the ability of consciousness to "reach its object." Of his example of an object of consciousness (redness) he says:

Thus it is now senseless to raise questions and doubts as to what the essence of redness is, or what the meaning of redness is, provided that while one "sees" redness and grasps it in its specific character, one means by the word "red" just exactly that which is being grasped and "seen"

there. And in the same way it is senseless, with respect to the essence of cognition and the fundamental structure of cognition, to wonder what its meaning is, provided one is immediately given the paradigmatic phenomena and the type in question in a purely "seeing" and eidetic reflection within the sphere of phenomenological reduction. (IP p. 45)

^e In "Sally believed that the man who robbed her was over six foot tall" Sally may have a belief (*de re*) about the specific robber (who she saw) or a belief (*de dicto*) about *whoever it was* who robbed her who she did not see (she estimated his height from the fact he had been able to reach a certain window to break in). McIntyre criticises Husserl for not attending more to cases of the latter indefinite or *de dicto* intentions. His own examples of such indefinite intentions are my desiring a new car or believing someone is at the door (see especially section 2, pp. 219 ff).

Certainly McIntyre is correct in pointing out that our thoughts are commonly only thoughts of indefinitely specified items and he would be right in criticising Husserl for almost never discussing such examples if he was correct in his interpretation of Husserl's assertion that consciousness is directed to "specific objects." This would be significant for Husserl's claim on the universality of intentionality. But note that even a non-specific *de dicto* reference can be specific to spatial and temporal coordinates. I can specify that "someone" be at a certain time and place without specifying who, but I have nonetheless been specific in my selection of the person I want, namely, whoever is at those coordinates. (This example, of course, precisely models the case of "blind referring" I describe for Wittgenstein's identification of simple objects, namely, whatever "it" (i.e., a) is that is related to b as the proposition 'aRb' identifies it).

Apparently encouraged by taking examples from perception McIntyre interprets "specific object" as if it were the particular existing object and that would presumably require a completely unambiguous description. That alone should have alerted McIntyre since rarely are any thoughts of objects so specific as to exclude all others except the ones (particular and existing) that we mean. But such a specification is not consistent with the transcendental reduced conditions of Husserl's phenomenology.

Even supposing a specific description of an object, how would we decide that such a description is indeed specific to one particular object if the object of thought need not be of anything existing? For then there is clearly no possibility of assessing the "fit" between my thought of it and the object itself.

In fact McIntyre even quotes Husserl (from LI p. 589) as saying that an act's matter, its noematic sense, "makes its object count as this object and no other" and "in what sense it is there meant." (p. 652) without, seemingly, appreciating that this must be read in the context of (the possibility) of there being no object. Which is to say that the "selection" of a specific object by virtue of a description is entirely phenomenological (i.e., not perceptual). The phenomenological analysis of the object would include specifying what

should count with respect of an object corresponding to the noematic description. And what will count will vary across different states of consciousness (different acts or noetic states). Imagining an object is as directed to its object as perceiving one is. The phenomenological specification of criteria for correspondence between description and object is "logical", not contingent, as indeed all parts of a noematic description are.

It is because of the logical nature of this identity of objects that *de dicto* reference is also an inappropriate model for intentionality. For to identify someone (*de dicto*) as "Whoever is at the door" is to pick out that someone according to contingent details.

⁷ Aron Gurwitsch, who does not appear to share Føllesdal's and McIntyre's fondness for modelling intending objects on perceiving objects (see note⁶ above), prefers to speak of the correlation or correspondence of conscious acts and their objects (Husserl himself uses this phrase, see IP p. 17, where he speaks, significantly, of the *a priori* correlation of cognition with its object).

⁸ McIntyre's quotations come from *Logical Investigations* where Husserl speaks of acts "directing themselves to a certain object and not another (p. 587, cf. McIntyre p. 219). But in the lead up to this passage it is clear that Husserl is thinking of the problem of how two or more different acts can possess the same content (and thereby share the same directionality). Which is to say that Husserl is involved here with the kind of ideal identity (i.e., not contingent identity) that characterises noemata. If we read on beyond Husserl's talk of "a certain object and no other" (and even "this object and no other") he says that:

This 'reference to an object' belongs peculiarly and intrinsically to an act experience, and the experiences manifesting it are by definition intentional experiences or acts. (underlining added)

By "to an act experience" Husserl means "to all act experiences." Although it is true that referring is an intentional act it is also the case that by no means all intentional acts are referring acts. Referring, like asserting, imagining, questioning etc concern the quality of an act. The noesis or quality of an act is independent of the matter or content of the act in the sense that, for example, whether I hope, question or assert that I will meet Jane tomorrow, makes no difference for the identity of the object concerned, the "object *simpliciter*."

The example that Husserl raises is instructional too, "equilateral triangle" and "equiangular triangle" direct us to the same object though by distinctive routes (i.e., through different contents or "matter"). Now it is clear both by Husserl's view that different descriptions can pick out the same (i.e., "one specific") object and from the very nature of the object he provides as an example (a triangle), that the objects which acts direct us to are not particular objects (i.e., not paradigmatically this triangle here, now) but whatever can be given by a description that essentially eschews contingent details as the description of "triangle" does. For that

"description" is a definition. That intentionality concerns such objects is why their actual existence has no bearing on its efficacy. Thus can Husserl say, of the "matter" of any act that:

The matter, therefore, must be that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the object meant in a general way but also in the precise way in which it is meant. The matter - to carry clearness a little further - is that peculiar side of an act's phenomenological content that not only determines that it grasps the object but also as what it grasps it, the properties, relations, categorial forms, that it itself attributes to it. (LI p. 589, italics added)

Thus, in speaking of picking out a specific object, Husserl does not mean a particular object. Rather, he is concerned with any thought's sufficiency in specifying an object, in giving "the precise way in which it is meant."

⁹ Reprinted in C. Marsh (ed.) (1956) pp. 39-56. Russell considers three kinds of denoting phrase: "The present King of France" (denoting nothing), "The present Queen of England" and ambiguous denotations such as "A man."

¹⁰ To go a stage further, in the final and ideal analysis (and following in the steps of Locke) meanings of complex ideas such as "The present King of France" are to be analysed into (logically proper) names for elements of experience ("objects" of acquaintance or sense-data), although, needless to say, the analysis would need to be developed much further than "There is one and only one King of France").

¹¹ Of course, it is my contention that, though in his early work Wittgenstein had not formulated an account of meaning in terms of 'use', still the attention (albeit limited) to (syntactical) context, to logical analysis of meaning, and to the notion of objects being construed into meaning might be considered early seeds of this later pragmatism.

¹² An exception to this seems to be wherever I identify one identity with another. If, for example, I say "That man there is my brother John" then my assertion can be confirmed or denied, it has a truth value.

And "mistaken identity" is more aptly titled a "mistaken identification". The identity given in "My brother John" is not something I can be mistaken about, no assertion is made or implied. Only in use can it be said to be, or to contain, an assertion. "My brother John" is not true or false and there need be no such item, I can say (and make sense) "I have no brother John."

¹³ John Hems makes the same point about the non-pragmatic aspect of this conception of intentionality thus:

The possible fulfillment of the intention is always, as it were, pre-determined by the intention, otherwise it could not be a fulfillment of this intention. (1960 p. 573)

Another thought along these lines is that of Wittgenstein's that every proposition is a signpost to its own verification, a thought he expressed in his "middle period" in the context of his own investigation of intentionality (see PR §150₁₁). Consider also Wittgenstein's own remark: "If I expect an event and that which fulfills my expectation occurs, does it make sense to ask whether that really is the event I expected? Note¹⁴ below is also relevant to this point.

¹⁴ It would accord with McIntyre's reference model for intentionality to think in terms of us recognising our own intentions empirically. As if I infallibly recognise an intention of mine to do x, as an intention to do x, through something like a kind of feeling of satisfaction. That is, as if I have a kind of inward perception of my own intentions which just happens to be error free. We know our own minds like nothing else we know Descartes insisted. Certainly, Husserl and Wittgenstein would have rejected this criterion based model for intentionality.

A better model for intentionality is suggested by Crispin Wright's idea of the "extension-determining concept" and its application to the concept of intention and to first-person intentions in particular.

The broad idea is that it is a concept whose extension is determined by our judgements: our judgements about what falls under that very concept. So as a first approximation we might say that a concept F is an extension-determining concept if and only if the things which are F are the things that we judge to be F. [...] We are interested in those concepts whose extensions are determined by our judgements. [Thus] in the case of an extension-determining concept there is an *a priori* connection between our judgements and the extension of the concept. (Holton (1993) p. 299. Compare Wittgenstein's later view that "Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of language." Z §55)

Or, in Wright's own words:

[S]ubjects best opinions *determine*, rather than reflect what is true to say about their intentional states, with the consequence that the notion of detection or 'inner tracking', as it were, is inappropriate.
(Wright, 1989, p. 250)

I am indebted to Richard Holton's (1993) paper for drawing my attention to Wright's idea though not to its application to the idea of intentionality.

Of course a footnote can not do justice to my suggestion of this alternative model I merely want to note its advantages in accounting for the apparent unerring aim of consciousness to, so to speak, detect or "reach" the object it is a consciousness of. That is, to be universal and not pragmatic. It would also be consistent with my view

that the notion of "fit" or of consciousness "hitting its target" applies only in cases of reference, never to cases of intentionality.

But I should also draw attention to the fact that it is precisely this last point which Wright agrees with and Holton argues strongly against (see especially part IV, pp. 313-318).

¹⁵ A fundamental problem of reference is that of priority, a chicken or egg question. On the one hand I must correctly attribute a characteristic to something in order to refer to it. So reference seems to presume on attribution. On the other hand attribution requires that we attribute a characteristic, correctly or not, to something we have by some other means already picked out. So attribution seems to presume on reference. Of course, this is linked to the similar problem of priority but with regards to naming and describing mentioned in chapter I.

There is a significant epistemological question correlative with this: if, for example, I speak of x and its particular colour, the logical subject of that assertion is a condition of my attributing the colour. To avoid a regress that subject cannot itself be contingent. If it were then no statement about the world could possibly be claimed to be true. This is not a reiteration of the familiar sceptic's epistemological position, that no claim can be known for certain. Rather, no claim could ever be made to be doubted, denied or confirmed. In effect, the possibility of making a claim on the world is conditional on the recognition of some identity and so that identity cannot likewise be conditional. We have to be able to make sense before we can begin to decide on the true nature of the world.

Something of a contrary view to this is the supposition of some kind of direct form of reference. This appears to be argued by McIntyre (pp. 226-229) to be offered by Husserl's account (from LI §§129-131). He says that, for Husserl, a certain X-component in an act's sense correlates with the object which bears the properties being attributed not by virtue of those attributions but independently and directly by virtue of this X-component. "[T]he X relates to the object 'simpliciter,' 'in abstraction from all predicates'." (LI p. 321)

However McIntyre makes it clear in a footnote (¹⁶) that this direct reference is to the object-meaning, not the object itself. I can only assume that in so far as we assume reference is always to something separate and independent of the referring expression itself, that this X-component of a particular thought of (e.g.) a die "refers" us to "the object *simpliciter*", "one central concept" which would be provided by that phenomenological object (the sum of all its possible horizons). Certainly such an object is at best only indirectly picked out by any particular description. For example, the die described as a six sided figure does not direct us to that ideal, complete identity of the die.

Still it might be felt that some kind of direct reference might be the solution to the problem of reference mentioned above. Such a reference seems to be forged entirely in the mind and constituted of intention alone. As if an object-of-reference independent of meaning or identity could be what I meant. As if, that is, despite the falsity

of what I assert of the object I can still be considered to have referred to that object. After all, what is it that I have falsely attributed the property to?

But though I shall not argue it here, I shall consider such "direct reference" a myth. If I can be said to refer at all then it cannot be by mere intention alone; rather, some correct descriptor is at least implied, by physical or textual context or indexically.

This point is significant if the chicken and egg situation I describe regarding the priority of reference or attribution is to be understood as a true dichotomy and not resolved superficially.

But intention is all that is required in the case of intentionality. In intending an object x, then the very object I intend, as I intend it, is the object my thought is directed to. In Wittgenstein's words, what is crucial to an intention is the picture - the picture of what I intended (cf. PR §21).

¹⁶ For an alternative view on this matter consistent with his realist interpretation of the *Tractatus* see Hems (1960). For example, Hems says:

But of course Wittgenstein is not offering us a version of intentionality. Instead of a theory of constitutive subjectivity Wittgenstein offers us a theory of language - but of language endowed with truth. This approach might be described as a linguistic version of the traditional correspondence theory of truth. (pp. 449-550)

I offer this view here simply because it so succinctly provides both an example of the interpretation I am opposing and the kind of theory of meaning I am arguing is unintelligible. It is my view that the correspondence of language and reality which Wittgenstein refers to as "mirroring" entails no element of truth. To say that a propositional structure corresponds to (mirrors) a structure in reality (a state of affairs) is not to say that the proposition represents this structure. In fact, for Wittgenstein, these two structures are both structures within the same logical space. Certainly there is a correspondence between the propositional sign and the fact, but both show the same underlying, identical logical form. So, in mirroring, no two separate logical forms are correlated and no truth (of correspondence) applies.

¹⁷ Now we noted before, a simple object (logical form) is not given by any single elementary proposition but only by the totality of the name's possible occurrences in propositions. A single elementary proposition manifests this form in something akin to, for example, the way any one sequence of numbers manifests the rule from which it and all other such sequences can be derived.

In a parallel move Husserl distinguishes (see LI §21, p. 590) the "intentional" and "semantic" essences. In brief, this recognises that any two acts which share the same object need not present it in the same manner noematically. Husserl instances his own and Nansen's ideas of "Greenland's icy wastes" and the concepts of "straight line" and "shortest line." Each has its "intentional essence" and the same object which two or more acts can direct us to is the "semantic essence" or "essential identity" - "a meaning in [the] ideal sense."

(LI p. 590) That Husserl contrives to account for these pairs of acts sharing the same object without any appeal to the notion of reference and the metaphysical entity they concern illustrates the "ideal" nature (the identity) of the object he considers acts direct us to. Husserl makes a similar point with his claim that an object is only manifested completely if taken in the context of all its possible "horizons."

I find no evidence in Husserl's account of any realist tendencies towards this "essential identity" just as I found no reason to put a realist's interpretation on Wittgenstein's view of simple objects. For Husserl the object ("essential identity") consciousness is directed to is not like the case of Venus picked out variously, intensionally, as the Evening and Morning Stars ("intentional essences"). As if these intentional essences serve almost as disguises for the (metaphysically) real identity of the object--the planet Venus. Instead the case is more like that of Superman and Clark Kent. Their identities as the caped crusader or the unassuming journalist do not disguise any real identity. The one can become the other but there is no third authentic identity. One would rather say that the object (person) is both Superman and Clarke Kent, crusader and journalist, a compilation of at least these two identities and a myriad other possible perspectives.

