

HEADHUNTERS, HARVESTERS, AND HOMELANDS:
THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT
IMPACTS IN INDONESIAN BORNEO

by

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This thesis analyzes the cultural, ecological, and economic impacts of resource extraction based economic development schemes on the peoples and landscapes of Indonesian Borneo. The theoretical framework of political ecology allows for an examination of the local and regional impacts of nation-state policies on indigenous peoples and illuminates the necessity of viewing historically different local and regional discourses and practices of development. Development programs have created a regime of production politics which are played out on the physical and cultural landscapes of Indonesian Borneo.

Extractive activities are a critical source of cash income on which indigenous peoples rely for economic and cultural independence from the Indonesian government. Indigenous peoples are resisting national economic and cultural policies which undermine the bases of sustainability for both their cultures and their homelands. The struggle over access to non-timber forest products is inherently a cultural struggle over the landscape and the identities evolved from it.

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DEDICATION

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The principal aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the social, economic, and ecological effects of resource extraction on the indigenous groups, such as the Dayak and Punan, in Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo. By presenting the local and regional impacts of development programs, such as transmigration, on indigenous Punan and Dayak peoples, I show the importance and necessity of looking at historically different local and regional discourses and practices regarding sustainable development from a theoretical political ecology perspective. Practical knowledge gleaned from such an analysis could positively affect current economic, social, and ecological development inside of Indonesia and the greater Southeast Asian region.

Political ecology examines the politics, economics, and ecological causes and impacts of various structural processes as promoted by various actors. (Blaikie 1985, Peet and Watts 1996) This thesis addresses causes more political than either economical or ecological due to its reliance on nation-state archival research. It has been structured to outline the multiple reasons that Indonesian Borneo has become the resource base of Indonesia while at the same time that resource base is continuously undermined by the state itself. Politics, economics, and ecology all play a part in this analysis, and further research would be based on fieldwork as well as a greater variety of documentation on Indonesia available globally in areas such as Indonesia, the Netherlands, Germany and England. Further suggested research would include work on Bornean transborder ecological effects and impacts from various sources, transborder legal and illegal trade, and non-state influences upon the indigenes of the interior of Borneo.

Through an in-depth look at the impacts of economic and cultural development on the indigenous peoples of Indonesian Borneo, and their traditional harvesting of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), my thesis aims to show the interdependence of regional economics and politics, and how the traditional subsistence strategies and agricultural systems of the indigenous peoples are impacted by development policies and economic growth strategies of the government of Indonesia. Changes in social relations and technology can undermine the bases of sustainability of both the indigenous cultures and the tropical forests on which they depend. By illuminating the socio-economic consequences of development programs in Indonesia, my thesis argues for the necessity of looking at different local traditional practices of land management and how they have developed historically, as well as how and why they may have been overlooked in the past.

Mutual misunderstandings about definitions of development and culture are embedded in the political discourses of the government of Indonesia and the various indigenous peoples of Indonesian Borneo. By employing a critique of rational Western universalism (Watts:1994), my thesis attempts to trace the links between dominant and marginalized cultures and government policies of development to allow for a retrieval of indigenous knowledge in which are embedded their traditional discourses on nature, ecological regulation and management practices (Peet: 1993). By employing a post-structural critique in the framework of my thesis I argue for the excavation of traditional and modern discourses of the indigenous peoples of Borneo in order to better understand the situated knowledge that they possess.

Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo provides an ideal location for my case study because of its location and its unique territorial characteristics. It is the third largest island in the world and its provinces are divided among the Kingdom of Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia. See Figure 1. The peoples of this island share this large landmass, climate, biodiversity and history, yet each of the countries' provinces have evolved along separate paths of development. The effects of this development can be seen directly on the landscape. Practices such as the damming of rivers and the logging of large tracts of



FIGURE 1. Map of Indonesia
(Source: King 1992:2)

rainforest have led to the loss of traditional resource access for indigenous groups as well as the loss of a large amount of biodiversity, and have been reflected in the alteration of the landscape. After analyzing Bornean locales and regions and the way they have been influenced by the economic and social policies and practices of the Indonesian government as well as other nations' regional policies and practices, I attempt to provide a framework that will allow a new way of understanding the motivations of the various agents as they practice sustainable economic development, as defined by the state.

In order to link theory to practice my thesis outlines the importance of NTFPs, as exemplified by rattan, for indigenous tribes throughout Indonesian Borneo (Sellato:1994). Extractive activities are important to the economic and social cohesiveness of the indigenous forest people and are critical as a source of cash income and economic independence from the Indonesian government. Previous research has shown that small-scale extraction of NTFPs produces more income for these groups than wage labor and rice agriculture in its contribution to community income (Dransfield:1988). In standard economic analysis, a significant source of both local use and foreign exchange values of NTFPs, such as rattan, are overlooked or undervalued (Caldicott:1988). This issue is of significance for three reasons. The first is that the importance of NTFPs to the indigenous people and the poor has not been taken into account when creating development programs aimed at benefiting indigenous forest people (Peluso:1992). Second, the collection of forest products provides a major source of cash income for indigenous women who are often denied alternative forms of earning income if they wish to remain in their traditional communities (Sellato:1994). Third, past and present development programs are actively undermining traditional access to NTFPs as well as encouraging their destruction through practices such as clear cutting for timber.

My thesis ultimately argues for a change in current development policy in Indonesia. For development to be sustainable, it must benefit a majority of the population that is the target of development. Indonesia has been pursuing the development of its timber industry at the same time as it attempts to modernize and develop its Dayak and Punan peoples in the interior of Indonesian Borneo. These developments have added

directly to the loss of traditional cultural practices for the indigenous groups. These people have a great deal of knowledge about their rainforests that is being lost as they are brought into the mainstream of Indonesian society. Their accumulated knowledge and experience could be tapped by implementing integrated social forestry policies which could benefit all concerned (Peluso:1994: 250).

As the population has increased in Indonesia, so has the demand for land and resources. Indonesia has followed a common pattern of development for Third World countries that contain tropical forests, where forests have served as an unlimited resource. Felling of the forests for timber has been seen as a positive common good by providing much needed foreign exchange revenue and simultaneously creating more living and agricultural space for its growing population, which is estimated to reach 226 million people by the year 2000, an increase of 65 percent since 1975 (Park:1992: 52).

A critical issue facing Indonesia is that in order to sustain development in the long-term, Indonesia must consider switching its emphasis from timber to non-timber forest products, both because of long-term effects such as the loss of arable soil and because of short-term effects such as the increasing scarcity of raw logs to export. NTFPs are worth an average of US \$700 dollars per hectare per year, which is a sustainable revenue, while raw logs earn a one time price of US \$1,000 (Park:1992:142). Non-timber forest products value would exceed the current value of timber if revenues generated by medicinal plants were included in a standard economic analysis (Park:1992: 142). Non-renewable resources that Indonesia depends upon for foreign exchange might not be available in the future due to development projects now in progress, which may force Indonesia to turn to other sources of revenue, such as NTFPs, in the future.

This thesis attempts to trace the links between global and regional environmental discourses and practices with the Indonesian government's policies of development in order to problematize and explain the complex interrelations among localities, regions and global structures which have worked together to create the dynamic complexity of human-environment conditions in contemporary Indonesian Borneo.

The Geographical Location and Features of Borneo

The third largest island on Earth is called Borneo and is located at 0 degree latitude and between 110 and 120 degrees longitude and is made up of an area of about 750,000 square kilometers. Politically it is divided between three nation-states; the former British territories of Sabah and Sarawak (since 1963 a part of the Federation of Malaysia), the former British Protectorate of Brunei, today Negara Brunei Darussalam, and the larger part of the island formerly Dutch Borneo, today known as Kalimantan, Indonesia. Indonesian Kalimantan is made up of four states: West, Central, South and East Kalimantan which total about 450,000 square kilometers. The physical geography of the island is dominated by a central spine of rugged mountains, well over 1,000 meters high, which form both an important watershed and a rather vague political boundary for much of their length. Around the coast of the island is a bound of low-lying land, often composed of mangrove or peat swamps. This territory, ranging in width from a few kilometers in parts of Sabah to several hundreds kilometers in S. Kalimantan, is an important zone for farming and settlement. The highest mountain in Borneo, Kinabalu, is 4,101 meters high and rises from the rugged Crocker Range in Sabah (Cleary and Eaton:1992:10). The large rivers constitute the vital arteries of communication, and their watersheds the chief cultural and economic boundaries. Thus, the Barito in the south dominates much of the landscape of southern Kalimantan, with the historic city of Banjarmasin close to its mouth. The Kahajan and the Kapuas flow into the same wide estuarine zone. To the north, the Mahakam and Kayan Rivers provide vital communication for much of East Kalimantan. flowing to the west is the Kapuas River,

the longest in Borneo, with the city of Pontianak at its mouth. The Rajang and Baram are the other major west coast rivers (Cleary and Eaton 1992:10).

With the Equator approximately bisecting the island, the climate is a tropical-equatorial one. Temperatures are consistently high, between about 24C and 34C, modified only by altitude, and relative and absolute humidity is also very high, usually well into the 80s. There is little seasonal variation in temperatures. Average annual rainfall varies from about 2,300 millimeters in the south-east of Borneo to 4,500 millimeters in parts of the interior. Generally, the rainy season lasts from about October to May with the 'less rainy' season following. Rainfall can be of great intensity, with tropical thunderstorms wreaking havoc with agriculture and communications.

Borneo has three human ecological zones - the coastal and estuarine belt, the river valleys, and the interior uplands, and historical and contemporary patterns of economy and culture on the island bear the imprint of these basic patterns of climate and forest cover. Along the coastal and estuarine belt live the culture groups of the Malay, Muslim town-dwelling groups of Brunei, of Banjarmasin, of Pontianak and its environs. Along the river valleys live the agrarian settled groups of Dayak and other settled indigenous tribes. In the interior uplands live the semi-nomadic and nomadic groups of the Punan, traditionally hunter-gatherers who are now encouraged by the Indonesian government to become settled agriculturists. The geographic personality of Borneo has been shaped as much by men and women, by invaders and inhabitants, as by its environment. Their differences in custom and culture constantly shape and reshape the landscape of Borneo. These groups "have appraised its resources for their times in terms of their capacities and

needs, have spread themselves through it as best suited their ends, and have filled it with the works that expressed their particular way of life” (Sauer 1963:104).

Constructing the ‘Other’

Even before the first landfall, early explorers of Borneo had inherited and imaginatively constructed that island’s landscape in keeping with the European construct of ‘Other’, derived in origin from the tales of Herodotus and Marco Polo, as well as from inscriptions within Mercator’s *Atlas*. Writ large upon his maps are the signifying and reflectant views that:

Here [in Europe] wee have the right of Lawes, the dignity of Christian Religion, the forces of Armes....Moreover, Europe manageth all Arts and Sciences with such dexterity, that for the invention of manie things shee may be truely called a Mother...she hath all manner of learning, whereas other Countries are all of them, overspread with Barbarisme’ (1636 I:42 cited in Rabasa 1995:362).

Inscribed within the *Atlas* is also the conception that no place can be left uncharted; the unknown is writ large as *Terra Australis incognita*, yet this naming and defining of far-away landscapes furthered the Western project of inventing the ‘Other’ as well as assigning it to a particular place in imaginative and physical space (Rabasa 1995:362).

The inhabitants are savage and bestial, and eat human flesh. They go naked, wearing only that bark as do the others. They are the ugliest people who live in those Indies...The king of Burne (Borneo) has two pearls large as two hens’ eggs. Those Moros worship Mahomet (Pigafetta (1523) 1962:252-253).

Pigafetta, one of 16 surviving members of Magellan’s crew returned to Spain with reports of great riches and strange peoples to be found in Borneo and throughout the Indies. His is the first European report to describe the landscape and people of Borneo

and was widely distributed throughout Europe at the time. His reports, describing fantastic places and people fed the Western imaginative construction of 'Other', and inspired many other explorers, such as Christopher Columbus, to set sail and find new lands of unknown peoples and riches. Later explorers of the Indies would return to fuel Europe's imagination with tales of the 'Bugi' men, and entire peoples with the tendency to 'run amok' at the slightest provocation. These stories were so evocative in the European imagination that they continue to live on today, in the common Western expression of describing rioting people as 'running amok', and tales told by parents of the 'bugi man' who will come after misbehaving children.

The desire to find, tame, and even capture the 'Other' is not particular to the explorers of Borneo and the Indies, but is rather a part of a larger paradigm of construction and representation by the West projected upon its alter-ego, its 'Other' as described by Said (1979:3). The Orient has been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, secret desires, haunting memories of landscapes and remarkable experiences. It is Europe's cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. Most importantly, this 'Other' has helped to define the West as its contrasting image, idea, personality and experience (Said 1979). Important in this very description is the unstated geography of positionality - that Western 'Others' could be there. The scientist, the scholar, the missionary, the trader, or the soldier imagined the barely explored margins of the world because he *could be there* (Said 1979:58). This privilege to real and imagined leisure time and to possibilities of travel itself establishes

an hierarchical relationship to the explored and visited place of 'Otherness' which, from the start, has been imaginatively constructed by the West.

"Men make their own history. What they can know is what they have made"

(Vico, cited by Said 1979:5) What does it mean to construct or to have a history?

Foucault answers that this signals "a great mutation in the consciousness of Western man, a mutation which has to do ultimately with 'our modernity', which in turn is the sense we have of being utterly different from all other forms of humanity known to history"

(Foucault 1970:219-220). We, then, construct not only a history, but also a legitimate existence: history and legitimation go hand in hand; our inscribed and described history legitimates 'us' and not 'Others' (Ashcroft et.al.1995:355). Indeed, it is the very construction and description of a particular history which then etymologically quickly assumes a power to signify the 'Other'. History is not just what we know, as Vico states, but is also inherently a result of contesting discourses (Ashcroft et.al.1995:356). The signification of the 'Other' then leads to resistance of the 'Other' to being inscribed and defined from without and so finds itself an active subject engaging in the project of dissembling the dualisms of the Western, imperial history and reinscribing its own, indigenous history. As Caliban, Shakespeare's representative 'Other' proclaims to Prospero in *The Tempest*: "You taught me language; and my profit on 't/Is, I know how to curse' (I, ii:363-4). Not only can the 'Other' curse, the 'Other' can re-present, in the West's own language, their own situated and particular history within the West's discursive framework and proceed to literally and figuratively write back to the physical

and imaginative center of empire from the Empires' constructed margins, refuting that inscribed marginality of assigned place in a Western hierarchy.

Constant in Western representations of the 'Other' are two normative characteristics of the 'savage'; that of terror and of lack (Ashcroft et.al. 1995:85). The 'native savages' are terrifying in their ferocity, their habits, their appearance, and their apparent irreligiousness. Constant also is lack; enunciated by Mercator as early as 1636, of all accoutrements of civilization as defined by the West; of clothing, law, order, language and God. "Within the Western project of colonialism, these representations (of terror and lack) have been re-projected to the colonized - through formalized education or general colonialist cultural relations - as authoritative pictures of themselves" (Ashcroft et.al. 1995:85).

This project of defining 'Other' and thereby establishing hierarchy in relation to the 'Other', as was done during colonialism, has not yet come to an end, it is embedded in the everyday practices of society and policy making within many post-colonial states, as exemplified by the nation-state of Indonesia. The practice of 'civilizing' is put forth as one of nation-state building through economic and social development constructs and modernization programs. The targets of these programs are often the marginalized, the 'Other' of the nation, the indigenes, of which the indigenous Punan and Dayak groups of Indonesian Kalimantan are representative. The project is a benevolent one, just as the colonial project was meant for the 'natives' own good, to raise them up the ladder of civilization.

Just as colonial subjects did not often appreciate the humanitarian intent of the modernizing 'gift' of Western civilization, seeing it instead as patronizing at the least and the death of their own very cultures at the most, current marginalized subjects also reject outside cultures being mapped and inscribed upon them. It is less common, however, to hear the voice of the marginalized subject in response to colonial and post-colonial rhetorics of civilization, but it might very well sound like this:

As for what we were like before we met you, I no longer care. No periods of time over which my ancestors held sway, no documentation of complex civilizations, is any comfort to me. Even if I really came from people who were living like monkeys in trees, it was better to be that than what happened to me, what I became after I met you (Kincaid 1988 excerpted in Ashcroft et.al. 1995:94).

Deconstructing the 'Other'

Colonialism is commonly thought of as a distant Western project carried out in the 'Orient' yet it and its impacts can still be seen in many post-colonial nation-states, such as Indonesia, where the influence of its Dutch colonizers can still be seen writ large and small not only on the physical landscape of Borneo but within the very signifiers of culture, economics, and statehood itself throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Crucial in understanding what 'Other' signifies inside of Indonesia requires the excavation of the essence of 'Other' in that culture. 'Other' is a construct inherited from the Dutch, yet perpetuated by the elite planners of society and government of Indonesia, themselves a product of this binary discourse that frames discussion of society in terms of what is Western and what is not. This submission and accedence to a dichotomous cultural

framework demands that the very conception of 'indigene' and 'territory' be reassessed. The 'Other' is always what is not Western. Or? How does one then define those indigenous people who have themselves become the colonizers in a post-colonial state, whose primary goal is to develop their newly-independent country by following Western economic models of modernization such as Rostow's (1960) and whose stated goals are to 'civilize' the 'savages' that remain within their given bounded territories? If the lines are then blurred between what constitutes 'indigenous' and 'Western', based not on area of origin but on cultural and economic signifiers, then it is not a great leap to state that the colonial paradigm and its discourses are still with us and functioning to tame the perennial 'Other', its only threat to legitimacy. More complex analysis of colonial relations and its 'Other' of post-colonial resistances need to be undertaken in order to dislocate the dualisms of center/margin, self/other, colonizer/colonized and savage/civilized. Destabilizing these dualities requires an analysis of what these binary oppositions signify without trivializing or essentializing the persisting and historic inequalities within those relations and structures. Examining the imaginative and real discourses of political economy and ecology of the Indonesian nation-state as practiced within Indonesian Borneo and its impacts upon that landscape is one avenue of attempting to discover and uncover the discourse of the 'Other' within the construct of post-colonial dualisms and paradigms.

CHAPTER II

DISCOVERING THE INDIGENES OF BORNEO: THE PUNAN AND DAYAK GROUPS

The island of Borneo, located between Sulawesi, Java, Sumatra, Malaysia and the Philippines, being the third largest island in the world has long been an object of fascination for explorers from diverse areas of the globe, such as East Asia and the West. Rumors of rich lands with strange peoples gave rise to fantasies of the 'Other' more persuasive than reality. These rumors and fantasies brought many explorers to Southeast Asia in search of silk and jewels, as well as very important and valuable herbs and spices such as sandalwood, ginger, cloves, cinnamon, and other exotic items.

Borneo, representing for explorers the penultimate wilderness with its dense jungles, strange flora and fauna, and wild inhabitants, who occupy the extreme of the European scale of 'Otherness' with their strange languages, customs, and behaviors, has tempted many foreigners to its shores, seeking to discover riches, prove themselves, or both. Correa, a survivor of Magellan's voyage reports that in Borneo "they found in the port many merchant junks from all parts of Malacca, which made frequent visits to Borneo... They entered these junks and plundered much gold and rich stuffs, and captured a son of the King of Luzon" (Correa (1526) 1962: 310). Reports such as these led to the Dutch establishing the Dutch East Indies Company in Batavia, Java, in 1602, primarily in

order to satisfy the Dutch government's interest in and gain greater access to commercial goods (Brosse 1983:12). Maximilianus Transylvanus reports that:

Porne (Borneo) must be considered of more importance than any other islands which they have examined...All these islanders are heathen and worship the sun and the moon...they say that man after his death, has no feeling, as he had none before his birth...They marry as many wives as they can afford...the produce of camphor, ginger, and cinnamon, is great among them...Some carry on traffic in the neighboring islands, to which they go in junks; some devote themselves to hunting; some to fishing; and others to agriculture (Transylvanus (1522) 1962:301).

Borneo has been imagined and constructed as a personal test of survival and attracted explorers such as Georg Mueller, for whom the Muller Range was named, who was killed by Dayaks in the upper Kapuas region in 1825 (Veth 1856, ii:396 cited in Ave 1993:9), and Charles Fox and Henry Steele, officers of the Sarawak Government who were killed in 1859 by indigenes in Kanowit on the Rejang river in 1859 (Ave 1993:9). More recently the writer Hanson (1988) has described this instinctual desire to explore the unknown: "The first crossing of the island taught me how to travel. The return trip would test my limits" (1988:174). The danger to life and limb have not been under-reported; the landscape of Borneo is indeed a dangerous place for someone not acquainted with its forests, its terrain and topography, and those unused to the climate and customs of the island. Here on this inhabiting the 'wilderness' are found many 'exotic' peoples, most of whom belong either to the Dayak or Punan groups. See Figure 2.

In the past, these two populations have been classified together as Dayaks, with the Punan sometimes classed with 'land Dayaks' as opposed to 'sea Dayaks', who are a




FIGURE 2. Distribution of Main Ethnic Groups of Borneo
(Source: Cleary and Eaton 1992:95)

group of fishing Dayak of the northwest coast of Borneo (cf. King 1978; Hudson 1967, Ave and King 1986, Nieuwenhuis 1900). Early explorers and visitors used the Bornian exonym Dayak to describe all non-Malay indigenous peoples of Borneo, an exonym that is still common in usage today.¹ It was not until after 1950 that any serious articles began to appear describing the Punan as distinct from the Dayak groups, though these writings focused exclusively upon groups living in Sarawak (cf. Harrison 1949, Needham 1954, Urquhart 1959, Tuton Kaboy 1974, Sandin 1956, Nicolaisen 1976). It was not until after 1980 that the nomads, or Punan, become a specific topic of study not only in Sarawak (Peter Kedit 1982) but also in Kalimantan (cf. Hildebrand 1982, Hoffman 1983, Rousseau 1990, Sellato 1994, Brosius 1986). A complete inventory of Punan groups has yet to be made and dozens of Punan groups exist for whom no ethnographic data whatsoever has been gathered (Sellato 1994:14). The literature that does exist on the Punan as distinct from the Dayak has been only recently produced by a very small group of scholars such as Rousseau (1990), Hoffman (1983), and Sellato (1994). Literature is still lacking for many of the Punan groups and they are only very recently being studied as distinct and separate from Dayak groups by scholars.

Briefly, Dayak groups, as defined by Rousseau (1990) and Sellato (1994), are those peoples who are settled or semi-settled and who engage in shifting cultivation and have some permanent or semi-permanent shelter that they occupy for long (three months plus) periods of time (cf. Sellato 1994, Rousseau 1990). The Punan groups are those people who traditionally are hunter and gatherers, who travel in small bands (less than thirty, often as small as five) and rarely stay in one place for longer than a week. These

people live by hunting wild animals and by gathering forest produce for both consumption and for trade with nearby Dayak groups (cf. Peluso 1991, Cleary and Eaton 1992, Rousseau, 1990, Sellato 1994).

Images of 'Other'

I determined to go myself to their (*trings*) *kampong*; but the Sultan and all the people said it would not be safe to do so: the people were cannibals, and were hated as well as feared by all their neighbors... This Priestess told me - holding out her hand - that the palms are considered the best eating. Then she pointed to the knee, and again to the forehead, using the Malay word *bai, bai* (good, good) each time, to indicate that the brains, and the flesh on the knees of a human being, are also considered delicacies.... more interesting, perhaps, as that we were now within a short distance of the country in which the tailed race of men lived... I could hardly resist the temptation to penetrate myself into the stronghold of my ancestral representatives... He called them 'Orang-boentoet', literally, tail-people... Tjiropon declared with a grave face that the caudal appendage of these people was from two or four inches long... (Bock 1881 in King 1992:157)

The Punan and Dayak peoples of Borneo have intrigued explorers and travelers, who carried with them images gleaned from earlier reports, such as Pigafetta's and Correa's, who were surviving crewmembers Magellan's voyages. Images in the popular imagination were of fierce headhunters, cannibals, and other exotics who later explorers hoped might be representative of Darwin's missing link, waiting to be discovered and brought back to the shores of Albion or elsewhere in Europe for all to see and know.

More recently have the indigenes of Borneo been viewed and studied by visitors and scholars not just as curiosities of Borneo, but as a unique people with their own cultural and socio-political systems deeply embedded within the Bornean imaginative and physical landscape. O'Hanlon (1984) muses that:

Perhaps Lubbock had got it the wrong way round in his *Prehistoric Times*. Perhaps it was not so much the 'horrible dread of unknown evil' but the very sensible dread, in this climate, of every passing accident, of every present micro-organism. They were certainly very stable societies, but perhaps this was exactly why they were so stable (1984:80).

The Punan

There has been speculation about the origins of the Punan every since the first explorer landed on Bornean shores. The origin of the Punan, defined as nomadic hunter-gatherer groups (Sellato 1994:115) has been a topic of contention among scholars for some time. Three general lines of argument have arisen, all of which have their own supporters. The first, as argued by Hose and McDougall (1912), Kennedy (1935) and Urquhart (1935) sees the Punan as fragmented groups left behind in a process of evolution which brought the Dayaks to become farming peoples. A somewhat weak, second line of argument supported by Vrocklage (1936), Heine-Geldern (1946), and more recently by J. Nicolaisen (1976a, 1976b), is founded upon the idea that hunter-gatherer culture is of necessity independent of the culture of the farmers (the Dayaks) due to the existence of incompatible traits in the culture and social organization of the Punan hunter-gatherers and Dayak farmers (Sellato 1994:115). Finally, the third line of argument (Harrison 1949; Seitz 1981; Hoffman 1983, Bellwood 1985) maintains that the culture of the hunter-gatherers is a "secondary primitivism, the result of devolution... Thus according to this theory, the hunter-gatherers would be the descendants of farmers who went off to live in the primary forest for reasons that might be political (warfare) or economic (specialization in the exploitation of the forest environment)" (Sellato 1994:116). In this

view, the Punan are seen as either political or economic victims of others whose only recourse has been to literally run away into the dense forests, where they would presumably not only adapt quickly but be unaffected by those political and economic developments which forced them to become refugees. King (1993), a scholar of Bornean peoples, strongly supports this last theory though I find Sellato's (1992, 1994) argument, discussed below, more plausible.

All of the above lines of argument demand the acceptance of theoretical assumptions based on a very small amount of literature concerning the Punan specifically. There is very little known of the Punan of Borneo, and much of what is known has been drawn from just one region as mentioned above, the Malaysian state of Sarawak, and from a relatively recent time frame encompassing only the last hundred years (Sellato 1994:116). Within theories of Punan origin there is a lack of space and time perspective, due to the very limited studies of the past hundred years, that are inherently necessary in understanding Punan genesis. The above theories also contradict each other, though there is no reason to assume that they must be mutually exclusive, given the large territory and time span concerned. As Sellato (1994) points out "a flaw intrinsic to all these theories is the opposition of nomad to farmer, as if they were mutually exclusive" leading to a linear evolutionary model that is not necessarily tenable (Sellato 1994:116). Sellato theorizes that the Punan are an autonomous original culture of nomadic hunter-gatherers who have elaborated new economic systems compatible with their underlying traditional ideology (Sellato 1994:117). Rousseau (1990) suggests that the most appropriate framework for understanding Punan society is as a network, rather than a

system with a set of recognizable structures. These two ways of defining a society are not inherently mutually exclusive, indeed they can be seen as complementary, in that those who share a same system may form a common network, such as the Dayak groups, though this need not be the case as networks may be formed because of contrasts as well as similarities, as with the Punan, defined predominantly by what they are not: agriculturists, Malays (Rousseau 1990:301). It is within this theoretical framework presented by Sellato (1994) and Rousseau (1990) on which I base my discussion of the Punan throughout this thesis.

Dayak Identity

Throughout the literature describing Dayak peoples, also referred to as '*Dyak*', '*Daya*' or '*Dya*', the term Dayak is used either to describe all non-Muslim, non-Malay peoples of Borneo (e.g. King 1993:29), or is used to refer specifically to those peoples who are not nomads, Muslim, or Malay, and that are settled or semi-settled in Borneo (cf. Sellato 1994, Rousseau 1990). This second description serves to make an important distinction between the Punan, who are nomad hunter-gatherers, and the Dayak groups. Though the two peoples are related in that they share the same Austronesian-Mongoloid ancestors, a distinction made between the two groups based on economic and ecological criteria is useful in discussing the impacts of political and economical development on the cultures of these groups and how these impacts differ for them as well as what common ground may be created for both groups through their reactions to development.

During the nineteenth century the exonym term Dayak became commonly used by Europeans to refer to the non-Christian, non-Malay indigenes of Borneo (King 1993:29). The term came into usage during the eighteenth century by the Dutch as a general referent for 'inland' or 'interior' people (Pringle 1970:xviii, Ave 1993:30). This term had somewhat derogatory connotations, meaning 'rustic', 'yokel' or 'bumpkin'. Ave (1993) explains that the term Dayak was a referent created for natives by non-indigenes and suggests that "the name Dayak, probably derived from the Malay *aja*, means 'native' and is very likely a designation applied by immigrant Malays settled on the coast to the pagan population of Borneo" (Ave 1993:30). Whatever the genesis of the term Dayak, it is common usage now to describe, at the very least, those non-Muslim, non-Malay indigenous peoples of the interior of Borneo. Ave and King (1986) use the term to describe the indigenes of the island, and break that category down into a number of subgroups, making no distinction, though, between the Dayak and Punan groups. The subgroups include the Iban, Ngaju, Kadazan/Dusun, Land Dayak, Kenyah, Kayan, Murut, and Melanau (Ave and King 1986:9-14). See Figure 2. This thesis uses the exonym term 'Dayak' to refer to those non-Muslim, non-Malay, and non-nomadic indigenous peoples of the interior of Borneo.

It is important here to note that both referents 'Dayak', whether inclusive of the Punan or not, and 'Punan' are, throughout the ethnographic literature on Borneo, categorically contrasted with 'Malay' (Ave 1993:31, cf. Ave et.al. 1983, Sellato 1994, Rousseau 1990). A critical distinction of peoples in Bornean society is based on who is Muslim and who is not. The main defining characteristic of Malay-ness is adherence to

the Islamic religion, though characteristics of Malay-ness are also based on their language and customs and the majority of Bornean Malays originated from the autochthonous peoples of Borneo who converted to Islam. Gradually over time religious conversion would result in a reclassification of the Dayak converts as Malay; the local Malay term for this process is *masuk Melayu* ('to become Malay') (Ave 1993:31, e.g. Sellato 1992). It is this process of 'becoming Malay' that accounts for the early indigenous Dayak population of Brunei to have now become predominantly Malay (King 1993). Throughout Borneo, there are many Dayak people and groups that have converted to Islam and become Malay, an identity which, thoroughly adopted, requires the repudiation and 'forgetting' of their Dayak roots. They refer to themselves as Malay and after conversion are referred to as Malay throughout the current ethnographic literature (King 1993:32).

