Davies, Ronald B.Liebman, Benjamin H., 1971-2004-11-092004-11-092003-11https://hdl.handle.net/1794/26121 p.It is well established that the threat of antidumping duties can help sustain collusion between a foreign firm and its domestic counterpart. However, when the foreign firm is a multinational, its subsidiary will fight against a new duty, potentially making this threat hollow and collusion less likely. We show that the multinational may therefore choose to submit to a tariff even under collusion since evidence indicates that duties are more difficult to remove than initiate. In this way, it is possible to obtain a greater degree of commitment, although it comes at a cost. Nevertheless, we show that this can be a more profitable strategy than those previously explored. In fact, we find several cases where subsidiaries of multinational firms have indeed filed for protection from their own parents.205422 bytesapplication/pdfen-USAntidumpingCollusionForeign direct investmentWorking Paper