THROUGH AN EXPERIMENTAL LENS: ANALYZING THE POLISH REVOLUTION OF 1989 WITH THE SCRIPTING METHOD OF THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REVOLUTIONS

by

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In this thesis project, the primary focus is the Polish Revolution of 1989. Through the exploration of this event, it is possible to gain a greater understanding not only of the event itself, but of the nature of revolution, more generally, and the utility of nonviolence as a tool for political change. To conduct this study, I am observing this event through an experimental lens of comparative revolutionary history called "scripting," which is discussed and developed in the book edited by Stanford University Professors Keith Baker and Dan Edelstein titled *Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions*.[1] Within this framework, I divide this piece into three sections, each with the intention of trying to understand the implications of what happened in Poland in 1989. In the first section, following the introduction, I define revolution in general terms and then recount the history of the Polish Revolution with the intent of determining whether the event was revolutionary or not, where I find that it could be understood as a self-limiting revolution, as suggested by Jadwiga Staniszkis, which connects quite well with the idea of the "script." In the second section, I paint the picture of Professor Edelstein and Baker's concept of "scripting" through defining the framework itself,

[1] Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein, *Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015).

as well as lining out why it might be more useful than other means of comparison within the study of revolutions, which is then followed by examples of the application of the scripting method provided by the supporting authors of *Scripting Revolution* in the Russian and Egyptian Revolutions. From there, I then flip the script onto the Polish Revolution where I find that the Solidarity Trade-Union-turned-Political-Party operated within the script that was created by the Polish Dissidents of the Workers' Defense Committee that struggled against the Polish United Workers' Party in the decade before the Polish Revolution. In the final section of this project, I take to the task of determining whether or not certain means of conducting revolution are, objectively, more successful than another, through comparing the intentions laid out by the scripts and the leaders that instituted them in each revolution observed in this project to the observed outcomes of the revolutionary events. In doing so, I find examples of both nonviolent and violent revolution having instances where they can be seen as less successful due to a failure to achieve the desired outcomes, while the Polish Revolution remains an example of complete success. Through this exploration, I primarily intend to understand the nonviolent nature of the Polish Revolution of 1989 and expound upon the concept of "scripting" as a means of conducting the study of comparative history, but there is more to gain from this effort outside of deepening the pools of knowledge surrounding revolution and its study. By better understanding the tools available to groups and individuals to alter the political institution within which they operate, the greater the chance there is to realize a better future. There is no better or worse way of enacting a revolution, but there is a correct method for doing so in consideration of the situation the revolution occurs within, which is why knowing what the options that are laid out by historical precedent is so important to achieving success.

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Introduction: Against the Norm

Not too long ago, in the year 1989, something unprecedented happened in Poland. A trade-union-turned-political-party successfully ousted members of the ruling communist party from their government positions to bring about a new era of liberal democracy in the country, which many thought an impossible goal to achieve. This was one of the Revolutions of 1989. To provide context behind the reasoning for this grouping, these revolutions are considered collectively for three main reasons. The first is that many of them occurred in Central and Eastern European countries that were part of the Eastern Bloc that was aligned with the Soviet Union. The second is that they saw an explosion of political action in 1989 that created a massive wave of institutional change, even if their revolutionary endeavors existed prior to that point. In each of the revolutions, whether it was in Hungary, Poland, or Berlin, the revolting actors succeeded in overturning the one-party communist rule they resided within and then instituted new political systems to replace the destroyed communist apparatus. The most interesting and final defining aspect of these revolutions, though, has nothing to do with where or when they occurred or even the fact that they overthrew communist regimes. Rather, it is that these Revolutions of 1989 achieved their goals through the utilization of nonviolent means, which went against the historical precedent for revolutionary action leading up to that point.

When asked what makes a revolution revolutionary, the utilization of violence to achieve political ends might come to mind. After all, this has been the status quo for the majority of global history. Whether it be the guillotine of the French Revolution in the 18th century, the guerilla warfare of the Cuban Revolution in the 20th century, or the civil wars of the Arab Spring in the 21st century, violence has consistently been the key to revolutionary change. However, the Revolutions of 1989 defied this norm. Somehow, within a history, and a century, of violent

revolution, those struggles that took place in Central and Eastern Europe insisted on using nonviolent tactics, and the country that found itself at the forefront of this movement was Poland and the Solidarity Trade Union that led the people through strikes and martial law before spearheading negotiations with the Polish United Workers' Party.

While the main purposes of this piece are to, one, frame the Polish Revolution of 1989 within an experimental lens of comparative revolutionary history to try and understand how the event remained nonviolent in a century of revolutionary violence, and, two, compare the outcomes of violent and nonviolent revolutions in an attempt to determine the viability of nonviolence as a tool for effecting political change, there is a question of definition that needs to be addressed first. This piece is meant to create a better understanding of revolutions, after all, but whether or not the Polish Revolution lives up to what its name entails is a point of debate amongst scholars. Some, like François Furet, a historian of the French Revolution, argue that, despite being considered a part of the Revolutions of 1989, the peaceful revolutions that occurred during the period should not actually be categorized as revolutions at all because of their failure to include certain defining characteristics whose presence is necessary for any given struggle to be deemed revolutionary.[2] Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether having such discussions of the application of comparative lenses and contrasting outcomes to the Polish "Revolution" of 1989 is an appropriate endeavor to undertake by determining whether a revolution transpired in Poland that year. To do so requires recounting and understanding what exactly happened during that epoch of Polish history that earned the event its revolutionary label.

[2] Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague*, 1st U.S. ed. (New York: Random House, 1990), 162.

Chapter 1: What Makes a Revolution?

I. The Supposed Polish Revolution of 1989

Not long after Poland became part of the Eastern Bloc in 1949, the country began to face social, political, and economic struggles under the rule of the Polish United Workers' Party. In response to these issues, the people of Poland lodged their grievances through protest and dissident movements that cropped up in the 50s, 60s, and 70s. While these efforts did have some relative success, as will be discussed later with regards to the Workers' Defense Committee, they failed to pull the country out of the oppressive situation within which they found themselves. Because of this, by 1980, a narrow minority of Polish citizens considered the situation in Poland to be "good," while many held the "organizational paralysis" of the government to be the main culprit behind the country's condition.[3] The Party's decisions to freeze prices, limit loans for importation, arbitrarily cut back on investments, and refuse to cooperate with producers, alongside their utter failure to prevent inflation and increase access to necessities, led people to believe that the state of Polish society had worsened in comparison to years prior.[4] However, the tipping point that pushed the Polish people to rekindle their efforts of governmental opposition was when one of the Party's leaders, First Secretary Edward Gierek, decided to raise meat prices. This action swiftly resulted in the workers ceasing their production efforts and calling for either increased wages or the reversion of the price increases before they returned to work.

At this point, the Workers' Party seemed weak to the people of Poland because of the concessions they had been making over the years to the opposition movements they faced.

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[3] Andrzej Paczkowski, *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Poland, 1980-1989: Solidarity, Martial Law, and the End of Communism in Europe* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2015), 11.
[4] Ibid.

However, instead of trying to restructure their efforts to give themselves a stronger image, the Party's response to the situation that developed in light of the raised meat prices only further proved that they were easily swayed by popular pressure. Once production in the country came to a halt, the Party quickly responded by, at least partially, meeting the demands of all of the workers that went on strike. This response then created an avalanche of political action with a greater number of organizational movements cropping up to take advantage of the increased possibility that they would be afforded concessions from the government. Thus began the summer of strikes in August of 1980. Of the strikes that broke out at this time, two events stood to be crucially important in the course of the overarching movement. The first transpired on the 14th of that month, where there was an orchestrated and organized strike at the Gdańsk Shipyard that was headed by an electrician named Lech Wałęşa, a man who had ties to the intellectual leaders of previous Polish dissident movements such as Jacek Kuroń. Then, on the 16th of that same month, the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee was formed, with that same electrician at its head, which helped organize strikes around the country, thus allowing the oppositional movement to spread like wildfire.

Soon enough, the demands of the workers, and the organizations that were helping them, started to move away from simple matters of pay increases and price reductions toward addressing such things as permissions to create independent trade unions. Surprisingly, both the Polish and Soviet Communist Parties accepted these demands since they did not know what else to do in response – using force to suppress the movement was not a viable option in light of similar means being used to counter a similar situation in 1970, which resulted in a massacre. Because of this willingness to accept the demands of the striking public, the stage was now set for the future of Polish politics. The people were now allowed to band together and create

unions, and, with that power, the Independent Self-Government Trade Union Solidarity was born. It was a symbol of community. A symbol of support. Through this union, Solidarity cells and opposition movements began to spread further throughout Polish society, which created a nationally inclusive organizational effort that shifted the goals of the broader movement once again. The focus was no longer about making demands, but about proposing changes that would have government officials claim responsibility for oppressing the Polish people and begin reforming the country's political system in realms extending beyond the economic dimension. The most crucial aspect of Solidarity's platform, though, was their insistence on not using force in achieving their goals. Their intention was not to overthrow the government through violent outbursts, but through civil acts that were reflective of the ends they wished to attain. They were a self-limiting revolutionary force.

Once Solidarity had started to gain popularity, scholars suggest that there were three different paths the Polish United Workers' Party could have chosen as their response to the growing opposition: one, they could absorb Solidarity and use it to their own benefit, two, they could stop insisting on not using violent suppression and eradicate the trade union in its entirety or, three, they could watch the Soviet system in Poland disintegrate while Solidarity took control of the country.[5] Despite their previous sentiments of making concessions toward opposition, the Party was not ready to loosen their control of the country. Amongst those in the Party, there were the moderates, such as the future Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski, and initially the Soviets in Moscow, that hoped to take the route of absorbing and weaking Solidarity, while the hardliners wanted to see Solidarity's eradication. Because of this lack of agreement, the Party's platform in dealing with Solidarity and its different cells was initially to use delay tactics to postpone the

[5] Ibid, 22.

legal recognition of the union and its branches, but having this outward resistance to the desires of millions of citizens was only met with their increasing protestation.

Regardless of the different positions within the Party on how to handle the Solidarity problem, the consensus was that something needed to be done, which is why Soviet and Polish leadership started to take action. They began to prepare the Soviet troops that were available through the Warsaw Pact in the event that the growing opposition, organized by Solidarity, got out of hand while also making preparations for the initiation of martial law. The Workers' Party finally decided to flex their guns, nearing the end of 1980, on November 21st in response to a strike that broke out in defense of a Solidarity member's arrest on the grounds of "illegal anti-socialist activities."[6] The Party saw the mobilization of workers in this instance as a declaration of war and put their forces on alert, yet there did not end up being any conflict between the army and the workers. Going into December, the party became a bit bolder with their actions and met various strikes that cropped up with some sort of militaristic response, such as the occupation of an Officer's School where students were striking. Finally, on December 5th, Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski stated that it was now time for the police to defend the country from the threat posed by Solidarity. It was time for the summer of strikes and the "Solidarity carnival" to come to an end, once the Polish Politburo allowed for the initiation of martial law.[7]

Following the Politburo's approval, martial law began in Poland somewhere in the middle of the night between December 12th and 13th. Regardless of the time, the martial institutions and actions that the Party had been preparing came to fruition on the 13th. The oppositional movements, who initially viewed themselves as the ones who were in charge of the situation, were unprepared for such a strong suppressive push from what they perceived to be a

[6] Ibid, 25.
[7] Ibid, 31.

weak government, which was especially true when the government revoked the legal recognition of all non-government affiliated trade unions. In addition to that major blow, which was meant to target Solidarity and its supporters, suppressive actions were taken throughout wider Polish society. Many were arrested, and even more were placed in internment, which included leaders like Lech Wałeşa and Jacek Kuroń. Some were given jail time and fines through an expedited trial system, strikers lost their jobs, newspaper and other media groups were suspended, governmental institutions were purged of possible opposition supporters, propaganda was released to tarnish Solidarity's credibility, restrictions were placed on public gatherings and entertainment, information that was still disseminated was censored, calls were monitored, and the list continues on. Unsurprisingly, in the wake of these suppressive actions, the strikes and protests that were once present throughout the country fizzled out within fifteen days of the initiation of martial law, and Jaruzelski proclaimed victory in the first battle of his campaign to defend Poland.

Of the battles that Jaruzelski still needed to fight, the most prominent was that of the trade unions. While the implementation of martial law was meant to suppress the influence and identity of Solidarity, which, on the surface, it accomplished during this period of martial law, that was as far as Jaruzelski and his comrades were initially wanting to go. The Party was not bent on the eradication of the trade union like the hardliners that had muddled Party politics previously. Instead, they thought that they might be able to transform Solidarity to better fit within the communist political system with the hope that they could use it as a tool for their own benefit. To Jaruzelski and those aligned with his goals, the inclusion of trade unions, like Solidarity, was a necessary evil to incorporate into the system for the purpose of greater societal control and peace, which was a power they believed Lech Wałeşa was the key to unlocking.

They initially hoped that they could get him to convince his Solidarity comrades to open up to compromising with the Party, become calmer, and rid themselves of radicals. While Wałeşa did technically agree to doing all of this for Jaruzelski, he never actually ended up going through with such things. In coming to agreements with the Party, Wałeşa seemed to be bluffing and dishonest during those early negotiations, which eventually resulted in Jaruzelski giving up on this endeavor, placing Wałeşa in internment, and moving on from trying to co-opt Solidarity.[8] The solution that the Party devised in light of this failure to incorporate Solidarity was to create their own pro-government trade unions, which they had complete jurisdiction and control over. With nowhere left to go, what remained of Solidarity went underground.