Migrants of Borneo

Over time many peoples have found their way to the island of Borneo. Those with the most impact on the culture of the island have been the Chinese and the Muslim peoples from the Southeast Asia area, both within and outside of Indonesia (Ave 1993:32). The Malay population of Borneo has played a significant role in the political economy of the island due to their involvement in trade. Malays have traditionally occupied coastal areas and rivers with easy access to the sea. The interior was traditionally outside the Malay areas of settlement, though it did serve as a refuge for Malays, who for numerous reasons found it necessary to flee and find at least temporary

refuge elsewhere (Nieuwenhuis 1936:127, Rousseau 1990:282). The interior also serves as a land of opportunity for entrepreneurs wanting to gain access to NTFPs such as rattan, damar, birds' nests, and spices, the trade in which they continue to serve a particular economic role, discussed in chapter four.

Of special concern in this thesis are the Javanese and Maduran migrants and the ethnic Chinese Indonesians, many of whom arrived from China as long ago as the seventh and eighth centuries and settled hundreds of years ago throughout Indonesia and Malaysia, though the bulk of Chinese settlement in Borneo has occurred only in the last 200 years (Chin 1987:13, Ave 1993:34). The Chinese arrived originally to pursue their interests in trade, and eventually settled and assimilated into the Bornean urban and semi-urban landscape. For example, some Chinese settlers arrived in Western Kalimantan in the latter part of the eighteenth century as goldminers and as the deposits were exhausted some became market-gardeners and coconut- and pepper-growers. Other Chinese were brought by Europeans to develop commercial agriculture or take up rice-farming (Ave 1993:34). These Chinese, now Indonesian citizens, have had a very significant impact on the economic landscape of the area. They are found primarily in the trading and commercial sectors and are mostly urban-based (Chew 1990; Chin 1981, Ave 1993). They originally established an economic niche as small-scale traders and middlemen, from which they have expanded in time to commerce, trade, the service sector and manufacturing, though the bulk of the ethnic Chinese in Borneo still practice small-scale trade, very important to the larger island economy as seen with the trade of rattan (*Calamus spp.*) discussed in chapter four. The population of ethnic Chinese Indonesians

in Borneo is estimated by King (1993) at approximately one million (1993:35). It is very difficult to determine the specific number of ethnic Chinese in Kalimantan as accurate data on ethnicity is lacking and census categories are often fluid (for example no distinction is made differentiating Malays and Dayak who have converted to Malay) and give no detailed breakdown based on ethnicity. What is certain is that there is a sizable population of ethnic Chinese Indonesians throughout Kalimantan and that their impact on the economy of the area has been of consequence (Cleary and Eaton 1992:94). The ethnic Chinese of Borneo, as well as throughout Southeast Asia, have often been treated by their adopted countries governments as semi-citizens, and have often been viewed by their fellow citizens as still foreign. In times of national stress, it is often the ethnic Chinese on whom suspicion is cast because of their supposed economic prosperity as to their loyalty to their adopted state and community. They often suffer harassment or worse during times of crisis and have not yet fully assimilated into their host cultures because of local assumptions of ethnic Chinese prosperity (cf. Cleary and Eaton 1992, King 1993, Peluso 1994).

Increasingly significant to the cultural landscape of Kalimantan has been Islam, and the migration of Indonesian Muslims to the territory. The advent of Islam to the island began centuries ago, Pigafetta claims that the "Moros worshipped Mahomet (Pigafetta 1962:193), though the impact outside of the small coastal trading areas was until the last two hundred years insignificant. King (1993) explains that the Muslim Javanese are found throughout Borneo:

Their settlement certainly dates back to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, during the golden age of the East Javanese kingdom of Majapahit, which claimed

sovereignty over parts of Borneo at that time...The Javanese population in Kalimantan specifically has increased dramatically during the last two decades as a result of government-sponsored large-scale resettlement (or transmigration) of communities from overcrowded Java to the less populated regions of Borneo (King1993:33).

Among Muslim migrants to Kalimantan are the Madurese from the island of Madura, located just north-east of Java. See Figure 3. The Madurese are now found throughout Kalimantan, mainly in urban and semi-urban areas and work mostly as casual laborers, estate workers, fishermen and cattle traders (King1993:33). Other Muslim migrants to Kalimantan include peoples from Sumatra, Sulawesi, the Malaysian Peninsula and the Bajaus, the famous 'sea-gypsies' or 'nomads' from the southern Philippines (cf. Nimmo 1972, Sather 1975, King 1988, Ave and King 1986, Rousseau 1990). The impact of all of these Muslim migrants was confined to urban coastal areas until earlier this century when the Dutch began moving large numbers of Javanese and Balinese to Kalimantan to work on cash-crop plantations outside of the semi-urban areas of Kalimantan. This program has been continued by the Indonesian government since its independence from the Dutch in 1945 and continues today, referred to as the Transmigration Program. This thesis discusses the cultural, economic and environmental impacts of transmigration on the Bornean indigenes' physical and imaginative landscape further in chapter five.

Punan Identity

In the style of classic ethnographic anthropology, Bernard Sellato (1994) has studied the Punan substantively and in-depth. He characterizes the traditional Punan




FIGURE 3. Areas of Origin of Transmigrants
(Source: Park 1992:53)

groups as having a set of distinct qualities which constitute uniqueness from the Dayak: they are individualistic, pragmatic, opportunistic and secular. Qualities they tend to exhibit which constitute their difference as Punan are egalitarianism, an emphasis on physical mobility, and a lack of interest in concretizing their past, preferring to keep their history alive through everyday practices of their own lives (Sellato 1994:220). These characteristics are manifestations of their ideological system which most nomadic groups of Borneo share (Rousseau 1990). This ideology is separate from and has remained independent of the ideologies of the more predominant Dayak farming peoples. It is those Punan characteristics which have led to innovation in subsistence strategies when faced with economic change and impacts from outside of the Punan groups. Sellato defines the Punan culture as being based on a mixed subsistence economy and the commercial collecting of NTFPs, as well as adaptive strategies to outside influences. This thesis discusses NTFPs, specifically rattan (*Calamus spp.*) in chapter four. This Punan economy plays a role in the maintenance of the essential values that constitute their ideological system by preserving basic principles of Punan life such as family autonomy, mobility, economic versatility, and the 'open' nature of their society (Sellato 1994:221). Sellato (1994) claims a specific Punan ideology, in contrast to farmers (Dayak groups), which preserves the contrast between the two groups, especially within the economic sphere. This new Punan culture or 'Punan-ness' (the term is Sellatos') is constructed by the ideological premises of traditional Punan culture which is still preserved today, despite their seeming acculturation to 'settling down' as promoted by the government of Indonesia (1994:220).

This Punan-ness is an extremely important concept that helps to understand the ways Punan resist government development plans and maintain their own (varied yet Punan) identities. It has been noted frequently throughout ethnographic studies (cf. Bock 1881; Harrison 1949; Geertz 1963) that Punan groups do interact and are frequently closer to farmer groups than to their next neighboring Punan group, a fact that has lent credibility to theories of Punan origin such as Hoffmans', discussed earlier, who further believes that the Punan are the forest based 'wings' of Dayak groups, which is essentially an argument for de-evolution (Hoffman 1985: 134). The relationship between the Dayak farmers and the Punan hunter-gatherers, as well as government economic and socio-cultural usage of this relationship, must be outlined here briefly.

The Punan depend for their subsistence upon the forest, and from this forest they also collect valuable NTFPs. These are valuable to the Punan in that they can be traded for goods, and are also valuable to the government of Indonesia for gaining export dollars. Rattan is one of the most valuable NTFPs to the government in that it ranks the highest of all NTFPs in export value. During 1982-1986, rattan accounted for 75 percent of total NTFP exports in Indonesia (Godoy 1989: 348). Prior to 1988 most rattan (approximately 120,000 tons (dry weight) per year) was exported raw and semi-processed and provided between 80 and 90 percent of the world supply of rattan, and provided in a normal year about US \$100 million dollars for the state (Godoy 1989: 349). See Table 1. As of 1992, after the 1988 ban on the export of raw rattan, rattan was worth, at a conservative estimate, about US \$90 million a year to the government of

TABLE 1. Indonesian Rattan Exports and Price Developments for 1986 to 1989

Year	Volume (Tons)	Total Value (US\$ in Millions)	Average US\$/Ton
1986	109,555	109,547	999.93
1987	143,447	211,607	1,445.16
1988	85,223	194,067	2,227.17
1989	25,221	87,185	3,446.84

(Source: Godoy 1989:144)

TABLE 2: Exports of Non-Timber and Timber Products in Indonesia, 1979-1983.
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)

YEAR	VALUE OF NON-TIMBER EXPORTS	VALUE OF TIMBER EXPORTS	NON-TIMBER EXPORTS AS PERCENTAGE OF TIMBER EXPORTS
1979	114.0	2,172.3	5.2
1980	125.6	1,672.1	7.5
1981	106.0	951.8	11.2
1982	120.0	899.4	13.3
1983	127.0	1,161.1	11.0

(Source: Panayotou and Ashton 1992: 77)

Indonesia (Park 1992: 87). This makes rattan the third largest export dollar earner for the state, discounting oil and gas production, earning approximately 10 percent of what is earned by timber (Godoy 1989: 350). See Table 2. Indonesia is still the world's primary producer of rattan, supplying it in semi-finished (4 percent) and finished (96 percent) to the world market today (Godoy 1989: 351). Export statistics undervalue the importance of NTFP commodities to village economies, though this does not change the ranking of rattan relative to other NTFPs as state income earners (e.g. de Beer and McDermott 1989). Rattan is, however, of large importance to village economies, in the village of Dadahup in Central Kalimantan, monocrop rattan gardens account for over 90 percent of smallholder's cash income (Godoy 1989: 350).

The Punan trade rattan and other NTFPs to the Dayak farming group with whom they are associated for goods that they cannot obtain themselves such as dogs, axes, salt, and other goods. The farming group benefits from this relationship as they receive NTFPs, sometimes which they specify beforehand, and which they can trade downriver for a profit and purchase necessities that they in turn do not possess or have access to otherwise.

Punan and Dayak Relationships

Punan and Dayak groups will have varied relationships, some closer than others economically and socially. Farming groups will often try to settle 'their' Punan, so as to accrue the benefits of having access to NTFPs and being the only buyers for these

products (Peluso 1994, Sellato 1994). There will be various debts owed to each other, and as long as the relationship is mutually satisfying a good partnership exists. The Punan, though they may not receive as favorable of trade rates, do receive a kind of security in return. They can always obtain food-stuffs in times of scarcity from 'their' farmers, and they may develop kinship ties which raises individual Punan status within the tribe. It is in the farmers' best interests to settle 'their' Punan, but not to convert them to farming as all mutual benefits would be lost (Sellato 1994:167).

This system contains its own checks and balances. Like people in all stages of development the world over, some are inclined to take advantage of others given the opportunity. Should the Punan group feel morally or economically taken advantage of, they may leave and have done so in the past (Sellato 1994:168).² The Punan will adapt, at least part-time, to a more apparently sedentary lifestyle, but only as long as it does not infringe upon their own 'Punan-ness' and their own ways of life. If this is infringed upon, they will resist overtly, be removing themselves, or covertly, by resisting complete acculturation with the farming group. One of the ways they may covertly resist is by not adopting certain linguistic traits such as terminology that implies stratification (Rousseau 1990).

Members of Punan groups are inherently socially equal, both in gender and in class. Social inequality seems to rise out of three factors, as Sellato (1994:200) explains. The economic exploitation of power, the hereditary transmission of power, and social stratification as a corollary to the first two (in the case of those with stratified farmer neighbors). If a Punan leader abuses his position, the group maintains the right to

impeach him, and Sellato (1994: 200) notes that on the whole Punan leaders do not abuse their positions. The hereditary transmission of power is sometimes seen to influence some Punan men, who gain prestige within the Punan group by marrying a daughter of a Dayak chief, and within the Dayak group by acting as a trade liaison between the two groups. The Punan are able to acquire gongs and Chinese Ming period jars with the profits from their own commercial collecting of NTFPs which in turn enables them to afford a Dayak bride price, should they decide to marry outside of their group. This bride price is often set in terms of material goods, such as Chinese gongs and jars, which are traditionally a much sought after, high status item within Dayak communities since the advent of Chinese traders hundreds of years ago. The small brass gongs and the Chinese storage jars, some dating from as far back as the Ming dynasty and large enough for a child to fit into, are found in almost every longhouse in Borneo and are still used as currency throughout the island (O'Hanlon 1984:79). If the Punan live closely to the Dayak farming group, a tendency toward rank endogamy does make itself felt which serves to reinforce and enhance the relationship between the two groups (1994:200). Examples given by Sellato (1994) are the Punan Aoheng and Seputan who stressed their alliances with Dayak Kayan and Long Gelat aristocrats, especially pleased with the fact that these nobles recognized them as counterparts (1994:201). Punan groups that become so closely associated with Dayak farming communities who live nearby do tend to become stratified and do tend to settle down permanently with those Dayak eventually (Rousseau 1990:263).

Once the Punan begin to settle, there is then a need to affirm their own identity in relation to the farmers by remembering names and facts that relate to legitimizing a territorial claim, status, a house or goods. "There is a new need to find or invent deep and ancient roots in the ethnic landscape of the region, to elaborate or borrow origin myths, simply in order to justify the group's existence and affirm its cohesion. The plain fact of being, of being there, is no longer enough; it is also necessary to *have been*. Sometimes it is even necessary to have been *there*" (Sellato 1994:210). Time and place take a conceptual hold on the settlers, and the representation of landscape symbolically, historically and materially becomes all important, where before it just was.

Most often though, the band opposes any change of this sort. They do this more or less vigorously, explicitly or through inertia, by rejecting the establishment of stratification or even, still earlier, the attempt to impose a hereditary transmission of leadership. "Aoheng and Kajang communities, which accepted stratification, took exception to the dictatorial nature of leadership that it implies and maintain a certain degree of power to control or even depose their aristocrats, which serves to maintain the relatively democratic character of their societies" (1994:201). Sellato further notes that:

the Bukat, for their part, explicitly and firmly rejected every attempt by their leaders to establish hereditary chieftainships, as their recent history adequately shows. In spite of their close acquaintance with the strictly stratified society of the Kayan, they remained in a permanent state of "gumlau" revolt (see Leach 1954) against attempts to import their neighbors' social system into their own. They have preserved and put into practice their ideas of equality and individual autonomy up to the present day (1994:202).

Unmixed Punan societies have, in general, resisted the temptation to inequality and stratification. Those who have not were often composite ethnic groups, made up of

nomads intermarried with horticulturists. Rousseau (1990) and Sellato (1994) feel that it is the unmixed Punan who may have had a true ideal of egalitarianism. Enhancing this egalitarianism is the fact that they also have economic options to which they are strongly attached yet which are inherently flexible and adaptable options being “based in all probability on a particular ideal of individualism.” (Sellato 1994:203). Rousseau (1990) and Sellato (1994) suggests that for the Punan, the idea of a political organization above the level of the family has no appeal. Fundamentally individualistic and pragmatic, they prefer to content themselves with their “nomad-style” political system and concern themselves primarily with their respective economic options, though they do so at the expense of a political vision at levels higher than the family such as the local group, regional groups or a greater Bornean Punan group identification:

Ideology seems to find its most important application in the economic sphere; it is here, that ideology acts most positively, most constructively, leading to the invention of new economic systems. In the political sphere, ideology is expressed by inertia in the rejection of social transformations and the preservation of a “nomad-style” political system. These elements were so important to the Punan groups that they sought to preserve if not to enhance them over long periods of time after the abandonment of a strictly nomadic way of life (Sellato 1994:204).


Language is one tool that the Punan use to resist complete assimilation into their neighbors farming culture and maintain their own identity of Punan-ness. When some Punan groups join a ‘settled’ group to practice ‘traditional’ subsistence agriculture they also tend to adopt the language of the settled group. They do not, however, adopt all words that do not have an equivalent word in their own vocabulary (Rousseau 1990:254). The kinship ties that the adopted language signifies are not deemed relevant in Punan cultures; therefore by not adopting this vocabulary they also do not adopt the significance

of the relationships that the vocabulary refers to. They maintain their own identity while assimilating into Dayak culture and while strategically adopting the signs of a government promoted culture. It is largely through language that local practices are instituted but meanings are never fixed and outside forces can often determine what is to be endowed with meaning, while internal forces determine which meanings will have any significance (Rousseau 1990).

Punan will adapt culturally to a point in order to promote their own mixed subsistence way of life, adopting economic practices that they find pragmatic. The farming groups that they associate with have a vested interest in the Punan maintaining a mixed subsistence system, and though they desire their Punan to settle, they do not want to make them the same as themselves as it would not behoove them economically, and culturally it may affect unwanted changes in their own settlement.

The Punan Political Economy and 'Settling-Down'

The government sees Punan as potential farmers and, until settled, as a subversive threat to national stability as long as they roam the forests and remain nomadic or semi-nomadic. In the state's narrative of development, the Punan are on their way to modernity and the first step is sedentarization as farmers (Ave and King 1986:98) See Figure 4. Within the state's economic and socio-cultural development plans, the Punan are 'loose canons'. They do not contribute to the economy (their contributions are credited to their Dayak farming neighbors who trade the NTFPs downriver) which is a duty of all citizens of the state. A long time state goal has been self-sufficiency in rice, in



Translations have been added in italics. * denotes illegible text in original.

FIGURE 4. The Desire to Civilize
(Source: Based on Ave and King 1986:99)

practice meaning that all rural peoples should grow enough for their own consumption as well as a surplus for the market. The Punan groups in general have a dislike for rice, and choose not to eat it unless they have exhausted their own sago staples and will eat it reluctantly in the absence of anything better when visiting Dayak farming villages (Sellato 1994:175, 180). The Punan dislike of rice can be attributed to the fact that the investment in labor required of rice is in direct competition with the commercial collection of NTFPs. In addition, the successful cultivation of rice virtually demands that the Punan remain in one place for the duration of the growing cycle, which the Punan are loath to do. Sellato (1994) points out that when the Punan do cultivate rice, the swidden fields are often very small, poorly cared for, and are left to themselves after sowing. Returning to the fields after long absences, the Punan are content to reap whatever rice has been left by rodents and insects. The Punan families for whom commercial collecting has become an economic priority have adapted their dietary economy to facilitate commercial collecting of NTFPs. The opportunity costs lost in time spent cultivating rice is regarded by the Punan as a serious economic drawback which would seriously infringe on the time available to them to collect forest products (Sellato 1994:181). The Punan themselves have chosen to give economic priority in their culture to the commercial collecting of valuable NTFPs, for which a steady demand exists, and have so become professional collectors.

This priority is expressed in a specific adaptation of their subsistence system, which permits flexibility and mobility while at the same time guaranteeing them their daily food, and consequently, in a refusal to invest more time in an activity, such as rice farming, that would restrict their mobility (Sellato 1994:184).

It should also be noted, that an integral part of 'Punan-ness' is the traditional absolute equality of the sexes. With settling and farming, equality among sexes has become strained and disparate; Punan women in settled groups end up performing seventy percent of the agricultural work, while men focus primarily on collecting forest products for trade (Rousseau 1990:247). If the stage is reached that settled Punan no longer collect at all, then men and women eventually come to specialize in different phases of agricultural farm work. Settling down negatively impacts gender equality within the group, something the Punan traditionally uphold (Sellato 1994:202).

In government efforts to settle the Punan, they have met with resistance not just from the Punan, but also from their farming neighbors who do not want their Punan to settle. They do not disapprove of the practice of agriculture in and of itself, but do worry about the possibility that the Punan might come to depend too heavily on rice as well as move into the Dayak farmers economic niche, becoming competitors for resources such as land rather than partners in the local political economy of resource distribution and usage (Rousseau 1990:250). The farmer also has the very real worry of losing his Punan suppliers of NTFPs, on which the local Dayaks depend for trade (e.g. Rousseau 1990:249). The farmers have a saying: "everybody knows that Punan are supposed to be collectors, and people ought to do what they are supposed to do" (Sellato 1994:175).

Other than the loss of the profits they earn on Punan NTFPs, the farmers are also concerned about territorial claims made by Punan farmers, who tend to come settle in the fertile lowlands traditionally cultivated by the farmers; and they also fear the loss of their political control over the Punan. Once the Punan reach the stage of sedentarization and

early horticulture, the farmers no longer have any control over the process of Punan settling, and they may see 'their' Punan escape from their economic domination. If there are no other bands upriver, the supply of NTFPs dries up and the farmers see their profits melt away (Rousseau 1990:250). At this point the forest is then open to professional collectors brought in from the coasts or from downriver who are quite damaging to the environment, being invested only in a quick profit, not the land. Since European arrival in Borneo, administrations have sought to settle the Punan. Pauwels (1935 cited in Rousseau 1990:250) reports that in East Borneo at the turn of the century territorial administrators attempted, unsuccessfully, to settle the Punan through pressure on Dayak farming chiefs who themselves needed the Punan to gather NTFPs. Pressure on the Punan to settle continues to be exerted by both Malaysian and Indonesian governments who, especially after the confrontation of the 1960s between the two states, were uneasy about the existence of nomads inhabiting the margins of their territories whom they could not effectively control and whom they (unrealistically) feared would support and help guerrillas (Rousseau 1990:250). That the Indonesian government seeks to settle the Punan goes against the farmers interests completely, and subverts their social system which relies economically and politically on 'their' Punan remaining Punan, and doing so in close proximity to Dayak farming villages. Some Dayak farmers will go so far as to spread dark tales of taboos forbidding nomads to practice agriculture or find some other means to prevent 'their' Punan from settling (Sellato 1994:174).

Another factor in state desire for settling the Punan is to gain legitimate control of their territory (e.g. King 1993). Once the Punan have officially settled on government

assigned land, they lose their rights to their traditional territories, leaving it open for concessions that will then not be publicly resisted. Locally, the debate is based on issues of territorial ownership versus control of and access to the forest, discussed in more depth in chapter five. Punan maintain control and access to the forest by persistently maintaining their 'Punan-ness' while the government insists on ownership by dint of their own claims to the territory, legitimated in the historical discourse of the founding and defining of the nation-state. The army's doctrine of Territorial Management explains one objective as:

To manage potentials of an area, including geographic factors and the ideological-political-social-cultural-military conditions, in order to create regional strength as the invincible arena by means of the security approach (Liong and Budiardjo 1990:36).

The government sees the Punan, as well as the semi-settled Dayaks, as incompatible with building a modern nation-state and feels it must civilize the 'savages' for their own and for the countries' benefit. Social Affairs official for East Kalimantan, Dr. Wiyono, describes the Punan groups as :

These isolated communities, in the nomadic and semi-nomadic categories, generally still live backwardly in several ways, socially, culturally, economically, and in their religion and education (*Suara Pembaruan* 28 May 1996 in *DTE* 30 August 1996).

The state of Indonesia benefits from this view of the Punan and Dayak groups economically; by the money it earns by exploiting the resources found on Punan land, politically; through a supposed greater social cohesiveness, really sameness, and socially; the threat of subversion is diffused with the settling of the Punan and the government earns credit internationally for modernizing its 'natives'(eg. NDIO 1993:55). In the

process, cultures and peoples are eliminated who, through their 'Punan-ness', have demonstrated that a true democracy can exist without modernization and assimilation. Though they may lack an epistemological and/or oral history do not lack an identity, again a concept threatening to the nation-state, which has itself a selective memory and whose identity is based on Javanese histories of hegemony and cultural superiority.

Punan Resistance to Acculturation

Punan will resist state-led development projects designed to modernize themselves and their cultures if this in any way diminishes their Punan-ness, though they will attempt to incorporate their traditional culture into the accoutrements of modernization. When they must organize to defend their territory, it is not for their territory per se, but for valuable trees and plants such as fruit trees and rattan on which they subsist. They will then defend as a band, but not to date as a larger federation of groups. Sellato (1994:203) suggests that for the Punan, the idea of a political organization above the level of the family has no appeal. Their identities and 'Punan-ness' are based on fundamental characteristics of individualism and pragmatism, which precludes interest in any larger scale political system above the 'nomad-style' family level. This suggests that they must concern themselves first and foremost with their respective economic options as proscribed by their traditional lifestyle and culture. If, however, the Punan have adapted their own NTFP collection activities to meet the needs of local and regional demand, then it is possible that a larger political vision is not precluded by their traditional individualism and economic activities. Indeed, if they choose to continue in

their role as supplier of NTFPs to the Dayak, it may be necessary to engage in a larger political vision which I believe will not contradict any traditional cultural or economic practices that they may currently have. I would further suggest that the Punan are able in some cases to convince their farming neighbors with whom they are associated to do this for and or with them; after all, it is in the farmers interests to keep the Punan in the forests at least to some degree. The Dayaks gain economically from Punan resistance to modernization and so, I believe, would approve of and support this resistance to a greater change in their social and economic order. The Dayaks as a group are much more organized politically and socially (they have established for themselves the Institute of Dayakology, an NGO created to give voice to the Dayak as a group which is based in Kalimantan and run by Dayaks), and if necessary this organization can be used as a tool by the Punan, who are often classed as Dayaks themselves, to resist development through top-down modernization programs which may be detrimental to both the Punan and Dayak cultures and livelihoods.

As long as there are forests for the Punan to migrate into, they will do so when necessary as overt acts of resistance. When forced to assimilate, their resistance will be covert but effective. They do not adopt enthusiastically ideas foreign and challenging to their Punan-ness, and so maintain their identity, even if settled and far away from their home territories. "Rituals ..apparently absent or nearly so in traditional Punan society, have been borrowed and adapted in various ways, and, it would seem, not very earnestly" (Sellato 1994:205). Though, ironically, their farmer neighbors respect them highly as effective shamanistic healers and ideal mediators between humans and souls due perhaps

to their perceived closeness with nature, this view also allows the Punan to be perceived as more 'primitive' by those same neighbors and by the state itself. While the Punan may adopt the rice cult as practiced by their farming neighbors, they divest it of its ritual importance. Referring to rice, the Punan, even when settled, chose not to adopt the specific term referring to cooked rice, simply calling it "food," as they do sago and cassava (Sellato 1994:206).

The Punan have borrowed rituals in areas where they were forced to do so by their social interactions with the farmers, and not elsewhere. Their evident reluctance to grant a sacred character to a material object like a house or to an economic activity like rice farming, along with an absence of any inclination toward their neighbors' cosmological beliefs and theories, the notable minimalism of the ritual and religious sphere in the Punan traditional culture and their lack of enthusiasm for borrowed rituals, all lead to the conclusion that Punan societies are fundamentally non-religious and solidly pragmatic (Sellato 1994: 207).

They refuse to seriously adopt any socio-cultural trait that interferes with their Punan-ness, though they may appear to have adopted these traits, they are necessary accessories in maintaining a peaceful and fruitful relationship with their neighbors and to be seen as acceding to the state's desires to 'civilize' them. At stake are long-standing traditions that define the Punan as Punan. Changes to these traditions are primarily pragmatic, adaptive strategies designed to reinforce Punan culture while assimilating to changes in their economic and cultural landscapes.

Inside of the context of traditional Punan culture, as it has been outlined by both Rousseau (1990) and Sellato (1994), the function of Punan society is based far more upon a system of rules of behavior, or of relations between individuals, than upon the experience of a bounded social entity such as clans or larger political units. The Punan band is in its essence fluid, the affiliation of families to the band is uncertain and

fluctuating in that they may join or leave the group at will without permission of a chief. In this mobile, fluctuating and what we may consider a highly unstable context, interpersonal relationships play a far more important role than any set of fixed and supposedly transcendent laws which would be in essence unresponsive to the subjective reality of the individual Punan, and which normatively constitutes *adat* in the closed society of the Dayak farmers (Sellato 1994:208, Rousseau 1990:250). Traditional Punan society, as defined by Sellato (1994), Rousseau (1990), and Brosius (1986), with its nomadic way of life and its flexible social organization, is very much constructed and identified by characteristics of openness, individualism, pragmatism, opportunism, and secularity. In the course of the government promoted conversion of this society to another way of life, it borrows from its neighbors socio-cultural elements that are carefully selected and flexibly adapted in order to minimize any challenge to its intrinsic characteristics and to preserve its inherent 'Punan-ness'. See Figure 4. While the characteristics and ideology associated with traditional Punan culture permits the adaptation of new economic strategies, these in turn can be seen to act to preserve the basic, intrinsic values of the Punan culture (Sellato 1994:208). It is this very feature of their identities that may well allow the Punan to survive intact as a cultural group while evading, resisting, and undergoing assimilation into the larger regional Dayak culture and the greater regional Indonesian culture as defined by the Indonesian state itself.

Punan identity is not rooted in place or time, "the shared memory of an ancient center of dispersal and/or a traditional territory serves to give the Punan group ascertain sense of place; but sometimes recollection is itself lost" (Sellato 1994:208). It has been

stressed in differentiating the Punan from the Dayak groups that the Punan attach little importance to time, show no great interest in their own history or genealogies and rarely if ever speak of heroes or of the exploits of their ancestors (Sellato 1994:208). The past does not hold great cultural value for them, nor does it serve to bind their society, rather it is their very lifestyle, their day to day activities, that serves this function of identity building. It is an open society, in contrast with the Dayaks whose society is relatively closed and permanent and whose sense of identity is based on an unwritten charter which is in part the body of *adat* of the group and in part the body of its historical and mythical traditions. This charter legitimizes current status and hierarchical relationships within Dayak society and it legitimizes the power hierarchies inherent in the Dayaks' stratified society. In traditional Punan society there is no corollary conception of power to legitimize, neither social status, nor rank, nor territory, nor ancestral house. The open society of the Punan is as it is, not as it should be, and always is present in the physical and imaginary landscapes that the Punan traverse temporally and spatially. The characteristic constructions of 'Punan-ness', based as it is on the essential values of individualism, pragmatism and more, is a symbolic and representative ideology which has no need to be legitimized by tradition or to be upheld by reference to a body of oral or written texts, because it is rooted in the innermost self of each individual and confirmed by daily life, what we in the West often define as 'Civil Society' (Peet and Watts 1996). This feeling being by definition common to all the Punan, affirms Punan identity in direct contrast to that of the Dayaks (Sellato 1994:209). An example of this is given by Sellato (1994:210):

For those Bukat who have always remained within their region of origin, it is relatively easy to maintain an awareness of historical roots in the land, a fact that makes it possible to develop ethno-historical reconstructions covering a period of over a century and a half. Conversely, a group like the present-day Lisum, several times uprooted and having several times changed their ethnonym, no longer feel that they have anything in common with the other nomad groups that once were their kinfolk except for the nomadic way of life, a certain feeling of "Punan-ness".