¹⁸ On this point Barry Smith (1989) argues (p. 57) that Husserl is merely following Brentano who, Smith argues, "is not referring to putative transcendent targets of mental acts" but to "immanent 'objects of thought'." He remarks that:

Confusion on this matter has reigned in the secondary literature on Brentano above all because his own statement of the intentionality principle in the oft-quoted passage from the *Psychology* (pp. 88ff) is not entirely clear. Brentano himself however appends a footnote to this passage in which he states explicitly that for him the intentionality relation holds always between an act and an object immanent to the mind.

¹⁹ Also consider 2.0231:

The substance of the world [objects, 2.021] can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented - only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.

²⁰ Here we might recall Frege's analogy of the telescope. I observe the moon through a telescope. The moon itself is the reference which is observed by me via the objective image projected by the object lens of the instrument (and which is capable of being projected onto a screen, it is a so-called real image). This real, objective image is analogous to the sense through which I "observe" the moon itself. I don't see this image, I see the moon, the reference. Phenomenology's concern lies in a exploration of this objective image and with its intentionality. That is, with how, within this image, there is

"implied" a possible object. Whether there is a moon as a referent does not concern phenomenology.

²¹ Husserl also rejects a second model of intentionality which is basically a modification of the perceptual one, the empiricist's model. This argues a causal account of perception (one in which interpretation is minimised or even excluded). What we see and even how we see it we are caused to see. Husserl objects to this Lockian notion of the passive and receptive *tabula rasa* (free even of any innate ideas or constraining principles):

It is only in cognition that the essence of objectivity can be studied at all, with respect to all its basic forms; only in cognition is it truly given, is it evidently "seen". [...] And the object is not a thing which is put into cognition as into a sack, as if cognition were a completely empty form, one and the same empty sack in which now this, now that is placed. But in givenness we see that the object is constituted in cognition. (IP p. 59)

CHAPTER IX

THE AGENT OF REPRESENTATION

The Ego can be concrete only in the flowing multiformity of his intentional life, along with the objects meant - and in some cases constituted as existent for him - in that life. [The phenomenology of this self constitution coincides with phenomenology as a whole. (CM p. 68)

I objectively confront every object. But not the I.
(NB 80₁₀)

Introduction

By my interpretation, the parallel between Wittgenstein's conception of language and Husserl's of consciousness is manifested in their respective views of objects and the intentionality towards them. A remark of the phenomenologist, Paul Thévarez alerts us to a crucial aspect of intentionality which I have yet to consider:

Intentionality can very well be revelatory and constitutive of the objective world; it none the less remains that the immediately reflexive consciousness of self is a constituting power more original, a fact more primitive, than intentionality. (Thévarez 1962 p. 131)

Husserl does not think that his epoché has left us "confronting nothing" (CM p. 20), for, unlike Descartes, he thinks the *Cogito* alone is pregnant with significance. The task of phenomenology, as Socratic midwife, is to, non-deductively, deliver its progeny.

The bare identity of the "I am" is not the only thing given as indubitable in transcendental experience. Rather there extends through all the particular data of actual and

possible self-experience [...] a universal apodictically experientiable structure of the Ego [...] (CM p. 28)

What we "gain possession of" is the "pure stream of my consciousness"

... with all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them: the universe of "phenomena" in the [...] phenomenological sense. The epoché can also be said to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego. (CM pp. 20-21, underlining added)

So, in apprehending the (meaning) structures of conscious experience, in effect, I apprehend myself. I am not merely a casual observer and recorder of particular *cogitationes* but rather, in my descriptions of phenomena, I understand myself. Phenomenologically, my understanding of myself is synonymous with that "universal apodictically experientiable structure of the Ego."

So far this self has been in the background, undeclared but suggested throughout by my discussion of the constitution and prescription of identities for objects and, in Wittgenstein's case, of the use of propositions as norms of description. It is to the self as agent in these activities that I now turn. The question is, to what extent is Wittgenstein's "philosophical self" or "metaphysical self" (5.641, 5.633) to be identified with Husserl's "transcendental Ego" which "coincides with phenomenology as a whole."

I shall argue that within Wittgenstein's conception of this self lies a foundation for a plurality, not a singularity, of forms. I shall also argue, following the same line of thought, that he held a transcendental view of both logic and ethics (see 6.13, 6.421), comparable with Husserl's, which provides the link between his remarks

on language, the role of objects and his closing remarks on ethics and aesthetics.

Sense and Necessity as Evidence of Agency

Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being [...] falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being.

If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely - nonsense. (Husserl CM pp. 83-4, underlining added)

I want to report how I found the world.

I have to judge the world, to measure things. (NB 82_{E,7})

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'. (5.641b)

I have argued that the notion of intentionality, central to Husserl's phenomenology, applies to Wittgenstein's account in at least two important respects:

1. As with each and every thought, each and every proposition has its "object". And, as with phenomenological intentionality, objects constitute the senses of propositions by virtue of being ideal and objective entities.
2. As is the case with intentionality, the relation between propositions and their objects takes the form of a fundamental semantic relation. I have argued such a relation is distinct from that of pragmatic reference in that intentional objects constitute the senses of propositions irrespective of their truth. False propositions, no less than true ones, reach their objects.

Husserl accounted for the universal, infallible aim of thought to reach its objects by noting that the objects "picked out" were

constituted in its own process. Such a constituting of objects does not generate objects existing in consciousness though they are immanent in it. Immanence and existence are not the same. In John Heidegger's words objects are constituted, not created, in thought. Consciousness, so to speak, generates objects which are prescriptions of identities, conditions of the senses of thoughts in Husserl's case, propositions in Wittgenstein's.'

So, for both Husserl and Wittgenstein, the representing self is identified with a specific notion of will revealed by the phenomenological reductions, i.e., independent of any consideration of the contingency of the world. This self Wittgenstein identified with the limits of the world (represented by the set of all well formed propositions, true or false).

Husserl considers himself to be investigating what the natural sciences presuppose as their foundations. But, consistent with his wide definition of science, he certainly envisioned a phenomenology of a much wider range of objects than those we commonly associate with natural science. "There are many sorts of objectivity and, correlatively, many sorts of so-called givenness." he says (IP p. 51) and:

[T]ranscendental theories of constitution arise that, as non-formal, relate to any spatial things whatever [...], to any psycho-physical beings, to human beings as such, to their self-comportment towards their natural and otherwise determined surrounding world, to any social communities, any cultural objects, and ultimately to any Objective world whatever. (CM p. 52)

And above all,

[This world] gets its whole sense, universal and specific, and its acceptance as existing, exclusively from such

cogitationes. In these my whole world-life goes on, including my scientifically inquiring and grounding life. By my living, by my experiencing, valuing, and acting I can enter no world other than the one that gets its sense and acceptance or status in and from me, myself. (CM p. 21, underlining added)

Thus does all cognition receive its "significance." (IP p. 48)

Humanity's goals, needs, interests and theories all contribute to the form, value or meaning which constituted the character of all kinds of "being", in a word, its "objectification."

At the heart of Wittgensteinian representation of the world and as a condition of that representation, lies a comparable (transcendental) activity- -the constitution or prescription of object identities manifest by the set of elementary propositions. Such prescription is not in accordance with how the world happens to be so the will is free to transcend experience of the (contingent) world. I have argued that this prescription of objects' identities consists of elevating the status of certain propositions to (logical) definitions. But in its transcendence of experience, this process cannot guarantee that the resulting form of our propositions (as it is reflected in the syntax of names) is suitable for the representation of this world. After all, any proposition we elevate in this way could turn out to be false. That is, if 'aRb' is false, then unless 'a' and 'b' can be defined in terms of some other elementary proposition which is true ('aRc' perhaps), then one or both of the identities of a and b are "false" identities. But this concern overlooks the formality of Wittgenstein's notion of "object", a general theoretical factotem, one which is infinitely analogically interpretable in accordance with any world we

might want to represent. But this still seems to require that it be made clear what minimum conditions must prevail in all worlds such that a language formalised on the basis described by Wittgenstein may be represented and this I undertake to do in chapter X.²

For Wittgenstein no fact or object in its contingent particularity, that is, in itself, possesses any significance, and the constitution of objects' identities amounts to awarding a logical significance to certain arbitrarily selected propositions.³ It is arguable that all significance for Wittgenstein is viewed as "logical". At this fundamental level meaning and significance become identified. (This point will become important shortly with respect to how we are to view the ineffable nature Wittgenstein ascribes to both logic and ethics.) So what can exist or what can be the case (a "logical place", 3.411) is determined by "stipulations" of values for variables (3.316, 3.317). It is my contention that it is no mere pun to note the ambiguity of "value" here, the logician's sense and its ethical sense. Logical, ethical, aesthetical valuation share a common source and all are ineffable. And all mark a transcendental agency that is a condition of representation and not itself represented.

My point is that, though it almost certainly was not what Wittgenstein had in mind at the time, the *Tractatus* account of meaning could be construed as a blueprint, or better, a prototype or proforma for a range of what the later Wittgenstein might have referred to as propositional or representational language games. These would be distinguished according to the "kinds" of objects with which they dealt, but finally, all according with his notion of a bare logical

form. The solution I shall propose in chapter X to the problem of what exactly are the minimum conditions necessary in the world for its representation will reveal why it might be the case that the *Tractatus*, too, successfully defends more than just the "language game" of the natural sciences. But though I consider my solution is consistent with the view of language Wittgenstein provides it certainly goes beyond anything Wittgenstein explicitly recognised.

All of this--the notion of object identities being constituted or prescribed, the independence of such prescription from the facts of the world and the idea that there is ultimately a unity to the apparent diversity of object-structures (the universality of intentionality in other words)--is clearly suggestive of some representing agency. This agent should be conceived simply as the counterpart to the directionality of intentionality towards objects but in the reverse direction.

The Nature of the Will of the Representing Agent

Over the period of 15th.October to 19th.November 1916 (when he was stationed in Olmütz, Moravia following a harrowing period on the Russian front and during which he first met Paul Engelmann⁴) Wittgenstein put down a series of remarks concerning the will. These are wide ranging and difficult to interpret. As usual only the very condensed versions of these views appear at all in the *Tractatus*.

According to Wittgenstein the (contingent) world and my will are independent (6.373) and:

Even if everything that we wished for were to happen, still this would only be a favour granted by fate, so to

speaks: for there is no logical connexion between will and world, which would guarantee it and the supposed physical connexion itself is surely not something that we could will. (6.374)

But he also speaks of the relation between an act of will and its fulfillment as being "compelled." (NB 88₁₉) What I think he has in mind here is that the act's fulfillment "follows" necessarily. The emphasis is not on the event occurring but on its being recognisable as the fulfillment of that act. If I will my arm to rise I do not see it as an accident when it is that event which follows that intention, I do not come to associate an occasion of willing with the consequent (physical) action by Humean association. I am never caught by surprise in this respect. To put this another way, what event in the world follows any act of my will is clearly contingent but that any particular event is considered by me to be a fulfillment of my act of will is not.

Wishing and wanting, for example, are distinguishable from willing in just this respect- -they do not possess any logical connection to the facts, that is, to their fulfillment (NB 77₉). And it is indeed a fact that is needed to fulfill them. I am satisfied in my wish that I shall become rich only if that actually happens. "Happens" is the operative concept here.

Wishing, Wittgenstein argues, precedes the event, but he conceives of willing as accompanying the event.

Suppose that a process were to accompany my wish. Should I have willed the process?

Would not this accompanying appear accidental in contrast to the compelled accompanying of the will? (NB 88₁₇₋₁₉)

Wittgenstein explores the following reductio experiment:

I can imagine carrying out the act of will for raising my arm, but my arm does not move. (E.g. a sinew is torn.) True, but, it will be said, the sinew surely moves and that just shews that the act of will related to the sinew and not to the arm. But let us go further and suppose that even the sinew did not move, and so on.

and he concludes

We should then arrive at the position that the act of will does not relate to a body at all, and so that in the ordinary sense of the word there is no such thing as the act of will. (NB 86₄)

Now Wittgenstein is not denying that we do indeed will actions, so he is not recommending a correction to our usual manner of expressing such experiences. He is just reiterating his conclusion that the act of willing is not an event (i.e., some fact) in the contingent world. So he does not wish to see willing reduced to certain psychological states such as wanting or wishing (see NB 88₇).

Wishing is not acting. But willing is acting.

(My wish relates, e.g., to the movement of the chair, my will to a muscular feeling. (NB 88_{7-e})

But the act of will is related to the muscular feeling and is not identical with (and reducible to) it so,

Have the feelings by which I ascertain that an act of the will takes place any particular characteristic which distinguishes them from other ideas?

It seems not! (NB 87_{5-e})

The act of will is not an experience. (NB 89₄)

What I think Wittgenstein is getting at here is that if the causal chain of bodily events is systematically denied- -first a sinew fails, then the muscle, then the nerve and so on- -there is no point reached at which I admit a failure on my part to have willed. I do not conclude from my failure to do x, "Oh! maybe I didn't will x after all!" Willing, we could say, is not explained pragmatically in terms

of its success or in terms of certain associated feelings (to them it is only contingently related). Wittgenstein is reduced to concluding that:

The act of the will is not the cause of the action but is the action itself. (NB 87₁₄)

Clearly this cannot mean he identifies (e.g.) my willing my arm to rise with the event of my arm rising for he acknowledges that I will my arm to rise even when a split sinew prevents it rising. So Wittgenstein must mean that willing alone is an act distinct from the exercising of the will (which an intact sinew allow, see NB 76_{1e}-77₁). But now, how can we reconcile these two claims--that willing is acting but that it is also not a fact (such as a physical action) in the world? What kind of 'act' does Wittgenstein have in mind here? In fact he qualifies his statement that willing is acting by adding that the object of an act of will is the "intended action." (NB 87_{1e}) Thus can I be said to have willed my arm to rise even though that event never comes about.

What seems to be left as a residue of Wittgenstein's reductio experiment is just the idea of the action constituted in terms of its object ("And the will does have to have an object." NB 87₁₇) That "idea" is a picture of the proposed raising of my arm, just as a proposition is a picture. And just as I am infallible with regard to the intentionality of my meanings, so too am I infallible in my knowledge of my acts of will.