Despite not being legally recognized, Solidarity still continued its operations while underground. Of course, what they were able to do was limited in scope, but they persisted all the same through limited acts of civil resistance and protesting. Yet, despite their persistence, the general membership simply did not have the motivation to orchestrate any grand movements like they had in the past. That is, until the "anesthetic" wore off in light of the Radio Solidarity broadcasts that dispersed information amongst those members who were in hiding, which accompanied the greater proliferation of underground media and their respective systems.[9] These newly implemented and improved mediums provided greater opportunities for organizing protests, but the martial state remained an unrelenting force. The party continued to suppress anything that contained a trace of Solidarity, which was exemplified by the formal de-legalization of the union on October 8th, 1982. With the trade unions of Poland being effectively neutralized, their leaders, such as Lech Wałeşa, were finally released from interment since they were no longer deemed a threat to the Workers' Party in light of there being no legally

[8] Ibid, 151 – 154.
[9] Ibid, 187.

recognized body for them to return to. However, the martial state and the restrictions instituted to limit groups like Solidarity were not a permanent condition within Poland.

Amongst the officials of the Polish United Workers' Party, there was a general recognition that the restrictions of martial law needed to be lessened or negative opinions would develop amongst the citizens that would explode into greater backlash. With the relative success of the implementation of martial law and Solidarity being taken out of the picture, at least to the knowledge of government officials, Jaruzelski believed that he had control over the situation. It is this assumption that justified his decision to call for the end of martial law in Poland on July 20th, 1983, which took effect the following day. Immediately following this decision, Jaruzelski did seemingly have control of the situation. He was providing for the country, putting meat on the table for the people of Poland, which meant that there was not as much widespread public sympathy or desire for action through any of the illegal trade unions, like Solidarity. However, in 1985, food prices rose, which resulted in the Party's control of the economy being called into question once again. Despite the presence of this predicament, nothing of major importance took place to address these issues for a couple years. Both the Polish United Workers' Party and Solidarity knew that some sort of action needed to be taken to address the issue, but neither group knew how to proceed. This impasse come to an end, however, in 1988 in the years following Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to the position of General Secretary of the Soviet Union. His policies of perestroika, which aimed to restructure the Soviet Union, and glasnost, which allowed for greater freedoms of speech and openness, had a direct influence on Polish Party officials, which included Jaruzelski, who desired to be close collaborators with Gorbachev and his reformist orientation.

This shift toward reformism within Jaruzelski arguably stemmed from the confidence he had in his own control of the situation. This is a bit of an ironic change, though, because while he joined Gorbachev in confidence, Jaruzelski failed to realize that he was losing his grasp on the country. The economic situation continued to worsen and Jaruzelski's analysts, whom he decided to ignore, said that socialism had exhausted its creativity in solving the problems that it faced. The people of Poland were losing faith in the government's capacity to maintain national stability and strikes broke out across the country once more. The first wave of strikes happened in April and May of 1988 with a second wave rolling in around August. What was the main demand in these endeavors? The relegalization of an organization that promised to do something about the dire state of the country: the Solidarity Trade Union.

This revived strike effort in the country could be considered the beginning of the end of communist rule in Poland. The situation was rapidly falling out of the Party's control, and they knew that they had to make concessions to pacify the masses before they were entirely ousted from power. Bringing Solidarity back from being buried underground was, initially, out of the question for the Party at this point in the protests, but Jaruzelski's advisors believed that they could no longer suppress the voices of their opposition. They knew the only way to placate the citizens while revitalizing both the Party and Soviet ideologies was to be open to reforming government institutions and policies with the inclusion of the public's opinion. This approach to addressing the rising unrest in Poland was very much in line with those policies that Gorbachev had put forth, yet not everyone in the Polish United Workers' Party was on board.

While he knew that reinstating martial law was no longer a viable solution to the renewed strike efforts in the country, Jaruzelski was not ready to accept the alternative of letting opposition voices to have a seat at the table either. He ended up waffling around the issue for a

while, in a similar manner to Wałeşa when he was asked to calm down Solidarity at the beginning of the martial law period. Despite this initial attitude toward the inclusion of trade unions in the political sphere, Jaruzelski was eventually convinced that they should be given the chance to negotiate after seeing the televised debate held between Lech Wałeşa and Party General Czesław Kiszczak. Not only did the general public believe that Wałeşa decisively won this debate, but so too did Jaruzelski. Jaruzelski, in light of the result of this debate, could no longer deny the sway that Wałeşa and Solidarity held over the country and the truth in what they were saying regarding the country's degrading situation. Thanks to their efforts, both from popular pressure and Wałeşa's victory, Solidarity was given the opportunity to come to the bargaining table, which they responded to immediately in organizing hundreds of members into multiple groups to handle negotiations with the Party. And so, the scene for the Round Table talks was set.

It took four months of negotiations between Solidarity leaders and Polish Party officials to work out the details of these Round Table Talks, but the time finally came for the two groups to come to a compromise in February of 1989. Going into those meetings, aptly named for the bagel-shaped round table at which they took place, the participants on both sides each had their own goals in mind. For those on the side of Solidarity, the primary concern was the relegalization of the trade union. Aside from that, they also wanted to have the ability to place checks on the government, and, by extension, the Polish United Workers' Party, through parliamentary representation. With this power, Solidarity would be able to exert pressure on legislators to make meaningful reforms to the policies and institutions that limited civil freedoms and economics in the country. On the other hand, the Party wanted to make it out of the situation relatively unscathed and take some of the societal pressures off its shoulders by having Solidarity

claim some level of responsibility for the economic reforms that Mieczysław Rakowski, the Prime Minister at the time, and his government had made since their succession of Jaruzelski. In exchange for this political scapegoat, they were willing to hold a fair election where Solidarity would be guaranteed a third of the seats in the parliament with the added possibility of having the opportunity to be given other government positions. However, the Party was not united in their handling of the Round Table talks. Some members, like Jaruzelski, who was now solely working as the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party and 6th Chairman of the Council of State, as of 1985, and Rakowski, refrained from contributing to the negotiations while others, like the Moscow Soviets themselves, were willing to allow the events to unfurl in their own course since they were interested in seeing where Solidarity would take the matter while continuing the country's relationship with the Soviet Union.

Regardless of anyone's disdain for the Round Table talks, agreements were inevitably met on a variety of issues ranging from economics to labor rights. The most consequential of these changes, though, had to be those made to the political systems. Following the conclusion of the Round Table talks, the first fair election of a new era would be held. However, the playing field would look a bit different. Firstly, only 35 percent of the seats in the Sejm would be up for contest while Party officials would have exclusive rights to the other 65 percent. In addition, there would be a transition to a presidential system where the members of the Sejm would decide who shall become their chief executive, which essentially meant that the Party got to pick the first president to be Wojciech Jaruzelski. Finally, as a concession to Solidarity to make up for this imbalance, a second house would be added to parliament where every seat would be equally available to both Solidarity and Workers' Party members.

When it came time for the election, neither Solidarity nor the Party were prepared for what transpired. Even those that were at the head of the effort on the Solidarity side, like Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik, were uncertain as to what the outcome would be.[10] However, on June 4th, 1989, the result was clear: Solidarity won. But not only did they win, they swept every possible appointment they could. They won their 35 percent of the Sejm, totaling 161 of the 460 seats, as well as 99 of the 100 seats in the newly established Senate. The most important aspect of this victory, though, was the fact that it was acknowledged and accepted by both the Polish United Workers' Party and the Soviet Union. Of course, the Party still held power through the military, Jaruzelski's presidency, and their connection to the Soviet Union for the time being, but they no longer held a complete monopoly on the political power of the country.

In the proceeding years, the Party's grasp on the country's politics went into decline, especially after coalition building efforts from oppositional forces. Because of these efforts, Solidarity came to control governmental affairs. People believed that the group was capable of making beneficial changes within the country because of the principles they demonstrated in their previous efforts throughout the decade, which provided them the legitimacy and authority to reform various economic, social, and political systems. As these actions began to be put into place, matters only continued to worsen for the Party through subsequent elections and Jaruzelski's resignation from his presidency in the year following his election. In time, the communists were flushed entirely out of the government through the country's newly reformed political system and they eventually separated from their relationship with the Soviet Union. While all of this took a fair amount of time and effort to accomplish, both prior to and following that first election of the new age of Polish democracy, it was nevertheless that event in 1989,

[10] Ash, *The Magic Lantern*, 25.

orchestrated by the Solidarity Trade Union, that entirely redirected the course of the country. That was the supposed point of revolution.

II. Was it a Revolution?

As mentioned in the introduction for this piece, some take issue with considering the event that took place in Poland in 1989 a revolution. To them, there are certain characteristics that need to be present in a reformative event for it to be considered revolutionary, and the Polish "Revolution" simply does not fit the description. So, what does constitute a revolution in their eyes? An example of what many consider to be revolutionary action is brought to light in "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship" where Isaac Kraminick shares, "it is striking how many writers describe revolutions as simply the presence of violence in the political process. Arendt, Wolin, De Jouvenel, Davies, Friedrich, Eckstein, Huntington, and Calvert are all examples of this tendency."[11] Within this frequently used definition, revolutions must include the forcible overthrow of ruling and governmental bodies to allow for a wholly new system to be able to rise from the ashes of what previously existed. These two components are the main reasons why scholars, like François Furet, consider the Polish Revolution to be "not really a revolution at all" or the "passing of an illusion."[12] Not only did the event not include any violent action from those in opposition to the Polish United Workers' Party and the Soviet Union, but there was not a revolutionary ideology behind what they were trying to accomplish. Solidarity was not trying to establish a never-before-seen system in the country; they simply wanted to institute a liberal democracy without having to kill anyone to achieve that end.

[11] Isaac Kraminick, "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship," *History and Theory* 11, no. 1 (1972): 26–63, 28.
[12] François Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

Therefore, going by this definition that necessitates violence and fundamental societal shifts, the Polish Revolution was not revolutionary and would be better categorized as a popular movement that resulted in society-wide reforms. However, not all scholars agree that this popularly utilized definition of revolution should be the sole manner of characterizing those kinds of events, hence why the Polish Revolution of 1989 remains labelled as a revolution.

Within the discourse among those seeking to make societal changes, there is always the question of means and ends and whether or not one justifies the other. Is it acceptable for thousands of people to die in the pursuit of change as long as the end result is utopian in nature? Or is it peaceful change that brings about a prosperous future? It is within this discussion that the Polish Revolution of 1989 can be considered revolutionary. For the majority of the revolutions throughout history, the ends have justified the means. The guillotines, the clashes, the warfare. All of those acts of violence were seen as necessary to achieve the reformative goals the revolutionaries set out for themselves. To them, achieving a brighter future was only possible once heads started rolling. However, the Polish Revolution, alongside the other Revolutions of 1989, defied this norm and revolutionized revolution. Rather than leaning into the utilization of violence to effect the change they desired, Solidarity explicitly avoided those options and instead stuck to performing acts of civil disobedience, organizing mass movements, and negotiating with the Polish United Workers' Party to reform the institutions of the country. That was the revolutionary ideology that guided them in their efforts: non-revolutionary revolution.

So, while the Polish Revolution was not revolutionary in a traditional sense, it was revolutionary in the way that its actors altered the perception of what a revolution could be and used that newly developed method to radically change the societal, economic, and political institutions of the country. With this differentiation between the revolutions of the past and what

transpired in 1989 in mind, many find it appropriate to add an additional descriptor to the event to call attention to the fact that the Polish Revolution was different from what came before while still being revolutionary. Yes, it was a revolution, but to Bruce Ackerman it was a liberal revolution in the sense that it was oriented around the present and the past with the intention of transforming governing principles through collective action with fundamental limitations.[13] To Jürgen Habermas, it was a nachholende revolution, or a revolution of catching up, where Poland was simply trying to meet their western contemporaries where they stood.[14] To George Weigel, it was the final revolution in the manner that the actors were turning toward good nature in their means and, by extension, toward God.[15] To Timothy Garton Ash, it was a "refolution" because of the reform-orientation both from the Party at the top and Solidarity at the bottom.[16] However, the most compelling of the revolutionary descriptors is the one created by Jadwiga Staniszkis in the self-limiting revolution.[17] While Staniszkis uses this term to demonstrate how Solidarity tried to contain radical sentiments within the trade union formula, thinking of the Polish Revolution as self-limiting implies a lot more than one might initially think. It suggests that there is something that both the Party and Solidarity were holding back. The actors knew the history of their own country's revolutionary efforts, as well as those of others, and they were making a conscious attempt to refrain from indulging in the temptation of violence that they knew they were capable of unleashing. It is almost as if they were reading the scripts of the events that came before to use as a basis for their actions while adapting them to fit the terms of their own situation.

