A Handbook for Educational Leaders Applying the Principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design by Tod Schneider Hill Walker Jeffrey Sprague ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management College of Education University of Oregon 2000 ii Safe School Design: A Handbook for Educational Leaders Applying the Principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Editorial Director: Stuart C. Smith Photographs: Tod Schneider ___________________________________________________________________ Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schneider,Tod. Safe school design : a handbook for educational leaders applying the principles of crime prevention through environmental design / by Tod Schneider, Hill Walker, Jeffrey Sprague. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISBN 0-86552-148-4 1. School buildings?Design and construction?Security measures. 2. School violence?Prevention. I. Walker, Hill M. II. Sprague, Jeffrey R. (Jeffrey Richard ), 1956- III. Title. LB3221 .S33 2000 371.6?dc21 00-061694 ___________________________________________________________________ Type: 12 pt Times New Roman Printer: Sheridan Books, Chelsea, Michigan UOPS: G270 Printed on recycled paper FIRST EDITION Printed in the United States of America, 2000 ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management 5207 University of Oregon Eugene, OR 97403-5207 Telephone: (541) 346-5044 Fax: (541) 346-2334 World Wide Web: http://eric.uoregon.edu ERIC/CEM Accession Number: EA 030 490 This publication was prepared in part with funding from the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education, under contract no. OERI-RR 93002006. The opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the Department of Education. The University of Oregon is an equal opportunity, affirmative action institution committed to cultural diversity. iii MISSION OF ERIC AND THE CLEARINGHOUSE The Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) is a national information system operated by the U.S. Department of Education. ERIC serves the educational community by disseminating research results and other resource information that can be used in developing more effective educational programs. The ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, one of several such units in the system, was established at the University of Oregon in 1966. The Clearinghouse and its companion units process research reports and journal articles for announcement in ERIC?s index and abstract bulletins. Research reports are announced in Resources in Education (RIE), available in many libraries and by subscription from the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402-9371. Most of the documents listed in RIE can be purchased through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service, operated by Cincinnati Bell Information Systems. Journal articles are announced in Current Index to Journals in Education. CIJE is also available in many libraries and can be ordered from Oryx Press, 4041 North Central Avenue at Indian School, Suite 700, Phoenix, Arizona 85012. Semiannual cumulations can be ordered separately. Besides processing documents and journal articles, the Clearinghouse prepares bibliographies, literature reviews, monographs, and other interpretive research studies on topics in its educational area. CLEARINGHOUSE NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD George Babigian, Executive Director, American Education Finance Association Anne L. Bryant, Executive Director, National School Boards Association Vincent L. Ferrandino, National Association of Elementary School Principals Paul Houston, Executive Director, American Association of School Administrators Karen Seashore Louis, Vice President, Division A, American Educational Research Association John T. MacDonald, Director, State Leadership Center, Council of Chief State School Officers Gerald Tirozzi, Executive Director, National Association of Secondary School Principals Michelle Young, Executive Director, University Council for Educational Administration ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF Philip K. Piele, Professor and Director Stuart C. Smith, Associate Director v About the Authors Tod Schneider is the Eugene, Oregon, Police Department?s Crime Pre- vention Specialist and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Analyst. He also serves other law-enforcement and educational agencies through his work as a national consultant and lecturer on vio- lence, environmental design, and confrontation management. He is an affiliate of the Institute on Violence and Destructive Behavior at the University of Oregon. Officer Schneider works closely with communi- ties and schools in implementing violence-prevention strategies, and in creating positive school climates. ? ? ? Hill Walker is codirector, along with Jeffrey Sprague, of the Institute on Violence and Destructive Behavior (IVDB) at the University of Oregon and has conducted research on students with disruptive behavior disorders in school settings for over three decades. He is a specialist in school- and preschool-based prevention and is the principal developer of the First Step to Success early intervention program for coping with antisocial behavior patterns at the point of school entry. His work in making schools safer and violence free has been broadly recognized nationally. ? ? ? Jeffrey Sprague is an expert in school safety, violence prevention, de- linquency, and evaluation of programs in delinquency prevention and school safety. He serves as codirector of the IVDB and is the principal investigator of the Peaceable Educational Practices Program for creating positive, safe, and effective schools. Dr. Sprague is a national expert in the above areas and is highly influential in state and federal policy initia- tives in school safety and prevention of youth violence. vii Preface This resource guide was written to help school board members and school leaders create safer schools through effective design, usage, and supervision strategies. The guide is based on principles and concepts of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). The guide is a product of the Institute on Violence and Destructive Behavior (IVDB), which is codirected by Jeffrey Sprague, Ph.D., and Hill Walker, Ph.D. The institute was founded in 1994 to systematically address issues of youth violence and destructive behavior, particularly within school settings but also in community contexts. The institute is one of four centers and institutes in the College of Education at the Uni- versity of Oregon that collectively house and coordinate all research, development, and outreach activities of college faculty and staff. The IVDB?s mission is to ?empower schools and social service agen- cies to address violence and destructive behavior at the point of school entry and beyond, in order to ensure safety and facilitate the academic achievement and healthy social development of children and youth.? This mission is accomplished by and through the following means: 1. conducting original research 2. developing tools and intervention programs that will address the needs of at-risk youth, their family members, and the professionals who serve them in a range of school and agency contexts 3. providing training and technical assistance to personnel, agencies, and legislative bodies in order to make schools safer, effective, and violence free 4. contributing to the development of policies and practices that will allow the best information to be accessed and applied in addressing the critical issues of school safety and violence prevention- intervention The content of this volume focuses on this latter strategy for enhanc- ing school safety. This document was developed by IVDB-affiliated personnel with the goal of creating safer schools by providing school administrators and school board members with access to the extensive body of knowledge on innovations in the architectural design, use, and supervision of space in our schools. The senior author, Tod Schneider, a crime-prevention specialist for the Eugene, Oregon, police department, has considerable expertise in viii Safe School Design evaluating and providing technical assistance to schools and community agencies in Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). A great deal is currently known about enhancing school safety through this avenue, but this knowledge has not been systematically applied in our public school systems. The purpose of this book is to synthesize, integrate, and make avail- able to school personnel solid information on this topic in the hope that it will make their tasks easier in ensuring the safety of students in the school setting as well as in the neighborhoods and communities that schools serve. ix Table of Contents About the Authors ...................................................................................................................................v Preface ................................................................................................................................................... vii List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................... xi List of Figures ....................................................................................................................................... xii List of Sidebars .................................................................................................................................... xiii List of Forms and Other Instruments ............................................................................................... xiv 1. The Changed Landscape of School Safety and Security ................................................................1 Characteristics of Safe and Unsafe Schools .........................................................................................2 Sources of Vulnerability to School Safety ...........................................................................................3 The Role of Physical Design and Technology in Creating Safer Schools ...........................................3 Social Ecology and Safe School Environments ...................................................................................7 The Knowledge Base on Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) .....................9 2. The Relevance of CPTED as a Strategy for Improving School Safety and Security ................. 11 CPTED as a Tool for Enhancing School Safety.................................................................................12 CPTED Profiles of Recent School Tragedies ....................................................................................13 3. Key CPTED Concepts and Principles ............................................................................................23 Natural Surveillance ...........................................................................................................................24 Natural Access Control ......................................................................................................................24 Territorial Behavior ............................................................................................................................25 Design Conflict ..................................................................................................................................27 4. Site Evaluation: The Foundation for Improving School Safety and Security ............................31 Initial Assessment on Self-Report Instruments ..................................................................................31 School Environmental Design Assessment ........................................................................................35 Conducting the School-Site Evaluation .............................................................................................45 Conclusion .........................................................................................................................................69 5. Case Study Applications of CPTED Principles .............................................................................71 St. Helena Elementary........................................................................................................................71 Braddock Elementary .........................................................................................................................73 6. The Role of Architects in School Design ........................................................................................79 7. Policy Recommendations for School Districts ...............................................................................87 Future Construction............................................................................................................................87 Maintenance of Existing Structures ...................................................................................................89 Security Technology...........................................................................................................................92 Safe School Design x Common Errors ..................................................................................................................................92 Conclusion .........................................................................................................................................93 Recommended Resources for Enhancing School Safety and Security .............................................95 Appendices .............................................................................................................................................99 A. National School Safety Center?s School Crime Assessment Tool .............................................101 B. Oregon School Safety Survey ....................................................................................................103 Bibliography.........................................................................................................................................107 xi List of Tables Table 2-1 Profiles of Recent School Violence Incidents .................................................................14 Table 2-2 Expert Coding of Strategies and Interventions According to Their Likely Effectiveness in Reducing School Violence Incidents ...................................................15 Table 2-3 Generic Situations Coded for Likely Effectiveness in Terms of Responsiveness to Differing Strategies and Interventions .............................................................................17 Table 5-1 Websites on School Safety, Violence Prevention, and CPTED .....................................76 Table 6-1 Scheme A: St. Helena Elementary ....................................................................................83 Table 6-2 Scheme B: St. Helena Elementary ....................................................................................85 xii List of Figures Figure 1-1 Bipolar Dimensions and Attributes of Unsafe and Safe Schools with Associated Risk and Protective Factors .................................................................................................4 Figure 1-2 Major Components of a Prototype Safe-Schools Plan.........................................................5 Figure 1- 3 School Safety: Sources of Vulnerability in School Settings ................................................6 Figure 4-1 Lowest Security Level .......................................................................................................62 Figure 4-2 Office Is Located Along Main Hallway .............................................................................62 Figure 4-3 Office Extends into Main Hallway ....................................................................................62 Figure 4-4 Office Extends into Main Hallway and Includes View to Outside ....................................62 Figure 4-5 Entry Design Now Heightens Surveillance Capability......................................................63 Figure 4-6 Multiple Entries Have Now Been Reduced .......................................................................63 Figure 4-7 The Main Entry Door Now Leads to a Double-Door Decompression Chamber/Vestibule .............................................................................................................63 Figure 6-1 St. Helena Elementary School?Security Study Diagram of Existing School and Site-Security Issues ........................................81 Figure 6-2 St. Helena Elementary School?Security Study Scheme A: Provides Most Extensive Natural Surveillance from Office Without Visual 0bstacles ..................................................................82 Figure 6-3 St. Helena Elementary School?Security Study Scheme B: Surveillance Improved by the Temporary Classrooms North of New Administration Offices, but Some Issues Unresolved .....................................84 Figure 7-1 Elements of School Security .............................................................................................91 xiii List of Sidebars Use of Security Measures by Schools ....................................................................................................8 A Brief History of CPTED ....................................................................................................................10 Public Perception vs. Reality ................................................................................................................16 Thurston High School ............................................................................................................................18 Kip Kinkel?s Route of Access, May 21, 1998, 0755 hours ................................................................20 The Use of Glass Reinforcement ..........................................................................................................25 Access-Control Devices ........................................................................................................................26 Examples of Territoriality That Lead to Exclusion .............................................................................27 Communication Devices .......................................................................................................................29 Eight-Point CPTED Needs Assessment ...............................................................................................32 Parents and Schools Succeeding in Providing Organized Routes to Travel (PASSPORT) .............46 Parking, Growth, and Entry Points .......................................................................................................49 Impact of Adult Presence ......................................................................................................................55 The Electronic Surveillance Paradox ...................................................................................................57 Security Vestibules ...............................................................................................................................59 Flame Detectors .....................................................................................................................................66 Critiques of Selected School Incidents: Could They Have Been Prevented Through Application of CPTED Principles? ...............................................................................................74 Security Ideas for New School Design ................................................................................................88 xiv List of Forms and Other Instruments Campus Incident Frequency and Severity Scale .................................................................................33 School Environmental Design Assessment Cover Sheet ....................................................................38 School Environmental Design Assessment Cover Sheet (Completed Sample) .............................39 Site-Assessment Form ...........................................................................................................................40 Site-Assessment Form (Completed Sample) ......................................................................................41 Location Checklist .................................................................................................................................42 1 These terrible school tragedies signaled the advent of a new and deadly escalation of violence: multiple homicides and exten- sive injuries of many students and adults. Since 1993, 48 students have been killed and 91 injured in school shootings (Rib- bon of Promise, 2000). Until the 1990s, most school deaths rep- resented single occurrences; the tragedies at the above sites marked unfortunate ex- ceptions to this pattern. For example, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, which monitor school shootings, report that dur- ing the 1992-93 school year, there were two campus tragedies involving multiple homi- cides; in the 1997-98 school year, there were five. There was none in 1993-94, one in 1994-95, and four each in 1995-96 and 1996-97. These disturbing statistics reflect an ominous trend that we all hope will not continue. On February 29, 2000, a seven-year-old boy from a dysfunctional, chaotic family background in Flint, Michigan, brought a stolen, 32-caliber handgun to school and shot to death a six-year-old girl with whom he?d had an argument the day before. This event marks yet another change in the school-shootings landscape in that both the victim and victimizer were first-graders. That the scourge of school shootings could extend downward to this age level borders on the unbelievable?but it has. As a society, we need to understand the real risks that impinge upon children?s lives in today?s society, and take positive steps to prevent similar events from occurring in the future. The public response to the spate of school shootings and myriad threats of vio- lence from students over the past seven years has been immediate and strong, re- sulting in enormous pressures on school administrators to do everything in their power to make schools safer and violence free. To date, the educational community seems to have invested primarily in a two- pronged response. The first strategy has been to intensify conventional school-security measures, which range from I.D. cards to metal de- CHAPTER1 Introduction The Changed Landscape of School Safety and Security In the decade of the nineties, the landscape of school safety and youth violence in U.S. schools changed dramatically?perhaps in ways that most observers of the educational scene could hardly have imagined. The place names of Jonesboro, Arkansas; West Paducah, Kentucky; Edinboro, Pennsylvania; Springfield, Oregon; and Littleton, Colo- rado, are forever etched in our collective memory. 2 Safe School Design These students are writing appreciative comments on each others? paper capes. A positive school climate is a strong protective factor. tectors. The effectiveness and appropriate- ness of metal detectors in the school set- ting continue to be hotly debated. In a fur- ther effort to enhance security, many schools have also increased the presence of school resource officers. A second strategy has involved attempts at profiling and identifying students who may have a higher than normal risk of com- mitting violent acts. Numerous checklists of symptoms and supposed indicators of potential violence have emerged, but little attention has been paid to their validity, which is extremely limited for the purpose of identifying, before the fact, students likely to perpetrate acts of school violence. Profiling strategies, long used by the FBI in the search for patterns of criminal behavior, have a substantial downside risk when applied to the complex task of de- tecting potentially violent offenders in schools. School-based profiling is far more likely to stigmatize vulnerable youth and ruin their reputations than it is to aid in the early detection or interdiction of a poten- tially violent student. This overall approach of relying on se- curity measures and profiling techniques is fraught with limitations, and it may be appropriate only within chaotic schools that serve crime-ridden neighborhoods in some of our nation?s inner cities. The ma- jority of schools will be better served by implementing alternative techniques of a more positive, enduring nature that shape the design, structure, operation, and climate of the school. We recommend that school officials consider these alternatives before resorting to the severe measures of increas- ing security and profiling G43G68G61G72G61G63G74G65G72G69G73G74G69G63G73G20G6FG66G20G53G61G66G65 G61G6EG64G20G55G6EG73G61G66G65G20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG73 So just how safe are today?s schools? They?re not as safe as we like to think. Con- fidential self-reports of victimization by af- fected youth do not confirm one of our most cherished beliefs: that schools are among the safest places for children and youth. Dr. Paul Kingery, executive director of the Hamilton-Fish National Institute on School and Community Violence at George Washington University, reports that most young children ?are at higher risk for vio- lence at school than elsewhere? (Kingery, February 29, 2000). The Hamilton-Fish Institute analyzed data from the National Crime Victimiza- tion Survey of youth conducted over a three-year period (1993-95). The results showed that 12-year-olds face higher risk of victimization by violent crime in school than anywhere else. This is particularly true for girls, who are at risk of being assaulted by both strangers and by acquaintances. Only beyond the age of 12 does the risk of victimization outside of school surpass the risk in school. According to the survey results, 61 per- cent of girls and 47 percent of boys who were victims of violence by a stranger were injured in a school building or on school grounds. Of all the acts of violence perpe- trated by acquaintances against 12-year-old boys and girls, 61 percent of the boys and The Changed Landscape 3 2. the administrative operations and practices of the school 3. the neighborhoods and surrounding communities served by the school 4. the behavioral characteristics and histories of the students who are enrolled in the school (see Sprague and Walker in press; Walker and Walker 2000). Figure 1-3 illustrates these four areas and lists indicators under each. Typically, in the search for school-safety solutions, educators? attention is focused primarily on student backgrounds, characteristics, atti- tudes, and behavior patterns. However, the remaining three sources of vulnerability shown in the figure also account for sig- nificant variations in the relative safety of schools. Ensuring the safety and security of stu- dents and staff members in today?s schools is a very daunting task that requires a com- prehensive approach. Our society?s myriad social problems (abuse, neglect, fragmen- tation, rage, and so forth) are spilling over into the schooling process at an alarming rate. It is essential that school officials ad- dress these four areas systematically and identify and ameliorate the risk factors within them so that, to the extent possible, violence can be prevented and schools made safer. G54G68G65G20G52G6FG6CG65G20G6FG66G20G50G68G79G73G69G63G61G6C G44G65G73G69G67G6EG20G61G6EG64G20G54G65G63G68G6EG6FG6CG6FG67G79G20G69G6E G43G72G65G61G74G69G6EG67G20G53G61G66G65G72G20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG73 Perhaps the most neglected of the four sources of vulnerability displayed in fig- ure 1-3 is the architectural design of the school building and surrounding grounds. Safety and security were not of paramount concern when the vast majority of the nation?s school facilities were designed. If school planners paid relatively less atten- tion to this area in the past, it was because 64 percent of the girls were victimized at school. These results send an important message to educators, parents, and the larger soci- ety: We need to make schools safer than they currently are. School shootings gar- ner the lion?s share of media attention; it is clear, however, that a significant propor- tion of our children and youth are quietly victimized by the violent actions of others that do not involve lethal outcomes. Figure 1-1 characterizes safe versus un- safe schools and lists the attributes that move schools in the direction of greater versus lesser safety. As a general rule, the research indicates safer schools tend to be ones that are well led have positive climates and atmospheres are inclusive of all students are academically effective Schools in some states are now required to have a school-safety and/or a crisis-re- sponse plan in place. Just as many schools have a school-improvement plan, every school should have on file a comprehen- sive plan that addresses risk factors in re- gard to school safety and that prescribes procedures to follow in case of an emer- gency. Figure 1-2 displays the components that are relevant to developing a school-safety plan. The more at risk the school and the more palpable the threats to its safety and security, the greater the number of these options planners should consider in con- structing the overall plan. G53G6FG75G72G63G65G73G20G6FG66G20G56G75G6CG6EG65G72G61G62G69G6CG69G74G79 G74G6FG20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20G53G61G66G65G74G79 Schools encounter vulnerabilities to their safety and security in four major ar- eas: 1. the design, supervision, and use of school space 4 Safe School Design G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20 G31G2DG31 G42G69G70G6FG6CG61G72G20G44G69G6DG65G6EG73G69G6FG6EG73G20G61G6EG64G20G41G74G74G72G69G62G75G74G65G73G20G6FG66 G55G6EG73G61G66G65G20G61G6EG64G20G53G61G66G65G20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG73G20G77G69G74G68 G41G73G73G6FG63G69G61G74G65G64G20 G52G69G73G6B G61G6EG64G20 G50G72G6FG74G65G63G74G69G76G65G20G46._G61G63G74G6FG72G73 G53G61G66G65G20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG73 (Effective, accepting, freedom from potential physical and psychological harm, absence of violence, nurturing, caring, protective) G53G20G63G68G6FG6FG6CG2DG42G61G73G65G64G20G50G72G6FG74G65G63G74G69G76G65 G46._G61G63G74G6FG72G73 Positive school climate and atmosphere Clear and high performance expectations for all students Inclusionary values and practices throughout the school Strong student bonding to the school environment and the schooling process High levels of student participation and parent involvement in schooling Provision of opportunities for skill acquisition and social development Schoolwide conflict-resolution strategies G55G6EG73G61G66G65G20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG73 (Lack of cohesion, chaotic, stressful, disorganized, poorly structured, ineffective, high risk, gang activity, violent incidents, unclear behavioral and academic expectations) G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG2DG42G61G73G65G64G20G52G69G73G6BG20G46._G61G63G74G6FG72G73 Poor design and use of school space Overcrowding Lack of caring but firm disciplinary procedures Insensitivity and poor accommodation to multicultural factors Student alienation Rejection of at-risk students by teachers and peers Anger and resentment at school routines and demands for conformity Poor supervision The Changed Landscape 5 G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20 G31G2DG32 G4DG61G6AG6FG72G20G43G6FG6DG70G6FG6EG65G6EG74G73G20G6FG66G20G61 G50G72G6FG74G6FG74G79G70G65G20G53G61G66G65G2DG53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG73G20G50G6CG61G6E Community Psychology and Media Plan for Increasing Awareness and Disseminating Key Knowledge Schoolwide Discipline Plan Plan for Violence/Juvenile Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Use of Space Enhanced Communication System Linking Parents, Students, Teachers, Administrators, and Law Enforcement Interagency Community Intervention Plan for Habitual Juvenile Offenders Plan for Securing the Physical Safety of the School Building Staff Development and Training Plan Violence Prevention and Gang Control Plan Crisis Management/ Intervention Plan Systematic Evaluation Plan for Assessing School Safety and Determining Effectiveness Curricular, Instructional, and Behavior Management Plan for Preventing Aggressive, Antisocial Behavior Patterns and Violence 6 Safe School Design G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20G31G2DG33 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20G53G61G66G65G74G79G3A G53G6FG75G72G63G65G73G20G6FG66G20 G56G75G6CG6EG65G72G61G62G69G6CG69G74G79G20G69G6EG20 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20G53G65G74G74G69G6EG67G73 Characteristics of Students Enrolled ? Poverty of students and families Proportion of at- risk students enrolled Frequency and type of arrests in school and community School discipline referrals Academic achievement levels Nature of the Neighborhood Served by the School Disorganization or decay Crime levels Availability of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs Exposure to violent media Lack of afterschool activities Design, Use, and Supervision of School Space ? Height of windows Number and type of entrances/exits Location and design of bathrooms Patterns of supervision Traffic patterns and their management Lighting Ratio of supervising adults to students Administrative and Management Practices of the School Effectiveness and quality of administrative leadership Consistent, firm, and caring disciplinary procedures Positive, inclusive school climate Effective communication with students, families, and teachers Effective staff training and support Full student engagement with school processes and activities The Changed Landscape 7 Positive roles for older students, such as crossing guards, help to create a positive environment. safety was lower on the list of priorities, not because planners did not know how to design safe physical plants. Today, planners can make use of time- tested principles of architecture to enhance safety and improve security in the design and retrofitting of schools, and they can employ newer technologies to monitor spaces and the individuals who inhabit them. These design and monitoring tech- niques represent highly cost-effective ap- proaches to making school sites safer and violence free. The goals of these proce- dures are to prevent interpersonal conflict; to reduce the opportunities for vandalism, violence, and victimization of others; and to facilitate the smooth operation of the school building. G53G6FG63G69G61G6CG20G45G63G6FG6CG6FG67G79G20G61G6EG64G20G53G61G66G65 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20G45G6EG76G69G72G6FG6EG6DG65G6EG74G73 A multitude of influences that have a bearing on school safety and security can be subsumed under the broad framework of social ecology (Moos and Insel 1974; Romer and Heller 1983; Schalock 1989). Social ecology refers to the complex rela- tionships that exist between an individual?s actions and the context(s) in which they occur. Social ecologists seek to answer this question: To what extent is human behav- ior influenced by the host of environmen- tal factors (social and physical) that are present at any given time, and in any set- ting, in which the behavior occurs? Re- search on the antecedents of human behav- ior indicate that contextual factors are ex- tremely influential in accounting for behav- ioral outcomes. The field of social ecology generally fo- cuses on two major sources of variability or influence on human actions: behavioral and physical. Behavioral ecology refers to the social contingencies, expectations, and demands that influence behavior in specific contexts and situations (for example, aca- demic failure, bullying, and harassment). Physical ecology, in contrast, refers to the manner in which the physical charac- teristics of the setting influence human be- havior (for example, overcrowded class- rooms, chaotic neighborhood surrounding the school, deteriorating buildings). The behavioral ecology of the school might be reflected in rules of conduct: fighting is not acceptable and will lead to a suspension; skateboarding is against the rules. The physical ecology of the school would be reflected in its design (for ex- ample, if you fight you are very likely to be seen and caught; the texture of the side- walk is not conducive to skateboarding). Social ecology provides a number of im- portant tools and principles for use in cre- ating schools that are positive, safer, and more effective. For example, a central prin- ciple of social ecology is the concept of person-environment fit or match (see Schalock and Jensen 1986). School plan- ners and architects would find it quite help- ful to know how well, say, the average 12- year-old?s characteristics (attitudes, skills, performance) match up or ?fit? with the demands and expectations of a particular setting, such as a classroom, hallway, or soccer field. 