This is remarkably similar to Renan's concept of a daily plebiscite of the people as the only justification for the continued existence of a nation-state. Indeed, according to Renan's definition, the Punan, then, have a more legitimate claim to nation-hood than does the government of Indonesia. They have, however, failed in previous attempts to assert that independence and uniqueness, which in their view need not necessarily be asserted because it just is. It is, they are, and they exist as they do, in the way that they continually choose best for their own cultural and economic survival. It is this survival that is threatened by the Indonesian nation-state in the guise of cultural and economic development, which they resist both overtly and covertly; by sometimes relying upon 'their' Dayak farmers to resist with them, by moving further away into the forests, and, when faced with no other choice, by direct resistance in the form of filing claims, blocking roads, and guerrilla attacks upon outsiders.

It is interesting to note, as it has been observed by Testart (1981) in Sellato (1994:210) that hunter-gatherers may lead a 'double life'. This is not dissimilar to Scotts' (1985,1990) formulation of public and private transcripts as related to cultural resistance. This double life consists of the Punan having an "external" culture similar to and modeled on their neighbors, while also preserving an "internal" culture through which they maintain their distinctiveness. For the Punan, the "internal" or "private" culture

consists of the ideological core of Punan-ness, maintained “almost unadulterated in the new Punan culture and forming the character for the “internal” functioning of the society, while the “external” culture consists of fragments of a body of *adat* and mythology borrowed from the farming groups and “activated” particularly in interactions with them” (Sellato 1994:210). These public and private transcripts indeed serve to maintain Punan-ness in the face of massive cultural, economic and political changes to the group and their territories as embodied in the imaginative and physical landscapes of Borneo.

It can be seen, then, that ethnicity, or identity, in Borneo has been historically constructed by internal and external cultural factors “borne by fronts of diffusion in a mobile, “open,” and dynamic social context very different from the “closed” and relatively static stratified farming societies” (Sellato 1994:214). There exists in Borneo an island wide sequence of cultural ‘situations’ or constructions of identities, ranked in terms of those considered most primitive to most civilized: hunting-gathering, horticulture, swidden rice farming, and irrigated rice farming.

This sequence, oriented overall and in the abstract as Borneo’s rivers flow, from the headwaters downward, represents a regional scale of values ranging from the ‘savage’ to the ‘civilized’, from the forest to the town. The Savage is always farther upstream (Sellato 1994:214).

Development projects of the Indonesian nation-state see modernization as the evolution on a linear plane of the ‘savage’ to the civilized, with the Punan being the ‘savages’ upstream. See Figure 4. These four categories, though, need not be seen linearly as they are each highly adapted systems that have specific economical and cultural functions that serve a specific economic and cultural function and are an end in and of themselves. They are mutually complementary systems that have aided in the cultural diversity and

economic interdependence of the island. Seeing these systems as linear and progressive not only leads to culturally situated judgments of Punan origins, but also presumes change as a necessity and constructs the only possible solution as one that insists upon development and modernization. This is the viewpoint of the government of Indonesia and of the mainstream international development community, who miss entirely the possibility of this system being a highly adapted and most appropriate for the ecosystem as well as the economic and cultural survival of the indigenous inhabitants of the island named Borneo.

The struggle over NTFPs, discussed in chapter four, in Indonesian Borneo is inherently a cultural struggle over the material and symbolic landscape and the identities that are part of this landscape. The new production regime related to NTFPs and forest access rights in Indonesian Borneo has converted rural Bornean society into a contested social terrain; the primary struggle over the harvesting and control of NTFPs is more accurately a struggle over the ownership and control of the land and the production processes therein. By viewing political and economic processes as a realm of various representations it can be seen that the struggles over meaning and the manufacture of symbolic and material dissent among the Dayak and Punan are manifestations of production politics and the struggle to maintain an identity that has always been dynamic.

CHAPTER III

THE POST-COLONIAL PROJECT OF NATION STATE BUILDING: NARRATION AND SOVEREIGNTY

Constructing a Post-Colonial Identity

There has been much written and debated by scholars about the origin of sovereign nations; how this concept came into being, how it has been practiced and how it currently functions internationally. Less work has been done on the construction of former colonies of European nations into legitimate sovereign nations of their own. By definition, the process of nation building for a former colony, such as Indonesia, is a different process under circumstances different than European nation-state formation. For newly created nation-states which were colonies, it is usually presupposed that they are legitimate nations simply because they exist thus. Previous research into the process of how a colony becomes a legitimate nation which is recognized internationally has not been extensive. Examining the basic assumptions of the European constructed definition of 'nation', and comparing that to the actual process of post-colonial nation-state construction can help to expose the underlying assumptions of what a nation is and what makes it legitimate, both internally and externally, and what constitutes an illegitimate nation both from within and without of the new nation-state.

Modern nation building faces a larger hurdle in the construction of the state because of inter-national pressures to conform to pre-existing definitions and standards of what it means to exist as a nation. In order to be seen as legitimate, a nation must take into consideration pre-existing inter-national standards to which it must at least appear to conform. New nations also must come to grips with their own colonial past which often colors how the new nation wishes to be perceived by its own citizens. This in turn affects how the new nation governs itself internally and how it interacts economically, politically, and socially with the outside world. If a nation is perceived to be illegitimate, either internally or externally, it faces many problems that can adversely affect its very foundations. To resolve this problem, it must at least appear to address the concerns of those who question its legitimacy. Thus, how the nation narrates and creates its public transcript (the official discourse meant for the public) is thus crucial in gaining legitimacy, and therefore power, to make economic, social, environmental and political decisions that will be respected, internally and externally (Scott 1990).

The recognition of independence by other nation-states is only the first step in the creation of a legitimate post-colonial nation-state. The signs by which a legitimate nation-state is known have always been difficult to identify whether race, religion, language, natural boundaries or frontiers. Yet these factors must be defined and negotiated both internally and externally in order for legitimacy to be accepted. Taking the discussion of decolonization beyond the purview of the imperial-colonial debate and adding dimensions of narration and representation allows for an analysis of what this narrative process means to the marginalized Punan and Dayaks of Indonesian Borneo and their

struggle to maintain their own distinct culture and identity while undergoing economic and social colonization by the Indonesian nation-state.

Indonesia as a post-colonial nation-state has come to believe the cultural fictions that it has inherited from its Dutch colonizers, and re-invented as its own narrative of identity. Its imaginative identity has been constructed as concrete reality and presented to its citizens as the only authentic identity in the name of nationalism. This construct is now threatened by new production regimes in Kalimantan and the contested social terrains that these regimes have created.

The nation-state as we know it today is a fairly modern construct, created only in the last 150 years in Europe (Renan 1882) and subsequently incorporated globally. What is a modern nation-state? Ruth McVey (1996) explains it well:

The nation involves collective commitment; its impulses are egalitarian, its foundation is sentiment. The state, however, presents itself not as ideal but as fact...this ideological odd couple has made itself into a particularly powerful focus of organization and thought...the almost unquestioned locus of power (1996:1).

A nation then, is founded on sentiment, an idea that Renan (1882) was among the first to formulate. A state is the organization of these thoughts into a legitimate political vehicle for these sentiments, creating in the process the nation-state.

There has been much written and debated by scholars about the origin of sovereign nations; how this concept came into being, how it has been practiced, and how it currently functions internationally. Less work has been done on the construction of former colonies of European nations into legitimate sovereign nations of their own. By definition, the process of nation-state building for a former colony, such as Indonesia, is a different process taken up under different circumstances than European nation-state

formation. For newly created nation-states which were colonies, it is usually presupposed that they are legitimate nations simply because they have been granted independence by their former colonizers and have been recognized by the international community of nation-states.

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Modern nation building faces a larger hurdle in the construction of the state because of inter-national pressures to conform to pre-existing definitions and standards of what it means to exist as a nation-state. In order to be seen as legitimate, a nation must take into consideration pre-existing inter-national standards to which it must at least appear to conform. New nation-states also must come to grips with their own colonial past which often colors how the new nation-state wishes to be perceived by its own citizens. This in turn affects how the new nation-state governs itself internally and how it interacts economically, politically, and socially with the outside world. If a nation is perceived to be illegitimate, either internally or externally, it faces many problems that can adversely affect its very foundations.

How a nation narrates itself is of crucial importance in nation-state building. The nation-state uses tools such as international alliances, propaganda, education, and its own history to convince its citizens of its right to rule representatively, and also to convince

other nation-states that it is internally recognized, and therefore representative of its citizens. This is an inferred necessity to becoming recognized externally as a bonafide nation-state and accepted as sovereign internationally. The modern structure of sovereignty and the sovereign nation-state system has become the absolute governing structure of the world. Within politics, economics, development, the environment, and the construction of civil society, all dialogue becomes inter-national, regardless of the issue.

I will examine the recent history of nation-state building in Indonesia to help illustrate how a (former) colony becomes constructed as a nation-state through both internal and external narratives. This deconstruction of the current state narrative of nationhood will serve to illuminate the acceptance, or resistance, of legitimacy in Indonesia today as seen by her citizens, both enfranchized and marginalized.

Constructing the Indonesian Nation

From the early 1910s on, nationhood emerged as the dominant mode of organizing community and identity in Southeast Asia. Signs and symbols of nationhood sprung up all over the region, including Indonesia. Within fifty years, nationhood took over all other forms of social organization. How and why this happened when it did needs to be examined more closely in order to see the underlying legitimizing factors of nation-state construction. By taking the discussion of decolonization out of the purview of the 'imperial-colonial' debate and adding a third, international, dimension to the discussion of how a nation-state is constituted, one can forge a deeper and more integrated

understanding of how nation-states are now created and how Indonesia was able to constitute itself as a legitimate nation-state in the world community.

As Jan Aart Scholte (1995) points out, many comparative studies of the Southeast Asia region have been done of colonialism and post-colonialism that address each country within the region individually. What many fail to do is to look at the specific inter-national factors of nation-state creation. Often ignored is the idea that connections between countries can have figured in the very construction of the nation-state. This brings the causation beyond the 'national' level and takes it to the global level, allowing for a richer analysis of the factors that contributed to nation-state formation in Indonesia (Scholte 1995:191).³

Globalization triggered a revolution in the way that growing numbers of people in insular Southeast Asia conceptualized their group identities and sense of community. Small-scale, intimate *adat* (traditional) collectives became increasing obsolete in the emerging network of globalization. This globalization imported the idea of a nation-state to what is now Indonesia and Malaysia and replaced the older frameworks of social organization (Scholte 1995:211). The world became increasingly international in accessibility after the 1870s due to factors such as the advent of steam and motor engines, the advent of the steamship, the completion in 1871 of the first intercontinental telegraph cable across the Indonesian archipelago and the creation in 1874 of the Universal Postal Union. See Table 3. More people were educated at locales abroad where enclaves were formed of Indonesians, Arabs, Indians, and 'Others' (Scholte 1995:211). Increasingly, they identified not only with each other but also with the 'nation' from which they

originated, which helped to foster the diffusion of the concept of 'nationalism' and 'nation'.

TABLE 3. International Changes in Trade and Communication Between 1870 and 1930 in Indonesia

Form of Trade and Communication	1870	1930
Netherlands East Indies (NEI) merchant fleet vessels	880	6253
Rail & Tramway Construction in NEI (in km)	24.7	7,400
Road Building (in km)	*	70,000
Volume of Exports	x	5x
Ocean going ships cargo capacity	x	5x
Number of tourists	*	15,000
Arab population in NEI	9,000	85,000
Number of Hajis making Pilgrimages	2,000	300,000
NEI external debt (in billions of guilders)	*	1.3
Externally owned assets in NEI (in billions of guilders)	*	3.5
International postal delivery times (in days)	59	4
Number of cross-border telegrams (beginning in 1910)	250,000	700,000
Number of books lent by mobile libraries	100,000	2,000,000

(Data from Scholte, 1995)

* = minimal amount, no figures available

x = exact number not available

NEI = Netherlands East Indies

Scholte (1995) views the construction of Indonesian nationality as a primarily international affair and sees five factors inherent in this construction, some of which can also be inferred by examining Renan's definition closely.⁴ Scholte sees these factors as claims to uniqueness of identity vis a `vis the rest of the world; through the defining of citizens and of 'outsiders' and their exclusion from Indonesian society; by a kind of collective defense against an outside force defined as 'enemy', the candidates for enemyship in Indonesia are the Dutch, Japanese, and to some degree the ethnic Chinese; through various international sponsors who encourage the development of the nation for one reason or another; and through the establishment of a recognized national sovereignty

and diplomatic international relations, in other words, outside recognition of legitimacy. Scholte concludes that nationhood comes not so much from within as from the interaction between the 'domestic' and the 'external' (Tonnesson 1994:14).

It is almost impossible to define or become a nation without referring to nationalism, which in itself is a declaration of uniqueness: "the nation is an abstraction, an allegory, a myth that does not correspond to a reality that can be scientifically defined" (Brennan 1993:49). Race, language, religion, geography, or some combination of these seem insufficient for determining national essence, and yet people die for nations, fight wars for them and write fictions on their behalf. What is nationalism? "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist" (Brennan 1993:49). Nationalism becomes invented externally and internally in a emerging nation-state in order to ensure that the nation-state not only comes into existence, but remains there.

The defining of outsiders and the claiming of a unique identity vis a `vis other nation-states requires, at least initially, internal cohesion in the process of nation-state building. Whether or not all or a majority of the people believe in the creation of the particular nation, nationalism is implied per se. As soon as the defining of 'Other' and of 'unique' begins, so does the process of creating a nationalism, and its narrative, which can be seen as a necessary component in the external or inter-national recognition of a new nation-state.

The outward tangible signs of a nations' narrative are readily apparent. Flags, coins, postal stamps, passports for its citizens, monuments, and the creation of its own

name to signify its existence are obvious examples. All of these 'signs' are based on what is regarded by the nation-state as its collective history, its battles and its victories. Most of all, these 'signs' serve as a mark of legitimacy, internationally and internally, and as a collective reminder to its citizens of *why* they exist as a nation, and must continue to do so. These signs personalize for these citizens the *raison d'être* of the state and exist internally to ensure that its citizenry does not *forget* this reason and cease supporting the nation-state. For a nation to form it must 'forget' parts of its own history and for it to continue existing, without fragmenting, it must remember what it collectively represents in the present. It must always remember what benefits accrue to its members from constant legitimizing signifiers, or as Renan (1882) states:

forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for the principle of nationality. Indeed, historical inquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, even of those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always effected by means of brutality (Bhabha 1993:10).

In order to make these signifiers constantly relevant to the component citizens, a myth must be created and perpetuated by the state. This is done by creating a new unifying narrative and engaging in historical revisionism. The state creates and narrates its own version of its history in order to perpetuate its very existence. Often government leaders point to their national traditions, folklore, or historic community as the basis of the formation of their nation. They must protect their own culture as represented by these signifiers. These signifiers define the nation-state, and it is for the glory and defense of these signifiers that nationalism comes into existence. The pointing at tradition for legitimization is often very effective in narrating and creating a nation-state, yet the roots

of this tradition are rarely examined. Its very effectiveness comes from the appeal to and legitimizing of the (powerless) majority of the population by the (powerful) minority, the leaders, of the population. The people that created the idea of nation in Indonesia were not agrarian peasants, but members of the military, the educated, and the landholding classes, often one and the same. Bruce King (cited in Brennan 1993:53) points out that “Nationalism is an urban movement which identifies with the rural areas as a source of authenticity, finding in the ‘folk’ the attitudes, beliefs, customs and language to create a sense of national unity among people who have other loyalties.” What the agrarian peasants and the leaders had in common was their Javaneseness, which was re-defined as standard Indonesianness during the struggle for independence. This construction allowed the leaders to represent a unique nation-state complete with all the signs of being a bona-fide state to the international community of nation-states, as well as to its own citizenry.

Leaders represented themselves internally and externally as heroic saviors from both their Dutch and Japanese colonizers, as well as from the threat of communism and social disorganization during its war of independence (1945-1949) as it sought a pluralistic democracy. It now presents its current form of government as the best of all alternatives, pointing to its turbulent past in the 1950s as proof. This is an example of historical revisionism as the 1950s were a time when Indonesia was most truly democratic and when a popularly supported constitution was written by a popularly elected constituent assembly.⁵ This constitution was never adopted; instead Sukarno declared a return to the 1945 constitution when faced with a choice between an integralist state which could be legitimized by reference to Indonesian culture and the *Pancasila*

ideology⁶ as opposed to a practicing constitutionalist state which would severely limit his powers in practice (Nasution 1995:45). *Pancasila* is the term applied to the five principles of state philosophy, as incorporated by amendment into the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 18 August 1945 (Leifer 1995:180). Those principles include a belief in one supreme god, humanism, nationalism, popular sovereignty and social justice (Leifer 1995:180). As argued by Sukarno in 1945, the 1945 constitution envisioned an integralist state where human rights and guarantees ought to reflect family values *and the customary laws (adat) governing life in Javanese Villages* (emphasis mine). These values and laws place the interests of society over those of the individual and particularistic rights over universal human rights. Open conflict is considered inappropriate and opposition is regarded as taboo (Nasution 1995:43). The *Pancasila* ideology is based on this particular, Javanese *adat* and embodies the concept of individual conformity to declared state values. The state uses this customary *adat* to justify itself both externally and internally. To the world it presents itself as creating a democracy based on unique cultural values, while it uses traditional culture and nationalism to legitimize the temporary abrogation of its citizens' basic human rights such as free speech. This narrative of tradition and uniqueness is constructed in such a way as to allow the state to brand anyone who would undermine it, for example to demand basic human rights, as a traitor too much influenced by Western concepts of individualism, or alternatively promoting 'communitistic' type concepts of equality. Promoting anything other than *Pancasila* ideology as interpreted by the state is not only un-Indonesian, but severely punishable under state laws as subversive of the nation-state.⁷

In this inter-national and intra-national construction, there is signaled a very explicit identity. That Sukarno argued for a constitution based on *adat that traditionally governed life in Javanese villages* (emphasis mine) is a sign of his belief in the concept that it was the Javanese who hold the national identity, while the remainder of the country (the 12,000+ islands that make up the Indonesian nation-state) serves as the physical state embodiment of the new nation-state (McVey 1996). That there was no international questioning of this Javanese hegemony is indicative of the ignorance or lack of concern by this international community on what the actual identity of the indigenes throughout the archipelago was constituted of culturally.

It is clear that plenty of political institutions, ideological movements and groups - not least in anti-nationalism - were so unprecedented that even historic continuity had to be invented, for example by creating an ancient past beyond effective historical continuity either by semi-fiction...or by forgery. It is also clear that entirely new symbols and devices came into existence...such as the national anthem, ...the national flag,... or the personification of 'the nation' in symbol or image. (Renan in Brennan 1993:49).

Nations, then, are imaginary constructs that depend for their existence on an apparatus of cultural fictions (Brennan 1993:50). They also depend on the constant internal legitimization, that is, the *will* of the people to be a group, a nation, while the process of nation building is occurring. After the nation-state is built, the will of the people becomes less important for legitimizing the nation-state. More important is the will of the international community to recognize the fledgling nation-state as legitimate. Once internal and international legitimacy has been granted the new nation-state, only extreme circumstances can break it up again.

To break up a nation-state that has created itself can prove very difficult but not impossible. The very force that gave it legitimacy as a fledgling nation-state could take it away again, though with considerable difficulty. What all nation-states that have disintegrated in the last few years have had in common is that the people have stopped willing it to be as it is. The West and the ruling parties in the East had underestimated the will of the people and forgotten that internal legitimacy is necessary to sustain a nation-state in the long run. The heads of state had forgotten that they must be seen as united and address basic concerns in order to maintain their own legitimacy. In this case, the international community begins to address the nation-states origins and re-evaluate that states legitimacy.

“Nationalism has normally been, amongst other things, an exercise in collective defense against interventions from the ‘outside’ world” (Scholte 1995:193). A nation-state generally arises and is sustained by self-protective reactions against intruders from afar. There is generally a feeling that the signifiers and symbols of the nation-state must be protected from corruption from the ‘outside’ and influences that are seen as contrary to the nation-state ideology and threatening to its internal unity.

Symbols are created to maintain unity and are what the citizenry collectively rally around when threatened. Indonesia has certainly lacked no ‘outsiders’ to defend against. Certainly, independence from their Dutch colonizers was desirable to all but a minority of Indonesians. “National communities have characteristically been established through the exclusion of outsiders concurrently with the inclusion of insiders” (Scholte 1995:193). This is done through racial discrimination and institutions of citizenship. By labeling

some members as aliens, such as those of Chinese heritage, those that are citizens reinforce the identity of their nation through exclusion. The Dutch had legitimized their system of apartheid based on the rhetoric of culture and nationalism. Those citizens used to a European legal and social system lived under those laws, and those with different *adat* traditions were to have their own courts and laws to which they were responsible. In practice, this was discrimination and the difference in treatment was not lost on the indigenous peoples and their leaders who were simultaneously forming a nationalist consciousness. "National identities have been defined in terms of contrasts with external 'Others', and to that extent have had no content except in relation to 'foreigners'. Nations have thus presupposed an inter-national situation" (Scholte 1995:192). So, although there is often internal debate about how their nation is 'distinct' from other nations (i.e. language, religion, territory), there is absolute agreement that nationhood is a vital issue within a larger, international world. The definition of who is an Indonesian is defined by who is not, such as the Dutch, the Japanese or the ethnic Chinese. The Dayak and Punan are considered citizens conditionally, provided they adapt, develop, and modernize.

The Japanese were another 'outsider' that the Indonesians needed to defend against, during the Second World War. When the Japanese arrived to liberate their 'little brothers' they, too, practiced exclusion, in the name of a 'greater co-prosperity sphere' (Sato 1994:15). The communists who refused to co-operate with the Japanese on principle were disempowered and marginalized. The Japanese did, however, create a unity among Indonesians that had previously eluded the Nationalists. The Japanese enabled the Nationalists by consolidating their political leadership and gained nationalist

support by promising independence after the war. They created the indigenous defense forces (*Pembela Tanah Air* - PETA - Defenders of the Fatherland, and Heiho, a youth group branch of PETA), consolidated Islamic groups and politicized the youth by requiring all youth to participate in citizenship groups. These factors consolidated the post-war nationalist position by establishing a structure and ideology of nationalism which enabled Sukarno to proclaim a legitimate nation-state following independence (Sato 1994:vii). Shared suffering created a national unity among groups with differing political agendas who were then able to bury their differences long enough to become an independent nation-state. After the revolution ended in 1949 these differences would reappear to undermine the Sukarno and then the Suharto governments, in power since 1966, each of whom reacted differently to these challenges.

Ideas of identity and nationalism arose in Indonesia soon after the Dutch opened up educational opportunities for the 'native' peoples of their colony. The use of a nationalist rhetoric to unite the people against the Dutch came shortly thereafter. The word 'Indonesia' was not used as a territorially descriptive term by indigenous Indonesians for their land and territory until 1922, when the Indonesia Students' Association was founded in the Netherlands in 1922 (Mulder 1994:20). Before this time, those peoples native to Indonesia referred to themselves 'Jawan' or 'Balian', referring to the names of their islands of origin or else to their particular Sultanate. In 1928 the idea of 'Indonesia' was institutionalized at the Youth Congress, which declared the famous oath that Indonesia is one country with one people and one language, now used to justify the *Pancasila* ideology. As Mulder states: "the intellectual climate had been changing,

especially because of the influence of Marxism, utopian socialism and humanism; society became constructable; people could be educated; social melioration was possible” (1994:20). This construction of identity narratives has led to the Indonesian government as being able to define their own indigenes as ‘Other’ and promote their assimilation into Indonesian society despite the implicit loss of culture inherent in this conceptualization.

When Sukarno established the nation-state of Indonesia he followed the practice of exclusion, though previous legal discriminatory practices were removed. Having learned the practice of national exclusion and inclusion from their colonizers, Indonesians were able to apply those lessons after independence in defining themselves to the rest of the world as a unified nation-state. By declaring a democracy and showing the signs of being one to the rest of the world, Indonesia was recognized and supported as sovereign. Once achieving that recognition, Sukarno was free to revert back to an integrative rather than participatory democracy, without facing international condemnation. Sukarno was able to use the marks of democracy to gain legitimate recognition, then use the symbols and rhetoric of tradition to repress participation of the people in governing the nation-state, justifying this with the fragility of the new nation-state, marked by communist and independence rebellions in some outer islands.

Many of the traditional *adat* orders have been viewed by Indonesians as being undermined by global influences such as capitalism, mechanization, and individualism. Globalism requires Indonesia to become internally united against potentially corrupting influences of their self-defined indigenous *adat* culture. Conversely, European humanistic ideas, Darwinism, Marxism and Reformist Islam, have all had a role in the creation and

legitimization of the nation of Indonesia by providing ideologies with which the nation could defend itself against perceived disruptive influences. With these ideas society became constructable, and as people became educated in liberating ideologies social melioration became possible. This is already apparent in the basic ideas of the *Taman Siswa School* movement of 1922 that combined Javanese educational principles with modern, humanistic thinking, or in the Marxist inspiration of the left wing of the *Sarekat Islam* political association. Modern social thought also is evident in Sukarno's 1926 essay on the compatibility of Marxism, Islam and Nationalism. (Mulder 1994:21). However, with the coup of 1965, which placed Suharto in power as President, communism was outlawed throughout Indonesia, and Western style capitalism within Indonesia is closely monitored to prevent divisiveness within Indonesian society.

External Nation Building and Internal State Building

The outsiders that the Indonesian nation-state presently defends itself against are inside its own borders in the forms of communism, Western capitalism and individualism, as well as 'backward tribes' that threaten national cohesion. People who are not in line with *Pancasila* are suspect, and in a defensive move, these are the people arrested, harassed and sometimes even given death sentences for treason; such as the communists in 1966 and some Dayaks in 1997. Scholte (1995) explains that somewhat paradoxically in view of the previous point, projects in nation-building have normally gained significant support from external sponsors who have endorsed the given national project as a progressive development for the people concerned. "Indeed, often such

'foreigners' have sought, perhaps unconsciously, to confirm their own national identity and community in part by encouraging the construction of 'the other' in similar, national terms." (Scholte 1995:193). Nations by definition must be a plurality - there cannot be just one, for that would eliminate the 'Other' from which to view and mirror themselves.

A wide range of international interventions contributed to the Indonesian national project. Foreign states, external pressure groups, trade unions abroad, transnational firms, the world press, academics from overseas, and transnational religious movements such as Islam have promoted Indonesian nationhood for their own benefit, only sometimes acknowledged (Scholte 1995:215). Even before the official transfer of sovereignty in December of 1949, the Indonesian state had established diplomatic relations with nineteen external governments.⁸ No outside state openly took a principled stand against the post-1945 advance of Indonesian national self-determination, and even the Netherlands recognized Indonesia as a nation-state *de facto*, though it insisted on participating in the process of independence.

Various external states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) applied material sanctions during the war of independence to effect a transfer of sovereignty to an Indonesian national state. A number of British-Indian troops crossed over from Allied to Republican armies in 1945-46. In Australia, a number of unions maintained a boycott on loading and repairing ships bound for Indonesia for the duration of the revolution. The British halted deliveries of military equipment to Netherlands forces which deprived them of their single largest source of arms, and the US suspended disbursement of \$14 million dollars of Marshall Aid to the Dutch sponsored United States of Indonesia. In addition,

India banned Dutch aircraft from its land and airspace and President Nehru held a conference to denounce the Dutch anti-republican offensive (Scholte 1995:220).

Scholte explains that “international relations have promoted the growth of nations insofar as the national concept has emerged as a central pillar of contemporary world order. Social life has in the twentieth century become organized in terms of nations to such a degree that nationhood has obtained the character of a global social structure, with the tendencies of self-perpetuation, if not self-expansion, that are associated with entrenched structures. As an ordering principle of social relations on a world scale, the national concept has been embedded at the international as well as the local level of social life” (Scholte 1995:193). Sukarno and Hatta recognized that world support would help their cause and regularly pursued opportunities to internationalize their struggle. Hatta appealed “to the world powers, who are now determining the future world structure, to approve Indonesia’s Independence” (Scholte 1995:221). The Ministry of Information meanwhile cultivated external backing through an internationally distributed English language publication called *Voice of Free Indonesia* which effectively tapped into the international well of sympathy abroad (Scholte 1995:222).

What these nation-states abroad gained by granting legitimacy to the Nationalists were future economic and political influence. In helping to create the Indonesian nation-state, Western powers were able to ensure lucrative trade relationships for both their governments and multi-national corporations (MNCs). For the West in particular, supporting the Nationalists meant that they could control the rise of communism in

Southeast Asia by forging alliances with those in power who would ensure that communist factions did not gain control of government.

It is impossible for any unacknowledged nation or otherwise illegitimate and unrecognized system to participate in the world economy or governing system today without being a bonafide nation-state. The 'nation of Islam' is not, as reflected in its lack of participation in world structures and organizations such as the United Nations. The 'uncivilized natives' of insular Borneo and other islands are not recognized as nations, though they have common attributes and traditional territorial claims to be one, *ipso facto*. *De jure* recognition is not granted because they already belong geographically within a nation-state that has been previously recognized as legitimate by the international order.

Representations and Colonialism

Taking the discussion of decolonization beyond the purview of the imperial-colonial debate and adding dimensions of narration and representation allows for an analysis of what this narrative process means to the marginalized Punan of Borneo, such as the Bukat, and their struggle to maintain their own distinct culture and identity while undergoing economic and social colonization by the Indonesian nation-state.

Post-colonial nation-states share an assertion of uniqueness and, by definition, Otherness. This creates a dichotomy which implies a defining norm appropriated from their colonizers. With independence, Indonesia has adopted the gaze of its colonizers and defines itself by this vision. The nation-state functions as a producer of narratives and

reproduces this seduction in its own narrative. Indonesia seduces the international community using that community's own construction of legitimacy to gain legitimacy for itself while confessing its 'Otherness' to it. The act of confession to 'Otherness' and underdevelopment allows for assimilation, without risk of censure, into the international community of legitimate nation-states.

The narrative that was produced by the Indonesian constitution of 1945 defines Javanese *adat* as the norm. Validation of this norm has come from several sources; from sheer might, or power, internally and externally during independence; through pretension, the rhetoric that claims to incorporate the disenfranchised; and by assertion, that this norm is for the good of all. It claims this norm as an interpretation of Kants' categorical imperative and thereby asserts morality and all the dichotomies that this entails (Scott 1990:21). The production of these norms, backed by internationally accepted epistemologies allows the nation-state to function as a producer and thereby a seducer, both of the international community of nation-states and its own citizens. The production re-produces seduction in its own origin narrative, completing the circle of dichotomies.