But this view of willing as entailing a picture of the action intended surely fails to distinguish it from wishing, for example, for

both will entail a description of their objects (objectives)? Just as I know what I will, likewise I know what I want. But rather as the phenomenology of objects or propositions includes the means by which they might be verified, the phenomenology of willing, unlike wishing, includes the means by which those ends could be realised. Suppose that I will that I raise my arm after several failed attempts to do so because of the torn sinew, and at that moment my arm is raised, puppet like, by some external means. Clearly I would not say that I had willed that event. I did not describe what I willed as my arm rising but as me raising my arm. Now in wishing, this aspect of means is absent. My wish to become rich is fulfilled irrespective of how I come by the money. If I were to say that I was willing myself to become rich, yet under questioning I could give no account of how I intended that end might come about, then I think we might say that this was merely an idle wish. Conversely, I can often wish, for example, that you will call today and I could, on occasions, account for why that might happen, but I would not suppose that account was a condition of my claim to have wished.

In Wittgenstein's broad sense of "logical" the fulfillment of my act of will is *a priori*, it is a function of the sense attaching to the description I would give of that act. Just as I cannot imagine intending some meaning that has no object, so:

The will seems always to have to relate to an idea. We cannot imagine, e.g., having carried out an act of will without having detected that we have carried it out. (NB 86_{1a})

I.e., it is analytic to the act that it is carried out, or in Husserl's terminology, eidetically all acts of will infallibly reach their targets just as all propositions intentionally reach theirs. I know of my acts of will just as I know my own intentions. I do not detect my own acts of will by observing their effects anymore than thoughts or propositions target their (phenomenal) objects by truly describing them. I can will events that never happen as I can describe objects that never exist.

This parallel between willing and meaning is not coincidental. It marks the common constitutive agency that is at work in the formulation of meanings and in the awarding of significance to actions. Both are essentially intentional.

For Wittgenstein the thinking and willing self is a unity to be interpreted as essentially the willing agent^s responsible for the values provided for both objects and acts. Intended actions and propositions alike are only contingently related to an actual act or fact respectively. So those willings and propositions must get their sense from some other source than the world itself. That source is the intentional, constituting self.

In brief, with regard to willing or thinking, both concern the sense of the world, that it has any value. It is my contention that there could be no world (something expressible or representable and therefore structured) that did not have value; that is, the value required for its representation- -that something is simple for me,

objects (cf. NB 70₇), or for its representation as good or evil, the source or motive of human action.

The Transcendental Character of the Representing Agent

Whatever may be the plays on words and the acrobatics of logic, to understand is, above all, to unify. [...] [to discover] in the shimmering mirrors of phenomena eternal relations capable of summing them up and summing themselves up in a single principle. [...] That nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute illustrates the essential impulse of the human drama. (Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus* p. 13)

The solutions of the problems of logic must be simple, since they set the standard of simplicity.

Men have always had a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the answers to questions are symmetrically combined - a priori - to form a self contained system.

A realm subject to the law: Simplex sigillum veri.
(5.4541)

To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world. (5.4711).

The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand. (4.5) [A] variable. (4.53)

The concrete ego himself is the universal theme of the description. CM p. 38

I am my World. (5.63)

So Wittgenstein distinguishes between genuine facts of psychology such as wishing and a philosophical "attitude" to the world that is manifest in my "acts" of will. Parallel with this, like Husserl, he distinguishes the empirical self from the metaphysical self (see 5.641).

By phenomenological epoché I reduce my natural human Ego and my psychic life - the realm of my psychological self-experience - to my transcendental-phenomenological Ego, [...]

Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any Object is a piece of my Ego. (CM p. 26)

My status as an existing human being is bracketed in the phenomenological enquiry. My physiological, biological and psychological conditions are all matters of fact and are therefore reduced. This "natural human Ego" lives in the world as part of it. And above all it is describable. Also, its intentions are essentially pragmatic being directed towards causally affecting the facts in the contingent world. And it can fail in these endeavours.

But my transcendent ego is not an existing thing:

There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. (5.631)

The I is not an object.

The subject does not belong to the world. (5.632)

That Wittgenstein's "metaphysical self" is no fact (not part of the contingent world) ensures that it is not describable. Its intentions are manifest in the ascription of values both in logic and in the ethical-aesthetical sense. Logic, ethics and aesthetics, all are transcendental conditions of the world (NB 77₇₋₈, 6.13, 6.421) and mark "attitudes" in virtue of which things (and events) become significant "through their relation to my will." (NB 84₁₁) This "attitude" marks the will's foothold in the world. But it is a foothold which leaves no print since that would be itself a fact. Still, this self, Wittgenstein believes, is evidently shown in the forms of our descriptions (and, arguably, our actions). To say that the forms of description are shown is of a piece with saying that the metaphysical self is manifest in the world. So:

[T]here really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world.'

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world - not a part of it. (5.641)

These last two points- -that the self is not any part of the world but is its limits (in some way yet to be clarified)- -suggest something of the nature of the representing agent (what Husserl might have usefully titled the intentional self). Husserl, anticipating Thévenez's caution, recognises that in his awareness of the "world" of objects, under the constraints of transcendental and eidetic reductions, he also acquires himself as "pure Ego." (CM p. 21) But he has only the sentence prior to this also recognised that it is, finally, the natural world alone that he always speaks of and which is all that he can speak of.

Just as consciousness is not a sack into which objects are lodged, so too, the self is not a limit to the world as a boundary or a container is a limit. Perhaps analogously the self is more like the boundary line of a ball game, it does not limit the extent of play causally, it is not effective as a physical boundary; only the rules restrain the game such that it falls within that boundary. The rules both constitute the game and in the same move prescribe its limits.⁶

But the point is that, in a sense, the transcendental ego, has no describable "interior." Husserl says that the transcendental ego is responsible for every imaginable sense and being (CM p. 84), all are "products" of the transcendental ego's transcendental acts of will and furthermore,

If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then outside is precisely - nonsense. (CM p. 84)

So there is no place left in which the transcendental ego might reside. It is not to be found as part of the world but there is no sense that can attach to any alternatives. There is no outside. This leaves only the possibility that the ego and the world are in some respect identified. This Husserl confirms:

[The] explication of all my ego's constitutings and all the objectivities existing for him, necessarily assumed, the methodic form of an a priori self-explication. (CM p. 84, underlining added)

What the self is actually identified with here is the constituting, intentional act. Transcendence as "part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly" gets its sense and its existential status "exclusively from my experiencing, my objectivating, thinking, valuing or doing", that is, from my "grounding acts". It is in this sense that the ego (the will) is identified with the world. The ego is the limit of the world just as the metaphysical self is for Wittgenstein. Husserl's "Ego" bears within him the world "as an accepted sense" and is "necessarily presupposed by this sense." (CM p. 26)

Husserlian subjectivism is distinct from the psychological or sensualistic idealism (see CM p. 86) of Berkeley or Hume (which of course represented exactly the kind of naturalistic explanation that Husserl rejected). The self is not identical with the world as it exists and so not identical either with actual experience as such (though it is identical with its possibility). Husserl is not saying "I am this world." Rather, he is saying, "I am all possible worlds." Just as, to develop the analogy a stage further, the rule constraining

football-players to a particular playing area, and if you like, all the rules constraining a game, do not result in producing just today's particular game. Playing by the same rules does not result in all games being identical. The constitutive rules merely format the game and give it its sense; each game is only understandable on their terms, but no particular game can be identified with them.

So, for Husserl, a complete description of the world of possible objects (and their various noetic forms) is identical with a description of the transcendental Ego. There is no residue after analysing consciousness noetically and noematically.

There are two points which this brief survey of Husserl's transcendental Ego illustrates that are significant for the review of Wittgenstein's metaphysical self. The identification of self and the world and the distinction between this empirical world and all possible worlds (the world as limit).

Wittgenstein's Identification of the Self and the Limits of the World

Wittgenstein's analysis of modal propositions (5.541 - 5.5421) provides the clearest explanation of how the metaphysical subject (the willing or intentional self) should be conceived. Or, rather, how in fact it is not to be conceived at all. He remarks on how it is only superficial to consider propositions of the kind 'A believes that p' or 'A says that p' as revealing a psychological self which stands in a particular relation (an attitude of believing, assertion etc.) to some proposition. In fact, such propositions are, we might say, "trans-

material" propositions- -'A says that p' relates the formal and material, it possesses the form "'p' says that p". And in case this appears to merely state an identity Wittgenstein reminds us (5.542) that in his scheme this is actually a correlation of two facts- -the propositional sign and the fact in the world which it mirrors (related by projection).

This analysis of modal propositions rids Wittgenstein of a possible objection to his claim that all complex propositions are truth functional but it also allows him to conclude that there is no such thing as the soul "as conceived in the superficial psychology of the day." (5.5421) Under Wittgenstein's analysis the self of these beliefs or statements drops out. In effect, like Husserl's analysis, the self whose attitudes to 'p' these propositions appear to describe, becomes reduced in some manner, to facts of the world. But in Wittgenstein's case it is not quite a reduction to just the facts, but rather to their correlation or congruence, the projection of one fact onto the other which it mirrors. The limits of the world, which the metaphysical self is identified with, are thus its logical limits, the limits of sense.

On the face of it there appears to be a discrepancy in Wittgenstein's remarks in this context; he speaks not only of the powerlessness of my will and of its independence from the happenings of the world (NB p73₁₁, 6.373) but also of my willing making the world my world (5.63) and a wholly different world (6.43). Of course, Wittgenstein would not deny that the biological self causally

interacts with the world but there is no necessity for such changes to occur as a consequence of my actions.⁷

The resolution of this apparent difficulty lies with recognising Wittgenstein's ambiguous use of 'world' which is apparent, for example, in:

If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts. (6.43a, though of course, the facts are the world.)

Wittgenstein is here alluding to a parallel distinction with that of the empirical and metaphysical selves, namely the empirical world (of facts, 1.1) and the world which is my world. The former corresponds to Husserl's world of the natural attitude, the contingent (existing) facts, which the empirical self is part of and which is causally related to other parts. These relations are real relations between entities which exist.

The latter world is presupposed (is a condition of) this natural empirical world. It constitutes the limits of possibility (i.e., all possible worlds). It marks the limits of sense or logical space. Or, it might be called, using Husserl's terminology, the eidetic world, the realm of the imagination, the limits of thought.

Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.

We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either. (5.61)

What cannot be imagined cannot even be talked about. (NB 84₁₀)

It is this transcendental world as limits which Wittgenstein identifies with the metaphysical self (5.63) and also with the limits of language (5.6, 5.62), the limits of logical space (5.61), life

(5.621), the totality of objects (5.5561) and which provides the element of truth in solipsism (5.62, 5.64). It is a world in which the metaphysical self is, in some sense, "implied" (but cf. 5.633c); in fact, as a proposition's content "implies" its own form (evident but not explicitly; or metaphorically as our visual field "implies", and does not include, the seeing eye, 5.633, 5.6331).

To speak of logical limits to the world is precisely to speak of its internal structure which we know of not by experience (5.552, 6.1222, 5.634) but rather, as we know of our metaphysical self:

What kind of reason is there for the assumption of a willing subject?

Is not my world adequate for individuation? (NB 89_{B-ε})

Essentially, what makes the self evident in these limits is that they represent the meaning of the world, or better, that it has a meaning. There is no meaning to the contingent world in the sense that what happens to be the facts cannot be accorded any significance, that p and not that q is mysterious so far as Wittgenstein is concerned. To say that the world has no value in it (6.41) is to say just that we can give contingency no account. But that p and that q are possibilities is not mysterious, which is only to say that both p and q make sense. To "see" the willing subject in the world is of a piece with saying that there is significance or meaning (a logical form) to the world.

Agency, the World and Values

So the metaphysical self does not so much penetrate as permeate the world bestowing meaning (structure, necessity). Only thus does the world become explicable.

Wittgenstein supposes that the possibility of representation resides ultimately in a single condition, the identity of the respective forms of the empirical world and language. But we have seen that the values that are awarded variables of the sign system (the function of the metaphysical will) can vary, objects are construed into meaning (named) by virtue of being awarded a syntax. In everyday language this activity of the will extends to objects that are not actually Wittgensteinian objects, though, of course, they thereby become treated as such. By this single mechanism there is introduced into language the possibilities of varieties of representation rather as Albert Camus rhetorically observes:

Great feelings take with them their own universe, splendid or abject. They light up with their passion an exclusive world in which they recognise their climate. There is a universe of jealousy, or ambition, of selfishness, or of generosity. A universe - in other words, a metaphysic and an attitude of mind. (1955, p. 8)

In other words, a world which is my world which marks both a limit of it and of (what amounts to the same thing) my thought. The world of the happy man is different from that of the unhappy man (6.43), and presumably different from the worlds of jealous, ambitious, selfish or generous people.

The world must, so to speak, wax or wane as a whole. As if by accession or loss of meaning. (4B 73₁₇, see also 6.43)

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein operates what is in effect a meta-valuation; he relies upon the notion that only one form of representation is objective. This is perhaps the most significant misconception in the *Tractatus* (see chapter X) and in this respect Husserl's phenomenology (and Wittgenstein's own later work) both improve on it by recognising that this notion of objectivity is mistaken and should be uncovered phenomenologically.

So "value" is interpreted as "logical place" and "significance" is understood in terms of anything's place in a system or structure (a logical space), to be explicated in terms internal to that system.²⁴ But, for the early Wittgenstein, only one form of representation "truly" (objectively) mirrored the form of reality. That form of representation is that in which objects, whose relations to other objects are singular, are construed thus:

This object is simple for me. (NB 70 \rightarrow)

But the point is that, despite Wittgenstein's insistence on there being a single condition for the representation of reality, he recognised that the metaphysical will is the source of a variety of representational forms which represent in essence, valuations. All such valuations are transcendental (6.13, 6.421), marking a common root in the activity of the transcendental agent. All, as condition and limit of the world and not part of it, are not constituted of facts and are ineffable (though showable) (NB 73 \rightarrow , 6.421). True, only one form is objective, but ethics (and aesthetics) as well as logic are conditions (and limits) of the (contingent) world (NB 77 \rightarrow) and are functions of my metaphysical will. To say that x is good or x is

beautiful is on a level with saying that x is simple (or, alternatively, that it is necessary). But only the latter is objective and mirrors the forms of what it is supposed a representation of.

Conclusion: The Harmony of Will and
the World in the Tractatus

If there is any single unifying theme linking the two apparently disparate halves of Wittgenstein's thesis, on language and ethics, it almost certainly lies in the notion of harmony. Firstly, "harmony" should be interpreted (psychologically) in the context of his suggestion that happiness is an acceptance of fate; one lives happily if one lives in the present (lives timelessly) (see the whole NB entry of 8.7.16, 4_e-75₁₁). This amounts to living reconciled with whatever happens to be the case.

