Wheeler, Samuel C.2018-12-112018-12-112009Wheeler III, Samuel. "Response to Livingston's Response: What's Missing?." Konturen [Online], 2.1 (2009): 71-75.1947-3796https://hdl.handle.net/1794/239695 pagesAt this point in the discussion, I am beginning to suspect that Livingston and I have different conceptions of what Davidson’s “framework” is. I take it to be quite a bit more than the idea that a theory of meaning is a recursive truth-definition. So this response will set out what I take Davidson’s view and framework to be, and explain why, on that understanding, the inadequacies Livingston and McDowell ascribe to Davidson’s framework are not genuine inadequacies. Of course it may well be that I am just not getting something. I will begin by discussing two peripheral points: First, my understanding of Davidsonian indeterminacy makes it something more than ambiguity that can be cleared up by determining the intention of the speaker or author. Second, addressing the remark at the bottom of footnote 14, I give an explanation of what I take to be the Quinean-Davidsonian approach to ontology. The main part of this response discusses the central issue of whether a Davidsonian account of language is adequate as a philosophical account of language.enCreative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0-USArticle10.5399/uo/konturen.2.1.1326