THE CORRIENTES RIVER CASE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE'S
MOBILIZATION IN RESPONSE TO OIL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE PERUVIAN AMAZON
by
GRACIELA MARIA MERCEDES LU
A THESIS
Presented to the Department of International Studies
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
December 2009
----------------
"The Corrientes River Case: Indigenous People's Mobilization in Response to Oil
Development in the Peruvian Amazon," a thesis prepared by Graciela Marfa Mercedes
Lu in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the
Department of International Studies. This thesis has been approved and accepted by:
lT.. hiS man.u...s. c.ript .has been approved by the advisor and committee named~
_be'oV\l__~!1_d _~Y--'3:~c~_ard Linton, Dean of the Graduate Scho~I_.. ~
ii
Date
Committee in Charge:
Accepted by:
Derrick Hindery, Chair
Anita M. Weiss
Carlos Aguirre
© 2009 Graciela Marfa Mercedes Lu
III
An Abstract of the Thesis of
Graciela M. Lu for the degree of
in the Department of International Studies to be taken
IV
Master of Arts
December 2009
Title: THE CORRIENTES RIVER CASE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE'S MOBILIZATION
IN RESPONSE TO OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PERUVIAN AMAZON
Approved:
Derrick Hindery
Economic models applied in Latin America tend to prioritize economic growth
heavily based on extractive industries and a power distribution model that affects social
equity and respect for human rights.
This thesis advances our understanding of the social, political and environmental
concerns that influenced the formation of a movement among the Achuar people, in
response to oil exploitation activities in the Peruvian Amazon. This study is based on a
political ecology analysis and a review of existing literature on local and global relations
of environmental issues. The Corrientes River case reveals how Amazonian indigenous
people gained competence to demand recognition of their collective rights to health and
citizenship. The Achuar people's mobilization was a result of frustration of sterile
dialogue with the authorities, the oil companies, and the pressure exerted by local people
on their leaders. This mobilization resulted in an agreement that otherwise would likely
not have been reached.
v
CURRICULUM VITAE
NAME OF AUTHOR: Graciela Maria Mercedes Lu
PLACE OF BIRTH: Lima, Peru
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
University of Oregon, Eugene
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima, Peru
DEGREES AWARDED:
Master of Arts, Department of International Studies, 2009, University of Oregon
Bachelor of Science, Pharmacy and Biochemistry, 2001, Universidad Nacional
Mayor de San Marcos, Lima, Peru
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:
Political Ecology
Development and Social Movements in Latin America
Environmental Health and Toxicology
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
Environmental Research Scientist, Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide
(ELAW) U.S. office, 2003 to date
Environmental Science Advisor, Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide,
(ELAW), Lima, Peru, 1991-2003
Technical Coordinator, APGEP-SENREM Project (USAID), Peruvian
Environmental Law Society-SPDA, 1997-2000
Research Assistant of Pharmacognosy, School of Pharmacy and Biochemistry,
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima, Peru, 1989-1991
vi
Vll
PUBLICATIONS:
Lu, M. (2009). La industria petrolera, efectos en el ambiente y la salud humana.
Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR). Environmental Law
Alliance Worldwide (ELAW), Lima, Peru.
Lu, M. (2009). Gufa metodol6gica para la aplicaci6n del modulo de capacitaci6n
actividades de hidrocarburos y derechos de los pueblos indfgenas (reviewer).
Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR). Environmental Law
Alliance Worldwide (ELAW), Lima, Peru.
Lu, M. & Mayorga, P. (2001). Manual para el uso de la prueba en casos de
contaminaci6n hfdrica. Instituto de Derecho Ambiental y Desarrollo
Sustentable (IDEADS).Guatemala.
V111
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express sincere appreciation to Professors Weiss, Bindery, and
Aguirre for their encouragement, and support for the completion of my Masters Degree.
Thank you Professor Bindery for your patience and guidance in conducting the research
for this thesis. I am particularly grateful to Lily La Torre L6pez and Marti Orta for the
helpful information they provided for my research. I am especially indebted to my friend
Diana Bermudez Sokolich, who provided invaluable support and encouragement to
enable me to achieve my goals.
IX
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my parents, Romulo Lu and Graciela De Lama,
and to my siblings Romulo and Lili for their love and support throughout the years.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Purpose of the Study 1
Objectives 2
Area of Study......................................................................................................... 3
Indigenous Groups in the Area.......................... 4
II. LITERATURE REVIEW........................................................................................ 5
Oil in the Peruvian Amazon: The Promise of Development................................. 5
Nature, Environment, and Natural Resources.................................................. 5
Influence of Identity on Social Mobilization in the Corrientes River Case..... 8
Cultural Politics in the Context of the Corrientes Case 10
Brief Historical Background of Conflicts Between Amazon Indigenous
Groups and Extractive Industries 11
III. SOCIAL MOBILIZAnON IN THE CORRIENTES RIVER CASE 15
History of the Conflict: Occidental Petroleum Corporation of Peru and
Pluspetrol Norte S.A. 1970s-0ctober 22, 2006..................................................... 15
Factors That Influenced Indigenous Peoples' Organization in the Corrientes
River Case.............................................................................................................. 22
Early Organizing of the Indigenous Groups in the Corrientes River Basin .......... 23
x
Chapter
xi
Page
Evidence of Contamination and the Effects on the Achuar
Indigenous Peoples 30
Influence of Non-Indigenous Groups: National and International
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 37
Role of the Peruvian Government.... 44
Oxy and Pluspetrol Norte S.A. 51
. IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 55
APPENDICES
A. MINUTES OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INDIGENOUS
COMMUNITIES OF THE CORRIENTES RNER (FECONACO), THE
MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND MINES, MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF LORETO, PLUSPETROL NORTE
S.A., AND THE OMBUDSMAN, OCTOBER 22, 2006................................ 65
B. MAPS 74
C. ACRONYMS 79
BIBLIOGRAPHY 80
XlI
LIST OF TABLES
1. Summary of Key Events Related to the Corrientes Case: February 2004-
October 2006.......................................................................................................... 18
2. Reports with Assessments of Oil Contamination in Block lAB 32
3. Results of Analysis of Lead in Blood by DIGESA (2006).................................... 35
4. Results of Analysis of Cadmium in Blood by DIGESA (2006) 35
Xlll
LIST OF MAPS
Map Page
1. Corrientes River Basin........................................................................................... 74
2. Block lAB 75
3. Indigenous Groups in Block lAB 76
4. Indigenous Communities, Protected Areas and Hydrocarbon Concessions
in the Peruvian Amazon......................................................................................... 77
5. Hydrocarbon Concessions in Peru (2008) 78
ICHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Study
Power conflicts today between Amazon indigenous groups, government
authorities, and corporations over land and nature are more acute than ever. Global oil
and natural gas demand has increased steadily in the last 30 years, making its exploitation
more attractive to governments and oil corporations which are actively pushing into
remote Amazonian ecosystems. The oil wells in the COlTientes, Tigre, and Pastaza rivers
in the Department of Loreto in Peru started operations in the 1970s, and were the first in a
succession of oil concessions throughout the Peruvian Amazon. The Achuar people of the
COlTientes River went through a process from being 'invisible' in the 1970s to leading a
movement resulting in the recognition of their rights to clean water, health, and territory
in an October 22,2006 agreement with Pluspetrol Norte S.A. (a subsidiary of the
Argentinean oil company Pluspetrol) and Peruvian authorities. This study examines the
factors that account for the Achuar mobilization and the nature of their demands. As the
case is still ongoing, a more detailed analysis of the events after the agreement would
exceed the scope of this study.
The struggle of indigenous societies affected by oil exploitation in the concession
area called Block lAB contributes to understanding the conditions that can empower or
2weaken indigenous peoples facing dominant societies that control their lands and
resources. Considering the rapid proliferation of extractive industries in the Peruvian
Amazon and the violent responses that occurred in the last year, there is an urgent need
for research, evaluation, and analysis of these aspects of social-environmental conflicts.
Objectives
Using an analysis of interrelations of the actors involved in this case (indigenous
federations, national and international non-profit organizations, government authorities,
and oil companies operating in the Corrientes River basin (Map 1)), I examine the
following questions in relation to key events that occurred from the 1970s to 2006:
• How were the outcomes of the mobilization by indigenous groups in the
Corrientes River basin shaped?
• What factors influenced indigenous groups of the Corrientes River to organize in
response to oil and gas development?
• How did local, national, and international groups influence the outcomes of
mobilization?
I use political ecology as a framework for this study. Paul Robbins (2006) defines
political ecology as "the empirical, research-based explorations to explain linkages in the
condition and change of social/environmental systems, with explicit considerations of
power" (p. 12). I use environmental identity and social movement thesis (Robbins) for
the analysis of factors that influenced the Achuar ofthe Corrientes River and to explain
that their struggle against oil activities in their territories was primarily a result of an
3imperative need to secure their right to health, achieve political representation, and
demand citizenship. The mobilization of the Achuar of the Corrientes River basin took
place in the midst of emerging perceptions of nature as a resource, development, and
culture that provide a basis for a political ecology framework focused on difference. This
approach guides my overall intent to articulate these concepts in a broader context both
locally and globally.
Area of Study
This study comprises the territories of the Achuar and Quechua people affected by
oil activities in Block lAB (located in the Peruvian Amazon's northern border with
Ecuador, between the districts of Trompeteros and Tigre in the Province of Loreto,
located in the Department of Loreto) and the district of Andoas (Province of Alto
Amazonas, Department of Loreto). The study focuses on those Achuar communities that
live on the approximately 200,000 hectares of forest that are most affected by oil
activities, part of whose territory is in Block lAB (total area: 497,027 hectares) shown in
Map 2. The study area is located in the Amazon basin, the world's largest tropical
rainforest, and is subdivided into two terrestrial ecoregions: the Amazon River's
floodplains, and the rainforest ofNapo. I Both ecoregions were included in Global 200, an
analytical tool developed by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF, see Appendix C for a
list of acronyms) to identify 200 (out of 825) ecoregions whose conservation would
I An ecoregion is a relatively large unit of land with a distinct assemblage of species with high
representation value and are therefore worthy of greater attention. (Olson and Dinerstein, 1998; WWF
2000).
4achieve the goal of saving a broad diversity of the Earth's ecosystems. These ecoregions
include those with exceptional levels of biodiversity, such as high species richness or
endemism, or those with unusual ecological or evolutionary phenomena.
Indigenous Groups in the Area
The population of the Corrientes River basin is almost exclusively indigenous,
belonging to the Jibaro-Candoa and Quechua linguistic families. The Jibaro family
comprises the Achuar, the Candoshi, the Huambisa-Shuar, and the Zarpas; the Quechua
family comprises the Quechua Lamista, the Quechua del Napo, and the Quechua del
Pastaza and the Tigre. People of the communities in this study area belong to the Achuar
linguistic family.
The Achuar territory spans across both sides of the Peruvian and Ecuadorian
border. In Peru, the Achuar population of 12,500 is distributed among 77 communities in
the basins of the Pastaza, Huasaga, Huitoyagu, Morona, and Corrientes rivers of the
Department of Loreto. There are approximately 4,750 Achuar in 12 communities in
Block lAB. They are organized into two federations-the Federation of the Indigenous
Communities of the Upper Tigre (FECONAT) and the Federation of the Native
Communities of the Corrientes River (FECONACO)-which represent the five
communities most affected by oil activities.
5CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Oil in the Peruvian Amazon:
The Promise of Development
Nature, Environment, and Natural Resources
The concept of nature is complex and often contradictory. Global transformation
of nature wrought by industrialization and "modernization" has created dominant views
of both the physical and intellectual aspects of nature. This experience filters out old,
incompatible conceptions of nature and precipitates new ones. Much as the growth of a
tree adds a new ring each year, the social concept of nature has accumulated innumerable
layers of meaning in the course of history (Smith, 1984). Nature has different meanings
for indigenous peoples, environmentalists, states, corporations, development agencies,
and non-indigenous urban or rural dwellers from different social classes. These meanings
are based primarily on the particularity of the social, political, and economic relations
within which people live out their lives (Bender, 1993). These diverse notions of nature
coexist in specific social settings and according to particular historical moments (Ulloa,
2005), but the old concepts of nature are co-opted by the present purposes and by the
dominant voices. The meaning of nature has therefore shifted throughout history
according to cultural, socioeconomic, and political factors (Escobar, 1999). Neil Smith
6(1984) calls it "the ideology of nature" and talks about dualist views. On one hand is the
concept of nature as external (the realm of extra human objects and processes existing
outside society); on the other hand is nature viewed as universal, which includes the
human with the non-human. External nature, according to Smith, is "the raw material
from which society is built, the frontier which industrial capitalism continually pushes
back" (p. 2). Industrialization has brought with it the notion of nature as a "resource" for
economic growth-a resource that could be managed, directed, and engineered. These
narratives have always been presented as "rational" and "objective," where the modem
concept of the environment and economic growth could be reconciled. These dominant
perceptions of nature view it merely as a source for economic growth.
The Report of the Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future (1987), prepared
by the World Commission of Environment and Development, which was convened by
the United Nations, launched the concept of sustainable development and delineated
environmental principles that influenced much of the ethos of the environmental
movement. The Brundtland Report highlighted the link between poverty and
environmental degradation, which is particularly relevant to the focus of this thesis. The
report proposes sustainable development as a great alternative for the eradication of
poverty and the protection ofthe environment in one single approach. 2 One of the key
arguments of the report was that "poverty itself pollutes the environment, creating
environmental stress" (8th paragraph), and it explicitly recommended an annual growth
2 "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Our Common Future, Report of the Bruntland
Commission, 1987. Oxford University Press. •
7rate of 3% for countries in the south and north (to accommodate higher exports from the
south). These arguments appear contradictory regarding the Amazonian indigenous
people, who live under the poverty line; but at the same time, many consider their
traditional way of life a model of living in harmony with the planet. The development of
ecological consciousness that accompanied the rapid growth of industrial civilization also
affected the transformation of "nature" into "environment" (Escobar, 1995).
