Matsunaga, StevenQuinto, Claire2020-09-242020-09-242020-09-24https://hdl.handle.net/1794/25675I examine the claim that managers who issue quarterly earnings guidance sacrifice long-term value to enhance short-term performance, i.e., that quarterly earnings guidance encourages myopic behavior. I find that quarterly guiders are more likely to meet quarterly earnings expectations and tend to use more short-term language in their corporate disclosures, supporting the view that quarterly earnings guidance shifts a manager’s attention to the short term. However, quarterly earnings guidance does not appear to have a negative impact on a firm’s long-term performance. Using an entropy-balanced sample, I find that quarterly guiders outperform non-guiders over the next three and five years across a variety of performance measures. Also inconsistent with the claims of critics, I find no evidence that quarterly earnings guidance is associated with more earnings management or underinvestment. Taken together, my results do not support the view that quarterly earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia. Instead, it appears that among the firms that choose to provide it, the benefits of quarterly earnings guidance outweigh the costs.en-USAll Rights Reserved.Managerial myopiaQuarterly earnings guidanceReal effects of disclosureVoluntary disclosureElectronic Thesis or Dissertation