INNER CHILD
WORK:
WHAT IS REALLY
HAPPENING?
Donald A. Price,
Donald A. Price, Ph.D., is a Marriage and Family Therapist
in Salt Lake City, Utah.
For reprints write Donald A. Price, Ph.D. , 182 S. 600 E., Suite
203, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
ABSTRACT
The popular concept of " the inner child " and "inner child work "
will be evaluated and compared to various theories of personal devel-
opment, including object relations, self psychology, Jungian and dis-
sociation theories. It will be suggested that much of what is being
accessed in such work is compatible with these theories and may be
at least ego-state based rather than just a pleasing visualization or
metaphor. Terminology clarifications and cautions as well as direc-
tions for effective hypnotic approaches will be outlined.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of the inner child is not new, clinically dat-
ing back at least to Jung (Abrams, 1990). Abrams (1990)
traces its earliest roots back to Greek mythology, implying
an origin in primordial times. Modern day definitions, how-
ever, are quite varied. The experiences of individuals attend-
ing large group workshops providing "Inner Child Work"
range from no effect to over-stimulation and the opening of
a Pandora box, sometimes without a therapeutic alliance
in place. It may escalate the difficulty of the work for some
already in therapy.
Because of witnessing these latter experiences in some
of my patients, I delved further into the literature. Based on
clinical experience and discussion with colleagues, I have
found both positive and negative aspects to the concept. In
the process, I found myself needing to clarify and attempt
to ground the concept in solid theory. This stimulated me
to look for parallel constructs across various theories.
As I pursued this aim I formulated a number of hypothe-
ses as well as raised a number of as yet unanswered questions,
and would suggest a few cautions.
The Inner Child Movement
According to Abrams (1990) , there are six important rea-
sons why the image of the inner child has such a compelling
message for us today: 1) There has been a popular expan-
sion of interest in psychology, particularly in the relevance
of human childhood and its developmental importance;
2) A parallel general growth in psychotherapy has occured,
along with a growing interest in Jungian depth psychology
and in the treatment of narcissistic personality disorders.
"Both of these disciplines identify the image of the inner child
as the vulnerable soul, the wounded child in need of inte-
gration, and the injured self (Abrams, 1990, p. 7); 3) The
Adult Children of Alcoholics (AGA) program, a spin-off of
the twelve-step programs of Alcoholics Anonymous, makes
broad use of the child-within concept. According to Abrams,
"[I] t has been estimated that the ACA program is growing at
a rate of one new group nationwide every day" (1990, p. 8) ;
4) Child abuse is receiving increasing acknowledgment;
5) Contemporary parents are finding their roles burdensome.
Changing attitudes about children and their development,
child care outside the home, and women in the workforce
all, in Abram view, bring special attention to the child with-
in the parent, as well as to the inner life of the child:
The quality and success of parenting is deeply
enhanced when parents can realize their own
neglected child selves and transform them into com-
passionate resources for the care of their own chil-
dren. The way one treats the inner child strongly
determines the way one treats the outer child"
(Abrams, 1990, p. 9).
6) Abrams maintains there is a hunger for spirituality and
meaning in our era, "a longing for a second coming of a
divine inner child whose appearance would announce the
beginning of a new millennium of hope" (1990, p. 10).
The Concept of the Inner Child
There are many definitions in the literature of the inner
child. Some are very superficial; others are more fully devel-
oped. Whitfield (1987) states: "[W]e each have a `Child
Within- the part of us that is ultimately alive, energetic,
creative, and fulfilled. This is the Real Self - who we truly
are" (p. 9) . Bradshaw (1990) though focusing on the "wound-
ed child within," should be credited with integrating a vast
amount of self psychology, developmental psychology, object
relations, and family systems theory in his popular writings
and television series. Napier (1990) also integrates self psy-
68
DISSO( IATION, l ol. IX, No. I, March 1996
PRICE
chology, object relations, and dissociation theories in her writ-
ing, providing suggested self hypnotic scripts to access and
relate to a variety of types of inner children. Some groups
and books that promote inner child work provide adequate
precautions (Bradshaw, 1990), but most do riot.