Indonesia seduces the international community with its signifiers; flags, coins and constitution, using that communities own terms and validation of legitimacy to do so, thereby risking no censure. Indonesia follows the norms laid out for it by the international community. It claims a written epistemology produced for an international audience as much as for an internal one, though the meaning of it is interpreted variously for its various audiences, engaging in Janus-faced behavior in order to be recognized externally

and maintain a state at home (McVey 1996). The epistemology, the narration, is used to seduce the meaning of the production versus the actual product.

The defining norm and the gaze that the Indonesian nation-states views itself with is that of a Javanese hegemony, based publicly on public rites of tradition or religion, but scripted privately on economics and geographic location. The Dutch and the Japanese both focused their occupation of Indonesia on Java and created there a center of trade, making it the center for the rest of the archipelago, while still keeping the colony on the margins of the Western powers. Though colonized, its colonizers replicated a Western world order within that colony. Those on the margins in the outer islands were marginalized both economically and politically. The land on which they lived was viewed as empty of everything but economic opportunity, and those who lived upon the land were seen as sources of cheap labor or potential supporters of political projects. But this is key to understanding why it was so important for first the Dutch, then Japanese, and now the nation-state itself to claim as the outer islands as their own. Though by claiming these islands they are forced to develop them, this is an obligation that Indonesia is anxious to fulfill. Much of its foreign exchange earnings come from outer islands, as well as providing a space in which Javanese, feeling land-pressures, can escape to and start their lives anew as property owners, farmers, or factory workers.

Nationalism is only one element of state ideology in Indonesia today. Having organized itself into a nation of states Indonesia is feeling the pressure to define and stabilize its relationships both to other nations and to the 'Other' inside of itself, that is, its marginalized indigenous peoples (Geertz 1973:238). These people are in the process


of being brought into the 'developed' state and, in the process, are losing their own traditional ways, including their traditional subsistence base of resource usage. The state's goal of total development for all of Indonesia is seen clearly by those 'undeveloped' and marginalized people, such as the Punan, as internal colonization for the economic benefit of the center, Java. This is a clear case of:

the paradigmatic case of the developmentalist colonization and extractive exploitation of indigenous lands due to the pressure of modernization, overpopulation, landlessness and poverty in the national heartland, on the one hand, and to the drive for industrialization and the quest for cheap materials, on the other hand (Penz 1992:139).


Having become internationally recognized as a nation-state, the internal tensions within the state have come to the fore. The assumed collective unity is fragmented and political, economic and social interests are bringing these differences out where they are seen to be internally discriminatory on the basis of ethnicity and resource access. As the population has increased in Indonesia, land and resources are in increasing demand. Current development policy of the Indonesian government focuses on development of the outer islands. Transmigration projects in outer island areas such as Kalimantan serve the dual purposes of alleviating population pressures on Java, which contains fifty percent of the population of Indonesia, and providing agricultural land for landless peasants. To fill the demand for land and development, funds from the state are required and for the state to provide these funds it extracts its natural resources from its lesser developed areas such as Indonesian Borneo. Resources such as timber, oil, and NTFPs, are extracted primarily from areas such as Kalimantan, located in the outer islands, away from Java. These resources provide much needed foreign exchange revenue that the government needs to

participate effectively in the global economy as well as to finance internal development of the outer islands, including Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo, for both transmigrants and indigenous 'under-developed' populations. See Table 1. Indigenous populations lose their own resource base to the 'common good' of the state and are forced to develop or 'modernize' which creates resentment towards the state who they feel only wants their resources and is not ultimately concerned for their well being. Development statistics in Kalimantan regarding infant mortality, mortality and literacy bear this view out. See Figure 5. Being saddled with native indigenes who feel no special affinity for their nation-state and who do not consider themselves Indonesian, except perhaps in the abstract, is another opportunity for the government to signal the international community its continuing desire to conform by modernizing its own 'backward' peoples through development.


This narrative has enabled Jakarta to present the problem of its 'natives' as a classic Third World issue of under-development. It allows the construction of the solution to be one of production rather than class, gender or race. Having confessed its 'problems' and needs to the international community, Indonesia avoids international censure while continuing its project of modernizing Indonesian Kalimantan through development practices. It has become a 'core' to its own 'periphery' as seen by the very real flow of profit and resources out of Kalimantan. See Table 2. This act of confession, by being presented as a Western development issue, allows assimilation into the international community and receives approval from it. It proposes pre-approved urbanization, industrialization and development as solutions which make the issue one of production




(a) Infant Mortality (Brunei, Sarawak, Sabah—1988; Kalimantan—1987)



(b) Percentage of Population Classed as Illiterate (Brunei—1988; Sarawak and Sabah—1980; Kalimantan—1985)



(c) Length of Metalled Road (1985-1986)



(d) Access to Piped Water (1987)

FIGURE 5. Development Indicators in Borneo. (Source: Cleary and Eaton 1992:160)

rather than race or class. Using the international epistemology and rhetoric is a means to its own narratives end, which is to modernize at all costs, though these costs are born in the main by the non-Javanese Indonesians and other disenfranchised minorities. The power to colonize internally was given by the community of nation-states at Indonesia's conception and encouraged with international aid programs such as World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). As long as it can confess its underdevelopedness to the community of nation-states, it can make use of a self-defined solution that falls in line with solutions proposed by the international development community and know that approval of its actions are guaranteed, as well as international aid, which serves to strengthen its external legitimacy.

Indonesian Development Schemes

Since colonial times, Indonesian indigenous communities and government forest departments have struggled for the control of forest resources. Many Dutch forestry laws have been translated verbatim into Indonesian and form the backbone of Indonesian Forestry practice (Peluso 1983,1990,1991, 1994). As global demand for non-timber forest products (NTFPs) has become increasingly important to the export economy of Indonesia, it has increased its economic development of both Kalimantan and the indigenous peoples that live on that land. The political ecology of development allows for seeing economic life as a realm of representations where the manufacture of symbolic and material resistance to development by indigenous peoples is a struggle to maintain a dynamic identity.

Appropriation of the accoutrements of 'civilization' in no way implies that the Punan in question have adopted the national identity of 'Indonesian-ness', rather it implies that the Punan have adapted their public identity to outside pressures and are engaged in developing representational tools for resisting further encroachments on their own cultural identity and territory. How the development narratives of the nation-state and its marginalized peoples within it differ opens a theoretical viewpoint in which the identity of territory can be deconstructed and understood.

Development, from the point of view of the Indonesian state, is integral to its project of modernizing and fully becoming a recognized partner with the international community of powerful nation-states, while development from the Indigenous Dayak and Punan point of view, is a project meant to fully modernize them and in the process of doing so, change their entire culture and way of life. Development of forested land by timber and mining concerns causes not only siltation of rivers and deforestation of forests, but also flooding that results in the destruction of settlements, livestock and crops. Economically important trees are lost despite legal agreements that they will be preserved. Wildlife becomes scarce as its habitat is disturbed or destroyed and the peoples means of living and livelihoods are lost perhaps permanently.

The Indonesian government at times makes amends by moving those affected by development into resettlement camps, meant to be temporary, where the indigenes learn the lingua franca, Indonesian, and trade skills. The government hopes that they then use the camp as a jumping off point to a job working in a city, or in a timber or mining camp. The resettlement camps make it difficult to maintain indigenes' individual cultures, and

often lead to the fragmentation or break-up of families as the males migrate out to timber or mining camps and the women to urban areas where they often work in factories (Ave and King 1986).

An example illustrates this more fully. Cleary and Eaton (1992) report a case of a Punan (Penan) group rejecting monetary compensation from a timber concern (1992:183). A member of the *Long Adung* community refused the offer of a M\$100 note from a Limbang Trading Company timber camp manager for the destruction of his parents' graves with the statement, translated to English by Cleary and Eaton: "I told him that our bodies, dead or alive, were not for sale and I pleaded with him that if he had so much money already to please leave our land alone." The same authors quote and translate Punan leaders as stating that they wanted the government to understand that they would change at their own pace, "making our own choices and choosing development based on our own needs. We want the Government to respect our decision and stop the logging operations which are committed only to destruction of life" (1992:183).

Development and Non-Timber Forest Products

'Wilderness' as a metaphorical site of oppression and resistance is used as a rhetorical tool to justify the development of the 'uncivilized, wild, primitive' - including both people and the landscape they inhabit. See Figure 4. Development projects of the nation-state is also a discourse that relies on Western and colonial rhetoric as well as devices of political and economic control. The Indonesian nation-state lays claim to all the forests of Indonesia and in doing so ignores all traditional land right claims by groups

such as the Punan and Dayak that are considered unsettled (cf. Peluso 1994, Sellato 1994). This begins to explain the Indonesian government's continuance of clear cutting, mining and increasing transmigration projects.

Initially, the forest is seen by Southeast Asian developing economies as an unlimited resource where trends in the usage of the forest are seen as positive, i.e. more living and agricultural space for people. As the resources become scarcer, some people begin to call for conservation, which can eventually lead to legislation aimed at conserving the forests. At this stage a shift occurs to other sources of economically viable exports, such as NTFPs, or minerals (Hurst 1990). It appears that Indonesia has gone through these changes, yet NTFPs, especially rattan, are increasingly threatened as the successful establishment of large-scale plantations has still not occurred. A possible explanation for this dichotomy and the lack of implementation of alternatives to current socioeconomic development may be explained by the states' Western-influenced views of economic and cultural development and its viewing, uncomfortably, of its indigenous peoples as 'primitive' and 'Other' as compared to the nation-states self-assigned Javanese culture and identity (cf. Hurst 1990, Scott 1990).

Inside of the debate regarding development is where the 'environment' is situated and where the discourse surrounding development is defined by agents such as the nation-state, MNCs, and its elite (Peet and Watts 1993). All of these actors recognize the economic 'richness' of the Bornean landscape as well as the 'Otherness' of it and its 'savage' people, which in government discourse must be tamed and civilized (Said 1979). Contributing to this discourse is the international aid community as well as the

international nation-state community who grant legitimization to the ongoing practices of development in Borneo.⁹

The Indonesian government subscribes to a neoclassical modernist theory of development where:

development is essentially an economic problem. Economic growth is considered a suitable yardstick for it. In the end, growth means reduced inequality, unemployment and poverty (viz. the Kuznets 'U-curve'). Such progress becomes all the easier because the necessary technologies are increasingly available, often provided by the international community (Kay 1988:6).

Despite ever-increasing criticism of this model, it is followed by many developing nation-states, especially those where the World Bank has recommended its structural development policy. For Indonesia, this development theory provides for economic development through internal colonization (Mulder 1994). It is a top-down development theory that justifies the Javanese domination of outer islands economies and cultures in the name of national unity and progress. Although most resources and cash flow to the Javanese center from the outer islands periphery, the government espouses the belief that benefits, in the form of modernization, will eventually return to their peripheral outer-island economic colonies. The idea that its marginalized peoples may not choose to develop in this way is not a consideration, so any overt acts of resistance by marginalized groups such as the Punan and Dayak are treated, with the occasional assistance of the military, with increased development. There is a great fear of 'communists' and other 'subversives' throughout the nation-state. Often indigenes are accused of being communists when they disagree or protest government policies, which deters these people from protesting directly against development policies, though they will engage in

subversive acts of resistance none-the less (Scott 1985, 1990, Sellato 1994). This cultural misunderstanding and intolerance on the part of the Indonesian government has led to increasing direct and indirect attacks on the culture and livelihoods of peoples such as the Punan and the Dayak. Forest politics play the part of eliminating subsistence bases, forcing groups to move closer to developed, urban centers where they can be assimilated and absorbed into the economic and cultural center.

The Nation-State and the Punan & Dayak Groups

Despite the growing importance of NTFPs to Indonesia's economy, policy makers have generally ignored NTFPs in forming development plans for the country. Part of this ignorance may have to do with the governments' position that the indigenous peoples are 'backward' and lacking in culture. Because nationalist discourse demands that indigenous peoples must be brought into the mainstream Indonesian Javanese culture, it is the indigenous cultures that must change and is marginalized along with the NTFPs that they traditionally engage in collecting. The government continues to focus on timber as a revenue source while failing to acknowledge that NTFPs could potentially earn more than timber as well as being a much more sustainable use of the land's resources (de Beere and McDermott 1989). NTFPs have been undervalued as an economic asset when harvested by Punan groups most likely because of NTFPs role in helping to maintain Dayak and Punan economic and cultural independence from nation-state colonialism (Peluso 1990).

The lack of economic visibility of the Punan to the Indonesian government undermines indigenous peoples' importance as actors in the export economy of the nation-state. In the government's quest to bring them up to modern living standards, as they define it, the government itself is undermining the economic importance of NTFPs. Matu Tugang of the Punan of *Long Jaik* summarizes the impacts of encroaching logging, as translated by Langub:

We don't want the loggers to destroy our land. The rattan will be gone. All the materials of our life and work will be gone. There will be no pig here. They will run away with all the rest the forest animals. It will be difficult to fish if the rivers are muddy. All the fruit trees that are growing will be finished. If the loggers take away the trees that we *molong* (the practice of claiming a forest product for future use), how will we make boats? Do they think we have helicopters (1989:207)?

The Punan recognize that timber extraction is important for the state's revenue, but believe that logging should be organized so that the least damage is done to the land, forest, and their own cultural survival:

We ask them (loggers) if they cut the right side of the stream, they should preserve the left side, for rattan, for *gaharu*, for fruits...If the state authority really want to help us, they can keep the loggers from cutting all our trees. That would be good. That is what is necessary for us to live. If they really want to help us, preserve our land for our *uvud*, for our rattan, for our game. That would show that the authorities really care about us. Because this is our only way of life (Langub 1989:209).

The Indonesian government itself, as mentioned above, is actively engaged in 'civilizing' the Punan and the Dayak groups, as part of its goal of modern progress through economic and social development. The Indonesian government views its indigenous peoples as backwards, uncultured, and uncivilized, needing to be brought into

the Indonesian cultural mainstream as soon as possible (Rousseau 1990). The department of Social Affairs in Indonesia has stated that:

The problem is no longer one for the isolated groups themselves to take. *It is called a national problem because it involves national and humanitarian prestige. The fact that there are still isolated and remote peoples, developing at too slow of a pace, can affect the prestige and dignity of men in that country* (Hurst 1990:7, emphasis mine).

The government has tackled this development problem by encouraging indigenous peoples to move out of longhouses and into villages, by sending transmigrants into indigenous territories to build villages, by requiring the indigenous peoples to adopt one of five government approved religions or be considered 'subversives' and suffer harassment. The state has also declared the traditional shifting farming methods of the Dayaks, such as swidden, as illegal because of their alleged damage to the environment. No mention is made of the damage done to the environment by government sponsored clear-cutting. The underlying and unspoken narrative here is economic: activities that benefit the government's and elites' desire for foreign currency are acceptable activities despite any cultural and environmental problems that may be caused. Activities that conflict with these desires, as practiced by local people in swidden farming and the gathering and cultivating of rattan and other NTFPs in the forests, is unacceptable and so access to the forest must be if not denied, then at least controlled through methods such as licensing which affects the entire chain of production by removing indigenous economic independence. It is not lost on the local indigenous population that the state is in part

removing them from their land for other than humanitarian reasons; Adicondro, a Punan translated by Ave and King, asks:

Why are the hill-tribes lured out of the forest, while the timber companies are invited to exploit the timber without a proper ecological control? ...who caused the big floods in the Upper Barito and Upper Kahayan river basin the last two years - the Dayak hill-tribes or the big logging companies (1986:100)?

It seems that the Punan and Dayak people are not so much an object of humanitarian development concerns as much as they are an impediment to national economic development in the eyes of the state.

Indonesia calls those who do not cultivate permanent fields (swidden cultivation) and who live in the forests as people "who have no fixed residence" (the Punan), as *suku-suku terasing*, meaning those scattered, isolated groups of the interior, specifically the remote Dayak and the Punan (Ave and King 1986:98).¹⁰ Resettlement is a popular government program whose purpose is to bring the Punan and Dayak into the modern world (Ave and King 1986:99).¹¹ Moving people from the forested interior closer to coastal administrative centers also allows for the timber concessions to log without interruption and without much protest from the indigenous peoples inhabitant those areas. Another reason for resettlement is an unstated, strategic one: there is concern for possible future undesirable developments along the border between East Kalimantan and Sarawak-Sabah; most of the Punan and Dayak tribes in the border regions of Kalimantan also have closely related communities from the same tribes on the other side of the border and travel and trade across this political divide is commonplace, a situation that makes

Indonesian authorities uncomfortable in that they have no control over it (Ave and King, 1986:98).

In moving and 'resettling' these indigenous people away from their homelands, the government also forces them to abrogate any future claims to traditional land rights which would give access to the forest and its products back to these peoples. The first and most active province to engage in resettlement was East Kalimantan, the province most engaged in logging. Ten thousand Punan and Dayak (mainly Kenyah), families have been moved since the 1970s, with very mixed results and many whole-sale failures (Ave and King, 1986:100). These people end up migrating back to their homelands or to major cities like Samarinda to do manual labor work because of the unhealthy conditions and lack of economic opportunity near the resettlement camps, which very much resemble transmigration areas and share the same problems as those camps.

It is precisely because the state does not want to assist the Punan and Dayak groups in maintaining their unique identities and cultures that the state does not prevent the clear-cutting of massive areas of Punan and Dayak territories and homelands. This has led to situations of conflict between Punan and Dayak groups and timber companies that have sometimes escalated to armed conflicts, as illustrated by the Bentian Dayak case in Pasir, East Kalimantan, as recently as 1995 (*WRM* 1995). The Bentian grow rattan for market production in their swidden fallows. The development of timber concessions and transmigration settlement sites have destroyed Bentian swidden fallows, rattan crops, and ancient grave sites, as concessionaires and government projects appropriate land traditionally used by the Bentian. The timber concession areas are leased to Bob Hasan,

an Indonesian timber tycoon with close links to President Suharto. The Bentian have unsuccessfully petitioned the Indonesian government since 1986 for legal recognition of their ancestral lands (*WRM* 1995). The Bentian have now turned to the international community for help in securing land rights and their own cultural survival. They ask for recognition, restitution for destroyed crops and an end to logging on their land. Their demands have so far been ignored by the Indonesian government and logging continues.

The indigenous peoples themselves seek to regain and maintain sovereignty over their own land and resources, necessary for their cultural survival. Their claims go beyond fair treatment by the nation-state as they insist on the validity of their own 'Otherness' and demand respect for their own culture and way of life. In their quest for cultural self-determination they insist on maintaining what they themselves define as critical access to the forest in order to maintain their traditional culture. Their social and economic identities are intertwined and overlap as they are both based on the physical landscape in a symbiotic relationship.

Sellato's (1994) conception of Punan-ness is an extremely important concept that helps to understand the ways Punan resist government development plans and maintain their own (varied yet Punan) identities, as discussed earlier. It has been noted frequently throughout ethnographic studies (cf. Bock 1882:69; Cole 1947:340; Harrison 1949; Geertz 1963) that Punan groups do interact and are frequently closer to farmer groups (most often land Dayaks) than to their next neighboring Punan group. The relationship between the farmers and Punans, and government usage of this relationship, as discussed earlier is often ignored or mis-understood because of cultural differences in defining

'production' and 'usefulness'. The government sees Punan as potential farmers and, until settled, as not only subversive threat to national stability but also as unproductive and unuseful. They are not seen as contributing to the economy and so do not fulfill their duty as citizens of Indonesia. Though the Punan may lack an epistemological and/or a oral history, they do not lack a coherent, sophisticated identity, again a concept threatening to the nation-state, which has itself a selective memory and whose identity is based on Javanese hegemony. Punan identity enables them to resist adopting any socio-cultural trait that interferes with their Punan-ness. When they do appear to assimilate by adopting these traits, the traits must be seen as a visage of maintaining an image of cooperation and assimilation.

Studies of the Punan reveal how marginalized indigenous societies are engaged in a dialectical struggle between acceptance and resistance, coercion and consent, active and passive responses to change brought about by new state forest politics. Development and modernization projects have introduced new work and social conditions and therefore politics of production for indigenous producers of NTFPs. This has created a contested social terrain in which the representation of identity plays a large part in enacting the script provided by the narration of national and state identity. The spaces opened up by conflicts in the land ownership and the production system offer the possibility of significant advance and social change based on mutual acceptance and respect for cultural differences while enabling all actors to maintain their own unique identities.

This chapter argues for an understanding of identity and conflict in Indonesian Borneo through the application of a post-structuralist view of the political ecology of

development that enables taking into account post-colonial narratives of identities of both the indigenous peoples and the nation-state of Indonesia.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF RATTAN

This chapter outlines the cultural importance of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), as exemplified by rattan, to the indigenous groups, such as the Punan and Dayak, of Indonesian Borneo. Extractive activities are important to the economic and social 'fabric' of the indigenous peoples of Indonesian Borneo as well as being a critical source of cash income to maintain a degree of economic independence from the Indonesian government. In standard economic analysis, a significant source of both use and exchange values are overlooked or undervalued in analyzing the economic importance of NTFPs, especially rattan, though it is a major earner of income for the government. See Table 1. This issue is of import as the importance of NTFPs to the marginalized Punan and Dayak peoples and to the poor of Kalimantan has often been overlooked in standard economic analysis. Current development programs are actively undermining access to NTFPs by these people as well as encouraging their destruction through deforestation.

Through an in-depth look at the social, economic and ecological facets of rattan collection and processing in Kalimantan, Indonesia, this chapter demonstrates the interdependence of regional economics and politics with the traditional rattan gathering

and cultivation practices of the Punan and Dayak. Changes in forest access and forestry practices can seriously undermine local social relations as well as indigenous cultural and social identities. Forestry developments in Kalimantan are now threatening the sustainability of both the indigenous cultures and the tropical forests in which they live and on which they depend for both economic and cultural survival.

The Rattan Discourse

The most striking feature in the discourse surrounding rattan harvesting, cultivation and processing is the comparative lack of discourse inside of Indonesia, which exports 90 percent of the worlds' supply of rattan (Panayotou 1992:100) Most discussions and analysis of rattan are done by foreign scholars and development agencies (cf. Peluso 1991; Panayotou 1992; World Bank 1994) There is a considerable lack of discussion regarding this most important NTFP by the Indonesian government and its economic development planners, due likely to a focus on the forest and its trees and the quick cash to be made by logging. This lack, in and of itself, provides clues as to how the Indonesian government views rattan's importance not only economically, but culturally. By deconstructing the economic narrative, or lack of it, in this discourse it is possible to see how landscapes and environments are perceived and interpreted from viewpoints as varied as the people involved in bringing rattan from the forests to the local, regional and global economy. These viewpoints in turn reflect the particular experience, culture and values of the narrators of this discourse, which include the state and the Punan, Dayak, and Malay producers (Blaikie, 1995). This in turn allows analysis of why the Indonesian

nation-state continues the practice of unsustainable clear-cut logging of Kalimantan despite the very equal and real value of producing NTFPs, especially rattan, from these same forests. As Blaikie (1995) suggests, these discourses allow a critical evaluation of different versions of environmental issues in place of, or despite, scientific and economic 'truths'. Recognizing landscapes as social constructions begins to give voice to the traditionally voiceless. By not privileging one narrative over another, it becomes possible to open up spaces for the re-negotiation of what economic and cultural development can mean for all involved and affected (1995:203).

The limited attention given to rattan by the Indonesian authorities is due to the common perception within the state that rattan is important only in economic terms as an earner of foreign exchange. Any depletion of wild rattan stock becomes acceptable due to the governments' belief that rattan will soon, because of imminent technological advances, be monocropped on large-scale plantations. Appendix A. The legal discourse on rattan is one meant to encourage the economic exploitation of this wild cane while increasing government access to the existing wild and small-scale garden stocks (Godoy 1989:116) That Punan and Dayak access to these same stocks is decreasing is acceptable to the government because it would rather have them earn stable cash incomes within the timber and mining industries (Dove 1988). Government development policy also views the Bornean Punan and Dayak groups involved in the gathering, cultivating and harvesting of rattan as less 'civilized' than other Indonesians (e.g. Dove 1988). The Punan and Dayak rights to maintain and choose livelihoods are trivialized in this discourse, due to government economic and cultural development policies formulated

during its inception as an independent nation-state in 1945. The policies adopted at that time, specifically regarding forest access issues and indigenous peoples, have directly influenced the development of the rattan and timber industries today (e.g. Peluso 1994).

The main focus of this chapter is the rattan industry as a point of understanding current development policy in Indonesia, specifically in Bornean East Kalimantan, though not exclusive to it. The daunting physical characteristics of this island have kept it from being exploited by others for natural resources in the past, though with the recent advent of roads, trains and airplanes to many parts of Kalimantan, more opportunities for resource extraction have been created. With the opening up of this frontier, the government also seeks to simultaneously develop the Punan and Dayak groups and bring them into the socio-economic Indonesian mainstream as defined by the which ideal is historical based on Javanese culture.

Rattan

Rattans (*Calamus spp.*) are found growing wild in the lowland everwet rainforests of tropical Southeast Asia, in nations such as the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Malaysia. *C. Calamus*, with 370 known species, is the largest of the canes and the most widespread genus found from West Africa to Australia (Johnson, 1993 p. 39). *C. Calamus* rattan is a member of the same palm family which includes the ubiquitous palm tree and the African Oil Palm. Its uses include oil, fruit, building materials and many minor products such as medicine and various ornamental uses.¹² The four principal rattan producing countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and

Thailand (Godoy 1989:123). Rattans are spiny, climbing plants belong to a subfamily of palms called *Calamoideae*. Because it is a climber it requires arboreal support and shade, which is usually provided by existing upper story trees in the rainforest (Caldicott 1988:62). It climbs tall trees with hooked grapples as it winds its way through the forest, where it can grow to be well over 150 meters long (Caldicott 1988:62). It does not require clear felling of tropical trees, rather, the clearing of these forests severely reduces the natural habitat needed by rattan to grow.

There are 13 genera and approximately 600 known species of rattan. Of the 300 species in seven genera documented in Indonesia, approximately 100 occur in Kalimantan (Peluso 1991:10). The most important in economic terms are: *Calamus manan*, *C. inops*, *C. caesius*, *C. trachycoleus* and *C. exilis*. Only nine or ten commercial types are widely traded in Kalimantan, although many non-commercial varieties are used by indigenous people (Peluso 1991:10). *C. caesius* and *C. trachycoleus* are cultivated (about 13,000 ha) in mixed small holder systems throughout semi-urban areas of all parts of Kalimantan (Johnson 1993:39).

The majority of rattan that ends up in production has been collected by hunter-gatherer indigenous peoples, the Punan, who extract it from the wild and trade it downriver to the neighboring Dayak groups in return for items such as salt, dogs, and increasingly, cash. Until it reaches a first-stage processing center, the only treatment given cut rattan by collectors is bundling in packs of approximately 28 kg each, air-drying, and for some varieties in some locales, removal of the outer coating on the stems. This is done by wrapping the rattan around a tree trunk and rubbing it back and forth, or

by washing the canes with sand at the river's edge. The bundled rattan is then sold to a trader who takes it down river by boat to a first stage processing center" (Peluso 1991:11). These indigenous peoples are the most familiar with rattan and have a well developed rattan 'folk' taxonomy with classifications similar to those recognized by botanists (Dransfield,1988:64). The state discourse on the collection of NTFPs has generally ignored or minimized the Punan role in gathering these NTFPs as well as how that role affects their trading relationships with their Dayak neighbors (cf. Peluso 1990, 1991, Panayotou and Ashton 1992, Sellato 1994). Their role, although marginalized, is of great significance in why cultural and economic development policies have considerable impact upon the indigenes and why those developments are resisted as a whole by these groups.

Rattan Harvesting, Cultivation and Trade

Punan groups are the main harvesters and collectors of wild rattan, though Dayak groups do engage in this practice, especially when pressed with financial considerations. Dayak groups are the main cultivators of rattan in the forests and semi-urban areas, intercropping it with subsistence crops (Peluso 1991:10). Some NTFPs with recognized economic value, such as rattan, are also collected in increasing amounts by transmigrants and other non-indigenous peoples. Some Dayak villages also have rattan gardens, though these are mostly grown by semi-urban groups closer to major cities where it is easier to sell. Small-scale plantations are usually operated by non-indigenous people from outside

of Kalimantan altogether, often times coming from Java as state-sponsored entrepreneurs (Peluso 1991:11).

There are several physical and socioeconomic factors which complicate the rattan gathering and trading process including seasonality, income potential, and access to and ownership of rattan resources (Peluso 1991). Knowing who the Punan are, their culture and identity, is important in understanding the implications and significance of their trade relations with their downriver neighbors and the greater region. There has, historically, been much fascination with and speculation about where the Punan come from, who they are and why they live in the forest (cf. Bock 1882; Cole 1947; Harrison 1949; Geertz 1963), which is discussed earlier in this thesis. Of primary importance in this thesis is the theoretical framework of Sellato (1994) and Rousseau (1990) who posit that the Punan hunting and gathering lifestyle fulfills a highly sophisticated political, social and economic function. The Punan are widely considered to have been the suppliers of NTFPs to the greater Asia region since the advent of traders to the island of Borneo, though that role is sometimes underestimated due to the Punan invisibility in the production process: once they have gathered NTFPs, sometimes to order, they trade it to their nearest Dayak neighbors for material goods, who then trade it downriver for goods and for cash (Peluso 1991). The NTFPs utilized by the Punan and Dayak forest dwellers in Kalimantan consist of all biological materials which can be extracted sustainably from the forests for human uses such as rattan for shelter building and tools, foods, medicines, spices, essential oils, resins, gums, latex, dyes, ornamental plants, fuelwood, fodder and raw materials such as bamboo and fibers such as hibiscus.

Indigenous Punan groups have a well recognized long-standing system of sustainable management of NTFPs, such as rattan, which they collect and trade to their Dayak neighbors and other '*orang luar*' (people from the outside) in return for previously mentioned items such as salt, brass gongs, Chinese ceramic jars, cloth, tobacco and more (Hoffman 1988:107).¹³ The Dayak dilemma in obtaining these NTFPs themselves is that as sedentary agriculturists who generally grow subsistence products, they do not have the time to go for long periods into the forest to collect sufficient amounts of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) for trade, though they will gather as well as cultivate some NTFPs with recognized economic value, such as rattan, to supplement their personal incomes and for use within the village. Hoffman (1988) suggests that this ecological-economic partnership is key to understanding the socio-economic relations between the 'settled' Dayak and 'their' Punan.

Until very recently, the Dayak groups have acted as shrewd middlemen in keeping 'their' Punan and downriver traders away from each other, thus guarding against the sort of direct trade that is starting to emerge on the island (Hoffman 1988:110). The Dayak have tenaciously held onto their role as middlemen in order to continue advantageous trade terms. Hoffman tells of one case where the Dayak Merap people of the village of Langap in Malinau subdistrict still refuse to tell 'their' Punan neighbors just how large a profit they make from selling birds' nests to the Chinese. Hoffman also found that the Dayak have scarcely any greater knowledge than 'their' Punan about the Chinese uses of NTFPs such as birds' nests or the regional economic value of their products. He notes that "nor was anyone aware that rattan is exported to foreign countries in the form of

expensive furniture”(Hoffman 1988:111). The Punan continue to gather a majority of NTFPs for trade with the Dayaks, and continue to live a way of life that others find ‘primitive’, including the Indonesian government which is promoting the cultural and economic development of these groups to bring them further into the economic and social mainstream of Indonesian society.