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13 Bruce A. Ackerman, *The Future of Liberal Revolution*, 1st ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

14 Jürgen Habermas, *Die Nachholende Revolution* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990).

15 George Weigel, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

16 Ash, *The Magic Lantern*, 14.

17 Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Chapter 2: The Revolutionary Script

I. *Scripting Revolution*

In their collected work *Scripting Revolution*, editors and contributors Keith Baker and Dan Edelstein, alongside the other authors whose help they enlisted in this work of global scope, posit a new method for the comparative study of revolutions. Their reasoning for doing so lies in their dissatisfaction with the current methods of comparative study of revolutions. On the one hand, Baker and Edelstein state that the work of making comparisons, while not exclusive to this realm of study, is usually left to social scientists, such as sociologists and political scientists. In their view, such comparisons of revolutionary events made by this division of scholars are unsatisfactory in the manner in which they try to understand the beginnings, middles, and ends of revolutionary events. In the case of beginnings, the issue lies in how social scientists pin the cause of any given revolutionary event on systemic failures that, supposedly, necessitate revolutionary action. This is a problematic frame of analysis to Baker and Edelstein since this way of conceptualizing the start of an event discounts the importance of the political crises that precede revolutionary action. As Baker and Edelstein put it, "preconditions are not conditions: some human assembly is still required."[18] Just because a country is ripe for revolution does not mean that a revolution will happen. The people have to be willing to act within their given situation, which might be brought to light by a spark or a triggering event rather than decades of systemic breakdown. As for the issue that Baker and Edelstein take up with social scientific interpretations of revolutionary middles and ends, the problem has to do with the idea of phases that is commonly used, where scholars would argue that revolutionary events follow a template

[18] Baker and Edelstein, *Scripting Revolution*, 7.

and that, once a revolution begins, then certain occurrences are fated to unfold. For example, following the outbreak of the French Revolution, there is a chain that interconnects "the fall of the Bourbon monarchy, the civil war, and the Terror," which social scientists then denote as the "'natural outcome of revolutionary struggle'" and is therefore a pattern that is "'inevitable'" in all subsequent revolutionary events.[19] However, Baker and Edelstein believe that revolutionaries do have agency in their endeavors and that they are conscious of the events that transpired before their own, which is how they explain instances when revolutions unfurl in similar manners. Looking at the Russian Revolution, which might be considered by social scientists as a textbook example of revolutions following a natural course, like what happened in France, Baker and Edelstein state that "if there was a 'Terror' after the Bolsheviks seized power, it was not because… that's when the Terror phase occurs, but rather because the Bolsheviks were consciously modeling their actions on the Jacobin script."[20] So, if social science does not satisfy the editors and authors of *Scripting Revolution*, it would seem obvious that they would use historical means for making comparisons, but that is not exactly the case.

Baker and Edelstein do not only take issue with social science in the realm of comparison with their preconditions and phases, but with historians and their specificity in their focus as well. While this sentiment in no way tries to demean the value of comparative work done within the field of revolutionary history, the editors of *Scripting Revolution* hold that, in the case of the answers they are trying to find, that historical comparative research is usually much too confined to realize all of the potential influences on any given revolutionary event. In the examples that Baker and Edelstein provide, they bring attention to how historians usually focus their comparisons on a specific time period, such as an age or a century. While this frame of research

[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid, 8.

does show how such things as globalization affected certain events, it does have it limits in the way in which "contemporaneous events do not always have the largest impact: it sometimes takes the repeated transmission and reworking of past events to make them influential."[21] There are certain truths about the events that have occurred throughout history that can only be uncovered by broadening the scope in which any given event, whether revolutionary or otherwise, is observed. Of course, the point of *Scripting Revolution* is not so that various authors can simply air their grievances with social scientific and historical research within comparative study. They do propose an alternative that takes the specificity of historical study and melds it with the vast interconnectedness that social scientists aim to achieve: the revolutionary script.

As Baker and Edelstein share in their introduction to *Scripting Revolution*, "Revolutions do not occur ex nihilo. Revolutionaries are extremely self-conscious of how previous revolutions unfolded," which is exactly what they aim to bring to light with this experimental methodology of scripting.[22] To put it simply, the revolutions of the past serve as the basis, or the script, for the revolutions of the revolutionary present. The script defines the situation within which the actors find themselves and provides certain courses of action, positions to take, or methods to employ based on the historical precedent that they decide best fits the revolutionary narrative of the situation. While one option is to entirely recycle the moves made by those that struggled before, operating within the script does not consign the actors to mindlessly following and employing previous events, ideologies, actions, and strategies until they either succeed or fail. Rather, they are free to adapt the script they chose to fit their specific situations by introducing new actors, events, and methods that previous revolutions might not have utilized. The script is simply the

[21] Ibid, 10.
[22] Ibid, 2.

basis. It "creates the situation and sets out the manner of its unfolding."[23] Everything that happens afterwards is in the hands of the actors. By comparing the histories of revolutions in this manner, Baker and Edelstein believe that a balance can be found between the desire for generalization held by scientists and the specified considerations of historians that emphasizes the overlooked presence of revolutionary actors' transnational historical awareness and their agency in making revolution. To them, there is a throughline in understanding how revolutions have been conducted throughout history. To put it in their terms, "Marx rewrote the script of the French Revolution; Lenin revised Marx; Mao revised Lenin; and so on and so forth," and this line of thought has the potential to interconnect various revolutionary movements, including the Polish Revolution of 1989.[24]

The issue in bringing up the example of the Revolution of 1989 within this discussion of scripts is that Baker, Edelstein, and the other contributing authors hardly even mention the existence of the event, much less deliberate how it might fit into the concept of the script. This is not to say that the actions of the Polish Revolution cannot be understood through this experimental method. Rather, it is omitted because of how new the scripting methodology is to the comparative study of revolutions. Baker and Edelstein address this point at the end of their introduction to the piece when they share that they "do not claim, with one volume, to have exhausted such a study."[25] While *Scripting Revolution* does include examples across time and place where revolutions have occurred to begin the discussion of the script, deliberation over this topic is not meant to end once the volume comes to a close. Even the idea of the script itself is not necessarily something that is set in stone and unanimously agreed upon by the authors, which

[23] Ibid, 2-3.
[24] Ibid, 2.
[25] Ibid, 21.

will be demonstrated through the difference in utilization of the script between Ian Thatcher's contribution regarding the Russian Revolution and that of Silvana Toska and the Arab Revolutions. Thus, Baker and Edelstein invite other historians to join in the conversation, to investigate other revolutions so that they might help in further defining the concept of the script while "uncovering other ways in which revolutions are produced by, and in turn produce, scripts," which is what the second portion of this thesis tries to accomplish.[26] By using the script approach to analyze the Polish Revolution, it is possible to determine what events that previously occurred served as the basis for the actions taken during this specific event. Before delving into that topic, though, it would be appropriate to first flesh out this methodology by looking at the work of some of the authors in *Scripting Revolution* to get a better idea of what exactly the script is, or at least how different authors interpret it to be, and how it applies to their areas of expertise, which might shed some light on the Polish example.

II. The Scripts

i. The Russian Revolution

In his chapter of *Scripting Revolution*, Ian Thatcher is focused on the case of the Russian Revolution that occurred in 1917. To some, as Thatcher points out, the key to either the success or failure of this event was in the hands of Lenin, the man who considered himself and his comrades as the communist vanguard of the proletariat. Those who held this sentiment, which was even held by such Marxists as Leon Trotsky, who would usually call attention to the myriad factors and social pressures that serve as the basis for revolution, believed that it was those revolutionaries, led by Lenin, that were trained to most efficiently represent the proletariat of

[26] Ibid.

Russian society that were responsible for delivering Russia from the maw of autocracy and capitalism before handing off the reins to the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, Thatcher believes that viewing the course of the Russian Revolution through this lens and emphasizing the role of powerful actors, like Lenin, over all other influencing factors does not call the proper attention to the different currents that were running through Russian society during this period of revolution. In reality, there were many different groups that were participating in the revolutionary effort and vying for the opportunity to lead the country in their preferred direction and, therefore, employing their own version of the revolutionary script. Of the scripts, and the groups that wielded them, Thatcher mentions in his contribution to *Scripting Revolution*, there was the "liberal script" of the Russian Provisional Government that wanted to head towards a constitutional democracy, the "socialist script" of the Mensheviks that wanted Russia to become a communist country that led the world in the pursuit of the utopian ideology, and the "extreme left script" of the Bolsheviks, which eventually came out on top in the battle for influence over the country.[27] The determinant factors behind why the Bolsheviks won out over the liberal and socialist ones have nothing to do with Lenin as a revolutionary figurehead, but are revealed in looking at how each script handled the desires of the proletariat population and whether they molded their agendas to those wills or not.

Starting with the Russian Provisional Government and their liberal script, this framework of continuing the revolutionary effort was initially well received as a result of the willingness of actors to move further left than what was seen in other European countries at the time. The reality was the result of the Provisional Government responding to popular demands within the country and having the internal desire to place as much distance between their involvement in

[27] Ian D. Thatcher, "Scripting the Russian Revolution," in *Scripting Revolution*, ed. Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015), 213–27, 214-222.

the revolutionary movement and the autocracy seen previously under the czardom. The Provisional Government wanted to take on such tasks as abolishing the death penalty and redistributing land to the peasantry, which resulted in many seeing this liberal force in Russian politics as humanitarian, but the support that stemmed from such promises was short lived. Since the liberal script of the Provisional Government was based upon the principles of democracy, its actors had to urge their supporters to practice patience and wait for the institution of such changes until they could hold the proper elections to get people into governmental positions who would be able to affect the desired alterations. In addition, they thought that it was the responsibility of the nation, as a newly democratic state, to continue to participate in the World War that was raging at the same time that the revolution was in motion. To make matters worse, when it came time to make the changes to Russian society that the proprietors of the liberal script promised, they ended up making extensive compromises with those that fought to maintain the previous political institutions of the country by allowing landowners compensation for their redistributed land, protecting the profitability of the industrial machine, and only combatting oppression so much that it might not upset the state of the Russian empire.[28] The people were not pleased with this being the outcome of their revolutionary struggles, so they turned to the socialists.

With the Mensheviks and the socialist script, there was some agreement with the Provisional Government and the liberal script in the necessity of starting the proletarian struggle with a bourgeois revolution that compromises with existing powers, but the difference between the two scripts was in how long that period of compromise should persist. To the socialist actors, liberalism was only a stage of the longer process of realizing a socialist future for the country.

[28] Ibid, 218.

Additionally, they dreamt of further reforms to Russian society pertaining to a wide range of policies, which included the democratization of the army that would transform this body into a force to serve and protect the proletariat and Russian democracy, rather than the elites and their interests. However, it was this institution the Mensheviks hoped to reform to serve the proletariat that resulted in the loss of support from the people of Russia for this script for the revolution. Initially, the Mensheviks were against getting involved in the affairs of other countries. They rejected the notion of being included in the imperialist practices of World War I and believed that each country had their own right to sovereignty. However, as Thatcher describes as "an ironic twist that in some scholars' estimation fatally undermined the moderate socialist script," the Mensheviks entirely shifted their sentiment toward getting involved in the war effort and instead held the belief that the best way to demonstrate the success of the Russian Revolution to the rest of the world was to go on the offensive, which resulted in the successful, yet destructive, Kerensky offensive in June of 1917.[29] While this effort might have seen some success, the toll that it took on the people of Russia worsened the feelings many already held about involvement in the war. The people were tired of fighting and they wanted the reparations that they had been promised by those that led them down the road of revolution. Luckily, such things were found with the Bolsheviks, even if it did take some convincing.

Within the script of the extreme left, there were two currents. The first was that of the Menshevik-Internationalists, or the anti-war Mensheviks. They detested the idea of working alongside the bourgeoise entirely, which they blamed for the suffering that the people of the nation were experiencing both in the realm of economics and fatigue in the face of war. They still thought that it was necessary to have a liberal bourgeois revolution, but that it should be kept

[29] Ibid, 221.

in check throughout its entirety until it transitioned into a socialist struggle. In addition, they wanted to pull out of the war effort, urge for peace globally, have the state take control of the economy, stifle counter-revolution, and begin the process of redistributing land. However, they did not have the opportunity to enact their version of the extreme left script because they were overshadowed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks. The script employed by the Bolsheviks was based upon the employment of violent class struggle and spoke to many of the insecurities that the Russian people were facing. They refused to work with the bourgeoise and liberals, the latter of which as equally considered as bourgeois in the eyes of a socialist revolution. They pledged to turn their involvement in the imperialist war into a fight on the home front against those that oppressed the proletariat. Above all else, they wanted to have the rights to the means of production and the property of the country turned over to the working class immediately. In having these acts as the basis of their revolutionary program, the Bolsheviks ensured that their script would be the one to be implemented as Russia moved into its future. The key to their success was not reliant on a vanguard being the champion of the people. Rather, it had to do with how well they were able to adapt their script to the desires of the weary Russian people.

While this account of the different scripts of the Russian Revolution by Thatcher does a great job highlighting the different currents that were running through Russian society during the country's revolutionary period, as well as how the Bolsheviks adapted their script to address the qualms of the Russian people, there is a glaring issue that stands out in this interpretation of the script. It does not say anything about what the scripts that the different revolutionary actors employed were based on. It does not demonstrate that those at the head of the Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and Provisional Government were conscious of the history of revolutionary struggle, nor that they defined their actions and politics around the examples left by previous events. This

omission of the true nature of Baker and Edelstein's scripting method might lead one to believe that the actors of the Russian Revolution did not, in fact, situate their actions within the history of revolutions, but that is not the case. As Baker and Edelstein state in the introduction to *Scripting Revolution*, the scripting method is experimental. What it means to different authors, both the contributors whose works are included and those that enter into dialogue with the method, can differ based on how those who interact with the method chose to interpret it, but that does not mean that the framework should remain this loose and up to interpretation if it is to be taken seriously as an alternative to other forms of comparative study of revolutions. Again, Baker and Edelstein mention that "the Bolsheviks were consciously modeling their actions on the Jacobin script" and that "Marx rewrote the script of the French Revolution; Lenin revised Marx," so there is undoubtedly revolutionary consciousness that served as the basis of the Russian Revolution. That relationship must be given greater attention and stated explicitly, though, to prove that revolutionary consciousness informed the scripts of the Russian Revolution, though, which is exactly what Lenin does in his writings.