The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of the world.

To it the amenities of the world are so many graces of fate. (NB 81_e-7)

And secondly, "harmony" may be interpreted in the context of the objective conditions of representation. In this context harmony is synonymous with the notion of the congruence that any true proposition possesses with its corresponding fact (by mirroring its structure).

And in this sense I can also speak of a will that is common to the whole world.

But this will is in a higher sense my will.

As my idea is the world, in the same way my will is the world-will. (NB 85₁₂₋₁₄)

Finally though, these two senses of "harmony" constitute a single issue where my metaphysical self acts so as to represent the world in accord with its essence (as opposed to its contingencies). Then there

will remain no residue of feeling or attitude about how the world ought to be or how I might hope it to be. It is in this respect that Wittgenstein draws his Spinozist-linguistic conclusions that my will and God's are indistinguishable from the essence of the world. These are the terms in which Wittgenstein conceives a happy state of the philosophical self:

In order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world. And that is what "being happy" means. (NB 75₄)

In contrast with this correlation of harmony and happiness, there is the hostile world of the unhappy person whose representations of the world are conditional on a form that is essentially foreign to it and at odds with its essence.

By virtue of my representing forms (objectively) possessing roots in the essence of reality what Richard Brockhaus says becomes true: "[T]he unconditioned reality of [simple objects] is not reducible to the will." (p. 319) But it is also true to say that only in virtue of my will is the necessary circumstance for representation achieved, that of the requisite use of this essence as a form of representation. So it is more appropriate here to speak of the concurrence or harmony of act and essence. It is in this respect that I shall argue that objectivity of sense fails and also that the forms of objects as simple, good or beautiful (their "logical" values or significance) become equal in status as objects (logical places).

Possessing a form and constituting a limited whole are of a piece. Wittgenstein remarks:

We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely

untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer. (6.52)

The problems of life are solved not by the uncovering of more and more facts. Wittgenstein is not concerned with the problems of the empirical self, of its material or psychological needs. He is speaking of the meaning of life and the attendant spiritual malaise which not only individuals "experience" but which can in fact infect whole cultures²

These problems cannot be dismissed merely by recognising some mistaken lines of thought or illegitimate expressions as some scholars have interpreted the *Tractatus* to be recommending as the revised project for philosophy (taking passage 6.53 alone and superficially for example):

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e., propositions of natural science [...] and then whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.

Wittgenstein recognises the limits to thought and expression and the limits of science and he finds them distinct in a quite unique manner. Science he supposes can clearly state its findings and its limits are marked by the set of true propositions. But the limits of thought and expression (the simple), as with the good and the beautiful "in" the world, are ineffable, they constitute what is mystical (6.432, 6.44, 6.45). This point Wittgenstein makes on a number of occasions but significantly he placed one such remark right before he outlined the "strictly correct" recommendations for the philosophical method I have just quoted. Wittgenstein's thesis is not

merely about language, he draws his message far more broadly than that. Essentially, Wittgenstein's point is an ethical one which he derives from insights into language and the agency its foundations reveal.

This realm of "the mystical", which coincides with the limits of expression, is not an inaccessible, unknowable realm. Uniquely these limits, Wittgenstein says, "show" themselves in the form our representations take. This idea of the perspicuity, but ineffability, of form is one which Wittgenstein was to maintain throughout his entire philosophy. It is not in any sense an evasion tactic in the face of discovering that philosophy appears to be confronted with a field of enquiry that is unapproachable; the silence which Wittgenstein speaks of in his concluding remark (7) does not condemn philosophy but merely redirects its gaze away from what is expressed to what expression requires and manifests. Harmony and happiness for the metaphysical self is to be found between it and these manifest forms, not between it and the way the world happens to be and as experience reveals it.

Notes

¹ I traced Wittgenstein's linguistic equivalents of this prescription of identities in chapters II-IV and so I offer this brief summary of my investigation for convenience of reference.

Wittgenstein drew a distinction between facts and logical complexes (see Ch. III) I used this as a model, not as an example, of the prescribing of simple identities for objects. (For we could not be sure that any examples we may cite would never reach down to the ultimate level of simplicity with which Wittgenstein is dealing in his analysis and must therefore be treated with caution; models are not examples and they can be expected to fail to represent what they only model in certain respects.) Anyway, the prescribing of identities seemed to parallel a process outlined by Wittgenstein in *On Certainty* where propositions stating contingent facts become elevated to the status of logical identities ("norms of description"). Rather as a proposition such as 'The vase is green' is transformed into 'The green vase'. Thus are further propositions furnished with their subjects. It is a discoverable fact that flowers consist of petals, sepals, stamens and so forth but that fact can also serve as a basis of other propositions in which we speak of flowers and what we mean are subjects whose identity is, 'that which consists of petals, sepals, etc.'

Now I noted that, though such logical complexes might, in certain respects, serve as Wittgensteinian objects, still they were not simple objects (see chapter III). Simple objects, I argued, possessed identities that are given as terms falling within the domain of the iota operator and constituted of an elementary proposition elevated to the status of a logical proposition. For example, the elementary proposition 'ab' (or 'aRb') yields the identity of a as 'that which can be related R to b' (see chapter V). Thus is something "construed" as simple and identified by virtue of its possible relations with others. It is, in effect, allocated (prescribed) a logical place. In my words of chapter II the object is a "coordinate of a relation", a coordinate of logical space.

In linguistic terms— the arbitrary award of a name to a Wittgensteinian object is not simply a matter of labelling (a correlation of sign and signified). In naming a sign is awarded a whole syntax, its logical identity. No name gets a meaning outside of its (logical) context, some structure. So the labelling of everyday items is too simplistic a model for Wittgenstein's conception of naming simples.

² Propositional signs require projecting onto states of affairs in order to possess sense. In 6.341-6.342 Wittgenstein explains a model which he thinks serves to elucidate how various forms of representation might serve to represent a world without determining the contingent make-up of it (i.e., without influencing the facts). A variety of different styles of mesh overlay a world of facts (represented by an array of dots on an otherwise undistinguished background). The relative position of the dots are recorded, though of course they are not determined, by way of their individual relations

to coordinates of the mesh. Changing the mesh will not affect the relative positions of dots to each other. Those relations of dots make up the facts of the world. But there remains in this model the supposition of a common form to dots and all possible meshes however minimal which is consistent with Wittgenstein's conception of mirroring. This form is what I shall try to elucidate in my final chapter.

³ This procedure for Husserl (he terms it "objectification") is a pragmatically determined procedure but I think this results in no great distinction between Husserl's account and Wittgenstein's. In particular I think it is arguable that in supposing the award of a name and a syntax to an object is arbitrary Wittgenstein means no more than that nothing in the object itself is accountable. If that is correct, Wittgenstein's account leaves open the question whether it may not be pragmatic concerns that determine an agent in her allocation of names. This point is also helpful in explaining how non-simple objects might become treated as genuine simple objects.

⁴ See Monks (1990) pp146-150. The outcome of Wittgenstein's discussions with Engelmann are pertinent to the issue of the present chapter. Monk records:

Certainly [Wittgenstein] discussed the book in depth with Engelmann, and from the latter's 'Observation on the *Tractatus*' included in his memoir it is clear that it had been firmly impressed upon him that: 'logic and mysticism have here sprung from the same root'. The central thread that links the logic and the mysticism - the idea of the unutterable truth that makes itself manifest - was an idea that came naturally to Engelmann. (p150)

⁵ On this matter of the will, and more generally on the explication of Wittgenstein's views on values and the mystical in relation to his account of meaning, see Eddy Zemach (1964). Also, for a consideration of Wittgenstein's views of the mystical see Brian McGuinness (1966).

I disagree with Zemach's bifurcation of the human agent into essentially the willing and the thinking selves as if Wittgenstein was offering distinct accounts of our representations of the world and our actions within it.

The thinking I gives the world a form. The willing I gives it a sense - a significance. Both Godheads are transcendental, i.e. world constituting. (Zemach p. 49)

I find no evidence in the *Notebooks* that Wittgenstein thought of the metaphysical self as anything but a undivided self and in particular Zemach's interpretation of Wittgenstein's reference to two godheads strikes me as particularly odd. Wittgenstein says:

There are two godheads: the world and my independent I. (NB 74_{1E})

Context makes it clear that by "world" here Wittgenstein is thinking of the empirical world of facts and certainly that is the world he considers his metaphysical self is independent of. (The world as limit, of course, he identifies his metaphysical self with.)

In a nutshell, Zemach interprets Wittgenstein as holding that we separately represent facts to ourselves and then judge them good or evil. I don't deny that we do judge facts as good or evil but I do maintain that that faculty of judgment, of awarding significance to facts, is of a piece with the faculty required to allocate values to names in the process of representation. For example, Wittgenstein says

Or is the mistake here this: even *wanting* (thinking) is an activity of the will? (NB 77_a, underlining added) The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists. (NB 87_b)

The subject is the willing subject. (NB 87_a).

⁶ I said that this was an analogy, but the idea that valuation and meaning are closely associated in Wittgenstein's account stems not only from the fact that he supposed both to be ineffable but also from his remarks concerning the limits and the unity of the world. For example, he says that the good or bad exercise of the will changes not the facts but the limits of the world but that also those limits are identical with its substance, the totality of simple objects, logical space. Husserl, too, remarks on "a universal constitutive synthesis" (IP p. 54) which conceives of all thought and all objects ultimately as constituting a single overarching structure to cognition.

Wittgenstein, in his turn, speaks of a view of the world as a limited whole viewed as if from eternity (6.45, see also NB 83) and of interpreting the world according to a simple, single formula (5.54541).

⁷ There is no causal nexus he says, 5.136, and the only necessity is logical. This ties in with another remark Wittgenstein makes concerning the freedom of the will which he says consists of not knowing what actions actually lie in the future. Willing compels acts he says yet:

We could know [future actions] only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference. (5.1362)

So the problem of willing lies with accounting for it as both an act and as something which is indeed compelling.

⁸ It is instructive to compare Wittgenstein's later statements on mathematics in PR with these claims, and the condition of contextuality for meaning, especially since we know that, even during his early work, he considered both verbal language and mathematics as, in essence, "languages". See, for example §§152-3, especially:

Thus, it isn't enough to say that *p* is provable, what we must say is: provable according to a particular system.

Further, the proposition doesn't assert that *p* is provable in the system *S*, but in its own system, the system of *p*. That *p* belongs to the system *S* cannot be asserted, but must show itself.

You can't say *p* belongs to the system *S*; you can't ask which system *p* belongs to; you can't search for the system of *p*. Understanding *p* means understanding its system. If *p* appears to go over from one system into another, then *p* has,

in reality, changed its sense. (PR §153, with the exception of the final sentence, which would require the concept of varieties of language games (systems) to be introduced, the rest of this passage could easily apply to an elementary proposition such as 'aRb' or, in fact what comes to the same thing, some particular simple object since such an object is explicated in terms of its possible relations with other objects as the elementary proposition 'aRb', for example, gives it).

On this account all explanation is systematic (nomothetic). The contingent world of facts is accidental and unexplainable and independent of my metaphysical self. Causal explanations are explanations only on the assumption of the *a priori* of the causal law which establishes a logical space for such explanation. But, of course, such a law is itself not a part of the contingent world (see 6.35, 6.36, 6.36311, 6.37 - 6.372), rather, it represents the work of the metaphysical self which constitutes for itself (and thereby knows infallibly) such logical spaces of values and which make for a sense to the world and, ultimately, all possible explanation of it. The procedure behind this constitution was precisely that explored in Ch. III whereby propositions became elevated to a logical status.

The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences (6.363)

This procedure, however, has no logical justification but only a psychological one.

It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in fact be realized. (6.3631)

⁹ Compare for example Wittgenstein's introduction to PR written in 1930.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION: LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD

Introduction

The intention in this concluding chapter is not only to summarise and relate various strands of the thesis on meaning that have developed from my interpretation of Wittgenstein's work, more importantly I shall provide some empirical and metaphysical grounding for those views. Finally, in focusing on the latter I shall say both why the account fails in one crucial respect and how Wittgenstein's recognition of that failure constitutes the most significant difference between it and his later work.

Language

But first we need the insight that the *crucial problem* must have to do with the *relation between cognition and its object*, but in the *reduced* sense, according to which we are dealing not with human cognition, but with cognition in general, apart from any existential assumptions either of the empirical ego or of a real world. (IP p. 60, underlining added)

Logical and Empirical Investigations of Simple
Objects: A Contradiction in Wittgenstein's
View and Its Resolution

As part of the evidence to support his interpretation of simple objects as ontological simples Norman Malcolm (1986, p. 34) repeats the following anecdote from his own memoir (1962, p. 76) of

Wittgenstein:

I asked Wittgenstein whether, when he wrote the *Tractatus*, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter! It was clear that he regarded his former opinion as absurd.

This view dates from 1949. A similar attitude in 1929, this time regarding the forms of elementary propositions is to be found expressed in his (1966) proposed paper on logical form¹

We can only arrive at a correct analysis [of propositions] by, what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e. in a certain sense *a posteriori*, and not by conjecturing about *a priori* possibilities. (p. 32)

The point seems to be that Wittgenstein had at some stage supposed that future empirical evidence might be forthcoming as to the forms of simple objects and of elementary propositions.²

Malcolm's report, I think, cannot be accounted for simply by supposing that Wittgenstein's view of the *Tractatus* had become confused with the passage of years and even corrupted by his discussions of it with other philosophers, most notably those of the Vienna Circle.³

The view that science may one day discover real, language-independent, simple objects is difficult to reconcile both with the explicit ontology of the *Tractatus* and with what Wittgenstein says about simple objects themselves. In the first case, if it is correct that Wittgenstein held the view that real simple objects constituted the world and the conditions necessary for its representation, why would he begin his thesis with the unqualified and unambiguous claim that the world is the totality of facts, not things? If one believed that facts consisted of existing simple objects one would be forced to conclude that those were what the world consisted of. Wittgenstein said that the (logical) possibility of any fact, not what possible contingent facts happen to obtain in the world, lay with simple objects. Simple objects are the logical limits of the contingent world. It would have been quite a different thing to have claimed that the world was fundamentally identical with the totality of objects.

Secondly, we have to square the view that science might discover the true identity of simple objects with Wittgenstein's view that they are indescribable (logical forms, which are only show by propositions) and their names are indefinables. Whatever science discovers would certainly not comply with either of those two conditions. What science will discover will be facts about simple objects and that certainly contradicts Wittgenstein's characterisation of them. The only legitimate forms of language are those of the natural sciences (6.53) and if simple objects are essentially indescribable, then no scientific discovery, description or explanation could possibly concern them, certainly not with respect to their logically simple

form itself. Furthermore, simple objects are necessary, not contingent entities but "Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is". (5.634c) Besides, Wittgenstein must also have recalled his remarks to the effect that experience has nothing to say regarding logic, including, presumably, the logical forms that are simple objects (see, for example, 5.551, 5.552a, 5.634).