For Dayaks who decide to collect rattan themselves, the income opportunities are variable depending on the location of their villages. For individuals living in villages farthest downriver, close to cities or near plantations, many opportunities to earn wages or sell agricultural produce exist, making the collection of rattan less attractive economically than it is for those furthest upriver and more remote from economic centers. Typically two to four members of a Dayak household may engage in the part-time collecting of rattan and other NTFPs. After the rattan has been harvested and collected, it only partially belongs to the collector if he has been provided credit by a local shopkeeper payable in an equivalent volume of rattan. More than half of all rattan collectors, especially upriver Dayaks, collect under such constraints, which obligates the collector to the investor to continue to do business with that person in the future. In some cases, the moral obligations last a lifetime (Peluso 1990, 1991). First stage processors re-wash and re-sand the rattan as they receive them from traders such as the Dayaks. They separate the rattan by size and smoke the smaller ones while the larger ones are boiled in a mixture of diesel oil and other ingredients. These are then stacked at a slant or rubbed with sawdust to remove the excess diesel oil, and are then air dried for three to five days. Both canes are sometimes bleached with sulfur to make them more attractive, protect them from

pests and preserve them. The canes are here sorted before sale to wholesalers and retailers in urban areas (Peluseo 1991:12).

Rattan is sometimes planted in burned-over swiddens by sedentary Dayaks, though other Dayak groups (as mentioned earlier) may cultivate it as part of a mixed garden system. It is but one of a variety of economic activities which might include swidden cultivation, cultivating rubber, pepper, cloves, rattan, coconuts, or other cash crops or alternatively, working for wages at logging concessions, distant timber camps or tree crop plantations (Peluso 1991:13). In West and Central Kalimantan, along the Barito River some Dayak and non-Dayak small-holders intercrop rattan with rubber and other fruit trees. Small holders in Central Kalimantan have been cultivating small-diameter rattans (*C. caesius*; *C. trachycoleus*) for over a century in areas of low-lying secondary alluvial forest on the banks of the Barito River where, due to periodic floods, the land is unsuitable for cultivation of more lucrative crops such as coconut trees, oil palms, or rice (Panayotou and Ashton, 1992:103). Within Central and East Kalimantan, shifting cultivators plant thin-diameter rattans after harvesting one or two years of dry rice in burned-over forest (Weinstock 1983; Panayotou and Ashton 1992:103). Rattans are ready for cutting after ten to fifteen years, just at the time cultivators are clearing the forest again to plant swiddens (Weinstock 1983; Panayotou and Ashton 1992:103).

Raising Cane

The village of Dadahup is a rare example of small-holder community plantation growth of rattan. Dadahup is located in the Pasir district of East Kalimantan and has a

well established tradition of rattan cultivation. This village is renowned for the cultivation of the commercial species of rattan called *irit* (*C. trachycoleus*), considered a very superior, rare, cane (Godoy and Feaw 1989:348). Dadahup has about 480 families, made up of 2635 people, who produce about 12,000 metric tons of rattan per year on 12,000 hectares of cultivated gardens (Godoy and Feaw 1989:348). Rattan cultivation became important to the village after the profits from rubber tapping decreased significantly after World War Two. Villagers in Dadahup also produce rice, about 500 ha; and rubber, 100 ha. None of these crops are grown with the use of fertilizers, pesticides or herbicides. Tools used are basic axes and knives. The amount of maintenance required for the cultivation of *irit* is minimal, taking farmers about five person days per hectare per year, and during harvesting a group of three to ten people cut about 35-100 kg of green cane per day (Godoy and Feaw 1989:348). The *irit* is ready for harvesting in approximately six years after seeding and then is selectively harvested every two to three years if prices are favorable. If not, harvesting of cane can wait as the cane continues to grow and becomes increasingly valuable the longer between harvesting.

If prices are favorable, or a villager needs cash or theft of the cane increases then the *irit* may be harvested more frequently. The income generated by the *irit* in addition to the income from rice and rubber serves the communities' needs well enough that many of the village's youth stay in Dadahup instead of migrating out, which is common to many other villages. Dadahup has experienced an increase in migration, unlike many other villages, as outsiders are attracted to the village for the high wages from rattan cutting and processing.

The district of Pasir is famous for its rattan gardens, as most homes cultivate some rattan. As the prices for available rattan increase, so does the theft of the rattan. In Pasir, reports tell of gangs of youth from outside of the local region who demand access to the gardens. When access is refused they take all of the rattan clump by force, disregarding both the traditional harvest share arrangements and the tradition of cutting only 10 percent of each clump (Peluso 1990:114).

Both wild and small-scale rattan cultivation are ecological and economical for growers. Cultivators and small-holders use a very low input approach to raising cane. Wild cultivation requires only that the seedling be planted in the forests or a garden with large trees and left alone for ten to fifteen years until maturity. Small-scale cultivation of rattan is usually used as an additional cash crop which is interspersed among subsistence crops and fruit trees. The successful cultivation of rattan does not require the use of pesticides, fertilizers or herbicides. The most important input required in the cultivation of rattan are large trees for it to climb for support. The techniques used are the same whether in the wild, small-scale gardens or in larger plantations, though rattan does not lend itself to growth as a monocrop, needing supports to climb. Appendix A. Cultivators and harvesters tools are simple and environmentally sound; they use digging sticks, axes and slashing knives, as well as basic hooks for tugging on the cane (Godoy and Feaw 1989:350). Key to successful management of future stocks is that the harvester only cut ten to twenty percent annually. If too much of a rattan clump is harvested at once, the plant may die. The knowledge required for cultivating and collecting rattan has traditionally been passed from generation to generation of rattan collectors and harvesters

(Peluso, 1991:11). Government and foreign agricultural aid is not required, just traditional know-how and access to land. Both of these integral inputs are being actively undermined by the current development policies of the Indonesian government.

The Dayak traders and cultivators trade the rattan to downriver Malays or other small entrepreneurs, via the Muslim Malay groups such as the Bugis and Banjars who tend to dominate the river trade. Large-scale boats are used which might employ four to five part-time seasonal workers (Peluso 1991:11). *Calamus caesius*, *C. manan*, *C. trachycoleus*, and *C. scipionum* are the main types of rattan that is traded, though Dransfield suggests that lesser known canes are likely to be adapted to the market as wild supplies are exhausted (Peluso 1991:10). According to Peluso (1991:10) in 1979, 7000 tons of rattan were produced in East Kalimantan, about 4,405 tons of which were exported. She estimates that these quantities are probably much higher as some rattan is smuggled into neighboring South Kalimantan (Peluso 1991:10). The Forest Industries Division of the Ministry of Forestry estimates that the province could produce 11,650 tons from wild sources annually (Peluso 1991:10). The only constraint to trade is the weather; during heavy rains or floods it is difficult for trade boats to travel upriver or for middlemen to transport the rattan from shallow tributaries by raft or canoe. Once the rattan arrives downriver, it goes through the initial stages of cleaning, drying and preserving for transport and preliminary sorting at a first stage processing center, which may employ anywhere from twenty to eighty workers, depending on the supply of cane. These employees are sometimes Dayaks who come from upriver and then generally work for wages on a seasonal basis, or are migrants from other islands, laid off employees of

oil and timber companies, or disillusioned transmigrants who have deserted site (Peluso 1990:15). These migrants are more likely to work year-round, though some will also engage in the collection of rattan for extra-income, where they compete directly with the Punan and Dayak harvesters and collectors.

Once semi-processed, the Malays sell the rattan to larger scale, ethnic Chinese exporters, who dominate the coastal, inner-island and international trade of rattan (Peluso 1991). Because exporters' contracts with overseas buyers are made on a yearly basis, seasonal fluctuations in monthly supply from upriver do not present major setbacks for the collectors or traders (Peluso 1991:13). The rattan is then sent to a major processing center in Java where it is used primarily to produce furniture and decorative objects for sale in the West. The neighboring island of Java is an attractive processing center because its wages are a third lower than in Kalimantan and there is easy access to large shipping ports, such as at Surabaya in Central Java. By 1989, rattan manufacturing capacities had increased 600 percent over 10 years and the number of manufacturing enterprises had increased 250 percent during that same period, though mainly in Java (Godoy 1989:117). The employment potential in Kalimantan of manufacturing operations, such as furniture making and rattan mat or carpet production is great, though the initial cost of the equipment is formidable for the small local entrepreneurs without access to large amounts of capital. There are estimates that the rattan mat and carpet industry of South Kalimantan could employ 15 percent of the industrial labor force of the entire province, rivaling the employment capacity of the timber industry. Similar estimates and conclusions can be drawn for East Kalimantan (Peluso 1991:15). Everytime that rattan

changes hands, value is added and another stage in processing is completed. Along the way, Punan, Dayak, middlemen traders, factory workers, and businessmen, as well as the Indonesian government itself, earn profits in the form of trade or cash from rattan.

Development and Rattan

The Rattan Trade

Ninety percent of the worlds' supply of rattan is exported from Indonesian Borneo, while rattan from East Kalimantan makes up fifty percent of that figure (Godoy 1989:119, Peluso 1991:8). During 1966, more rattan was exported from East Kalimantan than timber, though this changed during the 1970s as the world demand for tropical timber increased (Peluso 1991:8). From 1969 on to 1979, the volume of NTFPs exported doubled, while their value increased by a factor of twenty-two, indicating a healthy regional and global demand (Peluso 1990:114). In 1979, production of all plant and animal NTFPs was reported as 235,158 metric tons; roughly 180,000 tons of that total was exported, earning Indonesia US \$110 million (Peluso 1990:114). Among non-timber forest products, rattan ranks highest in value; during the period from 1982 to 1986 rattan accounted for about 75 percent of total NTFP exports in Indonesia (Godoy 1989:118). See Table 1. Until 1974 when the export of raw rattan was banned, rattan from Kalimantan had been exported in its raw form, mostly to Hong Kong (60 percent) and Singapore (20 percent) for processing (Peluso, 1990; Panayotou 1992:100). This ban was meant to encourage more in-country processing, though processing was primarily restricted to the initial stages of cleaning drying, preliminary sorting, and preserving for

transport, most of which occurred in Java rather than in the area of origin, primarily Kalimantan. In 1988, all semi-processed rattan was banned from export (Peluso, 1990:114). Exports of rattan continue to rise; for 1987 the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry reported the value of NTFPs exported to have reached US \$351 million which comprised 7.2 percent of Indonesia's total export earnings in forestry (Peluso 1994:114). See Table 2. This increasing value of NTFPs in export value has resulted not only from higher world prices on raw materials, but also from the increasing percentage of rattan exports which are semi-or fully processed.

Government Controls of Rattan

As rattan has become increasingly important to the value of the Indonesian economy, the state has adopted socio-economic development policies and created various laws and legislation intended to more fully manage rattan so as to better capture its long-term economic benefits. These policies are aimed at increasing rattan's in-country economic value and simultaneously decreasing common access to the forests while enhancing government access to, and control of, rattan, through naming some forests as production forests and through the establishment of rattan plantations. Plantations have the added benefit of constant production as well as easy access, cutting out all the middlemen as well as the indigenous gatherers of this product. This enables the state to continue logging its production forests while also, theoretically, increasing its share of profits from rattan. This is theoretical in that to date very few rattan plantations have been successful. Appendix A.

Up to the last century, the provincial sultans of Kutai, Berau and Pasir in Kalimantan claimed ownership of all forest products within their realms, though their control never extended to outlying Dayak and Punan groups, who operated independent of any regional power (Peluso 1990, 1991). Today, sultan's rights have been replaced by government claims to forest lands (Peluso 1994). The property status of rattan within a village forest territory shifts from 'open access' to common use by a harvest group depending on the village. Peluso explains that despite villagers' legal right to collect minor forest products within timber concessions, villagers have at times been denied entry to those areas; and timber company personnel have infringed on the rights of local residents, sometimes confiscating their rattan. Some of these conflicts are settled by ad hoc agreements between representatives of the timber company and village leaders (Peluso 1991:14), though other conflicts are settled by simple appropriation of the land by these representatives, knowing redress is highly unlikely given the legal and political weight of their companies and the state's own financial priorities.

Due to over-harvesting of wild rattan stocks, mostly by non-Punan and non-Dayak peoples, such as transmigrants and unemployed timber industry workers, the Indonesian government in 1987 started to issue collection licenses called *Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan* (HPHH - License to Harvest Rattan) which are issued only to individuals or to corporate entities. These licenses specify the name of the holder, the location of collection and the species and volume of rattan which may be cut. A provincial forester in Kalimantan has admitted, as translated by Peluso (1990) that the:

license system has been plagued with problems, not only because of misuse by traders and outside opportunists manipulating the system to their advantage, but also because many villages were not organized to apply for permits. Nor did the villages receive much help from the forestry officials (Peluso, 1990:115).

A study in 1988 found that the holders of these licenses tended to be river traders or other 'higher level traders' who act "as the agents who make arrangements regarding price and required volume" (Peluso, 1990:114). Rather than limiting non-indigenous access to the rattan, this license decreases access for all lower-level rattan collectors, especially the Punan and Dayak groups. Though any individual may apply for this license, Punans and Dayaks have an especially difficult time doing so. Factors making accessing licenses difficult include living far away from easy access to provincial forest offices, low literacy rates (some may not know the Indonesian language at all) (Cleary and Eaton 1992) and the sometimes corrupt foresters' unwillingness to grant licenses without some sort of '*oleh-oleh*' (gift) (Peluso 1990). Higher level traders who can afford to give '*oleh-oleh*' to local forest service authorities are granted the majority of the permits. The higher level traders who are given the collection permits are able to set lower prices for the harvested rattan, making collection less profitable for the Punan and Dayak collectors while increasing the traders profit margins. Relations between the forest service employees and indigenous groups have always been difficult (e.g. Peluso 1994). Forest service employees are usually non-local and have been posted to Kalimantan from Java. Their forest management practices are inherently Western in genesis and are applied to Indonesian plantation forestry, for which the state has been criticized (e.g. Peluso 1994). The main emphasis of this type of forest management is on managing the trees,

rather than the whole forest, for economic gain. This discourse of forest management inherently valorizes timber over any single or combination of NTFPs and may be a factor in the slow recognition of the economic, as well as cultural, importance of NTFPs to local as well as regional economies.

Another, more recent, state permit enacted in 1989 called *Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Rottan* (HPHHR - or license to harvest rattan forest products), is designed to control rattan extraction by functioning in a similar way to a state logging permit. This permit specifies that rattan harvesters are 'those who live in the vicinity of the forest who have been given permission by the authorities to harvest rattan' (Peluso 1990:69). The local governor or chief of the local forest service has the authority to issue these licenses which are non-transferable to individuals, groups or government cooperatives (unions are illegal in Indonesia as they are considered to be somewhat 'communistic' in tendency) (Peluso 1992:70). These permits also specify the holders name, the collection area and volume of species to be harvested within a maximum of six months. Collection areas may be located within various types of production or conversion forest for which 'Rattan Plantation Licenses' have been granted; they may not be located in Nature Reserves, Recreation Forests or National Parks (Peluso, 1990:115). The difficulties the Punan and Dayak encounter to gaining permitted access are the same as for the HPHH permit, described above. Those with the best access to this permit are the small-scale downriver traders and small businesses.

Another piece of state legislation affecting rattan is called *Hak Pegusahaan Hutan Tananman Rotan* (HPHTR - Forest Enterprise License for Rattan Plantations) enacted in

1989 at the same time as the HPHHR (Peluso 1990:116). Licensees may be government enterprises, private enterprises, cooperatives, farmers groups or individuals; they are granted rights to plant, maintain and benefit from plantation rattan in areas ranging from 2,500 ha. to 10,000 ha. Individuals and cooperatives may apply to establish plantations on less than 2,500 ha. These licenses are initially for a period of 20 years, and the holder must maintain the integrity of the resource and establish or cooperate with rattan processing industries (Peluso 1990:117). The Ministry of Forestry points to the licensing as having encouraged the growth of rattan plantations, some privately funded and some sponsored by the government and Godoy and Feaw (1989) have shown that this may be feasible for small-scale plantation owners. Appendix A. For small-scale cultivators and individuals, gaining access to this license can be extremely problematic for all of the previous mentioned reasons, as evidenced by the very few licenses granted to these individuals (Peluso 1992:69). In order to establish or cooperate with rattan processing industries, individuals must have a number of things: time, which implies full conversion to a cash economy from a subsistence one; capital to spare; and at least minimal business skills which serves to automatically exclude those more already economically marginalized peoples, the Punan, Dayak and other small-scale cultivators of rattan. This license is a direct example of the governments belief that technology making it more feasible to grow rattan on plantations successfully is imminent. Much research by the government has gone into the propagation of rattan plantations. For Punan and Dayaks who have traditionally established land tenure by the planting of perennial crops, including rattan, inside of their forest area (Peluso 1990; de Beere and McDermott 1989),

a potential benefit of licensing, particularly HPHTR, may be in its value as a tool in asserting long-term claims to their traditional homelands as recognized custodians.

The HPHH and HPHHR licenses, by restricting access to wild stocks, assert government control over the forests and its products. They also explicitly imply that the government is concerned, at least in the short-term, with the increasing scarcity of wild rattan stocks. This implication is further demonstrated by the third license, the HPHTR. As wild stocks decrease the government has put increasing energy in the form of technology and funding, into increasing plantation stocks. Over-harvesting of rattan means that it is gradually being taken out of its environment, the forest, and brought under government and private control via plantations. It is likely that if and when all natural stocks disappear from the wild, only the government and large-scale plantation owners will have access to rattan and its economic benefits.

The implications for the harvesters and small-scale cultivators of this conversion from harvesting to monocropping are enormous. Harvesters such as the Punan and Dayak depend on NTFPs, especially rattan, for their traditional economies as well as some of their every-day items. The scarcity and loss of access to remaining stocks already causes the Punan and Dayaks to turn to other less-profitable items for trade and cash and puts enormous pressure on their private economies (Sellato 1994, Rousseau 1990). Another negative local effect of licensing and export bans on raw and semi-processed cane lies in the detrimental effect on local economies within Kalimantan. Many lower-level collectors involved in the trade are paid less for their cane as Indonesian buyers are the only ones with access to the market, while outside of Indonesia the price of rattan goods increases

yearly. The profits are absorbed by the Malay and Chinese middlemen and larger businessmen, with increasingly less profits accumulating to the harvesters and cultivators of the cane. The low price of rattan inside of Kalimantan also removes incentives for the non-indigenous collectors, such as transmigrants, to invest in the replanting or cultivation of rattan - they will simply relocate again elsewhere where economic and labor opportunities are better. The entire licensing system encourages a process whereby those who are socio-economically marginalized from the greater socio-economic structure become more so, while those that are more integrated into the larger framework accrue both more access and profits from rattan which leads to increasing stratification between those who are harvesters and those who are traders.

Rattan and Development

Initially, the forest is seen by Southeast Asian developing economies as an unlimited resource where trends in the usage of the forest are seen as positive, i.e. more living and agricultural space for people. As the resources become scarcer, some people begin to call for conservation, which can eventually lead to legislation aimed at conserving the forests. At this stage a shift occurs to other sources of economically viable exports, such as NTFPs, or minerals (Hurst 1990). It appears that Indonesia has gone through these changes, yet NTFPs, especially rattan, are increasingly threatened as the successful establishment of large-scale plantations has still not occurred on as large a scale as the government had hoped for. A possible explanation for this dichotomy and the lack of implementation of alternatives to current socio-economic development may be explained by the government's Western influenced conceptions of economic and cultural

development and its viewing, uncomfortably, of its indigenous peoples as “Other” while viewing those citizens who are productive economically, such as businessmen and traders as culturally more evolved and models of identity for the indigenous harvesters.

‘The nation-state’s development project is a discourse that relies on Western and colonial rhetoric as well as devices of political and economic control. The Indonesian nation-state lays claim to all the forests of Indonesia and in doing so ignores all traditional land right claims by groups such as the Punan and Dayak that are considered unsettled. This begins to explain the Indonesian government’s continuance of clear cutting, mining and increasing transmigration projects. In order to understand why the government continues to practice this sort of economic development it is useful to briefly examine the policies and actors related to the extraction of timber in Kalimantan such as the forest service and government as well as transmigrants, timber workers and timber companies.

Forest Management

There is a long history of conflict between the National Forest Services and local peoples because of the Forest Services propensity to see forests only as economic resources for government interests.¹⁴ In many Southeast Asian countries the colonial-style legal and organizational structure prevails in postcolonial state forest management. In Indonesia, the *Jawatan Kehutan* or the Forest Service (*Boschwezen* under Dutch administration) was and still is a very powerful ministry within the central government. It is the Forest Service that decides who uses the land and for what purpose, so the amount

of power and influence that this particular branch of government has is enormous. The last forest laws were drawn up in the late 1920s by the Dutch and after independence were translated word for word and encoded into the new nation-state's legal system and so continue to dictate contemporary Indonesian forestry (Peluso 1994:44). Though at first glance it may seem odd that a government opposed to colonialism should retain colonial forestry practices, this makes sense if seen in the context of legitimizing policies restricting access to the forests and exercising economic control of the forests as a resource base.

Timber is the second largest income earner for Indonesia, superseded only by oil revenues (NDIO 1993:45). Indonesia banned the export of raw logs in 1980, when revenues on raw logs exceeded 2 billion U.S. dollars (Peluso 1994:44) Oil and timber provide much needed foreign exchange revenue that the Indonesian government needs to pay its international debts as well as to fund internal economic development. The forest clearance rates for timber are high and it is estimated that by the year 2000 all outer-island tropical rainforests in Indonesia will be gone if current rates of clear-cutting persist (Park 1992:41).

The Indonesian government works directly with the timber and oil companies to insure access to the forests, mainly because the elites of Indonesia are both government officials and major partners in Indonesian firms that are partners with foreign MNCs such as Oregon based Weyerhaeuser and Louisiana based Freeport McMoRan.. Foreign corporations are required to have Indonesian partners in order to insure that both the nation-state of Indonesia and Indonesians reap some benefit from the countries natural

resources.¹⁵ Large multi-national corporations have benefited enormously from Indonesia's logging concessions.¹⁶ As Ave and King (1986:87) explain:

Vast fortunes are accumulated by Indonesian entrepreneurs, both private and in public office; dealing in concessions (both in granting and receiving them) is a lucrative business, and there is no doubt that the unofficial moneys geared by this business are produced from the over-exploitation of the forests (Ave and King 1986:84).

The discrepancy between the duration of a concession (20 years) and the cutting cycle (35 years) also encourages concession holders to extract as much as they can from their area while they still have it.

Indonesia has instituted regulations that outline a select felling system that companies must adhere to, called *Teban Polih Indonesia* (Selective Cutting Regulations of Indonesia)(Ave and King 1986:86). The system has never been enforced due to the lack of enough forest service employees to monitor concessions and also because of the governments partnerships with logging MNCs which undermines its own Forest Services interests in sustainable forestry. Ave and King (1986) point out that "the problems of forest destruction are particularly acute in the province of East Kalimantan. In 1978 it had less than one per cent of Indonesia's population, but produced nearly 25 percent of the country's total export earnings" (1986:84). Of the four provinces in Kalimantan, East Kalimantan has the most timber concession activity as well as the largest production areas for wild varieties of rattan (Ave and King 1986). Although timber profits may be high in the short-term, benefiting Indonesian elites and MNCs, any long-term profits are questionable as supplies become rapidly exhausted.

Existing legislation also requires the replanting of all trees harvested, but due to a lack of enforcement, replanting exists mostly on paper (Ave and King, 1986:86). The trend in a few concessions that do replant to use fast growing non-endemic softwoods such as pine and eucalyptus rather than the slow-growing endemic hardwood trees such as teak and mahogany. This practice enables the companies to continue profiting from international timber demands, while changing the forest landscape into one of monocrop tree plantations.

Given the potential economic consequences of unsustainable clear-cutting, why does the government continue to encourage this practice? The elites within Indonesia have benefited greatly from the ban on manual logging and from the ban on raw log exporting. They will not cease engaging in clear-cutting their concessions as long as they make enormous short-term economic profits from the practice without having to be accountable for the condition of the land once they are done. MNCs will also not change their practices until forced to by the government - an unlikely event as long as they are engaged in partnerships with these same corporations (Cleary and Eaton 1992). Government economic and cultural development policies are supportive of these practices, while silent on the long-term cultural consequences of clear-cutting homelands of indigenous peoples as well as the ecological impacts. Long-term ecological and cultural consequences are inherently irrelevant to those Indonesian elites and MNCs benefiting economically now by clear-cutting the homelands of the indigenous inhabitants who occupy that landscape. Regulations have not insured that incentives are in place for concessionaires to be concerned with the impacts of their activities on the

landscape. Fees and fines for illegal activities, over-cutting, and non-reforestation of concessions are minimal and large businesses write these off as a cost of doing business. It is clear that the timber and oil companies, as well as their workers, are in direct competition with the indigenous inhabitants for the use of the resources of the forest.

The extraction of timber and NTFPs are intertwined, though on a large scale are mutually exclusive. Logic asserts that in areas that are clear-cut and heavily logged, NTFPs, including rattan, cannot be harvested - they are destroyed in the process of logging.¹⁷ The major ban on exports of raw logs was in part to increase employment in the timber cutting and processing sector by forcing timber factories and manufacturers to locate inside of the country (Peluso 1991, Cleary and Eaton 1992). The companies did so, but in areas where employment costs were the cheapest, in Java, resulting in no net increase of jobs in the regions of the timbers harvesting or for those needing it most, the workers in Kalimantan. The same has happened with the ban on the export of raw rattan cane. Manufacturers have located themselves in Java where wages are a third lower than in Kalimantan, resulting in few if any new jobs being created in the rattan industry in Kalimantan. More pressure has been put on NTFPs, while more and more non-Punan and non-Dayak peoples resort to gathering increasingly scarce NTFPs from decreasing amounts of land. After the manual logging ban, non-local interests (MNCs with local partners) were given increased access to the timber concessions, and clear-cutting became the norm. Outside workers were hired from other islands and the local workers (who had been harvesting timber manually) have had to find other means of employment (Panayotou and Ashton 1992:100). An interesting economic twist to the clearing of the

rainforests is that timber and oil workers often turn to the collection of NTFPs, especially rattan, to supplement their income when laid off or during off-seasons, which puts them in direct competition for rattan with the local workers that they have replaced. It is somewhat ironic that the government promotes timber as a major target industry for its unemployed when the collecting, trading and processing of NTFPs already employs more people (250,000), and could sustainably and at less ecological cost employ even more in the long-term, than timber harvesting (Panayotou and Ashton 1992:100).

Transmigrants also play an increasingly significant role in the increasing scarcity of NTFPs and rattan. When the transmigrants are in need of more income to buy clothes, kerosene and household staples, they often turn to the collection of NTFPs, though they are ignorant of traditional NTFP management practices, which puts a great strain on the availability of NTFPs as well as on their relations with the indigenous peoples in their locality. The number of transmigrants that have been settled in East Kalimantan as part of the government's policy of population resettlement is significant: between 1957 and 1980, 50,000 people, or 12,000 families, were sent to East Kalimantan from Java, while the population of the province increased from 550,000 people in 1961 to more than 1.2 million in 1980 (Ave and King 1986:93). Half of the population of the province is found in Balikpapan and Samarinda, the timber capital of East Kalimantan. These urban areas are surrounded by rural communities, many of which still practice shifting cultivation and oriented to subsistence activities. Relations have in areas become so strained between the two groups that warfare has broken out and the military authorities have had to intervene to force a reconciliation (Ave and King 1986:97). Also problematic is their view of the

forest and its products as a commons. The attitude, remarkably similar to the timber companies, is that whatever they do not take, somebody else will; so sustaining future stocks is not a consideration, but immediate harvesting for economic gain is.

It is necessary to note here though I discuss it in more depth in chapter five that the transmigrants are not necessarily farmers; but also vagrants, beggars, prostitutes and petty thieves from urban areas such as Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya in Java and Denpasar, Bali. Many of these people have never farmed, especially not on the poor soils of Kalimantan, so it is not too surprising that they abandon the transmigration program at the first signs of difficulty (Ave and King 1986:94). Sites chosen for settlements are often poor; although Kalimantan has much land, the poor soil is not suited for the pursuit of agriculture by concentrated settlements of Javanese and others. Much more deforestation occurs as the original land given to transmigration programs prove to be unsuitable for agriculture after three to five years, and more marginally fertile land is cleared for the settlers in a never-ending cycle. Their settlements are often located in forested areas that have previously been used for NTFP collection.

Clear-cut logging has enormous effects on not only the Indonesian landscape in Kalimantan, but on the people that live within that landscape. Displacement and resettlement of local indigenous tribal peoples and transmigrant settlers, the loss of species and cultural diversity, permanently exhausted and barren soils that often turn to laterite, local and regional climate changes, the loss of economic capital both from NTFPs and timber and an ever-increasing deficit for the nation-state are just some of the more obvious effects of clear-cutting large areas of the tropical rainforest in all parts of

Kalimantan. As Indonesia runs out of 'capital' products such as timber, they will turn to other major earners of export dollars, such as rattans, though they may discover that these materials may be in short supply in the future. In preparation for this situation, the government, as discussed above, encourages experimentation with large-scale rattan plantations. Despite the current lack of success in creating large-scale government rattan plantations, the government continues to permit and encourage large-scale clear-cutting of its forests, convinced that the plantations are feasible as a replacement for wild rattan.

At the present time, more foreign export income is earned for the government and its elites from the trade in timber while NTFPs, despite their large earnings are still worth less than fifteen percent of timbers value in foreign exchange income. See Table 2. Of all the NTFPs, rattan is by far the most important economically, accounting in the early 1980s for nearly half of Indonesia's total average annual export earnings from forest products (Peluso: 1994:8). Indonesia earned U.S. \$83 million in 1984, with some 83,000 to 150,000 people employed in collection, trade, and processing activities (Peluso 1991:8; Panayotou & Ashton 1992:100). Of the four provinces in Kalimantan, East Kalimantan boasts the largest production area for wild varieties of rattan, as well as the most timber concession activity. In 1988, due to the ban on semi-processed rattan, rattan production experienced rapid expansion which earned U.S. \$110 million or almost 10 percent of total forestry export earnings (Panayotou and Ashton, 1992:100). See Table 1. The rattan furniture trade is estimated to be worth more than \$2.5 billion per year (Panayotou and Ashton 1992:72). Studies have shown that as a whole NTFPs can have higher (up to ten times) economic values than timber and there have been repeated suggestions and studies

that show the great economic potential of switching from traditional logging to the collection of NTFPs (de Beere and McDermott, 1989; Caldecott, 1987).¹⁸ Over the last 15 years, rattans real price in the world and Indonesian markets has risen at a real annual rate of more than 20 percent owing to the shortages brought about by forest destruction and direct harvesting (Panayotou 1992:100).