Governments, multinational corporations, and international organizations claim advocacy
of the "protection of the environment" as a source of "natural resources" for economic
growth, a view radically in conflict with the integrated notion of a social ethnic group
based on land and nature. These divergent views and aspirations are an underlying
conflict in cases such as those among the indigenous groups in the Corrientes River
basin, the oil industry, and the government.
Several of the modem principles defining environmental influence, to some
extent, many mainstream environmental groups and organizations in which Western
science and knowledge is presented as speaking for the environment, capable of
proposing the best means of managing natural resources to the exclusion of non-western
discourses, including those of Amazonian indigenous groups. This dominant
environmental discourse assumes that non-Western perspectives, whether from a
Nepalese peasant, a rubber tapper from the Amazon, or an African nomad, would have
nothing significant to say in this regard (Escobar). Ironically, and despite different
perceptions of nature, environment, and natural resources, there is an important interplay
of views of nature and the environment that permeated and influenced social mobilization
8in environmental conflicts, such as the one between the indigenous groups in Block lAB
and the oil industry. This wide schism in environmental perception influenced identity
formation among the Achuar from the Corrientes River basin, national, and international
environmental groups supporting them, and gave a common ground between indigenous
and environmentalists on which to coordinate efforts and build national and international
support networks for the indigenous people.
Influence of Identity on Social Mobilization in the Corrientes River Case
A two-fold process influenced social mobilization of the people in Block lAB.
One is how and why international environmental and human rights organizations
constructed representations of indigenous peoples and subsequently integrated them to
the environmental movements and discourses. The other process is how the indigenous
peoples in the Corrientes region have responded to, appropriated, or negated such
processes, representations, and discourses. This interplay was crucial to building national
and international alliances that had a key role in the local organization's capacity to
mobilize, produce political power within indigenous groups, and influence the outcome
of indigenous peoples' social mobilization in the Corrientes River case.
Indigenous peoples' collective identity with nature, territory, and tradition was a
critical factor in developing specific actions against the oil industry in Block lAB. Since
the 1970s, indigenous peoples' political actions and processes of identity construction
have been related to modern ecology, environmentalism, and conservation (Conklin,
1997; Conklin & Graham 1995; Ulloa, 2005; Varese, 1996). This identity often takes the
9fonn of images and representations that invoke indigenous peoples as stewards of
nature-eco-heroes who protect the environment. Such stereotypes are, for the most part,
independent of indigenous peoples' traditional systems of knowledge and current
political goals (Ulloa, 2005). At the same time, since identity is a process of self-
differentiation, indigenous peoples also respond in relation to and sometimes opposition
to the conferred identity as part of the power/knowledge relations that imply negotiations
and conflicts. In the case analyzed in this thesis, with respect to indigenous peoples'
relations with environmental and human rights groups (national and international),
indigenous peoples participated in the interplay of reconstructing differences as a strategy
that challenges their social locations. The participation of indigenous communities in
Block lAB with environmental groups helped define a collective identity that enabled
their political actions and interactions with multiple agents, especially at the international
level. The indigenous peoples' understanding of their own collective identity as a result
of historical and contemporary social, political, economic, and cultural dynamics is far
from any stable or unitary holism presupposed by Western discourses ofprimitivism
(Ulloa). The "native" defending the "environment" is not only a stereotype, but also a
useful and effective means of indigenous self-representation in non-indigenous arenas.
This has allowed indigenous peoples to construct flexible political strategies articulated
to ecological practices in a manner that promotes respect for their ethnic identity and
enables them to respond to the ever-changing political relationships of culture and
territory. In the latter half of the 20th century when global industrialization and the
environmental movement emerged, indigenous peoples' claims increasingly focused on
10
the political autonomy they need to control and manage the natural resources in their
territories. This change occurred in large part due to the new economic value of nature in
a global economic and political order that again challenged their cultures, identities, and
claims to local political sovereignty. Since the 1990s, their political claims have focused
on environmental interests, thereby influencing and changing their own ideas of nature,
territory, autonomy, and identity (Ulloa). Social movements such as the indigenous
mobilization in Block lAB are not isolated. The Huaorani in Ecuador, the Ogoni in
Nigeria, and other indigenous peoples mobilizing where there are cultural and political
conflicts with extractive industries, are contributing to the creation of new solidarity
networks resulting in extra-local power bases.
Cultural Politics in the Context of the Corrientes Case
Wickstrom (2001) defines "cultural politics" as "the promotion of indigenous
values, beliefs, knowledge, ecological practices, and socioeconomic organization in
development, the responses such promotion elicits from existing political systems and the
conflicts that then ensue" (p. 16). Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar (1998) argue that
identity construction and cultural politics allow indigenous peoples to propose new ways
of doing politics, and influence the dominant political culture:
The process enacted when sets of social actors, shaped by and embodying
different cultural meanings and practices, come into conflict with each other. This
definition of cultural politics assumes that meanings and practices-particularly
those theorized as marginal, oppositional, minority, residual, emergent,
alternative, dissident, and the like, all of them conceived in relation to a given
dominant cultural order-can be the source of processes that must be accepted as
political. (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998, p. 7)
11
From this perspective, the indigenous peoples in Block lAB are contesting their
marginal position through political actions; they aim to be recognized such, as is stated in
the Peruvian Achuar website:
The objective is that the Achuar people be recognized at the national and
international levels. We want to spread knowledge about our culture, traditions,
and way oflife. (from http://www.achuarperu.org/es/index.htm)
The indigenous peoples in Block lAB are primarily demanding recognition of
their collective rights to health and citizenship. They demand respect for their territories,
way of life, and cultural differences based on the recognition of their differences as
peoples (Rappaport & Dover, 1996).
Brief Historical Background of Conflicts Between Amazon Indigenous Groups and
Extractive Industries
The Amazon is a vast territory of almost 3.7 million square miles (6 million
square km) shared by Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Suriname,
and the Guyanas (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2008). Peru has the second largest area of
Amazon forests, after Brazil. Today, the Peruvian Amazon occupies 60% of the country's
national territory, with roughly 783,000 km2, from the eastern slopes of the Andes selva
alta (high rainforest) to the selva baja (low rainforest), less than 800 meters above sea
level. Because of its varying altitudes, the Peruvian Amazon is marked by exceptional
biological diversity. Currently, 20% of this vast territory is under some form of natural
protected area (ANP-Area Natural Protegida) status, with nearly 11 million hectares
12
corresponding to titled native communities, and 2.8 million hectares of territorial reserves
for indigenous people in voluntary isolation.
The Peruvian Amazon has a population of more than 300,000 indigenous peoples
belonging to 56 ethnic groups and 17 linguistic families (Common Good Institute - mC).
Map 4 shows the location of Amazonian indigenous communities, oil and natural gas
concessions in Peru. Despite the size and biodiversity of the Peruvian Amazon, and the
existence of roughly 60 indigenous federations, these groups, until recently, have been
relatively insignificant and invisible on the "national" level. Influences in the
contemporary Amazon movement stretch back to the mid-century, and range from
missionary organizations and international aid to foreign researchers and international
non-governmental organizations.
Among the first documented cases of conflicts for resources between indigenous
and non-indigenous peoples in the Peruvian Amazon are those from the rubber era in the
late 1800s and early 1990s. Roger Casement's Putumayo reports, submitted to the British
Foreign Service in 1913, described a series of atrocities against indigenous peoples
working on and living near rubber plantations. Casement was sent to the Putumayo due to
the public outcry aroused in 1909 by a series of articles published in the London
magazine, Truth, depicting the brutalities of the Peruvian Amazon Company, known as
Casa Arana, a rubber company located in Putumayo. There are reported accounts of
tortures, slavery, and deaths among the Huitoto and Ocarina people in the rubber latex
field owned by Julio Cesar Arana. These are called the "Putumayo crimes" (Taussig,
1987). Arana and other rubber companies along the Putumayo claimed to be the first to
13
"conquer" (as the common phrase had it) the Putumayo. These conquistadores had been
establishing themselves along the rivers with their derechos de conquistar-their rights
to conquest (Taussig).
The first references of oil exploration in the Peruvian Amazon are in 1911 when J.
A. Douglas, a British geologist, explored the territory of the Arasaeri indigenous groups
in Inambari, Puno, in southeast Peru. Later, Douglas explored the central Amazon
territories of the Ashaninka people of the Perene valley. These first references did not
mention the existence of indigenous territories; they were reported as empty lands (La
Torre, 2004). The first commercial oil deposit was in 1929 in the Shipibo territory, near
the Pachitea river, and started operations nine years later by the Ganzo Azul company.
The Shipibo people had to relocate from the nearby areas to the oil operations. For
several decades, the inhospitable natural conditions made it difficult for oil companies to
continue explorations in the Amazon, despite a legal framework adopted in 1952 called
the Petroleum Act No. 11780 (Ley de Petroleo) under President Manuel Odria. This Act
facilitated oil concessions on 16 million hectares with mixed results-not oil explorations
were successful. In 1959, Fernando Belaunde (an aspiring politician at that time, who
later became President of Peru for two terms, 1963-68 and 1980-85) wrote a book
entitled "Peru's Own Conquest," in which he argued that the solution to Peru's pressing
social and economic problems lay in the vast Amazon region (Smith, 1982). The
aforementioned discoveries of vast amounts of very profitable resources, legal
developments, and writings were designed according to a center/periphery dialectic found
in Colonial America, where the indigenous peoples were ignored, not considered
14
beneficiaries of the profit accumulations of the center. This model was conceived to
enhance capital accumulation of the groups in power in Lima, which ultimately aimed to
consolidate their political and social control over the periphery (Smith). The positions of
these governments regarding development must be understood in the historical context of
modem colonialism.
15
CHAPTER III
SOCIAL MOBILIZAnON IN THE
CORRIENTES RIVER CASE
History of the Conflict: Occidental Petroleum
Corporation of Peru and Pluspetrol Norte S.A.
1970s-0ctober 22, 2006
Since the mid-1900s, the Amazon has been considered a region with high
potential for oil and gas production. In February 1969, the military government of
President Juan Velasco passed Law 17440 declaring oil exploration for "national
interest." Oil production, mining, and public services were expropriated from foreign
private companies. Oil activities were controlled by the state-owned company PetroPeru,
which included contracts with multinational oil corporations. On June 22, 1971, one of
the largest U.S. oil and gas companies, Occidental Petroleum Corporation of Peru (Oxy)
signed an agreement with the Peruvian government, and in 1972 drilled the first
exploratory well, named Capahuari Norte I-X, considered today the location of the first
oil found in the Achuar, Quechua, and Urarina territories. Today the oil concession area
is known as Block lAB (497,027 hectares) operated by Oxy from 1972-2000. The state-
owned oil company Petroperu operated Block 8 (182,348 hectares), and 8X (697,254
hectares), also located in the basins of the Corrientes, Pastaza, and Tigre rivers, in the
16
provinces of Loreto and Alto Amazonas in the Department of Loreto (La Torre, 1998).
This study will focus on the oil operations in Block 1AB. Commercial production of
crude oil in Block lAB started in 1975. Oil was transported on small boats to the city of
Iquitos, then to the village of San Jose de Saramuro, and from there by boat to Manaus in
Brazil. In 1978, Oxy started to deliver the crude oil to the state-owned oil company,
Petroperu, in the gathering station in Andoas del Ramal Norte through a pipeline
connected to a pumping station along the North-Peruvian Oil Pipeline (Oleoducto
Norperuano), which brought the crude to the oil refinery of Bayovar on the north Pacific
coast (Orta, 2007). Occidental Petroleum Corporation S.A. (Oxy) received the concession
in 1996 after its privatization, and in May 2000 the Argentinean company, Pluspetrol,
acquired the all the rights to the concession.
Oxy drilled approximately 230 oil wells in Block lAB since the discovery of
camp Capahuari Norte in 1972 until 2000, when Pluspetrol Corporation S.A acquired the
concession (Oxy, 1999). Oxy also built a network of 484 km of roads for its own use and
installed an 856 km long oil pipeline (Oleoducto Nor Peruano) with a cost of $ 1 billion.
Facilities included a main campsite, a crude oil collection station in Andoas, nine
production camps, oil transport pipelines, a small airport, helipads, and refineries
(Earthrights, 2007).
Oxy undertook intensive activities in the Corrientes in Block lAB. In 1979, Block
lAB was the largest oil producer in Peru, with 109,000 barrels of crude oil per day.
Environmental guidelines for the oil industry were almost non-existent in Peru when
operations started in the mid 1970s. Therefore, Oxy had no legal obligation to control the
17
contamination caused by toxic effluents such as produced water3, drilling muds,
hazardous wastes from equipment and other maintenance, solid domestic wastes, crude
oil spills, air pollution from petroleum storage tanks, gas venting, gas flaring, and energy
generators, among others. In 1984, the National Office for the Assessment ofNatural
Resources (ONERN) declared Block lAB "the most environmentally damaged region in
Peru."
The General Directorate of Environmental Affairs of the Ministry of Energy and
Mines (DGAA) reported on the contamination of rivers and sediments in Block lAB and
described the extensive spread of contamination, which contained heavy metals,
hydrocarbons, and chlorides. The agency further detailed air pollution as well as various
other environmental and social impacts.
