

FOREST ACTIVISTS AND PLACE-BASED COLLABORATION FOR
NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THE NORTHWEST
AND NORTHERN CALIFORNIA

by


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Title: FOREST ACTIVISTS AND PLACE-BASED COLLABORATION FOR
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This study examines the relationship of forest activists and “place-based” collaborations for U.S. national forest management. Three case studies – California’s Quincy Library Group (QLG) and Oregon’s Applegate Partnership and Lake County Community Sustainability Initiative (LCCSI) – are its focus. Collaborations are supposed to facilitate cooperation among stakeholders. Of the cases, only the LCCSI has successfully built a cooperative relationship that includes multiple forest activists who are well-respected in activist circles. This thesis argues that activists are invested in the current forest management regulatory framework, and collaborations can be perceived as threatening to the framework. It contends that the LCCSI has been successful because, unlike the other cases, activists generally do not perceive the LCCSI as threatening to the framework. Also, the LCCSI has succeeded because it remains true to four themes of

“good collaborations”. However, this thesis argues that collaborations are extremely context sensitive, making the LCCSI experience difficult to replicate.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Questions Posed

This study addresses the use of collaboration as a tool for natural resource management in the United States. In the past decade collaboration and other emerging concepts for resource management, such as community forestry and ecosystem management, have come into vogue (Wondolleck and Yaffe 2000, Cestero 1999, Cortner and Moote 1999, Gray and Kusel 1998, Yaffe et al. 1996). Seldom mentioned prior to the 1990s, these concepts lead some observers to conclude that the United States has entered into a new and era of resource management. Cortner and Moote ponder whether the nation's first resource management paradigm shift since the end of the 19th century is at hand. Wondolleck and Yaffe state that "we are in a period that is as significant as the period one hundred years ago when President Theodore Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot and others invented a set of principles for management of public resources" (xi).

Specifically, this thesis examines how forest activists¹ have received, and relate to, "place-based" collaborations² for national forest management in the Northwest and northern California. The relationships between activists and three collaborations – the Applegate Partnership of southwestern Oregon, the Quincy Library Group (QLG) of California's Sierra Nevada mountains and the Lake County Community Sustainability

Initiative (LCCSI) of south-central Oregon – are the focus of this work (see the map on page 3).

Place-based collaborations are supposed to facilitate cooperative relationships among diverse forest management stakeholders. Yet, of the three cases, only the LCCSI has successfully catalyzed a strong working relationship that includes multiple forest activists who are well-respected within their own circles.³ Conversely, the actions of Applegate Partnership and QLG have generated suspicion and concern from most forest activists. The ironic result of the relationships between activists and the Applegate Partnership and QLG is that these collaborations have generated confrontation as they have endeavored to develop cooperative relationships among stakeholders.

This thesis provides an analysis that addresses three questions:

- 1) Forest activists and other environmentalists have extensively critiqued the concept of place-based collaboration for natural resource management. What are the main points of the activist critique, and what motivates activists to criticize place-based collaborations?
- 2) How can the relative success of the LCCSI at building a working relationship between forest activists and other stakeholders be explained?
- 3) To what degree, if any, should the LCCSI experience be held up as a model to other emerging place-based collaborations for resource management?

This thesis argues that the reception of collaboration by forest activists is complex in nature. Many activists are not opposed to collaboration in principle; in fact some forest activists are involved in the two more controversial case study collaborations. However, many activists who are open to the concept still often approach collaborations skeptically and avoid participation. I argue that this occurs when the activist community




Figure 1
Map of Case Study Areas

perceives collaborative activities to be threatening to the national forest regulatory framework, or to be lacking key characteristics considered necessary to make collaborations successful. This study argues that the Applegate Partnership and QLG have failed to build strong relationships with activists because of these factors. Conversely, to date the LCCSI has had a more fruitful relationship with forest activists because it has consciously shied away from challenging the regulatory framework and has been open and inclusive of activists and their views.

While many forest activists accept and participate in collaborations under the right conditions, I also illustrate that there are activists who are highly unlikely to condone and engage in collaborative activities. Many of these activists find collaborations to be logistically onerous. Others seldom waiver from “no compromise” positions regarding their stances on issues and ideals and therefore are unreceptive to the cooperative and compromising nature of collaborations.