There are a number of possible theoretical bases one
could use for conceptualizing the inner child. Abrams(1990)
book of readings looks at the inner child from a number of
different perspectives. One of the first people he includes is
Jung, who discovered his own inner child, and found a place
in his theory to describe that phenomenon. Jung (1959) said
"the child motif is a picture of certainforgotten things in our
childhood" (p.161).
Certain phases in an individual s life can become
autonomous, can personify themselves to the extent
that they result in a vision of oneself -- for instance,
one sees oneself as a child. Visionary experiences
of this kind, whether they occur in dreams or in the
waking state, are, as we know, conditional on a dis-
sociation having previously taken place between past
and present ..
The child motif represents not only something
that existed in the distant past but also something
that existsnow, that is to say, it. is not just a vestige
but a system functioning in the present whose pur-
pose is to compensate or correct, in a meaningful
manner, the inevitable one-sidedness and extrava-
gances of the conscious mind. It is in the nature of
the conscious mind to concentrate on relatively few
contents and to raise them to the highest pitch of
clarity.A necessary result and precondition is the
exclusion of other potential contents of con-
sciousness. The exclusion is bound to bring about
a certain one-sidedness of the conscious contents.
(Jung, 1959, p. 162)
Hall (1986), in looking at the compatibility of dissocia-
tion and Jungian theory, observed that the following con-
cepts have a bearing on the nature of the inner child from
a Jungian point of view:
An archetype in itself is simply a tendency for the
psyche to structure experience in a certain man-
ner; in this regard, the term archetype has some
relationship to imprinting, leaving a lasting impres-
sion.. .
Complexes are groups of related images held
together by a common emotional tone and based
upon an archetypal core. . .(Hall, 1986, p. 112).
While all complexes have an innate tendency
toward personification and rudimentary con-
sciousness, those that are associated with the ego-
complex partake of what is ordinary consciousness.
(Hall, 1986, p. 113)
Thus Jung described dissociated aspects of the past that
tend toward personification. He discovered that he himself
had an inner child, and spent some period of time on his
own in play therapy, every day after lunch and againin the
evenings, building a complete village as a way to access the
11-year-old part of himself who played with blocks. Mills and
Crowley (1990) observe that lung contact with his own
inner child played a crucial part in releasing the extraordi-
nary creative energies that culminated in his theory of the
archetypes and the collective unconscious" (p. 222).
More recently Heinz Kohut (1971, 1977) self psychol-
ogy has focused on the self and fragments of the self, these
fragments in relation to significant others, and the devel-
opmental task of pulling these self fragments together in a
cohesive fashion. Object relations theorists (e.g., Masterson,
1981) talk about both good self and bad self representations.
They note the normality of such phenomena in early child-
hood development because the child is unable to contain
the strong opposite feelings (ambivalence) about self and
parents (thus developing corresponding split self and object
representations). In later writings (Masterson 1985, 1988)
shifted his focus from the object to the self as he develops
his ideas about the real self and the false self.
David Scharff (1991) describes self and object repre-
sentations as structures with the qualities of ego states.
Missildine (1963), and Berne (1977) in his work on Trans-
actional Analysis, have both argued for work with a child part
of the self, describing these parts as some form of ego state.
This writer first exposure to the concept of an inner child
was while doing a doctoral dissertation, which consisted of
the creation of a paper and pencil instrument to measure
the relative intensity of the ego states as defined by
Transactional Analysis (Price, 1976a, 1976h). The outcome
revealed substantial reliability from a variety of measures
(including patterns in factor analysis), but little or no valid-
ity based on rater perceptions. He concluded that consistent
patterns of behavior, feelings, and attitudes are being mea-
sured in the study of ego states, but it is difficult to define
precisely or consistently what they are.
Watkins and Watkins, building on the concepts of Federn
(as did Scharff [1991]), define an ego state as "a body of
behaviors and experiences which are bound together by some
common principle and separated from other such states by
a boundary which is more or less permeable" (1979, p. 5).
In his bookStates of Mind, Horowitz says such states of mind
can be "described as a recurrent pattern of experience and
of behavior that is both verbal and nonverbal"(1987, p. 27).
