Slovic, PaulLichtenstein, Sarah2017-05-092017-05-091971Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (1971). Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 46-55.https://hdl.handle.net/1794/2231230 pagesSubjects in 3 experiments chose their preferred bet from pairs of bets, and later bid for each bet separately. In each pair, one bet had· a higher probability ·of winning (P bet); the other offered more to win (S bet). Bidding method (selling vs. buying) and payoff method (real­-play vs. hourly wage) were varied. Results showed that when the P bet was chosen, the$ bet o􀁙en received a higher bid. These inconsistencies violate every risky decision model, but can be understood via information-processing considerations. In bidding, S starts with amount to win and .adjusts it downward to account for other attributes of the bet. In choosing; there is no natural starting point. Thus amount to win dominates bids but not choices. One need not call this behavior irrational, but it casts doubt on the descriptive validity of expected utility models of risky decision making.enCreative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0-USDecision makingGame theoryReaction(psychology)Mathematical modelsHuman performanceProbabilityUncertaintyBehaviorReliabilityPsychological testsArticle