8 Safe School Design G55G73G65G20 G6FG66G20 G53G65G63G75G72G69G74G79G20 G4DG65G61G73G75G72G65G73 G62G79G20 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG73 A 1997 Public School Survey conducted by Westat for the National Center for Education Statistics asked schools which of seven security measures they used: 1. Visitors required to sign in. 2. Access to school grounds controlled. 3. Access to school building controlled. 4. School campus closed for most students during lunch. 5. Students required to pass through metal detectors daily. 6. Random metal detector checks performed. 7. Schools conducted drug sweeps. They sorted responses into the following categories: Stringent Security Options 2% Full-time guard and daily or random metal-detec- tor checks Moderate Security Measures 11% Full-time guard, or part-time guard with restricted access to the school, or metal detectors with no guard Low-level Security Measures 84% Restricted access to the school but no guards or metal detectors No Security Measures 3% The survey did not directly address CPTED measures incorporated into architectural de- sign, nor did it address the role of police in the schools. A 1996 study by the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice/National Center on Institu- tions and Alternatives, An Analysis of Juvenile Homicides: Where They Occur and the Effectiveness of Adult Court Intervention, found that six states contained 56 percent of all juvenile arrests in the U.S. (Florida, Michigan, New York, Illinois, Texas, and Califor- nia), and that four cities that contain just 5.3 percent of the U.S. juvenile population accounted for 30 percent of the country?s juvenile homicide arrests. The Changed Landscape 9 Safe schools tend to be accommodat- ing and supportive of the broad range of students whom they serve; safe schools are inclusive; and safe schools are also engag- ing of students? needs, interests, and spe- cial requirements. As a rule, schools with positive school climates tend to maximize the principle of person-environment fit for all students. The physical ecology of the school is likewise a powerful factor in contributing to its safety, security, and effectiveness. The design and use of school space has a huge but often unrecognized impact on the be- havior of students as well as staff. Over- crowded schools and classrooms and hall- ways that are too narrow to accommodate the number of students moving through them, for example, are likely to produce far more conflicts than less crowded physi- cal spaces. The use of lighting, color, and building-design features can all influence how individuals feel and act in the school setting. G54G68G65G20G4BG6EG6FG77G6CG65G64G67G65G20G42G61G73G65G20G6FG6E G43G72G69G6DG65G20G50G72G65G76G65G6EG74G69G6FG6EG20G54G68G72G6FG75G67G68 G45G6EG76G69G72G6FG6EG6DG65G6EG74G61G6CG20G44G65G73G69G67G6E G28G43G50G54G45G44G29 An important knowledge base relating to the influence of the social and physical environment on safety and security has emerged over the past four decades. This knowledge has been organized and formu- lated into a set of principles known as Crime Prevention Through Environmen- tal Design (CPTED). Based on principles of social ecology, with an emphasis on physical ecology, CPTED helps us to understand how the constructed physical environment affects human behavior, and thus how it can be used to improve the management and use of physical spaces. CPTED has been used extensively in the prevention and deter- rence of criminal behavior in a range of community settings, including schools. CPTED asserts that the proper design and use of the built environment can produce three important outcomes: reduction in the incidence and fear of crime improvements in quality of life productive use of space (Crowe 1990) It is most unfortunate that, in the cur- rent press to create safer schools and re- duce the likelihood of student violence, CPTED concepts and principles, which would be greatly beneficial to these tasks, are remarkably ignored and underutilized. We believe the CPTED approach is one of the most effective tools currently available for accomplishing these goals. The purpose of this book is to illustrate how the CPTED knowledge base can be applied produc- tively in the effort to create safer schools. The remaining chapters describe a full range of CPTED topics, with the goal of enabling educators and other specialists to apply these techniques successfully. Chap- ter 2 examines the relevance and useful- ness of CPTED as a strategy for address- ing school safety and security issues. Chap- ter 3 provides an introduction to key CPTED concepts, basic principles, guide- lines, and effective application to school settings. Chapter 4 describes site-based evalua- tion procedures for conducting a school safety assessment. This chapter also pre- sents a series of recommendations for im- proving a school?s safety and security based on CPTED assessments. Chapter 5 takes the reader through two CPTED school-safety assessments, high- lighting typical problems and recommend- ing solutions based upon the results. Finally, a list of recommended resources on school safety is provided in the Appen- dix. 10 Safe School Design G41G20 G42G72G69G65G66G20 G48G69G73G74G6FG72G79G20 G6FG66G20 G43G50G54G45G44 The roots of modern CPTED can be found in Jane Jacobs? seminal book, The Life and Death of Great American Cities (Jacobs 1960). In studying the impact of urban design, Jacobs found that how people take ownership of an area can have a major impact on the levels of disorder and unrest in those locations. She called upon developers, planners, and communi- ties to build diverse neighborhoods with better opportunities for social interaction. Substantial contributions to the field in re- cent years have also been made by the city planner and police captain team of Stan and Sherry Carter, with their successful work on the North Tamiami trail in Sarasota, Florida (Plaster 1993). Concepts dealing with the fear of crime and the role of women in pub- lic spaces were brought to CPTED by the Toronto-based women?s advocacy group METRAC, based largely on the contribu- tions of Gerda R. Wekerle. Professor Wekerle serves on the Faculty of Environ- mental Studies at York University, and has been influential within the Toronto Safe City committee (Wekerle 1992, Wekerle and Whitzman 1995). Dozens of CPTED analysts have been in- strumental in the field?s continued evolution and dynamism, such as urban planner and criminologist Gregory Saville and Virginia Tech University Professor Diane Zahm. Oth- ers, such as Toronto high school principal Gerry Cleveland and Tucson psychologist Dennis Embry, have made important con- tributions to the affective side of the CPTED field, focusing on the social ecology of schools. This dramatic growth culminated in the for- mation of the International CPTED Asso- ciation (ICA) in 1996, in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. The ICA has grown to over 400 members in 35 countries around the world; has annual conferences, newsletters, and websites; and is in the process of establish- ing global professional standards for the CPTED movement. It has also taken on the task of advancing the theory and practice of CPTED beyond physical strategies, with an emphasis on the rebuilding of community. The term ?Crime Prevention Through Envi- ronmental Design? (CPTED) first appeared in 1971 with the publication of a book by the same title, authored by C. Ray Jeffery, a professor at Florida State University?s School of Criminology. Jeffery?s work fo- cused on the science of ecology and called for interdisciplinary study of ?the ecology of crime? (Jeffery 1971, 1999). Oscar Newman?s Defensible Space followed a year later, emphasizing territoriality, sur- veillance, image, and ?mileu??safe zones (Newman 1972). Today, this latter concept has been renamed the ?broken windows? theory. Newman?s ideas were widely adopted by government and corporate groups for further development and appli- cation, with a focus on surveillance, access control, and territoriality. During a decade of decline in U.S. applica- tions, Canada continued to see significant strides in the application of CPTED by aca- demicians Pat and Paul Brantingham, and by Canada?s first CPTED consultants, Greg Saville and Paul Wong, all based in Vancouver. In the U.K., CPTED led to the evolution of a whole new approach called ?situational crime prevention? by criminolo- gists Patricia Mayhew and Ronald Clark. The 1990s saw a burst of activity in the ap- plication of CPTED principles. Timothy D. Crowe brought renewed attention to the field with his 1991 book Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: Applica- tions of Architectural Design and Space Management Concepts. Crowe is personally responsible for teaching and mentoring a sig- nificant number of today?s CPTED special- ists, often through the National Crime Pre- vention Institute at the University of Louis- ville. 11 The following cities and communities all experienced substantial reductions in crime rates by instituting CPTED mea- sures: Atlanta, Georgia; Richmond, Vir- ginia; Toronto, Ontario; Sarasota, Florida; the Clason Point row houses in the Bronx; Potomac Gardens in Washington, D.C.; and the Five Oaks neighborhood in Dayton, Ohio. These communities instituted such strat- egies as improving control of access (for example, blocking off some streets to ve- hicle traffic to discourage drug dealers), de- fining border areas with fencing to rein- force a sense of territoriality, and improv- ing lighting to enhance natural surveil- lance. Multistory parking garages, com- monly cited as locations that generate fear and allow victimization, can be greatly im- proved with CPTED measures. The Uni- versity of Louisville made one downtown garage safer by increasing ceiling height and lighting while also installing numer- ous security devices and improving natu- ral surveillance. A public garage in San Francisco, de- signed by Gordon Chong and Associates, has a sophisticated, computerized lighting scheme to illuminate all areas of the ga- rage. Chong sought to compensate for the human eye?s difficulty in adjusting to con- trasting lighting conditions. The interior of the garage is more brightly illuminated dur- ing the day so the eye can better adapt to the shift from natural outdoor light. After dark, interior lighting is subdued to more closely match the level of lighting on the streets. These arrangements allow individu- als to shift between environments without temporarily compromising their ability to see while their eyes adjust to dramatically different light levels. Consultant Toni Sachs Pfeiffer was hired by the German National Railways to study the operation of their main railway stations. She found architectural columns that blocked views and larger fields of vi- sion. Some visitors, unfamiliar with the space, easily became disoriented. Her ar- chitectural redesign of the space opened up viewing areas and reduced disorientation, with an accompanying increase in legiti- mate uses of the site. A drop in littering rates was also attributed to the redesign. A number of communities in Canada, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have developed CPTED guidelines for use by private build- ers as well as by government planners. The CHAPTER2 The Relevance of CPTED as a Strategy for Improving School Safety and Security The concepts and principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) have been applied successfully in a broad range of settings and situations in the U.S. and internationally. To illustrate that diversity, here are some examples of CPTED applications in nonschool settings: 12 Safe School Design CPTED approach has been found applicable for every- thing from city parks to multi- unit housing complexes. More recently, CPTED has been applied successfully to school design and retrofitting efforts throughout the United States. For example, San Di- ego, California, schools dark- ened their campuses and in- stalled strategic fencing, and the result was a dramatic drop in campus crime rates. Dark- ened campuses at night make it difficult for intruders to gain undetected access to the school grounds or building. If they do intrude, use of motion-detection lights alerts others to their presence and makes them easier to detect. In addition, there is a savings on electric bills. Florida has adopted statewide school- based CPTED standards. CPTED has be- come a standard component of the training that school professionals receive through the National School Safety Center, affili- ated with Pepperdine University, and the National Crime Prevention Institute in Lou- isville, Kentucky. In addition, private con- sultants and groups such as the International CPTED Association promote school appli- cations of CPTED throughout the world. G43G50G54G45G44G20G61G73G20G61G20G54G6FG6FG6CG20G66G6FG72 G45G6EG68G61G6EG63G69G6EG67G20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20G53G61G66G65G74G79 Security plans for schools must be indi- vidually crafted and tailored to the needs and characteristics of specific school sites if they are to be effective. Each school rep- resents a unique mix of histories, cultures, attitudes and expectations, physical and social realities, risk and protective factors, and resources. The incidence of crime, the risk of crime, and the fear of crime are unique to each school and community. The physical retrofitting of an existing school site to improve its relative safety requires different considerations than does building a new school. Urban schools face different challenges than do rural ones in this regard. Preoccupation with indoor school safety can lead school authorities to overlook ex- terior locations where violence is just as likely or even more likely to occur. One study found that two out of three school- based violent deaths occurred outdoors (in parking lots, on private property, on the streets, or in neighborhoods en route to or from school) (see Kachur, Stennies, and Powell 1996). The public pressures resulting from a school tragedy can easily force administra- tors into considering highly visible school- security measures, such as the use of metal detectors, surveillance cameras, ID cards, or security guards. While these relatively quick and easy-to-implement strategies may be politically understandable and do im- prove school security to some degree, they may not be the best solutions over the long term. In most cases, school districts? security needs will be better served by more delib- erate planning and consideration of struc- tural changes that focus on reducing risk factors and enhancing protective factors. Equipment stored adjacent to this low roof provides easy roof access, inviting trouble. The Relevance of CPTED 13 CPTED concepts, principles, and tools can make very important contributions in this process. G43G50G54G45G44G20G50G72G6FG66G69G6CG65G73G20G6FG66G20G52G65G63G65G6EG74 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20G54G72G61G67G65G64G69G65G73 School-based tragedies involving stu- dent and/or staff deaths have taken place in a variety of locations. The perpetrators? motives have likewise varied. Upon close inspection, each of these acts of violence would have required distinctly different preventive measures. G4CG6FG63G61G74G69G6FG6EG73 Survey data on school-related violent in- cidents over a two-year period (1992-94), reported in the Journal of the American Medical Association (1996), reveal the fol- lowing pattern: Roughly one-third of the incidents oc- curred inside schools (29.5 percent). Another one-third occurred on campus, outdoors (35.3 percent). The remaining one-third occurred off the school site (35.2 percent). A review, by the senior author, of 216 National School Safety Center files on school-associated violent deaths between 1992 and 1998, in which locations were specified, documented the following: Indoor, on-campus deaths?76 (35 per- cent) Outdoor, on-campus deaths?97 (45 per- cent) Outdoor, off-campus deaths?41 (19 per- cent) Indoor, off-campus deaths?2 (1 percent) The most common on-campus locations documented in the NSSC files were: Parking lots and school bus stops?38 percent Hallways and stairwells?30 percent Playgrounds, ball fields, school yards, or grounds?23 percent Classrooms, staff rooms, or school of- fices?21 percent Front steps or entry area?11 percent Breezeways, center courts, or quad- rangles?9 percent Bathrooms?6 percent Cafeterias?5 percent G4DG6FG74G69G76G65G73 According to the JAMA study, motives for school tragedies are often complex in nature. The largest proportion of cases in- volved interpersonal, non-romance-related disputes (33.3 percent); gang-related ac- tivities (31.4 percent) were next most fre- quent. The remaining incidents were attrib- uted to a range of motives including sui- cide (18.1 percent), romance-related dis- putes (11.4 percent), robbery or attempted robbery (9.5 percent), disputes over money or property (6.7 percent), drug-related ac- tivities (5.7 percent), and unintentional kill- ings (4.8 percent). To further illustrate the range and diver- sity of contemporary situations involving school violence, we have assembled in table 2-1 a variety of data on recent inci- dents involving multiple fatalities on school grounds. The table gives each incident?s location, access paths, ages of perpetrators, and other details. The diversity of circumstances docu- mented in table 2-1 illustrates the need for individually tailored strategies for respond- ing to and preventing such situations. Table 2-2 provides expert coding of these same incidents according to strategies and inter- ventions that have varying degrees of ef- fectiveness. Coding assigns a higher nu- meric value to approaches most likely to have a direct, positive impact. These rat- 14 Safe School Design Incident February 29, 2000. Mount Morris Township, MI. A first-grader pulled out a gun and shot 6-year-old Kayla Rolland. May 20, 1999. Conyers, GA. Gunman opened fire in the common area of Heritage High School, near cafeteria. April 28, 1999. Taber, Canada. A 14- year-old boy threatened a teacher and shot two students. April 20, 1999. Littleton, CO. Colum- bine High School. May 21, 1998. Springfield, OR. Shooting. Kip Kinkel. Parked blocks away, walked in with a 22 caliber rifle and 2 handguns. May 21, 1998. St. Charles, MO. Three 6th-grade boys? plan for a sniper attack during a false alarm was thwarted, intended as a copycat of Jonesboro, planned for June 6, the last day of school. May 21, 1998. Onalaska, WA. Suspect took girlfriend off school bus at gunpoint, took her home, shot himself. May 19, 1998. Fayetteville, TN. Honor student opens fire, kills classmate dating his girlfriend. April 28, 1998. Pomona, CA. Three shot while playing basketball at elementary school after hours. April 26, 1998. Edinboro, PA. One killed, 3 wounded, at school dance off campus; then walked inside club, fired more, then left. April 24, 1998. Jonesboro, AR. Fifteen shot, false fire alarm. December 1, 1997. West Paducah, KY. Heath HS. Eight shot in prayer circle, 22 cal. pistol, 2 rifles, 2 shotguns wrapped & taped in a quilt. No gun experience? only violent video games. February 19, 1997. Bethel, AK. Evan Ramsey shoots 4. History of threats. February 2, 1996. Moses Lake, WA. Four shot On campus X X X X X X X X X X X Indoors or Out I I I I I O I O O O&I O I I I Access path Hallway Hallway Hallway Main entry; hallways Service driveway, to breezeway, to cafeteria Unknown Bus, foot, home In parking lot Outdoor basketball court Patio outside banquet hall Sniped from woods Front lobby Lobby Algebra Class Age 7 unk 14 17 15 11 15 18 14 14 11 13 14 16 14 Time of day/ Details Easy gun access at home; child hid gun in his clothing. The school has a campus policeman and surveillance cameras. Described as an unpopular former student, ridiculed in the past, armed with a sawed off .22 caliber rifle. Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris kill 15 with multiple guns and bombs. Before school; Allegedly shot parents night before at home. Attack wasn?t carried out because the boys couldn?t get guns. They had recently threatened classmates. Suicide. 3 days before graduation; jealousy. After school; group rivalry. Loner who never smiled; .25 cal. handgun. During school; fire alarm as lure. Mental illness; teacher was six yards away, returning from parking lot duty. Shotgun; revenge wasmotive. During school; hunting rifle G54G61G62G6CG65G20 G32G2DG31 G50G72G6FG66G69G6CG65G73G20G6FG66G20G52G65G63G65G6EG74G20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20G56G69G6FG6CG65G6EG63G65G20G49G6EG63G69G64G65G6EG74G73 The Relevance of CPTED 15 G54G61G62G6CG65G20 G32G2DG32 G45G78G70G65G72G74G20 G43G6FG64G69G6EG67G20 G6FG66G20 G53G74G72G61G74G65G67G69G65G73G20 G61G6EG64G20 G49G6EG74G65G72G76G65G6EG74G69G6FG6EG73 G41G63G63G6FG72G64G69G6EG67G20 G74G6FG20 G54G68G65G69G72G20 G4CG69G6BG65G6CG79G20 G45G66G66G65G63G74G69G76G65G6EG65G73G73 G69G6EG20 G52G65G64G75G63G69G6EG67G20 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20 G56G69G6FG6CG65G6EG63G65G20 G49G6EG63G69G64G65G6EG74G73 Police or security officers in the schools 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 CPTED measures 3 2 0 2 2 1 0 2 2 3 3 Secondary intervention (targeted) measures ?individual and group intervention programs ?parent training and support 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Primary prevention (universal) measures ?behavior manage- ment curricula ?schoolwide discipline 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 What would have been most likely to make a difference? (Ranging from 0, least likely, to 3, most likely) Springfield, OR, assault in cafeteria. St. Charles, MO, planned sniper attack, outdoors. Onalaska, WA, boy takes girl off bus, shoots self at home. Houston, TX, gun went off accidentally in backpack. Fayetteville, TN, youth kills out of jealousy. Pomona, CA, 3 shot after-hours, playing basketball. Edinboro, PA, off- campus club. Jonesboro, AR, 15 shot, false fire alarm. West Paducah, KY, 8 shot in prayer circle. Pearl, MS, 9 shot, possible ?satanic? conspiracy by 6 kids. Bethel, AK, Evan Ramsey shoots 4. 16 Safe School Design ings are broad-brush and subjective, but they do indicate priorities for possible re- medial actions for the purpose of avoiding similar problems in the future. Table 2-3 provides similar coding for generic situations that are often associated with violence in and around schools. This table further illustrates how circumstances can affect prioritization of remedial actions. Through careful analysis of the loca- tions of school tragedies, the circumstances surrounding them, and the motives behind the violence, CPTED experts obtain clues that can guide school officials in altering the nature and use of school spaces as one means to prevent such incidents in the fu- ture. By collecting data on and analyzing a broad range of similar situations, the CPTED knowledge base can be used to develop generic prevention strategies that until now have been largely unavailable. Chapter 3 describes the CPTED knowl- edge base and how it has evolved over the last several decades. G50G75G62G6CG69G63G20 G50G65G72G63G65G70G74G69G6FG6E G76G73G2EG20 G52G65G61G6CG69G74G79 Data and Polling in Context Although school-related violence con- tinues to be a grave concern, and inci- dents continue to occur, the pervasive- ness of the problem needs to be kept in perspective. 40%?Decrease in school-related vio- lent deaths, school year 1997/98 to 1998/99. 49%?Increase in poll respondents re- porting fear of a school shooting in their community, 1998 to 1999. 1 in 2 million?The chance that a school-aged child would die in a school, 1998/99. 71%?Portion of respondents who thought such an incident was likely in their community. 56%?Decline in juvenile homicide ar- rests between 93 and 98. 62%?Portion of poll respondents who believe juvenile crime is increasing. 4%?Portion of juvenile homicides that occur in rural areas. First?Rank of rural parents in fear for their children?s safety in schools vs. ur- ban and suburban parents. Source: Justice Policy Institute/ Children?s Law Center, April 24, 2000 www.cjcj.org/schoolhousehype/ The Relevance of CPTED 17 G54G61G62G6CG65G20 G32G2DG33 G47G65G6EG65G72G69G63G20G53G69G74G75G61G74G69G6FG6EG73G20G43G6FG64G65G64G20G66G6FG72G20G4CG69G6BG65G6CG79G20G45G66G66G65G63G74G69G76G65G6EG65G73G73 G69G6EG20G54G65G72G6DG73G20G6FG66G20G52G65G73G70G6FG6EG73G69G76G65G6EG65G73G73 G74G6FG20G44G69G66G66G65G72G69G6EG67G20G53G74G72G61G74G65G67G69G65G73 G61G6EG64G20G49G6EG74G65G72G76G65G6EG74G69G6FG6EG73 Police or security officers in schools 1 3 1 3 0 CPTED measures 3 2 1 3 1 Secondary intervention (targeted) measures 1 2 3 2 0 Primary prevention (universal) measures 3 3 1 3 3 For the sce- narios listed below, which remedies should take highest priority? (0-3) Crime-ridden neighborhood, reasonably behaved kids. Reasonable neighborhood, out-of-control student body. Good neighbor- hood and school, just a few out-of- control kids. Crime-ridden neighborhood, out-of-control student body. No problems of any kind, but area is becoming more diverse, and there are con- cerns that conflicts could occur. 0 = Least effective; 3 = Most effective 18 Safe School Design G54G68G75G72G73G74G6FG6EG20 G48G69G67G68G20 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6C On May 21, 1998, 15-year-old Kip Kinkel murdered his parents, then slipped onto his high school campus and shot into a crowded cafeteria, injuring twenty-five people and killing two. The incident was one of many high-profile mass school shootings in the United States within a relatively short period, and it drew considerable attention to Thurston High School, in Springfield, Or- egon, as various parties sought explanations, remedies, or perhaps just someone to blame. The school had no reason to assume a mass shooting would take place. It had no history of similar incidents, and generally did not have a significant problem with violent, in- tolerant, or abusive behavior. A predictable residue of posttraumatic stress has affected many students and staff at the school since the shootings took place, but there has not been any indication of an esca- lation in violence at the school whatsoever. If anything, the opposite is true; the predomi- nant attitude on campus from students and staff alike is that problems must be solved nonviolently. Kip Kinkel has not become an antihero among the disaffected. Rather, he is widely perceived as mentally ill. With the benefit of hindsight, Kinkel?s psy- chological problems are much more evident than they were at the time. His state of mind, coupled with easy access to deadly weapons and the failure of both his parents and the system as a whole to effectively intervene in time are now all patently obvious problems that should have been addressed. But on top of all those shortcomings, the facility itself, from a CPTED perspective, was an indefen- sible space. Thurston?s circumstances underscore the re- ality that schools can be found at two differ- ent ends of the spectrum, at least in the United States: those that perceive a continual problem with life-threatening violence and weapons violations, and are largely concen- trated in blighted urban areas; and those that almost never see evidence of these types of problems, and that make up the vast major- ity of schools in the country. For war-zone schools, the CPTED concept is an easy one to sell, but the application is difficult to finance. For relatively peaceful schools, CPTED changes may be looked upon as paranoid luxuries, wasting money that could be better spent on teachers and supplies. Paradoxically, as the wave of mass shootings has illustrated, it has been the low- risk schools, devoid of security features, that have suffered the most dramatic conse- quences. The easy solution is to integrate CPTED into school designs when they are still in the blue- print stage, imposing little or no impact on the cost of the facility. More difficult is spending money after construction to miti- gate security weaknesses that should have been caught earlier in the process. In too many cases, the original architecture is a dis- mal failure from a CPTED perspective, and the necessary improvements are significant financial investments. Thurston High School is far from unique in this respect, but its story is illustrative. The school is vast and sprawling, with at least fourteen major uncontrolled access points, mostly in the form of dark, underlit breeze- ways, allowing entry into the facility. Most of these entry points had no natural sur- veillance, territoriality, or access control in- corporated into their design when the school was built in 1959. Mesh fences and gates were added to the breezeways a few years ago, but these are only secured after hours, primarily to prevent vandalism. They offer no protection for students during the school day. Security cameras that view and tape the ex- terior of the building proved impotent as a deterrent or intervention tool during the Kinkel incident (see photo, page 56). Making this site functional from a CPTED perspective would require the replacement of the mesh fences and gates at all fourteen ac- cess points with secure, controlled, and/or su- pervised entries. If cost were no concern, a high-security vestibule (see sidebar, page 59) installed on each side of the building, along Continued on p. 19 The Relevance of CPTED 19 with conventionally secured entry points, would be ideal. Costs for four such entries could run as high as $360,000. The school administrative office is located at the main entry point. The addition of a secure entry vestibule would not be archi- tecturally difficult, but would only be worth- while if the additional fourteen entry points were fully controlled. The weakness of the overall design of this school cannot be overemphasized. Some critics might suggest that reasonable secu- rity arrangements could have compensated for the design flaws, but this would be an unfounded assumption. Consider the mea- sures in place at the time of the shooting: 1. Closed Campus. Students in grades 9- 11 cannot leave campus during the school day for any reason without par- ent and school permission. Even their cars are locked into the south lot. Se- niors park in the north lot and their ve- hicles are not restricted. 2. Building Security Cameras. The entire perimeter of the building and courtyard is covered by security cameras 24 hours every day. The campus is also fenced to provide for restricted access and easier supervision of strangers on campus. 3. Substitute/ Teacher/ Visitor Identifica- tion. Visitors and substitutes are asked to check in at the office and wear iden- tifying badges. 4. Campus Monitor. Two campus monitors patrol campus throughout the school day. 5. Volunteers. They assist with building su- pervision before school and during lunch, patrolling and talking to students. 6. Cafeteria Supervision. Two teachers are assigned each period throughout the day to walk around and monitor activity in the cafeteria. 