Davies, Ronald B.Egger, HartmutEgger, Peter2007-02-212007-02-212003-04-10https://hdl.handle.net/1794/387840 p.This paper studies non-cooperative tax competition between two countries for an international producer. The international producer chooses where to locate its headquarters and whether to serve the overseas market through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that, in the absence of tax competition, the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can use its tax rate to enforce exporting instead of FDI, thereby leading to a Nash equilibrium in the tax setting game which is associated with higher world welfare than the no-tax situation. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits.202073 bytesapplication/pdfen-USTax competitionMultinational enterprisesProfit taxationDouble taxation reliefWorking Paper