Albini and Pease (1989) make a sound argument for the
existence of parallels between Kohut ideas of self frag-
mentation (due to parental failures in childhood), and the
failure to reach the developmental task ofassociation (of the
normally existing "states of consciousness" [Putnam, 1989] ).
69
DISSOCIATION, Vol. IX, No. I. Mardi 1996
INNER CHILD WORK
When we think developmentally and look to child
patients and their experiences in a developmentally
phase-specific way, we see the early MPD phenom-
ena as being not so much a dissociative but a pre-
associative disorder. In saying we refer
to an early period (birth to six to eight years) before
the formation of a firmly cohesive nuclear self is
established. The child needs to come to distinguish
her/his existence and achievements from those of
the primary caretakers, as well as to integrate and
recognize experiences with various people, which
have different emotional tone. Due to the com-
plexity of these developmental tasks, the young
child often fails to see these early experiences as
part of the same reality. When, for example, we see
how easily children are able to pretend, in play, to
alternate between different emotional states, we are
looking at separate nascent selves or separate cen-
ters of experience
It is our view that the phase appropriate exis-
tence of separate nuclei around which self-experi-
ences can condense is more common than not in
developing children. We hypothesize that split off
sectors of self nuclei seen in incipient cases of MPD
are related to a normal developmental analogue
that precedes the establishment of the cohesive
nuclear self.
(Albini Pease, 1989, p. 148)
Putnam (1990) has further elaborated a "states of con-
sciousness model." He suggests that although different the-
ories use different terminologies when describing aspects of
the self, the ego state or states of consciousness concept
derived from infant research (Wolff, 1987; Emde et al., 1976)
and dissociation theory has perhaps the best capability of
becoming a clarifying and unifying concept.
The research of Nancy Hornstein (1989) suggests there
are five patterns of dynamic family interaction associated with
the development of dissociative disorders. There is abundant
opportunity, from whatever theory one starts, for an indi-
vidual to be left with a split-off or dissociated or unassociat-
ed part of self, or for a part of the self not to have had suffi-
cient soothing or nurturing to associate or become cohesive.
It is this writer opinion that dissociation theory can pro-
vide a unifying theory, not only to the inner child movement,
but to personality theory as a whole. But in order to do that,
several terminological definitions need to be clarified. Of
particular importance is the relation betweendissociation and
splitting, seeking clarity in the distinction betweenprocessand
content. Other authors have discussed or attempted to clari-
fy or resolve these issues, including Gruenewald (1977),
Grotstein (1981), Mathis (1988), Young (1988), Counts
(1990), and Ferguson (1990), none completely satisfactori-
70
ly, though Ferguson comes closest to what is suggested here.
First, this writer proposes to define as the men-
tal process of distancing or separating from a trauma,
unmanageable feeling, an unwanted or unacceptable part
of self representation or object representation, an unac-
ceptable impulse/behavior, or from conflicting or polarized
experiences; (e.g., in a double bind [Spiegel, 1986]).
Second, it is suggested that the noun be reserved to
describe a mental unit or structure resulting from the rigid-
ification or more permanent fixation(a fait accompli) of what
was distanced or dissociated (as described above), or from
an introjection or incorporation of an external object
(Lister, 1982; Rose, 1986) . Ferguson (1990) also draws a con-
ceptual distinction between dissociation and splitting, leav-
ing splitting to describe "the permanent subdivision of the
self into cohesive personality fragments" (p. 436). He states
further that "the degree of anxiety necessary for splitting
results in permanent alterations in the functioning of the
mental apparatus that are not easily reversible. This implies
alterations in the functioning of the underlying neurologi-
cal substrate" (p. 439).
A split can contain any content (Sands, 1994) and,
depending on the theory, is called an ego state, self fragment,
or part-self or part-object representation. In object relations
theory all alters in a patient with MPD can be classified as a
personifications of a self or of an object representation.
A split is most often the result of repeated dissociations,
but can happen in some persons/occasions instantly, once
the person is skilled at dissociating and creating parts. A split
is probably a combination of the defenses of dissociation and
disavowal or denial. The more walled off (amnestic) the split
is, the more likely it is combined with the defenses of dis-
avowal ("That is not me") and/or denial ("This did not hap-
pen." ) A split may or may not be surrounded by an amnesia
barrier. A split-off part or personality may experience itself
as conscious, but the content may not be experienced as con-
scious by the host. Thus, the "states of consciousness" theo-
ry of Putnam (1989) again seems to clarify and unify.