7. Campus Supervision. Two teachers are assigned each period throughout the day to walk around and monitor activity on campus. 8. 2-Way Communication System. All duty teachers, monitors, and administrators carry 2-way radios. 9. Triage Committee. Building administra- tors, counselors, and the school nurse meet weekly to review any student who has generated concerns by any member of the group. Problem solving takes place, and informal action plans are de- veloped ranging from continued moni- toring to intervention. This group also forms the primary crisis team for the building; specific roles in a crisis are reviewed with the group each fall. 10. Safety Committee. The building has a safety committee that meets monthly to review any safety concerns on campus. The committee is composed of classi- fied staff, certified employees, and ad- ministration. 11. Lockdown Procedure. Building emer- gency procedures are reviewed with staff each fall and are contained in the staff handbook. 12. Confidential Reporting System. The school has an answering-machine sys- tem that allows individuals to leave messages for anyone during nonschool hours. The machine tape is reviewed each morning at 7:30 with messages dis- tributed as necessary. 13. Reward System. A monetary reward sys- tem is in place and is used on a case- by-case basis, as deemed necessary by the administrator involved. Since the time of the shooting, a School Re- source Officer has been added to the mix. Beginning in spring 1999 all staff members have been required to wear picture ID badges when on campus. 20 Safe School Design G4BG69G70G20 G4BG69G6EG6BG65G6CG92G73G20 G52G6FG75G74G65G20 G6FG66G20 G41G63G63G65G73G73G2C G4DG61G79G20 G32G31G2CG20 G31G39G39G38G2C G30G37G35G35G20 G68G6FG75G72G73 Continued on p. 21 1 Kinkel drove to aneighboring resi- dential area and entered the grounds through an established pedestrian access point on the northeast corner of the property. A turnstile prevents vehicles from en- tering here. This access point sits in a vacant lot separated from neighboring resi- dences by sight- obscuring fences and bushes. There is no natu- ral surveillance in this direction from within any nearby or even distant buildings. 2 Kinkel threadedhis way between cars in a small parking area and entered an unse- cured breezeway on the north side of the property. His approach was captured by the surveillance camera, but noth- ing in his appear- ance appeared worthy of alarm at the time. The Relevance of CPTED 21 3 Kinkel shot twostudents in the breezeway. 4 He then enteredthe cafeteria where the bulk of the shootings occurred. It was here that he was finally tackled and brought un- der control by fellow students. 23 CHAPTER3 Key CPTED Concepts and Principles Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is built around three ba- sic concepts: 1. Natural surveillance?the ability to see what?s going on. 2. Natural access control?the ability to control entry and exit from an environ- ment. 3. Territoriality?the ability of legiti- mate users to control an area, while dis- couraging illicit users. CPTED takes a broad environmental view of a target setting, carefully noting structural design weaknesses and the ex- tent to which they allow for potentially dangerous human behavior. When the physical design is faulty, or if the space is used inappropriately, CPTED seeks ways to redesign and use the space more effec- tively. A cardinal rule in any CPTED evalua- tion of a particular space is to ask whether the space is used legitimately and in a func- tional manner. A number of CPTED rec- ommendations will flow from the result- ing analysis. The assumption is that the more functional a space becomes (that is, the more likely the space will be used for the purpose for which it was designed), the more likely it is that legitimate activity will occur there. Use of school spaces for purposes other than those for which they were designed poses a common threat to school safety and security. Low-traffic areas on school cam- puses, such as bathrooms and stairways, particularly where there is a low ratio of adults to students, are examples of places vulnerable to criminal behavior and vic- timization. When CPTED principles and guidelines are implemented to make the school environment safer and more func- tional, crime prevention is often an impor- tant byproduct. Here are some key principles of CPTED that are critical to the successful applica- tion of this process: Take the broadest possible view. Observe the physical setting and its rela- tionship to human behavior in the set- ting. Notice any design weaknesses. Question everything. Look for ways to use the space more functionally, with the goal of encourag- ing desired behavior. Apply CPTED with integrity; if CPTED is skillfully applied, crime prevention will be a byproduct of its successful ap- plication. CPTED practitioners design or redesign an overall environment so that it simply works better?deterring crime and undes- ired behavior in the process. CPTED takes all conventional security approaches into account: mechanical (the locks, structural changes, security technology), human or organizational (what people can do as in- 24 Safe School Design dividuals in using the space or as members of groups in order to be safer), and natural measures. Natural measures are highly cost-effec- tive in that, once insti- tuted, they passively improve security. In- stalling a window or trimming a shrub, for example, can result in an improved capacity to monitor an environ- ment without requiring conscious additional at- tention, and the benefit is often realized at a one-time-only cost. Contrast the effec- tiveness of these natural measures with hir- ing a security guard, which requires con- tinued active attention and expenditure, or installing a security camera, which needs someone to actively watch the monitor. A key benefit of natural measures to a school, in this context, is that teachers and school staff can remain primarily focused on their normal duties, instead of on policing. G4EG61G74G75G72G61G6CG20G53G75G72G76G65G69G6CG6CG61G6EG63G65 An environment should be designed so legitimate users can see as much of it as possible without taking extra measures. For example, a window above the kitchen sink provides natural surveillance of the yard for anyone standing there. If the view from that window is obstructed, and a resi- dent has to go to the front door to see what?s happening outside, then natural surveillance is obviously impaired. Solid walls or thick hedges on school campuses often serve no constructive pur- pose, but do provide ?cover? (visual block- ages that create locations in which unau- thorized individuals can hide and engage in undesirable activities that are illegal, dangerous, or destructive). G4EG61G74G75G72G61G6CG20G41G63G63G65G73G73G20G43G6FG6EG74G72G6FG6C The Anasazi cliff dwellings of the American Southwest allowed not only great natural surveillance but supreme ac- cess control as well. Visitors were subject to extensive scrutiny as they climbed lad- ders to gain entry to the Anasazi dwellings. Aside from the barrier provided by the natural physical structure, it was relatively easy for the residents to further impair ac- cess via physical resistance, a dropped rock, or other means. In schools, access control typically means providing a gate keeper at any open door, sending all visitors to the main of- fice for entry processing, and locking any doors that can?t be watched. The distinc- tion between can not and may not shouldn?t be lost in this regard. ?May not? is the proper description for many access-control policies, such as ?Visitors may not enter the school without obtaining a pass from the office.? Between ?dead? walls and breezeways, this school has designed out natural surveillance and natural access control. Key CPTED Concepts 25 With such policies there is no device or means to enforce this rule on the ?can not? level. The end result is a policy that will inconvenience the vast majority of school visitors but that can be ignored by willful trespassers. Policies move to the ?can not? level when trespassing without a pass is physically impossible, because the doors just won?t open, or somebody?s there to stop trespassers. The key point is that school officials should consider the potential impact of any security measures before their implemen- tation and ask, ?Is this going to have the G54G68G65G20 G55G73G65G20 G6FG66G20 G47G6CG61G73G73G20 G52G65G69G6EG66G6FG72G63G65G6DG65G6EG74 Windows are critical for natural surveillance, but they do pose penetration risks. Glass breakage can provide access for burglars, but much worse is the fact that projectiles can penetrate windows and shattered glass can cause serious injuries, particularly when explo- sions are involved. Glass reinforcement can be very expensive, so its use in schools will of course be ex- tremely limited. Reinforcement options, in order of expense, include the following: Security film. This material is a thin film usually installed on the inside of the glass. If the glass is shattered, it is still difficult to penetrate; the film holds the glass together. In most cases the film is a sufficient deter- rent. Burglars will still succeed at breaking the window, but they are less likely to gain entry. Costs run close to $5 per square foot including installation. Some types of film are also touted for use on the exterior of the pane, designed to absorb vandalism that aims at scratching the window. The film is eventually peeled off and replaced with a new layer. Frame reinforcement. Security film by itself may not provide enough protection against explosive devices. If a higher level of security is desired, the filmed window can be reinforced with specially designed L- shaped frame reinforcers that hold the film firmly against the edges of the pane and keep the window from blowing inward.1 Laminated glass-clad polycarbonates. This involves laminating high-tech polycar- bonate plastics to glass, or in some cases not using glass at all. This product is highly resistant to penetration and should deter molotov cocktails and the like, at a cost of approximately $50 per square foot. Bullet-resistant glass. At 1-2? thick, this multiple-ply laminate of alternating glass and polycarbonate and/or metal mesh hy- brids will ?resist? bullets ?ranging from a .38 super automatic to a high power .30-06 rifle,?2 but at a cost of about $150 per square foot. 000000000000000000000000000000 1Details on this type of product can be seen on the web at: www.framelok.com/usa/system or at www.framegard.co.uk/story/fulstory.htm 2www.saflex.com/Application intended effect on targeted behavior or does it merely convey proper etiquette to stu- dents and others who are already willing to voluntarily comply?? An armed intruder is unlikely to turn away from a doorway just because it?s marked ?Do not enter,? which is a ?may not? level of control. Lock- ing and carefully monitoring the door, on the other hand, could make a considerable difference at the ?can not? level. G54G65G72G72G69G74G6FG72G69G61G6CG20G42G65G68G61G76G69G6FG72 The third key element of CPTED is ter- ritoriality. Gang members understand this 26 Safe School Design G41G63G63G65G73G73G2DG43G6FG6EG74G72G6FG6CG20 G44G65G76G69G63G65G73 Keys are often troublesome. They get copied and lost, and rekeying or coping is expensive. Staff members are obli- gated to carry rings of keys to open doors. Keys do have some advantages. They are not dependent on an external power source being operable. There will still be a need to have keys available in a highly secure location in case of a power-outage if it affects an entry sys- tem. There are several good alternatives to keys. These include push-button codes, swipe cards, proximity cards, and fin- gerprint or retinal scanners. Push-but- ton coded entries are vulnerable because uninvited visitors can in many cases learn the codes. Each time the code is changed, everyone has to be informed about the change. Swipe cards are an improvement be- cause the card itself is coded to allow entry to only appropriate doors at se- lected times. Only one card is needed for multiple entry points, and the card can double as an identification card. Even better than a swipe card, which in- volves placing the card in a machine, is the proximity card, which only has to be close to the reader to unlock a door. It is a good idea for schools to get bids or cost estimates on switching to these devices. Even if no change is planned for the immediate future, there may come a time when the cost of rekeying, and the amount of theft and burglary, warrant making the switch. Contact: Check with a local member of the National Fire and Burglar Alarm As- sociation for estimates. You can also check with manufacturers, such as Cy- press Computer Systems at 800-807- 2977, or ILCO (which produces LearnLok) at www.ilcounican.com, telephone: 888-217-5654. concept very well?they use graffiti to spray and mark areas they wish to claim as their turf. By painting over their graf- fiti, we symbolically take that territory back, which sends a very important mes- sage to everyone. If a school can reinforce a sense of territoriality and shared owner- ship, students and staff will feel more em- powered to challenge inappropriate behav- ior when it occurs. Maintenance of school property (for ex- ample, picking up trash, fixing broken win- dows, or sweeping up broken bottles) sends a strong message that this is a school some- one cares about. Well-maintained, graffiti- free areas are treated with more respect by students and communicate a sense of safety, caring, and effectiveness. School activities can similarly reinforce territoriality. If the ball field is used for Little League games on weekends, it won?t be attractive to criminals looking for vic- tims, gangs seeking to claim turf, or ad- dicts dealing drugs. It will be harder for such groups to intimidate the general popu- lace because citizens are present in large numbers and will likely have plenty of as- sistance resources (such as cell phones). How should territoriality operate within the context of a diverse student body? In schools, especially high schools, students seek to establish territoriality in a multi- tude of ways, from their allegiance to the school?s athletic teams to their mode of dress and the places they choose to con- gregate during lunch breaks. Expressing territoriality in these ways can foster a strong sense of belonging and commitment to the school; but if school officials allow measures to be taken with- out a sufficiently broad perspective, they can unintentionally undermine inclusive- ness. Different cultures, religions, races, beliefs, lifestyles, or genders can be at odds when the accommodation of one comes at the expense of others. Key CPTED Concepts 27 G45G78G61G6DG70G6CG65G73G20 G6FG66G20 G54G65G72G72G69G74G6FG72G69G61G6CG69G74G79G20 G54G68G61G74G20 G4CG65G61G64G20 G74G6FG20 G45G78G63G6CG75G73G69G6FG6E Men?s team: the Spartans Women?s team: the Spartanettes. Annual ?slave auction?? people bid on other people for services, as a fundraiser. Football team name: the Cherokees or the Redskins. An extreme emphasis on one school activity, while disre- garding another. The diminutive ending is just what the term suggests? diminishing, or making less of something. For cultures with a collective or individual memory of enslavement, this can be a chilling trivialization of a culture?s history. Naming a team after a culture other than one?s own may not feel offensive?but what if the team were named af- ter your culture, and the team members didn?t belong to your culture? What if the name implied that your culture was savage or warlike? If the primary message apparent at the school is ?our team is best, kill all the rest,? how does this instill pride in non-athletes or students who didn?t make the team? How about students who transferred from a competing team?s school? Does this message reinforce curriculum that pro- motes tolerance and respect for others? Sensitivity to and accommodation of differences are important considerations in achieving balanced territoriality. The al- ternative can be an enhanced sense of own- ership by a mainstream subpopulation of students, but a deeper sense of alienation among at-risk students or minority groups. In this case, territoriality for one group is gained at the price of another group?s ex- clusion. Ultimately this sense of exclusion can exacerbate problem behaviors at school, as one set of students express intolerance of other students, and they in turn lose com- mitment to and respect for the school. Stu- dents looking for a place to belong, who feel rejected by a mainstream group?s mes- sage of territoriality, may drift into gangs or other undesirable circles. These three concepts?natural surveil- lance, natural access control, and territori- ality?can be brought to bear productively when assessing the vast majority of troubled physical environments. If care- fully considered, they can help pinpoint significant environmental design problems and weaknesses that can be remedied. In many cases, when CPTED considerations are applied at the design stage of a new school building, security can be greatly im- proved at no additional cost in construc- tion or retrofitting. Enduring CPTED solutions can be as simple as moving a window to improve natural surveillance, changing a fence de- sign to establish access control, or paint- ing a mural to build a sense of pride and ownership among students, while simul- taneously recovering turf claimed by gangs. 28 Safe School Design G44G65G73G69G67G6E G43G6FG6EG66G6CG69G63G74 Errors in the way an area or setting is structurally designed, situated, or used can provide evidence of a dysfunctional envi- ronment. For ex- ample, at the onset of World War II, New York City ordered that all skylights be painted over to reduce the amount of light visible to enemy planes. So the sky- lights became dys- functional?and stayed that way until very recently, when someone thought to question the situation. New York?s Plaza Hotel was less fortunate: the hotel operators reportedly painted over some Tiffany style skylights and then in- stalled a large air conditioning system that blocked the skylights permanently. This example underscores a basic rule of CPTED: question everything. Why is an environment designed the way it is? Why does one segment of the community avoid meetings at the school? Why do people use that passageway, but not an- other? Why is this door propped open? Perhaps a particular building, room, or entryway previously served one function but now serves another. How is space defined? Is it clear who owns it? Where are its borders? Borders can be so unclear that they actually invite trespassers by default; for example, there?s nothing telling them not to intrude, and it may look like a good place to explore, or sleep, or to sell drugs. In some settings, signs can help where the environmental design falls short. Clear, reasonable, well- communicated rules and restrictions help encourage appropriate behavior on the property or in the facility. Safety concerns can paralyze a school?s ability to focus on its primary function of providing instruction that leads to student learning. Some remedies, such as hiring se- curity guards, can be quite costly. Utiliz- ing school staff to patrol the grounds re- duces the amount of time they have avail- able for their primary educational roles. Overt security measures, such as armed guards, metal detectors, and random back- pack or locker checks, may actually be counterproductive if they reinforce fearful- ness on campus. By applying CPTED concepts effec- tively, a school can (1) improve natural sur- veillance, access control, and territoriality, often with minimal, one-time investments that can be incorporated into bond mea- sures or facility-construction budgets; (2) save money by reducing the need for more active, ongoing measures, such as hiring security guards; and (3) create an environ- ment that reinforces the primary purpose of an educational facility. Wrought-iron fencing provides access control while maintaining natural surveillance. Key CPTED Concepts 29 G43G6FG6DG6DG75G6EG69G63G61G74G69G6FG6EG20 G44G65G76G69G63G65G73 numbers of staff. The proper setup includes a keyboard that can be used to enter and send messages to anyone carrying a pager. It can send to specific individuals, specific teams (such as a crisis-response group), or to all staff. One of the scariest elements of a ma- jor crisis involves being barricaded and not knowing what?s going on. This device could be very effective in dispelling some of those fears by sending regular updates, such as the location of a gunman, whether police have arrived yet, and so forth. Followup: Check with local Pager compa- nies to see if this service is available in your area. One company that provides this prod- uct in selected Oregon locations is PageNet at 503-821-2035. Tracking devices. In some cases tracking devices may be appropriate. These can be carried, serving as portable panic buttons, and monitored for location within the site by a central computer. These devices can also be attached to valuable equipment to track thefts in progress. Followup: Check with local security com- panies for this service. One manufacturer is Detection Systems, Inc.: telephone 716-223- 4060, www.detectionsys.com. Communication devices are good invest- ments. Unlike video cameras or armed guards, they do not ?up the ante? in raising the level of fear based on their presence. In- stead, they facilitate the reporting of suspi- cious or threatening activity, and they make it easier for the school?s administration to send emergency messages quickly. Disasters can at least be mitigated in almost all cases with good communication. Options include: Public-address systems and intercoms. These should be checked at least annually to see if they still work, including during in- clement weather. For example, in some schools, the intercoms don?t work when it rains! It should be possible to hear announce- ments in the bathrooms, the cafeteria, the parking lot, and throughout the grounds. It should be possible to reach all locations with one announcement as well as selected rooms. Telephones. There should be a phone in each room. Better still, provide staff with cell phones. Combination cell phone/radios pro- vide more flexibility. If at all possible, phones should be equipped with caller ID? a very helpful feature in identifying prank callers. Display pagers. These devices can be very useful for quietly sending emergency mes- sages and updates simultaneously to large 31 It takes only one tragedy to make the benefits of preventive assessment crystal clear in hindsight for any school. Even rela- tively minor environmental flaws are wor- thy of attention and action. For example, if someone trips over broken steps because of deferred maintenance, that?s a twisted ankle, and serious litigation may result. If nothing is done to actively discourage drug dealers from hanging out on school cam- puses, the district incurs a risk of liability that may threaten its insurability. A child who threatens violent behavior obviously CHAPTER4 Site Evaluation: The Foundation for Improving School Safety and Security Every school can benefit from an assessment of its environmental design to determine whether the school is a safe and secure place to learn and work. A school site sur- rounded by or infused with criminal activity has an obvious need for such an assessment, but even campuses that seem at first glance to be orderly and secure may, when in- spected, be found to present a multitude of risks. cannot be ignored. Whenever there is a his- tory of trouble, or if future problems are foreseeable, one can reasonably anticipate eventual personal injuries, as well as sub- sequent legal action. This chapter presents a variety of tools for assessing school safety and recom- mends procedures for conducting the school-site evaluation. G49G6EG69G74G69G61G6CG20G41G73G73G65G73G73G6DG65G6EG74G20G6FG6E G53G65G6CG66G2DG52G65G70G6FG72G74G20G49G6EG73G74G72G75G6DG65G6EG74G73 To determine the general level of risk in a school and its surrounding community, the National School Safety Center?s School Crime Assessment Tool (see Appendix A) and the Oregon School Safety Survey (see Appendix B) can serve as good initial in- dicators. To examine the need for Crime Preven- tion Through Environmental Design (CPTED) measures, see the 8-Point CPTED Needs Assessment (page 32), along with the Campus Incident Frequency and Severity Scale (page 33). Schools do not exist in a vacuum but rather are a reflection of the contexts in which they function. Surrounding circum- This recycling and garbage area includes a tank of flammable gas. Options would include either full exposure or full enclosure. Either option would discourage arson. 32 Safe School Design G45G69G67G68G74G2DG50G6FG69G6EG74G20 G43G50G54G45G44 G4EG65G65G64G73G20 G41G73G73G65G73G73G6DG65G6EG74 stances and risks (for example, neigh- borhood and student and family charac- teristics) can obviously positively or negatively affect a school?s overall level of risk for violence. The self-report as- sessment tools provided in Appendices A and B can help quantify some of these mediating factors. Administrators who are implement- ing a CPTED assessment must consider a number of issues and characteristics of their school and its community. Such considerations include, but are not lim- ited to, the following: What is the student-teacher ratio? The greater the ratio of students to teachers and other adults in the school, the larger the overall risk to school safety. Students 6. Can staff rapidly lock down the school, with students protected in individual class- rooms, in case an armed person has entered the building? (That is, is there a working public-address system, and can the class- room doors be quickly locked?) 7. Does the school?s overall climate and at- mosphere, as reflected in what occurs on a daily basis (including security measures, or- derliness, cooperation, and teacher morale), inspire hope, confidence, appreciation, trust, and respect among students and staff? The correct answer, in items 1-7, should be yes. If it isn?t, School CPTED analysis should be strongly considered. 8. Are there locations at the school?hall- ways, bathrooms, hidden alcoves, dugouts, locker rooms, loading docks, informal gath- ering areas?that you associate with ongo- ing problems, such as graffiti, vandalism, bullying, or worse activities? (If yes, see Campus Incident Frequency and Severity Scale) 1. Can students travel from home to school without encountering unreasonable ob- stacles? 2. Do areas directly adjoining school prop- erty have legitimacy, positive territoriality, and ownership (as opposed to a no-man?s land where snipers could hide)? 3. Can office staff see intruders approach- ing the building at any given time without taking extraordinary measures? 4. Does the school have the ability to stop unwelcome visitors, such as armed students or menacing adults, from simply choosing to enter the school? (That is, must they ring a bell, pass through a metal detector, pass the main office window, be buzzed in, check a backpack, or just be visible to staff so that they can be challenged? Or can they decide to enter through the back door, the side door, the kitchen door, or other place?) 5. Do staff members have natural surveil- lance of activity inside the school, without having to step into the hallway, through a set of double doors, or around a corner? consistently report that the more adults there are in school spaces, especially low- traffic areas, the safer they feel and the Extensive hate graffiti undermines school climate and territoriality. Site Evaluation 33 G43G61G6DG70G75G73G20 G49G6EG63G69G64G65G6EG74G20 G46._G72G65G71G75G65G6EG63G79G20 G61G6EG64G20 G53G65G76G65G72G69G74G79G20 G53G63G61G6CG65 This exercise is intended to quickly identify problem areas in the school, based on your general impressions. Rate each item for frequency and severity: Frequency Estimated frequency/ past 12 months (include anec- dotes, rumors, informal, and/or formal reports): 0?No problems, not appli- cable. 1?At least three incidents have occurred in the past school year. 2?Problems occur at least monthly. Severity / past 12 months: 0?Inconsequential/ not applicable. 1?Property damage or theft under $100, and/or low-risk exten- sive littering, such as cigarette butts and paper cups. 2?Property damage or theft over $100; and/or high-risk debris such as broken bottles, hypodermic needles, bullets, knives, and/ or other weapons. 3?Verbal conflict (such as sexual or racial harassment), disrup- tive behavior (yelling in class, throwing books, overt defiance such as breaking rules in front of staff). 4?Unarmed physical conflict, fear-inducing behavior. 5?Armed physical conflict. Location Total Frequency Severity (rate 0-2) (rate 0-5) 1. classrooms 2. hallway locker bays 3. locker rooms 4. gym 5. bathrooms (specify male/female) 6. other specific indoor areas (such as library, computer lab, woodshop) 7. specific undefined outdoor areas (such as behind bushes) 8. specific defined outdoor areas (such as loading dock or playground) 9. parking areas 10. bike or foot paths 11. nearby loitering locations 12. nearby businesses, malls, or plazas 13. nearby residences 14. campuswide, other (specify) or unknown location 15. locations associated with particular groups / gangs TOTALS A frequency of at least 2 and severity of at least 2 at any one location warrant attention. The higher the total, the more urgent the need. 34 Safe School Design less opportunity there is for victimization by others. What are some distinctive features of the student-body population? These might in- clude the number of students on reduced-fee or free lunches; the migration or turnover rate for the student body as a whole; the number of discipline referrals, suspen- sions, and expulsions within a school year; and the num- ber of students who have been arrested. Are there conflicts among diverse groups within the school? Is the campus open or closed? If stu- dents are free to wander on and off cam- pus during the school day, there may be implications for traffic conflicts, neigh- borhood problems, drug usage and deal- ing, as well as the continual risk of weap- ons being brought back onto the cam- pus. An open campus often serves as a risk factor for unsafe schools. What is the school?s overall climate? What measures are in place to affect it? Are there universal violence-prevention curricula and interventions in place (such as the Second Step Violence Prevention Program, the Effective Behavioral Sup- port Program, and so forth)? Does schoolwide discipline exist and is it ef- fective? What percentage of the student body displays excessive antisocial behavior? How many referrals are there to the of- fice per week or per month? Individu- ally, what are the consequences for stu- dent misbehavior and conflict? Are there targeted intervention programs available for at-risk students such as First Steps to Success (Walker and others 1997)? Are staff responses to student misbehavior uniform and consistent? Is there a sys- tem for communicating about student be- havior among staff? Are classified em- ployees left out of the loop, or included? Are police officers assigned to the schools and, if so, for how many hours a week? What are their roles? How effective are the police at preventing crimes, gather- ing intelligence, or apprehending sus- pects? Do they have a role other than en- forcement, such as law-related counsel- ing or education? Is the police presence having an impact? How well are the po- lice received by the students? Has any- one ever polled students to find out? How often have the police been dis- patched to the school? Is crime at the school a chronic problem or an unusual occurrence? Cooperative police agen- cies with computerized databases can be an enormous help in answering these questions. How do the statistics for this school compare with those of similar schools elsewhere in the community, and with the community as a whole, on a per- capita basis? How does crime within the school compare with crime within a four- block radius of the school? During what hours do most crimes in the surrounding area occur? Are students walking through a war zone to get to campus? How many Open campuses are more frequently associated with off campus conflict. Site Evaluation 35 students from a particular school have been detained by the juvenile justice sys- tem this year? Have there been traumatic recent events or are there smoldering, long- term community tensions that need to be considered? Has there been a recent school shooting publicized in the media? Has there been a rash of bike thefts or vandalism? Is there a developing prob- lem with bullying on the playground? Have businesses nearby been fighting a wave of robberies? Are there resources to be accessed in the surrounding neighborhood? Are there businesses that can be partnered with? Are youth mentors to be found? Are libraries, parks, swimming pools, greenhouses, museums, or exhibits avail- able nearby? Are there natural features that can be incorporated into science classes, such as streams, fields, or gar- dens? If the neighborhood is in terrible shape, or if students have to walk through a ?war zone? or high-speed traffic area to get to school, then the school may want to consider working with commu- nity leaders and investing in the sur- rounding area?s renewal. Schools might also consider involving the students in transforming their neighborhoods, help- ing small businesses repair damaged storefronts, cleaning up vacant lots, or starting microbusinesses such as herb gardens. School safety often reflects the level of safety in the surrounding neigh- borhood. Any decisions about changing the school environment will benefit substan- tially from an indepth understanding of neighborhood and community assets and deficits. The risks found in the surround- ing neighborhood, particularly risks iden- tified through use of the school-safety as- sessment tools (see Appendices A and B), the eight-point CPTED Needs Assessment, or the Campus Incident Frequency and Severity Scale will go far in identifying the school?s risks and vulnerabilities. It may become clear, for example, that the playground is a frequent trouble spot and the location lacks natural surveillance. Students approaching from the south side of the building, for example, may be chronically late because trains frequently block the road, gangs menace students, or traffic lights don?t work reliably. The hall- way at lunch hour may be the scene of many conflicts because of foot traffic in and out of the cafeteria conflicting with stu- dents? socializing in locker bays at the same time. The more specifically such problems are defined, the greater the likelihood that solutions will be on target, efficient, and workable. This sort of analysis should be part of an assessment of a school?s safety status and capacity for positive change. G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20G45G6EG76G69G72G6FG6EG6DG65G6EG74G61G6C G44G65G73G69G67G6EG20G41G73G73G65G73G73G6DG65G6EG74 Assessment of school facilities for the purpose of improving safety can be an un- wieldy and difficult task. The old one-room schoolhouse has generally grown into ei- ther a two-story labyrinth in a fortress-like shell or a sprawling hodgepodge of build- ings scattered over a large site in a typical campus-style setting. For the vast major- ity of these facilities, CPTED principles were absent when the architects did their design work. The end result is that retro- fitting, often on a large scale, is now nec- essary if the school is to be even margin- ally safe. Who should perform the assessment? Factoring in time, money, and available ex- pertise, school districts might choose be- tween hiring a CPTED consultant or con- ducting the assessment in-house. One of the goals of this chapter is to equip school 36 Safe School Design staffs to conduct their own assessments and learn how to interpret the results. Districts can send one or more employees to an in- stitute for CPTED training, hire a CPTED specialist to provide a seminar locally, or, most economically, use the remainder of this chapter as a guide to conduct a self- evaluation. G47G75G69G64G65G6CG69G6EG65G73G20 G66G6FG72 G43G6FG6EG64G75G63G74G69G6EG67G20 G61G20 G43G50G54G45G44 G45G76G61G6CG75G61G74G69G6FG6E Once an initial assessment of the school?s relative safety has been completed using the self-report measures described in the preceding section, the CPTED evalua- tion process can begin. Several forms and checklists are essential tools with which to conduct the security inspection and evaluation. Readers have our permission to duplicate or adapt these forms as needed to gain the greatest benefit from the evalu- ation. 