While it would be possible to find statements from each of the different parties that competed for influence over the direction of the Russian Revolution that line out what exactly the scripts were that they based their actions around, such a task would undoubtedly require its own research project. Finding the basis of the script for the Bolsheviks is easy to accomplish, though, due to the countless pieces of writing provided by Lenin regarding revolution, specifically those that reference the Russian Revolution's connection to the Revolution of 1848. In the lead-up to the Russian Revolution, some revolutionaries brought to light that there were two possible paths the revolution might take in the "ascending line" of the French Revolution, where "power passed gradually from the moderate party to the more radical" and the

"descending line" of the Revolution of 1848 that saw the opposite transition of power occur.[30] Some argued that it was necessary for Russia to follow the ascending path rather than the descending path to prevent a similar fate of bourgeois takeover and imperialist coup d'état that transpired in France in 1848, but Lenin was not so quick to follow this logic. Rather than toying with lines of "'strategic conceptions,'" Lenin instead suggests that it is necessary to pay greater attention to "the alignment of classes" in the revolutionary struggle, which is a point where the Revolution of 1848 stands as a clear example since the issue in the revolution's failure did not stem from the proletariat itself, but from betrayal at the hands of the petty-bourgeoisie. In fact, Lenin, in another writing, demonstrates a heightened conscious of the Revolution of 1848 when he mentions that "the commune taught the European proletariat to pose concretely the tasks of the socialist revolution. The lesson learnt by the proletariat will not be forgotten. The working class will make use of it, as it has already done in Russia during the December uprising."[31] In other words, the scripts of both the Russian Revolution of 1917 and of 1905 had a script that was created with acute awareness of the Revolution of 1848. That was the script that Lenin used as the basis of the Bolshevik platform, his rewriting of Marx's revision of the French Revolution, where he and the party adapted the script to avoid the negative implications of the descending line of 1848.

ii. The Egyptian Revolution

Despite the Revolutions of 1989, and therefore the Polish Revolution, not having a section specifically devoted to them in *Scripting Revolution*, they are mentioned in Silvana

[30] V.I. Lenin, "On the Two Lines in the Revolution," in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 21 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 415–20.
[31] V.I. Lenin, "Lessons of the Commune," in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 13 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 475–78.

Toska's contribution to the piece, titled "The Multiple Scripts of the Arab Revolutions." While Thatcher might not have done much to establish what events the different actors of the Russian Revolution used as the basis of their revolutionary scripts, Toska states what she has found to be the source of the script for the Arab Revolutions from the beginning of her contribution, which is where the Revolutions of 1989 are brought into the conversation. According to her, the peacefulness of the revolutions that occurred in Eastern and Central Europe created a "euphoria" that made people globally begin to reimagine what revolution could look like and the forms in which they might be able to change the political systems that oppressed them.[32] She then goes on to say that the spread of this euphoria is present in the example of the Arab Revolutions because of two facts. The first is that the claims made by the actors of the Arab Revolutions held some similarities to those made by the participants in the Revolutions of 1989. The second, which is a bit more specific, is that the two groups of revolutionaries were in contact, which resulted in the adoption of Eastern European scripts and methods for effecting change.[33] With that knowledge made readily available, the task of understanding the script of the Arab Revolutions is made much simpler to undertake.

Providing some context for the Arab Revolutions, also referred to as the Arab Spring, these events stemmed from the presence of oppressive regimes that came into existence in the 1950s and 60s following coups that overthrew the monarchies in Iraq, Egypt, and Libya. These regimes, once coming to power, then came to an agreement with the publics of their respective countries, creating a social contract that defined the expectations under their rule, which were then adopted by other Arabic regimes. A lot of the policies that were considered a part of these

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[32] Silvana Toska, "The Multiple Scripts of the Arab Revolutions," in *Scripting Revolution*, ed. Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015), 325–43, 325.
[33] Ibid.

contracts were socialistic in nature, which brought a fair amount of pain when the regimes decided to make the transition towards economic liberalization. This propagated cracks within the countries' safety nets that left many young people stranded, feeling that they had no future. Additionally, in the 1990s, the popularity of Islam rose since those who practiced the religion, who had previously been persecuted by the regimes of the different countries, had taken up the task of supporting those that were left behind by the new economic policies. Thus, going into the 2010s, within the Arab countries there was "severe economic stagnation following decades of sluggish growth and the financial crises of 2008; increasingly unresponsive and corrupt regimes; a growing Islamist population; and a large, young, and well-educated middle class."[34] Considering all of these factors of instability, the conditions were ripe for a revolution to occur, but what exactly did the people seek to accomplish if they were to do so? For some countries, the only action that could be equivocally agreed to was to overthrow the regimes that ruled over them, which is demonstrated clearly in the example of the Egyptian Revolution.

The Egyptian Revolution began in Tunisa with protests following a man's "idiosyncratic" self-immolation that "epitomized social grievances shared across the Middle East."[35] At the beginning of this movement, the group that led the effort was the April 6 Youth Movement, which was tolerated by the ruling regime and had experience in organizing protests. There are two aspects of the movement that should be brought to light in their means, which were centered around social media and labor organization, and their goals, which included a democratic transition to a new era of Egyptian politics. Using these tenets as their script, the Youth Movement took charge of the early stages of the event as it transitioned away from simply being about protesting the government and into the realm of revolution. From this information

[34] Ibid, 332.
[35] Ibid, 332.

provided by Toska, it already becomes clear the ways in which the script of the Youth Movement in the Egyptian Revolution and the scripts of the Revolutions of 1989 were connected. They both shared a disposition towards effecting change through methods of nonviolence and labor organization, but that is where the similarities between the two events start to disappear.

Something that Solidarity was not known for dealing with was division within their opposition against the Polish United Workers' Party. In the case of Egypt and the Youth Movement, one of the biggest challenges was the presence of other opposition groups that joined the effort. Each brought their own scripts that they wanted to implement and the one that drastically redefined the revolution in Egypt was that of the Muslim Brotherhood. To the Brotherhood, a democratic regime was not the answer to Egypt's plights. While it is difficult to pin down exactly what their intentions were, according to Toska, the inclusion of the Brotherhood and their disposition towards democracy meant that the effort had to find some middle ground to meet at so they might be united in their opposition, which ended up being the desire to overthrow the government.[36]

As a result of this division amongst the revolutionaries, once president Hosni Mubarak stepped down and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces took power, which was a trusted institution in the eyes of the revolution, it was unclear where the future might take the country. Would it be "the establishment of a democratic regime, a utopian ideal of an Islamist state, or Nasserist socialism?"[37] Perhaps there would be another middle ground to meet upon. When it came time to restructure the institutions of the country and elect people into power, it was the

[36] Ibid, 334.
[37] Ibid, 335.

Brotherhood that emerged victorious. They did well in parliamentary elections and managed to get one of their members, Mohammad Mursi, elected as president, which meant that the constitution, formed through assembly, was markedly Islamist. Throughout all of these proceedings, the Brotherhood's prominence at the head of the revolutionary effort was not taken very well. This sentiment eventually resulted in the military deposing Mursi and his aides while taking actions to politically restrict the Brotherhood as a whole. This is where the account of the Egyptian Revolution, provided by Toska, comes to an end, but her discussion continues.

The actions taken by the military, of course, raised a lot of questions for the people of Egypt. Were the military's actions antidemocratic? Were they revolutionary? Were they trying to correct the path of the original revolution? Regardless of the answer, this situation created a very complex reality that is a bit difficult to come to terms with, but the truth was that the revolution was still happening even if it did look different from its starting point since it was no longer following the script laid out by the Revolutions of 1989. This reality had nothing to do with a departure from nonviolent means or the complete abandonment of the revolution, but was rather a product of the movement's attempts to include as many voices they possibly could in the fight against the Mubarak regime. The revolution began with a defined vision for the future of Egypt, but as time went on, that vision became less clear, which also brought instability and internal conflict that prevented the continuation of the revolutionary effort as it was once formulated. There was no clear way forward and, thus, achieving the outcome lined out by the scripts of the Revolutions of 1989 became unattainable since a "quick and effective transition of power to a leadership that could legitimately claim revolutionary authority" was unattainable.[38]

[38] Ibid, 342.

Without a defined purpose for the Egyptian Revolution or a group leading the charge, the script of the revolution had to change, but what would the solution be? A shift towards another revolutionary example or something entirely original? According to Toska, the latter is the more likely explanation. With consideration of the point made about the Revolutions of 1989, Toska suggests that "in that sense, the meaning of revolution [for the Arab Revolutions] evolved much as it did during the French Revolution – in other words, away from popular sovereignty."[39] However, Toska only mentions this comparison briefly before adding that the parallels between these two revolutionary scripts, that of the Egyptians and the French, are quite limited and, thus, ineffective in the pursuit of claiming that the later parts of the Egyptian Revolution included actions based on the script provided by the French Revolution. Toska's reasoning behind this claim lies in the fact that the Egyptian Revolution did not shift toward the "millenarian model" of the French Revolution in its shift away from popular sovereignty, and that "for revolutions to result in French-style millenarianism, the positing of either a final settlement… or a permanent revolution is necessary in order for the revolution to gain a certain religious quality related to millenarianism."[40] Thus, the Egyptian Revolution did not take on this millenarian model because there was not a unified revolutionary authority or current. There was no one that could claim that they were acting in the pursuit of revolutionary ideals, since there was stark disagreement about what those ideals were, and there could be no perpetual revolution because there was no universally agreed upon end goal for the struggle.

So, the script of the Egyptian Revolution has components of both the Revolutions of 1989 and the French Revolution, but the event itself is not following either of those previous examples, albeit because doing so is unattainable. Rather, it seems that the Egyptian Revolution,

[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.

and the other Arab Revolutions, follow a script that is adapted from such events as the Revolutions of 1989 and the French Revolution where it served as an "uprising *against* personalistic regimes rather than *for* a particular type of regime."[41] They used similar means as the events that preceded their own and used revolutionary vocabulary in voicing their hopes for democratic practices and freedoms, but their lack of unified vision meant that they had to find another path to walk since accomplishing the same feats would prove difficult considering their unique political situations. The result of this reality, at least at the time of Toska writing this contribution to *Scripting Revolution*, is that the course of the revolution moving forward is slightly unclear. Perhaps authoritarianism will fill the vacuum that the revolution leaves behind as it struggles to find a point of unity following the deposition of Mubarak and his regime. Or, perhaps, this uncertain state may serve as a sense of balance in Egypt where the volatility of the situation will continue to oust those who claim leadership until a force that can claim popular sovereignty can take control of the situation. It is a course of events and actions that could one day serve to be the script of a future revolution.

iii. The Polish Revolution

In trying to determine what the script is for any given revolutionary events, the search frequently leads research to situations, countries, and events outside of the main event of interest itself. For example, as was previously mentioned, in looking at the Russian Revolution, Ian Thatcher brought to light the similarities between that event and its ideologically opposed actors to what happened in France during its different revolutionary periods in the 18th and 19th centuries. Similarly, with the Egyptian Revolution, Silvana Toska points out how the initial movement, sparked by a man's self-immolation, followed a path similar to that of the

[41] Ibid, 330.

Revolutions of 1989 in the desire held by the actors to utilize non-violent means to realize their ends. However, determining the script of a revolution might not always necessitate directly comparing the course of the event of interest to either the examples of other countries that underwent revolutions or even to successful revolts. Rather, the point where the scripting method shines the most is in the way that it creates a throughline between all of the different revolutions and revolts of the past. The connecting point is not whether any given event was successful or not, but rather whether the actors consciously defined their actions within the framework provided by an event that transpired before their own and if they then adapted those basic ideals to fit within their own contexts. With these considerations in mind, it is possible to determine the script of the Polish Revolution by looking a bit further back into the country's history at the efforts of the Workers' Defense Committee in the 1970s.

Once Poland became a part of the Eastern Bloc that came under communist dominance in the 1940s, dissent against the Soviet Union and the Polish United Workers' Party was usually not tolerated by the officials of the Party. However, there were two groups that were poised to strike out in opposition if they were ever given the opportunity to do so. The first was the Roman Catholic church, which "remained at least a potential political force without interruption" to rival communism and Stalinism, which was not something that was present in other countries that were a part of the Union at the time.[42] The other was the intellectuals, which were of great importance to Polish history to the point that "'every Polish schoolboy knows… that since the times of the partitions, the *inteligencja* has had a mission to uphold the spirit and culture of the nation against the political powers that be.'"[43] While the intellectual community was initially

[42] Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 168.
[43] Ibid.

aligned with Communism and Marxism, which resulted in some supporting the Soviets and the Workers' Party, they gradually transitioned away from the ideology, thus denouncing such things as Stalinism and pushing them towards the realm of revisionism. However, they did not necessarily have the space or facilities for dissenting, which is where the relationship between these intellectuals and the still powerful church becomes significant.

In 1956, the Catholic church cut a deal with the ruling government where they agreed to lessen their opposition to the regime in exchange for the Primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, being freed from prison and receiving less restrictive treatment towards their practices. With this newly acquired liberty, the Church, and its various locations, served as a safe haven for intellectuals that aligned with the church's values to organize their efforts without being threatened by regime oppression. These Catholic individuals believed, much like the revisionists that were in opposition to Stalinism at the time, in "'having concessions and rights 'granted' from above rather than in organizing pressure from below. They sought harmony, not conflict."[44] However, this brand of politics, of creating "'socialism with a human face,'" was utterly crushed in the wake of the Soviet Union's actions in their invasion of Czechoslovakia and the destruction of the Dubček regime in Prague in March of 1968.[45] The Soviets, and their comrades in the Eastern Bloc countries, were tired of having to convince the people of the legitimacy of their rule and the ideology of the Party, so they took to using alternative means for cementing their control of the regions, which resulted in the greater suppression of dissent movements.

Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the other Eastern European countries that comprised the Eastern Bloc revolted against their governments, where one of the stronger

[44] Ibid, 172.
[45] Ibid, 173.

reactions occurred in Poland. However, in the case of Poland, the Workers' Party was not willing to tolerate any dissent at this point in time, which led to certain plays being banned from being performed, the stifling of protests and demonstrations held by students and other intellectuals, and the punishment of those protestors with intellectuals being fired from their positions and students being expelled from their educational institutions. One of the people of import that was affected by these actions that might sound familiar is one Adam Michnik, who not only played a role in the dissent movement of this decade, but also in Solidarity Trade Union of the 1980s where he worked closely with Wałeşa. Soon after this situation with the intellectuals of Poland, it was the workers' turn to protest against the establishment since, in 1970, they had their benefits cut, were "excoriated… for their laziness," and faced the brunt of increased food prices.[46] However, throughout these struggles neither group of dissidents came to the aid of the other. The workers did not aid the intellectuals, the intellectuals were not there for the workers, and the church stayed out of the altercations. They were fighting three different battles when they could have joined forces to exert greater pressure, which they did eventually realize they were capable of doing. They felt that, if they wanted to change Poland for the better, they would have to stand together in their endeavors to achieve their mutual goals. This mentality is what served as the backbone of the Polish dissent movement during the 1970s, which was greatly informed by Leszek Kołakowski's "Theses on Hope and Hopelessness," a text some deem as the "'fundamental theoretical text of the Polish democratic opposition in the 1970s.'"[47]

Looking at this piece written by Kołakowski, and the implications that it had on the Polish dissident movement of this period, it becomes clear how the Polish people rationalized

[46] Ibid, 174.
[47] Ibid, 175.

opposing the Soviet presence in their country and the Polish United Workers' Party despite the fact that many believed it impossible to reform the political system which dominated their country. As was mentioned previously, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the idea of reforming Soviet and communist political systems to be more humanistic rather than serving as a tool to maintain domination and the Party ideology became infeasible. The system had become "unreformable" and those who postulated as to how to how to correct the path of Poland determined that it would be impossible to only partially eradicate the power of the monopole and that "all past and foreseeable changes within the framework of the system are unimportant and can be easily reversed, for they cannot be institutionalized without destroying the whole mechanism."[48] The solution to this predicament, then, would be to take the whole system out in one fell swoop through a worldwide violent revolution that would result in a socialist society. Kołakowski then goes on to list seven different reasons as to why people perceived Soviet institutions to be unreformable, thus justifying the desire for violent action to alter the system, but he does not do this to support the violent option that some proposed. Rather, he brings these issues to light with the intention of demonstrating how these supposed strengths of the Soviet system are actually the reasons why the dream of reformism had the potential to persist.

The reasons that are given as to why reform was an impossible task to uptake were that democratization was inconceivable because of the concentration of decision making power within the Soviet apparatus, the role of experts was reduced in exchange for bolstering Party control of governmental institutions, freedom of information was unthinkable, the degradation of the apparatus to maintain hierarchical monopoly bred negative characteristics in the ruling class,

[48] Leszek Kolakowski, "Hope and Hopelessness," *Survey: A Journal of East & West Studies* 17, no. 3 (80) (Summer 1971): 32–52, 37.

the despotic nature of the rules tended towards aggression alongside fear tactics and threats that scared people away from acting in opposition, the nationalization of social life made it impossible to formulate plans away from the view of the Party, and that the expansion of rights would undoubtedly lead to the ruin of everything that the Soviets had tried to build up until that point.[49] This list of strengths was undoubtedly enough to scare most away from trying to work to internally reform Soviet institutions, but Kołakowski suggests that these features being perceived as strengths in the first place was exactly the reason why they held the power that they did. In reality, these strengths were actually weaknesses that the people of Poland could take advantage of. For example, Kołakowski shares that the supposed rigidity of the Soviet system was merely a product of the people being convinced that it was unreformable. The concentration of power at the top of the political system was demonstrative of an internal conflict within the Soviet Union between their unity under a single tyrant and the security of individuals in their positions within the system. The shift away from Marxist-Leninism was a source of insecurity since maintaining the ideology harmed the Union because the people no longer believed, yet keeping it around was seen as a necessity since it served as a founding myth that propped up the system even through difficulties. The befuddling desire of the Soviet Union for countries under their umbrella to have greater dependence on the overarching system they employed while simultaneously wanting those same countries to have decreased dependence on the Soviet systems so that they could have greater liberty in their decision-making capabilities, left the Union in an uncertain state.

With these weaknesses in mind, Kołakowski then took on the task of suggesting how the oppositional forces of Poland might be able to exploit these contradictions of the Soviet Union. The goal was to both erode those already weakened institutions even further and to use “a

[49] Ibid, 38-41.

ceaseless pressure aimed at diminishing Polish dependence on the USSR," but there is one other component that Kołakowski deemed crucial to the liberation of Poland: the intelligentsia.[50] This group, which for much of Polish history has been deemed as the protectors of the culture of the nation, was equally convinced that reform was an impossibility, which helps to explain why they held such passive sentiments towards the workers when they struck out against the Workers' Party in 1970.[51] For the liberation of Poland to be possible, it was necessary to convince these people who were so crucial to the nation that their misbelief in the plausibility of reform had done more harm than good in the struggle of the Polish people. Without the sway they held, change of the magnitude that was necessary for Poland was much more difficult to achieve, but if the intelligentsia worked alongside the workers, the church, and the students, reform was indeed possible. Kołakowski held that change was not an all-or-nothing instantaneous event to be accomplished without national unity. Instead, it was something that had to be affected through the gradual application of societal pressures over an extended period of time that took advantage of the weaknesses of oppressive systems. The Soviet systems that were present in the countries of the Eastern Bloc, and in the Union itself, were falling apart largely from their own contradictions, and the two choices for action were to do nothing and allow the oppressions impressed upon them to worsen or to do something about the situation with the tools and information available. So, the people of Poland decided to do something, with these theses serving as their fundamental principles, in 1976.

In June of that year, the government tried its hand once again at solving the economic situation persistently facing the country, at least since becoming a part of the Eastern Bloc, by

[50] Ibid, 48.
[51] Ibid, 51.

increasing prices for food and other agricultural products to a much worse degree than was seen in 1970. Of course, this made life much more difficult for those who were already struggling to provide for their families, which served to kickstart renewed oppositional movements, much like had happened before. However, there was something different about these protests since they came to be much more organized than what had transpired previously. Through these events, the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) came into being and became "the first real organized opposition to the Polish government."[52] This group was the product of a plethora of contributors, but there are people of note, both founders and not, who formulated the demands and practices of the group. The first was Kołakowski who, through his theses, brought to light that the Union and the Polish government were not entirely rigid institutions and that they could be changed if the dissidents all banded together, led by the intelligentsia, to take advantage of the weaknesses in the system. The second was Adam Michnik, who held a similar sentiment to Kołakowski in the fact that the intellectuals could no longer be allowed to abandon the other dissidents in society like they had at the beginning of the decade. Furthermore, they were to accept that the key to "hollowing out" the Soviet apparatus to permit the freedom of expression was to maintain and promote moral values whilst working within the current confines of Polish political and legal institutions.[53] Finally, the last person of importance, whose politics help situate the fundamental tenets of the KOR within a history of revolutionary action, was another familiar name seen in the later Polish Revolution, Jacek Kuroń.

Of the people who opposed the communist rule in Poland, Kuroń stands as one of the most prominent figures not only in the 1970s, but also in the decades prior and following the

[52] Gleason, *Totalitarianism*, 177.
[53] Ibid.

time of the KOR. During the time of the KOR, Kuroń, who was one of the founders, largely based his beliefs on how the group should conduct itself in its own struggle against the Soviet Union on the examples of previous oppositional movement against the Union, and those governments that allied with them, while recognizing that those previous struggles would have seen a greater level of success if the different actors saw greater collaboration since he held that "'only well organized, conscious mass resistance movements can save our national existence and culture of totalitarian destruction.'"[54] Thus, when it came to the demands that Kuroń and the KOR made in the wake of the actions taken by the Polish government in 1976, they were limited primarily to reinstating the workers that had been fired in the demonstrations in July and for amnesty to be provided to those who received sentencing.[55] Kuroń also held hopes that it was possible to bring about the "Finlandization" of Poland since both the Soviet Union and the Polish government no longer believed in their founding ideologies, as Kołakowski suggested.[56]

While the Finlandization of the country did not come about from the efforts of the KOR, the group did experience some relative success. They were able to provide aid to those workers who were punished in their demonstrations in 1976. Additionally, they set up newspapers, journals, and a publishing house while organizing lectures and seminars so that they might keep the people of Poland educated in their struggle against the Soviets and the Workers' Party. Of course, the efforts of the KOR were still suppressed by the Polish government, but the point still stands that their efforts served as the beginning of organized opposition in Poland, where the torch was then passed on to Solidarity in 1980. The KOR and its leaders stressed unity, nonviolence, and legality in their means of achieving the future they desired to see in Poland and

[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid, 178.
[56] Ibid.

these same traits were passed on to the efforts of Solidarity either through example and the knowledge of Solidarity leaders of their struggles or through direct instruction and involvement from such people as Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń. Solidarity knew, from the example of the struggles that preceded their own, that operating within the political system of the period was a viable option so that they might try and hollow it out to make it so that bringing about more substantial changes was more feasible.

The Polish dissident movements of the 1970s undoubtedly served as the script, the defining framework, of the revolution that occurred in the 1980s and informed the actions of the Solidarity Trade Union. If the direct connections and parallels in the histories of these two events do not adequately demonstrate this point, though, it is made certain in the words of Lech Wałęsa when he speaks of Jacek Kuroń as "a man of fixed ideas, and the originator of radical concepts… it was him, too, that I owed much, especially the help that KOR gave me and many others when unemployed or in personal difficulties. Now the time had come to repay the debt."[57] With this statement from Wałęsa regarding the role of the KOR and Kuroń in the formation of Solidarity's platform, there can be no doubt that the two events are connected, with one serving as the script for the other, but understanding the script of the Polish Revolution does not simply end at the definition of the framework within which it resided. As has been mentioned previously, part of the beauty of the scripting method is that it not only demonstrates how different revolutionary events are interconnected, but also how the revolutionary actors eventually adapt the script that initially defined their actions so that it might better fit their specific situations. In Russia, adapting meant bending to the desires of the peasantry and the proletariat for the Bolshevik script. In Egypt, it meant moving away from initial ideals regarding the creating of a new

[57] Lech Wałęsa, A Way of Hope, 1st ed. (New York: H. Holt, 1987), 149.

democratic system of governance. Similarly, the Solidarity Trade Union adapted the script that they inherited from the Workers' Defense Committee.

The main adaptation that Solidarity made of the script they inherited from the KOR has to do with the focus, prevalence, and the actions of the working people. In the case of KOR, the actions of the group were primarily directed by the intelligentsia, which was something that was stressed by leaders and thinkers both before and during the group's efforts in the 1970s. The intellectuals were seen as the vanguard of the Polish people and their culture; thus, it was essential that they were not only actively participating in oppositional efforts against the Soviet Union and the Polish United Workers' Party, but that they were also serving as the leaders in those efforts. For Solidarity, the emphasis shifted away from the intelligentsia and more towards the workers. Looking at the occurrences that took place before, during, and after the initiation of martial law in response to Solidarity's growing popularity, it was the workers that were organized nationwide who were at the forefront of the opposition movement against the Polish United Workers' Party. This shift in focus is even highlighted by the leader of Solidarity himself, Lech Wałęşa. Of course, such intellectuals as Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń still played a role advising Solidarity once their time with the KOR was through, but the leading man of the revolutionary occurrence of the 1980s, Wałęşa, had his beginnings as an electrician at Gdańsk Shipyard where his main qualifications for becoming the leader of this mass oppositional movement stemmed from his care for his fellow workers and his efforts to organize them against their oppressors. There were millions of workers in Poland who were facing the brunt of the Party's abuses, and they held the key to both legitimacy and power within the politics of the nation. By tapping into their frustrations and organizing those numbers of people to exert

immense popular pressure against the state government, the leaders at the helm of the Polish Revolution properly adapted the script to fit their unique situation.

III. How Does the Script Perform?

As mentioned earlier, the concept of scripting within the comparative study of revolutions is experimental as it currently stands. After all, the editors of *Scripting Revolution* themselves admit that their work does not even come close to exhausting both the formulation and application of this methodology of historical study, which is why they invite others to test out the script for themselves. Thus, having attempted to apply the script to an event omitted from *Scripting Revolution*, it only seems appropriate to review the ways in which this method is helpful for understanding the different influences that formulate the actions of a revolutionary event as well as the ways in which it might still need to develop.

The main way in which the idea of scripting could improve has to do with having a consistent definition as to what exactly a script is throughout the different texts that attempt to employ the method. In *Scripting Revolution*, reading through the different pieces from the various contributors, it becomes apparent that not everyone who is experimenting with applying the script is on the same page as to what it entails to find the script of any given revolutionary event. For example, with regards to Thatcher and his exploration of the Russian Revolution, he never quite states what the event that served as the defining framework for the revolution was. Rather, he seems to equate the script to the different groups that are trying to direct the course of Russian politics during the country's revolutionary period. Of course, by stepping back and thinking about the work that Thatcher does in his section highlighting the different groups, it is clear to see the ways in which the Russian Revolution shares similarities with the revolutions of France in the 18th and 19th centuries, but such information should be stated explicitly since that is

the main reasoning behind using the scripting method in the first place: inter-revolutionary comparison. Similarly, in the case of another section of *Scripting Revolution* titled "The Reel, Real and Hyper-Real Revolution," the author, Lillian Guerra, seems to interpret the scripts of the Cuban Revolution as the different manners in which both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries portrayed events to the general populace through documentary films.[58] However, there are some authors in *Scripting Revolution* that seemed to have understood the concept of the script, at least as laid out by Baker and Edelstein, in a much more compelling way than others, which is where one can see this methodology truly shine.