While the LCCSI appears to be more successful than the other two case study efforts at fostering a cooperative relationship that includes a diversity of forest activists, I question the efficacy of “modeling” other collaborations based upon the LCCSI experience. By definition, place-based collaborations are very dependent on characteristics that are unique to a locale and the persons involved. This is not to say that emerging collaborations cannot glean valuable lessons from the LCCSI, and the other case studies for that matter. However, as new collaborations develop their architects must remain acutely mindful of their own unique circumstances if they are to build


successful working relationships among stakeholders. This issue is discussed further, using illustrations from the case study experiences, in Chapter VII.

Introducing the Issues


Place-based collaboration focuses on developing locally driven, cooperative approaches to resource management. In defining place-based collaborations Cestero (1999, v) states that these efforts “typically focus their work on specific geographic locales,” such as a particular parcel of national forest. She also notes that collaborations endeavor to “bring together people from across the spectrum of diverse, typically adversarial, perspectives in public land management [such as forest activist, timber industry and rural community perspectives] to resolve problems” (v).⁴ As Figure 2 illustrates, collaborations often have the quality of raising citizens from observers of, and watchdogs over, land management decision making processes to positions more equal to the federal agency personnel that have traditionally been charged with decision making (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1993). Place-based collaboration advocates contend that by involving diverse stakeholders at the local level, focusing on cooperation, and adapting to local ecological and socioeconomic conditions, forest management can be tailored to adequately suit the interests of multiple and diverse stakeholders (Gray and Kusel 1998, Braxton-Little 1998).

The focus of place-based collaborations on locally driven solutions is a significant departure from the existing national forest management framework. Congress’s 1897 passage of the U.S. Forest Service Organic Act centralized federal authority over forest

Status Quo Model of Resource Management Decision Making



Collaborative Model of Resource Management Decision Making



Adapted from: U.S. Department of Agriculture 1993

Figure 2
Comparison of Decision Making Models

management. Since then, centralized rules have been the bedrock of the national forest management paradigm. Wilkinson (1992) notes that the most important result of the Organic Act was to replace the “passive federal presence on federal timber land” with “broad federal power” (124). The Organic Act created the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) as a strong professional federal bureaucracy to oversee the day to day management of the country’s national forests. The act also firmly established Congress, not stakeholders at the local level, as responsible for setting management priorities for the national forests. Governed by the federal legal framework, the adversarial system of administrative appeals and lawsuits, instead of locally based cooperation, serves to adjudicate disagreements among forest management stakeholders under the centralized framework.

The Organic Act provided the USFS with a decidedly utilitarian mission, directing the agency to provide for a “continuous flow of timber” and “to secure favorable water flow conditions” from the national forests (Hirt 1994, 30). For much of the Forest Service’s history, forest activists have challenged the blatant timber production bias of the USFS as set forth by the Organic Act (Hays 1998, Hirt 1994, Nash 1982). However, in their campaigns to quell the national forest timber program, forest activists have not challenged the tradition of centralized federal authority itself.

To the contrary, the strategy of the forest activist community has served to solidify the framework of central authority and supplement it with environmental values (Hays 1998, Hirt 1994, Wilkinson 1992, Nash 1982). In the process, forest activists have developed a vested interest in maintaining the centralized framework. Legislative acts that shift forest management away from a simple focus on timber production – such as

the 1964 Wilderness Act, the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the 1976 National Forest Management Act (NFMA) – have been catalyzed by forest activism (Hirt 1994, Wilkinson 1992). Many of these same laws have forced the USFS to provide forums for public dialogue regarding the agency's actions. Laws like the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the NFMA force the USFS to explain their proposed activities, take comments from the public on agency activities, and issue responses to public comments (Coggins, Leshy and Wilkinson 1993).⁵ Failure to comply with legislatively imposed forest management rules or public participation guidelines exposes the USFS to litigation.