1. The School Environmental Design Assessment (SEDA) Cover Sheet. To be- gin the process, the CPTED evaluator fills out this form, which assembles on one sheet vital information about the school for quick overview purposes. A blank sample (for reproduction) of this form is provided on page 38. To illustrate the intended use of the SEDA cover sheet, a completed form, using a hypothetical school as an example, is provided on page 39. 2. The CPTED Site-Assessment Form. This two-page form is used to record observations on characteristics of particular places, such as a single class- room, a hallway, a playground, or a site in the surrounding community that is fre- quented by students. The evaluator can also record recommendations and rate the rela- tive risk to security of the conditions he or she identifies. A blank copy of the Site-Assessment Form is provided on page 40, along with a sample of the completed form (for a hy- pothetical school) on the following page. It is not critical that every room or nook and cranny be treated to its own assess- ment form. Some rooms or hallways will have no apparent problems; in such cases, the evaluator can check them off on the Location Checklist on page 42 and move on. In column three of the Site-Assessment Form, the evaluator ranks (on a scale of 0 to 3) the relative risk status of each design feature of the school location being as- sessed. These ratings are based on the documented evidence at hand and follow a simple, four-step hierarchy of risk: No risk, where the design looks accept- able and no problems have been reported, is valued at 0. Low risk, where the design looks weak but there have been no reported prob- lems, rates 1. Medium risk, where the design looks weak and there is clear evidence or re- ports of trouble, rates 2. High risk, where serious design flaws are apparent and/or have contributed to se- rious consequences, rates 3. The risks are tallied for each location within the school and its surroundings. When the CPTED assessment is complete, a reviewer can quickly determine where to focus remedial or preventive actions. Each location within the site can earn a total rat- ing of anywhere from 0 to 9. Obviously, a 9 rating warrants immediate attention. The key words listed in the left-hand column of this form, under the categories Surveillance, Access Control, and Territo- riality/Climate, are included only as prompts. Most items will not be relevant to every location within the site, and it is not required that they be addressed or rated. Site Evaluation 37 They are included only as reminders to help the evaluator consider possible points of concern and/or conceivable remedies. The list of prompts is not exhaustive; valid rem- edies can be designed that are not noted on this list. The key words in the prompts list are defined in the following section, and many of the terms are discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section, Conducting the School-Site Evaluation. If you encounter unfamiliar terminology on the form, con- sult the corresponding discussion of the terms that follows. 3. Location Checklist. The evaluator uses this form (on page 42) to keep track of which locations within and around the campus have been scrutinized. One copy should suffice; using this checklist in con- junction with multiple copies of the Site- Assessment Form, the evaluator checks off locations as they are inspected. The ?com- ments? section of the form provides an op- portunity for brief reminders, such as ?As- bestos abatement in progress. Come back after 3/24,? ?No problems apparent here,? or ?Scheduled to be remodeled for a band practice area summer of 2000.? G44G69G73G63G75G73G73G69G6FG6EG20 G6FG66G20 G54G65G72G6DG73G20 G6FG6E G74G68G65G20 G53G69G74G65G2DG45G76G61G6CG75G61G74G69G6FG6EG20 G46._G6FG72G6DG3A G50G72G6FG62G6CG65G6DG73G20 G74G6FG20 G57G61G74G63G68G20G66G6FG72G20 G61G6EG64 G52G65G6CG61G74G65G64G20 G53G6FG6CG75G74G69G6FG6EG73 In this section, we define and clarify terms on the CPTED Site-Assessment Form. The following discussion of termi- nology (in alphabetical order) corresponds to the prompts found on the survey sheet and provides sample problems and solu- tions. Abutting areas?Two or more activi- ties may overlap or combine with danger- ous results. For example, if bus exhaust is inadvertently aimed at the air-conditioning intake pipes, the consequences can be se- rious. Remedies include examining adja- cent activities for compatibility, moving one of the activities, or separating them with dividing structures. Activity Placement?At times, activi- ties are poorly located on a school site. Placing a basketball court next to a sand box can cause collisions between basket- ball players and toddlers. A playground placed next to a machine shop can expose children to unnecessary hazards. On the other hand, moving a legitimate activity into an area can be a good remedy, push- ing potential misbehavior away from a lo- cation. Alarm systems?Many schools utilize alarm systems but may lack a clear under- standing of how they operate. Often alarms are old and poorly designed, or fail to iden- tify which part of the building is register- ing smoke, noise, or glass breakage. Rem- edies include offering inservice training, conducting drills or practice scenarios, and checking with the alarm company or po- lice to see how accurately the alarm pin- points a problem location. Alternative entries?Do visitors have too many entry options? Are you focusing on the front door while the back door is wide open? Remedies include considering all points of possible entry, as discussed under Gateways below. Annunciators?Schools with dozens of doors have a hard time keeping track of them all. Electronic annunciators can set off an LED display or a buzzer at a main office console, identifying which door has been opened. These devices are particularly useful after hours, or when tighter security is warranted. Beneath building areas?Problem visitors may be able to access a school through a crawl space beneath the build- ing. Make sure those areas are sealed off. Blind corners?If activity around the corner is out of sight, pedestrians can?t pre- pare themselves for what they may be 38 Safe School Design G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20 G45G6EG76G69G72G6FG6EG6DG65G6EG74G61G6C G44G65G73G69G67G6EG20 G41G73G73G65G73G73G6DG65G6EG74G20 G43G6FG76G65G72G20 G53G68G65G65G74 Name of School ____________________________________________________________ Location __________________________________________________________________ Contact name and number ___________________________________________________ Date _____________________________________________________________________ Total student population _____________________________________________________ Total staff _________________________________________________________________ Distinctive features of student body population (demographics, special needs, language, free lunch, turnover, etc.) Open or closed campus______________________________________________________ Universal measures _________________________________________________________ Targeted measures __________________________________________________________ Crisis plan access __________________________________________________________ Police or security guards on campus ___________________________________________ Recent events or other issues of concern _______________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ Condition of Public Address System, indoors and outdoors ________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ Hot spots/ primary issues ____________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________ Calls for police service at school, 12-month period ______________________________ Calls for police service, 4-block radius, 12-month period _________________________ Site Evaluation 39 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20 G45G6EG76G69G72G6FG6EG6DG65G6EG74G61G6C G44G65G73G69G67G6EG20 G41G73G73G65G73G73G6DG65G6EG74G20 G43G6FG76G65G72G20 G53G68G65G65G74 G28G63G6FG6DG70G6CG65G74G65G64G20 G73G61G6DG70G6CG65G29 Name of School: Ridley High School Location: 702 Pearl Road Contact name and number: Head custodian, Jack Webb, 333-3333, and Principal, Ginger Rodeknik, 333-4545 Date: 4/23/99 Total student population: 987 Total staff: 35 Distinctive features of student body population (demographics, special needs, lan- guage, free lunch, turnover, etc.): 60% Black, 30% Hispanic, 10% White Open or closed campus: closed Universal measures: school rule book handed out in September; violence prevention curricula being considered by a committee of teachers. Targeted measures: Problem students are referred to the special-services team for individual behavior-management planning. Crisis plan access: The school crisis plan is on the principal?s wall, and should be on each classroom wall. Police or security guards on campus: Officer Pat Ridley is assigned to four schools in this section of town. He is at this school on Mondays, or if called because of a crisis. He carries a pager. Recent events or other issues of concern: Gang graffiti persistently showing up be- hind the gym; Mr. Webb reports finding broken bottles and condoms on the gym roof on a regular basis. Public address system: Doesn?t work in playground, sometimes fails indoors when it rains. Hot spots/ primary issues: Ms. Rodeknik describes three students as ?scary,? includ- ing one who has a family that has threatened violence against her for disciplining him. The father is known to carry a knife and has a drinking problem. Calls for police service at school, 12-month period: (These data may be available from local police agencies, depending on their technical resources?computerized data bases, crime analysts, adequate time and budgets, and ultimately their willingness to cooperate) 62 Calls for police service, 4-block radius, 12-month period: 870 40 Safe School Design G53G69G74G65G2DG41G73G73G65G73G73G6DG65G6EG74G20 G46._G6FG72G6D Risk 0-3*Area: Surveillance ? lights ? landscaping ? windows ? obstructions to sight or sound ? traffic related ? dead walls ? blind corners ? blind alcoves ? mirrors ? cameras ? activity placement Access Control ? fortress ? sprawl ? gateways ? traffic control ? fencing ? zones ? beneath building ? roof access ? alternative entries ? door and key controls ? annunciators ? windows ? alarm systems ? public events ? bathrooms ? water fountains ? emergency vehicles Territoriality/Climate ? gang indicators ? other messages ? signs ? gathering areas ? patios ? maintenance ? safe materials ? abutting areas ? furnishings/decor TOTAL Observations/Recommendations * Risk values: 0=no apparent risk; 1=low risk; 2=medium risk, evidence of misbehavior; 3=high risk, major design flaws and/or serious problems. ** Key words in the left-hand column are prompts to help guide site evaluations. They are not neces- sarily relevant to every location. Site Evaluation 41 G53G69G74G65G2DG41G73G73G65G73G73G6DG65G6EG74G20 G46._G6FG72G6D G28G63G6FG6DG70G6CG65G74G65G64G20G73G61G6DG70G6CG65G29 Risk 0-3* 1 3 3 2 9 Area: North grounds Surveillance ? lights ? landscaping ? windows ? obstructions to sight or sound ? traffic related ? dead walls ? blind corners ? blind alcoves ? mirrors ? cameras ? activity placement Access Control ? fortress ? sprawl ? gateways ? traffic control ? fencing ? zones ? beneath building ? roof access ? alternative entries ? door and key controls ? annunciators ? windows ? alarm systems ? public events ? bathrooms ? water fountains ? emergency vehicles Territoriality/Climate ? gang indicators ? other messages ? signs ? gathering areas ? patios ? maintenance ? safe materials ? abutting areas ? furnishings/decor TOTAL Observations/Recommendations Mostly dead walls from school side. Limited visibility from neighbors and corner store. Can we put in windows? Lights at night cause glare; neighbors can?t really see what?s going on. May have made a difference in recent assault?neighbors were unable to determine what they were hearing. Maybe shield the lights? There?s nothing to keep cars from entering the field. In an accident a car could come over curb and onto baseball field. A drunk driver did so last term and a child was injured. Plant trees, or install fencing? The bathrooms were locked. Are they opened for games? The landscaping nearby is in bad shape and is collecting garbage. Racial epi- thets have been painted on the storage shed. Trim shrubs, make arrangements to open bath- rooms, repaint shed? * Risk values: 0=no apparent risk; 1=low risk; 2=medium risk, evidence of misbehavior; 3=high risk, major design flaws and/or serious problems. ** Key words in the left-hand column are prompts to help guide site evaluations. They are not neces- sarily relevant to every location. 42 Safe School Design G4CG6FG63G61G74G69G6FG6EG20 G43G68G65G63G6BG6CG69G73G74 Location Checklist (Use in conjunction with Site- Assessment Form. Check off locations once they?ve been examined.) a20 Location Comments Surrounding neighborhood (N,S,E,W) Borders and grounds (N,S,E,W) Building exterior (N,S,E,W) Playgrounds Parking lots Driveways Loading docks, dumpsters Main entry area Main office Hallways and all entry/exit doors Classrooms Cafeteria Gymnasium Auditorium Bathrooms Locker rooms Art rooms Industrial and home economics rooms Science labs Library Preschool Courtyards Music rooms Special-education rooms Computer / technology rooms Furnace and custodial storage Time-out room Meeting / conference rooms Site Evaluation 43 about to encounter. These are common problems in hallways, where students may collide, or outdoors, where bullies may lie in wait for victims to appear. Common rem- edies include installing convex mirrors, moving walkways a few feet further away from the building (to expand the view at the corner), or redesigning a hallway with a curved or chamfered design. Cameras?When no other surveillance options are feasible, cameras may be a rea- sonable consideration. Fire stairwells, se- cluded basements, poorly designed sprawl- ing buildings, or other strategic locations on campuses may be most effectively ob- served with video cameras. However, rec- ognize that cameras are usually more ef- fective for gathering evidence after the fact than they are as a tool for discouraging mis- behavior. Their quality can vary dramati- cally, from impressive to useless. Cameras need to be connected to a slow-speed VCR for taping purposes and/or watched on monitors. Dead walls?This refers to solid walls that lack windows. Long, dead walls gen- erally offer ?cover,? or a place to hide, for people engaged in illicit activities. The more dead walls at a location, the harder it is to see activity on the grounds from in- side, and the more dependent a school be- comes on patrols and/or surveillance cam- eras. Obvious remedies involve either in- stalling windows or redesigning the walls to allow surveillance. The walls could be reduced to three feet in height, constructed from wrought iron, replaced with a rose trellis, or demolished as unnecessary. Door and key controls?In what man- ner are doors secured? Are keys used, and if so, how well are they controlled? Are they frequently copied and handed out? Does anyone know who has keys? Are al- ternative entries controlled with alarms? Do doors lock automatically upon closing? Do the automatic closers work? Remedies include switching to coded entries, using smart cards, marking keys ?do not dupli- cate,? installing fire alarms on emergency doors, and maintaining existing hardware. Emergency vehicles?Do improved se- curity arrangements block emergency ve- hicle access? Remedies include commu- nicating with emergency vehicle person- nel about key or electronic gate-access ar- rangements. Fencing?Would more fencing at this location make a difference? Or does the type of fencing have implications for safety and security? Is it serving as a dead wall? Is it easy to climb over? Does it pose a li- ability risk due to dangerous design fea- tures, such as voltage, barbs, or tips? Is it covered with graffiti? Remedies involve changing to a more appropriate fence de- sign or material, such as wrought iron, which is highly vandal resistant and pro- vides little surface area for graffiti. Fortress?Some buildings, including large chain stores, exclusive communities, and schools, wall themselves in to enhance security. The weakness in this approach is that it leaves people outside the walls, in- cluding students, exposed and without pro- tection. In worst-case scenarios, people in- side the walls cannot hear, see, or reach people outside the walls to provide assis- tance, or vice versa. In a school, this can mean that a child is at higher risk than ever while traveling to and from school. Rem- edies include installing windows, remov- ing unneeded walls, installing cameras or mirrors, transporting by bus, or deploying crossing guards and other security person- nel. Furnishings/decor?Does the school decor reinforce messages of pride and be- longing? If the school looks uncomfortable, feels uncomfortable, or sends a message that alienates, its appearance is subverting the school?s mission. Remedies include in- volving students and their families in room decoration and furniture selection. 44 Safe School Design Gang indicators?Gang graffiti is a common indicator, but clothing styles and police reports can also provide evidence. Gang activity is a strong indicator that a location is at high risk. Remedies include implementing gang-intervention programs, moving activities to safer locations, im- proving surveillance, or displacing gang activity by moving in legitimate non-gang activities. Gateways?How many access points are there? Metal detectors at the front door are worthless if intruders can enter through the service entrance, or slip a gun through an open window. Sporting events will lose income if visitors have the option of slip- ping under the tent. Remedies include tighter security at alternative access points, more fencing, better key control, and stricter policies about open doors. Gathering areas?Where do people as- semble and for what purposes? Has the back lot turned into a skateboard park? Do students gather to buy drugs behind the cor- ner grocery store? Remedies include rede- signing areas to be conducive to desired activities while discouraging undesirable actions, improving natural surveillance, or blocking off access. Developed gathering areas will attract legitimate activity, leav- ing illegitimate activity isolated and more apparent. Landscaping?Do trees, bushes, shrub- bery, or ground contours block the view? Remedies may include lopping off lower tree limbs, reducing shrubs to no more than three feet in height, or bulldozing mounds. Lights?Is lighting adequate? Are there pockets of shadow? Does the lighting cre- ate glare? Remedies may include chang- ing, installing, protecting, or redirecting light fixtures. Maintenance?Site designs can be ex- cellent, but poor maintenance can under- mine their effectiveness. If trash is accu- mulating at a particular spot, or if graffiti is allowed to remain on a wall, the school is effectively ceding control over that area. Buildings that are falling apart similarly send a message that the school is giving up. The remedy is effective, timely main- tenance. Mirrors?Any location with blind spots may benefit from the installation of mirrors. These may be commercial convex mirrors, or they may be reflective alumi- num sculpture that helps expose otherwise hidden activity. Mirrors are one of the most economical CPTED remedies available. Obstructions to sight or sound? Does anything block vision or the ability to hear activity? Obstructions could include sculp- tures, landscaping, walls, abandoned tool sheds, construction noise that makes teach- ing nearly impossible, or double-door ves- tibules that are designed to block sound. Remedies may include moving objects, razing eyesores, installing mirrors, or mounting acoustic buffering materials. Other messages?Has the school or have surrounding businesses installed signs that send productive or destructive mes- sages? How do these messages hurt or help the school?s mission? Do they frighten and alienate, or encourage and inspire? Rem- edies include petitioning adult bookstores to hide offensive materials, or helping schools to craft more inclusive messages in their entry areas. Patios?School rooms often have small sections of underutilized grounds just out- side their windows, but the rooms have no individual ownership of that space. Disrup- tive behavior can fill the void. One rem- edy would be to develop the area as a pa- tio or garden area, establishing classroom turf. Public events?School security ar- rangements may be adequate during the school day, but may fall short during pub- lic events. Gym or auditorium events, for example, may oblige the school to allow Site Evaluation 45 visitors access to the entire building. Rem- edies include considering the impact of public events and adjusting access design and control accordingly. The use of accor- dion gates in hallways is one good ex- ample. Roof access?Problem visitors very commonly find their way onto a school?s roof, where they engage in undesirable ac- tivities. Do heating tanks, electrical fix- tures, or other features serve as unintended ladders, making roofs accessible? Rem- edies include removing the ladders or blocking the roof access point with nontraversable walls or fencing. Safe materials?A design may use haz- ardous materials, such as concrete play ar- eas or unforgiving climbing structures. Remedies include use of soft-impact ma- terials and removal or repair of structures that can catch clothes, scrape skin, or oth- erwise injure. Signs?Are the rules clear? Do students know that certain areas are off limits? Do they grasp that the grassy area is still school property, and that smoking is not allowed? Signs can help remedy these situations. Sprawl?Many communities, as well as campuses, suffer from sprawl. When build- ings are spread over a large area, they are much more difficult to monitor. Intruders can slip onto campus from multiple direc- tions, and they can hide between buildings. The greater the number of buildings, the more entrances must be secured and/or monitored, and the more difficult school security becomes. Remedies include en- closing the campus to obligate entry through only one monitored gateway; in- stalling more windows, mirrors, or cam- eras around campus; deploying campus patrols; or linking most buildings to restrict access to, from, and between them. Traffic control?Does the movement of vehicles, bicycles, and pedestrians lead to risks or conflicts? Typical problems, which intensify during release and arrival times, include parking-lot chaos, unmarked crossings, and obscured crossings. Rem- edies may include changing traffic-flow patterns, moving pickup and dropoff loca- tions, installing traffic-control devices, or installing mirrors. Water fountains?Are water fountains frequently clogged or damaged? Are they placed in functional locations? Are they hidden from natural surveillance? Rem- edies include more protective designs or more open locations. Windows?Do windows allow for natural surveillance? They may be installed too high for this purpose, covered with closed curtains, or glazed to obscure vi- sion. Remedies may include installing, moving, uncovering, or reglazing win- dows. If breakage is a problem, options include security film, protective mesh cov- ering, plastic windows, and alarmed win- dows. Zones?Could this area be better man- aged if it were broken into zones? Some- times an area is just too large to supervise. For example, allowing cars to park on all four sides of a building can pose this prob- lem. Remedies include closing off sections of the school or campus, obliging all driv- ers to park in one lot, or using accordion gates to close off certain hallways so that basketball fans don?t have the run of the school instead of just the gym. G43G6FG6EG64G75G63G74G69G6EG67G20G74G68G65G20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG2D G53G69G74G65G20G45G76G61G6CG75G61G74G69G6FG6E Evaluation of the school site begins with a close look at the environment in which it is placed. Typically, neighborhood and community problems spill over di- rectly into the school setting. Conditions noted during the evaluation of the commu- nity will give school officials helpful clues as they seek ways to make both the school 46 Safe School Design and the neighborhood safer for their stu- dents. Who should conduct the assessment? A team, including an administrator, a teacher, a student, a custodian, and/or a school re- source officer, can bring a broad perspec- tive and diverse information to this pro- cess. Use of such a team is highly recom- mended. G43G69G72G63G6CG69G6EG67G20 G49G6E Begin the CPTED assessment process by working slowly around the outside of the site while taking notes on the forms provided, starting as far as four blocks away from the site and circling in. If the surrounding neighborhood is relatively im- poverished and/or disorganized, there?s a greater likelihood that the school experi- ences a high level of social disorder (Gottfredson 1997). These neighborhood conditions may in- dicate that student safety en route to school needs to be a consideration. Safe areas where students can study on campus after school should assume greater urgency if students are unlikely to find an adequate workspace at home. Other ways the school could reach out to the community?extending an umbrella of safety and order into the neighbor- hood?would be to institute adult literacy classes or family-support centers at the school. These are but a few of the problems and potential solutions that careful assessment of the school?s immediate community set- ting can indicate. Some suggested questions to pose in evaluating the surrounding neighborhood and community are provided below. Is the neighborhood a positive, nega- tive, or neutral factor? - Is it riddled with crime so that it poses a menace from which students should be protected and sheltered? Or can it serve as a resource for field trips and mentors? - Chain stores and corporations often have grant programs available to lo- cal schools that are worth pursuing, and many businesses would help with fund-raising if asked (for example, with cash donations, collection jars on the counter, or donated goods such as food for bake sales or contributed ser- vices to offer through a raffle). - Apprenticeships, mentorships, and on- the-job training opportunities can be win-win arrangements, helping small businesses survive while providing job skills and valuable experience for stu- dents. - Museums, exhibits, theaters, or recre- ation centers can provide enriching op- portunities for student field trips. A show may be too expensive for most students, but the rehearsals might be open to a ?practice? audience. G50G61G72G65G6EG74G73G20 G61G6EG64G20 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG73 G53G75G63G63G65G65G64G69G6EG67G20 G69G6EG20 G50G72G6FG76G69G64G69G6EG67 G4FG72G67G61G6EG69G7AG65G64G20 G52G6FG75G74G65G73G20 G74G6F G54G72G61G76G65G6C G28G50G41G53G53G50G4FG52G54G29 In the Visalia (California) Unified School District, Visalia Police, parents, and com- munity-based organizations worked to- gether to establish the PASSPORT pro- gram in response to concerns about safety for children walking to school through unsafe streets. Volunteers wear identifi- cation badges and commit themselves to watching certain routes during high-risk hours. Contact: Ralph Lomeli, Safe Schools Co- ordinator, Visalia Unified School District, 315 East Acequia, Visalia, CA 93291; 209- 730-7579. Site Evaluation 47 - Supportive neighbors can provide safe havens (such as Block Homes) for children traveling to or from school, or they might volunteer, if asked, to serve as tutors or to share their exper- tise as guest speakers in the class- room. Some might be willing to serve as crossing guards or playground monitors. Neighbors from varied backgrounds can be invaluable re- sources for bilingual education. - A large facility nearby may be an es- sential resource if a school evacuation becomes necessary. Establish a rela- tionship with the owners; know how to reach them in an emergency. Any activities that build bridges to the community can potentially create more re- sources from which the school can draw as it seeks to fulfill its mission and increase its level of safety. The more neighbors feel connected to the school, the more likely they will extend themselves to the school and its students. If neighbors know the principal, they?re that much more likely to call him or her about suspicious activi- ties observed on school grounds after hours. Currying favor and developing posi- tive relations with school neighbors can provide invaluable natural surveillance. Do students walk, ride buses, ride bi- cycles, or drive, or do parents drop them off at school? Students? primary mode of transport will determine some safety concerns. Bus drivers may need safety training, corners may require crossing guards, and dropoff locations may need careful planning to avoid traffic snarls. How safely could eight-year-olds walk through that part of town to get to school? Would they encounter traffic hazards? Passed-out drunks? Gang turf? Drug dealers or prostitutes? Do students express fear about traveling to and from school? Are there aban- doned buildings where squatters might be living? Could a child be lured into one of those buildings unnoticed? Are buildings boarded up? If the journey looks perilous, school of- ficials might want to promote car pooling, encourage students to walk in groups, add bus service, or assign crossing guards. Civic groups, resident associations, Neigh- borhood Watch groups, or police might be approached about neighborhood revitaliza- tion and community policing. Are there areas where kids hang out during or after school, litter, harass the neighbors, smoke cigarettes, or worse? Students may have to walk a gauntlet of delinquents and gang members to get home. Extending positive school influence into the neighborhood can turn attitudes around. Community-service initiatives (such as building renovations, street-cleaning ef- forts, litter patrols, and similar measures) can help empower neighborhood residents to reclaim ownership and territoriality over their turf. What kinds of video games are served up at the local shops?let alone on cam- pus? Do these games portray human beings as targets for violence or abuse? What posters, billboards, or marquees do children see on a daily basis? Do Travel between home and school can be designed for safety or perilously neglected. 