In 1996 one of the communities of the Pastaza, Alianza Capahuari, sent a letter to
President Alberto Fujimori that described the serious health problems and contamination
caused by the discharge of toxic effluents by Oxy. The Commission on Ecology and the
Amazon of the Peruvian Congress requested the Ministry ofEnergy and Mines to
comment on the matter. The Ministry responded that the water samples from the
freshwater sources were within the national water quality standards.
Numerous meetings and key events between the Achuar leaders and the
authorities took place between early 2004 and October 2006, as summarized in Table 1.
3 Produced water is water trapped in underground formations that is brought to the surface along with
oil or gas. It is by far the largest volume byproduct or waste stream associated with oil and gas production.
The physical and chemical properties of produced water vary considerably, but include oil and grease, salt,
high temperature, heavy metals. Most produced waters are more saline than seawater. They may also
include chemical additives used in drilling and producing operations and in the oil/water separation
process. Metals typically found in produced waters include zinc, lead, manganese, iron, and barium. Metals
concentrations in produced water are often higher than those in seawater.
Table 1
Summary ofKey Events Related to the Corrientes Case: February 2004-0ctober 2006
18
Date
February 2004
2004
October 2004
January 2005
May 2005
May 2005
June-July 2005
November 2005
January-
February 2006
June 2006
July 2006
Event
Representatives of indigenous federations went to Lima to denounce health and
environmental problems and propose solutions. Met with Congressional
representatives, the Ombudsman Office, and the media.
Release of the documentary "Death in Sion," about the contamination and its effects
in the Corrientes area. Obtained Honor Mention in the VII Festival oflndigenous
Peoples (Chile 2004) and was part of the Official Selection of the Anaconda Prize
2004.
Denouncement filed with the Commission of Amazonian, Indigenous, and Afro-
Peruvian Affairs of the Peruvian Congress. Representatives of the affected
indigenous peoples, Occidental Petroleum Corporation S.A., and Pluspetrol were
invited to participate in a session of the commission.
Members of the community protested against Pluspetrol for the lack of compliance
with the agreements. A high-ranking official signed an agreement with the
community to comply with the agreement. Five months later the oil company
continued not to comply with the agreement. The community took over the road for
3 days.
The regional office of the Environmental Health Office of the Ministry of Health
carried out water sampling.
The Achuar, Quechua, and Urarina people of the Corrientes met with the health
authorities in the area, prepared a memorial, and demanded urgent action by the state
to cleanup the contamination. Official recognition of75 areas contaminated by oil
activities in Block lAB.
Inspection of Blocks lAB and 8 by a congressional commission. Water sampling.
Meetings with representatives of Pluspetrol and the Ministry of Health took place in
order to analyze biological (human), water, sediment, and soil samples. The results
were given to the communities 11 months later (May 2006). They revealed that
66.21 % of blood samples from children under 18 years old exceeded the Centers for
Disease Control level of concern value of 10 Ilg/dl. 98.65% of them had cadmium
blood levels above the limit value «0.1 Ilg/dl). 79.2% ofblood samples from adults
tested exceeded the limit value for lead. 99.2% of blood samples from adults showed
cadmium levels above what is found in tobacco smokers (although this is not a habit
in the area). 64.8% of blood samples from adults exceeded the biological tolerance
level for cadmium.
Given the lack of compliance and results, a general assembly of communities of the
Corrientes basin members of FECONACO demanded the closure of oil activities.
This was the first time the local people expressed total opposition to oil activities and
demanded to stop them.
Armed Achuar members took over Pluspetrol's airports in Blocks 8 and lAB
demanding attention to their claims.
Given the results of the health reports, the regional branch of AIDESEP in lquitos,
ORAl, demanded to stop oil activities in the region of Loreto. The regional
government of Loreto drafted a plan to address the environmental contamination and
health effects on the indigenous community ofthe Corrientes River.
The results of the health assessment by the Ministry of Health caught the attention of
the national and international media. The regional health authorities created a plan to
address the health and environmental problems, and also created water quality
surveillance and control plan in the Corrientes area.
- ------------
19
Table 1 (continued)
Date Event
August-Sept Results were released from the first samples taken under the water quality
2006 surveillance and control plan. The results confirmed negative impacts on freshwater
resources by oil activities. Meetings occurred with representatives of the Achuar
communities and the Ministry of Health.
October 2006 More than 300 Achuar took over oil campsites Jibarito, Huayuri, and Dorissa for 13
days; 40 workers were detained. The Achuar, Pluspetrol, and governmental
authorities signed an agreement that states that Pluspetrol comply with a
comprehensive list of demands made by the local people. The 9-point agreement is
described below and a copy is in Appendix A.
Source: (Orta, 2008)
The indigenous communities in the Corrientes, which did not see any tangible
changes in years of meetings, agreements, commitments, and promises from Pluspetrol
Norte S.A. and the government, pressured leaders of FECONACO and AIDESEP. On
October 4, 2006, after the government officials failed to show up at a meeting with
indigenous leaders to discuss solutions to the health problems in their communities, 30
Achuar traditional authorities from FECONACO called for immediate re-injection of
produced water and a meeting with the Peruvian government and Pluspetrol. "The
Achuar people have stood up," the indigenous leaders said, "and we have said calmly but
firmly: Enough, we ourselves are going to stop pollution in our communities" (Amazon
Watch, 2006). Four days later, the Achuar took over the oil wells of Block lAB and
blocked road traffic to the site. Conflicting media reports surfaced about the occupation,
blaming the Achuar for violence and hostage taking, which the Achuar denied. One
report of 40 hostages taken turned out to be oil workers who could not leave the area
because of the road blockade. The Peruvian government sent in 150 troops, but the
Achuar refused to leave Pluspetrol's facilities, and the troops left the area. On October
15, the Achuar leaders sent a proposal to the government requesting to re-inject produced
20
waters in the future; create new decision-making mechanisms and schedules; provide
health care, temporary nutritional support, and safe drinking water; and remediate the
environmental damages (FECONACO, 2006). On October 19, the Minister of Energy
and Mines, Juan Valdivia, issued a warning that a shortage of oil could occur with "grave
consequences for the region and for the Amazon in general" if the Achuar continued their
occupation. Crude oil from Block lAB accounted for 50% of the total national oil
production. On October 21, a delegation of authorities including representatives of the
Ombudsman office, Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM),
and journalists met with the Achuar leaders in Pluspetrol's facilities in the Corrientes.
On October 22,2006, representatives of FECONACO, Pluspetrol, AIDESEP,
MINEM, the Ministry of Health, and the Ombudsman office signed an agreement that
included commitments to:
• Re-inject 100% of the produced waters in concession "lAB" by December 2007
(Pluspetrol had originally committed to re-injecting 15% by 2010);
• Re-inject produced waters in the neighboring Block 8 by July 2008 or compensate
the communities if not done by the deadline;
• Start the implementation of an Integrated Health Plan conducted by the Ministry
of Health during the year 2006, with a budget of over $ 10 million paid by
Pluspetrol;
• Build and supply a rural Hospital in Villa Trompeteros, the capital of the
Trompeteros district, in the Department of Loreto, with the support of the
21
Ministry of Health, and the Regional Government of Loreto, financed by
P1uspetro1;
• Supply 1 year of emergency food for affected communities given that the river
fish and game were highly contaminated; and
• FECONACO would implement a community-based environmental monitoring
program. Pluspetro1 would create a fund to cover the costs. Infonnation obtained
from the environmental monitoring would be readily available to community
members and FECONACO (Appendix A).
The Achuar called off the blockade, which had closed down the rainforest oil
facility and shut down 50% of Peru's oil production. FECONACO stated that the media
distorted the events portraying the blockade as violent (FECONACO, 2006): "We have
achieved 98% of our demands, and won recognition of our rights," said Andres Sandi,
President of FECONACO, the representative organization of the Achuar people of the
Corrientes River. "This victory is the result of the strength of our people who came
together and pressured hard and would not abandon our demands."
Another indigenous organization in the region, the Federation of Indigenous
Peoples of the Low Corrientes River (FEPIBAC), rejected the occupation of the oil
company's facilities by FECONACO, saying they welcomed oil, wood, and mining
exploitation as good economic opportunities for the indigenous peoples, but that they
wanted more control over the process (Indiancountry, 2006). Javier Echeverria, legal
advisor for AIDESEP, and FECONACO claim FEPIBAC, and its supporting national
indigenous organization Confederation of Amazonian Nations (CONAP), are funded by
22
oil companies to create dissension within Amazonian peoples affected by oil drilling
(Garrigues, 2006).
Factors That Influenced Indigenous Peoples'
Organization in the Corrientes River Case
This section describes national and international influences on indigenous
peoples' mobilization in the Corrientes River case. Given the lack of systematic and
continuous registries of events by the communities in the Corrientes River basin, and
their representatives, this description is based on accounts of facts described by Orta
(2007), La Torre (1998), AIDESEP, FECONACO's public statements, and my
participation as technical advisor to the non-profit organization Racimos de Ungurahui
from the mid 1990s until late 2006. First, I describe background related to Amazonian
indigenous organizations in Peru; actions by or concerning indigenous peoples that led to
the mobilization of natives in Block lAB; and actions by or concerning non-indigenous
actors that led to the agreement between FECONACO, the Peruvian authorities, and
Pluspetrol in 2006. These relations are closely intertwined; they are described separately
in order to facilitate examination. This is not an exhaustive analysis of all the actions and
combinations. Rather, I focus on the key factors and their influence on indigenous
people's mobilization and signing the agreement of October 22,2006.
_.._--_._----------
23
Early Organizing of the Indigenous Groups in the
Corrientes River Basin
It is important to understand the difficulties that Amazonian indigenous peoples
living in Peru face to get organized and to coordinate any mobilization. The roughly
300,000 indigenous peoples in the Peruvian Amazon (IBC, AIDESEP) are among the
poorest and least served by the Peruvian government. Charts on poverty of Amazonian
indigenous peoples produced by the National Institute of Statistics (INEI) have only three
categories: misery, extreme poverty, and poverty (1995). The most populated category is
that of extreme poverty, according to INEI's poverty indicators based on access to health,
sanitation, education, and income to cover basic food costs. Thirty-two out of the 56
Amazon ethnic groups are classified as living in misery and extreme poverty (INEI). This
is important to consider in order to realize the difficulties they have in obtaining an
identity document, carrying out a transaction at any public office, traveling for several
days to the closest town to the public registrar's office, or doing any simple paperwork
considered easy by any other citizen. Such efforts require major effort and costs for a
citizen living in the middle of the forest. In addition, other significant barriers exist:
• Most of indigenous community members speak only their native language, and
have limited capacity to express themselves in Spanish.
• Many of these citizens have not had access to formal education.
• There are conflicts at the local level among several actors over the management
and control of natural resources.
24
• They have to interact with regional and national authorities and multinational
corporations about concepts, terms, and matters with which they are unfamiliar.
Bebbington and Scurrah (2008) note that Amazonian indigenous organizations
gained force with a national scope. AIDESEP was founded in 1979, soon after some
problems with organizational capacity and internal conflicts since 1992 weakened it
temporarily. AIDESEP went through a deep crisis that led to the creation of another
organization, CONAP. Contrary to the common perception in the Western imaginary, not
all Amazonian indigenous people are opposed to modernization. In this case in particular,
CONAP is closer to the concepts of modernization and development of an urban dweller
than imagined. In contrast, AIDESEP prioritizes a distinctively different form of
development that is more critical and reactive toward extractive industries, while CONAP
leaders not only support, for example, oil development, but also would even travel with
the state-owned oil company Perupetro S.A. around the world stating that they are
partners and support their work. In the late 1990s, Amazonian indigenous organizations
in Peru became more active, although there has always been a lingering question about
the term "indigenous" and who identifies with it. Many Andeans do not consider
themselves indigenous; it is a term still used more commonly when referring Amazonian
indigenous peoples. Throughout history, attitudes toward land have differentiated and
distanced Peruvian Amazonian and Andean peoples. Even some Amazonian indigenous
leaders have stated that Andeans prefer dividing the land into agricultural parcels while
Amazonian indigenous peoples prefer collective land use. In any case, Bebbington and
Scurrah believe that, while Andean people defend their land as family and community
25
managed, Amazonian people defend their land in broader terms, as an integrated part of
their ethnic group. These factors are useful in understanding the complexity of problems
that native peoples face in the context of organization and mobilization (Soria, 2002).
The military government of General Juan Velasco enacted the Native
Communities Act (Ley de Comunidades Nativas No. 20653) on June 18, 1974. This was
the first law to acknowledge land ownership and territorial rights for all indigenous
peoples in the Peruvian Amazon, and started a process of land titling for some
communities. The most important of the law's 19 articles pertaining to indigenous
communities are Article 7, which defines native communities, and Article 9, which
defines the new social unit called "Native Community," which stipulates membership
(described below). One important nuance is that the law uses the term "indigenous" for
Amazonian indigenous peoples.
Article 7: "Native Communities have origin in the tribal groups of the rainforest
and high rainforest whose members are families sharing the following elements: language
or dialect, cultural and social characteristics, collective use, and permanent residence in
the same territory either as nomadic or sedentary."
Article 8: "Members of Native Communities are people born within and those
incorporated to them as long as they comply with the Native Communities' Statute. A
person can lose the status of community member ifhe/she resides outside of the territory
for twelve consecutive months. Exceptions are cases where members are absent due to:
proven studies or health reasons, relocation to another native community and members in
military service."
26
Articles 3 to 6 of the aforementioned law guarantee the integrity of native
community territory and the government mandate to issue a land title to each legally
recognized community for its communally held lands. In 1978, the government replaced
Law 20653 with Law 21175 to facilitate granting of large land and forest concessions in
the Amazon to private investors (Smith, 1982) regardless of the native communities'
property rights.