Government and the Punan and Dayak Groups

The lack of economic visibility of the Punan to the Indonesian government undermines these peoples importance as actors in the export economy of the nation-state. In the government's quest to bring them up to modern living standards, as they define it, the government itself is undermining the economic importance of NTFPs by continuing to grant large-scale logging concessions despite the lack of successful state plantations. Wild rattan, by state association with 'wild savages' becomes, by definition, something to be tamed and controlled by being moved to a space where control and development is in the hands of the state rather than the peoples. The Berawan of Long Teru, as translated and reported by Colchester (1989:63) has said:

We don't want to lose our heritage of our land traditionally given by our ancestors and culturally respected by us. Our land is our survival and to take it away from us it would mean the extermination of our people (1989:63).

The Sarawak Minister for the Environment and Tourism, himself a timber tycoon, and in no way dissimilar from his Kalimantan counterpart bar nationality, has stated that indigenous efforts to save their homelands are:

A ploy to get forest for themselves and later give out their own timber concessions. If every longhouse wants a communal forest, we might as well stop logging (Colchester 1989:41)

The Punan recognize that timber extraction is important for the state's revenue, but believe that logging should be organized and managed in a manner that provides that the least temporary damage is done to the landscape and in a way that ensures their own continued traditional use of the land (Langub 1989:207). The practices of NTFP harvesting and logging are inherently incompatible. When considering one practice in favor over the other, the government chooses logging because of economic and cultural advantages. Culturally, logging is viewed as a development that will help the indigenes join and assimilate into modern Indonesian society, as part of its goal of modern progress through economic and social development.

Despite the growing importance of NTFPs to Indonesia's economy, policy makers have generally ignored NTFPs in forming development plans for the country. Part of this ignorance may have to do with the government's position that its Punan and Dayak indigenes are 'backward' and lacking in culture. Because nationalist discourse demands that the Punan and Dayak peoples must be brought into the mainstream Indonesian culture, itself a Javanese product, it is the indigenous cultures that must change which are marginalized along with the NTFPs that they traditionally harvest in a shadow economy that ultimately benefits the state's purse. The government continues to focus on timber as a revenue source while failing to acknowledge that NTFPs are an almost equal and much more sustainable use of the land's resources. NTFPs have been undervalued as an economic asset when harvested by indigenes, likely because of NTFPs role in helping to

maintain indigenous economic and cultural independence from nation-state colonialism.

This chapter has sought to identify the social, economic and ecological factors behind the over-harvesting of NTFPs, specifically rattan, in order to show why the Indonesian government continues to pursue the economic and cultural development of Indonesian Borneo and its peoples even though that development has not been sustainable, either culturally or economically, for the inhabitants of those provinces. Cultural prejudices regarding the indigenous people in Kalimantan has led to development policies meant not to increase the quality of their lives, but to change their cultures to better reflect a larger regional culture inscribed from the Indonesian political and cultural center of Java. This can be viewed as amounting to internal colonization of these marginalized people by the elite of the country and by the Indonesian government itself through its policies of economic and social development. It is that government that decides what it means to be civilized and cultured, and it is those definitions of culture that the Indigenous people are judged by and meant to conform to.

The Punan and the Dayak have resisted this assimilation into the Indonesian cultural mainstream and continue to seek methods of resistance that will allow them to maintain their own cultural identity and choose whether or how to develop on their own terms. Initiatives meant to foster community participation such as social forestry extractive reserves (Peluso 1990:114) have not yet been part of the international communities nor the Indonesian nation-state's development practices. The added value of NTFPs can make mixed-use natural forest management a far more economically favorable option on agriculturally marginal land than timber production. (Panayotou and

Ashton 1992:98) Often, the forest service functions as an agent for the liquidation of natural assets in order to meet foreign debt interest payments and Indonesian elites' personal income goals. While it has become common for international aid donors and UN agencies as well as NGOs to profess their belief in the importance of participatory grassroots efforts, particularly those that empower women, their practices still often fail to support their discourse. Even today, the World Bank admits of its forest sector lending: "participation in decision-making remains far from adequate and the interests of many stakeholders are still neglected" (World Bank 1994:vi). It is critical that the Indonesian nation-state and aid agencies give political and economic support to the thousands of nomadic and semi-rural people who seek to stabilize an environment essential to their own survival and the economic long-term security of their nations.

CHAPTER V

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL

In the early months of 1997, riots and conflicts erupted in West Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo, between indigenous Dayak groups and Madurese transmigrants. Initially, surface causes were reported by the international media such as the *Jakarta Post* and the *Sydney Herald* to derive from cultural misunderstandings and economic competition. These reports have only scratched the surface of the deeper causes of the riots, and these deeper causes are the focus of this chapter. Indonesian policies of economic and cultural development have created new class and production structures among these groups as well as fueling the already existing rift between the two. To simply attribute causation for the riots to incompatibility among cultures is to not only overlook deeper causes which are at the heart of the conflicts, but to risk essentializing the very real struggle facing the Dayaks peoples in maintaining their cultural, physical and imaginative landscape on which their very survival depends. It is also to negatively trivialize the many lives, Madurese, Dayak, Indonesian ethnic Chinese, and military lives lost in this conflict.

Though I focus on this conflict in West Kalimantan to illuminate the effects of state development policy, it is necessary to bear in mind that this is just one struggle over dignity, sovereignty, and cultural and physical landscapes the world over that is being

fought by indigenous peoples against not only their own government's political and economic structures but also often against multinational (MNCs) timber, mining, and agricultural concerns that seek to make of indigenous lands a capital input into the value-adding process for products to be sold and consumed the world over, with economic benefits accruing to a fortunate few, often elites in the country of production or businesses outside of the host country.¹⁹ Analysis of the conflict in Kalimantan serves to focus the lens of understanding on one locality that is representative of many localities around the globe.

The 1997 Conflict in West Kalimantan

Information about events in West Kalimantan is difficult to access due to many factors such as the state's policy of restricting access to information; the lack of a strong communication infrastructure in the area; journalists' difficulty of accessing areas of conflict because of slow travel time and difficult terrain; confusing and speculative due to the sensationalizing of reports for media consumption; and at times contradictory because of the agendas of those reporting on events. To make sense of the information that is available, the context of the presentation needs to be understood and one way of doing this is to look at the differences between public and private transcripts of the groups involved (Scott 1990)²⁰. This enables the deconstruction of the class and power relations inherent in the struggle over land and resource rights in Kalimantan, issues at the heart of the conflict.

Combining the common Javanese view of the Punan and Dayaks peoples along with the state position that these peoples are 'primitive' and in immediate need of the civilizing influence of modernization, it is hardly surprising that information is hard to gather from sources other than the state or its representatives, and that information is commonly biased. As Scott (1990), referring to Malaysian government views of its indigenous peoples, writes, "common among many dominant groups is the idea that those beneath them, those who have been marginalized, are 'deceitful', 'shamming', and lying by nature" (Scott 1990:3). Most Dayak people who live outside of urban areas lack access to communication tools and are unable to voice their views except when asked by reporters or government officials. In addition, informants will often tell the questioner what the informant believes the questioner wants to hear as may be the case when eager reporters searching for a spectacular story to sell ask leading questions without investigating the 'facts' they are given. Interviewed are local people, mostly in urban areas because of travel restrictions, who may wish to color the information they give for their own personal and political reasons. This may go a long way towards explaining the many contradictory reports of events coming out of West Kalimantan in early 1997. These reports, however, do serve to show where the cultural patterns of dominance and resistance in Kalimantan reside, and so help to make sense of Dayak actions towards the Madurese. "For good reason, nothing is straightforward here; the realities of power for subordinate groups mean that much of their political action requires interpretation precisely because it is intended to be cryptic and opaque." (Scott 1990:137)

In the first three months of 1997, riots and outright warfare throughout the cities, towns and forests of West Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo, between indigenous Dayaks and Madurese transmigrants have caused casualties estimated to be at one thousand or more, with over twelve hundred people missing (*DTE* 19 March, 1997). Clashes between the two groups have been occurring since the 1950s, but have never previously escalated to such a height of animosity. Over one thousand houses have been destroyed, tens of thousands have fled their villages for larger urban centers such as Pontianak, and between seven and eight thousand Madurese have become refugees while an additional three thousand Madurese have fled the troubles and returned to Madura (*DTE* 19 March, 1997). Damage to property has been estimated by West Kalimantan Governor Aspar Aswin at over 25 billion Rp. (rupeah) (*DTE* 19 March, 1997). The army sent in over three thousand troops from Java when local police forces became overwhelmed with the scope of the riots, and over seventy people (many leading members of the Dayak community such as Drs. Stephanus Juwen, head of the Institute of Dayakology, and SM Kaphat, leader of the West Kalimantan Indonesian Democracy Party (*Partei Demokrasi Indonesia* -PDI) have been arrested and face charges of subversion which carries the death penalty (*DTE* 28 March 1997). In addition, Malaysia has periodically closed their borders with West Kalimantan during this time to avoid the conflict from overlapping into their territory (*Asia Week* 7 March, 1997).

Reported reasons for these hostilities are numerous; they range from the political and social to questions of jurisdiction. *Asia Week* (7 March, 1997) reports that the riots began at a pop concert in late December, when a popular singer changed political parties,

but elaborates no further. Other reports claim the cause as an alleged rape of a Dayak girl by a Maduran man, who was not prosecuted by the authorities. The Dayaks then killed the Maduran man, sparking retaliatory attacks. (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 March 1997; *AHRC* 13 March 1997). Reports such as those filed by John McBeth and Margot Cohen for *DTE* (19 March 1997) repute the cause as the cutting of fruit trees *molonged* (planted to signify usufruct rights) by Dayaks. Regardless of the incendiary cause of the latest outbreak in hostilities, some factors have been demanding attention for some time: issues of cultural survival and land rights, and all that these entail, have been and will most likely continue to be a main factor contributing to area hostilities. Some reports of the events are clearly exaggerated, such as this by a missionary:

It's like the killing fields...He and other missionaries have been shocked to see severed heads, victims with hearts and livers torn out and burned bodies thrown into open graves. The Dayaks, once known for their headhunting, have reportedly walked through villages under attack with heads on poles. Some of these young Dayak warriors have smeared their faces with the blood of the people they've killed. This is war. (*Asia Week* 7 March 1997).

This expression of shock is reminiscent of eighteenth century reports by missionaries on first encountering the 'wild head-hunting heathen' Dayaks in Borneo. Reports such as these unwittingly serve to support the state's position that the Dayak and Punan are indeed 'primitive', 'backward', and 'savage', and therefore in need of development support. The provincial head of social affairs in Central Kalimantan, William Sendok Rabu, claims that isolation, ignorance and lack of skills causes poverty and backwardness among the Dayak and Punan. Governor Warsito Rasman adds that "isolated peoples' backwardness meant that as a human resource they could not yet be used efficiently in

development” (*DTE* 31 November 1996). This is in line with the official goal of bringing indigenous groups into the mainstream of national life as productive citizens.

Dayak and Punan of West Kalimantan

The Dayaks and Punan groups are considered to be the original inhabitants of Borneo (cf. Ave and King 1986, Rousseau 1990, Sellato 1994). As discussed in Chapter two, Punan is a collective name referring to those groups who continue to practice hunting and gathering, maintaining a non-settled or semi-settled lifestyle as well as traditional cultural practices (*adat*). Much of their income is earned from the trade of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) which they collect and trade to their Dayak neighbors (Peluso 1990, 1991). Dayak is a collective term applied to those indigenous peoples who are semi-settled and settled, live primarily along rivers and practice slash and burn, or swidden, agriculture. Both Punan and Dayak groups, internally and externally, speak a variety of languages, differ in cultural practices such as clothing, architecture, oral histories, and social organization., and both are targets of government defined modernization programs.

Despite the many differences between the Dayak and Punan groups, they do share similarities in religious conceptions and worldviews, though the traditional religions based on animism have receded with the advent of Christian missionaries (Ave and King 1986:9). The Dutch encouraged the conversion to Christianity by the indigenes as a way of disseminating Western cultural and social values and of ‘pacifying’ and ‘civilizing’ the interior (Cleary and Eaton 1992:68). Cleary and Eaton (1992) explain: “in 1915, to

forestall any possible conflicts, the Dutch effectively divided Kalimantan in two, allocating the coastal, Malay areas to Protestant missionaries and the interior, largely Dayak and Punan areas, to the Roman Catholics” (1992:68). In 1928, the Borneo Evangelical Mission was created by the Dutch (Cleary and Eaton 1992:68). The desire to convert the indigenes to Christianity also led to the creation in the mid 1950s of the Missionary Aviation Fellowship (MAF). Its role in linking up various civil and missionary centers in the interior was of major importance throughout the island, providing a quick means of communication in hitherto impenetrable regions, secondary only to sea and river transport (Cleary and Eaton 1992:68). Indigenes and others continue to rely heavily on the services of the MAF, and the impact of Christianity on Dayak and Punan communities can be seen throughout many parts of the interior today (e.g. Obidzinski 1993). In contrast to Christian conversion, some indigenes convert to Islam, becoming thereby officially ‘Malay’, which is a term applied to those who speak Malay and practice Islam.

Recent migrants to West Kalimantan account for less than eight percent of the population, yet their impact on the semi-urban and urban economic and social landscapes has been disproportionately large, primarily due to state development policies. These peoples are predominantly found occupying coastal areas such as provincial capital of Pontianak and the smaller *kabupatens* (districts) of Sambas and Ketapan (Ave and King 1986:97). The Dayaks and Malays each comprise forty percent and the ethnic Chinese twelve percent of the provinces’ population (*Asia Week* 3/7/1997:46). Migrants have brought with them economic and social development that range in scale from the local to

the regional, negatively impacting local indigenes and their cultures while contributing positively to the regional and state economies.

Transmigrants and Immigrants

Kalimantan is a resource frontier, well endowed with natural resources including gold, diamonds, timber, and oil. It has attracted many who seek to carve out for themselves a better, more prosperous, life than they had in their own homelands. This view of Kalimantan as a 'new' and 'better' land of opportunities is promoted by the government of Indonesia throughout Java and Bali, areas it considers overpopulated.

Chinese have settled throughout Borneo, as well as throughout the Indonesian archipelago, as discussed in chapter 2. The ethnic Chinese in Borneo mainly engage in trade and live in urban or semi-urban areas. Indonesian ethnic Chinese, mostly Christian traders, are wealthier than the majority of Malays and Muslims in Kalimantan (Ave and King 1986:10). They are considered a conspicuous example of the prosperous merchant class and are reported by *Asia Week* (24 January 1997) to control about 70 percent of the economy though they comprise only three percent of the population of almost 200 million Indonesians (Mackie 1992:163). Though 70 percent is a figure that is likely quite overestimated, the assigning of such enormous economic influence to the ethnic Chinese is illustrative of the influence and power attributed to the ethnic Chinese as a group by the general citizenry of Indonesia.²¹ This view of the ethnic Chinese may help to explain why the ethnic Chinese are often a first target of racist sentiment throughout Indonesia and are traditionally the first group on whom the state and other Indonesians, mainly Muslim,

cast suspicions of national and economic loyalty at times of national economic and political stress (Mackie 1990:83).²² During the recent hostilities in West Kalimantan some ethnic Chinese were attacked and had their shops plundered and burned by the Madurese, who were themselves being attacked by the Dayaks (*DTE* 19 March 1997, *Asia Times* 20 February 1997).

Internal Indonesian migrants to Borneo also include Buginese from Sulawesi to East and West Kalimantan; Javanese (mostly Muslim), who have settled throughout Kalimantan; and Madurese from the island of Madura off the coast of Java. Numbers of Madurese have been settling throughout all the provinces of Kalimantan since the 1930s. Some Madurese are not permanent migrants but move back and forth periodically between their homes and urban areas such as Pontianak in West Kalimantan (Ave and King 1986:97). Madurese are usually spontaneous transmigrants who follow family or friends who have themselves immigrated to the area under sponsored transmigration schemes (*Tempo* 2 March 1997). Madurese often migrate by boat to the island to work in industrial centers or to establish farms (Ave and King 1986:98).

The Madurese transmigrants have traditionally been ranked within the lowest socio-economic class of Javanese and Madurese Society. Transmigration is not only hope for a better quality of life, but the opportunity to raise oneself and one's family up the ladder of economic class (*Asia Times*, 20 February 1997). Arriving in Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo, they have shared in the government's view of the Dayaks as 'primitive' peoples that reflect the 'untamed jungles' they occupy (King 1993:273; *DTE* 3 March 1997). Differing religions also add to misunderstandings and hostilities between

the two groups. Most Madurese are at least nominally Muslim, with a very small proportion of Christians, while many Dayaks are animist or have converted to Christianity (Lebar 1972:54). Madurese feel superior psychologically; they come from an island considered to have a slightly 'better' class of society; they practice wet rice farming, small trade, and are predominantly Muslim, all practices encouraged and supported by the state (King 1993:33 cf. Hurst 1990; G. Appell 1985).

Cultural Differences Between Dayaks and Madurese

Dayaks and Madurese come from opposing religions and world-views, with different ideas of the rights they hold as Indonesian citizens due to their ethnicity, class, and/or geographical location. The Dayaks feel that the Madurese are treated favorably by local police and the state, and that they themselves are accorded little respect by the Madurese (e.g. *Asia Times*, 20 February, 1997). The Madurese in turn share the state view of Dayaks as uncivilized, uneducated, and irreligious (King 1993:272; *DTE* 3 March 1997). The Dayaks feel patronized and threatened by this new group of immigrants who Dayaks consider to be guests in their home. An often used example by the Dayaks of disrespectful behavior on the part of the Madurese is the practice of Madurese often carrying knives, and not removing them when entering a Dayaks home, which to the Dayaks is a sign of mistrust of the host and signals malicious intent (*Asia Week* 7 March 1997, *Asia Times* 20 February, 1997). The underlying cause of conflict is not primarily ethnic, though, but economic, cultural, and political. These differences cause resentment

that takes the form of ethnic explosion against those who are perceived to have the most immediate negative impact on the Dayak economic and cultural position: the Madurese.

Dayaks have lived more or less peacefully with all migrant ethnic groups with the exception of the Madurese. Clashes between the two groups have been occurring since the 1950s, though the recent violence is regarded as the worst clash between the two groups to date (*DTE* 19 March 1997). Both the Dayaks, predominantly Catholic, and Madurese, predominantly Muslim, are marginalized, poor, and compete with each other for the same jobs while the Madurese are treated more favorably by the local police and authorities (Ave and King 1986:10; e.g. Cleary and Eaton 1992). Dayaks complain that migrant workers receive preferential treatment by local officials and are rarely prosecuted for breaking the law (*AHRC* 13 March 1997). It is not surprising that if the Dayaks feel discriminated against by the state authorities that they have more faith in their own traditional *adat* than in the national justice system.

Those Dayaks who live in urban areas, such as Pontianak where they comprise two percent of the population, are usually there due to resettlement schemes by the state (*AHRC* 13 March, 1997). When land is concessioned or other-wise developed, the Dayak occupants are resettled to areas which are considered to hold more potential and opportunity for earning wages, such as near rubber plantations or closer to industrial areas. The Dayaks often refuse the resettlement and drift to the larger towns to seek wage employment (King 1993:270). The government's current target is the resettlement of twenty thousand Dayak families a year (IGDA 1997:3). Once relocated, many Dayaks become squatters on the edges of towns and working at low-level, low-wage labor jobs,

such as in plywood factories (cf. King 1993, Ave 1993, Cleary and Eaton 1992). This relocation itself takes a toll on Dayak cultural morale and the Dayak now demand greater land rights as well as greater representation within government (e.g. Appell 1988).

Analysts see the burning of three plantations in the last two years as evidence of the Dayaks' growing resentment of the government's appropriation of traditional land, and its forced selling of Dayak land at below market prices (*Asia Times* 20 February 1997)²³.

Laurentius Kadir, a Dayak and head of the province's Directorate for Village Development explains that "this is the accumulation of many conflicts. Yes, there's the cultural gap with the Madurese but there's also a dissatisfaction with how Dayak land has been taken away illegally" (*Asia Times* 20 February 1997).

Madurese who have spontaneously transmigrated and Dayaks who have been resettled compete for the same low-pay labor intensive jobs and for cheap housing on the outskirts of urban areas. Outside of the cities, they compete for the same jobs on plantations and on logging and mining concessions. The Madurese tend to occupy lower socio-economic positions in Indonesian Borneo's society and are often employed in badly paid laboring jobs, working as pedicab drivers, ferryboat men, fishermen, cattle breeders, farmers, stone cutters and estate laborers (Ave and King 1986:10, *Tempo* 2 March 1997). They also work in the rubber, palm, oil, coconut and timber plantations, as well as in primary industries such as mining.

Beyond religious differences, are differences in economic opportunity both in the forests and in urban and semi-urban areas as the Madurese settlers have moved into the lower rungs of the economy, effectively crowding out the Dayaks. Environmental factors

also play a role in that the forests that the Dayaks have relied upon in the past for subsistence and supplies of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) produced by the Punan for trade have been degraded, logged, mined, contaminated, and replaced by wet-rice fields (currently swamp forest in Central Kalimantan is being converted to a million-hectare rice fields project -DTE 19 March 1997), and monocrop plantations, severely restricting self-sufficiency and income earning opportunities for the displaced Dayaks (cf. Dove 1988, Cleary and Eaton 1992). Cleary and Eaton (1992) estimate that less than 27,000 square kilometers of forests are left protected (Cleary and Eaton 1992:203). See Figure 6. In addition, Park (1992) estimates the total clearance of Indonesian forests by the year 2000 at current rates of logging (1992:41) Further problems for the Dayak arise in areas such Sangau Ledo in West Kalimantan when supermarkets and large retail outlets open up, squeezing out many local small traders, including the ethnic Chinese and Dayak groups, leaving the Dayaks to compete with Madurese for employment.

All of these economic and cultural inequities have added emotional fuel to the recent riots. For the Dayaks, the Madurese may represent the proverbial straw that has broken the camel's back. Though the government's motto is 'unity in diversity', West Kalimantan riots have shown that unity is impossible as long as there is great economic disparity and cultural bias. The more prosperity that accrues to a select few immigrant groups, the more the disparity in income, the higher the chance of conflict between groups such as the Dayaks and the Madurese. Juwono Sudarsono of the National Defense Institute "warns that the country could be torn apart if opportunities are not widened" (*Asia Week*, 7 March ,1997:46). Dayaks are not represented in the government, and there




FIGURE 6. Bornean Conservation Areas
(Source: Cleary and Eaton 1992:202)

are no Dayaks with a rank higher than *bupati* (a local government administrator) in the state. This has led to a situation where the Dayak have no voice in determining local development of the land to which they feel they have primary *in situ* rights (*Asia Week* 7 March 1997). That situation has not changed though several peace agreements have been signed. These peace agreements are tentative at best, given that they have not been arrived at on their own with the parties involved, but were directed by the government. “Some community leaders said that without grass-roots support and recognition of the economic and political disparity behind the ethnic enmity, the peace proposals were futile” (*Asia Times* 20 February 1997). At the first peace agreement of 18 February, 1997, which did not hold, there was only one Dayak representative involved and many Dayaks did not hear of the agreement for days (*Asia Times*, 20 February 1997). “The peace agreements won’t be effective if only the elite sign them and in a formal fashion without *adat* ceremonies in the villages and involvement of the masses on the ground. They may say peace in the city but the people fighting in the villages don’t know” explains Laurentius Kadir to the *Asia Times* (20 February 1997). Yosep, a Dayak, translated by the *Asia Times* (20 February 1997) states “we are tired of being marginalized. The government only wants to work with us for tourism purposes but not in government”. It seems that the chances for a lasting peace are minimal as long as social inequity between the two groups and land rights disputes due to development programs are not addressed by the state at local, regional, and federal levels.

Ethnicity and Economics

The cultures of many indigenous groups the world over are deeply intertwined with the land that they live on. It is not just soil, but a landscape that is both symbolic and representative of their very identities. It is development and the resultant negotiation of identity that often brings about conflicts between the state and indigenes, and the Dayaks and the state of Indonesia are no exception.

Reports in *Asia Week*, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the *Jakarta Post*, and other international papers have consigned the conflict in West Kalimantan to cultural and economic differences and framed this in terms of “a fight for what’s left” (*Asia Week* 7 March 1997). They report that transmigrants have displaced the Dayaks from their former economic niche, leaving the Dayak with little or no economic opportunities (*Asia Week* 3 March, 1997). *Asia Week* reports that the government attributes the cause of unrest to one of class economics, the gap between the rich and the poor: “The results of development are not equally shared - this is what makes people angry” said Ilyas Rukhiyat, a leader of the Muslim *Nahdlatul Ulama* (the national Islamic association) (*Asia Week* 24 March, 1997). Economic factors are indeed important, though they only explain one dimension of the conflict. Dayaks have recently made the important assertion that their animosity is based also on issues of human dignity and integrity. As Scott (1990) points out: “The practices of domination and exploitation typically generate the insults and slights to human dignity that in turn foster a hidden transcript of indignation” (1990:7). This indignation has come to the fore and presented itself concretely in the form of violence. The violence in West Kalimantan has served to expose the hidden transcript of the Dayak

peoples ,defined as “discourse that takes place ‘offstage,’ beyond direct observation by power holders” (Scott 1990:4). What had before been only nuanced, has come into the open in a most direct way. It repudiates the public transcript, where the Dayaks are viewed by the government as endorsing the terms of their marginalization, as well as being willing partners in that marginalization.

At the heart of the problems are not just economic and ethnic differences, but a desire on the part of the Dayaks to be treated with full and equal rights of state citizenship as well as to retain their traditional culture, politics, economy, and traditional (*adat*) land.²⁴ These desires are expressed through the demand for land rights; they want to maintain control of their traditional (*adat*) land rights which go unrecognized by the Indonesian government. Their land is instead appropriated in the national interest and given to immigrants for transmigration settlement, such as happened to the Bentian Dayaks in East Kalimantan in the late 1980s (Dove 1988; AHRC 13 March 1997). The district of Sanggau, located in the Kapuas River Basin and the site of the outbreak of the latest hostilities, has received over 10,000 transmigrants since 1979. Before 1979, none were sent there, rather over 20,000 transmigrants had been sent to Pontianak, the urban center of the region (Cleary and Eaton 1992:235). This change in assigned destinations for transmigrants occurred due to the government’s desire to settle the more sparsely populated regions for security reasons, discussed later in this chapter. As transmigrants move into areas formerly occupied by indigenes such as the Punan and Dayaks groups, hostilities due to questions of land rights and cultural norms are almost inevitable.

Problems also arise when the Dayak groups see their fallow lands taken over by transmigrants who not only unwittingly appropriate their land, but cut the fruit trees bordering the fallows that Dayaks use to maintain a claim to the land (Abdoellah 1996:273). This practice is called *molonging* and is widespread throughout Borneo (cf. Dove 1988; Sellato 1994; Ave and King 1986). By cutting a fruit tree or any other tree that has been *molonged*, the transmigrants are sometimes unwittingly negating any previous land claims or usage rights of the Dayaks of the area, as well as privileging their own agricultural system and culture over the Dayaks'. Differing cultural practices can easily lead to misunderstandings, but left as misunderstandings feelings may harden and less attempts are then made by either party to sort out any of these conflicts. Often, too, misunderstandings have a larger cause, such as state policies that encourage land clearing by immigrants, or the building of mosques in non-Muslim indigenous communities. This leaves transmigrants such as the Madurese in an awkward position between following state policy and offending (even unintentionally) their indigenous neighbors or disregarding (intentionally or unintentionally) state policies themselves.

The Transmigration Project

The transmigration scheme has a long history, beginning with Dutch colonization, who utilized this concept to move labor to where it was most needed; in their case to monocrop plantations and industrial sites (Ave and King 1986:92). Resettlement to Kalimantan began in 1921 when 250 families from Central Java were moved to a site in Barabai, 140 km north of Banjarmasin in the current province of South Kalimantan (Ave

and King 1986:92). The Dutch government was forced to end the project there shortly after, due to malaria and land infertility (Ave and King 1986:92). This first project in transmigration was a forewarning of the consequences of resettlement. Many recent transmigration and resettlement sites have had to be abandoned because of similar reasons.

The transmigration scheme was revived by the newly independent Indonesian government in 1949 (Park 1992:52). Transmigration was seen as a way to simultaneously relieve population pressures on Java while developing the outer-islands both culturally and economically. Easing population pressures in areas of high density to lower density contributes to a more balanced population distribution and 'creates more equitable chances for prosperity for all citizens' (Cleary and Eaton 1992:230). During the late 1960s, transmigration was also viewed by aid agencies such as the World Bank as a ideal solution to the overcrowding of Java as well as providing labor for the newly booming industries of Borneo such as the agriculture, mining, and timber industries (World Bank: Overseas Economic Development (OED) Precis, 1994:1). As part of its structural adjustment program in Indonesia, the World Bank has provided funding totaling \$560 million to date for seven transmigration and resettlement schemes (World Bank: OED Precis 1994:1). In addition, the World Bank supports development projects for resource utilization: the *Jakarta Post* (22 November 1996 cited in *DTE* 30 August 1996) reports that the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a private sector agency of the World Bank agreed to provide US \$41 million in equity and loans to an Indonesian company to develop oil palm estates and refineries in West Kalimantan. The company will use part of

the loan to develop 34,000 hectares of oil palm plantations under the nucleus estate/small holder scheme which uses transmigrant families, as well as some local farmers. Corporate secretary Indradi Kusama states “the project will help raise the living standards of more than seventeen thousand families” and then quoted IFC’s director for agribusiness development, Karl Voltaire “we are pleased to be associated with a project that has a high development impact”(*Jakarta Post* 22 November 1996 quoted in *DTE* 30 August 1996). This high impact development plan may well have contributed to the conflict of early 1997 in West Kalimantan.

Objectives of Transmigration

During Indonesia’s First Five-Year Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*), or Repelita 1, from 1969 to 1974, transmigration was writ into law with the introduction of Basic Law No. 3 of 1972. Transmigration is defined by this legislation as “the voluntary migration of Indonesian population from one region within Indonesia to a different region within Indonesia” (IGDA 1997:1) Specifics of the legislation include the “the removal and /or transfer of population from an area to settle in other area determined upon within the territory of the republic of Indonesia, *in the interests of the development of the country, or for other reasons considered necessary by the Government*”.²⁵ This last is in part to ‘fill the empty spaces for security and defense’ (Ave and King 1986:92, e.g. Cleary and Eaton 1992; King 1993; Park 1992).