48 Safe School Design they stereotype people based on race, gender, religion, or other attributes? Do they promote alcohol or cigarette use? Do they glorify violence? If the destructive messages that some students observe on a daily basis over- whelm school attempts at instilling posi- tive values, the school, neighborhood, and/ or community may have a serious prob- lem. A campaign to reduce or eliminate such negative influences can be an impor- tant educational experience for students and may also improve neighborhood and school climates. G53G69G74G65G20 G42G6FG75G6EG64G61G72G69G65G73 Upon approaching the school, observe how many options are available to would- be intruders for gaining access. Ideally, fencing restricts access to only selected en- try points. Those entry points should be controllable and fully securable by the school. Where fencing is not practical, the fall-back position should be extra vigilance in securing the school buildings them- selves. To establish territoriality, the entry area should be clearly marked with signs tell- ing visitors what is expected of them. In addition to making the rules clear, these signs make confrontations more comfort- able for staff, who don?t have to wonder whether illegitimate trespassers grasp that they are unwelcome. Signs sending visi- tors to the office should be accompanied by site maps and arrows. Without them, intruders will feel empowered to wander the campus while ?looking for the office.? G42G65G79G6FG6EG64G20 G53G69G74G65G20 G42G6FG75G6EG64G61G72G69G65G73 Natural surveillance should extend be- yond the school grounds, considering the surrounding neighborhood as well. It?s not unusual for sites just beyond the school grounds to serve as gathering spots for nonschool youth. The presence of a police/ school-security officer, or merely the knowledge that the gathering spots are under the gaze of school staff, can often convince a problematic group to move else- where. Students are often at high risk of vic- timization after they leave school grounds. Recruiting neighboring businesses to keep lights on, or to stand sentry on the street, can make a huge difference in student safety. G4CG69G67G68G74G69G6EG67 An afterdark site visit is essential to evaluate the adequacy of school lighting. School districts have been moving in the direction of darkened campuses for a num- ber of years now, though some still pro- mote full lighting. Both approaches have had some success. After schools in Oregon, Florida, California, and elsewhere went to blacked-out campuses over the past de- cade, they saw a significant drop in elec- tricity bills as well as vandalism. There are two drawbacks: the schools may not be per- ceived as community resources during those dark hours, and conceivably illicit be- havior could more easily go undetected on unlighted school grounds. Advantages to lighted campuses include improved surveillance of the site from neighboring properties, passers-by, or pa- trol cars; maximized use of public facili- ties; and a stronger bond with the surround- ing neighborhood. Legitimate activities on the school site can help discourage mis- use; adult learners in attendance can pro- vide positive role models for those younger and less experienced. Partial lighting can be problematic: if the entry is brightly lit, but a nearby area is not, the human eye will adjust to the bright spot, causing the nearby shadowed Site Evaluation 49 area to become impenetrably black. This means it?s a great place to hide, either to plan an assault on others visible in the brightly lit area or to commit other kinds of crimes. Watch for uneven lighting, in- cluding pockets of shadow created by shrubs, fencing, or dumpsters. These ob- stacles can provide hiding places in broad daylight, too. Trimming shrubs to no more than a few feet in height, lopping off tree limbs below six feet in height, and remov- ing alternate slats from solid wood fences are easy solutions. A related concern is excessive lighting. Massive security lights may annoy neigh- bors. They can also cause counterproduc- tive glare, in which case neighbors can?t see the campus, can?t observe suspicious activity, and are thus less likely to call the police when they should. Thoughtful shielding can remedy this problem. Yet an- other concern to think about is unbalanced lighting. If the interior is brightly lit, while the exterior is dark, the occupants become overexposed. Intruders looking through the windows can see them, but the occupants can?t see the intruders. One reasonable approach is to go with darkened campuses but maintain the capac- ity for flexible scheduling. If someone wants to offer a night class at the school, it shouldn?t be derailed because it would be after the scheduled blackout hour; nor should it be conducted with inadequate lighting inside or out. In addition, motion- response lights can be installed in chroni- cally troubled locations where alert neigh- bors could be relied on to notice the light and respond appropriately. G54G72G61G66G66G69G63G2CG20 G43G72G69G6DG65G2CG20 G44G72G6FG70G6FG66G66 G41G72G65G61G73G20 G61G6EG64G20 G50G61G72G6BG69G6EG67G20 G4CG6FG74G73 Are there traffic-calming devices on or near campus? Examples would include stop lights, blinking yellow lights, school-cross- ing markings, speed bumps, roundabouts (a cement circle or planter constructed in the middle of an intersection, forcing cars to slow down and drive around the obstruc- tion), or ?woonerfs? (originally a Dutch de- sign in which an area allows cars access G50G61G72G6BG69G6EG67G2CG20 G47G72G6FG77G74G68G2CG20 G61G6EG64 G45G6EG74G72G79G20 G50G6FG69G6EG74G73 Schools, communities, and traffic pat- terns change over time. Small parking lots near the main entry may be out- grown, and additional parking may spring up in unanticipated locations, based solely on availability. In some cases these changes will have a ripple effect, as drivers now seek the most con- venient access point from the new park- ing area to the school. The latter may be at quite a distance from the official main entry or office. As this new development spirals out of control, the back door and/or breezeways may become the functional equivalent of the front of the school. When this hap- pens, access control and natural surveil- lance usually deteriorate or disappear en- tirely. Behavioral modification may be attempted, such as discouraging students from opening the secure backdoors when people knock, or insisting that students circle the building and enter at the front. Even though the purpose of these mea- sures is to protect those students already inside the school, they may expose the students trying to enter to a greater per- sonal risk, and they are generally a poor fix for a dysfunctional layout. From a preventive point of view, new parking or vehicle driveways should be planned with the bigger picture in mind, either routing all traffic to the intended entry or adding a guardian at the new point of entry. This new guardian might be a rebuilt front office at the new loca- tion, a secondary office at the new loca- tion, posting of staff, or other variations on this theme. 50 Safe School Design but contains sufficient obstacles to oblige them to drive slowly). Sharp turns can slow traffic, but be wary of impatient drivers cut- ting corners. Best-case scenarios would place safety islands be- tween opposing traffic lanes, bike lanes, and sidewalks. Bike lanes should parallel vehicle lanes and sidewalks to avoid any surprise conflicts; transportation paths should be predictable and safe. One of the most common con- flicts surfaces at pickup and dropoff times, when small chil- dren dash between large cars and buses, when older children recklessly peel out of parking lots, or parents rush to deliver their children to school on time. Pay attention to the actual traffic flow and how to control it. Must cars back out of parking spaces? Most parking-lot accidents involve back- ing up or out. Driving forward offers better visibility. Can fencing control the points at which children dash across traffic lanes? Sometimes an area needs to be redesigned to accommodate unforeseen foot-traffic patterns. Parking lots can be hard to control if they?re overly spread out. If lots are scat- tered throughout the property, they will be that much more difficult to patrol. Zoned lots, on the other hand, can force drivers to park closer together, providing enhanced mutual security through natural surveil- lance. Data indicate parking lots were the sites for 10.5 percent of all school-associ- ated violent deaths, on or off campus, be- tween 1992 and 1994 (Kachur, Stennies, Powell, and others 1996). A review of Na- tional School Safety Center files by the se- nior author found that between 1992 and 1998 parking lots were the most common outdoor, on-campus sites of school homi- cides. Zoned lots use mechanical barriers to se- lect which parking-lot sections will be available at particular times of day. By keeping parked vehicles in one controlled area, they will be easier to oversee using fewer staff. Vehicles that show up in the off-limits area become that much more ap- parent, and staff can respond appropriately. For those high-school students who drive their cars to school, a requirement that they obtain and pay for parking permits has several advantages in addition to the in- come from fees, which help to cover school expenses. Permit-revocation can serve as leverage to encourage courteous driving, and the record-keeping for permits makes it easier to determine who owns which car. In the most extreme situations, parking lots may require continual monitoring in the form of a parking-lot attendant, as well as entrance and exit control gates. These can be enhanced with wrong-way puncture devices that make entering through the exit, or exiting through the entrance, physically impossible. A related concern is the environment in- side the school bus, as it transports students to and from school. If the bus is an envi- ronment beyond the driver?s control, hu- man or electronic monitoring can help. Consider encouraging parents, police, or The view of the parking lot from the main office is an important design consideration. Site Evaluation 51 volunteers to ride the bus as well. Parents of problem kids might be required to es- cort their children to school until their be- havior is brought under control. G42G69G6BG65G20 G50G61G74G68G73 Urban bike paths may generate some controversy, usually among property own- ers who fear that paths will lead to crime. Studies of rails-to-trails paths, particularly in Seattle, suggest that paths do not gener- ate crime and in fact they raise property values. The senior author?s review of Na- tional School Safety Center files found no mention of bike paths in any school homi- cides nationwide. Isolation and a lack of surveillance are key factors in path safety, just as these factors heighten the risk of victimization anywhere else. Crimes near paths in Lane County, Or- egon, have almost always taken place in hidden areas adjacent to the path, rather than the path itself. This risk can be miti- gated by clearing thick brush near the paths and encouraging people not to travel alone (a good precaution regardless of location). Another major issue regarding paths is whether they undermine access control for the school. At first glance, paths may ap- pear to do so, but frequently the access al- ready existed as an undeveloped open space, such as an abandoned lot, rail line, or riverbank. In those cases, the access was already undermined?intruders could en- ter at will. The distinction a bike path brings is that now legitimate users are also present, and usually they constitute the majority. As a result, this legitimate pres- ence improves security throughout the area by mitigating the isolation and lack of ter- ritoriality that existed before. Legitimate users of the area can discover suspicious activity, discourage it, report it, or inter- vene directly. In such a scenario, the path makes the location safer by bringing in natural surveillance. A further consideration with bike paths is the level of risk students can avoid by using the new path. If the path is well de- signed, it will be sufficiently removed from urban congestion to avoid traffic hazards, but it will stay close enough to potential allies to maintain safety. If neighboring homes have a view of the path, for ex- ample, users will be safer because some- body can see their distress and call for help. If the alternative is to force the student to ride on a congested road, the risk of ve- hicle-versus-bicycle accidents will far ex- ceed the likelihood of a problem on a well- planned, off-road trail. G46._G65G6EG63G69G6EG67 What type of fencing is used? Solid walls and certain types of fencing block natural surveillance, thereby reducing se- curity. Fences and walls also provide at- The ?dead wall? on the left blocks natural surveil- lance; the mesh fence on the right does not. tractive canvases for graffiti, which means higher maintenance costs for the school. Graffiti must be removed as quickly as possible (preferably within 24 hours) to send a clear message to gangs that they are not welcome. In some cases, special coatings can be applied to surfaces, mak- ing it easier to remove graffiti with a spe- 52 Safe School Design cial cleanser. This isn?t always the most cost-effective approach; if the graffiti is in- frequent you may be better off simply painting over it. Wrought-iron fencing is the best choice because it provides no significant surface for graffiti, is extremely vandal resistant, and requires minimal maintenance. Al- though it is expensive, wrought-iron fenc- ing is extremely durable. A common prac- tical compromise is chain-link fencing. Drawbacks to chain-link are its vulnerabil- ity to cutting, ramming, or climbing, and its dreary institutional appearance. Wrought-iron fencing, on the other hand, enhances a school?s climate, reinforcing an image of a solid, enduring institution. Chain-link, at its worst, can reinforce a storage yard, industrial image. G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20 G47G72G6FG75G6EG64G73 Study the grounds on each side of the school building?north, south, east, and west?separately and ask the following questions: Which hazards are present? What obstacles are there to clear vision? Does the landscaping create blind spots? Are playground areas safe to fall, run, or play on? Are there hard surfaces or sharp edges? Are there protruding objects that might injure students or snag clothing, or which could possibly cause other in- juries? Are water fountains and bathrooms ac- cessible? Are there shaded areas for hot-weather activities? Are weeds and pests controlled with toxic chemicals that pose a health haz- ard to students? On the other hand, do uncontrolled weeds and pests pose haz- ards, such as tripping, or stumbling into a bees? nest? What about public events, such as ball games? Where do visitors park? Can they find their way around? Can you control access to the field? What kinds of activities occur on the grounds? Which of these are desirable, and which are not? Which are school functions? Does a rough crowd tend to hang out? How could you change the environment to diminish its appeal to this group? Would they appreciate unappealing light- ing or piped-in music? G53G70G72G61G77G6CG20 G61G6EG64G20 G41G63G63G65G73G73 G43G6FG6EG74G72G6FG6C Does the school lean toward a sprawl- ing campus or a fortress-like design? A sprawling campus, just like a sprawling city, is harder to patrol. Such campuses are highly permeable; visitors may be able to slip between buildings throughout the cam- pus. Security, in this case, could be a daunt- ing challenge. Sprawling campuses can be made safer by taking the following steps: 1. Close the gaps. Link all the build- ings with wrought-iron fencing and gates. Done effectively, this forces visitors to en- ter through selected entry points, where they can at least be observed (and in some cases interviewed), passed through a metal Parents predictably will park along this fence line while attending athletic events. Site Evaluation 53 detector, or even frisked depending on the level of risk and suspicion. By using wrought-iron instead of solid walls, the school retains natural surveillance. Chil- dren in trouble outside the walls can still be seen, heard, and rescued. Another option is to construct substan- tial, solid walls, usually of a design and material compatible with existing struc- tures. The walls should be insurmountable and should contain windows. The windows can use wrought-iron bars instead of glass. Breezeways can be converted into en- closed hallways, ideally with pitched roofs replacing flat designs. The flat designs make roof trespass easy and enticing, and they tend to leak, requiring more frequent maintenance. A pitched-metal roof is less conducive to intruders and less mainte- nance-intensive. In some cases the inner wall of the hall can be left open to the new, fully enclosed, inner courtyard, primarily as a cost-saving feature. The newly con- verted hallway can also be designed with a generous width to accommodate a wider distribution of lockers, mitigating density and conflict problems between classes. One school reportedly has used glassed-in breezeways to some advantage by integrat- ing passive solar heating into their plans as well. A very important issue that arises with this type of redesign is the potential for con- flicts with building safety codes. Attach- ing buildings with solid walls or even fenc- ing can be construed as creating one large building, and this may engender some fire risks that must be addressed. This is not an insurmountable problem. Often it can be resolved by adding a sprinkler system, or by installing firewalls in certain locations, to restrict a fire?s ability to move quickly from one wing to another. As one architect pointed out, the reduced insurance costs that come with the installation of sprinkler systems should more than cover the costs of the retrofitting! (As an example, see Case Study: St. Hel- ena Elementary in the next chapter.) 2. Make each building a secure facil- ity in and of itself. When facilities are scat- tered throughout the community or the campus is widely accessible because of ex- cessive sprawl, site-containment is not a re- alistic option. Security under those circum- stances may need to focus on each build- ing separately, with each entry area de- signed for maximum natural surveillance and access control. Ideally these entries will be staffed, with the degree of screening commensurate with the perception of risk. Access-control devices, such as swipe cards, may be necessary as well. This campus suffers from sprawl; access control is impractical. This school is designed as a fortress. A lack of windows means no surveillance of the surroundings and no natural light for students. 54 Safe School Design Building-to-building communication devices will be unavoidable necessities. In addition, if circumstances dictate that fewer CPTED measures can be applied, the greater will be the demand for human sur- veillance to compensate. One result is that teachers will have to spend that much more time on security patrol. G46._G6FG72G74G72G65G73G73G65G73 Fortress-like school buildings usually have an advantage over sprawling cam- puses?there?s only one building to con- trol, and once students are inside the risk is contained. Their primary disadvantage is akin to what is seen in gated communi- ties: it may be safe on the inside, but it be- comes that much more dangerous once you leave. The barricading wall that keeps people secure on the inside also prevents staff members from seeing vulnerable stu- dents should they be accosted outside the walls. An important fact to remember: the risk level for school-related victimization generally doubles once students leave the building! Those solid walls will also hide afterhours intruders from vigilant neigh- bors. This risk can be reduced by replac- ing the walls with a less obstructing style (such as trading solid walls for wrought- iron fencing), and by taking care in the lo- cation and installation of windows. The portable buildings on the left obliged the main building to leave backdoors unlocked, eliminating access control. Wrought-iron fencing reestablishes access control without compromising natural surveillance. Avoid placing solid or ?dead? walls along the outer skin of the building. The hidden areas that can result may become magnets for illicit activities. Dark or hid- den alcoves, commonly found at loading docks or sheltered entry areas, are espe- cially attractive to trespassers?or troubled students?looking for a spot to engage in destructive behavior. Loading docks, garbage areas, utility or storage boxes, window sills, and many ar- chitectural features also frequently offer easy roof access to intruders. Be careful to control access to these areas. A fortress-like design may be great up to a point, but there is a limit. One large school building may be just as unwieldy to monitor, supervise, and care for as is a sprawling campus. One school police of- ficer, referring to such a school, reported that there were at least 60 doors in the school building to monitor. G48G69G64G69G6EG67G20 G50G6CG61G63G65G73 Every blind corner is a potential haz- ard. Make it easy for people to see what?s coming. If the blind corner is unavoidable, reduce the risk where possible by install- ing windows, mounting convex mirrors strategically close to the corners, or mov- Site Evaluation 55 cameras historically have tended to require high maintenance, and Murphy?s Law fre- quently seems to keep them from captur- ing critical events. Fiber-optic cabling al- lows the greatest distance between camera and receivers in a hard-wired system; wire- less models are dependent on repeaters to relay signals about every 1,500 feet. As ing the walkway at least a few feet away from the building. This adds a margin of safety as pedestrians round the bend, so that they can avoid being taken by surprise. Teacher presence has been shown to be a major school-safety factor. Building in natural surveillance is a great way to make the most efficient use of these staff re- sources. G56G69G64G65G6FG20 G43G61G6DG65G72G61G73 Some school officials believe security can be enhanced by installing surveillance cameras. In hidden areas, such as fire stair- wells, they may be the only realistic op- tion. Unfortunately, cameras aren?t a sig- nificant crime deterrent. They can, how- ever, be invaluable in identifying culprits after the fact. One source suggests that tapes can serve as teaching tools if students are allowed to view the videotapes and learn from their own misbehavior (Curwin and Mendler 1997). Some institutions install multiple moni- tors in a back room and pay security offic- ers to watch them. This expectation is prob- ably unrealistic. Studies conducted two de- cades ago demonstrated that twenty min- utes was about the limit for attentive view- ing, even with motivated watchers (Green 1999). Camera technology continues to change, and quality continues to improve. Pan-tilt G49G6DG70G61G63G74G20 G6FG66G20 G41G64G75G6CG74 G50G72G65G73G65G6EG63G65 ?In a survey of more than 100 students, teachers, and administrators at five midwestern high schools, Ron A. Astor, professor of social work and education, University of Michigan, found that, of the 166 reported acts of school violence, all occurred in locations where few or no adults?especially teachers?were present. About 40% of the incidents took place in hallways between class periods, while another 20% occurred in cafeterias during lunch-time. Other dan- gerous areas included gyms, locker rooms, auditoriums, and parking lots, especially right before or after the school day...? ?While teachers in the study indicated a sense of ownership and responsibil- ity for the space within their classrooms, many were reluctant to extend that feel- ing to areas of ?undefined public space,? which accounts for about a third of all school space... the students in the study said that ?unowned? public places must be ?personally reclaimed? by adults who have authority, know students person- ally, and know what procedure to fol- low when conflict arises in those loca- tions....? ??By far, the most effective violence in- tervention described by students, teach- ers, and administrators was the physi- cal presence of teachers who are will- ing to intervene, coupled with a clear, consistent administrative policy on vio- lence,? Astor explains.? SOURCE: USA Today, December 1996, v.125, n. 2619 p.13 (1) Unnecessary visual barriers create a hiding place for illicit activities. 56 Safe School Design wireless technology has improved, this op- tion has become increasingly attractive. In- stallation professionals can be consulted about what works best in a given location. Signs can be posted warning that video sur- veillance may be used if vandalism or other criminal activity becomes a problem. The signs themselves may be effective deter- rents. At the same time, avoid implying that security services are in place if they are not. If someone is victimized, they might have a legal argument that they rea- sonably assumed a higher level of secu- rity than actually existed. For this reason, signs saying ?surveillance cameras in use? should only be installed when this is ac- curate. Schools have had good success with cameras temporarily installed at trouble spots to identify culprits and confront them later. With adequate attic space, wires can be strung with reasonable ease, but where this is not the case a wireless model is far preferable. Portable systems offer an economical alternative, giving districts the flexibility This video surveillance image of Kip Kinkel approaching Thurston High School illustrates the severe limitations of surveillance cameras as security devices. Kinkel is not identifiable in this image, nor is it obvious that he poses a threat. of moving cameras to vari- ous locations as needed. Portable cameras also give the school the option of buying fewer systems of higher quality rather than wholesale lots of cheaper cameras to accommodate a large number of locations on a permanent basis. Each camera will also require a slow-speed re- cording device, and per- sonnel will be obliged to change the tapes daily. At least seven tapes should be on hand, one for each day of the week. In this manner at least six days pass before evidence is erased or taped over. Common concerns with cameras: Some of the most common complaints about cameras are that (1) they get vandalized or stolen, and (2) they do not capture ad- equate pictures. Bear these considerations in mind while choosing camera locations, and insist on field testing equipment be- fore making a final purchase. Final points about cameras: The price of a good one could equal the cost of in- stalling one or more windows or a panic- button alarm, adding convex mirrors to all major hallway intersections, and/or pur- chasing numerous violence-prevention curricula. The camera can document troublemakers, and the windows and mir- rors can help to spot and deter them; the social ecology of the school, on the other hand, is more likely to prevent them! G54G65G72G72G69G74G6FG72G69G61G6CG69G74G79 As mentioned earlier, territoriality is the third key component of CPTED, along with natural surveillance and natural ac- cess control. Establishing territoriality in- volves sending a clear message to others Site Evaluation 57 that says, ?We?re in charge here.? In schools, it also helps reinforce a message among students and staff that says, ?We belong here and this is our school.? In conducting a CPTED assessment, watch for positive and negative territorial messages. The most common negative messages are in the form of graffiti. Whether it?s gang graffiti on the gym walls or racist graffiti in a bathroom stall, the effect can still be demoralizing and fear- inducing. Positive countermeasures can include painting over or removing graffiti. Going one step further, schools can display artwork or banners that send constructive territorial messages, such as ?Pursuing truth in the company of friends.? School uniforms have emerged as a very powerful tool for establishing territorial- ity. A 1997 study found that 41 percent of elementary school principals were in fa- vor of school uniforms (see National As- sociation of Elementary School Principals 1997). Schools ranging from Long Beach, California, to Springfield, Oregon, and eastward across the country, report that stu- dent misbehavior decreased once uniforms became mandatory. Many side benefits can accrue from school uniforms: intruders will stand out like sore thumbs; families are relieved of the financial burden of buying ?fashion- able? wardrobes for their children; and gang attire becomes a moot point. Further- more, when young people are accused of misbehavior in the neighborhood, uniforms or the lack of them will help identify per- petrators, and possibly protect a student and, by association, the school from being falsely accused! G54G68G65G20 G45G6EG74G72G79G20 G41G72G65G61 The main office should be the primary gate-keeper for the school, with its staff monitoring all who enter the building. Ev- G54G68G65G20 G45G6CG65G63G74G72G6FG6EG69G63 G53G75G72G76G65G69G6CG6CG61G6EG63G65G20 G50G61G72G61G64G6FG78 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), and to some degree the entire concept of surveil- lance, can be looked at as logical exten- sions of the thinking behind the Panopticon prison model of the nineteenth century. This approach suggested building a facil- ity in which all residents were under con- stant natural surveillance without necessar- ily being able to see the viewer. The concept is a powerful one, with great potential for both use and abuse, particu- larly in a nonprison setting. CCTV has become widely popular in a va- riety of locations, ranging from prisons to public squares. It has been remarkably ef- fective for influencing traffic behavior in Australia and Canada, reducing speeding vehicles in one location five-fold, with a subsequent drop in injuries from 40,000 to 15,000 annually, and with fatalities drop- ping from 1,000 to fewer than 250. This electronic surveillance is purely ob- jective, with no decisions made based on protected class or other factors vulnerable to prejudice. Some suggest that one result of this objectivity should be a rise in en- forcement against previously underpoliced groups, and it can thus be an equalizer that sensitizes privileged groups to the same level of accountability imposed on more conventionally targeted classes. But CCTV also has an Orwellian side. The omnipresence of Big Brother can under- mine the quality of freedom in a society, throwing a chill into politically unpopular or diverse activities that can be scrutinized and ostensibly punished. Whether or not authorities abuse this technology, as long as the perception suggests that this could happen, democratic freedoms may be un- dermined. For these reasons, the use of CCTV should be thoughtfully weighed and carefully monitored. As authors Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong observed, ?the only crite- rion which distinguishes a modern traffic control system from the apparatus of po- litical control is democratic accountability? (Norris and Armstong 1999). 