Before the Native Communities Act, Amazonian indigenous peoples were
organized within their communities and basins. The Ashaninka, Amuesha, and Aguaruna
of Alto Marafion in the Central Amazon created the first indigenous federations in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. The first national Amazonian indigenous organization, the
National Coordinator of Amazonian Native Communities of Peru (COCONASEP),
emerged in 1979, and in 1980 changed its name to AIDESEP. This national organization
was formed as a result of the legal requirements stipulated under the Native Communities
Act, especially to enforce Article 6, which requires that the government legally recognize
indigenous communities. In 1979, the military government of Francisco Morales
Bermudez called for elections of a Constitutional Assembly that, by rewriting the
nation's Constitution, would establish the basis for a return to civilian government. The
new document granted legal recognition to the native communities of the Peruvian
Amazon and declared their lands inalienable, unless a two-thirds majority of any
community agreed to dissolve their communa11and holdings. This was perceived as a
double-edged sword because there were constitutional grounds for dissolving the
27
communal land base of any indigenous community, which could have occurred by
unscrupulous interests (Smith, 1982).
The creation of legally recognized indigenous organizations emerged at the same
time as intense deterioration caused by the discharge of toxic effluents into rivers, open
disposal of solid wastes, and oil spills were being documented by the government and
international organizations. The emergence of "environmental awareness," especially in
the northern hemisphere, aimed at protection of biodiversity, influenced global
perceptions of the Amazon as an idyllic, "untouched" paradise inhabited by indigenous
peoples living in harmony with nature. As mentioned, the social and political context in
the early 1970s was also favorable to the creation of indigenous organizations. Social
rights movements around the world, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
emergence of the environmental movement contributed as external influences on the
formation of indigenous federations.
The influence of national and international policies aiming to guarantee the
protection of human rights, indigenous peoples, and natural resources is reflected, for
example, in AIDESEP's organizational objectives:
1) Represent current and historical interests of all the Amazon's indigenous
peoples.
2) Guarantee the conservation and development of cultural identity, territory, and
values of each one of the Amazon's indigenous peoples.
3) Make it possible for indigenous peoples to exercise self-determination within
national and international legal frameworks.
28
4) Promote human development in a manner that is sustainable for indigenous
peoples. (Retrieved from: http://www.aidesep.org.pe/)
AIDESEP is recognized as the largest national indigenous organization,
representing 1,340 communities from 48 federations and organizations of64 indigenous
groups from the Peruvian Amazon.
The indigenous people in Block lAB from the three basins (the Corrientes,
Pastaza, and Tigre rivers), started to organize in the early 1990s with the creation of three
organizations: the Federation of Natives of the Tigre River (FECONAT), the Federation
of the Quechua Indigenous of the Pastaza River (FEDIQUEP), and FECONACO. The
Achuar, Quechua, and Urarina communities in Block lAB are represented by
FECONACO, which was created during a General Assembly in the native community of
Pampa Hermosa on June 10, 1991. It represents 30 native communities of the Quechua,
Urarina, and Achuar groups of the Corrientes River basin, from the district of
Trompeteros in Loreto. The organization's objectives are "To defend indigenous peoples'
rights, promote the defense of indigenous culture and values, and the development of its
people." (Retrieved from http://www.achuarperu.org/es /1 Oorganizacion
/FECONACO.html)
In 2000, the Achuar decided to create a national organization, FENAP, formed by
the local Achuar federations Achuar Together (AT!) and the Chayat Achuar Organization
(ORACH), which coordinates with its equivalent in Ecuador, the Achuar Nations of
Ecuador (NAE).
29
The Achuar population perceived Oxy and Pluspetrol to be oil corporations that to
some extent act like the State, but which is not authorized by their communities to be
present in the area. This relationship subordinated indigenous inhabitants because the oil
company provided transportation, health care, and support for small specific needs, such
as power generators, education materials and the like. This kind of relationship strongly
influenced the initiatives undertaken by the Achuar people that created their own
federations demanding their rights. Oxy's response (Oxy operated the oil concession in
Block lAB from the 1970s-2000) to the creation of indigenous federations was to reduce
the emergency health services it provided, including support for air transportation for
those who were seriously ill.
In 1996, a local resident, Fabriciano Sangama Napuchi (who later became Mayor
ofTrompeteros), filed a complaint with the National Prosecutor against Oxy and the
state-owned oil company, Petroperu, for contamination of the Corrientes River. At the
same time, FECONACO requested the formation of a special commission, formed by a
representative of the Ombudsman office, the National Congress, International Labor
Organization (ILO), AIDESEP, and FECONACO, to carry out an environmental audit
and an assessment of the contamination of the Corrientes River. Simultaneously,
FECONAT tried without success to file claims against Oxy, and to persuade government
authorities to declare the Tigre River in a state of emergency. FEDIQUEP filed the same
claims on behalf of affected people in the Pastaza River basin.
The communities living in Pastaza basin, in the town of Alianza Capahuari, filed
a petition to President Alberto Fujimori describing the serious health conditions of the
30
people and the contamination caused by the company's discharge of toxic waters. The
Commission of Environment, Ecology, and Amazon of the Congress requested that the
Ministry of Energy and Mines comment on the situation. The Ministry's response stated
that the results of water samples from the river complied with the national water quality
standards. These samples were taken and analyzed by Oxy as part of periodic reporting
that oil companies submit to MINEM.
During 2002 and 2003, the Achuar leaders held meetings with high-ranking
officials of Pluspetrol, the Ministry of Energy and Mines, members of Congress, and the
First Lady (Eliane Karp), among others. They resulted in the company granting minor
compensation to the affected communities. Moreover, the state did not pay much
attention to Achuar demands.
Evidence of Contamination and Effects on the
Achuar Indigenous Peoples
Human health was the first concern that led the Achuar to demand that their
citizen rights be recognized. In the 1990s, delegations of Achuar members travelled to
Lima to tell the authorities and Amazon indigenous organizations that the water they
were drinking was causing disease and death, mainly among the Achuar people living
along the Corrientes River basin. There are no documented records of the incidence of
diseases related to environmental contamination in the area. I have met with Achuar
leaders in Lima on various occasions since the mid 1990s, when they described the rivers,
soil, and streams contaminated with produced water, oil, and industrial wastes from the
31
operations. These pollutants, either individually or collectively, when present in high
concentrations, can present a threat to aquatic life (a major source of protein consumed
by the local people) when they are discharged, or to people who drink water from the
rivers and have direct contact when swimming. Depending on the physical and chemical
properties and the nature of exposure, produced water can have serious health effects,
such as heavy metal poisoning, cancer, and skin diseases, as well as liver, kidney, and
digestive problems. As the amount of produced water increases, the amount of produced
water constituents entering the water increase, even assuming concentration discharge
limits are met.
Produced water comprises approximately 98% of the total volume of exploration
and production waste generated by the oil and gas industry, and is the largest volume
waste stream generated by the industry. The U.S. Department of Energy reported that oil
wells could produce an average of more than 7.5 to 20 barrels of produced water for each
barrel of crude oil (Veil et aI., 2004).
FECONACO's demands for the intervention of public agencies such as the
Ministry of Health's General Direction of Environmental Health (DIGESA), the
Supervising Organism for Energy Investment (OSINERG, created in 1996), the
Ombudsman Office, and MINEM brought controversial results. OSINERG and
DIGESA's reports of2004-2005 showed evidence of significant environmental
contamination and high levels of lead and cadmium in the blood of indigenous peoples in
the Corrientes, which supported the most important demand of the affected people. They
also reported that the accumulated contamination and the discharge of toxic effluents
32
during Oxy's operations continued by Pluspetrol. Table 2 shows only some reports by
authorities, the Oil Company, and private organizations of environmental and health
assessments in Block lAB.
Table 2
Reports with Assessments of Oil Contamination in Block lAB
Document
Report of oil
spill
Assessments of
contamination
by private
organizations
Impact
assessments by
governmental
agencies
Sanctions
against
Pluspetrol
Norte
Environmental
Management
Plans
Content
OSINERG Oil Spill Reports
1. Social-environmental assessment 2002
2. Comments to Report 1429-2005 Assessment of
physical - chemical monitoring of the Corrientes
river by DlGESA April-May 2005
1. Indigenous rights affected by oil industry in
Chambira. Report No. 47 Urarina people
2. Diagnose of Oil Contamination in the Peruvian
Amazon
3. Environmental Assessment of Block lAB, 8 and
64. Discharge of produced water. Reply to official
letter No. 0075-2004JDC/CR - Peruvian Congress.
4. Technical report of monitoring, surveillance,
control and assessment of environmental assessments
in the Tigre and Corrientes River basins
5. Report No. 1429-2005 Assessment of physical-
chemical monitoring of the Corrientes river
6. Report No. 40432 Analysis of fish from the
Corrientes and Tigre rivers
7. Recognition visit to the Corrientes river basin
8. Statistical analysis of morbidity causes in external
medical consultations District of Trompeteros,
Province and Department of Loreto
1. Resolution No. 396-2005-GG
2. Resolution No. 224-2005-GG
Complementary Environmental management Plan,
Block lAB
Source/authors/date
OSINERG 98-2002
1. FECONACO, Racimos de
Ungurahui, Labor, ELAW
(2002)
2. Lu, Mercedes (2005) ELAW
1. Ombudsman (2000)
2. Gomez, Rosario - HAP
(1995)
3. OSINERG (2004)
4. Regional government of
Loreto.
5. DlGESA April-May 2005
6. HAP (1983)
7. DlGESA (2005)
8. Alcantara, C. (2005)
National Office of Statistics
and Informatics
1. OSINERG (2005)
2. OSINERG (2005)
Pluspetrol Norte S.A. and
Seacrest Group Peru (2004)
Source: Racimos de Ungurahui (2005)
33
Numerous studies of health and environmental issues have been done to assess the
contamination caused by Oxy, and Pluspetrol Norte S.A. in Block lAB. Some of them by
OSINERG, E-Tech, Marti Orta, Grupo de Trabajo Racimos de Ungurahui, FECONACO,
the Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon (lIAP), and other national and
international organizations. For many years, health has been the core of FECONACO's
claims, and in second place, whether or not the contamination from Oxy and later
Pluspetrol is affecting the Achuar's health. Of all the environmental and health
assessments, there are two reports that had key roles in FECONACO's mobilization:
OSINERG's report of 2004 in response to the Peruvian Congress request to conduct an
assessment in Block lAB (whose conclusions were described above); and DIGESA's
report of 2006, with the results of water from the Corrientes river and biological samples
of the local people. DIGESA (2006) concludes that 3 out of 17 water samples contained
chloride concentrations over a reference value taken from an Ecuadorian Technical
Environmental Regulation (250 mg/l). Of five sediment samples, all showed
concentration of total petroleum hydrocarbons between 370 and 1,560 mg/kg (which
contains benzene carcinogenic substance, according to The International Agency for
Research on Cancer (U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry-ATSDR,
1999). Lead levels in sediments were of 18-24 mg/kg. These results were considered
infonnative by DIGESA since there is no limit for these substances established in
Peruvian law (Orta, 2007).
The same study presents the results of74 blood samples taken from children age 2
to 17 in six native communities and in Villa Trompeteros, the District capital, in 2005
34
(Table 3). The CDC level of concern of 10 micrograms per deciliter (llg/dL) oflead in
blood for children was exceeded in 66.21 % of the samples. In the same study, of 125
adult (age 18-60 years) blood samples, 79.20% had levels of 10-19.9 micrograms per
deciliter oflead in blood (DIGESA, 2006, Orta, 2007). All fall below 20 micrograms of
lead per deciliter of blood, the absorption limit for people not occupationally exposed to
lead, according to the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
(ACGIH). USAID indicates that no safe blood lead level is known and that even levels of
less than 10 micrograms per deciliter have adverse effects on children. In adults, high
blood lead levels are related to hypertension and cardiovascular disease. Lead can be
carried from matemal to fetal circulation through the placenta, exposing the fetus to lead,
and even at matemal blood levels of less than 10 micrograms per deciliter, fetal brain
development is adversely affected (USAID, 2005, Orta, 2007). Children exposed to lead
may develop brain function damage. Even at low levels of exposure, lead can affect a
child's mental and physical growth. Exposure to lead is more dangerous for young and
unbom children. Harmful effects include premature births, smaller babies, decreased
mental ability in the infant, leaming difficulties, and reduced growth in young children
(ATSDR, 2007).
Blood samples in this study were also tested for cadmium (Table 4), which led to
the finding that 98.65% of2- to 17-year-olds exceeded acceptable limits for people not
occupationally exposed (less than 0.1 micrograms of cadmium per deciliter of blood).
Also classified at risk were 37.84% of those youths, with 0.21-0.5 micrograms per
deciliter. Of the adult samples, 99.20% were over established permissible limits
35
Table 3
Results ofAnalysis ofLead in Blood by DIGESA (2006)
Concentration of
lead in micrograms
per deciliter
Less than 10
Age 0-1 7 years
Number of Percentage
samples
25 33.78
Age 18-60 years
Number of Percentage
samples
26 20.80
39 52.70 99
10 13.51 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
74 100.00 125
Note: U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) considers a blood lead level of 10 micrograms per
deciliter (/lg/dL) as level of concern for children (ATSDR, 2007).
(DIGESA, 2006, Orta 2007). Both lead and cadmium are considered to be among the six
most toxic metals for humans (Spadaro & Rabl, 2004).
Table 4
Results ofAnalysis ofCadmium in Blood by DIGESA (2006)
Concentration of Age 0-17 years Age 18-60 years
cadmium in Number of Percentage Number of Percentage
micrograms per samples samples
deciliter
Less than 0.10 1.35 0.80
0.11-0.20 1.35 2 1.60
0.21-0.50 28 37.84 37 29.60
More than 0.50 44 59.46 85 68.00
Total 74 100.00 125 100.00
Note: Acceptable blood cadmium levels according to the ACGIH are 0.1 micrograms per deciliter (Orta
2007).