These two problems seem too obvious and basic for us to suppose Wittgenstein to have overlooked them, even allowing for the passage of time and his own re-evaluations. So how can we suppose he reconciled them for himself?

I began this thesis by noting the character of language that preoccupied Wittgenstein--its "productivity" (that it can be adapted, admittedly often with loss of economy of expression, to express any new sense), and its determinacy (that despite the vagaries of everyday language, even within the notion of ambiguity itself, is the supposition of alterative senses). Both of these features of language concern its limits. I also began this thesis by claiming that the role of simple objects is crucial in this respect, since they mark the limits of the world and ultimately language's range of expression. It is because simple objects provide the conditions underlying expressibility that they are themselves beyond expression. So how are they manifested? Not, I think, by scientific investigation as Norman Malcolm supposes, but indirectly:

To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world. (5.4711)

It seems that Wittgenstein's position was that, rather than science discovering the forms of empirical reality, philosophy's "logical" investigation of language must expose them. That, for Husserl, would amount to exposing the presuppositions of natural science.

For the present I want to give a possible account of how Wittgenstein could hold these apparently conflicting views about simple objects. To anticipate my argument one has to only recall one fundamental point concerning the object of Wittgenstein's enquiry which I first raised in chapter I,

It now seems possible to give the most general propositional form: that is, to give a description of the propositions of any sign language whatsoever.

It is clear that only what is essential to the most general propositional form may be included in its description.

The general form of the proposition is: This is how things stand. (4.5, the emphases are Wittgenstein's own)

There are three points significant for my thesis here but only the following⁴ is of consequence for my present discussion: Wittgenstein is making clear that his focus is on any possible language or form of representation whatsoever. His focus is on what the Hintikkas (1986) termed "language as the universal medium" (of expression or representation). This distinguishes Wittgenstein's investigation from those of contemporary linguistics. The former sets itself the task of uncovering a universal form for all existing and all possible languages, which is to say that, for Wittgenstein's purposes, any empirical linguistic investigation, even one cast so wide as to encompass all existing and dead languages, would not be sufficiently

general. Or, conversely a sufficiently deep investigation of any one language could successfully reveal this form.

Now this fundamental and universal form Wittgenstein assumes is what reality itself must possess. It may be significant for any human language whether this world really is composed of some form of atomic entities. For instance, recent claims about the elemental status of quarks might be significant for the argument that this world is, because of this determinate atomistic constitution, open to representation by existing human languages. But is the quark-constitution of this world a necessary condition of all possible (representable) worlds? Human languages may reflect our terrestrial origins in ways unique to the human condition on earth. Just as any one propositional form might be a contingent and superficial form so too is the form of this world that they reveal.

To put this another way, might the universe not have evolved differently? It seems as if, by the very nature of the question, this could only be answered speculatively, though it is clear that the facts could have been otherwise. It does not seem to me to be ruled out that the universe might have had some other constitution, for it appears to be an empirical claim that quarks are the simple objects of this universe and that surely applies to any other particles that a future physics might conjecture or discover. But there could be no empirical demonstration that no other simple atomic particles are possible, for surely it is only epistemologically the case that I can imagine, for example, nothing other than particles that fall within the confines of space and time. If metaphysical forms do give rise to

our language's forms then it is only to be expected that I could not think, much less express, alternatives to those forms.

Of course, the more fundamental form that I am about to suggest is not an alternative to this world's form but is, I shall suppose, a form fundamental to all possible representable worlds.

If I am correct in this, then the discovery that quarks are the fundamental elements of this universe would not be sufficient as a description of the universal form Wittgenstein supposes it must share with any other, such that both are representable.

So the fundamental form which is manifest universally by all propositions may not in itself be the real existing atoms proposed by physics (nor, for that matter, any elemental cognitive or brain states proposed by cognitive science⁶). It is not surprising that the material analyses of natural sciences unearth a material ontology but that in itself does not show that these material conditions are identical with the conditions Wittgenstein hypothesised *a priori* as necessary for the determination of sense. Such necessary conditions do not lie within what is to be represented alone but rather with what it, and the language used for its representation, share. And language is never descriptive of what it shares with reality, rather, by what it shares with reality is it descriptive.

It is still the case that the "real" atoms proposed now or in the future by science may well be fundamental to this world's representation. Wittgenstein could maintain that science rather than philosophy would provide the identities of objects (and describe the facts it discovers)⁶ while still maintaining that it should be the

prerogative of philosophy, not science, to say (or rather show) what is essential to these particular atoms, this world's ontology (namely, that they manifest the essential simplicity requisite of any representable world).

To put this another way, that this world may consist ultimately of unanalysable quarks and is by virtue of that representable, does not mean that some other world, as a matter of fact not consisting of quarks, is unrepresentable. It is up to philosophy to show what such an alternative world must be like but science must identify this world's atoms.

It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have *something* - a form - in common with it. (2.022)

What makes such a universe imaginable at all? Its imaginability lies in its sharing with this world, even this world as present day science gives it, a common form - logical simplicity (and compositeness).

I shall argue that this notion of simplicity is synonymous with the notion of any imaginable world's distinguishability and its consisting of facts.

The Manifestation of the Universal Form of Language and the World

Wittgenstein maintained that it should be possible to foresee (see, for example, NB 897-10) the logical forms that are the basis of this relation of language to the world (cf. NB 897). The question is how such *a priori* forms can be expressed given that in their essence they do not constitute facts? 'Object' is a variable (4.1272) and I

have argued that it is a term that is infinitely, analogically interpretable such that a language employing the concept is infinitely adaptable to any world whatsoever whatever happens to be its ontology. Consequently the general form of a proposition composed of such terms is itself a variable, or better, a prototype, which is a manifestation of the form of any legitimate elementary proposition. The concept of the prototypical proposition is crucial. If a prototype alone, in which no objects are named, shows the essence of reality (does not possess it but is it, as Eddy Zemach, 1964, expresses it, p. 46) then whatever is the (describable) nature of real objects named in propositions, that nature must be redundant with regard to that form (simplicity) and our knowledge of it.

Exactly what is this fundamental form of elementary propositions? I have already remarked that Wittgenstein dismisses the two obvious contenders $\exists x$ and aRb . Predicational and relational propositional forms are, as Wittgenstein was later (1929) to express it:

[T]he norms of *our particular* language into which we project in ever so many different ways ever so many different logical forms. And for this very reason we can draw no conclusions - except very vague ones - from the use of these norms as to the actual logical form of the phenomena described. (p. 33, italics added, see also 5.5571)⁷

Corresponding to the forms of facts (simple objects in direct combination) elementary propositions must consist of concatenations of names (5.55, 3.14, 3.141). This itself is an *a priori* insight and owes nothing to any empirical investigation of ordinary language (5.555).⁸ Thus we speak of prototypes of elementary propositions "quite apart from any individual cases." (So there cannot be an hypothesis about

this form.) I have ventured to propose that the prototypical form of any elementary proposition is best represented by 'ab' (cf. 4.22).

But we cannot *a priori* foresee any individual elementary proposition since that requires an acquaintance with the corresponding fact. Substituting names into the prototype elementary proposition pins the prototype to the world but all that such individual propositions have in common is the manner in which they bear a congruence with the world and the prototype.

This fundamental form also amounts to a revelation of the logical form of objects since objects' forms are merely the possibility of their combinations. Substituting particular names into the prototype analogically interprets the propositional sign just as a substitution of a name analogically interprets 'object'. There is nothing in common between such distinctive objects as J.L. Austin's "medium sized pieces of dry goods" or Wittgenstein's "dance of motes in the air" except the possibility of them having simple relations with other objects. And since 'relation' itself is a variable, this does not amount to any real similarity. None of this would be the case, presumably, with any examples of ultimately unanalysable atoms that science claims to uncover.

The emphasis on a search for a prototype marks precisely how Wittgenstein's investigation is an investigation of the essence of all possible languages and how it is irrelevant to that investigation just what, atomistically, is the make-up of any particular world or its inhabitants.

So prototypical form is evident *a priori*. Experience Wittgenstein seems to think, would only obscure such observations (intuitions) by distracting us into observing details of our particular world and our particular language alone. This is why analysis of propositions, if it is supposed as reaching down through languages' many surfaces to the deepest of structure, cannot pay any regard to reductive empirical analysis which quickly loses touch with the proposition's meaning and its logical unity.

It remains to say if and how objects and their relations are manifest in our experience of the world. In particular, since substitutions of names into argument places in prototypes are not arbitrary (they "hang together") they are not distinct from functions in being syncategorematic. Likewise the elemental particulars of facts are inconceivable except as parts of those facts. This marks their essential difference from complex objects about which there are facts to be known and described and which are individual entities that can exist independently of other objects and be named.

The World

Yes, but has nature nothing to say here? Indeed she has - but she makes herself audible in another way.

"You'll surely run up against existence and non-existence somewhere!" But that means against facts, not concepts.

(Wittgenstein, Z §364)

Real or Formal Determinacy?
An Ontological Dichotomy

"How is the world brought to expression?" was how I expressed Wittgenstein's focus in my opening chapter. In developing my interpretation of his solution I have been critical of both prevailing alternatives. Realists' notions of simple objects I have found both unintelligible and inconsistent with most of what Wittgenstein has to say, or rather, says he cannot say, about them.

Conversely, formalists' claims, such as:

It was not Wittgenstein's intention to base a metaphysics upon logic or the nature of our language. He was not saying that there is something by which our grammar is determined, and therefore he did not try to infer features of the world from our language. (McGuinness, 1981, p. 62)

...are simply impossible to square with that one recurring, central theme of Wittgenstein's early work, that in its essence language mirrors reality.

The theory of logical portrayal [...] says [...]: In order for it to be possible that a proposition should be true or false [...] something in the proposition must be identical with reality. (NB 15e, namely, logical form, 2.18)

It is true that Wittgenstein considered our everyday propositional forms as superficial and without ontological consequence. But the concatenation of names is a more profound and deeper form that reflects, immediately and objectively, the deployment of objects in reality.

In considering the question of the existence of simple objects I noted Ernst Specht's contention (see Ch. III) that, for the later Wittgenstein, identities of objects were drawn up in close conformity

with certain facts of nature and I have found that a similar view was already in evidence in Wittgenstein's early work. Those identities were drawn up in terms of their possible simple relations expressed in elementary propositions. So an elementary proposition being true necessitates the identification of its subject (as that proposition portrayed them), namely, as whatever could partake in the relation the proposition asserted to be the case. This relation between truth and its conditions (object identities) I have spoken of as a kind of "reciprocity" of support. The use of certain propositions as norms in the constitution of object identities I have characterised as intentional (and the theory of meaning issuing from that as phenomenological).

"The principal of representation" Wittgenstein sought (NB 23₉) dealt with the essential conditions for truth. This in itself he thought manifested the fundamental, logically articulated form necessary to any representation. Furthermore, just as a simple, non-articulated sign could be neither true nor false (NB 8₇), neither could anything non-articulated (a simple object) be the subject of a proposition.

My explanation in terms of structure is only as good as the account I have provided of objects. That issue I might have seemed, if not to have ignored, at least evaded, by means of the strategy of referring the identities of objects to the structures they subsist. Such circularity is an inevitable characteristic of any holistic account. "Objects" or "things", as a consequence, I have only been able to describe, as did Wittgenstein himself, as akin to the

variables which supposedly name them. "Object" itself is a "pseudo-concept" (4.1272) which does work as a general theoretical factotem, infinitely analogically interpretable. That in itself means the concept says nothing.

There are two issues left: what is the nature of human experience of the world such that it supports my conception of simple objects and what exactly are the minimum ontological conclusions to be reached about any world from this theory of meaning and the role of "objects." It will prove an advantage for its overall credibility if these two aspects of my thesis can be tied together. And I say "my" thesis since, though obviously derived from Wittgenstein's account, the views that follow are my own. The resulting account is holistic and takes the form of a hybrid of phenomenalism and phenomenology.

Distinguishing and Relating Simple objects as a Cognitive Process

Let me return to my central question, what it means for something to be a thing. What is the essence of "thingness" or "objecthood"?

Phenomenalism has the virtue of providing a direct link between experience and analysis. Simple, unanalysable (presumably because they lie at the threshold of perceptibility) data, furnished by the senses, are taken to be empirical atoms from which the perceived world is constructed. There are two important objections to this: how such construction and its correlate, analysis, is to be conceived and the intelligibility of so-called "sense-data" as fundamentals of experience.

The first problem has a long history. Perceived complex objects of experience are not merely contingent compounds of sensed qualities. But that a vase is some colour, shape etc. is a necessary property of material objects. Thus the problem of phenomenally accounting for the complex world is that of conceiving of its logical construction from sense data or of accounting for the logical characteristics of sense data.

Secondly, how does the account of my perceiving simple unanalysable elements of qualities square with experience itself? Not very well I contend. There is an important reason why, whenever I imagine some example of a sense datum, a patch of blue perhaps, that it is always finite in extension and made perspicuous by virtue of a background it is distinguishable from (spatially or temporally). To have an utterly undistinguishable view is to have no view at all (or arguably, constitutes a case of sensory deprivation). I suggest we would not see such a 'view' as a colour let alone see it as blue⁹ for what would it be that I identify? Would not my experience be the same if my entire view spatially and across time, were of blue or of white? (I did not say what I experienced was the same, I am speaking of awareness here, not the object of my awareness).

However, it must be conceded that an account of simple objects should offer some kind of ontology other than that bleak theoretical description- simple objects, and it would be greatly enhanced by the kind of account phenomenism offers with regard to the role of experience too.

Now, corresponding to my claim that data of our senses are unintelligible except in distinction from other data, it seems to me that simple objects are essentially entities distinguished from all else. Here the temptation to model the case for simple objects on that of ordinary objects has to be resisted.¹⁰ As I remarked above, complex objects can have independent existence, they are describable, there are facts to be known about them. Thus complex objects can be identified quite independent of any relations they may or may not have with other objects. Quite the opposite is the case for simple objects. We cannot conceive of a simple object except in terms of its possible relations to others. We could not, for example, first identify a simple object and then subsequently discover a relation it has with another.¹¹ Simple objects and their relations are of a piece.

Is this it perhaps - in this view the object is seen together with space and time instead of in space and time?
(NB 83_a)

How does this claim fit with the characterisation I have given of the fundamental nature of our experience, that it is an "experience" of a distinction within the world rather than of an identity?