This transmigration law outlines the objectives of the program as: the improvement of living standards; regional development; more balanced population

distribution; equitable distribution of development; *fuller utilization of human and natural resources; the promotion of national unity; and the facilitating of national defense and security* (Cleary and Eaton 1992:230). Aims of the project as described by Basic Law No. 3 of 1972 at the receiving areas are: increased human resources and labors, *utilization of natural resources*, increased financial resources and investment, increased means and development of the infrastructure, transfer of technology, *increased production, and increase of new development centers*. In areas of origin, transmigration aims are to decrease population and labor density, to decrease rural-urban migration, to *preserve nature and the environment, to avoid natural disasters and security disturbances or casualties*, and to 'implement project which requires dislocation of population' (Cleary and Eaton 1992:230; Indonesian Constitution, cited in IGDA 1997:1). Of these goals, I will look closer at the development of human resources, increasing production, increasing new development centers, preserving nature, and maintaining of national security. I will also examine the resettlement project and discuss reasons for site failures of both transmigration and resettlement sites in the context of how they relate to the crisis in West Kalimantan of early 1997.

There are two types of transmigration; sponsored transmigration and spontaneous transmigration. During the First Long Term Development Period (each of which lasts for twenty-five years) 1.5 million families or 8.5 million persons were resettled, requiring the building of 55,000 km of roads and 69,000 meters of bridges, the opening up of more than 1.5 million hectares of new agricultural land, and the construction of 827,000 housing units (IGDA 1997:2). Between the years of 1971 and 1982 a total of 37,133

settlers arrived in West Kalimantan (IGDA 1997:2; cf. Ave and King 1986; Cleary and Eaton 1992). New transmigrants were sent to the *kabupatens* (a district or regional administrative unit under a bupati or district administrator) of Pontianak, Sintang and Sanggau, locations of the current conflict (Ave and King 1986:97). Goals achieved include attaining self-sufficiency in rice by raising food production which has been a long standing national goal as well as a personal goal of President Suharto's; the planting of hundreds of thousands of hectares of estate crops which emphasize export crops such as oil palm and rubber; the creation of thousands of hectares of industrial forest plantations for pulp and paper; and the supplying of *the needed labor for the increased developments in the receiving areas by additional workers*. In addition, over 50,000 families of 'forest squatters' were resettled by the state and local governments (IGDA 1997:3).

During the second Long Term Development Period (begun in 1994/95) under sponsored transmigration, 753,648 families have been moved and 795,063 families have moved spontaneously. These figures do not include the numerous individuals and families who have moved from Java, Bali, and Madura to the outer islands to participate in large development projects as laborers (mentioned above) or to work in other capacities (IGDA 1997:3) In addition, 20 percent of the local population at the transmigration site are given the opportunity to participate actively in the transmigration program and to utilize public facilities in the area, such as schools and health clinics. Types of economic development encouraged for the transmigration settlements are food crop agriculture plantations, industrial forest plantations, fresh water and sea water fishing, public services and industry (Cleary and Eaton 1992:234; IGDA 1997:3).

Sponsored transmigration has been assisted by the World Bank and additional financing has come from variety of internal and external sources such as corporate taxes (demanded of all concessionaires), international aid, and multilateral lending agencies (IGDA 1997:4; NDIO 1993:40).

Focusing on specific, stated objectives and purposes of transmigration can further illuminate how these factors effect the local communities at transmigration receiving areas, and shed light on the underlying causes of the 1997 conflict.

Development of Human Resources

Transmigration candidates are chosen from a predetermined area, defined by Presidential decree (Peluso 1994:208). Participants eligible are defined as poor farmers, laborers in the agricultural sector, fishermen, thieves, *forest squatters, the unemployed, and school dropouts* (Peluso 1994:228; IGDA 1997:2). Additional criteria is based on population density above the environment's carrying capacity as defined by the state, areas affected by natural disasters, and *areas that had been already affected by development projects* (IGDA 1997:2). The program provides houses, basic infrastructure, public facilities such as schools, and provides jobs or enterprises to the transmigrants (NDIO 1993:58). Specifically, transmigrants are promised a two to four hectare plot of farmland on freshly cleared forest; a basic wooden house; a supply of basic foodstuffs for one year; basic tools for the farming model chosen; seed supplies for the first harvest; fertilizers and pesticides for the first three years, if needed; and free transport to the site (Hurst 1990:52; Sage 1996:101). Seven types of activities are encouraged: integrated

agriculture, plantation forestry, fresh water fishery, sea water fishery, service, and industrial (IGDA 1997:3; NDIO 1993:58). The government also provides guidance and 'physical facilities' to the settlers for up to five years, which includes routine supervision, health guidance and basic services such as inputs for agricultural production, training, development of food crop farming systems, tree crops, animal husbandry, fisheries and cooperative and marketing improvement, all to alleviate poverty and improve the quality of life of the population (IGDA 1997:3 e.g. Cleary and Eaton 1992).

The goal of the Indonesian National Development Program, as defined by the GBHN (legislature adopted every five years by the People's Consultive Assembly, which provides direction for the formulation of each Five-Year Development Plan (IGDA 1997:4), is the *development of human quality and the quality of the community*. The goals of human resource development are part of the goals of national development as stated in Act. No. 10, 1992 on the Enhancement of Population and Development of Prosperous Families (IGDA 1997:4). The goal of this program is to "achieve a better quality of human resources, as users and conservers of the environment, and is to be overseen by a harmonious relation of human being in the environment *to attain sustainable development*" (Act. No. 10, art. 11, par.1:1992 translated in IGDA 1997:4).

Sustaining economic development requires the cooperation of the people and the utilitarian use of the country's natural resources. Cultural difference is equated to the project of human resource development "not only aimed at improving job productivity, but also at enhancing the quality of human being so that he could gain an adequate job and better quality of life", opportunities experienced by 753,648 families by 1997 (IGDA

1997:3-4 e.g. NDIO 1993:58). The goal then, is not only to develop a productive labor force, but also to develop a human being with a set of values that can *secure the sustainability of development*, as defined by the government of Indonesia (IGDA 1997:4). Projects to achieve that goal include children's health development, education and training, and employment (NDIO 1993:58). Increasing the quality of the labor force includes jobs skills training, literacy training, and service industry training (NDIO 1993:58). The stated goal for providing job opportunities emphasizes the need for labor intensive industries, which is encouraged by the creation of jobs in non-formal sectors such as street vendors, hawkers and more (IGDA 1997:4). The impact of government policy can be seen in employment rate changes in agriculture to labor industries since 1971. In 1971 the percentage of the labor force working in the agricultural sector was 64.2 percent of the total while in 1990 that percentage had decreased to 49.9 percent. The additional labor found work in the trade sector, which increased 14.7 percent; service sector, which increased 13.1 percent; and in the manufacturing sector which increased 11.4 percent (IGDA 1997:8; e.g. NDIO 1993:58).

Production and Development Centers

Current economic development plans in Indonesia (its Sixth Five-Year Plan and Second Long Term Development Plan both began April 1, 1994) focus on growth through industrialization: "an adequately high economic growth which is labor-intensive is a prerequisite for poverty alleviation" (IGDA 1997:10). These development goals also translate into many special programs to create jobs and alleviate poverty hand in hand

with the transmigration program, such as the special Presidential Instruction (INPRES - *Instruksi Presiden*) for the poor villages referred to as the Backward Village INPRES (INPRES *Desa Tertinggal*) program, created to improve upon the Integrated Area Development Program (PKT - *Program Kesejahteraan Terpadu*) (IGDA 1997:10). This program was launched during Repelita VI for the 'poor' villages and is designed to intensify a sustained poverty alleviation program to benefit them. Poor villages are those defined as consisting of farm laborers, farmers with very small plots of land, fishermen, fish laborers, *farmers engaged in shifting cultivation*, forest 'squatters', isolated communities, and school drop-outs (IGDA 1997:11).

INPRES provides a one time fund to under-developed communities for the communities to use to improve itself. It is participatory in that it is carried out directly by the people of the villages, with the assistance of the Regional Government. This assistance is supported by the existing Rural Civil Defense Organization (HANSIP - *Ketahanan Sipil*), the Education for Family Prosperity Organization (PKK - *Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*)(IGDA 1997:11). A drawback to the INPRES program is the potential for abuse: if the INPRES funds are distributed to village chiefs and party members they may serve to further marginalize those who do not have the right political leanings or connections.

While the plan recognizes cultural diversity inside of the country, it values that variety only in so far as it adds to the potential for development 'if used properly' (IGDA 1997:8). It recognizes explicitly that "specific environments offer different economic opportunities...the best combination of human potential and economic opportunities

provided by the environment result in improved local economic growth”(IGDA 1997:8). Cultural and ecological diversity is only seen as a potentially rich source of economic growth rather than as unique cultural adaptations to specific environments or locales, valuable in and of themselves.

The Preservation of Nature

Just as the discourse surrounding conceptions of sustainable development has many varying, and at times contradictory, meanings, so also does the discourse that constructs the preservation of nature in Indonesia. Preservation, in Indonesian Borneo, does not seem to mean preserving nature in perpetuity, nor does the state claim this as a definition; it has designated special areas as nature reserves for just that purpose. Rather, the preservation of nature in Indonesia is better understood as making economic use of areas of natural resources, while maintaining the underlying resource structure in order to preserve or regenerate those resources for future use. If understood in this way, it is understandable that the state assigns logging and other concessions to land that it considers otherwise unprofitable. Land assigned to concessions usually falls under the definition of ‘productive forests’, set aside specifically for resource extraction (cf. Cleary and Eaton 1992; Peluso 1994). Provisions under this law include the mandatory re-planting fees paid for by timber concessions and compensation to those with legal title to the land being concessioned (Cleary and Eaton 1992:142). In practice, it has been difficult for the state to collect re-forestation fees from concessions, and it has been extremely difficult for local peoples to prove ownership of the land as they often do not

own actual titles, but have inherited the land from their families or steward the land as a group through traditional *adat* land practices (Cleary and Eaton 1992:142; Sage 1996:101).

A goal of transmigration as discussed earlier is to enable the fuller utilization of citizenry and the nation's natural resources. This discourse views any citizen that is outside of the standard economy as under-utilized (e.g. Sage 1996). The unemployed, criminals, and forest-based hunter-gatherers are lumped together in this definition, including as well those that utilize shifting cultivation (*swidden*), making no differentiation between those who have traditionally practiced *swidden* and those who have adopted this farming method more recently such as immigrants. The term 'shifting cultivation' is used by the state to describe all activities from sustainable *swidden* farming, to the opportunistic activities of pioneer settlers who clear forests to grow cash crops and then abandon the land when soils are exhausted (Potter 1996:63). Shifting cultivation is viewed by the government as a 'waste' of resources, in this case of forest, that could be better used for concessionaire income that will contribute to the country's economy and thereby provide long-term benefits to all (King 1993:171). Hurst (1990) discusses the connection between land rights and development:

The strongest opposition to tribal land rights has come from politicians and businessmen involved in the timber and mining industries. They frequently claim that the forests belong to the nation as a whole, not just those who live in them;...and that development for people in these remote areas can be provided only by exploiting the forests for timber (1990:275).

The state has also attributed to *swiddeners* the massive fires in East Kalimantan in 1982 and 1983 (Cleary and Eaton 1992:137). However, the vast amount of logging that

was done in the fire area is considered to have greatly increased the area and damage of the fire (Cleary and Eaton 1992:137). Logging roads created corridors for the fire to spread, and the large amount of cut trees and shrubs left by loggers provided perfect kindling. The fires of 1982-83 were unusual in their size, not their occurrence. Fires rage yearly in Kalimantan, though they are almost always much smaller in size and scope. In 1994 three separate fires in Kalimantan consumed 80,220 hectares of forest. Combined with seven other fires in Sumatra, Java and Sulawesi, they created enough smoke and dust to require several public health warnings to be issued in Singapore and Malaysia and to shut down airports not only in Kalimantan but also in Kuala Lumpur, on the Malaysian Peninsula (*Tapol Bulletin* December 1994). The government views swidden agriculture as the main cause of these fires, rather than logging, and has declared swidden agriculture illegal, though enforcement is almost impossible in some areas (Cleary and Eaton 1992:137).

What the Indonesian government did not take into account in blaming environmental damage on swidden agriculturists were several factors; that there are two types of swidden cultivators, old and new; that swidden cultivation as practiced by the local indigenous groups such as the Dayaks, is not detrimental to the environment as a whole and that these swidders generally re-use land that has been fallowed (cf. Ave and King 1986: 86; Dove 1988:16). In addition, the amount of primary forest usually cut by swidders is estimated to be less than two percent of land used (Ave and King 1986:86, e.g. Park (1992). The Kalimantan landscape and soil is generally unsuitable for wet-rice farming, though swidden cultivation is both proven and productive for subsistence

purposes (Sage 1996:99). Another overlooked factor is the increasing number of transmigrants who turn to swidden agriculture. Many transmigrants have abandoned their transmigration sites as their soils have given out, and have moved into wider areas of the forest, often primary, to practice swidden agriculture, which they are not as well practiced in as the local indigenes, with deleterious impacts on the soils and forests (Potter 1996:32; Ave and King 1986:95).

An example of the connection between logging and environmental deterioration is the practice of swidden agriculture by non-locals, such as transmigrants, along logging roads in the commercial timber concessions of Kalimantan, discussed by Dove (1988):

After the concessionaire has built an access road and selectively logged off the forest, these swidden farmers follow the road in, clear and burn the remaining forest, and then plant their crops in the ashes. They usually crop the land again during the second, third and sometimes fourth following years, after which the land's plant cover is reduced to a fire-climax stand of *Imperata cylindrica* (*alang alang*), whereupon these farmers then move on up the logging road to a fresh stand of forest and begin the cycle all over again (Dove 1988:16, e.g. Vayda and Sahur 1985).

This increase in non-local swidders has had a deleterious impact on the environment, indigenous peoples, and the sustainability of local economies.

The government's response to this swidden-logging cycle, regardless of who is practicing it, has been to first ban swidden agriculture (1953), the practice of which is then punishable with fines, jail sentences, or both, and to drastically step up enforcement of the ban since the 1982-83 forest fires of East Kalimantan (Dove 1988:128). Secondly, the government has designed schemes to move the swidders into model villagers, near plantations or concessions to provide alternative and more modern wage-earning possibilities. This response, as Dove (1988) explains is "based on the assumption that the

guilty farmers are the *suku suku terasing* (isolated tribes who do not cultivate a permanent plot of land) who originally inhabited the remote interiors of the logging concessions” (1988:16). The state is able to make this assumption because it has not differentiated between the groups who practice swidden agriculture (Potter 1996:32).

The governments’ assumptions regarding the Dayaks and Punan cultures are clouded by a narrow concept of civilization and culture, inherited from its Dutch colonizers, and perpetuated through Western constructs of modernization and economic development. These assumptions further the state discourse of bringing the ‘primitive’, and the ‘backward’ ‘natives’ into the modern world. Few, if any, of the truck swiddeners are local indigenous peoples, most of them being spontaneous or government sponsored transmigrants (Potter 1996:63). Indigenous peoples do continue to practice traditional swidden agriculture in the few areas left over from the concessions, and as the new swiddeners move into the forest, locals continue to be pushed further and further out of their homelands. Many of the newly arrived swiddeners are sponsored by urban entrepreneurs. They are given capital and provided with chain saws, hired laborers, and seed, to open up and plant the ‘truck swiddens,’ and then they are provided with vehicles to transport the harvest to the urban markets (Potter 1996:63; Dove 1988:16).

In short, the direct sponsors of this destruction of the forests are members of the urban elite (and the consumers are the urban population). The indirect sponsors of this destruction are the logging concessionaires, whose contracts with the government typically make them responsible for controlling public access to the concession. In contrast, the forest-bound tribes, who to date have borne all of the blame for this destruction, neither sponsor, participate in, nor benefit from it” (Dove 1988:17).

National Security

Moving populations of the numerically largest and politically dominant ethnic group, the Javanese, as well as Madurese and Balinese, from the center to the scarcely populated margins of Indonesian territory which is inhabited by minority ethnic and cultural groups, is thought by the state to be an effective way of enhancing national security as well as promoting national identity. In addition, moving these peoples from overcrowded Java, Madura, and Bali, effectively 'decants' the population, allowing more room and presumably a better quality of life for those remaining. What is also promoted by the state is the encouragement of regional agricultural development by moving farmers (or those who could learn to farm) accustomed to intensive forms of cultivation, particularly irrigated wet rice agriculture, to areas where extensive methods of farming such as swidden (shifting cultivation) are practiced (Ave and King 1986:93). The purpose of this is two-fold; to bring under-utilized land into greater production; and to encourage the small, swidden, farmers in the settled area to adopt these new farming methods.

Resettlement

The resettlement program called *Resetelmen Penduduk* (RESPEN - Resettlement of Citizens), unlike transmigration, involves the moving of entire communities, rather than just families, within Kalimantan itself. The *translok*, or local transmigration, program was developed to protect sensitive forest and watershed areas and involves the enforced resettlement of former spontaneous migrants and local people to new areas. Sage (1996) notes that in Lampung Province, Sumatra, over 42,000 spontaneous migrant

families and further 22,000 indigenous families have been resettled from designated production forests and critical watershed areas under this program since 1979 (1996:101). Groups that receive particular attention and are targeted as prime candidates for relocation are those called *suku terasing*, meaning the isolated, scattered groups in the interior of Borneo, which are the Punan and some Dayak groups. As in Malaysian Borneo, one of the main goals of government is to overcome certain problems (as perceived by the government) which are posed by native peoples who do not cultivate permanent fields (i.e. the Dayaks *ladang* cultivators), and those who have 'no fixed residence' (i.e. the forest hunters and gatherers like the Punan). Some of the reasons for resettlement are ostensibly humanitarian, others are purely to do with administrative convenience and prejudice. The government claims that the inland groups:

- destroy valuable forests and wildlife by their methods of shifting cultivation and their wandering life style.

- live spread out in distant places which are difficult to access and far from the main centers of population; they remain outside government administration and control.

- must be brought into contact with civilization; this includes education, medical care, a religion, learning to wear (more) clothes, and to farm permanent fields, preferably sawahs. (Ave and King 1986:98; Obidzinski 1993:123)

The financing for these resettlement schemes has come mostly from the taxation of timber companies (Ave and King 1986:98). It is interesting to note that the province that has done the most logging is also the one most active in resettlement: East Kalimantan. The connection between timber and mining interests is best summarized by Laura P. Appell-Warren (1985) who notes:

East Kalimantan is currently being exploited for timber and minerals. As there are plans to expand these operations in the future, the semi-official policy for development, mentioned by local officials, is to free the land for the use of the timber and mineral companies. Thus the resettlement of the indigenous peoples appears to be partially motivated by the promise of economic gain (1985:14, cited in *Borneo Research Bulletin* 1993:124)

In addition, there has been concern for undesirable developments along the border of East Kalimantan and Sarawak-Sabah. Many Dayaks and Punan who occupy these border areas have closely related communities from the same group across the border. Travel across the border is commonplace and the authorities would like to make this border more 'safe' and secure (Ave and King 1986:98).

Qualifying for resettlement (*Resetelmen Penduduk* - population resettlement program) can be as simple as inhabiting an area that has been slated for a development project, such as logging and timber plantations, or living in an area that has been branded 'poor', such as the forest. Those Dayaks who live in areas leased to timber concessionaires automatically are seen in government discourse as not only poor, but as squatters who are in need of relocation to another site, where the government will provide schools to train them in Bahasa Indonesia and the Latin alphabet, health centers, single family houses (long-house settlements are seen as 'primitive'), and new land and inputs for permanent farming. Dove (1988) points out that a significant percentage of the resettlement villages built under this program have simply been abandoned by relocated '*suku terasing*' and that development officials tend to blame this on the 'poor mental attitude' of the resettled Dayaks (1988:18).

If Dayaks and Punan groups are not forced to move due to their land being concessioned or otherwise appropriated, some groups may choose to resettle on their own

accord to have closer access to public facilities located nearer to urban areas (e.g.. Peluso 1994:208). Factors influencing this decision include health care facilities, access to education for their children, and the quality of land available, as well as the chance of obtaining work (cf. Songan 1993:119; Ave and King 1986:100). The choice to resettle or not often comes down to whether or not the group or family loses or receives more than it originally had. All too often they find the cost of moving higher than expected and return to their previous locations, if that is still a possibility. If not, they must stay, move to another site, or migrate to the urban and industrial areas (cf. Ave and King 1986, Dove 1988).

Between the years of 1970 and 1985, about ten thousand, mostly Dayak, families were relocated in East Kalimantan (Ave and King 1986:98). The government currently aims to resettle twenty-thousand families a year (AHRC 13 March 1997). Overall, resettlement throughout Kalimantan has resulted in similar difficulties as those faced by transmigrants. Some settlements have gone well and others have been abject failures. The plan looks feasible and beneficial on paper. The relocated family is offered a house and two hectares of land; the community receives a school, a health clinic, roads, job opportunities, government assistance, and a place of worship. The place of worship, however, is often a *langgar* which is a particularly Islamic place of prayer. This langgar is a constant source of irritation for the resettled Punan and Dayaks who feel that they are being coerced into conversion to Islam (Ave and King 1986:98).

The success of a site often depends on a far-removed bureaucrat unfamiliar with the realities of rural life or the suitability of resettlement sites. Many, including Ave and

King (1986), have pointed out that these civil servants often have a 'missionary zeal' in their attitude toward resettlement of the Dayaks and Punans. The government discourse regarding the latest conflict contains overtones of this paternalistic attitude: the 'backward' Dayaks have been distrustful and have misunderstood the intentions of the Madurese. By fighting with them, the Dayaks are undoing the economic benefits the government has provided for them for their own development, and are undermining the governments efforts to develop Kalimantan for the good of the economy and all involved.

Development officials view resettlement as the optimal solution to a wide variety of different purported problems in the rural areas, involving the welfare of both the rural environment and the rural peoples themselves. Planners often cite the major problem as the destruction of valuable rainforest by indigenous swidden cultivators, also a principal rationale used by the Dutch for many resettlement programs, yet maintaining the integrity of the natural environment is usually not an effect of resettlement (Sage 1996:98; Dove 1988:19).

Far more common is destructive use of the forest by the government itself, following resettlement. While the government usually presents watershed protection or nature conservation as its planned alternative to the extant peasant exploitation, in fact, the actual alternative is often industrial logging...resettlement is usually followed by - and hence is clearly stimulated by as well - the granting of commercial logging concessions..measures to minimize logging impacts on the environment are rarely carried out: destructive extraction techniques are employed, soils are compacted, replanting is not done, and truck farmers are allowed into the concessions(Dove 1988:20).

Indigenous peoples are divided by the Social Affairs Department into groups that have been *dibina*, or guided, by the government and those who have not and are then targeted for guidance. A problem cited by planners is the real state concern for the physical

welfare of the Dayak people, which can only be improved if they are removed from their isolated forest communities to areas where government services are available, usually in semi-rural developed satellite areas. They claim the humanitarian goal of raising the 'backward' natives to a higher, more civilized, cultural level as exemplified by the provincial Social Affairs official for East Kalimantan, Dr. Wiyono, who counts isolated communities in his area who have not yet been reached by his office as numbering around four thousand families. He defines this isolation as being 'backward' socially, culturally, and economically. He views his job as that of modernizing the Punan by rectifying their backwardness, an attitude towards the Punan and Dayak groups shared by many officials and planners (*Suara Pembaruan* 28 May 1996 in *DTE* 30 August 1996). This motive, however humanitarian individually, is difficult to support as a policy for several reasons, one is the very real negative psychological and cultural impact of the scheme on the relocated people themselves (e.g.. Appell 1988).

Clearly, there is more to resettlement than the desire to 'improve' a people.

Motives of the program may well be to increase not the protection but the exploitation of the forest (Dove 1988:19).

If, as they argue, the Dayaks shifting cultivators are destroying the forest, then why are logging companies given free rein to cut down large areas of timber? ...why are the hilltribes lured out of the forest while the timber companies are invited to exploit the timber without a proper ecological control?...who caused the big floods in the Upper Barito and Upper Kahayan river basin in the last two years - the Dayaks hilltribes or the big logging companies (Ave and King 1986:100)?

It could also be asked: Who contributed the most to the great fires of East Kalimantan in 1982, the shifting cultivators or the logging companies? Is it all right to destroy the forest for profit but not to make use of it for subsistence? Why bring in additional

transmigrants, many of whom desert their sites and appropriate indigenous land on which they practice the same, but less sustainable, swidden cultivation that the government and often they themselves are so critical of?

There is certainly ambiguity as to how beneficial resettlement programs are for either the environment or the peoples resettled (e.g. Sage 1996). An implicit motive, other than economic development, of the resettlement programs described by Dove (1988:19) is the very real government view of the Dayak and Punan as a security threat to the state due to their 'wandering' ways and their lack of allegiance to the nation-state, though the reasons for this perspective are not completely clear. Dove (1988:21) outlines the genesis of this viewpoint as beginning during the historic kingdoms of Java, which were unable 'to exercise either political or economic control over people who lived in and from the forest (Dove 1988:21). People uncontrollable by the state included not just forest dwellers but those escaping from government control (criminals, peasants fleeing taxes and others)(cf. Rousseau 1990, Sellato 1994). It is now no longer possible to escape the government in the forests, regardless of how remote the forest. Still, government rhetoric, especially among the military and police, still categorizes forest dwellers as their greatest 'security' problem, as expressed in transmigration law itself.

The Punan and Dayak are consistently viewed by the state as 'communists' or 'primitive communists' or, if those categories are not applicable, then 'people susceptible to communist influence' despite the fact that they are traditionally more politically conservative than their urban counterparts, as well as the Dayak and Punan history of support for the state. (Dove 1988:21). "This point is borne out by recent Indonesian

history: the supporters of the attempted coup against the government in 1965 came largely from the cities and urban areas of Java and Bali. None were tribesmen from the remote, forested areas of the outer islands” (Dove 1988:21). Indeed, it is commonly known that the Punan and Dayaks supported the government during the coup and helped to round up those who supported the coup and fled into the forests (Rousseau 1990:249). It is unclear as to how obvious support of the state is now constituted, ironically, as a communist threat to the state, though if the state finds that its forest dwelling population is a security threat, that is sufficient rational for removing them from those strategic areas to locales more convenient for government supervision.

In the interest of developing the national economy, the indigenous Dayaks and Punans are expected to sacrifice their land in order for it to be mined for coal, gold or tin, drilled for oil reserves and logged for timber. In return, profits and benefits will ‘trickle - down’ back to those on the ground and the population as a whole will benefit through greater socio-economic development of the region and locality. Bringing additional people into Kalimantan through the transmigration programs and engaging indigenes in resettlement schemes are to help bring socio-economic development to the region by improving living standards and providing employment to the migrant. A major function of the transmigration program is to provide labor for mining, timber, energy and plantation concerns, as there is not enough labor in the provinces themselves to supply the concessions (Cleary and Eaton 1992:231). Ironically, once their homelands are developed, the indigenes, such as the Punan and Dayaks groups, are then asked to relocate even closer to urban areas. This is in order to bring them closer to ‘civilizing’

influences as well as to bring them nearer to the administrative jurisdiction of the state. Their homelands become concessions occupied by foreigners while they themselves become immigrants and foreigners into the semi-urban and urban landscapes.

Transmigration and Resettlement Site Failures

Problems inherent in the conceptualization of such programs as transmigration and resettlement are many: the homogenization of living standards for all regardless of cultural differences; the idea that neo-classical economic growth theories are appropriate for all regions considered under-developed; attempting to distribute populations equally on varied landscapes that demand diverse population densities (using only the factor of population density to determine the 'correct' capacity the land has for people is untenable - it is necessary to also take into consideration the potential of the land itself. Soils in Java and Kalimantan differ considerably in fertility and cannot be equated); that equitable distribution of development is interpreted as modernization and equal economic and cultural standards, based on the Javanese model; a lack of defining what fuller utilization of both human and natural resources means on the ground, in practice; that national unity rests on assimilation into defined Javanese norms; and that national defense and security is best served by moving farmers from other, crowded, islands to problematic 'empty' border regions, while those occupying those border regions are moved to landscapes remote from their homelands and completely foreign to their own cultures.

A number of transmigration projects have failed for one or more of the above reasons, though many have had some degree of success (e.g. Peluso 1994; Sage 1996).

Failures include the wholesale abandonment of a government assigned site and the returning home or migrating to urban areas of the settlers, and successes include sites that have been able to last for more than two years, grow enough basic staple crops such as rice to subsist upon, and experience reasonable mortality rates. Ave and King (1986) report that a part of the large Rasau Jaya transmigration project in the delta region of the Kapuas river 35 km south of Pontianak lost all of its settlers when they decided to abandon the project. The principal reason for this was the absolute unsuitability of the land for farming. In addition, the (Javanese) settlers who had been able to grow crops complained of the lack of opportunities to market them. The covered market in the town of Sintang, which had been specially built by the state to sell the anticipated supply of vegetables from the new areas, was frequently oversupplied which seriously impacted the sellers' profit margins and decreased farmers incentives to continue growing such crops (1986:93).

Ave and King (1986) highlight other problems built into the transmigration scheme. Problems begin with the selection process in Java. Not only farmers but also the homeless, beggars (*gepeng* or *gelandangan pengemis*), and prostitutes (WTS or *wanita tuna susila*) are chosen for candidacy. They are given a short period of instruction to prepare them for their more 'virtuous' calling and then transported (Ave and King 1986:94). This in effect simply transfers the problems of urban Java to the outer islands, without solving them. It is not a surprise that those sent to farm the poor soils of Kalimantan give up at the least sign of difficulty and migrate to the urban areas of Pontianak to revert back to their previous lifestyles. Ave and King (1986) report that it is

not uncommon to see vagrant women and children in urban areas such as Pontianak (Ave and King 1986:94).

In describing the aforementioned problem of a lack of markets in which to sell their crops, Ave and King (1986) also describe the interaction of the farmers with the Dayaks close by:

In one Desa Dayaks village near Sintang, a group of Javanese migrants in the neighborhood would visit the Desa headman to seek out from him information about the villages in the district which required laborers. These migrants turned their hand to any kind of work - house construction and repair, farming, cleaning and laying out and mending pathways. In this way they could get money to buy clothes, kerosene, household utensils and so on (1986:95).

Since the time (1986) Ave and King described this interaction, it is probable that the migrants established a labor niche in the growing economy that no longer depended on information from their Dayak neighbors (e.g. Sage 1996). As they established reputations for themselves as day workers and created rapport with their supervisors, they would presumably be called back for work and gradually take on all odd jobs that the Dayaks may have also depended on for quick cash, causing gradual resentment among the Dayaks to grow as they lost job opportunities to the migrants and as the migrants ceased asking for their permission or help. Many of the 'stranded' transmigrants from this area have become workers on the large oil-palm enterprise, Dami Sanggau, further displacing local Dayaks populations (Ave and King 1986:95).