36
IIAP reported in 1995 that the analysis of fish tissue taken from rivers and lakes
in Block lAB was contaminated with lead, cadmium, mercury (bioaccumulative toxic
elements, meaning the increase in the concentration of a substance, especially a
contaminant, in an organism or in the food chain over time). IIAP also reported high
levels of chlorides in fish tissue, affecting fish behavior and nutrition state. Therefore,
people in Block lAB are exposed to hazardous substances not only when they consume
and are in contact with soil and water, but also when they eat fish, an important source of
protein. Long-term exposure to lower levels of cadmium in food or water leads to an
accumulation of this element in the kidneys, and possible kidney disease. Other long-term
effects are lung damage and fragile bones. The U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) has determined that cadmium and cadmium compounds are known
human carcinogens (ATSDR, 2008).
Other documented practices reported by Orta (2007) that are not related to waste
management, but with clear negative health consequences for the local indigenous
populations, are the demand for prostitution in communities and sexual abuse of Achuar
women, with additional potential for the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.
Amazonian indigenous peoples' immune system is not prepared for diseases they have
not encountered before. In addition, alterations caused to the natural drainage system also
create conditions for the proliferation of the Anopheles sp. mosquito vector of malaria, a
significant health problem along the Corrientes. The health situation of the Achuar
communities is further aggravated because there are no health services readily available
in the area (Orta). The absence of health care services and a public authority in this
37
remote area of the rainforest means that people are left on their own to treat diseases with
what they have on hand.
Health authorities' inaction has been in evidence for some time. For example,
even after completing the blood tests that showed alarmingly high blood and cadmium
levels, the Ministry of Health did not take any action. Moreover, nearly a year passed
from the time the samples were collected, in June 2005, until their publication and
delivery to the communities in May 2006. Even achieving this apparently simple and
ethical response required the presentation of notarized letters to the Minister ofHealth,
Dr. Pilar Mazetti Soler (Orta, 2007). No health plan was designed or considered prior to
the mobilization undertaken by the indigenous communities of the Corrientes River basin
in October 2006.
Influence of Non-Indigenous Groups: National and International
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
New forms of collective actions emerged in Peru in the 1980s after over a decade
of military government. Democratic elections in 1980 opened space for social
mobilization, but also it was time of an unprecedented political violence and economic
crisis. During the 1980s, some social movements emerged, such as feminist, human
rights, regionalist, and environmental groups that started to spread throughout Peru. In
the 1990s, environmental and indigenous organizations gained more legitimate space in
Peru. New and stronger environmental organizations do not necessarily imply there is a
solid "environmental movement" in Peru. Bebbington and Scurrah (2008) point out that
38
actually separate groups or "movements" that have in common the defense of some
aspects of the environment coexist, but these organizations do not necessarily work
together because they do not share the same identity or agenda. "Brown"
environmentalists (a terminology used even among environmentalists) are concerned by
environmental and human health consequences of industrialization and/or man-made
pollution. "Green" or conservationist groups are focused on protecting biodiversity and
nature without paying much attention to the people living in those spaces or to social-
environmental conflicts (although in the last few years this group started to take small
steps to include more social issues in their agenda). There is another mixed group of
organizations concerned on social-environmental matters or the relationship between
environment, rights, and social justice. Finally, there are two more varieties: the "blue"
groups dedicated to environmental education and raising public awareness; and the
"sentimentalists," actively involved in campaigns such as those against bullfights and the
use of animals in scientific research, among others. The broad diversity of emphasis
evidently creates little cohesion among these groups (Bebbington and Scurrah).
Indigenous leaders of FECONACO and AIDESEP began to get in contact with
environmental organizations in the early and mid-1990s as a way to gain support, reach a
larger audience, and get the attention of the authorities. The newly created environmental
organizations (mainly the ones dedicated to social-environmental matters with more
interest in environmental rights and justice) were also looking for work areas to gain
influence and a legitimate space in environmental policy-making. The transition from an
authori tarian military regime to a democratic government in the 1980-1990s also
39
coincided with the emergence of an international environmental movement and the
adoption of global environmental principles. Changes in the state's structures were seen
as an opportunity both for the indigenous and environmental organizations to influence
the public opinion and to advocate for advancing environmental and indigenous rights.
Organizations such as Racimos de Ungurahui, a non-profit organization founded in Lima
in 1995 by lawyers and social and environmental scientists, is dedicated to supporting
Amazonian indigenous people affected by extractive industries, institutional capacity-
building, and land rights, and to provide free legal advice to Amazonian indigenous
groups. This organization accompanied the indigenous organizations FECONACO, ATI,
ORACH, FECONAT, FEDIQUEP and AIDESEP throughout the mobilization process
from the mid 1990s-2006 and had a key role building a support network of individuals
and organizations at the national and international levels. Other national organizations
involved were Shinai-Serjali (with interesting experiences developing ethno-cartography
of the Achuar territories by the communities), Instituto del Bien Comtin, and TAFOS
among others. Environmental organizations, indigenous rights groups, universities, and
individuals from the U.S., Europe, and other countries in Latin America became more
involved in the Corrientes case during the late 1990s and 2000s, contributing resources,
support and information to FECNACO. These include:
• Organization of Indigenous People of the Amazon Basin (COICA)
• Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONFENIAE)
• Amazon Watch
• The Peruvian office of the WWF
40
• E-Tech International
• The law finn Schonbrun, DeSimone, Seplow, Harris and Hoffman LLP
• Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW)
• Rainforest Action Network
• Fundaci6n Pachamama
• Earthrights International
• International Work Groups of Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)
• Joan Martinez-Alier, and Marti Orta, Autonomous University of Barcelona,
Spain.
Coordination with several national and international organizations was a very
complex process that required significant effort and resources. Empowerment of the
indigenous peoples living in Block lAB was possible as a result of effective networking
across local, national, and international scales. The alliance between FECONACO,
AIDESEP, and national environmental and human rights NGOs had three stages: First,
the indigenous federations in the Corrientes basin had to organize themselves, bring their
claims to Lima and have initial contacts with environmental NGOs and governmental
agencies. In the mid-1990s leaders of the Corrientes basin called on their national
representatives in Lima, AIDESEP for guidance and support to communicate their claims
to Oxy, and government authorities. Environmental and human rights groups based in
Lima provided great support to FECONACO and AIDESEP. They helped access the
financial resources necessary to cover the expensive transportation costs of the
community leaders from the Corrientes to Lima, provided advice to consolidate and
41
organize the local indigenous organizations, and make strategic international contacts.
The NGOs brought the environmental component (conservation and environmental
protection) public participation to the Corrientes case in the context of a demand to
enforce indigenous rights. On the other hand, the NGOs received the benefit of gaining a
legitimate space to participate in environmental policy-making and law enforcement. As
Soria (2001) points out in his analysis about Amazonian indigenous peoples and oil
industry, indigenous organizations gained political representation and benefited from
their close alliance with non-profit organizations, professionals, and influential people.
The first reports and accounts of the health and environmental problems caused
by the oil activities in Block lAB were made public at the same time as the first
environmental organizations were formed in Lima in the 1990s. The United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth
Summit of 1992, produced the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which
incorporated a series of principles defining the rights and responsibilities of the States,
including principles of public participation. FECONACO and the environmental NGOs
also demanded the enforcement of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 169 that Peru ratified in 1993 (Resolucion Legislativa No. 26253). ILO
Convention No. 169 emphasizes the conceptual approach to indigenous and tribal peoples
based on the respect for their specific identity and the rights such as:
Governments shall have the responsibility for developing, with the participation
of the peoples concerned, coordinated and systematic action to protect the rights
of these peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity.
42
Ensure that members of these peoples benefit on an equal footing from the rights
and opportunities, which nationa11aws and regulations grant to other members of
the population.
Indigenous and tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and
fundamental freedoms without hindrance or discrimination. (ILO Convention 169,
Articles 2 and 3)
This convention is based on two fundamental concepts: consultation and
participation. Aside from the fact that the effective application of ILO Convention 169 is
highly controversia1,4 the indigenous federations and environmentalists used its principles
and the provisions in the new environmenta11aws in the hydrocarbon sector (described
later), and to demand immediate intervention of the authorities in the Corrientes basin.
A second stage resulted from building associations with international support
groups. Information technology and the internet facilitated sharing information and
strategies internationally in a fast, effective way. Internet started in Peru in the early
1990s, first as a very expensive service provided by the National Telecommunications
Company (ENTEL Peru) to a handful of academic, research, and a few non-profit
organizations. Since the mid-1990s, the Red Cientiflca Peruana, a non-profit
organization, began to provide internet service to a popular audience that included many
environmental and indigenous organizations in Lima,5 which facilitated their
communications and outreach of international groups.
4 The questions around the efficacy of indigenous rights are based on two arguments: First, these
rights are not acknowledged by the Peruvian State despite international agreements being mandatory.
Second, different interpretations of these principles made them difficult to be enforced according to the
national law (Gamboa, 2006).
5 In 1996 the Red Cientfjica Peruana and the Ashaninka indigenous group of the Central Amazon
worked together to facilitate internet access to the Ashaninka indigenous leaders who wanted to build their
capacity to interact with similar organizations in Panama, Brazil and other countries in the region.
http://interred.wordpress .com/2007/0 I/26/mino-eusebio-castro-uno-de-Ios-lideres-del-pueblo-ashanika-de-
peru!
43
Environmentalists, human rights advocates, FECONACO, and AIDESEP were
able to reach government authorities, raise public awareness, and create advocacy
strategies. Together they participated in meetings held in the 1990 and 2000s with
representatives of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, the Ministry of Health, Oxy, Plus
Petrol Norte S.A., Congress representatives, the Public Prosecutor, and other government
agencies asking to assess the contamination. The alliance between the indigenous
federations, local NGOs (mostly "brown" environmentalists), and international groups
helped indigenous leaders articulate a more persuasive rights-based language that made it
more difficult for Congress representatives, the government agencies, and the oil
company to dismiss FECONACO's requests. FECONACO was able to gain skills to
define a strategy using persuasive arguments, claim for law enforcement, and dialogue
with the authorities instead of using a confrontational strategy more common as a fist
alternative in the indigenous movement. This persuasive strategy made possible to hold
meetings with the Ministry of Energy and Mines, the Ministry of Health, Congress
representatives, and Pluspetrol. As described in the following section, these interactions
between FECONACO and several public agencies revealed institutional and political
contradictions that determined the lack of capacity of the State to address the
environmental and health problems affecting the people in the Corrientes area.
A third stage ofjoint activities between the NGOs and the indigenous leaders of
FECONACO and AIDESEP addressed the technical problem of conducting
environmental and health assessments; finding trustworthy scientific evidences that
would identify the source of pollution and its effect on the people's health and the
44
environment. This required the intervention of national and international experts and the
public agencies in charge of assessing environmental health and contamination.
FECONACO's perseverance was able to achieve an intervention of the national
environmental health authority, DIGESA, and OSINERG. National and international
NGOs helped FECONACO interpret the assessment reports and perform independents
assessments of the oil contamination and its health effects. Reports with the results of
water and blood sample analysis, environmental and social assessments by DIGESA,
OSINERG, lIAP, the Regional Environmental Health Direction (DESA), MINEM, and
Racimos de Ungurahui documented (despite some differences in the values reported) that
oil extraction in Block IAB was the source of contamination (chlorides, barium, boron,
manganese, chromium, copper, oil, and grease among others). Reports also showed that
the oil industry's pollution severely affected the rivers, soil, and sediments in the
Corrientes River basin, and that the population ofBlock lAB had high blood lead and
cadmium levels. Interpretation of the reports by national and international experts and
organizations enabled FECONACO to demand an immediate intervention of the state to
enforce the environmental laws and of the company to stop discharging toxic effluents in
the river.
Role of the Peruvian Government
The Corrientes case illustrates the evolution of the social and political processes
in Peru that influence social-environmental conflicts to date. It also illustrates the
influence of underlying interests in the dynamics of social-environmental conflicts
45
between the state and indigenous peoples. Environmental and indigenous rights policies
and laws adopted in Peru since the late 1970s were influenced by global trends, an open
market economy, and an emerging environmental agenda that included new citizen
rights, and the responsibility of the state to enforce them. The Peruvian Constitution of
1979 had the core objective of developing policies to facilitate an economy capable to
compete effectively in the world market. It also included for the first time the right to live
in a healthy environment. This principle gave the environment a status of constitutional
human rights and the state's responsibility to safeguard it. For the first time, Peru adopted
a high-level policy with the mandate to protect the environment; consequently, this policy
required new laws and policies to implement it. These new policies faced the challenge of
developing an environmenta11aw framework while developing the country in a market
economy (Soria, 2001). The transition from an authoritarian military regime to
democracy also resulted in new policies promoting public participation in decision-
making processes (at least that was the political discourse used by the governments in the
1980s and 1990s to gain popular support). The Peruvian Environmental Code of 1990,
adopted during the government of President Fujimori, was a pioneer of its kind oflaw in
Latin America. It included principles (later amended and eliminated during President
Fujimori's mandate so they would not contradict other laws promoting private
investment) that set the basis for environmental rights, and policies that guided the
environmenta11aws and regulations for the oil industry. Chapter XII of the
Environmental Code contained norms to regulate the evaluation, enforcement, and
monitoring of natural resource management, thereby constituting a first effort to integrate
46
different actions to control water, air, noise, and visual pollution that were managed by
different independent entities in each ministry. However, the development of the
environmental sector has been strongly resisted by sectors that perceive environmental
protection as an obstacle to economic growth (World Bank, 2007). Therefore, Fujimori's
government later abolished Chapter XII of the Code, through the approval of the
Framework Law for the Growth of Private Investment (Decree 839 of August 20, 1996),
which brought back the responsibility of environmental management in the hydrocarbon
sector to the ministry in charge of controlling it--in this case MINEM. Furthennore,
environmentalists and citizen grbups' claims for an independent environmental
enforcement agency were dismissed. The new Peruvian Constitution adopted in 1993
replaced the one adopted in 1979. Article 2(22) of the 1993 Constitution includes a
provision that confinns the human right to an "ecologically balanced environment
adequate to the development oflife," a more diffuse principle than 1979 Constitution's
wording that clearly required the protection of a healthy environment and the prevention
of environmental deterioration.