If we focus on "the moment" of the drawing of a distinction what we find is that, in that one move, objects are established of a piece with their relatedness. In the one act of distinguishing one "thing" from another we recognise their similarity too. We so to speak, accept the categorial (i.e., logical) basis of their relation. For example, perceiving two juxtaposed colours, notes, or odours not only means seeing their differences (seeing them in relation to one another), in shade, volume or pungency, for example, respectively; it also means

recognising them both as colours, sounds or smells.¹² So to note a distinction between objects is of a piece with recognising their categorial similarity and their relatedness. (I should emphasise once again at this juncture that this is singularly the case for simple objects.)

The process of objectification in such an instance is simply a matter of attributing object status to whatever lies either side of the distinction that is drawn. That "whatever" accounts for the variable status of 'object.'

Analogous with marking the coordinate of a point in space where it matters not how long the arms are of the cross lines I draw (for the coordinate is the ideal point of their intersection), so it matters not the extent of the objects I distinguish at the simple "point" of distinction.¹³ That simple point and relation is the basis of the distinguished objects' simplicity and identity.

Note too, that the identities of the objects are not actually stated as such in our expression of these "experiences", it is a state of affairs that we report- -'aRb', a point in logical space (3.4) marking a relation, not some object's identity. This corresponds with my previous claim that it is elementary propositions, not names, that are the true atoms of meaning and the real analysans of propositions. Thus there is a holism to the resulting ontology corresponding to the holism of sense that I have argued for. Phenomenologically speaking, objects are "moments", not pieces or fragments, of states of affairs and are to be identified in terms of them.

My point can thus be summarise- -that just as in my analysis of elementary propositions in which the objects are given in terms of their relation to the original proposition as parts to a whole, so correspondingly in experience to perceive objects is already to conceive of their relatedness. Both logical and empirical analysis are thus holistic. In a sense I do not initially distinguish one colour from another, rather, in recognising their distinction the concept (the logic) of colour is recognised (as given). In this way the phenomenalist's problem of "logically constructing" complex objects from sense data is averted for simple objects come with their logical combineability already supplied.¹⁴

My examples so far have been limited to colours, and I have suggested a version of phenomenism, perhaps more appropriately thought of as "relativistic phenomenism", as the basis of objectification. But this form seems to me to be imaginable for any species of "object" including abstract non-perceived objects. The distinguishing and relating of such immaterial "objects" would not be quite so different a process as might be first thought when the cognitive aspect of the distinguishing of material objects in perception and their apprehended relatedness is fully appreciated. In phenomenism much is made of the ineffable nature of the primitive sense data themselves and of course this throws up possibly insurmountable problems with respect to privacy for the theory of meaning arising out of it. By contrast, what is truly ineffable in my account is the act of distinguishing itself. I neither name nor describe that ideally simple "experience". So insubstantial a "moment"

is it, that I cannot even claim it as "anything" I can be acquainted with. It is an awareness without expression, a phenomenon known only through its effects (objects).

This "experience" is surely the true anoetic experience--an "experience" that cannot itself be brought to consciousness (in the sense of finding expression in thought) for it is prior to all expression as a condition of it. By contrast, the objects that arise out of this "experience", though they too do not find expression in language they do show themselves both in this act of distinguishing and in the propositions reporting states of affairs.

As these simple distinctions at the same time amount to logical distinctions, at this primitive level phenomenalism and phenomenology coincide. Or rather, with its emphasis on sense data alone, phenomenalism becomes a special case of phenomenology.

Reality as a Continuum: an Analogy

And nothing seems to speak against infinite divisibility.

(NB 62_e)

[W]hat vacillates is our determinations, not the world.

(NB 62_{1c})

The original question of this chapter was whether an ontology of real simple objects is required as a condition of determinate sense. So far I have argued that by unanalysable object Wittgenstein need not have, and did not, mean contingently unanalysable but logically unanalysable. Simple objects are logically simple. And I have argued that sense is determined no less by naming objects construed as simple than it would be by naming real simple objects.

The preceding discussion of the relational nature of simple objects and their basis in our distinguishing reality could to justify only epistemological simples which are merely factitious, not objective, productions of our contingent human make-up. So I want to consider an analogy for the kind of "world" that my interpretation seems to be indicating in order to show that such subjectivity is not a corollary of such human/world interactions. The "kind" of reality I have in mind corresponding with the distinguishability condition is that of a continuum. Continuing (despite its dangers) with my example of the drawing of distinctions of colour, the best analogy for reality seems to be that of the colour spectrum for white light.

The naive realist would insist on the spectrum only serving as a model of the world of empirical and real atoms if it was not continuous but discrete, i.e., blocks of colour with firm boundaries. This is a stronger condition to place on reality and its representation than is required by the model of the continuous visible spectrum between ultra-violet and infra-red which seamlessly shades or merges to produce a single band of continuously graded colour. If this latter model can be made consistent with the minimum conditions for the determination of sense laid down by Wittgenstein then it will also have provided more fundamental conditions by covering a greater range of possible worlds.

I shall argue that, that a world is constituted of discrete atoms is sufficient but not necessary to it being representable, but that a world is distinguishable at all is both necessary and sufficient for its representation.

There are two basic objections to this continuous spectrum analogy. Both concern the determination of sense and both involve arguing that such a "world" is indeterminate and that any determination of sense therefore represents a form posited of reality, not given with it. The broad (Kantian) conclusion then follows, there could be no logical enquiry that could have ontological implications.

The first objection begins by noting that a genuine continuous spectrum is infinitely divisible, like the continuum of space. Any actual division of that will represent an arbitrary division. But that is like arguing that since the shapes we pick out in cloud formations are subjective (you see it as a pig in the sky, I see it as a face) that the cloud in fact has no particular shape at all. Two different observers may divide the colour band differently but that in itself does not detract from the fact that there are different colours across the band from red to violet. The division of a piece of string might be arbitrary, but that it is so divisible shows (what is objective) the essential nature of length itself. Likewise, though my distinguishing of colours may be arbitrary, that in itself can be ontologically significant, objectively speaking. My distinguishings do mark real differences. Ultimately the possibility (though perhaps never realisable, epistemologically speaking) of determining sense rests on an objective relationship of language to reality, not one that requires human interpretation. It is sufficient for that, that reality and the signs used in its representation are both distinguishable. This first objection seems to represent a confusion between the determinate nature of the continuum and the determination

of it which representation requires. My point is that there may be a problem determining exactly what the continuum is in itself but that is unimportant and merely an epistemological, not representational problem. That the continuum could be represented at all even if we had a god's objectivity is not affected. Representability is conditional on distinguishability. In fact, as Wittgenstein says, "nothing seems to speak against infinite divisibility" and that in itself is what language mirrors of reality.

The second objection can be expressed in two parts:

- A. If the continuum is genuinely a seamless gradation of colours then in naming any two colours and proposing a particular relation between them (i.e., stating a proposition about the world) I fail to determine a sense since the colour band for any colour is itself indeterminate.
- B. The infinite number of ways of dividing up this "world" means there never could be a definitive description of such a realm

Objection A is the substance of Peter Carruther's objection to this model:

Think, for example, of the colour spectrum: if this is infinitely divisible, then at whatever level of description you choose to define the boundary between two colours, that boundary will still be vague relative to the further analysis which is still possible. [...] Only if there exists atoms of colour, so to speak, will it be possible to draw a sharp boundary. (1990, p. 47)

What Carruthers says is certainly correct if the determination of sense were conditional on there being discrete atoms of colour (i.e., a banded, not continuous, spectrum). Then, certainly, the continuous spectrum "reality" would be unrepresentable in the determinate manner required.

But I have argued that Wittgenstein's identification of simple objects with their logical forms, their relations, does not require that there exist determinate, that is, simple, objects. To identify an object, a, as 'that which can be related R to b' leaves the nature of the object itself, in this case some colour, indeterminate. In place of the object's determination (simplicity) Wittgenstein has a determination of relation. If the colours of a spectrum are genuinely changing continuously along its length then wherever a line is drawn then there are (a priori and independent of them being distinguishable by human perception) two distinguishable colours either side of that distinction. The indeterminacy of the distinguished colours (objects) need not feature in their identities provided that their identities are given in terms of the determinate relations which arise with the distinction we have drawn. The distinction we draw is an ideal point of course.

Just as names achieve meaning by virtue of them occurring related to and distinguishable from others in a proposition, so too objects get an identity by virtue of being distinguishable, And just as a name is an arbitrary sign, a variable, so too is an object a variable, a thing that is indeterminate and indeterminable except in terms of its relations to other objects. The essence of both proposition and fact, language and the world, is structure, not the entities composing that structure. Nowhere does Wittgenstein speak of objects, in themselves, being determinate.

So, corresponding to the contextual principle Wittgenstein lays down for the meaning of names there is a principle of, what might be

called, the relativity of perceptual, or better, apprehendable, elements in the world. The object so distinguished is the "object-in-meaning" (see chapter V) whose identity is given in terms of its relation to what it is distinguished from and related to. The "object-of-reference" (see chapter V) corresponds to whatever it is that becomes objectified in the process of drawing the distinction, a band in the spectrum for example which, in itself, is indeterminate and therefore mute; it has no quiddity so to speak.

As for the objection B, that an infinite divisible reality could never receive complete description, that in itself is no objection to the possibility of determinate sense but only to the possibility of total description. Nowhere does Wittgenstein make complete knowledge a condition of the determinacy of sense.

An Overview of the World

The colour spectrum analogy is intended to suggest an alternative model for metaphysical reality. In place of a subsisting set of objects is a subsisting network or structure (a logical space). In this alternative scheme "objects" simply are the outcome of our recognising any distinction and the logical relatedness of the parts distinguished.

In phenomenology a central concept is that of object and the associated notion of identity and sameness. In Wittgenstein's scheme simplicity has a similar function to sameness. What I am concerned with here is the metaphysical grounds of these phenomenological claims. "What does the logical identity of sign and thing signified

really consist in?" (NB 3₃) To this end I have tried to explicate these grounds ontologically and empirically by suggesting that the minimum conditions necessary for anything, a world, to be representable is its distinguishability.

I have also argued for a variant of phenomenalism's atoms of experience (sense-data)- -not particular qualities but particular distinctions are most fundamental and characteristic to experience. That is, most directly, our awareness is of differences, not identities; the latter are conditional on the former. And because this in itself implies a cognitive content (by virtue of our recognising the relations and the basis of those relations, between whatever we distinguish), then reality, in terms of whatever is representable, can include anything, not just material things, which are distinguishable parts.¹⁵

Since the reality corresponding to the senses of propositions is nothing more than its logical, not contingent, parts (for those are what are named and their relations are what propositions picture); and since naming (which, taken alone, is non-expressive) and describing exhaust the resources of (propositional) language (as Wittgenstein conceives it), then the conditions necessary to such linguistic devices must themselves be ineffable. That is why distinguishing the metaphysical reality is fundamentally an anoetic experience and known only by an *a priori* consideration of the nature of, and conditions necessary for, ordinary experience of what is the case and of the forms of our representations (see NB 31₆₋₇).

The essence of the world suggested by this investigation of the logic of language is its heterogeneity. No world is thinkable that does not possess distinguishable parts. That representable reality is necessarily heterogeneous is, of course, a very limited conclusion, but that is precisely what we should expect of an investigation drawn so widely.

Conversely, no world could be imagined that was homogenous. An entirely amorphous reality could not, in Wittgenstein's view, be represented or even thought of. Wittgenstein's stronger claim is that there could be no such world. To understand that one only has to recall those opening remarks of the *Tractatus* -that any world whatsoever consists of facts and that their necessary articulation is the basis of representation (clearly a rejection of a Kantian dualism between the phenomenal and metaphysical realms). In Wittgenstein's view the so-called phenomenal world that language presents truly does reflect the fundamental nature of metaphysical reality by sharing its articulated form. In this respect the two facts, 'ab' and that a is related to b, are not separate.

But the distinctions that such a composite reality manifests does not in itself provide a fixed ontology of objects, rather, as we have seen, objectification is consequent on our recognition of any distinction which in itself only fixes the relatedness of the distinguished entities and does not inform us of the objects themselves. The objects themselves effectively shrink to mere coordinates of those relations; their actual constitution becomes of

no consequence for the determinate representation of the atomic fact they compose.

The object in itself is a point of reference (the so-called "object-of-reference" and remains obscure.¹⁶ Only the "object-in-meaning" is determined (identified), i.e., construed as simple by being apprehended in terms of how it relates to others under one form, by colour, location etc.

The objects identified in this manner, in so far as they do not mark a recognition of independent objects which are simple in themselves, are phenomenological in character. Seeing objects as if they were simple thereby answers the demands for the determination of sense at the same time as introducing an element of agency into the language-world relation. It is this relation of congruence of forms that I shall finally turn to.

Language and the World

The External and Internal Relations Between Language and the World: Truth and Truth Conditions

Wittgenstein speaks of the determination of sense being subsequent on some arbitrary stipulations. What is arbitrary is the assignment of names to objects. Names alone in no way determine their meanings, in a significant way they have no meaning. Merely naming anything is rejected by Wittgenstein as not significant in a theory of meaning. What is significant is that:

The proposition is a picture of a situation only in so far as it is logically articulated. (A simple - non-articulated - sign can be neither true nor false.) NB 87

Logic is interested only in reality. And thus in sentences ONLY in so far as they are pictures of reality.

But how CAN a SINGLE word be true or false? At any rate it cannot express the thought that agrees or does not agree with reality. That must be articulated.

A single word cannot be true or false in this sense: it cannot agree with reality, or the opposite. (NB 9₂₋₄)

Language mirrors reality and so constitutes its truth conditions.

Names in propositions copy objects in facts both in terms of number and their determinate combinations.

My gloss on naming simple objects is that the identities of the objects so named result from, and are given in terms of, the simple distinctions and relations that make up the most fundamental forms of our "experience" of the world (and from the subsequent elevation of those "experiences", as they are recorded in propositions, to the status of norms of description (see chapter II). The resulting constitution of objects' identities institutes a relation between language and the world that is intentional such that the names cited in any elementary proposition cannot fail to reach their objects. This relation I have referred to as a "fundamental semantic relation" which I contrasted with the pragmatic nature of reference whereby a description, contingent on its correctness, picks out its object and supplies it with an identity (see chapter III).

So it looks as if the logical identity between sign and things signified were not necessary, but only an internal, logical, relation between the two. (The holding of such a relation incorporates in a certain sense the holding of a certain kind of fundamental - internal - identity.)