One of the authors that seemed to have understood the concept of Baker and Edelstein's script the best has to be Toska with "The Multiple Scripts of the Arab Revolutions." Of course, the majority of her piece describes how the script of the Egyptian Revolution changed over time and moved away from the defining framework and principals that the April 6th Youth Movement initially set out, but she does acknowledge that there was something that the movement was adapting. There were defining characteristics of the movement that did not simply appear out of thin air from the minds of those who were in opposition to the Egyptian government. These revolutionaries saw the success of the Revolutions of 1989 and used those actions, platforms, and ideologies of peaceful reform that ousted communist domination and brought down the Soviet Union to define the basis and framework for their own endeavor where they hoped to accomplish the same goals in their own countries: the establishment of liberal democracy. Yes, the Egyptian Revolution was its own specific event that cannot be properly equated to any other event in history that has significantly transitioned away from the models of the Revolutions of 1989, but the event itself did not occur in a vacuum isolating it from the influence of other events. This is

[58] Lillian Guerra, "The Reel, Real, and Hyper-Real Revolution," in *Scripting Revolution*, ed. Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015), 267–86.

how the scripting method works the best. It combines both the specificity that is necessary in the study of history along with the interconnectivity of other social sciences.

There is a throughline to be found from the present to the distant past that can be brought to light through this method of conducting comparative study. For instance, consider this: as has been brought to light in this section on the script, the Egyptian Revolution is connected to the Polish Revolution of 1989 through the former's decision to take on the latter's script of nonviolence and reformative action through popular pressures to establish democratic principles in a nondemocratic country. Similarly, the Polish Revolution is connected to the Polish dissident movements of the 1960s and 1970s through the decision by Solidarity to base their actions on the principles of nonviolence and reformism developed by the intellectuals of the KOR. However, the connection to the past goes even further than what has been discussed in this section. The truth of this can be seen in the writings of the previously mentioned Jacek Kuroń. Before he was involved in either of these groups, Kuroń was arrested because of the views that he outlined in his "Open Letter to the Party" where he, and his co-author Karol Modzelewski, critiqued the socialism of the USSR and said that it was the responsibility of the working class to uproot the Polish United Workers' Party and free the people of Poland. In making this call to action, though, he acknowledged that the anti-bureaucratic struggle against Stalinism and the Soviets at the hands of the working class began in the 1950s with "the general strike in the GDR and the demonstrations and the street fighting… in Berlin, the series of strikes in the concentration camps in the USSR, the events… in Poznan and the first anti-bureaucratic revolutions in Poland and in Hungary."[59] Furthermore, later in this letter, when Kuroń is describing how revolutionary actions do not necessitate violence to achieve a movements goals, he mentions that "we

[59] Jacek Kuroń, *Solidarność: The Missing Link? : A New Edition of Poland's Classic Revolutionary Socialist Manifesto: Kuroń & Modzelewski's Open Letter to the Party* (London: Bookmarks, 1982), 55.

remember Poznan and Budapest" and the struggle that occurred in those two countries since they serve as examples of revolutionary actions that were meant to remain nonviolent, but were broken down by armed forces and political deprivation.[60] Kuroń, as well as the other intellectuals that founded and supported the KOR, were conscious of the struggles that took place before them and adapted the scripts of those struggles so that they took on the principles that they believed would work in their specific situation while also being willing to adapt those methods and actions to better fit their own struggle.

These, the Egyptian and Polish Revolutions as well as the Polish Dissident movements, are only three examples of how the script can be used to trace the interconnectivity of revolutionary events, but if one were to look into the scripts that served as the basis of the KOR that are mention by Kuroń, the connection would only continue to deepen, reaching back to such foundational revolutionary events as the French, American, and English Revolutions. It could be argued that everything that has happened in the world is connected in some way or another, and scripting is the tool for finding such throughlines between different revolutionary events throughout history while respecting their individual struggles and efforts.

[60] Ibid, 68.

Chapter 3: The Success of the Scripts

I. Defining Success

When it comes to determining whether or not any given event, revolutionary or otherwise, was successful, such a task can be difficult, if not impossible, to undertake. After all, there are countless different variables, perspectives, and opinions that would need to be accounted for. Of course, it is one thing to say that the group that was at the head of an event thought that their endeavor succeeded, but what about those who were in opposition to the movement? Would they, in their now subjugated position, say that what came to pass was successful? Or would they suggest that it was contrary to the values of their country? What about the sentiments of those who are on the receiving end of newly instituted policies and changes? While the movement might have successfully brought change to the system they operated within, who is to say that such changes were actually beneficial for their society as a whole and not simply for a concentrated group of powerful people? Similarly to these issues of perspective, there is also the course of the event that must be brought into considerations of success. Can an event be considered successful if it is still in progress? Or could it be seen as productive if it has achieved such things that might demonstrate that the movement is en route to success? There is undoubtedly a lot to consider when trying to determine the success of an event, which is why the definition of success for this piece will stray away from such divisive typology and instead remain within the realm of discussing the scripts of the various revolutions of interest by relating their intentions to their outcomes.

A defining feature of analyzing revolutionary events through the scripting method is the fact that the frameworks of different events are prone to shift as the initial intentions that the various movements are based upon face the reality of their situations and, thus, necessitate

adaptation to continue in their efforts. That is to say, the goals that any given revolutionary event might have at its conception have the potential to become substantially different from both the adapted intentions that develop and the outcomes that are eventually realized. Through comparing these different stages of the revolutionary process, with the knowledge provided by the understanding of their scripts as a guide, it is possible to come to some semblance of a conclusion regarding the success of a revolutionary movement by determining just how well the acting bodies of the events actualized either their initial intentions or their adapted ones. Then, by comparing the success seen in the outcomes of different types of revolution, it is additionally feasible to create some conclusions regarding whether or not one means of conducting revolution is more effective than others. Do the ends truly justify the means in violent events such as the Russian Revolution? Or is the key to making substantial, meaningful change through nonviolent methods, as seen in the Egyptian and Polish Revolutions?

II. The Intentions of the Scripts vs. Their Outcomes

i. The Bolsheviks and Russia

When returning to the script of the Russian Revolution, there are many different groups and sources that could be observed in an attempt to pin-point the initial intentions of the event itself. Of course, there are the liberals who desire freedom and patience, the moderate socialists that saw liberalism as a means for implementing socialism in Russia, and the Mensheviks who saw liberal domination as something to be short and unstable in the pursuit of their socialist goals. However, as discussed previously, none of these groups, and the scripts that they operated within, were the ones to take the helm of the Russian Revolution. That position went to the Bolsheviks, which they earned by being the most willing to take on the demands of the people and promising to act with immediacy in addressing the issues that plagued the proletarian

population. However, one of the most common critiques of the Bolsheviks and the Soviet Union that stemmed from their actions is that they did not accomplish what they set out to do creating a dictatorship of the proletariat as part of a proletarian revolution. Thus, to determine the verity of such claims regarding the methodology utilized in the Russian Revolution, it is necessary to discern, specifically, what the intentions of the Bolsheviks were, namely what they promised to the proletariat and the peasantry of the country, and how those promises compare to the outcomes of their efforts.

To gain an understanding of what the intentions, demands, and goals of the Bolshevik Party were, there are many different sources of information that might be able to describe these different aspects of the movement, such as the members, onlookers, oppositional forces, or otherwise, which might all have the potential to bring to light what exactly the people of Russia were told regarding the party that led the revolutionary effort. However, there is one singular person whose writings are capable of enumerating exactly what the intentions of the Bolsheviks were, which is the man at the head of the revolution itself: Lenin. In serving as the leader of the Bolshevik party throughout the course of the October Revolution, Lenin wrote many pieces and frequently shared his views regarding the nature of revolution in connection to the state and how the Russian people and his party should conduct their own revolution, the latter of which he clarifies explicitly in a pamphlet suggesting revisions to the program of the party itself in May of 1917. In this, he shares that the preamble of the pamphlet should be altered to state that "only a proletarian socialist revolution can lead humanity out of the deadlock created by imperialism."[61] This statement, of course, is referring to the international situation under the capitalist imperialist

[61] V.I. Lenin, "Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme," in *Selected Works*, vol. VI (London: Lawrence and Wishart LTD., 1964), 105–24, 107.

system, a key focus of Marxist theory, but Lenin also suggests what Russia can do in their situation through the actions taken by the Bolsheviks at the head of the revolution.

In truth, there is much that Lenin suggests to serve as the goals of the Bolshevik party. Chiefly, he argues that "at the present moment… the immediate duty of the party of the proletariat is to fight for a system of state organization which will best guarantee the economic progress and the rights of the people in general, and make possible the least painful transition to socialism in particular."[62] Furthermore, he suggests that the country can no longer exist within a "bourgeois parliamentary democratic republic," the police and standing army should be abolished and replaced by a people's militia, all governmental officials should be elected to office, subject to recall in the event of failure in performing their duties, given a limited income no greater than that of the average worker, and should be entirely replaced by representatives of the Soviet people in due time.[63] He then goes on to say that the new constitution for the new Russian democratic republic should ensure the people's sovereignty and the vesting of supreme power in their hands, proportional representation, abolishment of local authorities, the use of the native language rather than state language, and the right for nationalities to separate from the state. In discussing the financial reality that the revolution, the party, and the people of Russia find themselves in, he says that the conditions "prompt the Party to demand the nationalization of banks, syndicates (trusts), etc."[64] And, finally, with regards to the agrarian program, he states that the Bolshevik party "fights… for the immediate and complete confiscation of all landed estates… stands for the immediate transfer of all land to the peasantry… demands the nationalization of all land in the state… [and] transferring the livestock and agricultural

[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid, 107-108.
[64] Ibid, 109.

implements of the landlords to the peasants."[65] In short, the goal of the Bolshevik party, and therefore the Russian Revolution, is to accomplish a proletarian revolution that entirely disrupts the capitalist imperialist system within Russia through the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat that seeks to level the playing field and aid the working class in achieving this monumental task. That, according to Lenin, is the intention of the Bolsheviks and their script for the Russian Revolution, but how do these sentiments compare to what actually transpired?

In considering the outcomes of the Russian Revolution, it is important to consider exactly where the information is coming from and the reliability of the picture that one might paint of the labor of the Bolsheviks. The reasoning behind mentioning such a thing lies in the implications of returning to the writings of Lenin in an attempt to gauge the success of his party's endeavors. Looking to the future of Russian society, following the primary events of the Russian Revolution, Lenin, in 1918, said that "in a few days we demolished one of the oldest… monarchies. In a few months we went through the phases of coalition with the bourgeoisie and disillusionment in the bourgeois ideal… in a few weeks we deposed the bourgeoisie, and conquered its open resistance in civil war."[66] Continuing on, he claims that the Bolsheviks have instituted a more democratic government in the country, established the dictatorship of the proletariat, and begun the process of socialist reform. In the document in which he discusses this reality, he does also state that the efforts of the revolution, despite having had the supposed successes already, must continue on so that they might expound up this victorious beginning "through a series of hard experiences, to a victorious end."[67] Through this frame of viewing the events of the Russian Revolution, it would seem that the outcomes lined up perfectly with the

[65] Ibid.
[66] V.I. Lenin, "The Chief Task of Our Times" (The Workers' Socialist Federation, 1918), 3.
[67] Ibid, 5.

intentions that were set out from the beginning. However, it is important to consider the fact that Lenin might not have been painting the picture of the achievements of the revolution in an honest light, which is made apparent through the hindsight provided by various Marxists in the time since the Russian Revolution. If the revolution was successful in establishing a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, both being crucial aspects for enacting a truly revolutionary event, as described by Karl Marx, then there should be no qualms with the outcomes of the revolution from those who subscribe to the same ideologies as Lenin in later years. This does not seem to be the case.

The account given by Lenin of the supposed progress of the Russian Revolution, as of 1918, undoubtedly made it seem like the Bolsheviks had achieved a fair amount of their goals and that they were swiftly and assuredly moving towards the creation of a socialist society. However, another piece written in that same year contradicts what Lenin suggested in his own writings. This piece was written by one of the most important Marxist political theorists: Rosa Luxemburg. In her analysis of the Russian Revolution, at least up until the point of her writing the piece, she starts by laying out some of those promises and intentions of the Bolsheviks, such as placing the power entirely in the hands of the working class, creating a dictatorship of the proletariat, and seizing and redistributing the land to the peasantry. However, this is where her view of the revolution differs from that of Lenin since she believes that, as of 1918, the Bolsheviks had not yet achieved what they had set out to do. In the realm of agrarian reforms, she suggests that the Bolsheviks had gone about the process of land reclamation and redistribution in such a forceful way that they have created "enemies of socialism on the countryside."[68] As for the administrative changes that were made, she states that the dissolution

[68] Rosa Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Workers Age Publishers, 1940), 17.

of the Constituent Assembly, formulated by Trotsky and Lenin, was tant-amount to the "elimination of democracy as such, is worse than the disease it is supposed to cure; for it stops up the very living source from which alone can come correction of all the innate shortcomings of social institutions."[69] She also critiques how the Bolsheviks seemed to neglect such things as suffrage as well as "freedom of the press [and] the rights of association and assembly, which have been outlawed for all opponents of the Soviet regime," thus making the rule of the masses unattainable, which she also believes has not been realized.[70] As a Marxist, Luxemburg also believes in the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat in realizing a socialist future, which is why she brings to light the issue of dictatorship within Russia during the period in the fact that it is not the people that are exerting the power over Russian society, but the Bolsheviks who are in control of the entire operation, which is a "distorted expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat."[71] In this analysis of the event, Luxemburg gives a scathing review of the state of the Russian Revolution in 1918, but if what Lenin said is true and that the revolution was still in process and working toward that victorious ending, then perhaps it is the case that the situation improved as the Bolsheviks, and later the Soviets, led the country towards a socialist future. Again, reflective socialists say that was not the case.