The weakness of the Environmental and Natural Resources Code and the
fragmentation of environmental authority among the different sectors led to a lack of
coordination and an imbalance among the ministries in their technical capacity or
political will to implement laws. The fragmented environmental laws are not well known
by public sector authorities, let alone by the indigenous communities (Pulgar-Vidal,
Bernales & Noejovich, 1995). Moreover, the different sectors' environmental policies
47
frequently contradict each other, leaving the general feeling among the population that
environmental laws are almost impossible to be enforced.
This context describes how MINEM is the authority in charge of promoting and
enforcing the laws regulating the environmental impacts of oil and gas projects. During
the 1990s, Mll'l"EM passed a set of regulations, such as the Environmental Protection
Rule for Hydrocarbon Activities (Supreme Decree No. 043-93-EM), and the first
environmental guidelines for oil industry that included limits for effluent discharge in oil
operations. As in other activities, environmental regulations for the oil and gas activities
were adopted without previous planning. They were adopted at the same time as the
activity to be regulated developed (Soria, 200 I). The conflict of roles within the MINEM
resulted in a lack of enforcement of the environmental regulations because the authority
in charge of enforcing the environmental regulations of its sector was more inclined to
attract foreign investors, in this case to develop the oil industry. This was evident in the
public relations campaigns that appear in the media showing the oil industry as "black
gold," showing pictures of oil workers taking a bath with crude oil celebrating new oil
developments (Soria, 200 I).
In addition to MINEM, state agencies with a relevant role in this case were
DIGESA, OSINERG, the Attorney General's Office, the Ombudsman Office, and the
Congress. These agencies do not coordinate with MINEM for decision-making processes
affecting public health. In other words, MINEM makes decisions unilaterally about
environmental matters affecting public health, without the legal mandate or official
mechanisms to consult with the health sector or other authorities. This institutional
48
arrangement also affects other extractive industries such as mining and fisheries, where
the ministries in charge dictated the environmental regulations while the economic
interests of the government insisted on keeping the exploitation of natural resources in
the same conditions.
Actually, the legal framework has resulted mostly in a stronger emphasis to
regulate the relationship between the state and the private investors than to secure the
respect of the right to health of the citizens. Consequently, such a legal framework is an
invitation to conflict and abuse. Moreover, political decisions in the oil and gas sector are
dictated under the pressure of a broader range of factors, such as the impact of decisions
in a larger political scale, and the implications in the promotion of private investors in a
market economy.
The realization of the existing conflict of interest within MINEM (promoting oil
and gas projects and the environmental authority of the same activity), and a lack of
accountability, enforcement, and monitoring capacity generated mistrust in the
indigenous peoples of the Corrientes basin. MINEM lacked resources and staff to
conduct periodic assessments in a remote area such as the Corrientes River basin.
Consequently, the ministry's statements about Oxy's environmental performance (and
Pluspetrol's) were based solely on the reports prepared by the oil companies. The
incapacity of the state for an effective response to the just claims of the indigenous
communities was a key factor in increasing the fillstration and mistrust of FECONACO,
AIDESEP, and environmentalists in the government and the oil companies.
49
The process FECONACO went through for many years since the 1990s revealed
institutional weaknesses in the state to address the complex social-environmental
conflicts related to activities of extractive industries due to: (a) lack of formal
mechanisms to address citizen's complaints, (b) the absence of an integrated system with
other sectors to obtain reliable data that would provide analytical support to the decision-
making process, and (c) the absence of sufficient financial and human resources to
comply with the ministry's mandate to overview the environmental performance of the
companies (in this case the oil industry). Therefore, the national policies were perceived
as more effective in perpetuating the advantages of a politically powerful economic actor
in front of another actor who lacked resources (indigenous communities).
On a brighter side, given the above-mentioned inconsistencies, the Peruvian
Congress passed a law in 1996 creating the Supervising Organism for Energy Investment
(OSn~ERG), an autonomous agency reporting to the Presidency of the Ministers'
Council (PCM), and responsible for overseeing the compliance with technical and legal
norms relating to environmental protection and conservation in the electricity and
hydrocarbon sectors (World Bank, 2007). New environmental regulations for the oil and
gas sector required companies operating prior to the enactment of environmental
standards to implement measures progressively to comply with the environmental
regulations. MINEM required companies under its control to present an Environmental
Adequation and Management Plan (PAMA). Oxy presented a PAMA for the Block lAB
in late 1994 that was approved in May 1995. The cleanup and pollution prevention and
reduction plan was to be completed in 2002. Oxy transferred PAMA's obligations to
50
Pluspetrol Norte S.A. when they acquired the concession in the year 2000. In 2002, the
discharge of toxic effluents and large-scale contamination continued, so Pluspetrol Norte
S.A. negotiated a Complementary Environmental Plan (PAC) for Block lAB approved
on April 20 2005.
State intervention in the social-environmental conflict in the Corrientes basin was
a result of the pressure of local indigenous groups, environmentalists, and human rights
organizations who demanded the enforcement of the right to health and the
environmental quality standards. As Soria (200 I) says, the Peruvian government was
more capable of enacting environmental regulations than enforcing them. Therefore,
government interventions have not been able to yield promising results in addressing
social-environmental conflicts (Pulgar-Vidal, 2006). As Scurrah (1995) observes, the
Peruvian government does not always play an essential role in offering solutions to
environmental conflicts.
The Ombudsman's report of2007 about social-environmental conflicts by
extractive industries in Peru mentions the difficulties confronted to prove the causation
between an activity and the environmental and/or health damage. This led the state to
think that FECONACO's complaints about the health problems that pointed to oil activity
being responsible are an excuse made by radical groups with a hidden agenda. The
Ombudsman report alleged polarized positions in this conflict were results of the
government's defensive position, distant from its mandate to seek for an objective truth.
The report also pointed out that the government failed to assess the actual magnitude of
the contamination, despite its mandate to enforce constitutional rights. One example of
51
this situation was when Jorge del Castillo, the President of the Ministry's Council, sent a
letter to the Ombudsman, Beatriz Merino, on October 18, 2006, which said that the
claims of the natives were based on false reports and that the local people were
manipulated by non-governmental organizations. The Ombudsman's reply, dated October
19,2006, to the contrary acknowledged the truthfulness of the official reports of the
contamination and the public health risks, namely high levels oflead and cadmium found
in blood samples of some Achuar individuals because of the discharges of toxic effluents
and wastes from the oil company. It also requested the intervention of the Executive
Branch (check translation, you mean Executive Branch?) due to the inactiveness of the
Ministries of Health and Energy and Mines (La Torre, personal communication October
30,2006).
The local, regional, and national governments have not responded to repeated
requests by the communities and their federation, nor to the now-numerous technical
reports described above that highlight the very serious health and environmentally
dreadful conditions along the Corrientes River (Orta, 2007).
Oxy and Pluspetrol Norte S.A.
In 1979, Block lAB was the largest oil producer in Peru, although crude oil
production declined in the last few years. In 2004, production declined to 32,000 barrels
per day (Pluspetrol, 2004), and in 2005 it only produced 27,000 barrels per day; however,
Campodonico (2006) estimates that from 1975 to 2005, Block lAB produced 640 million
barrels of crude oil. Considering an average price $25 per barrel of crude oil (U.S. Energy
52
Infonnation Administration, 2007), in 30 years Block lAB production was valued in $16
billion (calculated as general income, not as total profit). In spite of production costs,
taxes, and other expenses, Block 1AB has yielded very high profits.
As explained in previous sections, in 1993 MINEM passed environmental
regulations for the oil and gas industry. A year later, Oxy presented to MINEM an
environmental plan (PAMA), with the company's commitments to comply progressively
with the environmental regulations by May 31,2002. Block lAB's concession was
acquired by Pluspetrol Corporation S.A. in 2000 (later Pluspetrol Norte S.A.); therefore,
Oxy was no longer responsible for the environmental plan. Pluspetrol continued
executing the plan and reporting to the authorities until the PAMA's completion in 2002.
Oxy's environmental plan committed to remediating the contamination caused by its
operations since 1995 with a total investment of $ 415,000, a small amount considering
the seriousness of the contamination and the company's profit. Given that most oil and
gas companies in operation in Peru were unable to comply with their environmental plans
according to schedule, in 2003 MINEM passed a nonn (Supreme Decree 028-2003 EM)
authorizing oil companies to present Complementary Environmental Plans (PAC) with
modifications and deadline extensions (OSINERG, 2004). In December 2004, Pluspetrol
Norte S.A. presented a 4-year PAC for Block lAB that MINEM approved. For many
years Oxy and Pluspetrol presented periodic reports of their environmental perfonnance
to MINEM; these reports did not show any contamination in Block lAB:
Reports of produced water monitoring in Blocks lAB and 8, presented by
Occidental Peruana Corporation S.A., Pluspetrol Corporation S.A or Pluspetrol
Norte S.A did not infonn of any values exceeding the maximum allowable limits.
(OSINERG 2004)
53
FECONACO pressured the Peruvian Congress to conduct an environmental
assessment in Block lAB. In 2004, OSINERG declared that the environmental reports
submitted by Oxy and Pluspetrol to MINEM had numerous illegalities: (a) Oxy and
Pluspetrol Norte S.A. located their monitoring water points in different places than they
reported; therefore the data MINEM received did not correspond to the actual monitoring
stations; (b) contrary to the values of water quality reported by Oxy and Pluspetrol Norte
S.A., pollution levels in freshwater resources exceeded the environmental guideline
values; (c) Pluspetrol Norte S.A. was indeed discharging toxic effluents with high content
of barium, chloride, hydrocarbons, oil, and grease at very high temperature, without any
treatment, directly to the soil and surface water courses; and (d) soils, creeks, and
freshwater courses were highly contaminated. Despite the official evidence, Oxy claimed
compliance with the environmental legislation of the hydrocarbon sector (Pluspetrol,
2004). Total calculation of the clean-up costs varies in each case, but, to illustrate, the
total cost of $ 415,000 that Oxy committed to implement their environmental plans is
small. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates that the average cost of gravel
decontamination reuse and revegetation in an oil-contaminated site in Alaska is $ 2.5
million per hectare (U.S. National Research Council).
Pluspetrol Norte S.A. was fined several times for oil spills and discharge of toxic
effluents. Until December 2007, OSINERG imposed fines for approximately $2,270,000.
Just from 1998 to 2002, 16 oil spills in the concessions operated by Pluspetrol Norte
(Blocks lAB and 8) were reported (La Republica newspaper, Dec. 29 2007). Ifwe
compare the amount of fines imposed on Pluspetrol Norte and the costs per hectare for a
54
clean up, paying fines cost less than implementing costly environmental remediation
measures. Considering that the total crude oil production in Block 1AB from 1972 to
2001 was 572,573 million barrels (MINEM, 2001) at an average price of $25 per barrel
of crude oil, the costs of the fines are not effective as a sanction. Moreover, Pluspetrol
has appealed all of these resolutions and is often exempted; for example, in May 2005,
the Fiscal Tribunal ruled in favor of Pluspetrol Peru Corporation, annulling fines in
excess of$5 million. (Resolucion del Tribunal Fiscal No. 02197-5-2005, Orta, 2007).
The OSINERG report of 2004 revealed that Oxy and Pluspetrol appeared to be
covering up the impacts of their activities. As mentioned, the real toxic effluent discharge
outlets were not located at the points declared by the companies in the monthly periodic
reports to MINEM, thus invalidating the company's water monitoring results and casting
doubt over other data provided by the company. This has led to a lawsuit filed against
Oxy, as an American corporation based in the United States (Orta). The Achuar case,
Maynas Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum, No. CV-07-5068, was filed in May 2007. In
April 2008, Judge Philip Gutierrez of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California ruled that it is more appropriately heard in Peru under the legal doctrine of
forum non-conveniens, which means the petition must be heard in Peru, not in the United
States.
55
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Corrientes River case reveals how Amazonian indigenous people gained
competence to demand recognition of their collective rights to health and citizenship as a
result of strategic alliances with national and transnational groups, and by adopting an
ecological rhetoric. Since 1996, FECONACO and the Achuar people ofthe Corrientes
River basin have used official channels of the Peruvian administration to present their
concerns about the health effects of massive contamination caused by over 30 years of oil
production in Block lAB and the threat it posed to their subsistence. During this time, the
Peruvian government was ineffective in addressing the conflict between the Achuar and
the oil companies in Block lAB, which escalated to the Achuar's blockade of
Pluspetrol's facilities for 13 days in October 2006. FECONACO's mobilization was a
result of frustration of over a decade of sterile dialogue with MINEM, health authorities,
and the oil companies (Oxy and Pluspetrol Norte S.A.), as well as pressure exerted by
local people on FECONACO's leaders. The mobilization and blockade of Pluspetrol's
facilities in October 2006 ended with an agreement with Pluspetrol and government
authorities that would be unthinkable to reach otherwise (the Achuar's efforts to dialogue
with the Oxy and Pluspetrol, and persuade the authorities over a decade was unfruitful).