Other problems mentioned by Ave and King (1986) are problems with the transmigration and resettlement infrastructure often being substandard to what migrants believe was promised by the state; difficulties in adjustment to the new climate and soil conditions by the settlers; and once adjusted, the new settler communities often form

socially, culturally and administratively separate communities from the indigenous local populations, interacting only in the market place or when the new migrants seek out the Dayaks for advice or favors (e.g., Sage 1996). These problems are reminiscent of Dutch experiences in this area: "Even the best and most conscientious farmer can do little with the poor, acidic peat-soils which are found in Rasau Jaya" (Ave and King 1986:94). This is directly a result of the fact that although there is plenty of 'empty' space in West Kalimantan, and Kalimantan in general, it does not have suitable soils for intensive agriculture by Javanese or others, regardless of the amount or sophistication of inputs (Sage 1996:98). The government has recognized that the soil is not as suitable as hoped for in many sites for wet rice farming, and is advocating timber plantations to fuel the pulp and paper industries for some of these areas. Transmigrants are then given jobs on the plantations, filling the labor requirements of the area. An example of such a project was started in early 1995 in West Kalimantan by a company called PT Nityasa Idola on 120 hectares of land in the Sambas district (an area of recent conflict) claimed by Dayak families in Belimbang Village. The government appointed village head signed over the land without consulting with the traditional leader or other villagers. Ten villagers received Rp. 500,000 (US \$250). Soon after, the villagers were told that they could no longer work on their fields as the land had been bought by PT Nityasa Idola and those who complained were threatened with being sent to jail by the government appointed leader. The villagers attempted to resolve their dispute within official channels but failed and subsequently in November of 1995 burned down the company's seedling camp (*DTE* 28 February 1996).

In other areas, the government has not given up on wet-rice farming. Areas it considers suitable include peat and swamp forests (Abdoellah 1996:266). *DTE* (11 January 1997) records that the *Jakarta Post* reported on 30 August 1996 that billions of rupeah are currently being spent by the state on converting swamp forests into a million-hectare rice fields project, though scientific studies of the area, as well as local opinion of the indigenes, are not as enthusiastic about the site potential for this usage. Abdoellah (1996) explains that the mangrove and coastal peat swamp forests in Kalimantan represent a substantially different ecotype from the extensive fertile soil in Java. The soil fertility is low and soils are unsuitable for rice cultivation without very expensive reclamation and waterworks construction. In addition, these swamps are usually inaccessible areas with fragile ecosystems making the area a poor choice for land development by transmigrants (1996:267). The government has, however, continued with this project despite the lack of international funding or approval. It continues to replace the million hectares of rice land lost in Java with a million hectares in Kalimantan in order to quell fears of food self-sufficiency throughout the country and to stave off criticism that the Suharto regime may not be doing its best to ensure food security for its people (*DTE* 30 August 1996). This project expects to hire many transmigrants as well as locals to work in the fields once the project is established.

The government of Indonesia has recognized that it is necessary to make some changes to the transmigration policies (Sage 1996:121). In the Pontianak paper *Akcaya* (5 March 1985 cited in Ave and King 1986) it was reported that "an agreement has been worked out to establish co-operative projects whereby the sites would be transformed into

'industrial zones'. Small-scale industries, in particular, would be encouraged" (Ave and King 1986:96). This was in part in recognition that many transmigrants had left their sites for comprehensive reasons. However, changing agricultural sites to technological-agricultural sites does not solve the ecological or cultural problems involved in shifting large populations to sparsely populated areas (Sage 1996:119). In addition, land that is turned to 'industrial' zones in Kalimantan only means that land elsewhere must become further sites for transmigration to provide labor in the provinces and to meet the continuing goal of self-sufficiency in rice. These changes mostly affect the transmigrants economic opportunities and do not address any other political, social, or ecological factors problematic in the scheme.

Also created to solve dilemmas in the basic transmigration scheme is the Nucleus Estate and Smallholder Scheme Project (PIR - *Perkebunan Inti dan Rakyat*) open to both locals and migrants, which very much resembles the Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA) in Malaysia (e.g. Cleary and Eaton 1992:239). Participants receive up to four hectares of land; two for rubber or other cash crops; one for his own use; and the rest for a house and garden. Transmigrants have been very positive about this project, but the Dayaks have been reserved. The rubber, or other cash crop, grown takes up to eight years to mature for production and during this time the small holder is financed by the government. When the crops come into production, the profits go to repaying loans of up to four million rupiahs at four and one half percent interest (Ave and King 1986:96). For the immigrants, it means a chance to earn a profit above what he might make as a rice farmer. For the Dayaks, the scheme often represents

a loss of freedom that he enjoys as a shifting cultivator with the added responsibility of worrying over what rights their children will have to the land. Dayaks believe that it is too difficult to pay back the government loans with the unstable profits from the cash crops and in addition, the Dayak becomes a mere laborer for cash whereas before he enjoyed a degree of economic independence (Ave and King 1986:96). These factors help to explain the luke-warm reception that the PIR scheme has received from local Dayak communities (Abdoellah 1996:273).

Through the discourses of productivity, utility, patriotism and modernity, the government views both Punan hunter-gatherers and Dayak settled swidden agriculturists as the same; primitive, uncivilized, and under-productive. This homocentric essentializing of the deep cultural, social, political and economic differences between these two groups to general categories allows the development of their landscape to be presented as a reasonable proposition for community and state development that will benefit all. The inherent contradiction of building community and enhancing all citizens quality of life is subsumed by the overriding goal of national, sustainable economic development, where sustainability is defined by growth.

This contradiction, and essentializing of indigenous culture is at the heart of the conflicts and riots that occurred Kalimantan in 1997.

Causes of Conflict

Forms of domination that bear a resemblance to one another are institutionalized means of extracting labor, goods, and services from a subject population. They embody formal assumptions about superiority and inferiority, often in elaborate ideological form, ... status in these systems of domination is ascribed by birth,

mobility is virtually nil, and subordinate groups are granted few if any political or civil rights....they also contain a strong element of personal rule...thus these forms of domination are infused by an element of personal terror that may take the form of arbitrary beatings, sexual violations, and other insults and humiliations...whether or not they occur to any particular subordinate, the ever-present knowledge that they might seem to color the relationship as a whole (Scott 1990:21).

The transmigration and resettlement schemes inherently privilege transmigrants over the local indigenous peoples. Locally, indigenous Dayak and Punan groups lose traditional access to their land because they do not officially own titles to the land in the first general instance, and in the second they lose specific opportunities for wage earning to the Madurese transmigrants who have appropriated that economic niche which was beforehand one of the very few open to the indigenes. The lack of titling to common lands and the state's claim to all lands that are not titled has created a situation whereby indigenous lands are often appropriated and titles to it given to transmigrants or concessionaires. That the state has privileged the transmigrants rights on an ideological basis becomes obvious throughout time, as seen by the Dayaks, as the transmigrants are perceived to be treated with greater favor from the state, both administratively and legally. They are seen to be given land appropriated from the indigenes, given work, sometimes previously done by indigenes, and finally they are perceived as barely or not at all suffering punishment when committing crimes that could lead to severe punishment for a Dayak.

The Madurese are not blind to these privileges, but must be assumed to have adapted accordingly through assimilation into the local and regional economic and social cultures (e.g. Abdoellah 1996:274). Though the Madurese had long known they were not

particularly welcomed by the Dayaks, they had been grudgingly accepted. The Madurese can be assumed to function with an unarticulated pressure towards economic production for the state in order to maintain their privileged position vis a vis the local Dayak population. The Madurese are influenced by the governing Javanese and their home cultural and state view that the Dayaks are 'primitive' and somehow 'less than human' and so in turn treat the Dayaks in just that way, whether consciously or subconsciously.

The Dayak realizes that he has lost his means of livelihood to the state and this loss is imaginatively and physically embodied by the Madurese transmigrants. That the Madurese do not respect the Dayak culture is to the Dayaks borne out by the previously mentioned fact that the Madurese often carry knives into Dayaks houses, directly contravening local *adat* and Dayaks culture. It could be compared to a non-Muslim person turning the arrow that points toward Mecca found in every Muslim house towards Los Angeles or the Vatican. This disrespect is as much at the heart of conflict as is the economic marginalization of the local indigenous populations in areas of development.

To the Dayaks, the Madurese represent state appropriation and are viewed as usurpers; they take Dayak land, profits, day-work, jobs, and denigrate local culture (e.g., Abdoellah 1996:276). One of the original sparks that lit the recent upheaval was the alleged rape of a Dayak woman by a Madurese youth. The Madurese man was not arrested or punished, and the Dayaks have stated that they felt slighted and their complaints trivialized by both the Madurese and the Government. They took it on themselves to remedy the situation and regain their own dignity, by applying their own traditional *adat* to the situation where an insult against one Dayak is an insult against the

entire group (Rousseau 1990:196). Taking justice into their own hands, as it were, is seen by the Dayaks as better than having no 'law' applied at all. Experiencing state abnegation of its responsibility towards them, the Dayak were left with no reason not to act in their own best interests and attempt to purge the Madurese 'guests' from their homeland.

The state's refusal to take satisfactory action against the Maduran man may have signaled to the Madurese that they had achieved greater favor with the state in relation to the Dayak population. To the Dayak population it signaled an abrogation of responsibility by the state to all of its citizens. Since the ideology of the state's public transcript of fairness and responsibility had in practice become seen as discriminatory and biased toward the Madurese, it could very well be that the Dayaks, for issues of dignity, had been left with no other option but to make public their own discourses as related within the group's private transcript. In prosecuting the Maduran man themselves according to the traditional Dayak judicial system (Rousseau 1990:196) they also make public their feelings of state abnegation of responsibility towards them as citizens.

In viewing their actions this way, they are also specifically pointing a proverbial finger at the Indonesian state for not intervening and protecting Dayak rights as well as it does slightly lesser marginalized citizens such as the Madurese. Inherent in this view is also the Dayak community pointing to the Indonesian state's public transcript of benign sovereignty and putting the lie to it. Here it becomes important for the state to get involved to restore its public transcript and maintain power, which it did by sending in over three thousand army troops trained for urban riots from Java to restore order to the area.

The Madurese have been given an unspoken seat of power by the state vis a vis the Dayaks and exercise this power, with apparent impunity as viewed by the Dayaks: the state turns a blind eye to Madurese abuse of local culture and the Dayaks are in no position to contravene. This system of domination, as described by Scott (1990) produces its own peculiar routine of insults and injury to Dayaks human dignity: the appropriation of land and labor; public humiliations, rapes, contempt, ritual denigration, and so on. Worst is the abuse of loved ones and not being able to come to their aid in any way, as may have been the case in the alleged rape of the Dayak woman. The power relations imposed by the state on the Dayak and Madurese populations demands 'conformity in the face of domination and is a question of suppressing a violent rage in the interest of oneself and loved ones' (Scott 1990:37). Within the discourse of citizenship rights and responsibilities, the Dayaks must appeal to the local state governing body for redress, which if not given often results in anger, frustration and humiliation for the Dayak(s).

This system of power relations that abrogates human dignity and integrity and which adds insult to injury must at some point break: at some point those abused most have nothing to lose and so break the social contract of power and insist on recognition - the hidden transcript becomes quite public, usually quite dramatically (Scott 1990). The Dayak is put into an existential dilemma, illustrated by reference to Hegel's analysis of the duelist (Scott 1990:21). A challenge is put out to the perpetrator of an injustice - a fight to the death for honor. Regardless of the outcome, honor is restored and the challenger is vindicated.

The physical and psychological domination of the Dayak by the state, symbolized and enforced by the Madurese comes to the fore in a conflict such as in West Kalimantan. The Dayak insist on real and symbolic equality by going public with the hidden transcript of the group. In burning down houses, killing Madurese, and demanding their expulsion the Dayak people give themselves the satisfaction of action. They are empowering themselves by participating in their own fate and making their demands and desires known which will empower all Dayaks, whether they participated or not in the crisis.

That this outburst has been effective can be seen in some remarks made to journalists by some who did not participate in the riots, both young and old Dayaks. They voice the desire for fair treatment by the government, beginning with expulsion by the Madurese. The young Dayaks are even more insistent that all Madurese are expelled, and they append the threat of more future violence to their statements (*DTE* 19 March 1997). Where before the riots those sorts of statements would be given no attention, seen as a simple act of wishing out loud, the violence of the last few months demands that those voices are taken seriously; it is not so much wishing out loud as verbalizing of the fact that as long as the situation is not changed, violence has become the only alternative, and an acceptable, way of achieving the Dayak demands. This is justified by the state's previous unfair treatment of the Dayaks who have simply taken the law which discriminated against them into their own hands. Though many may die in the violence, as a group they have been empowered and legitimated.

An end to this conflict may not signal an end to further violence in the future. Dayaks have demanded an end to cultural, economic, and environmental marginalization.

Until development responds to the Dayak needs in a way that is viewed as participatory and satisfactory for those affected the most, the indigenous Dayak and Punan, further outbreaks of violence are perhaps inevitable. The Dayak physically reject, as a last resort, domination expressed in a new weltanschauung; a hierarchical social order imposed on them from above by the state, ideologically and substantively, using the rhetoric of nationalism and loyalty to a state in which they are not allowed full rights and participatory citizenship in practice because of localized prejudice and constructions of them as 'Other' and somewhat 'less civilized' until they develop and modernize like the exemplified Madurese and Javanese citizens.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The nation-state as we know it today is a fairly modern construct, created only in the last 150 years in Europe and exported around the world. How the Indonesian nation-state has been invented and presented is explored in this thesis, as well as how Indonesia as a post-colonial nation-state has come to believe its own cultural fictions. Its imaginative identity has been constructed as concrete reality and presented to its citizens as the only authentic identity in the name of nationalism. This construct is now threatened by new production regimes in Kalimantan and the contested social terrains that these regimes have created.

Post-colonial nation-states share an assertion of uniqueness and, by definition, Otherness. This creates a dichotomy which implies a defining norm appropriated from their colonizers. With independence, Indonesia has adopted the gaze of its colonizers and defines itself by this vision. The nation-state functions as a producer of narratives and reproduces this seduction in its own narrative. Indonesia seduces the international community using that communities own construction of legitimacy to gain legitimacy for itself while confessing its 'Otherness' to it. The act of confession to 'Otherness' and underdevelopment allows for assimilation, without risk of censure, into the international community of legitimate nations.

This narrative has enabled Jakarta to present the problem of its 'natives' as a classic Third World issue of under-development. It allows the construction of the solution to be one of production rather than class, gender or race. Having confessed its 'problems' and needs to the international community, Indonesia avoids international censure while continuing its project of colonizing Kalimantan through development practices. It has become a 'core' to its own 'periphery' as seen by the very real flow of profit and resources out of Kalimantan.

Since colonial times, Indonesian indigenous communities and government forest departments have struggled for the control of forest resources. As global demand for non-timber forest products has become increasingly important to the export economy of Indonesia, it has increased its economic development of both Kalimantan and the indigenous peoples who live there. The political ecology of development allows for seeing economic life as a realm of representations where the manufacture of symbolic and material resistance to development by indigenous peoples is a struggle to maintain a dynamic identity. Appropriation of the accoutrements of 'civilization' in no way implies that the Punan in question have adopted the national identity of 'Indonesianess', rather it implies that the Punan have adapted their public identity to outside pressures and are engaged in developing representational tools for resisting further encroachments on their own cultural identity and territory. How the development narratives of the nation-state and its marginalized peoples within it differ opens a theoretical viewpoint in which the identity of territory can be deconstructed and understood.

Political ecology and the deconstruction of state discourses can demonstrate the necessity of looking at the different discourses involved in the economic and cultural development occurring within the landscapes, urban, semi-urban and forested, as well as economic, cultural and environmental, of Kalimantan. The discourses of the Indonesian government and the indigenous peoples regarding the definitions of cultural and economic development are a defining reason for the current lack of mutual understanding. Looking at the Bornean landscapes' locales, politics and economics allows for a deconstruction of the current political economy of rattan management as an example of NTFPs and also allows for an understanding of why development is taking place as it is today in Indonesian Borneo. The struggle over NTFPs in Indonesian Borneo is inherently a cultural struggle over the material and symbolic landscape and the identities that are part of this landscape. The new production regime related to NTFPs and forest access rights in Indonesian Borneo has converted rural Bornean society into a contested social terrain; the primary struggle over the harvesting and control of NTFPs is more accurately a struggle over the ownership and control of the land and the production processes therein. By viewing political and economic processes as a realm of various representations it can be seen that the struggles over meaning and the manufacture of symbolic and material dissent among the Dayak and Punan are manifestations of production politics and the struggle to maintain an identity that has always been dynamic.

Examination of the construct of identity within indigenous society, focusing specifically on the Punan, reveals how marginalized indigenous societies are engaged in a dialectical struggle between acceptance and resistance, coercion and consent, active and

passive responses to change brought about by new state forest politics. Development and modernization projects have introduced new work and social conditions and therefore politics of production for indigenous producers of NTFPs. This has created a contested social terrain in which the representation of identity plays a large part in enacting the script provided by the narration of national and state identity. The spaces opened up by conflicts in the land ownership and the production system offer the possibility of significant advance and social change based on mutual acceptance and respect for cultural differences while enabling all actors to maintain their own unique identities.

APPENDIX A

POTENTIAL OF RATTAN PLANTATIONS

The rattan species that have met with some success in medium-scale plantation cultivation include *Calamus caesius*, *C. manan* and *C. trachycoleus* (Dransfield 1988). Two rattan species, *C. exilis* and *C. zollingeri*, are thought to possess characteristics well-suited to managed harvesting (Siebert 1995). *C. zollingeri* is one of the more important canes used in the rattan furniture industry because it forms large diameter clusters and so is thicker than many other types of rattan canes. In a study done in the Kerinci-Seblat National Park in Sumatra, and in Dumoga-Bone National Park in Sulawesi, it was shown that if harvesting of this rattan is done in a sustainable manner by knowledgeable collectors, the average value per hectare of cane was \$15 for *C. exilis* and \$200 - \$333 per hectare for *C. zollingeri*. Many of the rattan collectors in these areas come from other areas of Sumatra and Sulawesi in search of better income opportunities. The illegal collection of rattan in the national forests provides enough of an income for these migrants to make trespass and illegal collecting worthwhile. In Siefert's (1995) study a cultivation trial of *C. exilis* was done in which two months after transplanting seedlings, all transplants appeared vigorous and healthy. Thirty months after planting, a 100 percent mortality rate was recorded. Several factors that may account for the mortality rate are lower soil organic matter levels, higher light intensities and greater weed populations in

farms than in forests (Siebert 1995). Because of the difficulty in farming rattan, sustainable collection of wild rattan by knowledgeable locals who have traditionally harvested in the wild must be included in government considerations of industry planning.

Godoy and Feaw (1989) have shown that small-holder cultivation of rattan can be profitable. Farmers in Dadahup in the Pasir district of East Kalimantan rely on rattan because it is more profitable than competing occupations or crops per unit of labor or per unit of area. Rattan is about eight times more profitable than the next most lucrative crop, rice, called *padi*, and about 15 times more profitable than poor stands of rubber in their study area. Its superior profitability holds despite the recent export ban on raw rattan. They conclude that rattan is also more profitable than a number of competing occupations when measured in returns per unit of labor. Employment in rattan harvesting and processing yields higher daily wages than other occupations. They also acknowledge that many rattan-processing activities are carried out by women, children and the aged at home late into the night, though they do not take into account the economic benefits to the family or village of this activity which would increase the profitability ratios even more. Their study supports the view that rattan cultivation increases net rural income and creates a positive present value to the country of Indonesia (Godoy and Feaw 1989:359).

APPENDIX B

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF EAST KALIMANTAN

East Kalimantan is bordered to the north and northwest by the Malaysian provinces of Sabah and Sarawak, while to the south and southwest lie the other Indonesian provinces of South, Central and West Kalimantan. The mountain range along the Malaysian-East Kalimantan border forms the province's major watershed and the headwaters of the Mahakam and Kayan river systems. These rivers and their tributaries are the major transport arteries and most of the inhabitants lie along their banks. The interior is inhabited by tribal groups such as the Kenyah Dayaks who are mostly swidden agriculturists. The river trade is dominated by Muslim groups including the Bugis and Banjars, while Indonesian Chinese dominate the coastal, inter-island and international trade (Peluso 1991:8). Administratively the province is divided into two municipalities and four districts. (Peluso 1991:8).

ENDNOTES

¹ The term exonym is used by Rousseau (1990) to describe a name applied to a group by non-members, that was not originally used by the group themselves.

² Sellato gives the example of the Punan Kohi of the Langasa: "the farmer chiefs may go too far with their manipulations and demands, and the Punan, after having grumblingly borne a great deal may finally feel they have had enough...when the Uma' Suling of the Meraseh (a Kayan group) imposed upon them an excessive burden of corvee labor, left the region overnight. Other nomads elsewhere deserted their hamlets under the pressure of obligations placed on them by the colonial government, in particular the duty of sending their children to school or of paying door tax" (1994:170).

³ It is noted, though, that it is absolutely true that Dutch colonialism had much itself to do with the creation of the nation state of Indonesia. This, however, does not answer the 'why' question.

⁴ Many other factors can be inferred by examining the differences in the nation building process in Europe and throughout its former colonies, but that is outside the scope of this paper.

⁵ The mandate of the assembly was to draft a new and definitive constitution which would guarantee domestic freedom for every Indonesian citizen. The Assembly was composed of 544 members and it sat continuously from 10 November, 1956 till 2 June, 1959. The general election for the Constituent Assembly was held in 1955 by which time Indonesia's external freedom was established and the recognition of her sovereignty was secure. The election was held pursuant to the vice-president decree of 1945 which limited the President's powers and gave the Parliament co-legislative powers (Nasution 1994:44).

⁶ Pancasila represents one language, one people, one government, one god and one nation. Multiple religions, languages and ideologies are seriously discouraged as they fragment nationalist unity.

⁷ According to a U.S. Department of State report released in March of 1995, at least 300 persons, convicted of subversion, are currently serving sentences. Hundreds more are believed to be in jail, convicted under the Hate-Sowing or Sedition laws. The Anti-subversion law makes it a crime to engage in acts that could distort, undermine, or deviate from the state ideology or broad outlines of state policy, or which could disseminate feelings of hostility or arouse hostility, disturbances, or anxiety among the

population. Punishment can include imprisonment for life and death sentences. Statistics on how many people are currently imprisoned for subversion are not made available by the Indonesian government.

⁸ *De jure* recognition was granted by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. *De facto* recognition, as provided for under the March 1947 Linggajati Agreement between the Hague and Yogyakarta, was extended by Australia, Britain, the Republic of China, India, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines and the USA (Scholte 1994:219).

⁹ The process of nation-state construction and the international narrative surrounding it is discussed in detail in another paper entitled "Nations and Narratives" by this author.

¹⁰ The general bias against fallows by the government is reinforced by semantics, culture and economists and agriculturists training. In Indonesia the word for fallows is *tanah kosong*, which translates as 'empty, unoccupied, unused' land. It does not acknowledge that it is in the process of generating life or regenerating its own life. Agriculturists training, based loosely on German forestry practices, tends to emphasize uniform stands of annual or perennial cash crops and to a lesser degree, plantation forestry. Many development specialists, policy makers and rural development planners are basically unfamiliar with the importance of extractive products to household, local and regional economies, as well as with the kinds of ecosystems from whence they come (Hecht 1989). The price for this emphasis on Green Revolution thinking is often paid for at the expense of the indigenous populations who are rarely asked for their input in development plans for their area. Their expertise is unrecognized, and when it is taken into account it is usually by ethnographers rather than development specialists. Indigenous have, however, recognized this bias on the part of government planners and developers. In the past, indigenous groups have let land lie fallow for future use without giving up their *adat* claims to it. Because the Indonesian government only recognizes land that is being 'used' as being owned or possessed, land and hunting territories are now being claimed by villagers by planting crops everywhere, although they recognize that the fertility of the soil may well be exhausted quickly by these practices, it serves their purposes for the short-term.

¹¹ Reasons given by the government for resettling these inland groups include: -they destroy valuable forests and wildlife as they practice swidden (if this is so, why are logging companies given free rein to cut down large areas of forest?), and also their wandering life-style, -they live spread out in distant places which are difficult to access and far from the main centers of population; they remain outside government administration and control, - they must be brought into contact with civilization; this includes education, medical care, a religion, learning to wear (more) clothes and to farm permanent fields, preferably sawahs (Ave & King 1986:98).

¹² Johnson classifies palms into three categories. One, improved cultivated palms such as *Cocos nucifera* and *Elaeis guineensis*. Two, unimproved cultivated palms which includes rattan such as *Calamus caesius*, *C. trachycoleus* and others, and three, semi-wild and wild palms which includes *Calamus exilis*, *C. inops*, *C. manan* and more. An estimated 477 species of native palms occur in Indonesia. About 105 are utilized to some degree, ranging from providing emergency food in local areas to supporting industries such as those associated with rattan furniture.

¹³ Hoffman notes that the trade of NTFPs was the major, if not only, source of income for settled Dayak groups (Hoffman 1988:103; e.g. Heine Eldern 1945:147). Goods obtained from the Punan via the Dayak included forest products such as aloes wood for incense, edible birds nests, bezoir stones for pharmaceutical purposes, Bornean rhinoceros horns, resins, rattan for furniture, gutta-perchas for waterproof caulking, camphor, beeswax and the illipe nut for cooking oil (Hoffman 1988:107).

¹⁴ The power of the Forest Service to enforce its policies should not be underestimated. In the late 1940s, the Forest Service labeled as squatters local peoples who had been living in the forest for the last decade. The people refused to leave and the foresters in some areas shot the local peoples, destroyed their homes and plowed up their crops. Today, conflicts between the two groups are aggravated by projects such as the Transmigration scheme (Peluso 1994:101).

¹⁵ Since the 1970s, foreign corporations have been required by law to form partnerships with Indonesian firms if they want to do business in Indonesia (Peluso 1994).

¹⁶ Indonesia banned the export of raw logs in 1980, when revenues exceed 2 billion U.S dollars (Hurst 1990:3). During the timber boom of 1970s, the industry was characterized by large MNCs partnering with local firms to export logs. The emphasis is now on the export of plywood, with foreign joint ventures accounting for only 16 percent of production (Hurst 1990:3).

¹⁷ Forest destruction has primary and secondary causes; the primary causes are clear-cutting for timber and for the creation of transmigration sites. Timber is a major contributor for the Indonesian government in providing much needed foreign export earnings, used to repay international debts accrued primarily through development aid. Secondary causes include, but are not limited to, general agricultural expansion due to a large population growth, spontaneous transmigration, multi-national corporation economic interests and the governments goals of development.

¹⁸ One such conservative study by Park (1992:142) suggests that rainforest products are actually worth 90 percent of the total market value of the Timber value per hectare was about \$1,000 while NTFPs sustainable revenue was about \$700 per annum. These values were based on a study of a tropical forest in Peru, though it is safe to assume that these

figures would be approximately the same or more proportionately for the Bornean rainforests (Panayotou and Ashton 1992:72).

¹⁹ Freeport-McMoroan is based in New Orleans, Louisiana and has mining operations in many countries, one of their most notorious being in Irian Jaya, Indonesia, where they mine what is commonly called the worlds largest gold mine. Another MNC of interest is Weyerhaeuser, which is based in the Pacific Northwest. They also have operations throughout Indonesia, including Kalimantan. An example of a Canadian multinational is Bre-X Corporation, who in the early months of 1997 had claimed to find the largest gold mine in the world in Busang, East Kalimantan, Indonesia.

²⁰ James Scott defines the public transcript as that discourse made public by the actors involved. An example are common everyday niceties, greetings, etc. that are known and practiced by the actors. It includes printed matter that is disseminated to the community, such as newspapers, and telecommunications as well. The hidden transcript is one of opinion and knowledge that each separate group knows, but is not 'common' knowledge in general. An example of the hidden transcript are the slaves who talk their 'real' opinion about their masters, yet do not do this around anyone who may expose this transcript to the masters. The acquiesce of a slave in public is a role of the public transcript, while talk of killing the master belongs in the realm of the private transcript.

²¹ Mackie explains that "for all the talk we have heard since the early years of the New Order about the close connections between wealthy Chinese *cukong* (business identities) and powerful Indonesian generals, there is little evidence that any of them have been able to carry much weight in the general decision making processes that determine the broader outlines of national economic or social policy formation (e.g. exchange rate policies, budgetary allocations, industrial priorities, etc.): at most they can exert some influence over particularistic decisions about the allocation of contracts, licenses, credits and so on" (Mackie 1990:83). That so much economic power is attributed to the ethnic Chinese may be because of the Salim group, the leader of which is ethnically Chinese and one of the wealthiest businessmen in Indonesia and Southeast Asia as well as being a close associate of President Suharto's.

²² MacIntyre explains that state suspicion of the ethnic Chinese Indonesians dates back to Independence: "One of the reasons control of the confiscated Dutch assets was not transferred to the private sector was that local entrepreneurs were predominantly Chinese rather than indigenous, or *pribumi*, Indonesians. In view of the widespread popular resentment towards the Chinese minority, it was politically inconceivable that they would be granted such windfall benefits" (MacIntyre 1992:140).

²³ The public relations officer of PT Sumatra Timor Indonesia, a construction subsidiary of the Sambu Group which is developing the peat forests of Central Kalimantan (e.g. *DTE* 30 August 1996) explains with regard to traditionally owned *adat* land appropriated

by the State for development projects that first, it is not the company's responsibility to deal with such matters as this has to be sorted out by the local government. He further explains "There is already a high level of understanding of the importance of the project so that they release their land without compensation" (*Kompas*, 20 June 1996 reported in *DTE* 30 August 1996).

²⁴ Technically, the Dayak and Punan are accorded full citizenship rights within Indonesia according to its constitution. In practice, however, it is very difficult for those peoples to assert those rights due to various state constructs of 'Indonesian-ness'. For example, although the Indigenes have full voting rights, they often do not hear of an election due to their remoteness from capital centers, and when they do it is difficult for them to travel to a central area to cast a ballot which they may often not be able to read due to its being in Indonesian, the official language, but which a full twenty one to forty percent of the inhabitants of West Kalimantan are illiterate in (Cleary and Eaton 1992:160). This figure rises considerably for indigenes when the urban and semi-urban areas and the interior, forested areas are separated. In addition, the Indigenes, though they have full rights to legal recourse within the state are often abrogated and not taken seriously by law officials, who are often from Java, in practice.

²⁵ Emphasis mine unless otherwise noted.

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