The point is only that the logical part of what is signified should be completely determined just by the logical part of the sign and the method of symbolizing: sign and method of symbolizing together must be logically identical with what is signified. (NB 19_{6,7})

This separation of objects' identities from the notion of truth value is crucial. For Wittgenstein the relation between name and simple object I interpreted as obtaining by a mapping of proposition onto fact (thus yielding names' syntaxes); thus it is distinct from the direct and independent correlation of name and complex object (of acquaintance). (And it must be so for it is assumed it obtains despite our ignorance of simple objects.)

We have already noted how Wittgenstein's investigation is into the universal conditions of representation. He says: "What is common to all representations is that they can be right or wrong, true or false." (NB 21₁₀) This corresponds with the notion that any world whatsoever consists of facts, i.e. is complex, distinguishable (heterogenous), contingent. Now we see that the condition of this universal form of representation must receive a quite separate account from that of the truth relation between language and the world.

The method of portrayal must be completely determinate before we can compare reality with the proposition at all in order to see whether it is true or false. (NB 23_e)

Too little is made of the difference between the relation of truth and the "relation" of truth conditions between language and the world. It can be stated both in terms of the objectivity of the congruence of forms of language and reality and in terms of the simples which constitute them. In the former, to say of any two things that they are identical is not to say that one is true of the other (though to assert they are congruent would, of course, be to say what is true, or false). 'ab' and that ab are both facts according to Wittgenstein and they thereby share a structure. Possessing such a structure is a

property of each fact, not something true of each fact. Propositions, not facts, possess truth values. Such a congruence of forms involves no element of meaning, that is why it can be posited as a precondition of meaning.

In the latter case, as truth conditions for propositions (the substance of the world), objects cannot themselves be truly represented. That was the kernel of my objection to the naive realist's insistence on the reality of simple objects and the possibility of scientific investigation of them. But in also rejecting the purely formalist account care needs to be taken not to be forced to the conclusion that there is after all something that is real about them, for that would still be representable.

The simplicity of simple objects ensures that in Wittgenstein's view they are unrepresentable because not articulated. That much is undoubtedly Wittgenstein's view. But in my interpretation another account of the ineffable nature of metaphysical reality emerges. The distinctions which give rise to objects (and their relations) are themselves beyond expression. They are "experiences" quite distinct from the experience we have of facts. I should have written of "distinctions" too, to mark them off from everyday, pragmatic distinctions that are describable and identify objects' differences by virtue of their complexity.

Anyhow, these "distinctions" are beyond expression for to say, for example, "This one is different from that" in itself says nothing. (Cf. Wittgenstein's claim that to say of two things that they are identical is to say nothing, (NB 4., 19_s and 5.53. 5.5303.) The

assertion of their distinction is redundant. In speaking of this and that we already show they are distinct, the statement of their distinctness is a tautology.

Another way to express the inexpressible nature of these fundamental distinguishings is again to draw a parallel from Wittgenstein's claims about identity. Namely, it is not a relation between objects (5.5301, I take him to mean an external relation here). Likewise it is not a contingent fact that I point to when I distinguish this shade of red from that (only if I say, "There is here a shade of red different from that one there" do I assert a fact). The difference between the two shades is not a real relation but a logical distinction (a logical, internal relation). As such, without that real relation linking the two "objects" there is no fact to report. This is another way of seeing the language-world relation as intentional. This internal relation between thought and its object or between a proposition and its subject (some state of affairs) is not a real relation as we saw in chapter VIII.

Objectivity and the Development of Wittgenstein's Thinking On Meaning

It remains to account for the point of failure of the thesis I have been attributing to Wittgenstein. The course of this explanation is predictable to anyone already familiar with Wittgenstein's later work. There the notion of the determinate character of sense, its objectivity, is not so much refuted as reinterpreted in the light of a growing awareness of the consequences of language for philosophical

investigation and expression (of such topics as necessity, truth, and objectivity). The early Wittgenstein had already claimed to be self-conscious in this respect. But what is absent from most of his musings in the *Notebooks* is sufficient development of such insights as seeing both the precision of instructions as apparently imprecise as, "Stand roughly here" and the inherent imprecision of "Stand exactly here." This elemental pragmatism is just the kind of development we might expect to go along with Wittgenstein's widening conception of his contextual thesis, from that of the logician's attention to the unity of the proposition as a context for the meaning of each name, to that of the "language game" and even "form of life.. These two closely related issues, the (objective) determination of sense and the role of context, mark on my interpretation the areas of greatest development in Wittgenstein's thinking on meaning.

In my introduction to this thesis I stressed the point that it is not we that express that p, but 'p' that expresses that p (reconsider Wittgenstein's treatment of modal propositions discussed in chapter IX). There is no need of a middle man. This amounts to asserting that sense itself is determinate, not determined by its use. Sense is objective. Wittgenstein states this euphemistically at 5.473 by remarking that logic must take care of itself and in the *Notebooks* he adds that this is "an extremely profound and important insight." (NB 2₂) At 6.124 he links this insight to the condition of an objective world:

It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols - whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character - are tautologies. This contains the decisive point. We have

said that some things are arbitrary in the symbols that we use and that some things are not. In logic it is only the latter that express: but that means that logic is not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself.

There is no doubt that the point of Wittgenstein's thesis is to account for (not to prove) that sense is objectively determinate. But it is also certainly the case that if we find this account plausible then we are more likely to be persuaded, if we are not already, that sense is indeed determinate. So I shall begin by outlining how objectivity arises given the interpretation I have argued and then move on to say why I think the case for it fails.

Objectivity

Must not the possibility of the representing relation be given by the proposition itself.

The proposition itself sunders what is congruent with it from what is not congruent. (NB 24₂₋₃)

Propositions reach out to their respective subjects by way of the (logical) "shapes" of facts in the world. They are logical-iconic signs. 'Shapes' of course is intended as a metaphor of "form" and it is forms that are compared. Also in that process names come to be identified with their respective objects. In the former process the content of the proposition is ignored, it is the proposition as prototype or "proto-picture" that is held up against reality (NB 32₄). Such a comparison is not empirical otherwise the proposition would be judged true or false. Yet it must be the case that the treatment of a proposition as a proto-picture must be part of our experience of

judging its truth for we recognise in the proposition what has to be the case for it to be true. In other words we apprehend its meaning.

And the difference between these two relations, truth and truth conditions, lies with the objectivity of the latter.

The difficulty of my theory of logical portrayal was that of finding a connexion between the signs on paper and a situation outside in the world

I always said that truth is a relation between the proposition and the situation, but could never pick out such a relation.

The representation of the world by means of completely generalised propositions [prototypes] might be called the impersonal representation of the world. (NB 19₁₁-20₁₋₂, underlining added)

I can be mistaken in judging a proposition's truth but I cannot be in error with regard to it possessing a sense for that is an objective relation, Wittgenstein argues, an internal relation (NB 9_e). In a word, it is intentional. Just as no thought can fail to reach its object, so too, no proposition can fail to reach its sense (some possible situation, 3.11, see also 2.201).

We do not judge a proposition's congruence with reality for there may well be no corresponding fact for comparison. Besides, we could not judge a nonsense which would be required in judging a proposition as non-congruent. A proposition, and this must be evident to us as language users in some way, by itself "sunders what is congruent with it from what is not congruent" (NB 25₂₋₃) by virtue of its "logical identity" with its subject. This is what I meant by saying the congruence relation, like intentionality, is not a real relation but marks the holding of a kind of fundamental, internal identity (NB 19_e).

So apprehending the congruence of a proposition is not actually a comparison at all any more than it was the case for Husserl that he recognised the object of his thought by comparison of the thought with some real object.¹⁷ The state of affairs the proposition is thought to be congruent with is in some manner internal to the proposition itself. Of course the content is absent, but what is actually present in the proposition is the form of the possible situation it is held to represent (as the proposition "contains" its own form too, which is the prototype from which it was produced by the substitution of names into its argument places).

Now a proposition alone can be understood, clearly I do not understand it by acquaintance with its subject (some fact). Recognising some observable fact as corresponding to a proposition does amount to a real comparison of forms but that is subsequent to my recognition of the logical forms of both independently of each other (truth conditions).

The projection of a propositional sign, that Wittgenstein speaks of in the 3.1's, is the analogue of the directionality of thought towards its object spoken of in phenomenology. In effect such directionality takes you nowhere, certainly not to any existing object. It is a pseudo-procedure, a projection of intention. Wittgenstein says (cf. 3.1, 3.11) we perceive by the senses the expression of a proposition by a written sentence. Clearly this is loose talk. All I literally "see" (all I am caused to see) are scratch marks and to see these as separate, let alone as names, is to apprehend them in relation to their syntactical deployment (3.326,

3.327). It is by virtue of names' syntax that this intention is manifested. The form the fundamental syntax takes (for it cannot be simply the syntax ordinary names engage in in everyday propositions) is the concatenation of names in elementary propositions. And that corresponds to the identity we provide for each object and which we arrive at by our intentional use of certain facts, such as that 'a' is related to 'b' in 'ab', as norms of description (yielding an identity and syntax for a as 'that which can be related R to b').

The Failure of Objectivity of Congruence

So Wittgenstein's idea is that a prototype picture, such as 'ab', is projected onto some fact and thereby receives its content (3.13) and becomes a picture of something. And the argument is: that such an empty form fits demonstrates the essential logical form of the world, i.e., in some way, otherwise distinctive states of affairs are similar to each other, they share an identical logical form. In a nutshell there is an order to the world and because of this both facts (propositional signs and what they represent) can be projected congruently into logical space.

In phenomenological thought the notion of sameness has been described as the keel of thought. Cognition could not take place without thought being steered between distinct object identities and its being capable of calling up and recognising any particular object. The analogue of this in Wittgenstein's thinking is an object's simplicity, that simple logical relation which corresponds in "experience" to the recognition of some distinction in reality. It is

with respect to their simplicity that all simple objects are the same. We have noted that this does not ensure that, in themselves, two simple objects are alike, except in so far as they have been distinguished from (and thereby related to) some other. The similarity of simple objects has no empirical criterion. That was why it is possible to construe any object at all as simple.

More important is the criticism which the later Wittgenstein himself developed of this idea of sameness, in particular, that it was considered by the early Wittgenstein to obtain between elementary propositions and the prototype picture objectively. That all elementary propositions correspond in form and so are alike in this respect was the basis of Wittgenstein's assertion that the world has an order and is determinate. But with considerable prescience and understatement Wittgenstein wrote what he considered "only the material for a thought" in his notes of September 1916:

There cannot be an orderly or disorderly world, so that one could say that our world is orderly. In every possible world there is an order even if it is a complicated one, just as in space too there are not orderly and disorderly points, but every distribution of points is orderly. (NB 83₂)

Here we find seeds of two important views of the later Wittgenstein's close link to what was already a central idea in the *Tractatus*. Firstly there is the notion that a term cannot be used absolutely and without antithesis (cf. especially BB pp. 45-6). If all worlds are ordered then the term is, *ex hypothesi*, without antithesis and thus without meaning. (The ensuing paradox that Wittgenstein deliberately

provokes by then asserting that all worlds are ordered serves to highlight the ineffable character of such metaphysical claims.)

Secondly, we find Wittgenstein offering a cameo of his later view that anything can be found to accord with some rule just as any sequence of numbers must comply with some, albeit perhaps complex, formula. Both of these points offer strong support for the early Wittgenstein's view that metaphysical claims on, for example, the essence of the world and its overall form or order, are inherently paradoxical.

But my point in quoting the above passage (NB 83₂) is not just to illustrate the continuity of Wittgenstein's work. It is, rather, to illustrate a fundamental flaw in this early thinking which, I have argued, stems largely from conceiving language as a discrete, independently functioning system of signs. The limited (propositional) context Wittgenstein enunciated in the *Tractatus* (see above, chapter III) leaves him having to maintain an objective and immediate relation between this sign system and that which it represents. This relation is supposed to obtain through the congruence of forms of propositions and facts. But, so the later Wittgenstein's criticism goes, any two forms can be argued to correspond in this way. The paradigm of congruence between geometric shapes is misleadingly simplistic. Logical form is an apprehended essence. That anything from an atom to a dance of motes in the air (to persist with Wittgenstein's examples) can be apprehended (construed) as an object and as thereby partake in the logical function of "object", leaves little to be said

of the objectivity of any resulting relation of congruence and the order to reality.

In his 1929 discussion of logical form, Wittgenstein (1966) makes just this point by analogy. Two planes (which recall his own earlier analogy of a mesh overlaying reality in 6.341 - 6.342) represent reality and language. On the reality plane there are figures displayed which are to be, by some rule of projection or another, reproduced onto the second (language) plane. It was precisely this view, that a rule of projection can be followed objectively without interpretation, that was later to receive such devastating criticism by Wittgenstein himself in his investigation of rule following.¹⁸ It is not possible nor necessary to review that criticism here. It is sufficient to note that the early Wittgenstein himself recognised the need for a process of projection or translation. That in itself is all that is required to undermine the apparent naturalness of the geometric congruence metaphor of the proposition-fact relation. Wittgenstein had something more like the projections of engineering drawings and perhaps the projection of three dimensional figures onto two dimensional paper in mind. We only have to appreciate the ingenuity of Escher's manipulations of that process to understand in a stroke much of the later Wittgenstein's suggestions of possible alternative readings of apparently obvious (natural) rules.

Some Seeds of Scepticism Over Objectivity
in the Early Work

The early Wittgenstein himself hints, in two places, at an alternative view of the notion of congruence, one that seems to represent a move away from the idea of objectivity and which naturally reopens the whole issue of the determination of sense:

The possibility of all similies, of the whole pictorial quality of our language, is founded in the logic of portrayal. (NB 48₁₁, in the *Tractatus* he uses "imagery" rather than "similie", underlining added. Also see 4.015)

In giving the general form of a proposition you are explaining what kind of ways of putting together the symbols of things and relations will correspond to (be analogous to) the things having those relations in reality. (NB 113₂, underlining added)

Now I do not mean to overstate the significance of these isolated remarks. They might, alongside the earlier, equally isolated statement on the order of reality, be considered as seeds sown for later germination. Given Wittgenstein's broad reading of "logical" little seems to separate logical form from analogical form. Certainly I think the notions of "object" and "simplicity" as pseudo-concepts possess precisely the inexpressible and elusive character we associate with analogy and metaphor.

Wittgenstein says, "Names signalise what is common to a single form and a single content" and goes on to add, as if offering an explanation, that "only together with their syntactical use do they signalise one particular logical form (NB 53₅). But how much further does this explanation take us in our understanding of how different sets of names can be arguments in the same logical formula? Which is,

in effect, to ask how different sets of names could be analogues of each other? The syntactical deployment of one name is, after all, only given in terms of its relation to other names deployed in place of variables in that formula. To understand the logical form of any one object named in the resulting proposition it seems as if I would need to understand the logical forms of all others named there. But of course each of them in turn can only be known likewise. So it seems as if there is no piecemeal way of grasping the overall form of any proposition; only as a whole is it to be seen. This is what we might have expected considering the contextual thesis Wittgenstein maintained, and his idea that elementary propositions, not names, marked the endpoint of logical analysis.