58 Safe School Design eryone approaching at the primary entry point should pass the main office and be seen by the staff. The office should use glass extensively, and office staff should have unobstructed views in all directions. The main office should also have a clear view of the grounds whenever possible, especially the main entry area, main drive, bus loading zone, and main parking area. If staff in the office can also observe the main playground, so much the better. At the very least, making this a reality in most schools will involve putting windows in a few dead walls. At worst, it will involve extensive renovation and new construc- tion, resulting in an office space that ex- tends out the front of the building. Visitors should be visually drawn to this one entry, and indicators should clearly communicate the steps they will have to A deadwall blocks natural surveillance of ap- proaching visitors at this site. Surveillance can be restored by installing windows This office sits far back from the entry doors. An architectural feature partially blocks the view. This office is located directly inside the main doors, but the view is blocked by an art display on the windows. take to enter the building. For example, ar- rows, maps, and multilingual signs might inform them that they will be buzzed in electronically if they will check in at the external sliding office window adjacent to the front doors. At the window, visitors will be asked to state their business and answer any relevant questions, and then they will be given a visitor?s tag. A large, promi- nently displayed, conveniently located sign should share important information, dis- play a map, and guide visitors to appropri- ate locations. G4DG65G74G61G6CG20 G44G65G74G65G63G74G6FG72G73 A significant number of schools, espe- cially in major urban areas, have deter- mined that the number of weapons show- ing up on campus warrants installing metal Site Evaluation 59 G20 G53G65G63G75G72G69G74G79G20 G56G65G73G74G69G62G75G6CG65G73 There are some difficulties with incor- porating such a vestibule into a school: Vestibules will allow a customer flow rate of 3-5 seconds per person; the sheer volume and intensity of pedes- trian traffic in a school may pose a po- tential traffic-jam situation. Fire and life safety-code issues may need to be addressed. Emergency access for firefighters or police needs to be built into the sys- tem (emergency override buttons and wireless remote controls are avail- able). The vestibules can be quite expensive, ranging from $48,500 to $81,700 per vestibule in one recent quote. None of these problems is insurmount- able, and even the steep cost may be jus- tifiable in comparison to the ongoing costs of staffing conventional entries. With a large, sprawling facility, vesti- bules might be needed in multiple loca- tions. Additional, conventional entries and exits would still be options for the schools to use as they saw fit. The ad- vantage would be a facility that still al- lows reasonable access from each side, while still screening out weapons. For more information, one manufacturer to contact is Diebold, P.O. Box 3077, Dept. 9-79, North Canton, Ohio 44720- 8077. For schools experiencing chronic prob- lems with weapons violations, metal de- tectors may become necessary invest- ments. The cost of the scanning portal, wands, and x-ray machine, coupled with the considerable expense of staffing the equipment, may make it reasonable to consider a fully contained security ves- tibule as an alternative. Security vestibules are more commonly associated with financial and commer- cial buildings. They provide a high-se- curity, fully contained entry vestibule that a visitor must pass through to reach the facility. If the metal detector is trig- gered, the second door will not open, and the visitor has no alternative but to turn around and leave. There are no guards present to put at risk, to argue with, or to require salaries. A built-in camera and intercom allow the central office or a security officer to communicate with visitors from a safe distance and to make judgment calls about overriding the detector and allow- ing access. Visitors can also be in- structed to open their coats and back- packs and display contents to the cam- era?all at a safe distance from school staff. People exiting the building also pass through a vestibule designed to make entry through the exit impossible. Additional features may include: weight-sensing floor mats that prevent more than one person from entering emergency backup power fire and ADA compliance ?trapping? capability if a facility wants to ensnare a person leaving through the vestibule various levels of bullet-resistant glass 60 Safe School Design detectors. Fifteen percent of schools sur- veyed nationally in 1994 were already us- ing metal detectors; 11-13 percent reported using them in 1998, though with varying degrees of rigor. Metal detectors appear regularly on lists of security recommendations, and under certain circumstances they may be wise in- vestments. To be effective, however, there must not be any other way to enter the school, such as through another unlocked door or window, and the equipment must be supervised by staff prepared to disarm intruders. These requirements ratchet up the costs of using metal detectors in schools. Metal detectors do have their share of critics. In an Education Digest article in September 1994, Del Stover expressed concern that high schools risk becoming indistinguishable from high-tech prisons if they overinvest in security devices. Writ- ing in Scholastic Update that same year, Karen N. Peart took a look at Wingate High School in the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn, New York, which installed metal detectors in 1990 after being rated one of the city?s five most dangerous high schools. She quoted one student as saying, ?It makes me feel safer,? while others complained that the school felt too prison-like. Wingate?s use of detectors encountered some implementation and technical prob- lems. Scanning of students was conducted intermittently, on a random basis, because scanning all students required too much time. Students reported that they could un- dermine the effectiveness of the metal de- tectors by hiding weapons behind belt buckles. According to Peart, the school?s principal, Richard Organisciak, felt that the money might have been better spent on new books and peer-mediation training. Organisciak?s sentiments are under- standable. Nevertheless, approximately 973,000 students brought handguns to school in the past year on one or more oc- casions, and that cannot be ignored. The fact that one is safer from victimization by gun violence in prisons than in our public schools should be alarming. Metal detec- tors may be controversial, but they should undoubtedly be considered, along with all other options, in choosing the right mix of safety measures for a particular school. Making schools safer and violence-free requires a comprehensive approach. When schools are at a severe level of risk, it may be necessary to consider options that pre- viously had been considered unpalatable. G4FG66G66G69G63G65G20 G44G65G73G69G67G6EG20 G61G6EG64 G53G61G66G65G74G79G20 G43G6FG6EG63G65G72G6EG73 Although it may not have always been the case, the role of the office as school guardian is now of primary importance. The office should be located and designed in a manner that reinforces this critical role. The strategic function of the school office in advancing safety and security can be ac- complished by emphasizing natural sur- veillance, natural access control, and ter- ritoriality in office placement and design. Basic design considerations. School of- fice design and operational issues are criti- cal to overall school safety and security: good interschool communication devices, working PA systems, and annunciators in- dicating when exterior doors are opened are all examples of basic strategies. Con- fidential materials need to be filed se- curely; confiscated drugs or weapons, lost and found items, and teachers? mailboxes need similar protection. If these secure spaces aren?t planned for, the result may be a congested, inefficient workspace. Similarly, room for copy machines, fax ma- chines, printers, and telephone equipment boxes is necessary to permit staff mem- bers? freedom of movement. Receptionists, as the first line of de- fense, need the basic protection of a Site Evaluation 61 counter, topped in extreme cases with a protective plexiglass shield. Seating should be available to de-escalate confronta- tions?it?s harder to be aggressive or at- tack from a seated position. Office staff members should also have a safe haven to which they can retreat if threatened, usually another room with a lockable door and a working phone. The principal?s office should always have two exits, even if one is a window. The nurse?s office needs easy accessibility for stretch- ers and access to an ambulance without pa- rading a sick or injured student through the halls. And what about students sent to the prin- cipal for disciplinary reasons? Where are they to be placed and how are they accom- modated? Does the child sent to the office for disruptive behavior share space with an- other child waiting to be picked up for a dental appointment? Role of the office in access control. The office needs to be placed at the main en- trance. Under the best of circumstances it should be designed to be fully capable of maintaining absolute control over school access as necessary. Very commonly, schools fall short of this level of security, by as much as six out of seven levels (see illustrations in figures 4-1 to 4-7) on the following scale developed by Schneider: Level 1. At the lowest security level, the office is hidden deep within the building, allowing no significant surveillance, terri- toriality, or access control. Level 2. The office is located along a main corridor, but has no access control, and very limited natural surveillance into the hall. Level 3. The office extends into the hall- way, allowing surveillance up and down the hall. Level 4. The office also incorporates surveillance to the outside of the building. Level 5. The entry is adjacent to the of- fice, giving greatly improved surveillance capability to the office staff. Level 6. All building entry doors are now secured, obliging visitors to enter ad- jacent to the main entrance. This brings the school to an optimum level of natural sur- veillance, but access control is still negli- gible. Level 7. Only at the seventh level is natural surveillance matched with true ac- cess control. Visitors must pass through an entry vestibule, check in at the office, and be buzzed electronically through a second set of doors. Metal detectors can be incor- porated into the first set of doors, alerting school staff when more careful examina- tion of visitors is warranted. G48G61G6CG6CG77G61G79G73 In a recent midwestern study, school hallways were identified as the location for 40 percent of school conflicts (Caught in the Crossfire: A Report on Gun Violence in Our Schools 1990). This study identi- fied hallways as the site of one out of four shootings in schools?the most common indoor location for such tragedies. Our ex- amination of National School Safety Cen- ter case files corroborates this finding. A more recent report identifies hallways as the location for 8.6 percent of all school- associated violent deaths (indoors, out- doors, on or off campus) between 1992 and 1994 (Kachur, Stennies, and Powell and others 1996). Hallways are generally long and have dead walls, which block off all natural sur- veillance. Their usage patterns tend to fluc- tuate?with intensive use followed gener- ally by 45 minutes or so of nonuse; this pattern repeats throughout the school day. An empty hallway can be a foreboding space. Metal lockers, hard tile floors, and even painted-over acoustic ceiling tiles pro- 62 Safe School Design G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20 G34G2DG33 G4CG65G76G65G6CG20 G33G3A G4FG66G66G69G63G65G20G45G78G74G65G6EG64G73G20G69G6EG74G6F G4DG61G69G6EG20G48G61G6CG6CG77G61G79 Office extends into main hallway. Windows are installed on all sides Improved surveillance up and down main hallway, including main entrees, but no surveillance up and down additional hallways. Still no access control. G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20 G34G2DG32 G4CG65G76G65G6CG20 G32G3A G4FG66G66G69G63G65G20G49G73G20 G4CG6FG63G61G74G65G64 G41G6CG6FG6EG67G20G4DG61G69G6EG20G48G61G6CG6CG77G61G79 Office is located along main hallway. Minimal surveillance inside main hallway limited to area directly adjacent to office. Multiple entries. Still no access control. G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20 G34G2DG31 G4CG65G76G65G6CG20 G31G3A G4CG6FG77G65G73G74G20 G53G65G63G75G72G69G74G79G20G4CG65G76G65G6C Office is hidden inside building. No surveillance inside. No access control. Visitors who respond to signs directing them to office have permission to roam through entire building while seeking the office. G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20 G34G2DG34 G4CG65G76G65G6CG20 G34G3A G4FG66G66G69G63G65G20G45G78G74G65G6EG64G73G20G69G6EG74G6FG20 G4DG61G69G6E G48G61G6CG6CG77G61G79G20G61G6EG64G20G49G6EG63G6CG75G64G65G73G20 G56G69G65G77G20G74G6F G4FG75G74G73G69G64G65 Office extends into main hallway and includes view to outside. Improved surveillance inside and out. Office staff potentially have direct views into all 3 hallways. Still no access control?staff can see some visitors after they enter, but can?t prevent them from entering. Site Evaluation 63 G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20 G34G2DG37 G4CG65G76G65G6CG20 G37G3A G54G68G65G20G4DG61G69G6EG20G45G6EG74G72G79G20G44G6FG6FG72G20G4EG6FG77G20G4CG65G61G64G73G20G74G6FG20 G61G20G44G6FG75G62G6CG65G2DG44G6FG6FG72 G44G65G63G6FG6DG70G72G65G73G73G69G6FG6EG20 G43G68G61G6DG62G65G72G2FG56G65G73G74G69G62G75G6CG65 G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20 G34G2DG36 G4CG65G76G65G6CG20 G36G3A G4DG75G6CG74G69G70G6CG65G20G45G6EG74G72G69G65G73G20G48G61G76G65G20G4EG6FG77 G42G65G65G6EG20 G52G65G64G75G63G65G64 Multiple entries have now been reduced. Only one door is the main entry, two are fire exits, and one is the primary exit. Surveillance is further improved. Access control is still lacking. G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20 G34G2DG35 G4CG65G76G65G6CG20 G35G3A G45G6EG74G72G79G20G44G65G73G69G67G6EG20G4EG6FG77G20G48G65G69G67G68G74G65G6EG73 G53G75G72G76G65G69G6CG6CG61G6EG63G65G20 G43G61G70G61G62G69G6CG69G74G79 Entry design now heightens surveillance capability. Visitors must now pass directly adjacent to the main office while entering or leaving. This strengthens territoriality and positions staff to intervene more directly with an unwelcome visitor. Extended office design now allows surveillance up and down hallways, into main entry areas, and outside the main entry. Access control is still lacking. The main entry door now leads to a double-door decompression chamber/vestibule. Visitor access is electronically controllable from the office; at any time, the office staff can electronically control the second set of doors, requiring visitors to check in at a sliding window before further access is allowed. Emergency exits can be alarmed, and/or annunciators in office can indicate when doors are opened. Metal detectors can be located inside the first set of double doors. If detectors are triggered, the second set of doors won?t open until released by office staff. Pass- through windows into office allow visitors to empty pockets (similar to an airport). 64 Safe School Design duce an echo chamber with an ambiance similar to that of a multistory parking ga- rage. Hallways are common locations for fire alarms, which in turn are popular targets for some trouble- some students. In Jonesboro, Arkansas, two boys used such an alarm to lure students and school staff members outdoors and shoot them in April 1998. Three sixth-grad- ers plotted a similar attack in St. Charles, Missouri, the next month but didn?t carry out the attack. Placing the fire alarms in a location that allows natural surveillance can cut down on the possibility they will be tampered with. All too often the hallway turns into a mosh pit of shoving, jostling, pestering, yelling, flirting, harassing, and bullying going on at once. Abutting lockers virtu- ally guarantee student conflicts as one open door must crash into the neighboring locker or its owner. The chaotic atmosphere, a floor design that incorporates multiple es- cape routes, multiple visual obstacles (in- cluding classroom doors, locker doors, and students), overcrowding, and a nonterritorial climate all help establish a location that is particularly inviting for con- flict and destructive behavior. Some remedies to these common hall- way problems include: Schedule locker access. If lockers were painted alternate colors, and only blue lockers could be opened during first, third, and fifth periods, while only red lockers could be opened during second, fourth, and sixth periods, conflicts would be reduced. Stagger class times. If ninth-grade classes ended at ten minutes after the hour, and tenth-grade classes ended at twenty minutes after the hour, hallway traffic would be drastically reduced. Design new construction to allow more hall space. The following design features are worth considering: recess lockers into niches out of the hall traffic; recess door- ways out of the hall traffic; install lock- ers farther apart; muffle hallway noise; and improve visibility around blind cor- ners with the use of rounded or ?cham- fered? corners and convex mirrors. At the same time, care should be taken not to create nooks in which perpetrators can hide their behavior from monitors. Avoid ?dead? wall designs. Unused wall space should be given to adjacent teach- ers to use for displays. This usage in- creases a sense of ownership over that particular hall space; teachers and stu- dents are more inclined to check when Murals on these walls include directional signs to help visitors or new students find their way. Site Evaluation 65 they hear disruptive activity in the hall that may threaten their artwork. Improve surveillance. One-way mirrors and/or convex mirrors can give students the impression that teachers might be watching, and this knowledge may have a beneficial effect on their behavior, even if staff members aren?t in a position to monitor the halls. Actual surveillance provided by trained adults is the ideal, of course. At the same time, a positive school climate can be undermined if grim security guards contribute to an oppres- sive or fearful atmosphere. One option that seems effective has been to recruit students? parents to be a pres- ence at schools. Principal Jacqueline Greenwood recruited fathers to serve this purpose at Arlington High School in In- dianapolis in the late 1980s (Kipnis 1999). An Oakland, California, junior high school had success with hiring mothers and grandmothers, who substi- tuted hugs and greetings for more con- ventional means of student control. Where admonishments were necessary, students were much more concerned about disappointing grandma than they were about distressing a security guard (Noguera 1995). The unfortunate draw- back to any of these human or organiza- tional approaches is the tremendous amount of energy required to maintain an adequate level of family and commu- nity involvement over a long period. G52G65G73G74G72G6FG6FG6DG73 Restrooms can be dreaded campus lo- cations. It is estimated that 22 percent of students are afraid to use school bathrooms because they are sites of frequent victim- ization. Once students go in there, no one can hear them being victimized. School bathrooms have long been havens for van- dalism, cigarette smoking, drug use, shake- downs, and general havoc. If a school could make only one change to bathrooms, it might consider eliminat- ing double-door entries. Squeamishness about bathroom noises led to the creation of a commonly used, sound-muffling de- sign. Unfortunately, double-door entries provide student victimizers on the inside with plenty of warning when someone is coming, because they can hear the first door open and close before the second door moves. By changing to a maze design, schools can eliminate the early warning system, and make it easier for teachers to hear assaults on persons or property in progress. A classic problem with bathrooms in- volves their locations. Frequently they are installed in hidden or obscure locations, further reducing natural surveillance. Ide- The stall with the greatest privacy has generated litter and graffitti while the other stalls have not. Locking open the outer door creates a maze entry, discouraging misbehavior. 66 Safe School Design ally, bathrooms should be installed near natural surveillance points, such as the main school office. Bathroom access is frequently a con- cern for afterschool sports events. A lack of facilities invites inappropriate use of the landscaping or other locations on the site; on the other hand, poorly sited facilities may invite visitors to have the run of the school to reach bathrooms. School restrooms often see their worst abuse from visitors, such as opposing teams. A loca- tion adjacent to the playing field is easier to supervise than facilities at a great dis- tance or in a hidden location. The choice of materials and mounting hardware should be made with vandalism-resistance in mind. G43G65G6EG74G72G61G6CG20 G43G6FG75G72G74G79G61G72G64 Central courtyards are common features of many schools. If they are fully enclosed by the school building, security should not be a problem; in most cases, the fire code will require at least two or three emergency exits distant from each other. Many court- yards, however, are open on at least one side. Sometimes the central courtyard is a three-sided space at the main entrance, with multiple doorways leading in all di- rections, making access control extremely difficult. As schools design courtyards, they should envision some worst-case sce- narios. For example, how could they keep unwanted intruders out? At the same time, how can they be sure they haven?t trapped students in a blind alley? The horror sto- ries that administrators fear the most may never come about, but they can almost al- ways count on problems with graffiti, skateboarding, or other chronic afterhours annoyances as possibilities within court- yards. Illustrations A and B (on the following page) demonstrate two approaches to courtyard and office design. In illustration A, the office has retreated from the guard- ian position; access is wide open via the main entry area as well as the two hidden entrances. In illustration B, the office is more aggressively positioned. This exag- gerated emphasis locates the office in a po- G46._G6CG61G6DG65G20 G44G65G74G65G63G74G6FG72G73 A New Tool for Smoking Enforcement One technological innovation holds promise for deterring or intercepting bathroom smokers as soon as they light a match. The Stealth Smoking Enforce- ment System offers a variety of overt and covert devices that are actually trig- gered by the flame of a lighter or match within thirty feet of the detector. The overt model looks like a smoke de- tector, and can be provided with a pro- tective cage; the flame can trigger a con- ventional sound alarm or a recorded message. Covert models may look like sprinkler heads, deodorizers, or vents, and can also send a message to a cen- tral console, identifying the location of the incident. This allows school staff to actually intercept the offender at the scene. The sound alarm relies on cul- prits learning from experience, and leaves it at that. The equipment comes in battery-oper- ated, hard-wired, and wireless-remote versions. Costs range from $249 for a hardwired detector, plus $39 for a pro- tective cage, to $2,399 for a ?6 pack? wireless kit, which includes six detec- tion devices and a receiver. The manufacturer lists a number of sat- isfied customers, including the Chicago Transit Authority, Lucent Technologies, Levi Strauss, Brookfield Academy, and Palmyra Schools. For more information, contact: Voice Products, phone: 216- 360-0433, fax: 216-360-9805, address: 23715 Mercantile Road #200, Cleve- land, Ohio 44122. Email: vproducts@cyberdrive.net Site Evaluation 67 Illustration A: The central courtyard is accessible via two hidden entries and a broad front entrance. The office is slightly withdrawn and cannot serve a gatekeeping function. Illustration B: The hidden entries are now equip0ped with fire doors, which can be unlocked as appropriate, and which are always accessible as fire exits. Visitors are now obligated to enter via the main entry, where the office has been extended into a more vigilant position. The broad front entrance is now controlled by a series of wrought- iron gates or fire doors. Visitors are funneled to the main entry, adjacent to the main office. 68 Safe School Design sition that allows surveillance over as much of the site as possible. Offices that are flush with the building often pay for this posi- tion with restricted surveillance. G47G79G6DG6EG61G73G69G75G6DG73G2C G41G75G64G69G74G6FG72G69G75G6DG73G2CG20 G61G6EG64 G43G61G66G65G74G65G72G69G61G73 Large gathering areas can have very dif- ferent purposes. Gymnasiums, for ex- ample, can function very effectively as sporting facilities, whereas their excessive reverberance would hardly suit a recital. Concert halls have very different acousti- cal needs. Gymnasiums and auditoriums share one characteristic with cafeterias: large crowds move in and out at close to the same time. Watch for traffic-flow conflicts and design to avoid them. The home team can have a different door than is used by the visiting team, for example. Cafeteria conflicts can be controlled through scheduling, clear identification of one-way entry and exit doors, and effective monitoring by caring adults. Cafeterias also suffer from excess reverberance. Astor?s study of midwestern high schools identified cafeterias as the site for one out of every five school-site con- flicts (?Teachers? Presence May Deter Vio- lence,? December 1996). G4CG6FG63G6BG65G72G20 G52G6FG6FG6DG73 G61G6EG64G20 G53G68G6FG77G65G72G73 Any place where a victim can be caught isolated or in a state of undress will be a temptation to offenders. Some schools have seen locker-room behavior dete- riorate to the point where they have done away with showers, or even physical- education uniforms, to avoid the need for undressing and the risks inherent with such vulnerability. A simpler adjustment would be to put a window in the coach?s office looking into the locker room. Unfortunately, in many cases where such windows exist, the coaches cover them out of discomfort, or out of respect for student privacy. Never- theless, just like anywhere else at school, an attentive adult is very effective at deter- ring misbehavior. If problems persist, stu- dent safety should take precedence over stu- dent privacy. Other options would include reducing locker height and redesigning locker-room layout(s) to make entrapment difficult. G50G75G62G6CG69G63G20 G41G63G63G65G73G73G20 G61G6EG64 G41G66G74G65G72G68G6FG75G72G73G20 G53G70G6FG72G74G73 G45G76G65G6EG74G73 A common oversight in site planning concerns bathroom access for the large crowds that turn out for sports events after hours or on the weekends. Bathroom ac- cess will be a critical issue that cannot be ignored. Questions to ask include: Are bathrooms accessible for events in this location? If they aren?t, where do people go? Are they located in hidden locations, where visitors will be vulnerable to at- tack? Site Evaluation 69 Does bathroom access mean the entire school must be left open during events, or can alternatives be arranged? Do the bathrooms show signs of abuse? Who locks and unlocks them? Is a key checkout arrangement conceiv- able for some types of events? Are double-door entries muffling sound to a point where teachers can?t hear fights occurring? (Remedies include locking one door open, switching to a maze-en- try design, or installing portable toilets.) Can bathrooms be built adjacent to the fields, accessible from outside without allowing access further into the school? G43G6CG61G73G73G72G6FG6FG6DG73 Classrooms were identified as the sec- ond most likely location for an in-school shooting in a 1990 study (Caught in the Crossfire: A Report on Gun Violence in Our Nation? Schools 1990), and they were the site of 9.5 percent of all school-associ- ated violent deaths during the 1992-94 pe- riod (Journal of the American Medical As- sociation, June 1996). This fact alone un- derscores the importance of CPTED ap- plications in this arena. There are at least three critical areas to address in terms of classroom design: 1. Access control. Can the class be locked down at a moment?s notice, or must the teacher first exit the room, insert a key in the knob, then re-enter the room? This is hardly an efficient action in a crisis. In fact, under high-stress circumstances, pre- dictable physiological responses rob hu- man beings of their fine-motor skills while preparing for ?fight or flight.? Fine-motor skills are precisely those needed to insert a key into a lock. An emergency exit on the exterior wall of the classroom can be of great value. Does it automatically lock from the out- side? An external door can also be a risk. In good weather, teachers often leave these doors ajar, providing easy access for of- fenders. 2. Surveillance. Can the teacher see what?s going on in the classroom, the adja- cent hallway, or nearby school grounds? Can staff members in the hallway easily see what?s occurring in the classroom? Teachers frequently cover the small win- dows in their doors?if they exist at all? to restrict distractions. 3. Territoriality. Is the area directly out- side the classroom marked in some way as semiprivate space? If not, intruders may feel comfortable loitering directly outside the classroom window. A developed patio, play space, or garden area helps establish this as outdoor classroom turf. The bottom line is to think about what makes a room safe; these details are criti- cal. A working PA system and/or a radio/ cell phone can be just as essential as chalk and a blackboard. G43G6FG6EG63G6CG75G73G69G6FG6E The debate on just how far to go in se- curing schools is far from over. In the wake of highly publicized schoolyard massacres, some people will push for a high-security lockup architectural design. Others will in- sist that a well-designed school should look like a place to learn?not a locked-down fortress. Prudent application of CPTED principles can satisfy both perspectives. Architectural features that allow school staff members to naturally see what?s go- ing on, to control access to the school, and to maintain control over the environment can make a tremendous difference, while enhancing, rather than detracting from, the learning environment. Violence has now, unfortunately, be- come a common occurrence in our nation?s 70 Safe School Design schools; we deny or ignore this develop- ment at our peril. Schools can prevent much of this violence with good design, but they must also be prepared to immedi- ately adjust security measures to match the level of risk anticipated or experienced on a daily basis. In most cases, schools are not now physically designed to deter vio- lent behavior, nor are they prepared to take swift action in securing the school when dangerous situations arise. By applying CPTED concepts, they could be. 71 CHAPTER5 Case Study Applications of CPTED Principles This chapter illustrates how a school-safety assessment can be conducted with the use of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts and principles. Case studies by the senior author of two elementary schools demonstrate how to conduct CPTED assessments, how to evaluate and interpret the results, and how to apply the information to make the schools safer. The case studies describe actual schools whose names have been changed to maintain confidentiality. G53G74G2EG20G48G65G6CG65G6EG61G20G45G6CG65G6DG65G6EG74G61G72G79 St. Helena school, located within a me- dium-sized suburban school district (15,000 students), was built in 1904 along a narrow country byway surrounded by farmland. Al- most a century later, the area now finds it- self on the outskirts of a medium-sized city surrounded by small businesses and malls. A raised freeway that surrounds the city passes a block away. A pub is located across the street. The adjacent road has been expanded to a five-lane thoroughfare creating so much noise that school windows are kept closed. There is no space for a car or bus to stop at the front door anymore, so most school ac- cess is through the back lot. That also is where the district added new build- ings?two portable classrooms along with several perma- nent structures?as the school site grew with the population. Amid this scat- tered cluster of ad- ditional buildings is a long row of class- rooms fronted by an open breezeway, in the style of a motel. Each classroom opens onto the breezeway, so there is no possi- bility of screening visitors to campus be- The original entry is no longer used by visitors. 72 Safe School Design fore they reach a chosen room. The one back driveway is clogged with traffic at student dropoff and pickup times. The scattered buildings provide a warren of hidden ar- eas that attract party- ing young adults, graffiti artists, skate- boarders, and drug users on a nightly ba- sis. There is no ac- cess control, the lay- out cuts off surveil- lance, and there are no indicators of terri- torial control. Visitors, who primarily enter through the east (back) entrance, must walk through the entire school campus to even find the office, which is still located at the front of the building, waiting for the occasional visitor to arrive from the west. The office has no view of any classrooms, nor can it see 99 percent of the campus. A sign at the back entrance, wistfully holding on to a rapidly diminishing past, still denies access to horses. G43G50G54G45G44G20G52G65G63G6FG6DG6DG65G6EG64G61G74G69G6FG6EG73 1. Office Location. So that the office may regain its role as gatekeeper and have natural surveillance of the rest of the cam- pus, it must be moved to the eastern side of the main school building. In such cir- cumstances, the natural choice is to con- vert an existing space, such as a classroom or storage space, for office use, because the goals are to minimize construction costs and to preserve the look of the building. Major road expansion has made it impossible for cars or buses to stop at the original main entry. In this particular case, the new construc- tion has already confused the look of the site to such a degree that preservation is no longer a reasonable concern. Any suit- able existing space that faces east could be converted to office space. If no such space can be found, a new office wing will need to be constructed, preferably in the center of the east (back) entrance. From this position, assuming that glass is used wherever possible, office staff can maintain extensive surveillance of the property and can effectively serve as gatekeeper. If all other doors automatically lock, visitors will be obliged to pass through the main office entry to gain ac- cess to the main hallway. A portable building that is not well lo- cated needs to be moved out of the way to allow proper surveillance between the school buildings and the school entry area. The office should also have access con- trol over everyone who comes onto the property. That control can only be realized through the changes discussed below. 2. Scattered Buildings. The eastern side of the campus, with its handful of newer buildings, is riddled with problems, high- Case Study 73 lighted by a water fountain that is encased in a padlocked wire-mesh cage. In addi- tion, there are dead walls, blocked angles of surveillance, blind corners, multiple ac- cess points to the open areas adjacent to, into, and on top of the buildings. Mirrors and windows would do little good; the main problems occur after hours, when no authorized person is there to see anyway. The easiest cure for this area would be to transform it into an enclosed, secured courtyard. Enclosing the courtyard elimi- nates all the problems at once. The site would no longer function as an afterhours hangout, nor could it be used as an access point onto the roof. Moreover, the court- yard could be used for outdoor activities more securely; sculpture or artwork is more likely to survive over time. To create the enclosure, there are two options: tall wrought-iron fencing or solid walls, peppered with windows for surveil- lance. Fencing in this case would be a little awkward because of the need for fire ex- its. It?s very difficult to secure fencing against intruders who can reach through and manipulate fire-exit hardware. Of course, the fire exits could be alarmed as a deterrent. Solid walls would achieve maxi- The back lot is the main access point for most vehicle traffic. mum security and could be designed to match the brickwork of the original con- struction. 