Ozymy, JoshuaOzymy, Melissa Jarrell2023-05-012023-05-012023-04-2838 J. Env’t. L. & Litig. 731049-0280https://hdl.handle.net/1794/2821536 pagesThe U.S. EPA and Department of Justice are tasked with the investigation and prosecution of environmental crimes occurring under the U.S. Clean Air Act (CAA). Criminal sanctions are meant to increase the cost of CAA crimes relative to the economic benefit, with the goal of deterring specific individuals and firms from offending and providing general deterrence indirectly via observation of other potential offenders. Prior research has examined sanctioning under the CAA, but little examines the plausibility of the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. Through content analysis of all 2,588 criminal prosecutions resulting from the EPA’s criminal investigations between 1983 and 2019, we explore the probability of detection and prosecution for all CAA prosecutions. Results show the probability of detection and prosecution to be very low across the regulated community. We conclude by offering three remedies for improving the plausibility of deterrence, including enhancing resources to impose sanctions, developing greater community involvement in enforcement efforts, and raising the profile and salience of criminal enforcement activities.en-USAll Rights Reserved.U.S. Clean Air ActEnvironmental crimeEnvironmental Protection AgencyArticle