The agreement was comprised of nine points that would benefit the Achuar people in
56
Block lAB while Pluspetrol Norte S.A. continues oil exploitation activities in the area.
The landmark agreement was unprecedented and included Pluspetrol's commitments to
achieve 100% reinjection of produced waters, provide health care, safe water, and food
supply, also dedication of 5% of all oil royalties received by the Department of Loreto to
the Achuar community for development and education, and other demands. Even though
the agreement's enforcement is still in progress, on December 2007, Pluspetrol
accomplished 100% reinjection of produced waters (the largest volume of toxic wastes
produced in oil exploitation), reducing substantially the discharge of toxic substances into
rivers and streams in the area.
Despite a steady decline of production volume since the mid-l 990s, Oxy and
Pluspetrol had enough revenues for the implementation of pollution prevention and
abatement technologies. Block lAB produces the largest amount of crude oil in the
Peruvian Amazon. In its heyday during the early 1990s, Block lAB produced annually
more than 50% of the total national oil production (21,000 million barrels - MBLS, in
1992 according to MINEM, Hydrocarbon Statistic Report 2001). This was a larger
amount than the same concession's annual production in 2008, equivalent to 31.24%
(8,233 MBLS) of the total national annual oil production. Despite this production decline,
Block lAB was still the head of the oil producers' list, (MINEM, Hydrocarbon Statistic
Report 2008). Pluspetrol also holds the Block 8 concession (adjacent to Block lAB),
which renders the Argentinean company the largest crude oil producer in Peru, equivalent
in 2008 to 52.68% of the total national production. In addition, Pluspetrol is a leading
partner of the two consortiums in charge of the production and transportation of the
57
Camisea Natural Gas Project in Cusco, Peru. With an investment of$2.7 billion, the
Camisea Project is one of the largest gas projects in South America. Therefore, Pluspetrol
has the necessary financial resources to cover the costs of pollution prevention and
environmental remediation in Block lAB. Pluspetrol is aware of the importance of
having the local people's acceptance of their presence in the area in order to continue
activities and avoid lawsuits, violent social conflicts, and international campaigns that
would affect its corporate image. Since the 1990s, Oxy, Chevron, Texaco, Shell, Enron,
and other oil companies have been targets of international campaigns and boycotts led by
indigenous rights and environmental groups, some of them affecting seriously not only
their image but also their revenues. Therefore, the blockade the Achuar organized in
October 2006 put Pluspetrol in a difficult position where it was better to accept the
conditions of the local people than to put its investments in the Peruvian Amazon and its
corporate image at risk.
A close reading of the nine points in the agreement of October 22, 2006, between
the Achuar, Pluspetrol, and the Peruvian authorities shows that the core claims of the
Achuar were about survival and citizenship. There is no mention of environment,
biodiversity, or conservation. Could this mobilization be interpreted as "environmental"?
As Martinez-Alier says, survival makes the poor (in relative economic terms) aware of
the need to mobilize when nature is affected (2008). The Achuar's motives are different
from those viewed as a monothematic, post-materialistic environmentalism of the
industrialized countries, mostly based on aesthetic values of the physical environment.
Martinez-Alier calls this a "popular environmentalism," (p.3) not born as a result of
58
economic prosperity and articulated in quantitative values of hard natural sciences, but
with the influence of more complex social and cultural aspects.
The role of the state in the Corrientes River case exposed institutional weaknesses
and lack of capacity to deal with social-environmental conflicts. Until the mid-1990s,
pollution control and environmental regulations for oil and gas activities were non-
existent in Peru. Therefore, there was no legal obligation for oil companies (extractive
industries in general) to prevent, reduce, and control the effluents and wastes generated;
consequently, cumulative effects of these activities still cause significant negative health
and environmental impacts today. In addition, MINEM has the mandate to create and
enforce pollution control for the hydrocarbon sector, the governmental authority in
charge of advancing energy investments. These are conflictive mandates: promoting
hydrocarbon activities and enforcing environmental standards. MINEM has decision-
making power over environmental management plans, impact assessment studies, and
others with potential to affect public health (through air, water, and soil contamination)
without the mandate to coordinate decisions affecting public health with the health
authorities. In other words MINEM makes decisions of its sector (energy and mining),
with potential impacts on water, soil, and air quality that affect public health, without the
legal requirement to have the opinion of public health officials. The existing system's
conflict of interests and MINEM's evident bias in favor of oil companies raises serious
questions regarding its neutrality. These situations led to the creation of an independent
regulatory body, OSINERG, but despite the latter's duties to overview and impose
sanctions on companies that violate the law, it has limited power to make decisions in the
59
energy sector. OSINERG fined Pluspetrol approximately $4 million; however,
considering that the overall costs of implementing pollution control measures
(reinjection, solid and liquid wastes treatment, air pollution control, and cleanup) greatly
exceed the amounts of OSINERG's fines, many companies prefer to pay the fines instead
of enforcing environmental standards and international guidelines (such as the
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers - OGP, World Bank, and others).
This situation is worsened by the historical exclusion and marginalization of the
Amazonian indigenous people such as the Achuar in Block lAB, where a historical
absence of the state is translated into a total lack of health, sanitation, education, and
judicial services.
There is a pattern with regards to creation of "High Level" or "Research
Commissions" upon requests of citizens or the state to address social-environmental
conflicts, which to some extent replaces public agencies' duties. In many cases, high-
level commissions are seen as more trustworthy and effective than the official channels
requesting an intervention of MINEM, the authority in charge of regulating oil activities.
In addition, in the Corrientes River case (as in other social-environmental conflicts) the
state preferred to step aside and let the companies deal with local groups independently,
leading to specific negotiations and agreements. These specific agreements are not
regulated, and therefore in many cases are not enforced, which exacerbates a feeling of
frustration and mistrust on the part of indigenous groups with regards to government
officials and dialogue. Consequently, there is a rising sense of mistrust in the
government, which leads to radicalization and violence in social-environmental conflicts.
60
Reports by OSINERG6 and DIGESA (among others) provide evidence that Oxy
and Pluspetrol Norte S.A. did not take sufficient measures to prevent, control, reduce, and
mitigate the effects of their operations on the environment and public health. These
companies discharged effluent and waste in violation of national and international laws
and operation guidelines. As mentioned in this document, several reports from official
and private agencies assessed the magnitude of the contamination, its effects on the local
people's health, and the demonstrated premeditated interest of both companies to provide
misleading information, such as the location of water monitoring sites that in practice
were different from those approved by MINEM.
These factors influenced the decision of the indigenous people in Block lAB to
organize a collective action and mobilization aimed at asserting their right to citizenship
and health. Their association with national and transnational environmental groups was
essential to overcome limitations such as the lack of resources for organizing social
mobilization, and lack of knowledge about the intricacies oflaw and governmental
agencies. It is often stated that one of the consequences of economic globalization is the
extension of the capitalist neoliberal model, which can result in significant social and
environmental effects, such as those documented in this thesis. However, at the same
time, globalization of technology and the media, tends to permeate relationships in time
and space that affect grassroots organizations, thereby affecting power relationships at the
local level. The development of telecommunications and media in the region studied
facilitated networking of the Achuar and local and transnational organizations that helped
6 Since January 2007 called OSINERGMIN, assuming also the supervision of mining activities, according
to Law No. 28964.
61
them access international support that was instrumental in acquiring the necessary legal,
technical, organizational, and financial means for social mobilization.
There is a strong element of identity in this case, especially concerning the
representation of Amazonian indigenous peoples and its meaning in the national and
international spheres. Indigenous peoples have been stereotyped for over 500 years as
savages and primitives. In the last decades, indigenous mobilizations related to extractive
industries have been interpreted either as driven by obscure political agendas or by a
perception of indigenous groups as ecological natives who protect the global
environment and biodiversity. Indigenous representations today are influenced by a
complex mix of structural, political, and historical conditions affecting power over
natural resources, democracy, and the emergence of a global environmental and
indigenous rights agenda. The role of identity and culture in the emergence of the
indigenous movement in the Peruvian Amazon can be explained using Escobar's (1998)
analysis of "new" and "old" social movements in Latin America. New social movements
are those for which identity is important, those that engage in "new fonns of doing
politics," and those that contribute to new fOnTIS of sociability (p. 6). Today, there is a
more prominent role of contested meanings of nature, environment and natural resources
in social movements, and, in this case, perceptions of space (rainforest wilderness and the
indigenous peoples who need to be dominated and modernized) are not limited to the
physical environment. At the same time, power relations after the transition to democratic
government involved a reconfiguration of state-civil society relations. The adoption of
new environmental policies, standards, and citizen rights was central to the
62
modernization agenda of the democratic governments in Peru since the 1980s. A lack of
effective intervention by some government authorities led to a weakening of dialogue
between citizens, companies, and the state, leading to radical measures such as the
Achuar's blockade ofPluspetrol's facilities in October 2006. It is important to highlight
that the intervention of the Ombudsman office was key in recognizing the validity of the
Achuar demands based on official evidence of environmental quality data and health
assessments by DIGESA, OSINERG and other institutions. The Ombudsman support to
the indigenous people of the Corrientes River basin was key to acknowledge the urgency
of the indigenous people's demands to address the contamination affecting their right to
health and livelihood.
Peru's economy relies significantly on extractive industries (mining, oil, natural
gas, and fisheries). However, Peru's natural resources have not been used to develop a
diversified and a more equal distribution of benefits. To the contrary, socio-
environmental conflicts related to extractive industries in Peru are escalating. Every year
we see polarized points of view among citizens groups, the state and private investors.
The lack of consultation and public participation in recent new development policies,
regional trade agreements, and infrastructure projects such as the Initiative for the
Integration of Regional Infrastructure of South America (URSA) funded by international
financial institutions are approved in Peru without effective public participation and
consultation, creating new conditions for conflicts with indigenous and local people.
These conflicts can be interpreted from different perspectives, but, in general, as Pulgar-
Vidal (2006) states, they are a result of the confluence of social, cultural, emotional, and
63
political factors whelmed by a long history of misunderstandings, marginalization, and
exclusion. To date, the Peruvian government postpones the enforcement of environmental
obligations affecting extractive industries. These activities frequently take place in
remote areas, such as Block lAB, where populations of historically marginalized and
excluded people live, who perceive unfair enrichment of foreign companies taking
advantage of ancestral lands. The well-documented evidence of the state's inaction in
cases such as the oil industry in Block 1AB reinforces the perception by Amazonian
peoples that all oil companies are the same. Peru needs to carry out profound institutional
refornls to decentralize decision-making affecting extractive industries to ensure more
independent and sound socio-environmental stewardship. Mistrust in the government is
causing increasing weakness in the dialogue between citizen groups, the state, and private
investors, which drives local groups to choose violence as an alternative. Therefore, it is
necessary to create an independent environmental authority from the sector-management
model, with enough technical and financial resources and political capacity to
decentralize environmental management and to integrate local social groups in decision-
making. Decisions about extractive industries affecting public health should also involve
consultation with the Ministry of Health and must prioritize pollution prevention instead
of end-of-the-pipe approaches. It is also necessary to strengthen public participation and
create formal mechanisms to address citizens' claims regarding extractive industries and
conflict resolution instruments to prevent extreme violence in socio-environmental
conflicts.
64
In the Corrientes River basin, there is still an information gap about
environmental health to establish the relations between the environmental contamination
(soil, water, sediments), and its long-term effects on the Achuar population. It is also
necessary to assess the effectiveness of the remediation and pollution prevention
measures implemented by Pluspetrol Norte since 2007. At the national level, further in-
depth studies of the Peruvian government's institutional capacity are necessary to
understand and propose more constructive and effective ways to address access to
environmental justice. As Bebbington suggests (2009), global networks dedicated to
extractive industries have been followed by the emergence of transnational networks of
protests and contestation, in many cases involving indigenous groups. Actors within these
networks seek a range of different outcomes (not call can be simply be labeled as
environmentalists, rights based, or the like). It is necessary to study how these networks
create peculiar geographical forms and consequences on perceptions of "Latin America"
and "indigenous groups" globally that influence on how the indigenous peoples are
viewed by others. In addition, to explore the intersections between contestation and
extraction, and their interrelation with the sociopolitical and global economic structures
that affects geographies of development.