3. Motel-Style Classrooms. Mov- ing the office and en- closing the court- yard still leave one problem unsolved: excessive access to the newer suite of classrooms whose doors open onto a breezeway. The so- lution is expensive but unavoidable if the school truly wants access control. The breezeway needs to be converted into a hallway, and the hallway needs to be connected to the main school building. Access to the hallway needs to be regulated by auto-locking doors (allow- ing use as emergency exits, or as needed by staff members who have keys), and signs should direct visitors to the new main en- try for admittance. G42G72G61G64G64G6FG63G6BG20G45G6CG65G6DG65G6EG74G61G72G79 Braddock Elementary School, built in 1926, is similar in original design to St. Hel- ena Elementary, but with different prob- lems. Both schools started with a classic fortress design. Differences surfaced when St. Helena grew while Braddock remained basically the same size. Braddock?s weakest feature is the office, located in the middle of an east-west hall- way. Its only natural-surveillance view is of the small slab of hallway directly adja- cent to the office door entry. The location does not allow surveillance of the north- south hallway nearby. To compound the problem, the office is not located near any 74 Safe School Design of the three main entrances, nor any of the informal entrances off the south play- ground area. The south wall is primarily a solid, dead wall. It offers a number of entry points, including the back door to the kitchen/caf- eteria area, the gym, a preschool, and at least one classroom. The building design at the southwest corner is a series of blind corners leading to the cafeteria entry and dumpster area. The south wall abuts a large field and playground area. A quiet residen- tial zone bordering the university rings the entire site. G43G72G69G74G69G71G75G65G73G20 G6FG66G20 G53G65G6CG65G63G74G65G64G20 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20 G49G6EG63G69G64G65G6EG74G73G3A G43G6FG75G6CG64G20 G54G68G65G79G20 G48G61G76G65G20 G42G65G65G6EG20 G50G72G65G76G65G6EG74G65G64G20 G54G68G72G6FG75G67G68 G41G70G70G6CG69G63G61G74G69G6FG6EG20 G6FG66G20 G43G50G54G45G44G20 G50G72G69G6EG63G69G70G6CG65G73G3F a73 Jonesboro, Arkansas, April 24, 1998? Two boys, ages 11 and 13, set off a fire alarm to draw Westside Middle School stu- dents outdoors. Dressed in camouflage out- fits, the two boys hid in the woods nearby, then shot 15 people once the crowd had gathered outside, killing four. Two rifles and additional weapons were recovered. There was no apparent motive for the shootings. The boys were quite accurate in their fire as a result of having had extensive practice in simulated target shooting from playing video games. Many more injuries resulted as a consequence. CPTED Analysis. The primary CPTED weakness in this scenario involves the nearby patch of woods, which apparently provided sufficient cover to camouflage the shooters. Any undeveloped turf near the school is an attractive location for illicit behavior. Perhaps if the woods had been clear of brush it would have helped. A fence between the school and the woods might have been somewhat beneficial, but only if it was untraversable. This might have re- stricted the boys in their ability to pull the alarm and then retreat into the forest. Improvements in surveillance, by installing windows or mirrors, might have allowed staff to see the offenders pulling the alarm. Installing alarms only in viewable locations might have been worthwhile in discourag- ing their misuse. A protected evacuation site might have helped, as might the ability to quickly re-enter the school. a73 West Paducah, Kentucky, December 1, 1997?Mike Carneal, a 14-year-old student who had made intolerant remarks in the past, came to school armed with a pistol and shot 8 students who had gathered for a prayer group inside the main entrance. He was armed with a .22 caliber semiautomatic handgun with three spare clips of ammuni- tion, two .22 caliber rifles, and two shot- guns. Most of the weapons had been stolen in a burglary. The long guns were hidden, wrapped and taped inside a quilt. He told a teacher, as well as his sister, who drove him to school, that the bundle was ?an English project.? He had previously told other students that ?something big? would happen Monday. He G43G50G54G45G44G20G52G65G63G6FG6DG6DG65G6EG64G61G74G69G6FG6EG73 1. The Office Area. Three options, vary- ing in expense, should be considered for the office area. The first, least expensive option is to in- stall convex mirrors to improve the office staff?s surveillance up and down the east- west hallway, and to some extent around the corner and down the north-south hall- way. This limited solution falls into the cat- egory of ?better than nothing.? The second option involves major con- struction: ballooning the office wall, the Continued on p. 75 Case Study 75 room presently adjacent to the main entry, near the southwest corner of the building. To allow surveillance, windows need to be installed looking into the entry vestibule from the new office, as well as looking out onto the east-west hallway and into one north-south hallway. Convex mirrors can still be used to supplement natural views, but the office now has extensive natural sur- veillance inside at least two hallways, in- side the entry vestibule, and directly out- side through the existing windows in the north wall. stood ten feet from his victims, inserted ear plugs, then fired methodically. Seventeen-year-old Ben Strong disarmed him before he could fire the single bullet left in the clip. A teacher heading into the school from parking-lot duty ?was six yards away from it?all of our students were run- ning out and I was running in.? Carneal said he had no particular vendetta. He is reported to have acted as if he had committed only a minor offense. CPTED Analysis. There are insufficient data to suggest that anyone could have rea- sonably anticipated this attack. Only severe CPTED measures would have had a real im- pact here, with an armed guard, metal de- tectors, and/or a controlled-entry vestibule. However, in a school with no history of similar incidents, it would be unrealistic to expect a constant full-security alert. With- out seeing the actual school layout, it is dif- ficult to assess architectural weaknesses. There is a slim chance that basic CPTED measures to reduce access?by holding the event deeper within the school, for example, while establishing restricted and monitored access?might have provided some degree of protection. Improved surveillance by staff would only have made a difference if the assailant?s weapons were visible before he entered the school. In this case, with a teacher mere yards away, it?s clear that adult staffing alone was not a significant factor. Schoolwide measures aimed at establishing a positive school atmosphere might have helped, but there is no evidence that a nega- tive climate was an issue. Any truly preven- tive remedies here would most likely have had to involve targeted intervention with Carneal himself. a73 Edinboro, Pennsylvania, April 26, 1998?Parker Middle School student An- drew Wurst, age 14, shot 4 people at an 8 th- grade graduation dance. The incident began on a patio outside a banquet hall at ?Nick?s Place,? an offcampus club. He then entered the building, fired more shots, left through a rear exit, and was arrested. His motive was unknown. One student described Wurst as looking ?dead? and as a grim loner who never fully opened his eyes. CPTED Analysis. In this case again, school CPTED measures would have been of no avail. If the club itself were to apply CPTED standards, they would have needed to con- trol the turf outside their patio area by block- ing access and heightening surveillance. The answer in this case seems to call for preven- tive behavior-management approaches and/ or psychological treatment. hallway, and the rooms across the hall, forming a banana shape. The hallway now bends around the office, and the office staff can directly see up and down the hallway, thanks to extensive use of glass. This op- tion, probably the most expensive of the three, may be impractical if load-bearing walls are involved, and it still doesn?t solve the access-control problem. The third option also involves signifi- cant costs, but it is not as radical a rede- sign as the second option, and it does ad- dress the access-control problem. The of- fice needs to change places with the class- 76 Safe School Design G54G61G62G6CG65G20 G35G2DG31 G57G45G42G53G49G54G45G53G20G6FG6EG20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20G53G61G66G65G74G79G2C G56G69G6FG6CG65G6EG63G65G20G50G72G65G76G65G6EG74G69G6FG6EG2CG20G61G6EG64G20G43G50G54G45G44 ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management http://eric.uoregon.edu/trends_issues/ safety/index.html Institute on Violence and Destructive Behavior ? University of Oregon http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~ivdb/ index.html International CPTED Association http://www.cpted.net International CPTED Association 1998 conferences papers www.arch.vt.edu/crimeprev/pages/ ConfPap.html National Alliance for Safe Schools www.safeschools.org/ National Association of Attorneys General/National School Boards Asso- ciation KEEP SCHOOLS SAFE www.keepschoolssafe.org National Center for Education Statistics ? Violence & Discipline Problems in U.S. Public Schools 1996-1997 http://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/violence National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities www.edfacilities.org National Education Association www.nea.org National Institute of Justice?publica- tion on security technologies www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/crimdocs.htm National Institute on the Education of At- Risk Students www.ed.gov/offices/OERI/At-Risk/ National Resource Center for Safe Schools www.safetyzone.org National School Safety Center www.nssc1.org/ NEA Safe Schools Page www.nea.org/issues/safescho/ Oregon School Boards Association ? Crisis Management www.OSBA.org/hotopics/crismgmt/ index.htm Ribbon of Promise www.ribbonofpromise.org Update Center for School Safety www.MHRCC.org/scss/links.html U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org U.S. Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS Web of Justice www.co.pinellas.fl.us/bcc/juscoord/ ejuvenile.htm The window into the entry vestibule should slide open to allow staff to com- municate with visitors. If additional secu- rity were desired, the vestibule could be enclosed by installing a second set of en- try doors with electronic locks; to gain en- try to the hallways, visitors would enter after being buzzed-in by office staff. If con- ditions warrant, the outer entry doors could incorporate metal detectors. All other entry points into the school need to automatically lock, and clearly Case Study 77 written, bilingual signs should direct visi- tors to the main office entry. 2. The South Wall. The south wall of the school is largely comprised of dead walls, though there are some exceptions. It has at least two very weak areas in terms of access control?a covered bike-storage area that?s nestled into the center of the south wall and that adjoins an entry door, and the kitchen area, with its series of blind corners and easy school access. One solution improves surveillance to the south while also enlarging the kitchen, which is so small that two people cannot pass each other without brushing up against the stove. The design would extend the kitchen wall outward, tracing an arc that encompasses the series of blind corners. The kitchen should have windows looking out into the south field, thereby improving natural surveillance. The bike-storage area is a dark and fore- boding place, imbedded beneath the build- ing, roughly below the library, and accessed from the south. There is no natural surveil- lance into this area, which is effectively sealed off both visually and physically. Ac- cess should be improved by replacing the damaged mesh fence with wrought iron and installing motion-detector lights to high- light afterhours intruders. The hidden en- try should be locked when not staffed. Ide- ally, the bike racks should be moved to the front of the building, directly outside the new main office windows, and adjacent to the main entry. 79 CHAPTER 6 The Role of Architects in School Design Architects bring exceptional expertise to the task of designing and retrofitting schools to make them safer. For example, architects can assess whether various options will satisfy building codes, and they can translate key concepts and needs into blueprints. Unfortunately, architects do not rou- tinely seek out training in CPTED, and CPTED analysts are not consistently in- vited to instruct architects and planners as part of their academic programs. It is not unusual for architects to reject input from CPTED analysts on the grounds that ar- chitects ?have been building schools for decades.? Most of the schools constructed over the past century are woefully inad- equate from a CPTED perspective, built in an era when school shootings and ram- pant, on-campus drug dealing were un- heard-of occurrences. CPTED analysts routinely review plans, or inspect new buildings, and find flaws that could easily have been fixed if caught in time. To cite two such errors noted by the senior author recently: 1. One state-of-the-art juvenile deten- tion facility positioned the guard at the metal detector, but installed the elevator to the courtrooms directly behind him. This meant all visitors were empowered to walk a few feet behind him, out of his field of vision?creating a very uncomfortable and potentially hazardous situation for security personnel. 2. Another new, multimillion-dollar, high-tech detention facility installed a two- story front wall of glass facing south. This resulted in overexposure to the sun on bright days, blinding any staff looking in that direction, completely undermining their natural surveillance of the entry walk- way and parking lot. Staff had temporarily addressed this problem by taping black plastic garbage bags over some of the win- dow panes. Many schools today were built decades ago with an anticipated lifespan of no more than fifty years and are now falling apart; many suffer from deferred maintenance due to budget shortfalls. Design flaws, use of building materials now known to create hazards, and inadequate maintenance have all led to unanticipated costs. Flat roofs re- quire hot-mopping on a regular basis, lead paint and asbestos pose health hazards, and moldy carpets contribute to a high rate of asthma among students. In the year 2000 an International Build- ing Code (IBC) will be introduced, with an expectation that it will be adopted gradually yet broadly. That process may take a few years; in the meantime many states, including Oregon, will continue to operate under current regulations. Even when the IBC is widely adopted, state and local legislation may require certain amendments to the code. 80 Safe School Design 0000000000000000000000000000 *One source of information about these new materials is Environmental Building Supplies at www. EcoHaus.com (503-222-3881). Improvements that might seem simple, such as connecting buildings with wrought- iron fencing, encounter building-code re- quirements of some complexity. The newly connected buildings may be considered as one large building under the code, and that designation triggers certain standards in terms of fire and other life-safety concerns. The more flammable the construction material, the smaller a building is allowed to be. In many cases, schools are built of less expensive, more highly combustible materials to stretch budgets. However, some factors can be manipulated to allow for a larger overall building. These vari- ables include, for example, the amount of empty space around the building; the con- struction materials used (brick, steel, and concrete buildings, in many respects, have no size limits, whereas 2 x 4 construction may be limited to as few as 9,600 square feet); the installation of sprinklers; or the construction of firewalls to protect one sec- tion of the new building from fire in an- other section. In many cases, it is more cost-effective to build an entirely new facility than it is to retrofit an old one, especially when viewed over a planned lifespan of 50 to 75 years. Although new materials may bring hazards as well?such as new carpets and glues that require ?off-gassing? for days or weeks?there are now environmentally friendly materials that provide healthy al- ternatives.* Exploding enrollment, availability of new technology, excessive maintenance costs, health hazards, corroded pipes, en- ergy-inefficient design, low-end construc- tion materials, and CPTED weaknesses can provide compelling justification to support bond measures for new school construc- tion. Any competent architect will be sensi- tive to these issues and receptive to new information. Health, safety, and CPTED concepts can easily be incorporated into school designs. In addition, they can be used to assess the cost-efficiency of archi- tectural alternatives, helping to determine at what point new construction becomes more economical than remodeling or ret- rofitting. Examples of the work of architects who are applying CPTED concepts are illus- trated on the following pages. In the first set of drawings (figures 6-1 and 6-2), Eu- gene, Oregon, architect Ed Waterbury has taken the CPTED recommendations for St. Helena Elementary (see previous chapter) and incorporated them into a number of design alternatives that address key secu- rity concerns while trying to contain costs as much as possible. Another example is a 3D perspective created by Springfield, Oregon, architect Arturo Paz of A. Paz Architects. His three- dimensional computer models illustrate an approach to design that allows a walk- through of the school site and its buildings. This modeling improves the capacity for noting CPTED flaws and correcting them almost immediately, such as by adding a window, curving a wall, or removing a vi- sual obstacle. This approach has enormous potential for detecting errors early in the design stage, rather than waiting until af- ter the building has been constructed (see illustrations). In Mr. Paz?s work it becomes apparent to the viewer that: Visitors will be visible to office staff as soon as they enter the parking lot. Visitors will be obligated to use the main entrance to gain entry to the school. Office staff members have an opportu- nity to scrutinize visitors and electroni- cally lock doors if this is warranted. The Role of Architects 81 G46._ G44G69G61 1. Isolated buildings with uncontrolled 82 Safe School Design G46._ G53 VEHICLE ENTRY ONLY The Role of Architects 83 G54G61G62G6CG65G20 G36G2DG31 G53G63G68G65G6DG65G20G41G3AG20G53G74G2EG20G48G65G6CG65G6EG61G20G45G6CG65G6DG65G6EG74G61G72G79 Description Reorganize school's administrative offices and faculty spaces for more direct visual supervision of students and visitors by: Removing existing "temporary" classroom building Constructing new building for administrative offices and faculty spaces Converting existing administrative offices and faculty spaces to classrooms Constructing new secure entry vestibule Constructing new covered walkways Create a secure and defined "campus" environment with formalized and central entrance. Provide 8' HGT security fencing (open and fitting into character of the school). Create a recognizable arrival and departure "platform" (safe and weather protected place for loading and unloading bus). Relocate unpaved staff parking area to new paved parking expansion to existing visitor parking lot. Provide a new site vehicle exit aisle and exit to Hunsaker Lane; Convert existing site vehicle entry/exit to entry only. Estimated Costs 1. Remove existing "temporary" $10,000 +/- classroom building 2. Construct new administrative offices and faculty spaces building (2700 s.f. +/-) $270,000 +/- 3. Convert existing administrative offices and faculty space to classrooms (1500 s.f. +/-) $375,000 +/- 4. Construct new secure entry vestibule (1000 s.f. +/-) $25,000 +/- 5. Construct new covered walkways (170 l.f. +/-) $32,300 +/- 6. Site improvements New arrival/depart "platform" (2900 s.f. +/-) $14,500 +/- Renovate existing staff gravel parking lot area $2,500 +/- New 8' HGT perimeter fencing (500 l.f. +/-) ornamental iron or $5,000 +/- chain link (Range) $27,000 +/- New paved staff parking lot expansion and exit aisle (16,500 s.f.+/-) $52,700 +/- General landscape improvements $2500 +/- Total estimated rough construction costs $816,500 84 Safe School Design G46._ G53 The Role of Architects 85 G54G61G62G6CG65G20 G36G2DG32 G53G63G68G65G6DG65G20G42G3AG20G53G74G2EG20G48G65G6CG65G6EG61G20G45G6CG65G6DG65G6EG74G61G72G79 Description Reorganize school's administrative offices and faculty spaces for more direct visual super- vision of students and visitors by: Construct new building for administrative offices and faculty spaces. Construct new secure entry vestibule. Convert existing administrative office and faculty spaces to classrooms. Construct new covered walkways. Create a secure and defined "campus" environment with formalized and central entrance. Provide 8' HGT security fencing (open and fitting into character of the school). Create a recognizable arrival and departure "platform" (safe and weather protected place for loading and unloading bus). Relocate unpaved staff parking area to new paved parking expansion to existing visitor parking lot. Provide a new site vehicle exit aisle and exit to Hunsaker Lane; convert existing site vehicle entry/exit to entry only. Estimated Costs 1. Construct new administrative offices and faculty (2500 s.f.+/-) $250,000 +/- space building 2. Construct new secure entry (600 s.f. +/-) $15,000 +/- vestibule 3. Convert existing administrative offices and (1500 s.f. +/-) $37,500 +/- faculty space 4. New covered walkways (185 l.f. +/-) $35,000 +/- 5. General site improvements New arrival/depart "platform" (2900 s.f. +/-) $14,500 +/- Renovate existing staff gravel parking lot area $2,500 +/- New 8' HGT perimeter fencing (521 l.f. +/-) ornamental iron or $5,200 +/- chain link (range) $26,000 +/- New paved staff parking lot expansion and exit aisle (16500 s.f. +/-) $52,700 +/- General landscape improvements $2500 +/- Total estimated rough construction costs $440,900 86 Safe School Design Office staff members have excellent natural surveillance, both within the facilities and outside the fenced area. Three-dimensional computer models by A. Paz Architects allow designers to note and correct CPTED flaws. 87 CHAPTER 7 Policy Recommendations for School Districts Familiarity with Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts puts school boards and administrators in a stronger position to mitigate risks and im- prove safety and security at school. Familiarity without follow-through, however, is an awkward equation when it comes to liability. If problems are foreseeable, it is wise not to ignore them but rather to take prudent action to prevent them. G46._G75G74G75G72G65G20G43G6FG6EG73G74G72G75G63G74G69G6FG6E Depending on local priorities, a school district can adopt guidelines that range from the extremely broad to the site-spe- cific. Some examples of possible policies are as follows: 1. The school board or central office may want to adopt a resolution that all fu- ture construction in the district shall meet with basic CPTED standards for school se- curity. 2. The school board may want to go a step further and specify that a trained CPTED inspector will review and approve all construction projects. This inspector can be a district employee with specialized training or an independent contractor with CPTED expertise. In either case the exper- tise must be documented to the satisfac- tion of the superintendent of schools or another designated authority. Qualified in- spectors and trainers can be reached through the International CPTED Associa- tion (www.cpted.net). 3. The school board may desire to specify particular design features that must Unfortunately, most schools were built without awareness of CPTED concepts, and the cost of remodeling these schools to the highest standards is far beyond the budgetary capacities of the vast majority of districts throughout the country. A recent National Center for Education Statistics report estimated it will cost the nation about $127 billion for long-delayed repairs and additions to school facilities (Richard 2000). To bring the nation?s schools into compliance with CPTED con- cepts, making them safer places in which to work and learn, would push this figure even higher. The question then becomes how to even begin to address an overwhelming price tag for infrastructure upkeep with equally ur- gent staffing and supply expenses and at the same time tackle school-security con- cerns. For school boards wishing to em- brace CPTED concepts, an appropriate policy must respond to needs in two broad categories: (1) future construction and (2) maintenance of existing structures. 88 Safe School Design G53G65G63G75G72G69G74G79G20 G49G64G65G61G73G20 G66G6FG72G20 G4EG65G77G20 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20 G44G65G73G69G67G6E The National Institute of Justice recently published a very helpful guide for schools and law-enforcement agencies titled The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technolo- gies in U.S. Schools: A Guide for Practical School Security Applications , by Mary W. Green (1999). This guide is highly recommended. The full text of the guide is available electroni- cally (in ASCII text, Adobe Acrobat, and HTML) at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/ crimdocs.htm The following excerpt from the guide suggests ideas to keep in mind when designing a new school facility. Although this list includes only a few basic security technologies (such as cameras, sen- sors, and so forth), the facility design should not preclude their straightforward installa- tion in the future. Limit the number of buildings?one building is best?to limit outsiders on the campus. Minimize the entrances to the school building?having one or two main en- trances/exits will support efforts to keep outsiders off campus. Allow enough room at the main entry in the event that a screen- ing area (i.e., for weapon or drug detec- tion) needs to be incorporated later on. Alarm other exits for emergency use only. Minimize the line of sight from secluded off-campus sites onto student gathering areas, the main entry doors, playgrounds, patios, and so forth . . . . (This suggestion must be tempered against the benefits gained from the natural, desirable surveil- lance by neighbors, passers-by, officers on patrol, and so forth). Allow for a security person to be posted at a single entrance onto campus to chal- lenge each vehicle for identification of all occupants. Buses and school employees should have a separate (and controlled) entrance. Provide a dropoff/pickup lane for buses only. Minimize the number of driveways or parking lots that students will have to walk across to get to the school building. Build single-stall bathrooms to mitigate bathroom confrontations and problems. Enclose the campus. (This is more a mea- sure to keep outsiders out rather than to keep insiders in.) Beside defining prop- erty boundaries, a robust fence forces a perpetrator to consciously trespass, rather than allowing casual entry. Make certain that the school building and classroom areas can be closed and locked off from the gym and other facilities used during off hours. Minimize secluded hiding places for un- be included in all new construction in the district. Some reasonable specifications in- clude the following: A front office shall be located adjacent to the front doors, with a level of secu- rity equal to or greater than level 5 on the Schneider scale (see page 61) All entrances will be designed to allow ac- cess control and surveillance capability. Bathrooms will be designed to allow for a maze-entry option wherever possible. If, instead of specifying particulars, the board wants to couch its CPTED policy in general terms, it can state a few broad guidelines, such as a requirement that all designs demonstrate reasonable integration of natural surveillance and natural access- control considerations. Continued on p. 89 Policy Recommendations and Guidelines 89 authorized persons, both inside and out- side buildings. Do not eliminate windows, but use them strategically. Consider incorporating clerestories or secure skylights that allow light in but that are less vulnerable than typical windows. Maximize the line of sight within build- ings. Large wide spaces, like hallways or com- mons, should have sufficient vertical di- mension so space does not feel restric- tive to students. Consider installing student lockers in classrooms or other areas easy to moni- tor so that there is no single locker area that becomes a bottleneck, and there is always the deterrence of an adult nearby . . . . Do not cut corners on communications, especially those required for security. Make certain that your facility has built in the necessary receivers and transmit- ters throughout the structure to allow for dependable two-way radio and cellular phone use. (Sometimes radio frequency communication is not possible deep within a large, structurally dense facil- ity.) Where possible, have buildings and other student gathering areas set back from the streets, driveways, or parking areas by at least 50 feet. Install a basic security alarm system throughout all hallways, administrative offices, and rooms containing high-value property, such as computers, VCRs, shop equipment, laboratory supplies, and mu- sical instruments. Allow a law enforcement officer to live on campus. (In some school districts, an officer is allowed to move his or her own trailer to a strategic location on campus and receive free utilities in exchange for prenegotiated and formally contracted re- sponsibilities.) The deterrent effect of a police vehicle parked on campus all night and weekend can be great. Such an ar- rangement can also provide both detec- tion and response in situations where damage is being inflicted upon the facil- ity, but no alarm system would normally detect it . . . . Provide a separate parking area for work-study students or those who will be leaving during the school day. (This al- lows the main student parking lot to be closed off during the school day.) Make certain that exterior lighting is suf- ficient for safety. Lights mounted on the exterior of buildings often are inadequate for adjoining driveways or parking lots. Do not underestimate the value of trees and landscaping on a school campus. An attractive, well maintained school is gen- erally less attractive to thieves. SOURCE: Green (1999). The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, A Guide for Practical School Security Applications. Washington D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, September 1999. 129 pages. G4DG61G69G6EG74G65G6EG61G6EG63G65G20G6FG66 G45G78G69G73G74G69G6EG67G20G53G74G72G75G63G74G75G72G65G73 This part of the policy task is more dif- ficult for most school boards, because it requires prioritizing CPTED improve- ments for existing schools. The choices boil down to pocketbook issues: it?s a rare school district that can implement all the necessary or recommended CPTED alter- ations in all their schools. One approach would be as follows: 1. Arrange to have all schools inspected. These inspections should be conducted with consistency, ideally by the same in- spector using the same standards through- out. Communicate with CPTED analysts well ahead of time to determine likely costs, which can then be incorporated into 90 Safe School Design grant requests. The inspector should pro- duce a report itemizing recommended im- provements throughout the district, regard- less of cost. 2. Arrange for rough estimates of costs for the recommended improvements. 3. Establish a fiscal plan to address these recommendations consistent with the bud- getary realities of your school district. This might involve pursuing state, federal, or private funds, or it might involve parcel- ing out improvements over a period of ten to twenty years. 4. Where funds are limited, schools should determine: which improvements are critical in the short run (for example, upgrade all faulty public-address systems) which improvements should be applied districtwide (for example, install convex mirrors wherever effective to eliminate blind spots; install windows in offices where it would make a significant dif- ference in surveillance; convert all breezeways into enclosed hallways, re- stricting outside access) which schools should be fixed first (for example, it may make more sense to fix one school well than all schools poorly) 5.Decide whether, as a pre- requisite for receiv- ing CPTED dollars, schools must take steps to improve their social ecology. Schools may be re- quired, for ex- ample, to establish an effective behav- ior-support plan, in- stitute a violence- prevention curricu- lum, or demonstrate a commitment to school improve- ment that might be worth supporting with physical measures. When school districts have limited dol- lars to spend and have decided to fix only a few schools rather than spread the funds so thin that they would have little impact, here are some considerations that may be useful in identifying candidates for limited CPTED funding: Other maintenance, repair, and longev- ity considerations make spending money on this particular building a worthwhile investment. In other words, this project would not involve throwing money down a black hole. This school has a history of significant behavioral problems, with students, staff, families, or visitors, which heightens the need for security measures. School has a history of significant prop- erty crimes that would justify investing in security measures. The school population exhibits signifi- cant risk factors?low socioeconomic status, high mobility, high percentage of special-education students?that are fre- quently associated with problem behav- iors. Installing office windows might be a priority districtwide. Policy Recommendations and Guidelines 91 G46._G69G67G75G72G65G20 G37G2DG31 Elements of School Security G54G68G69G73G20G64G69G61G67G72G61G6DG20G64G65G70G69G63G74G73G20G74G68G69G6EG67G73G20 G74G6FG20 G63G6FG6EG73G69G64G65G72G20G77G68G65G6EG20G64G65G73G69G67G6EG69G6EG67G20G61G20G6EG65G77 G73G65G63G75G72G69G74G79G20G73G79G73G74G65G6DG20G66G6FG72G20 G61G20G73G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20G65G6EG76G69G72G6FG6EG6DG65G6EG74G20G74G68G61G74G20 G63G61G6EG20G62G65G20G75G73G65G64 G61G67G61G69G6EG73G74 G76G61G72G69G6FG75G73G20G74G68G72G65G61G74G73G2EG20 G53G6FG6DG65G20G65G78G61G6DG70G6CG65G73G20G6FG66G20G65G61G63G68G20G63G6FG6DG70G6FG6EG65G6EG74G20G61G72G65G20G69G6EG63G6CG75G64G65G64G2E G43G6FG6EG73G65G71G75G65G6EG63G65G73 Suspension/ expulsion Mandatory work on campus Citation or arrest by law enforcement officer Judicial system G52G65G73G70G6FG6EG73G65G2F G49G6EG76G65G73G74G69G67G61G74G69G6FG6E Security personnel Law enforcement Viewing videotapes Reward offered for information G44G65G74G65G72G72G65G6EG63G65 Fencing Signs Reputation Video cameras I.D. checks Weapon screenings Officer(s) on campus Thorny bushes Antigraffiti sealers Random locker searches Vehicle checks Drug dogs G44G65G6CG61G79 Bolted-down equipment Locked doors Fences G44G65G74G65G63G74G69G6FG6E Sensors Drug dogs Bomb dogs Cameras Duress alarms Weapon screenings Student ?hotlines? or crimestopper programs Drug swipes Staff in strategic locations SOURCE: Green (1999). The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, A Guide for Practical School Security Applications. Washington D.C.: National Insti- tute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Sep- tember 1999. 