While forest activists are generally invested in the regulatory framework, place-based collaboration appeals to many who come from, or work with, rural forest communities⁶ in the Northwest and northern California. Cestero (1999) observes that place-based collaborations are typically “driven by local leaders and volunteers” (v). Many communities see place-based collaboration as a promising tool to overcome the divisiveness between forest activists and other environmentalists on one side, and communities and industry on the other, that the “Sagebrush Rebellion”, related “local control” efforts and the “Timber Wars” of the 1980s and early 1990s generated (Gray and Kusel 1998). Community advocates express excitement about the potential for collaboration to serve the interests of both communities and the environment (Kauffman 2000b, Gray and Kusel 1998). Additionally, community advocates contend that collaborations generate opportunities, largely absent under the centralized framework, for

rural communities to add their voice to forest management decisions making (Gray and Kusel 1998, Communities Committee 1997).

Based upon this discussion, it should not be surprising that collaboration has proven to be a hard sell within the forest activist community.⁷ As is illustrated in Chapter III, the early 1990s was a time when the activists' strategy of supporting the regulatory framework paid off significantly. Environmental regulations helped lead to plummeting timber harvest volumes throughout the Northwest and northern California (Carrel 1998, Braxton-Little 1995). With the memories of the Timber Wars not yet faded, many activists question whether collaborations are merely "Trojan Horses" with the real objective of increasing resource extraction by providing for local control of resources and the turning back of activist victories through the subversion of the regulatory framework.

Putting This Work Into Context

Scholarly Context

As a result of the increasing popularity of place-based collaboration for resource management, the production of both scholarly and non-academic literature on the subject has been on the rise in recent years. These works include, but are by no means limited to, Wondolleck and Yaffe's (2000) *Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from Innovations in Natural Resource Management*, Kenney's (2000) *Arguing About Consensus: Examining the Case Against Western Watershed Initiatives and Other Collaborative Groups Active in Natural Resource Management*, Cortner and Moote's (1999) *The Politics of Ecosystem Management*, Cestero's (1999) *Beyond the Hundredth Meeting: A*

Field Guide to Collaborative Conservation on the West's Public Lands, Yaffe et al.'s (1996) *Ecosystem Management in the United States* and Dagget's (1995) *Beyond the Rangeland Conflict: Toward a West that Works*. Place-based collaboration is also a popular topic of discussion in journals such as *Society and Natural Resources*, *The Journal of Forestry*, *American Forests* and the *Chronicle of Community*.

Kenney (2000) notes that many of the current works on place-based collaboration are not critical assessments and in part are produced "to generate greater enthusiasm and support – political, financial and popular – for these efforts" (1). I endeavor to avoid falling into the "cheerleading trap" and in this thesis I attempt to provide a rigorous analysis of the relationships between forest activists and the three case study collaborations.

Of the works listed above only Kenney's *Arguing About Consensus* provides a well-documented, though general, examination of the relationship between place-based collaborations and environmental activists. By using a case study approach I offer a more nuanced look at the collaboration-forest activist relationship than Kenney's study provides.

I also hope that this study will take a useful place beside the existing scholarly examinations of the three case study collaborations. Such studies include Duane's (1997) comparison of the Inimim Forest management plan and the Quincy Library Group, Sturtevant and Lange's (1996) analysis of group dynamics in the Applegate Partnership, Nickelsburg's (1998) review of the Applegate Partnership and the Malpai Borderlands Group and the various works by Mosley (2000a, 2000b, 1999) on the Applegate

Partnership. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first academic analysis of the Lake County Community Sustainability Initiative.

Scholarly Value of this Study

I hope that this study will provide insights that may be of value to a number of different parties. Among those that may find value in this study are forest activists and other environmental activists curious about place-based collaboration for natural resource management, collaboration practitioners with an interest in understanding and perhaps engaging activists, elected officials interested in the potential for place-based collaboration to serve as a tool for assisting in the development of land management policies and prescriptions, federal land managers who are increasingly being asked to use and interact with place-based collaborations and academics with a variety of interests regarding natural resource management.

Research Methods

A qualitative research methodology was utilized to gather data on the three case study collaborations and their relationships with forest activists. Document analysis and personal interviews were the two principal research methods employed. Documents, produced primarily by the place-based collaborations and forest activists, were collected and analyzed. Interviews, typically lasting forty-five minutes to two hours, were conducted with persons who had a demonstrated interest in at least one of the three case study projects. The interviews focused on forest activists; 35 of the 48 “official”

interview subjects were identified as forest activists. In addition to forest activists, interviews were conducted with nine Lake County community members, three collaboration practitioners and one Forest Service employee.