But this idea is also consistent with the kind of holistic explanation usually adopted towards metaphor and analogy²⁹ and which was to become a characteristic of the kind of explanation the later Wittgenstein advocated for philosophy, especially with regard to its treatment of core issues such as determinacy and objectivity.

Notes

¹ From "Some Remarks on Logical Form" reprinted in Copi and Beard (1966) pp. 31-37.

Wittgenstein expressed grave doubts about this paper almost as it was being written, viewing it apparently as regressive and not representative of the way his thoughts were turning. See Anscombe's (1959) appended note¹ p. 31)

² A further example of how Wittgenstein imagined empirical evidence emerging corresponding with his *a priori* findings, is to be found in a letter from Wittgenstein to Russell which is also quoted by Norman Malcolm (1986) p. 65:

Russell had asked: what are the constituents of a thought, and what is the relation of those to the pictured fact?

Wittgenstein replied:

"I don't know what the constituents of a thought are, but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out."
(NB, p. 130)

To Russell's question, 'Does a thought (*Gedanke*) consist of words?' Wittgenstein replied:

"No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of reality as words. What those constituents are I don't know." (NB, p. 131)

(Interestingly, this would have been precisely Husserl's answer had he been asked the same question).

³ However, despite Malcolm's report that Wittgenstein wrote those early (§§ 1-100) passages of his *Investigations*, supposedly a commentary on the *Tractatus*, with that book beside him and even thought of publishing the two texts as a single volume, I think that alone can hardly ensure that Wittgenstein was still recollecting his own original understanding (of around two decades earlier) accurately.

⁴ The other two points significant for my thesis that this passage makes are:

1. The indexical in the general form of the proposition indicates a concatenation of things- -objects in relations, not merely an object. It concerns how things stand in relation to one another. This "This" could indicate either some fact (that aRb) or meta-linguistically, some other proposition ('aRb')- -either way it would mean the same.
2. That the form of the proposition essentially concerns itself with what is not itself, in Husserlian terms- -something that is transcendental to itself.

⁵ A parallel argument can be made against the thesis that Chompskian deep grammatical forms might indicate fundamental forms of cognition or even fundamental (so-called hard-wired) states of the human brain. Would such psychical states thereby indirectly point to a necessary

and universal, atomic constitution to our representations of the world, mirroring not its atomic constitution but our own? Is it a necessary condition of representation and language that brains be constituted as human brains are? Our brain's constitution is surely a contingent matter and we are unable to say that no other constitution is capable of representation. Cognitive science is surely limited in its conclusions to human cognition and intelligence, unless, that is, "intelligence" is defined purely in terms of human cognition.

The further question here is whether Wittgenstein's *a priori* investigation can transcend these limits of human experience and empirical science to deliver on the wider (universal) question? And, of course, if so, then how?

⁶ It might be objected that science's description of any absolutely fundamental particles it discovers amount to illegitimate (even metaphorical) uses of language which transgress Wittgenstein's stipulations for legitimate scientific propositions. Since the simplicity of these entities would by definition exclude there being any facts to describe about them then perhaps science could, like philosophy, merely say, "There are simple objects." (but cf. 4.1272e) But if that were the case, in the very act of saying what it had discovered to be the real simple objects science lapses into nonsense or non-science.

For Wittgenstein's discussion of the "relative" determinacy of propositions of science and of everyday language see NB 67-68, *o*.

⁷ Though Wittgenstein disowned this paper (see note¹ above) these remarks are offered as an expression of views that closely resemble his earlier ones in the *Tractatus* and *Notebooks*.

Certainly the objectivity and universality of logical form suggested in this passage would have been rejected by the later Wittgenstein but it does represent his view on form during both his early work and the years leading up to his return to Cambridge in 1929. On this matter it is worth recording a further remark from December 1929:

The logical structure of elementary propositions need not have the slightest similarity with the logical structure of propositions. (Waisman, 1979, pp. 41-2)

Before this Wittgenstein had even said that with this redundancy of ordinary propositions *vis à vis* their logical form there should be a rejection too of the old concept of object (instanced he says in the works of Frege and Russell). That conception was bound to the concept of "noun" which itself could only be explicated in terms of these redundant, conventional propositional forms.

⁸ There is a problem here which lies as a paradox at the heart of Wittgenstein's thesis. Since all necessity issues from the necessity inherent to logical forms of simple objects, then what "force" lies behind this supposed *a priori* insight into these forms. It appears very much like an illegitimate extrapolation of the very necessity or form the investigation was supposed to explore. In a word it amounts

to a metalogic and one that presumes the very phenomenon it was intended to uncover. But:

A statement cannot be concerned with the logical structure of the world, for in order for a statement to be possible at all, in order for a proposition to be CAPABLE of making sense, the world must already have the logical structure that it has. The logic of the world is prior to all truth and falsehood. (NB 14_{1,2})

Of course, Wittgenstein was acutely aware of the paradox of this and all his other metaphysical statements and that is why his epistemology is ultimately based on what propositions *show* us of their structure (the structure which constitutes the condition of them saying anything). That a tautology is "true" is, in this unique sense, self-manifesting.

At the same time the *a priori* character of Wittgenstein's investigation underscores the priority he ascribes to logic over metaphysics which Peter Carruthers (1990) explores significantly, for example, in relation to the contextual thesis I considered in chapter IV. See his chapter 2: "The Context Principle":

And the only thing essential to the stipulation [of the values of a propositional variable] is that it is merely a description of the symbols and states nothing about what is signified." (3.317) So it is being claimed that in stipulating, for instance, that 'the book' is a permissible argument for the variable in 'x is red' whereas '7' is not, we should concern ourselves only with the sorts of sense which those expressions have, and not with their referents. It is being explicitly (and most emphatically) ruled out that we might attempt to justify the allowability of certain substitutions by appealing to essential features of the world. (p. 19)

⁹ For another statement in support of this and offered as a central idea of Wittgenstein's, and of its link to the allied notions of analysis and composition, see Brand (1979) section H: "Complex and Thing", pp. 91-104.

¹⁰ Such comparisons slip easily off the tongue. For instance:

I would not find out what object is designated by a name I am employing, by observing how I combine that name with other names in elementary sentences. No! When I construct an elementary proposition in order to analyse some state of affairs, I correlate names with objects.
(Malcolm, 1986 p. 31).

Intuitively this sounds correct, except that Malcolm is applying what is correct of our everyday treatment of complex objects to simple objects. Since Malcolm does not think simple objects are phenomenologists' sense data, we need grounds for our assumption that this is indeed how we deal with identifying simple objects (or rather, would deal with them if we had acquaintance with any).

As I have argued in several places, the simplicity and indescribable nature of simples leaves insurmountable problems for

Malcolm should he attempt to detail the mechanisms of identification, even in theory, of the simples he is supposing himself to correlate with individual names here.

¹¹ (cf. note¹⁰ above.) Exactly this problem crops up in the solution David Pears (1987) offers in his attempt to reconcile the apparent conflict between the idea that there is a one to one relation between name and simple object, that the object is the meaning of the name and the idea that names only get their meaning in a propositional context. He says:

[A] name may first be attached to an object in something like the way envisaged by Russell, but thereafter it will represent the object only so long as the possibilities presented by the propositions in which it occurs are real possibilities for that object. If 3.3 [the statement of the context principle] is taken in this way, it qualifies the direct attachment of names to objects but does not replace it with something completely different. The initial act of attachment is necessary for representation but not sufficient. (pp. 102-3)

The view I am espousing is that if one can indeed distinguish a simple object then one has already provided it with the logical identity redeemable in terms of its possible relations. That is, if one has an acquaintance with such an object, say a sense data of blue, then one is already "acquainted" (i.e., not subsequently) with the logic of colour i.e., with its possible relations, say of tone, shade and presumably spatially and temporally too. The object, as Wittgenstein suggests, is seen together with space and time rather than in them. (NB 83_s)

¹² The distinctions I am speaking of are intracategorical distinctions, colour from colour, smell from smell. In any elementary proposition (in which no generality occurs, meaning nothing general is named) categories become established. To distinguish by name and also to relate, two objects is to "recognise" and establish a category, not name it but show it. Generality arises from, not in elementary propositions. Isn't this what Wittgenstein means by speaking of how ordinary forms such as colour arise from the combinations of simple objects and that simple objects themselves can therefore have no forms in this sense? They are in a manner of speaking colourless (2.0232). And material properties are produced only from the configurations of objects (2.0231).

¹³ Rarely do the differentiations we make in experience come in such convenient single packages. For instance, no two colours can be distinguished by shade that are not simultaneously distinguished in space (or time) too. Indeed the logic of colour, that nothing can be red and green all over at the same time for example, seems to deny the possible separation of colour and spatial and temporal properties. But this need not complicate my point here since it is sufficient to my interpretation that these distinctions can be conceived in abstraction from one another even though in reality they cannot be separated.

For instance, in the colour spectrum it is clear that to only recognise the colour difference of red from violet represents an abstraction of that distinction from their other distinguishable quality, location. (Similarly, so-called point masses of physics, which have been suggested as exemplifying simple objects in Goddard and Judge, 1982, are surely an abstraction comparable if not identical to 'centre of gravity.')

But in a representation of the relations of two colours it appears not to compromise their determinacy that their actual mode of combination is not in itself simple (or singular). It might be put this way--in the comparison, their locations cancel out either side of the equation (the comparison). That each colour is conceived as not being in the same location as any other colour is common to both sides of the equation. This leaves the distinction of the two shades juxtaposed in abstraction.

But this process of abstraction may be redundant; it is arguable that distinguishing two spatial objects is not dependent on them also being distinguishable by colour. I can distinguish and relate two parts of a monochrome length of material (it may be arbitrary where I divide it but it is not arbitrary that it is so divisible). It is also arguable whether the distinguishing of two colours is dependent on them being spatially or temporally distinguishable as well. Certainly to be a different colour (all over) requires that two objects are not numerically identical. But in characterising, say, two tones of a colour no mention need be made of their location, unless it is two particular cases of each colour--this and that--that are being compared.

¹⁴ Of course it is essential here to maintain a clear distinction between the logical and the contingent relations of objects. My point is essentially a phenomenological eidetic one. We are not concerned whether there are any objects actually so related as my "experience" suggests (that e.g., there really are sounds in reality related to each other by a certain degree of volume or pitch). Besides, such a contingency could not serve to identify simple objects for then the truth of some elementary proposition would regressively rely on the truth of others which Wittgenstein denies. It is sufficient that one sound is identified in terms of its logical relation to another sound (as whatever can be so related by volume, pitch etc.

¹⁵ This inescapable association of distinguishing, objectifying and logically relating, the parts of our apprehended reality answers an objection to Wittgenstein's claim that the world consists of facts. The objection is that facts are linguistic entities and cannot be said to constitute the world as objects can. See for example Thompkins (1991) p. 225 and Black, especially "The *Tractatus* Conception of Fact", p. 31, and Strawson's remarks quoted p. 36.

The point being made here is that facts, unlike objects, can hardly be held in the hand and not because they are quicksilver. It is a failure of our grip on grammar, not things, that confuses us into seeing the world as constituted of facts. Wittgenstein would object here firstly by arguing the ontological status of "objects" with which "fact" is being compared. Strawson's view I think reflects the

underlying tendency to interpret "simple objects" on the model of everyday things. Wittgenstein argues "object" itself is a linguistic entity deriving from the concept of noun (see note ⁷ above). In other words, "object" too, is a linguistic notion.

But my point is that, in our apprehension of reality, what is given are distinguished and related entities (objects as Husserlian "moments") which constitute wholes—facts no less. In addition, for Wittgenstein, propositional signs are themselves facts so that even if a fact is a linguistic entity it is their essentially articulated form that reality shares with them such that the form of facts is the form of reality too.

¹⁶ This makes the mechanism for picking out such objects by its name especially difficult to account for but absolutely crucial to the account of how any proposition locates its subject.

For how I suppose this "fundamental semantic relation" is achieved (which I conceived as a linguistic kind of intentionality and described as "blind referencing") see my chapters VIII and IX. In a nutshell it is conditional on the relation between proposition and fact and relies in their congruence of forms.

¹⁷ There is perhaps more of a problem with accounting for a proposition reaching its subject than for a thought reaching its. Literally, in reality, propositions are expressed in written or spoken etc. signs. These "propositional signs" are themselves facts (3.14). How does Wittgenstein suppose that the two facts, 'The cat is on the mat' and that the cat is on the mat are related such that the former is true because of the latter? Clearly it is true because the cat is on the mat. But Wittgenstein's question concerns what makes it possible for that written sign to represent that fact. That the written sentence is a fact itself and separate from the fact it is held to represent seems to be the source of this problem. How are these two facts to be related? Wittgenstein disagrees, being separate facts is the grounds for any sentence being capable of representing its fact. Structure is common to both. Being a fact means the propositional sign is essentially articulated, it is distinguishable into (logical) parts (see NB 87, 93). Representation is then possible as a comparison of structures and through recognition of their congruence.

¹⁸ The early Wittgenstein, too, recognised the central importance of "rule-following", (see NB 897-9011). Here, significantly, Wittgenstein links rule following with his insight into the possible use of a general propositional form (i.e., a formula) and he also (NB 904-6) ties the operation, "and so on" to the "general concept of structural similarity."

¹⁹ A similar point has been made in linguistics by Tom Givón (1989) who concludes:

Isomorphism is thus neither an explanation of nor motivation for iconic coding, but simply part of its definition. (p. 96).

Givón offers a linguist's analysis of analogical foundations of meaning (which he associates with Peircean "abductive" thinking, an alternative to deductive and inductive thought).

Much like importance and relevance, the notions of similarity and analogy are in principle impervious to deductive or inductive reasoning. Equally, they are non-discrete, a matter of degree. In principle, anything can be similar to anything else, and anything may be viewed by analogy to anything else - provided the appropriate context, frame, or point of view is construed. And construing the appropriateness of context is, in principle, a purely abductive enterprise. (p. 6)

Pragmatically-based abductive inference [...] is in principle a different kind of reasoning [from deductive and inductive reasoning]. It proceeds by hypothesis, guesswork or intuition, often by analogy. It is thus, in principle, unconstrained. (p. 7)

See also Givón's remarks on the iconicity of grammar, chapter 3.4.

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