In 1948, the Socialist Party of Canada published a piece that described what they saw as the outcomes of the Russian Revolution. In their writings, they shared that they believed that "the Bolshevik Revolution, therefore, was not and could not have been a proletarian revolution. The best that can be said for it is that it was *intended* to be a proletarian revolution."[72] Their evidence for this being the case stems from various issues that came to pass through the actions

[69] Ibid, 28.
[70] Ibid, 32.
[71] Ibid, 40.
[72] Socialist Party, *The Russian Revolution: Its Origin and Outcome.* (Winnipeg: The Party, 1948), 12.

taken by the Bolshevik revolutionaries. They mention how the Bolsheviks restored capital punishment, suppressed oppositional papers, and forced out certain groups from the political system. Furthermore, they bring to light the ways in which the revolution had failed to address the class struggle within Russian society since "'there are classes in the U.S.S.R.: a privileged class and an exploited class, a ruling class and a ruled class,'" which "received the blessing of the government in the new constitution."[73] As for what the revolution that was supposed to be centered around the proletariat actually produced for that group, the Socialist Party of Canada does mention how the standard of living actually rose in the immediate period following the revolution, but that the extent of that reality only lasted until the late 1930s when the average standard of living "dropped to a level 32% lower than the pre-revolutionary standard."[74] In truth, the perspective of the Canadian Socialists seems to suggest that the shortcomings that were observed by Rosa Luxemburg were not addressed in due time, and that the Bolsheviks never actually established a dictatorship of the proletariat nor abolished the capitalist system in the country since "there is no important feature of capitalist society that is not now solidly entrenched in modern Russia."[75]

As suggested by the Socialist Party of Canada, the Bolshevik script for the Russian Revolution had the correct intentions at the outset. It was supposed to be a proletarian revolution with the working class in control of the endeavor. However, regardless of how Lenin might have tried to paint the outcomes of the revolutionary effort in a successful light, outside perspectives from fellow socialists and Marxists seem to suggest that the Bolsheviks did not entirely succeed in realizing their intentions. Yes, the revolution ousted the czar, set up a revolutionary

[73] Ibid, 42, 44.
[74] Ibid, 41.
[75] Ibid, 46.

government, pulled out of the war effort, limited the bourgeoisie, and began the process of the redistribution of land to the peasantry, but the manner in which some of these tasks were accomplished seemed to skew the event more towards the direction of there being a dictatorship of the Bolsheviks rather than a dictatorship of the proletariat. Whether it was the suppression of oppositional voices, even within the socialist parties, the forceful land redistribution process that made some enemies, or the failure to end capitalism within the country, it is clear that the Bolsheviks did not fully succeed in their revolutionary effort, at least in consideration of what they intended to accomplish.

ii. The April 6th Youth Movement and Egypt

Through the previous discussion of the Egyptian Revolution, it may already be clear as to how the intentions demonstrated at the beginning of the event, as championed by the April 6th Youth Movement, differed from the outcomes that were and are experienced to this day. However, there is much more that differentiates the beginning, middle, and end of this event than the shift away from advocating for democratic institutions and practices toward removing the Mubarak regime from power, which is why further elaboration regarding the intentions of the movement from its outset, how those intentions were altered with growing popularity, and what the actual outcomes were is necessary to understand just how successful this revolution was despite the appearance of success in deposing the Mubarak regime.

In the time preceding the April 6th Youth Movement in the 2000s, the situation in Egypt gave rise to "'a process of politicization of formerly apolitical citizens'" that stemmed from the three segments of society that participated in protests: the workers, the pro-democracy

movement, and neighborhood protestors.[76] From these segments, the April 6th Youth Movement had its start when a call for renewed strike action was made on the 6th of April in 2008, which saw the official creation of the Youth Movement itself. In interviews conducted with various members of the movement that started their involvement with the strike in 2008, who then continued their efforts once the movement became official, the manner in which the socioeconomic and political reality of Egypt in the early 2000s informed the initial intentions and goals of the April 6th Movement becomes clear. One man, a former member of the movement's cofounders' committee, notes how the movement transitioned through "many periods" where, initially, they were primarily focused on social and economic endeavors, but, wanting to reach the people whose betterment they advocated for, they then started to take on less political stances since "the street cares about how to eat and how to afford things for children."[77] This, however, seemed to have changed in 2009 when the group started to develop political demands with regards to "'changes in the constitution, removing the emergency law and the linking of prices to wages.'"[78] Additional interviews from other members of the April 6th Youth Movement delve deeper into the explicit aims of the movement. For example, Hassan Maher, a member that created the Giza Governorate's Media Committee stated that the group's demands were "'very obvious and general in nature'" where they wanted to see "'real democracy, with freedom, freedom of thought, and factual expression, no exclusion.'"[79] Another said that the movement did not deal in political demands, but rather in "'making freedom, social justice and human dignity possible.'"[80] Similarly, that same activist suggests that all the movement demands is

[76] Ali Sonay, *Making Revolution in Egypt: The 6 April Youth Movement in a Global Context*, First edition., Library of Modern Middle East Studies (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018), 64.
[77] Ibid, 69.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid, 82.
[80] Ibid.

"'social justice, a minimum and maximum wage, [and] a law regulating network so there is no unemployment.'"[81] If these statements do not already make it abundantly clear what the primary demand of the movement was, it is laid out plainly by one participating political scientist who stated that "'the most important aims are that we want Egypt to become a democratic civil state which respects human rights and implements social justice.'"[82] Achieving this goal was the initial intention of the April 6th Youth Movement, but that did not mean that it remained their primary intention.

As time went on and the movement faced different situations and circumstances in achieving their goal of creating a democratic civil state, the demands and aims of the April 6th Youth Movement became more concrete in some ways while gaining new stances in other areas. The main way in which time and experience altered the intentions of the April 6th Movement was in relation to the regime. Initially, the movement's plans of bringing about principles of democracy and fairness within Egyptian society did not necessitate the fall of the Mubarak regime. However, as recounted by the same political scientist who stated the primary aims of the movement above, once the strikes of 2011 started to occupy space, "'you could hear more and more the demand to bring down the regime.'"[83] As for the parts of the movement's demands for change that were made more explicit, some of these alterations to Egyptian society lay in their socioeconomic platform, especially with regards to having a maximum and minimum wage determined by the state of the cost of living. It was at this point as well that the movement started to try and devise a manner in which they might address both political and economic qualms in a joint manner. Through this frame of formulating and describing their desires, the movement

[81] Ibid, 83.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.

stated that it was against the idea of maintaining systems of capitalism that are either underneath a regime or participating in the capitalist system of the United States. However, they were also against the idea of a return to a socialist society, which suggests, as made explicit by Ahmed Maher, that their systematic solution to the problems they faced lay in the center left with democratic socialism.[84] However, it was in the pursuit of these desires that inevitably led to the volatile state that Egypt continues to find itself in.

Part of the April 6th Youth Movement's methodology in achieving the aims they laid out, which will be of no surprise considering the manner in which the script of the event adapted to the situation of the country, as discussed previously, was in the inclusion of different groups regardless of the ideology or segment of society from which they came. The movement was centered around an "'Aprilian ideology,'" which meant that they had no singular defining ideology. Rather, they were a group composed of Nasserists, Islamists, ElBaradei supporters, and those without a specific ideology.[85] Having a basis in this level of cross-ideological inclusivity was effective in garnering having numbers and power behind the April 6th Movement, but it did lead to considerable fragmentation amongst the membership. Since there was no universal ideology of the movement, this also meant that there was no universal aim. So, when it came time for elections once the Mubarak regime was removed from power, the inclusiveness of the movement created mixed results. Of course, those actors of the Egyptian Revolution who belonged to the core of the April 6th Movement were thrilled to have such an election in the first place, but the issue that rose during this democratic event was that the Youth Movement was no longer the most popular force of the revolution. That position went to the Muslim Brotherhood. So, when the election happened, the April 6th Youth Movement ended up supporting Mursi so

[84] Ibid, 86.
[85] Ibid.

that they might continue the movement as a whole, rather than allowing Mursi's opponent Ahmed Shafiq, one of Mubarak's men, win the position, through finding some manner to solve their cross-ideological situation. Doing this meant maintaining the well-being of the country, which necessitated some measure of stability and not a battle between forces within the revolutionary movement. Additionally, following this turning point in the revolution, it became clear that the movement was starting to take on some nationalistic principles where ideas were championed on Facebook pages about preserving the national identity and being mindful of the country's history when making changes going forward.

Clearly, the intentions of the revolutionaries of Egypt shifted considerably from their conception up until, and even past, the elections of 2011 and 2012, but looking at such things does not really do much in determining the success of the event. After all, it is one thing to share and promise certain changes and a whole other endeavor to actually deliver. So, what exactly were the outcomes that stemmed from the election of the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Mursi? The answer is underwhelming. While the revolutionary movement did succeed in ousting the Mubarak regime from power, what came to follow from the election of Mursi was essentially "a continuation of Mubarak's regime by a different actor."[86] Mursi did, indeed, beat his opponent, who wished to continue the legacy of Mubarak, but it was Mursi himself who essentially continued Mubarak's rule through his own actions. When it came to fulfilling the April 6th Youth Movement's promise of creating a new constitution, the effort was abandoned by the non-Islamists that participated in the document's drafting since Mubarak and the Brotherhood were neglecting consideration of "consensual mechanisms."[87] In response to this situation, Mursi then decided, apparently out of fear of facing repercussions by the judiciary, that

[86] Ibid, 77.
[87] Ibid.

the upper house and constitutional assembly would be immune from judicial action and that "'his own decrees were immune from judicial review.'"[88] Of course, such actions from Mursi were met with significant public backlash, which eventually resulted in his removal and a new round of elections, but those new elections ended up bringing people to power who opposed not only the Muslim Brotherhood, but also the April 6th Youth Movement and young revolutionaries as a whole, which resulted in the group being banned in 2014.[89]

In observing the outcomes of the efforts of the April 6th Youth Movement and comparing them to the intentions that were initially set out alongside the adapted goals of the revolutionary effort, what is demonstrated by the events that occurred might lead one to believe that the event failed as a whole. However, coming to such a conclusion would entirely discredit what work was done through the efforts of the participating revolutionaries. While the results of the effort did, in fact, lead to the installment of regimes that looked and functioned much like the bodies that ran the Egyptian government that created the conditions for revolution in the first place, it is important to consider the circumstances that led to such groups obtaining power. The movement not only succeeded in accomplishing its adapted goal of ousting the Mubarak regime, but it also successfully created the conditions for free and fair elections to be held and for democratic processes to be pursued. While it is true that such efforts did eventually grow to act as a counterrevolutionary force when it came to the creation of a new constitution under Mursi's presidency and the ban of the April 6th Youth Movement under the subsequent administration, the point still stands that the movement did accomplish some of its goals. Additionally, just because the revolution saw mixed success from the perspective of the April 6th Movement up until this point, that does not mean that the work is done. One way of looking at the event, as

[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid, 78.

suggested by an April 6th activist is that "'perhaps the revolution didn't realize its aims […] But it may also be that the revolution is prolonged. How can it be prolonged? By inheriting the revolutionary and cultural consciousness and the building of collectivity.'"[90] So, while the revolution, in its current state, may be considered generally unsuccessful when considering how the outcomes did not accomplish all that was desired by the revolutionaries of the April 6th Youth Movement, the actors of the script of the Egyptian Revolution, that does not mean that they cannot still take the necessary actions to further adapt the script and their actions to fit the context of Egypt and eventually realize the intentions with which they set out in this endeavor.

iii. Solidarity and Poland

Seeing as the entire course of the Polish Revolution has already been discussed, the task of cutting straight into the intentions and outcomes of the event is made much simpler than for the cases of Russia and Egypt. With that in mind, to determine the intentions of the Polish Revolution, it is necessary to consider the two different periods of Polish history that the event occupied and how the demands of the Solidarity Trade Union were altered by the context within which they were situated. These two periods are, as discussed in great detail previously, the time when Solidarity was a fledgling, although popular, trade union before the implementation of martial law and the time that followed the cessation of Jaruzelski's attempt at curbing the influence of the trade union within the country.

In the period prior to martial law, specifically in 1980, Solidarity was technically not yet a formal trade union, at least not until later in the year. However, that did not mean that the roots of Solidarity were not already forming during the strikes that broke out that year, especially at the one at the Gdańsk Shipyard. The reasoning behind this being the case is that the group that

[90] Ibid, 95.

organized those strikes in 1980 was the Inter-enterprise Strike Committee (MKS), which was headed by none other than the man who would later lead Solidarity to victory and become the president of the country: Lech Wałęşa. In a bulletin published by the MKS in August during the strike in the Gdańsk Shipyard, the group listed the 21 demands that must be met in order for the strikes to come to a conclusion. These demands included the recognition of the Free Trade Union, guarantees for the right to strike, protection of the freedoms of expression and publication, restoration of the rights of those who were punished during previous events in the defense of workers' rights, access to mass media, initiation of actions to address the country's economic situation, assurance of the availability of food products, suppression of floating prices, lowering the retirement age, improvement of working conditions, increase of travel allowance, and making Saturday a work-free day.[91]

Of course, after these demands were addressed, the extent of which will be discussed later, Prime Minister Jaruzelski brought Poland into a state of martial law where Solidarity was no longer legally recognized as a formal trade union. Thus, the next point of the Polish Revolution where the intentions of Solidarity can be identified is in the years following Jaruzelski's decision to end martial law in his illusion of control over the country. While Solidarity remained an unrecognized organization going into the period of martial law, that did not mean that they did not hold significant political sway in the country, which was something they fought to maintain whilst underground. Thus, once the restrictions of martial law were lifted, strikes broke out once more, Wałęşa won in a televised debate, and Solidarity was asked to come to the bargaining table with the Polish United Workers' Party. It is in those Round Table Talks that the renewed intentions of Solidarity can be observed. Since these talks were set up as

[91] Lech Wałęsa, *A Way of Hope*, 1st ed. (New York: H. Holt, 1987), 131-133.

means of negotiation between Solidarity and the Polish United Workers' Party, the two different sides both had something that they wanted to get out of the interaction. On Solidarity's side of the table, the main thing that they wanted was to rectify what had been taken from them when Jaruzelski imposed martial law: legal recognition. Besides that, they were also interested in the creation of a system that would check governmental power, and the officials who exercised said powers, as well as increasing parliamentary representation within the Sejm. From their perspective, the negotiators of Solidarity believed that instituting these changes would, at the very least, pressure whoever might be in power to agree to making reforms within the country regarding civil freedoms such as "the freedoms of association and speech, access to mass media for the opposition, and changes in the court system and local self-government."[92] On the other side of the table, the Party simply wanted Solidarity to shoulder some of the responsibility for the ineffective reforms made by the Rakowski government in their limited representation within the parliamentary bodies. The initial demands from both sides for these talks undoubtedly shifted throughout the multiple meetings, but they did eventually reach an agreement that worked out much in favor of Solidarity.