65
APPENDIX A
MINUTES OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES
OF THE CORRIENTES RIVER (FECONACO), THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND
MINES, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF LORETO,
PLUSPETROL NORTE S.A., AND THE OMBUDSMAN,
OCTOBER 22, 2006
This is an agreement subscribed on October 22, 2006, in the oil production site of
Dorissa, District of Trompeteros, Province of Loreto, Region of Loreto, customary land
of the Achuar, Quechua, and Urarina people. Parties are: the Ministry of Energy and
Mines, represented by the Vice-Minister of Energy, Pedro Gamio; the Minister of Health,
Dr. Carlos Vallejo, represented by the Vice-Minister of Health, Dr. Diego Fernandez;
Roberto Ramallo, General Manager of Pluspetrol Norte S.A. (hereafter Pluspetrol),
represented by its Field Manager, Ramon Cavero; the indigenous communities of the
Corrientes River (hereafter FECONACO) represented by its President, Andres Sandi; and
FECONACO's Vice President Gonzalo Palma. Also the Apus [local leaders] of the
indigenous communities of the Corrientes River basin: Tomas Maynas (community of
Nueva Jerusalem), Abel Nango (community of Jose Olaya), Marcial Huaman
(community of Sauki), Ramon Borja (community of Pijuayal), Francisco Sandi
(community of Antioquia), Julio Carijano (community of Pampa Hermosa), Wenceslao
66
Rios lieutenant governor (community of Valencia), Calixto Diaz (community of San
Jose), Meneleo Pinola (community Belen de Plantanoyacu), Cesar Dahua (community of
Providencia), Domingo Nango (community of Santa Rosa), Manuel Hualinga
(community of Sion), Daniel Hualinga (community of San Cristobal), Gilberto Navarro
(community of San Ramon), Enrique Macusi (community of Palmeras), Fernando
Saquiray (community of Peruanito), Francisco Liao (community of Paraiso). Also
subscribe this document as advisors, supporters, and observers: Edwin Vasquez,
President of AIDESEP's Regional Office in Iquitos-ORAI; Lily La Torre Lopez, legal
advisor of AIDESEP; Petronila Chumpi, Coordinator of AIDESEP; Jose Luis Carbajal,
Director of Social Affairs of the Ministry of Energy and Mines; Rolando Luque, Chief of
the Social Conflicts Unit-Ombudsman Office; Vito Vema, representative of the
Environmental Unit-Ombudsman Office; Lili Reyes, representative of the Ombudsman
Office in Iquitos; and Juan Baca, representative of the National Institute for the
Development of the Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian People (INDEPA). The
following agreement was subscribed:
First: Purpose and Objective of This Minute
The parties agree to subscribe this document that complements and describes in
detail part of the agreement subscribed on October 13, 2006. Both are now part of a
single document hereafter called TESTIMONY OF THE AGREEMENTS that has been,
and will continue being, included in legal decisions and documents to guarantee its
enforcement.
Second: Reinjection of the Produced Waters Discharged in the Corrientes River
67
a. Pluspetrol will reinject 100% of the produced water discharged in Block lAB in
the Corrientes River Basin by December 31,2007.
b. Pluspetrol will reinject 100% of the produced water discharged in Block 8 by
December 31,2008. In case Pluspetrol fails to comply with this deadline, it will
compensate the affected communities living in Block 8.
c. The Ministry of Energy and Mines will consider official the new reinjection plan.
It will approve an amendment of the Complementary Environmental Plan (PAC)
for Blocks lAB and 8; specifically, it will include the obligation to achieve a
100% reinjection of the produced waters according to the schedules mentioned in
paragraphs (a) and (b).
Third: Health Plan
a. FECONACO and the Regional Health Office of Loreto (hereafter DIRESA
Loreto) jointly defined a "Health Care Action Plan for the Communities affected
by the Contamination of the Corrientes River." This plan has been approved by
the Regional Government of Loreto (hereafter GOREL).
b. DIRESA Loreto will implement the Health Action Plan, as part of a Special
Health Care Project for the Corrientes River Basin, conducted by the Ministry of
Health, and DIRESA Loreto. The project's Board will include four
representatives of the indigenous communities. These representatives will be
elected according to the customary election processes of the indigenous
communities. It will engage the participation of the 31 resident communities in
68
the area. The Ombudsman will participate as observer. The Ministry of Health
and DIRESA Loreto will designate four additional Project Board members.
c. Project Board members will define and approve the budget. They will oversee the
allocation of funds and project management. Members will participate in the
decision-making processes relevant to the implementation of the Health Plan,
independently from the audits conducted by the National General Comptroller.
d. Pluspetrol will cover the costs of the Health Plan for a period of 10 years, and for
an amount of SIAO,169,986 new soles [equivalent to $ 12.5 million. Currency
exchange rate on the day of the agreement was 3.22 new soles = $1 according to
Ministry of Economy and Finances of Peru]. Pluspetrol will provide funds
annually according to an annual budget. The Special Health Care Project for the
Corrientes River Basin will manage the allocated funds.
e. The Special Health Care Project for the Corrientes River Basin will initiate this
year, according to an approved schedule.
f. The Ministry of Health (hereafter MINSA) will provide the necessary additional
health services because health care is a constitutional right.
g. MINSA will provide support to GOREL, and will receive funds from Pluspetrol
to start in January 2007 the construction and equipment of a category 1.4 Rural
Hospital in Villa Trompeteros, capital town of Trompeteros District.
h. Pluspetrol will have the right to conduct annual audits of the Health Plan's
financial management. In case Pluspetrol obtains an extension of its operations in
Block lAB and 8, the company also commits to continue providing financial
69
support to the Health Plan after the 10 year period established in (d) in this
document.
Four: Health Insurance for the Indigenous Peoples
a. GOREL approved a Health Insurance Plan (SIS) according to the Regional
Executive Decision No. 1240-206GRL-P. This plan comprises health care
coverage to all the communities of the Corrientes River basin.
b. GOREL, and MINSA, represented by DIRESA Loreto, will provide staff and
medicine to the health services of the Corrientes River, and for the
implementation of SIS.
c. A census of the beneficiary population of the Corrientes River basin will take
place in January 2007.
Five: Development Plan
a. The General Development Plan for the Indigenous Communities of the
Corrientes River basin (hereafter Development Plan) will benefit all communities
in the basin. GOREL and FECONACO prepared the mentioned plan considering
the community's contributions. The scheduled budget for this plan has not being
reviewed and approved yet by the communities.
b. GOREL will cover all costs of the Development Plan for an equivalent of S/.Il
million new soles [$3.4 million].
c. According to Article 7 of ILO Convention 169, indigenous communities of the
Corrientes River basin have the right to decide its own development priorities
and participate in the design, application, and evaluation of any development
70
project affecting the communities and its territories. Consequently, the
communities of the Corrientes River basin will participate in the definition of a
Scheduled Budget for the Development Plan mentioned in (b). Communities will
enforce their rights to oversee the adequate resources allocation through
FECONACO.
d. The Development Plan will start immediately after the approval of the scheduled
budget by the communities.
e. The Development Plan will include funding for the construction of a motor boat
for use by the indigenous communities.
f. Pluspetrol commits to provide funds for one year to cover the rental costs of a
boat used by indigenous communities to transport agricultural products to the
markets in Iquitos. After one year, Pluspetrol and the mentioned communities
will assess the results of this program, and will make decisions in the best interest
of the communities. The communities will manage the total revenues obtained by
this activity for the community'S benefit.
Six: Temporary Food Support and Drinking Water Supply
a. The National Food Support Program (hereafter PRONAA) will provide
temporary food support for one year to the indigenous communities of the
Corrientes River basin. This support will be provided during the implementation
of an environmental remediation, the recovery of the community's production
capacity, with the support of Pluspetrol.
71
b. Food supply distributed in the communities will consider the basic nutritional
needs of a family, following the nutritional recommendations defined in the
Health Plan.
c. Within 40-60 days, Pluspetrol commits to assess all water supply systems in
every community [wells, rivers, streams]. If necessary, the company will repair
and/or replace systems to secure water supply all day and ensure that water is
adequately treated for human consumption. The ministries of Health, Energy,
and Mines will overlook the compliance of this commitment.
d. The General Direction of Environmental Health (DIGESA) will perform water
quality assessments quarterly in coordination with FECONACO. DIGESA will
assess if water from rivers and streams is safe for human consumption.
Seven: Remediation of the Contamination in Blocks lAB and 8.
a. Pluspetrol will fund and coordinate with FECONACO to provide technical
training to indigenous community members to monitor the remediation of
impacts by oil activities.
b. The trained indigenous community members will monitor and oversee oil
activities in the area. They will report their findings to the communities and
leaders of FECONACO.
c. The indigenous community members who will receive training in monitoring
will receive a salary with funds provided by Pluspetrol. The Special Health
Care Project for the Corrientes River basin will receive the funds for this
72
purpose. Funds to pay the monthly salaries will be deposited in a separate
account.
d. The Peruvian government, represented by Perupetro, hired the company
ARCADIS to design an Environmental Remediation Program for Sf. 60 million
new soles [$18.75 million] for Block 8. FECONACO will be in charge of
overlooking and monitoring this program.
Eight: Follow-Up of the Agreement
The Ombudsman Office and the communities affiliated with FECONACO, will
supervise the enforcement of this Agreement, and will coordinate with the involved
state agencies and Pluspetrol.
Nine: Final Points
a. Once this Agreement is signed, including the signature of the Ministry of
Energy and Mines, the indigenous communities of the Corrientes River,
members of FECONACO, will leave the facilities owned by Pluspetrol, so
hydrocarbon production in Blocks lAB and 8 could continue normally.
b. Representatives of FECONACO and the Apus of each of the affiliated
communities commit to comply with all the points in this agreement
subscribed with the state and the company. Any complaint regarding the
commitments in the Agreement should be addressed with the participation of
the Ombudsman Office, who will call the parties for an immediate solution.
c. The involved parties subscribe this minute in good faith, aiming for an
immediate start of the agreements hereby described.
73
d. Any mention of the Regional Government of Loreto should have the approval
of the Regional Government of Loreto.
This minute is signed as evidence of agreement.
[signatures and fingerprints]
Declaration About New Oil Concessions in Blocks 104 and 106 in the
Corrientes River Basin
FECONACO would like to keep official record that it has expressed to the
Peruvian state its disagreement of granting new concessions for exploration and
exploitation of hydrocarbons to the company Burlington, currently Conoco
Philips; and to the company Petrolifera in Block 106.
APPENDIXB
MAPS
Map 1
Corrientes River basin
74
Corrientes River
Basin Region
COLOMBIA
BRAZIL
BOLIVIA
Source: Earthrights, Racimos de Ungurahui and Amazon Watch. (2007). A legacy ofharm.
Map 2
Block lAB
75
Block 1AB -_ .. _ _
II, Ill:l
< ji T'":..:L u9
ll:l
-t
Source: Earthrights, Racimos de Ungurahui and Amazon Watch. (2007). A legacy a/harm.
Map 3
Indigenous groups in Block lAB
Source: WWF - Peru. Conservation and management ofthe Abanico del Pastaza.
Retrieved from http://www.wwfperu.org.pe/donde_trabajamos/pastaza/ramsar.htm
76
77
Map 4
Indigenous communities, protected areas, and hydrocarbon concessions in the Peruvian
Amazon
COMUNIDADES NATIVAS TITULADAS POR FAMILIAS LINGOiSTICAS, PUEBLOS INDiGENAS
EN AISLAMIENTO,AREAS NATURALES PROTEGIDAS Y LOTES PETROLEROS
Source: Common Good Institute (IBC)
ECUADOR
Ii lEVENOACOY\,INIOAOES NATrIlAS POR FAMIL~SL1NGU[STlCAS (Fllenle IBC· TCA)_AAAWAK~BORA
_CMlUAPANA
1'.:.J HARAKIIlBUT
r..=J HUITOTO
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o LOTES PETROLEROS (Fuente uGH ·'1111'1:0 20(3)
2m AREAS NATURALES PROTEGIOAS
(Fllente INRENA· Junio 2003)
PUEBLOS INOiGENAS ENAISLAMIENTO SN RESERVA
o PUEBLOS INOk3ENAS EN AISlAMIENTO CON RESERVA
@ CAPITAl DE DEPARTAMENTO
/\/ LIMITE DEPARTAMENTAL
/\.., CARRETERAS
/\/Rfos
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.71BIEN COMUN
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COMUNIDAOES NATlVAS DEL PERU
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I ~:::::~;?~~~~~=;;:;i~~~.~~:! www,b1'l'nCQlnUo-l)el"u,org
COLOMBIA
BRASil
s
Source: Perupetro (2008)
78
0'
16'
75'
~
c=:::I Lotes en Contnrtos
Ii'IIIIID Lotes en Negociacion
El!!2l!IliI Lotes en Convenios
c::::::J Comreni08 HidrOCirburotl no Cony.
c::::::J Pere Contratos y PromociOn
c::::::J Aren en Promocl00
~ Cueneas Sedimentariae
--Oteoduc1o
--Gasoducto
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(~ Ares81n1angibles
ECUADOR
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LOTES DE CONTRATOS DE
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y
CUENCAS SEDIMENTARIAS
O'
0'
Map 5
Hydrocarbon concessions in Peru (2008)
ACHIH
AIDESEP
ANP
AT!
ATSDR
COCONASEP
COICA
CONAP
CONFENIAE
DESA
DGAA
DIGESA
ENTEL
ELAW
FECONACO
FECONAT
FENAP
FEPIBAC
FEDIQUEP
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ILO
INEI
IWGIA
MINEM
NAE
NGO
ONERN
ORACH
OSINERG
Oxy
PAC
PAMA
PCM
UNCED
USAID
USDHHS
WWF
79
APPENDIXC
ACRONYMS
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
Inter-ethnic Association for the Development of the Pemvian Rainforest
Natural Protected Area
Achuar Reunited
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
National Coordinator of the Amazonian Native Communities ofPem
Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin
Confederation ofPemvian Amazonian Nations
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
Regional Environmental Health Direction
General Directorate of Environmental Affairs - Ministry of Energy and Mines
General Directorate of Environmental Health - Ministry of Health
National Telecommunications Company
Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide
Federation of Native Communities of the Corrientes River
Federation ofNative Communities of the Tigre River
Federation of the Achuar Natives of Peru
Federation of Peoples of the Low Corrientes River
Federation for the Development ofthe Quechua Indigenous People of the Pastaza River
Common Good Institute
Research Institute of the Pemvian Amazon
International Labor Organization
National Institute of Statistics and Informatics
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
Ministry of Energy and Mines
Achuar Nations ofEcuador
Non-Governmental Organization
National Bureau for the Assessment of Natural Resources
Achuar Chayat Organization
Supervising Organism for Energy Investment
Occidental Petroleum Corporation
Complementary Environmental Plan
Program for Adaptation and Environmental Management
Presidency of the Ministers' Council
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
United States Agency for International Development
United States Department of Health and Human Services
World Wide Fund for Nature
80
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