129 pages. www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ nij/crimdocs.htm. 92 Safe School Design The surrounding neighborhood has a high crime rate, which correlates with greater risks for students approaching or leaving the school. G53G65G63G75G72G69G74G79G20G54G65G63G68G6EG6FG6CG6FG67G79 The school board may or may not want to separate funding for technology from funding for structural changes. Districts are often better off buying a small amount of higher quality security technology, and sharing this between schools, than look- ing for bargains that are less effective. Be mindful that today?s technology will be obsolete in a year or two; don?t lock in to specific technology to be purchased five years from now. Pay careful atten- tion to maintenance needs for technical equipment; ideally send at least two maintenance staff for training in equip- ment maintenance and repair. Make sure that your pur- chase source in- cludes a local main- tenance arrange- ment. The following list of technology op- tions is for illustra- tive purposes and may not necessarily in- clude the best choices for a particular dis- trict. 1. Install electronic controls, doorbells, and/or intercoms on front doors where they can be integrated into an appropri- ate access-control layout. 2. Buy one set of wireless high-sensitivity flame detectors to be moved between schools as the need arises, to address problems with smoking in the bath- rooms. 3. Invest in districtwide message-paging systems to alert staff members during crises. 4. Buy cell phones and/or radios for all campus supervisors. 5. Buy portable metal-detection equipment to be moved into schools as needed. 6. Buy one portable security-camera sys- tem, to be moved to troublesome loca- tions as the need arises. G43G6FG6DG6DG6FG6EG20G45G72G72G6FG72G73 1. Wholesale prescriptions. Each school faces unique challenges, with distinctive architecture, budgets, maintenance needs, staff, parents, student bodies, political cli- mates, and levels of support. Suggesting that one model would solve every school?s security problems is akin to treating every medical condition with the same drug. Smalltown, U.S.A., is not the same as East L.A. School boards, knowing the particu- lar challenges facing their own communi- ties and schools, are in the best position to Poor preplanning resulted in fencing being added to prevent falls into the stairwell; razor wire was added to block access to the roof. Policy Recommendations and Guidelines 93 prescribe solutions to fit unique local needs. 2. Hasty, mismatched problems and so- lutions. People are quick to propose solu- tions immediately after an incident has oc- curred, when parents are angry and admin- istrators want to demonstrate that they are taking action. Some of the most common errors in this regard involve installation of fencing and metal detectors. Before mak- ing major investments in these ?solutions,? it is productive to carefully identify the problems the district most commonly faces and decide exactly what should be done about them. Fencing, for example, can be a great tool for limiting access, but it?s not always the best solution to the problem of unautho- rized access. If students are now forced to walk all the way around the fence to get to school, are they perhaps even more likely to be victimized? Are they isolated during this walk? Are intruders cutting across the school grounds actually the problem you are facing? In many cases the problem visi- tors are coming through the main entrance. If metal detectors are installed, who is going to staff them? Must other staff posi- tions be cut to fund these new positions? Can students just as easily enter through another door, making the metal detector a waste of time and money? What are the metal detectors supposed to deter? Answers to these kinds of questions should be sought prior to any decision to commit a school district or a school to these or any other security options. G43G6FG6EG63G6CG75G73G69G6FG6E The physical aspects of CPTED dis- cussed in this book, complemented by cur- ricula, attitudes and beliefs, and behaviors that create a social ecology of nonviolence and mutual respect, can transform a school from a war zone to a safe haven for all in- volved. These elements can make our schools safer, more functional, and more economical to operate. If staff members can efficiently control access to the school, maintain natural surveillance over the site, and nurture a sense of identity within the school community, the school will be a safer and more effective setting for educa- tors and students. 95 Recommended Resources for Enhancing School Safety and Security Listed below are some recommended resources for improving the safety and security of schools.They address procedures that involve architectural changes, the optional use and supervision of school space, technological innovations to improve security, and behavioral-instructional interventions for creating a more effective school with a posi- tive climate. A Gentle Deterrent to Vandalism by James Wise, Psychology Today, September, 1982. Antisocial Behavior in School: Strategies and Best Practices, by Hill Walker, Geoff Colvin, and Elizabeth Ramnsey. Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole, 1995.481 pages. Reduction of School Violence: Alternatives to Suspension.(2nd Edition) by Beverley Johns, Valerie Carr, and Charles Hoots, LRP Publications, Horsham, PA, 1995. Applying Positive Behavioral Support and Functional Behavioral Assessment in Schools, Technical Assistance Guide # 1, available from the OSEP Center on Posi- tive Behavioral Interventions and Supports, go to http://pbis.org., 1999 B. E. S. T. Building Effective Schools To- gether: A Three Tiered Approach to Safe, Effective, and Healthy School.. Eugene, Oregon: Institute on Violence and Destruc- tive Behavior. Contact Rebecca Scarola, 1265 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1265 Caught in the Crossfire: A Report on Gun Violence in Our Nation?s Schools, Cen- ter to Prevent Handgun Violence, 1990. Classroom Environment, by Barry J. Frase. London; Dover, New Hampshire:Croom Helm, 1986. 226 pages. Confronting Violence on Buses, by James D. King, American School & University, June 1997 v69. Creating an Inviting Classroom Environ- ment, by Elizabeth S. Foster-Harrison and Ann Adams-Bullock. Bloomington; Indi- ana: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foun- dation, 1998. 38 pages. Creating Safe and Drug-Free Schools: An Action Guide. Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Education, Division of Safe an1d Drug-Free Schools, 400 Md. Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20202-6123. Creating Safe Schools; What Principals Can Do, by Marie Somers Hill and Frank W. Hill. Thousand Oaks California, Corwin Press, 1994. 132 pages. Crime Prevention Through Environmen- tal Design, by Timothy D. Crowe. Bos- ton: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991. 241 pages. Crisis Prevention and Response: Is Your School Prepared? by Cathy Paine and Jef- frey Sprague, Institute on Violence and De- structive Behavior, Oregon School Study Council Bulletin, available from the Or- egon School Study Council, 213 Educa- tion Bldg., 1571 Alder St., College of Edu- cation, 1215 University of Oregon, Eu- gene, OR 97403-1215 96 Safe School Design Defensible Space: Deterring Crime and Building Community, by Henry G. Cisneros.Rockville, Maryland: U.S. Depart- ment of Housing and Urban Development, 1995. (free copies available from HUD at 1-800-245-2691). Designing Places for Learning, edited by Anne Meek. Alexandria; Virginia: Associa- tion for Supervision and Curriculum Devel- opment, and Scottsdale, Arizona: The Coun- cil of Educational Facility Planners, Inter- national, 1995. 101 pages. The Development of Competence in Favor- able and Unfavorable Environments; Lessons from Research on Successful Children, by Ann S. Masten and J. Dou- glas Coatsworth, American Psychologist, 1998. Drawing in the Family; Family Involvement in the Schools, Education Commission of the States, 1988. Early Warning/Timely Response; A Guide to Safe Schools, Center for Effective col- laboration and Practice of the American In- stitutes for Research in collaboration with the National Association of School Psy- chologists, 1998. http://www.ed.gov/offices/ OSERS/OSEP/earlywrn.html Environmental Design & Premises Liabil- ity Series: NIJ Research in Brief, by Corey L.Gordon, partner in the Mass Tort depart- ment of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi. April 1996. (http:www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/ cptedlia.txt) First Step to Success: Helping Young Chil- dren Overcome Antisocial Behavior, by Hill M. Walker, Kate Kavanagh, Annemieke Golly, Bruce Stiller, Herb Severson, and Ed- ward Feil. Longmont, CO: Sopris West, Inc., 1997. Florida School CPTED Guidelines. Available on the internet at: www.arch.usf.edu/flctr/ projects/safesc/intro.htm. High Schools or High-Tech Prisons?By Del Stover, Education Digest, Set 1994 v60. Interior Design with Feng Shui, by Sarah Rossbach, Penguin Arkana, 1987 Lessons in Survival, by Karen N. Peart, Scho- lastic Update, Feb. 11, 1994 v126. Making Schools Safer and Violence Free, by Hill M. Walker and Michael H. Epstein, Austin, TX: PRO-ED, Inc. September, 2000. National Association of Elementary School Principals National Poll, 1997 NIJ Research in Brief; Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Park- ing Facilities, by Mary Smith (http:// www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/cptedpkg.txt). The Other Side of School Violence: Educa- tor Policies and Practices That May Con- tribute to Student Misbehavior, by Irwin A. Hyman and Donna C. Perone. Journal of School Psychology, Vol. 36, No.1, pp. 7- 27, 1998. The Power of Place; How Our Surround- ings Shape Our Thoughts, Emotions and Actions, by Winifred Gallagher. Poseidon Press, 1993. Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn?t, What?s Promising, Research in Brief. National Institute of Justice. by Lawrence W. Sherman, Denise Gottfredson, et al. 1998 (www.ncjrs.org/ works/). 21 pages. ED 423 321. Reinvesting in America, by Robin Garr. Reading, Massachusetts. Addison-Wesley, 1995. 271 pages. Resolving Conflict Creatively: Evaluating the Developmental Effects of a School- Based Violence Prevention Program in Neighborhood and Classroom Context, by J. Lawrence Aber, Stephanie M. Jones, Joshua L. Brown, Nina Chaudry, and Faith Samples, Development and Psychopathol- ogy, 10, Cambridge University Press, 1998. Safe by Design: Planning for Peaceful School Communities, by Sarah Miller, Janine Brodine, and Terri Miller. Available from the Committee for Children, Seattle, Washington, 2203 Airport Way South, Suite 500, Seattle, Washington 98134-2027, Sep- tember, 1996. Safe, Drug-Free, and Effective Schools for ALL Students by Mary Quinn, David Osher, and Catherine Hoffman, American Recommended Resources 97 Institutes for Research, Center for Effective Collaboratiion and Practice, OERI, 1000 Thomas Jefferson St., N. W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20007. 1998. School and Community Interventions to Prevent Serious and Violent Offending, U.S. Department of Justice, OJJDP, by Shay Bilchik, Administrator, 810 7th St., N.W., Washington, D.C., 20531. School and Community Partnerships: Re- forming Schools, Revitalizing Communi- ties, by Michelle Cahill, Cross City Cam- paign for Urban School Reform, 407 South Dearborn Street, Suite 1725, Chicago, Il. 60605.(312) 322 3880. School Safety: Promising Initiatives for Ad- dressing School Violence. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Children and Families, Committee on Labor and Human Resources US Senate. 48 pages. ED 384 125. http://www.calyx.net/ ~schaffer/GOVPUBS/gao/gao15.html Second Step: A Violence Prevention Cur- riculum. Seattle, Washington: Committee for Children, 2203 Airport Way South, Suite 500, Seattle, Washington 98134-2027. 1992. 109 pages. ED 350 542. Security Efforts Cut Chicago-School Vio- lence, by Debra Williams, Education Digest, Nov. 1995, v61 n3 p.18. Setting Up a Class for the Most Disruptive Students, by Peter Martin Commanday, Education Digest 59. (Jan 1994). Systemic Violence in Education; Promise Broken, edited by Juanita Ross Epp and Ailsa M. Watkinson, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1997. 220 pages. Teachers? Presence May Deter Violence, USA Today 125, 2619 (Dec. 1996). 13. Teaching Teachers to Protect Themselves and Their Students, by Julie L. Nicklin, Chronicle of Higher Education, 42,33 (April 26, 1996). The Acting Out Child: Coping with Class- room Disruption. by Hill M. Walker. (Sec- ond edition),Longmont, Colorado: Sopris West, Inc., 1995. 465 pages. The Appropriate and Effective Use of Secu- rity Technologies in U.S. Schools: A Guide for Schools and Law Enforcement Agen- cies, by Mary Green. Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.September, 1999. (Available through U.S. Dept. of Jus- tice, OJJDP, 810 7th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20531. 129 pages. The Science of Building Peace: How School Climate Can Prevent or Increase Sub- stance Abuse and Violent Crime, by Den- nis Embry, Ph.D., Heartsprings, Inc. 1997. (Ph 1-800-368-9356; e-mail: custrel@Heartsprings.org) Violence Prevention and School Safety: Is- sues, Problems, Approaches, and Recom- mended Solutions, by Hill M. Walker, Larry K. Irvin and Jeffrey R. Sprague, Or- egon School Study Council, University of Oregon,1997. What Works in Reducing Adolescent Vio- lence: An Empirical Review of the Field, by Patrick Tolan and Nancy Guerra, Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, Institute for Behavioral Sciences, Univer- sity of Colorado, Boulder, CO, 80309-0442. White House Annual Report on School Safety (produced annually), available from the U.S. Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, U.S. Department of Education, 400 Md. Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20202- 6123. Youth Violence Prevention, by Kenneth Powell and Darnell Hawkins, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, Supplement to Vol. 12, Number 5, September/October 1996. 99 Appendices G41G2E G4EG61G74G69G6FG6EG61G6CG20 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20 G53G61G66G65G74G79G20 G43G65G6EG74G65G72G92G73 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20 G43G72G69G6DG65G20 G41G73G73G65G73G73G6DG65G6EG74G20 G54G6FG6FG6C G42G2E G4FG72G65G67G6FG6EG20 G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG20 G53G61G66G65G74G79G20 G53G75G72G76G65G79 101 G41G70G70G65G6EG64G69G78G20 G41 National School Safety Center?s School Crime Assessment Tool The National School Safety Center has developed the following school-crime assessment tool to assist school administrators in evaluating their vulnerability to school-crime issues and potential school-climate problems. 1. Has your community crime rate increased over the past 12 months? 2. Are more than 15% of your work-order repairs vandalism- related? 3. Do you have an open campus? 4. Has there been an emergence of an underground student newspaper? 5. Is your community transiency rate increasing? 6. Do you have an increasing presence of graffiti in your community? 7. Do you have an increased presence of gangs in your community? 8. Is your truancy rate increasing? 9. Are your suspension and expulsion rates increasing? 10. Have you had increased conflicts relative to dress styles, food services, and types of music played at special events? 11. Do you have an increasing number of students on probation in your school? 12. Have you had isolated racial fights? 13. Have you reduced the number of extracurricular programs and sports at your school? 14. Has there been an increasing incidence of parents withdrawing students from your school because of fear? 15. Has your budget for professional development opportunities and in-service training for your staff been reduced or eliminated? 16. Are you discovering more weapons on your campus? 17. Do you have written screening and selection guidelines for new teachers and other youth-serving profes-sionals who work in your school? 18. Are drugs easily available in or around your school? 19. Are more than 40% of your students bused to school? 20. Have you had a student demon- stration or other signs of unrest within the past 12 months? 102 Safe School Design G53G63G6FG72G69G6EG67G20G61G6EG64G20G49G6EG74G65G72G70G72G65G74G61G74G69G6FG6E Multiply each affirmative answer by 5 and add the total. 0-20 Indicates no significant school safety problems. 25-45 An emerging school safety problem (safe school plan should be developed). 50-70 Significant potential for school safety problem (safe school plan should be developed). Over 70 School is a sitting time bomb (safe school plan should be developed immediately). Reprinted with permission of the National School Safety Center, Ronald D. Stephens, Executive Director. Phone: (805) 373-9977. Website: www.nssc1.org 103 G41G70G70G65G6EG64G69G78G20 G42 Oregon School Safety Survey Developed by Jeffrey Sprague, Geoffrey Colvin, & Larry Irvin The Institute on Violence and Destructive Behavior University of Oregon, College of Education For further information contact Jeffrey Sprague, Ph.D., at 541-346-3592 jsprague@ccmail.uoregon.edu 104 Safe School Design Essential Questions for School Safety Planning Please take a few minutes to complete the attached survey. Please place a check (X) next to the item that best reflects your opinion for each question. Your responses will be valuable in determining training and support needs related to school safety and vio- lence prevention. Your Role: Administrator __ Teacher __ Special Education Teacher __ Parent __ Related Service Provider __ Community Member __ Student __ Other __ Your School: Elementary __ Middle/Junior High __ High School __ Alternative School __ Number of Students: Less than 500 __ 501-1000 __ More than 1000 __ Location: Rural __ Small Urban City __ (< 250,000) __ Large Urban City (> 250,000) __ G53G65G63G74G69G6FG6EG20 G4FG6EG65 Assessment of Risk Rating Factors for School Safety Rating and Violence Indicate the extent to which these factors exist in your Not at all Minimally Moderately Extensively Don?t know school and neighborhood: 1. Illegal weapons 2. Vandalism 3. High student mobility (i.e. frequent changes in school enrollment) 4. Graffiti 5. Gang activity 6. Truancy 7. Student suspensions and/or expulsions 8. Students adjudicated by the court 9. Parents withdrawing students from school because of safety concerns 10. Child abuse in the home 11. Trespassing on school grounds 12. Poverty 13. Crimes (e.g. theft, extortion, hazing) 14. Illegal drug and alcohol use 15. Fights, conflict, and assault 16. Incidence of bullying, intimi- dation, and harassment 17. Deteriorating condition of the physical facilities in the school Appendix B 105 G53G65G63G74G69G6FG6EG20 G54G77G6F Assessment of Response Plans for School Safety Rating and Violence Rating Indicate the extent to which these factors exist in your Not at all Minimally Moderately Extensively Don?t know school and neighborhood: 18. Opportunity for extracurricular programs and sports activities. 19. Professional development and staff training 20. Crisis and emergency response plans 21. Consistently implemented schoolwide discipline plans 22. Student support services in school (e.g. counseling, monitoring, support team systems) 23. Parent involvement in school (e.g. efforts to enhance school safety, student support) 24. Student preparation for crises and emergencies 25. Supervision of students across all settings 26. Suicide prevention/response plans 27. Student participation and involvement in academic activities 28. Positive school climate for learning 29. Acceptance of diversity. 30. Response to conflict and problem solving 31. Collaboration with community resources 32. High expectations for student learning and productivity 33. Effective student-teacher relationships 106 Safe School Design G53G65G63G74G69G6FG6EG20 G54G68G72G65G65 Your Comments on School Safety and Violence 1. What is the most pressing safety need in your school? 2. What school safety activities does your school do best? 3. What topics are most important for training and staff development? 4. What are the biggest barriers to improved school safety measures? 5. What other comments do you have regarding school safety? 6. What other factors not included in this survey do you believe affect school safety? 107 Bibliography Anderson, Elijah. Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice/Na- tional Center on Institutions and Alterna- tives. An Analysis of Juvenile Homicides. Alexandria, Virginia, 1996. 14 pages. Center to Prevent Handgun Violence. Caught in the Crossfire: A Report on Gun Violence in our Nation?s Schools, 1990. 10 pages. ED 325 950. Crowe, Timothy. ?Designing Safer Schools.? Journal of School Safety (Fall 1990): 9-13. EJ 419 891. Curwin, Richard L., and Allen N. Mendler. As Tough as Necessary: Countering Violence, Aggression, and Hostility in Our Schools. Alexandria, Virginia: Association for Su- pervision and Curriculum Development, 1997. 162 pages. ED 413 410. Environmental Building Supplies www.ecoHouse.com Gottfredson, Denise C. ?School-Based Crime Prevention.? In Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn?t, What?s Promising, by Lawrence Sherman, Denise Gottfredson, Doris Mackenzie, John Eck, Peter Reuter, and Shawn Bushway. 5-1 to 5-74. College Park, Maryland: Department of Criminol- ogy and Criminal Justice, 1997. ED 423 321. Gottfredson, G.D., and D.C. Gottfredson Vic- timization in the Schools. New York: Ple- num, Inc., 1985. Green, Mary W. The Appropriate and Effec- tive Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, A Guide for Practical School Se- curity Applications. Washington D.C.: Na- tional Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, (September 1999). 129 pages. www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij Grossman, Dave. On Killing: The Psychologi- cal Cost of Learning To Kill in War and Soceity. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1996. 366 pages. Jeffery, C. R. CPTED: Past, Present and Fu- ture. A position paper prepared for the In- ternational CPTED Association at the 4th Annual International CPTED Association Conference, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada, 1999. __________. Crime Prevention Through En- vironmental Design. Beverly Hills, Califor- nia: Sage, 1971. 290 pages. Justice Policy Institute/Children?s Law Cen- ter www.cjcj.org/schoolhousehype/ Kachur, S. Patrick; G.M. Stennies; K.E. Powell; W. Modzeleski; R. Stephens; R. Murphy; M. Kresnow; D. Sleet; and R. Lowry. ?School Associated Violent Deaths in the United States, 1992-94.? Journal of the American Medical Association 275, 22 (1996): 1729-33. Kenworthy, Tom. ?Columbine Changes Schools? Inner World.? USA Today (April 14, 2000). 1A. Kingery, Paul. Presentation at College of Edu- cation, University of Oregon, February 29,2000. Kipnis, Aaron R. Angry Young Men: How Parents, Teachers, and Counselors Can Help Bad Boys Become Good Men. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999. 277 pages. Moos, Rudolph., and Paul Insel. Issues in So- cial Ecology: Human Milieus. Palo Alto, California: National Press Books, 1974. 616 pages. National Association of Elementary School Principals. National Poll, 1997. Newman, Oscar. Defensible Spaces: Crime Prevention through Urban Design. New York: MacMillan, 1972. 108 Safe School Design Noguera, Pedro A. ?Preventing and Produc- ing Violence: A Critical Analysis of Re- sponses to School Violence.? Harvard Edu- cational Review 65, 2 (Summer 1995).: 189-212. EJ 504 542. Norris, Clive, and Gary Armstrong. The Maxi- mum Surveillance Society; The Rise of CCTV. Oxford, England: Berg Publishers, 1999. 248 pages. Peart, K. N. ?Lessons in Survival.? Scholastic Update 126 (1994). Plaster, Sherry, and Stan Carter. Planning for Prevention: Sarasota, Florida?s Approach to Crime Prevention through Environment Design. Tallahassee, Florida: Florida Criminal Justice Executive Institute, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 1993. Richard, Alan. ?NCES Report Pegs School Repair Costs at $127 Billion.? Education Week XIX, 42 (July 12, 2000): 10. Romer, D., and T. Heller. ?Social Adaptation of Mentally Retarded Adults in Commu- nity Settings: A Social-Ecological Ap- proach.? Applied Research in Mental Re- tardation 4 (1983): 303-14. Sabo, Sandra R. ?Security by Design.? The American School Board Journal 80, 1 (January 1993): 37-39. EJ 455 723. Schalock, R. L. ?Person-Environment Analy- sis: Short and Long-Term Perspectives. ? In Economics, Industry and the Disabled: A Look Ahead, edited by W. E. Kiernan and R. L. Schalock. 115-127. Baltimore, Mary- land: Paul H. Brookes, 1989. Schalock, R. L., and C. M. Jensen. ?Assess- ing the Goodness-of-Fit between Persons and their Environments.? The Journal of the Association for Persons with Severe Handicaps 11, 2 (1986): 103-09. Sprague, J.R., and H.M. Walker. ?Early Iden- tification and Intervention for Youth with Antisocial and Violent Behavior.? In Build- ing Safe and Responsive Schools: Perspec- tives on School Discipline and School Vio- lence, edited by R. Skiba and R.L. Peterson, 2000. Stover, D. ?High Schools or High-Tech Pris- ons?? Education Digest 60 (1994). ?Teacher?s Presence May Deter Violence.?USA Today 125, 2619 (Decem- ber 1996): 13. Walker, H.M., and J. Eaton-Walker. ?Key Questions about School Safety: Critical Is- sues and Recommended Solutions.? NASSP Bulletin 84, 614 (March 2000): 46-55. Wekerle, Gerda R., and Planning and Devel- opment Department Staff. A Working Guide for Planning and Designing Safer Urban Environments. Toronto: Safe City Commit- tee of the City of Toronto, Canada, 1992. Wekerle, Gerda R., and Carolyn Whitzman. Safe Cities: Guidelines for Planning, De- sign, and Management. Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1995. 109 ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management College of Education University of Oregon a77 Website Resources on School Safety Trends and Issues Discussion of School Safety and Violence Prevention The Scope of the Problem Cause for Concern Encouraging Signs Striving for Solutions Assess School-Based Characteristics Be Aware of Individual Risk Factors and Protective Factors Be Aware of Potential Underlying Influences Focus on Early and Ongoing Intervention Offer Social-Skills Training and Violence-Prevention Curricula Some Areas of Controversy Engage in Student ?Profiling? and Other Techniques? Increase Building Security? Impose Stiffer Sentences on Juvenile Offenders? Legislative Testimony by Dr. Hill Walker, codirector of the Institute on Violence and Destructive Behavior, College of Education, University of Oregon: 1. Key Questions About School Safety 2. Oregon Senate Bill 555?the importance of early identification of and intervention with children who may be at risk of antisocial behavior ERIC Abstracts on School Safety Violence Prevention Policy Programs and Strategies Bullying and Harassment Gangs Discipline Issues Roots and Causes of Violence Research on Violence ERIC Digests on School Safety ERIC Digest 134: Sexual Misconduct by School Employees ERIC Digest 132: The Fundamentals of School Security ERIC Digest 117: Student Dress Codes ERIC Digest 94: School Violence Prevention To view these and other full-text resources on a variety of topics related to educational policy and management, go to our award-winning website: http://eric.uoregon.edu ? 111 Other Publications Available from the ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management Learning Experi- ences in School Renewal: An Exploration of Five Successful Programs Bruce Joyce and Emily Calhoun 1996 6 x 9 inches viii + 208 pages perfect bind ISBN: 0-86552-133-6 $14.50. Code: EMOLES Measuring Lead- ership: A Guide to Assessment for Development of School Executives Larry Lashway 1999 6x9 inches viii + 117 pages perfect bind ISBN 0-86552-140-9 $9.75.Code: EMOMLG. School Leadership: Handbook for Excellence Edited by Stuart C. Smith and Philip K. Piele Third Edition 1997 xvi + 432 pages Cloth ISBN 0- 86552-134-4 ($29.95) Code: EMOSLC Paper ISBN 0- 86552-135-2 ($19.95) Code: EMOSLP Student Motivation: Cultivating a Love of Learning Linda Lumsden 1999 6x9 inches vi + 113 pages perfect bind ISBN 0-86552-141-7 $9.50. Code: EMOSMC. Leading with Vision Larry Lashway 1997 6 x 9 inches xii + 148 pages perfect bind ISBN: 0- 86552-138-7 $13.50. Code: EMOLWV Roadmap to Restructuring: Charting the Course of Change in American Education David T. Conley Second Edition 1997 6 x 9 inches xvi + 571 pages Cloth ISBN: 0-86552-136-0 ($34.95) Code: EMORMC Paper ISBN 0-86552-137-9 ($23.95) Code: EMORMP How to Order: You may place an order by sending a check or money order, mailing or faxing a purchase order, or calling with a Visa or MasterCard number. Add 10% for S&H (minimum $4.00). Make payment to University of Oregon/ERIC. Shipping is by UPS ground or equivalent. Telephone (800) 438-8841 Fax (541) 346-2334 Publications Sales ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management 5207 University of Oregon Eugene, OR 97403-5207 You can also order online (with Visa or MasterCard) from our website?your gateway to information about educational policy and management. http://eric.uoregon.edu G54G68G65G20G45G52G49G43G20G43G6CG65G61G72G69G6EG67G68G6FG75G73G65G20G6FG6EG20G45G64G75G63G61G74G69G6FG6EG61G6CG20G4DG61G6EG61G67G65G6DG65G6EG74G20G69G73 G70G6CG65G61G73G65G64 G74G6FG20G61G6EG6EG6FG75G6EG63G65G20G61G20G62G6FG6FG6BG20G6FG6EG20G61G20G72G65G6CG61G74G65G64G20G74G6FG70G69G63G20G61G76G61G69G6CG61G62G6CG65G20G66G72G6FG6D G50G52G4FG2DG45G44G20G50G73G79G63G68G6FG6CG6FG67G69G63G61G6CG20G50G72G6FG64G75G63G74G73 G4DG61G6BG69G6EG67G20G53G63G68G6FG6FG6CG73G20G53G61G66G65G72G20G61G6EG64G20G56G69G6FG6CG65G6EG63G65G20G46._G72G65G65G3A G43G72G69G74G69G63G61G6CG20 G49G73G73G75G65G73G2CG20 G53G6FG6CG75G74G69G6FG6EG73G20 G61G6EG64G20 G52G65G63G6FG6DG6DG65G6EG64G65G64G20 G50G72G61G63G74G69G63G65G73 Editors: Hill M. Walker and Michael H. Epstein Please send me: QTY: PRICE TOTAL _____ #9198 Making Schools Safer and Violence Free $29.00 _______ Shipping and Handling Charges: _______ (United States 10%: Canada 15%; Foreign 20%) Texas Residents add 8.25% sales tax _______ SUBTOTAL _______ PRO-ED Psychological Products 8700 Shoal Creek Blvd Austin, Texas 78757-6897 800-897-3202 800 397-7633 Order online: www.proedinc.com Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is based on a simple premise: the physical characteristics of the set- ting influence human behavior. CPTED helps us to understand how the physical environment of schools affects the behavior of students and staff. Using CPTED principles, school architects and designers, and school board mem- bers and administrators can improve the management and use of physical spaces in schools, thus making them safer places for the people who work and learn in them. CPTED has been used extensively in the prevention and deter- rence of criminal behavior in a range of community settings, in- cluding schools. CPTED asserts that the proper design and use of the built environment can produce three important outcomes: ? reduction in the incidence and fear of crime improvements in quality of life productive use of space CPTED concepts and principles are remarkably ignored and underutilized in today?s schools. We believe the CPTED approach is one of the most effective tools currently available for creating safer schools and reducing the likelihood of student violence. The purpose of this book is to illustrate how the CPTED knowledge base can be applied productively in the effort to create safer schools. This guide provides school administrators and school board members with access to the extensive body of knowledge on inno- vations in the architectural design, use, and supervision of space in our schools. Contents 1. The Changed Landscape of School Safety and Security 2. The Relevance of CPTED as a Strategy for Improving School Safety and Security 3. Key CPTED Concepts and Principles 4. Site Evaluation: The Foundation for Improving School Safety and Security 5. Case Study Applications of CPTED Principles 6. The Role of Architects in School Design 7. Policy Recommendations for School Districts ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management College of Education University of Oregon The Authors ? Tod Schneider is the Eugene, Oregon, Police Department?s Crime Prevention Specialist and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Analyst. Hill Walker is codirector of the Institute on Violence and Destructive Behavior at the University of Oregon and has conducted research on students with disruptive behavior dis- orders in school settings for over three decades. Jeffrey Sprague is codirector of the Institute on Violence and Destructive Behavior at the University of Oregon and an expert in school safety, violence prevention, delinquency, and evaluation of programs in delinquency prevention and school safety.