With the demands of Solidarity now lined out clearly, for both before and after martial law, it is possible to determine just how successful the group was in realizing these intentions in the outcomes of the Polish Revolution. With regards to the 21 demands of the MKS, it should come as no surprise that the strikes that were advocating for those demands saw a fair amount of success since, one, Solidarity was born from those demands and became a legally recognized trade union and, two, martial law was used by Jaruzelski to address the growing popularity and success of the trade union and the freedoms that were granted as a result of the Gdańsk

[92] Paczkowski, *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, 292.

Agreement. It was on August 31st of 1980, a Monday, when the two sides of the disagreement were able to strike an accord and bring about the existence of the Gdańsk Agreement. From that brief period of cooperation, such things as the legality of trade unions and the right to strike came to be legalized and allowed within the country, but just because such things were allowed did not necessarily mean that their proceeding actions were taken smoothly. Wałęsa's accounts reveal that once the people of Poland, and therefore Solidarity, were provided those limited freedoms, they were plagued by a multitude of questions regarding their identity and platform; "what kind of Poland did we want? What sort of Poland was possible?... How do we resolve the thorny problem of censorship… the monopoly of the mass media… an economy doomed to inefficiency?"[93] Wałęsa also brings to light the fact that, while trying to find answers to these questions, Solidarity found itself in a volatile and uncertain point in Polish history since "during the strike, [they] had been the driving force, [they] had set out the problems to be resolved… but now the situation had changed. It was a race against the clock and [they] no longer had control of events."[94] So, while Solidarity technically had the means of realizing the changes that were laid out in the 21 demands of the MKS, that did not mean that it was time for those changes to be enacted, which was most certainly the case when Jaruzelski came into power and pulled the plug on the entire operation. Thus, the first phase of the Polish Revolution only saw some amount of success, which was then nullified by the implementation of martial law, yet that was not the end of the revolution. There was still a chance for a successful outcome.

Much in the same way that Lenin made a statement saying that the Bolsheviks had succeeded in destroying the czardom and deposing the bourgeoisie, Wałęsa made a similar statement regarding the supposed success of Solidarity in the Polish Revolution following the

[93] Wałęsa, *A Way of Hope*, 147.
[94] Ibid.

elections resulting from the Round Table Talks. In this statement, he mentioned how the event managed to maintain its nonviolent character and that all the movement was guilty of was "stubbornness, sacrifice, and abnegation."[95] Additionally, he stated that, "the Solidarity movement was successful because at every point it fought for whatever solution was the most humane, the most worthy, and for whatever was an alternative to brutality and hatred… and that is why, after many long years – and moments of real tragedy – we have succeeded."[96] While this portrayal of the efforts of Solidarity in the Polish Revolution is glowing, it could be the case that Wałęsa was simply painting the efforts of the movement in this positive light to provide some measure of legitimacy to himself and his party as it was entering the fray of Polish politics, much like Lenin did in trying to rally the people of Russia to the Bolshevik cause, which is why it is important to look into other another interpretation of what came to pass in 1989.

In his book *The Magic Lantern*, Timothy Garton Ash recounts his experiences in seeing the Revolutions of 1989 firsthand. He was in Budapest for the funeral of Imre Nagy, he was in Berlin when the wall fell, he was in Prague during the Velvet Revolution and met with Vaclav Havel himself, and he was in Warsaw before, throughout, and following the Solidarity's decisive electoral victory. In his observations of the event that was that fateful election, Ash, of course, lines out such things as the unprecedented victory of Solidarity in winning every seat they could in the Sejm as well as almost every seat in the Senate, but he also brings attention to the actions that followed this successful election. In their victory, Solidarity was faced with a situation where they were thrust into power faster than anyone would have anticipated and held complete legitimacy in their actions as a result of the public support they received. They finally had the

[95] Lech Wałęsa, *The Struggle and the Triumph: An Autobiography*, 1st English-language ed. (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1992), 233.
[96] Ibid.

tools to reshape Poland and, according to Ash, that is exactly what they did. In terms of the economic situation, which Solidarity had always promised to address, a team of economists swiftly put together a budget and legislative package that was approved by the parliament within twelve days of its initial proposition.[97] The political transition saw Solidarity's utilization of the current bureaucracy in such an effective manner that "the government had started to govern," which Ash says seems like an odd observation to make, but that "it had not happened in Poland for at least fifty years."[98] And, finally, there is the transition away from Soviet communism and the limitations that came along with life under such a system, which Ash suggests that "to say that communism ended on [June 4th, 1989] was a poetic exaggeration. But the end of communism in Poland followed directly from the free vote of the Polish people on that fourth of June."[99] So, it seems that there was truth in what Wałęsa said. The outcomes of the Polish Revolution lived up to the intentions that were set out both in 1980 and in 1989 in terms of the limitations of civil freedoms, the ineffective governance of the Polish United Workers' Party, and the undesirable economic situation that the country had faced for decades.

III. Comparing the Outcomes

As mentioned in the introduction to this section discussing the success of the revolutions of interest, the Russian, Egyptian, and Polish Revolutions, there are countless manners in which one could determine just how successful any given event or movement could be. For example, take the case of the Russian Revolution where Lenin swore that he and his Bolsheviks succeeded in deposing the bourgeoisie and establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat within the country. Or, with the Egyptian Revolution where the Muslim Brotherhood might have called the event

[97] Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern*, 43.
[98] Ibid, 44.
[99] Ibid, 46.

successful in the election of Mohamed Mursi until he was replaced by Minister of Defense Abel Fattah el-Sisi, who might have then found the struggle to be successful as a result of his electoral victory. Of course there are also such perspectives that might consider the movements an outright failure, like the Mensheviks and Liberals in Russia or the Polish United Workers' Party of Poland, the latter of which might even be debatable considering the negotiation between the Party and Solidarity. In light of these considerations, it is important to know how one might go about determining the success of any given event, which is why this methodology of comparing intentions and outcomes was utilized throughout this section. From the research done utilizing these means, the reality of the three revolutions of interest is given greater clarity. That is, to some degree, at least.

So, how does the nonviolent Polish Revolution of 1989 match up to its violent predecessor, the Russian Revolution in 1917, and its similarly nonviolent successor, the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, in terms of success in achieving the outcomes that were lined out in the intentions of those who were at the head of the endeavors? Looking at the events in terms of the completion of goals, the Polish Revolution seems to stand above the other two in a significant way. Of the demands that were laid out by Solidarity, they managed to address the vast majority of them through the negotiations held with the Party in the Round Table Talks and through their elected positions in the following years. They had trade unions independent from the government relegalized, issues of civil liberties were addressed, packages aimed at tackling the economic situation ended up making their way through parliament, and the era of communist rule came to an end, in due time. On the other hand, while the Bolsheviks and the April 6th Youth Movement did see some level of success in their efforts, there were some larger issues that were either left unaddressed or were abandoned for a later date in the hopes of continuing the revolutionary

movements. While the Russian Revolution succeeded in ending the czardom, leaving the war effort, and redistributing property to the peasantry, albeit forcefully, the Bolsheviks failed to let go of their powers to allow the event to become a proletarian revolution with the dictatorship of the proletariat at the helm. Similarly, the April 6th Youth Movement succeed in ousting the Mubarak regime, but at the cost of ensuring the establishment of a free and fair democracy in the country through their collaboration with groups that only shared sentiments regarding the end of the old regime and not the start of the next phase of Egyptian governance. However, to consider these events unsuccessful because they were unable to address every issue that they set out to accomplish is diminutive of the feats that the revolutionaries did achieve.

Deposing an existing regime is by no means an easy task and, going off of the precedent that was set by the definition of revolution that was given at the beginning of this piece, doing as such would qualify the event as a revolution. Thus, it could be said that while the Russian and Egyptian Revolutions were unsuccessful in completing all of the tasks that the original revolutionaries who set the scripts intended to accomplish, they were successful in instituting a significant shift in the economic, social, and political realities of their given countries. However, it is also possible that even this statement could be refuted if one were to suggest that the situations before and after those two revolutionary events actually did not significantly differ. Through this line of reasoning, one might argue that the rule of the Bolsheviks, and then the Soviets, produced a dictatorship that heavily resembled that of the czardom while the government under the Muslim Brotherhood and Minister el-Sisi felt much like what was experienced under Mubarak. Thus, the case for the Russian and Egyptian Revolutions is left slightly unclear. Some might say that they were entirely successful, others might claim that they were partially successful or even outright failures. Additionally, it is crucial to point out that this

being the reality of gauging the success of these events does not have anything to do with the means that either set of revolutionaries used to achieve their ends. If the Bolsheviks opted to utilize peaceful methods, that would not have ensured the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and a utopic socialist future in Russia. If the April 6th Youth Movement had decided to launch a guerilla campaign against the Mubarak regime, that would not have forced the Muslim Brotherhood to want to install democratic principles and practices into the government of Egypt, nor would it have necessarily prevented Minister el-Sisi from earning a position in office. The Polish Revolution was not more successful than the Russian and Egyptian Revolution because it was nonviolent; the Egyptian Revolution's lesser success demonstrates why that is the case. Rather, the example given by Poland showcases how nonviolent revolution was the right manner of revolting for the country with consideration of their history and the specific situation within which the revolution occurred. There is no "better" means of conducting a revolution. There is no "more successful" way to overthrow a government. Instead, it is simply a matter of finding the right manner to revolt at the right place and the right time, which is why being conscientious of not only your own country's history, but also the history of revolution internationally and the scripts that those examples provide is crucial to mounting a successful revolutionary effort.

Chapter 4: The Future of Nonviolent Revolution

What does the example of the Polish Revolution of 1989, its script and its outcome, have to offer for those that might want to make their own revolution in the modern day using the same means as the Polish people did in that fateful year? If anything, it stands as a testament to the importance of not only the study of history for any singular country or event, but of the study of historical occurrences on a global scale. While it might have been nice to have been able to make some grand swathing statement about the Polish Revolution serving as an example of the vast superiority of using nonviolent means to make the change that one may want to see in the world, that is simply not the truth of the reality within which we live. The truth is that the reason why the Polish Revolution saw the level of success that it did, the reason why nonviolence worked, is because the members of the Solidarity Trade Union knew that using such means would be effective in their specific situation at the end of the 1980s, which differed greatly from when they first tried to utilize such means at the start of the decade. When Solidarity, the Inter-enterprise Strike Committee, or the various protestors of 1980 used nonviolence to achieve the Gdańsk Agreement, they were soon met with the iron first of Jaruzelski with the imposition of martial law. Initially, nonviolence failed in Poland. Not only during the time of Solidarity, but in the era of KOR in the 1960s and 70s as well. However, when Solidarity reemployed such means in the last years of the decade, they did so because the situation was drastically different than it was before. Jaruzelski was no longer willing to seek military interference in the matters of the country because, one, he did not want to displease the public in the reinstatement of martial law, two, he wanted to be Gorbachev's assistant in Poland with regards to reforming the country through perestroika and glasnost and, three, he soon came to realize that he, and the Polish United Workers' Party, no longer had the legitimacy to maintain control and that, as a result of

Wałęsa's televised debate, that it was time to transition to a new era of Polish government. What Solidarity did in this case, then, is they took advantage of the situation that Jaruzelski laid out before them. They picked a script to serve as the basic framework for their actions that considered not only the situation that they were currently in, but the options that were available to them as lined out by the broader history of revolution and the country's own history of nonviolent action. They found the course of action that was right for them, and that is what led to their success in 1989. It was not the means that they used, but the manner in which they utilized such means.

There is no right and wrong way of conducting a revolution. No means of revolting is better than another. A violent revolution made nonviolent does not ensure that the event will see the same success as the Polish Revolution, nor will steering away from nonviolence doom a movement to an uncertain level of accomplishment. The key to the future of revolution, the future of making meaningful change in the world, is not something that is easy to find. It will not be discovered through the universal application of certain means, disciplines, or actions that are easily transferable from one occurrence to the next. Rather, it is something that every revolutionary, and the event within which they participate, will have to discover on their own. There will be no clear answer. There will be no directly applicable historical parallel. Rather, such answers will only be discoverable through an understanding of the history of revolutionary movements and the specificity of any given situation so that, when the time comes, an answer can be found that is contentious of needs of the moment while being informed by the vast wealth of knowledge provided by that which has already passed. Perhaps the answer will be violence. Perhaps the legacy of nonviolence that began with the Polish Revolution will continue on. That is for the revolutionaries of the future to decide.

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