The word "splitting " is problematic. It is a verb form
describing a process that is linked by many object relations
theorists to definite content (i.e., contradictory, black-white,
good-bad). As Ross (1989) points out, commenting on and
disagreeing with Young (1988) and Kernberg (1975) dis-
tinction between splitting and dissociation, "[C]ontradicto-
ry states area subset of incompatible states" (1989, p. 151.)
In keeping with the position that a split can contain any
content, not just good or bad (Ross, 1989; Sands, 1994), the
term "splitting" might best be abandoned in favor of a more
broad usage of the terms "projective identification " and
"countertransference." Thus, regardless of the content of the
split off part of self or object representation, the dynamics
can be described as the patient transference acting out or
reenactment through projective identification, which acti-
vates or induces a countertransference response in external
DISSOCIATION. vol. I. March 19116
PRICE
objects, causing them to enact the role/behavior of the split
off part.
A fragment (Braun, 1986) is a less developed mental unit
or self part.Fragmentation, a term often used in self-psychol-
ogy to describe decompensation in an adult, probably
describes the state of dissociated regressionin which there
is lack of cohesion (association) and often rapid switching
between less developed parts or personality fragments. In
the dissociation literature, when developed alters are
involved, this is referred to as the revolving door switch pat-
tern (Putnam, 1989).
Switching is the term in dissociation theory used to refer
to the change of state, or moving from one part or alter to
another. Some writers use the word splitting when referring
to switching, creating a further confusion.
WHAT IS THE INNER CHILD?
With these definitional clarifications, it seems reasonable
to suggest that what in the popular literature and workshop
circuit is now referred to as the inner child, is most eco-
nomically explained as a non-associated or dissociated and
often disowned or disavowed part of the self or self repre-
sentation; it has some degree of ego-state formation, and is
state dependent. It is a mental unit or structure of varying
degrees of complexity or development, depending on the
individual person, and often has the power to exert passive
influence (Kluft, 1987) on the conscious state. If this is true
then several corollaries follow:
1. The inner child is not just a visual image or metaphor,
but a powerful and influential part of the self.
2. The inner child may not be accessible through conscious
exercises, but may need varying depths of hypnosis to
be accessed.
3. The large group workshop format may, because of the
power of the group and the vulnerability of some indi-
viduals, release much more than that format is set up to
handle. A person with more developed ego states, may
in fact, dissociate more than anticipated, leaving such a
participant, if he/she does not have an individual ther-
apist, without adequate support or followup. Any ther-
apist doing "Inner Child Work" should be prepared to
treat fully developed multiple personality disorder
(MPD).
4. Though there may be some commonalities in types of
inner children (just as there are among alter personal-
ities between MPD patients) , the same even-handed atti-
tude of approaching each part, alter, inner child as
unique or idiosyncratic needs to be maintained. The
inner child may be wounded, creative, an angry pro-
tector, etc.
5. If the inner child is an ego state, then more time than
a quick empathic/integration exercise may he needed
to heal and integrate this part.
6. There is, in this conceptualization, no false or real self,
but different selves, or identities- each incomplete. The
real self comes about through accepting and integrat-
ing all the parts, and working through the various patha-
logical issues.Whether the strong part or weak part is
on the outside or inside can vary from person to person.
7. The term "inner child," though popular in some quar-
ters and disliked in others, seems to be a term that is
acceptable to many patients; it is much less threatening
and technical than "alter personality" or "self fragment"
or "self representation" or "ego state." Since therapists
need to translate professional jargon into useful concepts
anyway, this term might just as well be used, at least with
certain patients, since people are responding to it.
RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES IN
INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT
For therapists choosing to use the inner child concept,
the following steps may be useful:
1. Educate the patient cognitively about the inner child
concept. Explain how it is formed and left behind, link-
ing this to the problem being treated. For example, one
might say, "[F] or people like yourself who have grown
up in a difficult family situation where you were abused
or ignored, it is not uncommon that a part, an inner
child, is left behind without even realizing it. These inner
children can have a powerful influence on your feelings
about your self and your behavior . .") I also often
explain that we are all born with different states of con-
sciousness and that association is a developmental task
that can be hindered in difficult family circumstances.
2. Provide the patient with training in entering formal
trance and achieving deepening.
3. Teach finger (ideomotor) signals.
4. When the patient is ready to explore, give the sugges-
tion to go as deep as necessary to determine "if an inner
child or part of the mind was left behind." Elsewhere
(Price, 1990), the author has described more elaborate
imagery.
5. When this depth of trance has been reached, the ther-
apist may ask the patient to visualize a chalk board and
ask the chalk ("which writes answers for the unconscious
mind") whether there has been left behind an inner
child. If the answer is "no," ask the chalk about the source
71
D]SSUC]ATH1\. Col, I\. N. I. (larch Ifi91i
INNER CHILD WORK
of the troublesome behavior/feeling in question and fol-
low the procedures outlined by Watkins and Watkins
(1979) or Edelstien (1990) for symptom analysis. If the
answer is "yes," give suggestions for the adult self to look
around inside (e.g. " imagine walking down a hall way in
your mind, checking doors, of you might even find your-
self looking out of doors") for the inner child. If found,
ask the adult to describe its appearance, age, emotion-
al state, etc. These instructions should be very open
ended. The adult should be instructed to introduce
him/herself to the inner child: "Indicate that you are a
grown up part of her, and that you did not realize you
left her behind. You have come back to take care of her,
to meet her needs and hear her story," If the inner child
is not found, a note can be left on the chalk board
addressed to the child that the adult cares and will return
later to search again.
6. The scripts in Napier (1990) are excellent guides for
coaching the adult on how to nurture and respond to
the different types of children that might be found. It is
common that the inner child will be sullen and reject-
ing of the adult (because it feels abandoned by the adult) .
Angry (protective) parts may be negotiated with along
the guidelines of Watkins and Watkins (1988). and
Napier (1990).
7. One can ask the inner child if other inner children are
around. Sometimes they appear spontaneously or the
chalk board conveys this information. Sometimes as ther-
apy progresses, the patient senses the presence of anoth-
er child part.
8. The goal of treatment is to help the adult accept, under-
stand the function of, nurture and protect, and other-
wise meet the needs of the inner children. If this is done
over time in treatment, they tend to grow up and
mature, and/or eventually (visually) fade away (to be
framed as integrating or "corning home " ). Sometimes
a formal hypnotic visualization of unification may be
appropriate.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper argues that the inner child represents some
degree of ego-state formation and should be treated with the
seriousness that this concept demands. The positive thing
about the popularization of the inner child concept is that
it is a term that can be used to convey well grounded theo-
ry with terminology that is less frightening and more accept-
able to many patients (e.g., someone with narcissistic traits)
than the words "self-representation," "ego state," or "alter."
Furthermore, the popularization of the concepts by the
Bradshaw television series (both "On the Family" and
72
"Homecoming") , and Napier (1990) book are useful
adjuncts to therapy and/or prompt people to become aware
of their issues and seek help that they otherwise might not
pursue.
Questions remain regarding the theory: Does everyone
have an inner child as the movement suggests? Possibly every-
one does in the same way that Watkins and Watkins (1979)
suggest that all of us have ego states, or in the same sense
that Searles (1986) states that "borderline phenomena will
be encountered in any deep-reaching course of psycho-
analysis or intensive psychoanalytic therapy, for these phe-
nomena are part of the general human condition" (p. xii).
If an inner child cannot. be visualized does this mean that
there is none present, or that the person can not visualize
well, or, as in the case of some MPD patients, the visualiza-
tion is blocked in a defensive way? There is no easy answer
to this question. Finally, a caution remains for group work.
Since the inner child phenomenon is so idiosyncratic, and
the potential is so great for activating more than the format
or individual can handle, it is this writer s position that doing
inner child work in a large group format is very risky. 
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DISSOCIATION, Vol. IX. No. 1, March 1996