Forest activist interviewees were selected from a population of individuals who were identified as activists in literature or documents, or identified based on recommendations from other interviewees. Using this method, both supporters and detractors of place-based collaboration for national forest management were identified as “forest activists”, as were people involved at national, regional and grassroots scales. No system or criteria exists to provide for the “official” accreditation of forest activists, and therefore people with no known reputation within activist circles can lay claim to the forest activist title. In an effort to assure my analysis accurately portrays the views of recognized forest activists, I chose to not pursue some potential interview subjects who lacked reputations within forest activist circles.

Interviews for this study were considered “official” when they were tape-recorded and transcribed. Over the course of the research I had conversations with numerous other forest activists, forest community residents, place-based collaboration practitioners, federal agency employees and academics. However, since I did not record or otherwise document these conversations in detail I do not directly reference these conversations in this work.

Of the 35 forest activists interviewed over the course of this study, 19 were categorized as being active at the grassroots level. Six of these activists are “independents” who were not associated with a particular organization. The others were

affiliated, at least loosely, with seven different grassroots groups. I attribute the high proportion of grassroots activists to three factors. First, as place-based collaborations the case study efforts are focused on a particular locale instead of the more abstract policy level. Therefore, it was likely that over the course of my research I would come into contact with the activists that were “closest to the ground” with regard to each case study collaboration. Secondly, I found grassroots activists easier to contact and arrange interviews with than regional or national activists. Some activists and staff persons with larger organizations, such as state-level and national offices of the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council, were more difficult to arrange appointments with. Finally, grassroots activists are simply more plentiful than their national and regional counterparts.

Of the remaining 16 activists interviewed, eight, representing seven different organizations, were active primarily at a regional or statewide scale. The other eight represented six different national groups. Table 1 provides a list of the organizations with which activists interviewed for this study are associated.

In many cases the lines between grassroots, regional and national groups were blurry. For example, I chose to count two activists who were associated with the Ashland, Oregon based Headwaters as regional activists. However, due to Ashland’s proximity to the Applegate Valley, these activists have a knowledge of, and association with, the partnership that is more typical of grassroots activists.⁸ Also, I would have categorized the Pacific Rivers Council and the Native Forest Council as regional

organizations. However, the representatives of these groups explicitly referred to the organizations as active on the national scale.

Table 1
Organizations With Which Interviewees Are Associated

<i>Grassroots Organizations</i>	<i>Regional/State Organizations</i>	<i>National Organizations</i>
Central Sierra Nevada Environmental Resource Center (CA)	California Wilderness Coalition (CA)	American Lands Alliance
Friends of the Inyo (CA)	Conservation Science Support Center (OR)	Audubon Society
Friends of Plumas Wilderness (CA)	Friends of the River (CA)	Defenders of Wildlife
Friends of the Winema (OR)	Headwaters (OR)	Native Forest Council
Citizens for Better Forestry (CA)	Klamath Forest Alliance (CA)	Pacific Rivers Council
Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center (OR)	Oregon Natural Resources Council (OR)	The Wilderness Society
Thompson Creek Residents For Ecological Education (OR)	Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign (CA)	

It is also important to note that most of the interviewees who represented national organizations were associated with regional offices on the West Coast or with large chapters rather than the national headquarters. Moreover, as mentioned above, I was unable to arrange interviews with certain key activists from national and regional groups. In these cases written materials authored by these activists were used to analyze their perspectives. Relying on written materials has meant that the views of these activists

were not explored in as “interactive” of a fashion as the views of those that were interviewed.

This discussion of my interview data addresses two potential criticisms of this work. First, only 48 interviews were conducted and only 35 were with forest activists. Therefore, the interview data should not be misinterpreted as a statistically defensible representation of the general opinion of the forest activists toward place-based collaboration. Instead, the interview data serves solely to provide insight regarding the relationships of forest activists to the three case study collaborations. Second, the data collected for this study was skewed toward the perspectives of grassroots activists. Therefore, a similar study which focuses explicitly on activists more oriented to the national policy level might reveal different results.

Interviews were either conducted by telephone or in person, with most face to face interviews taking place during visits to the communities that are home to the collaborations. To investigate the Quincy Library Group and the Applegate Partnership – which are both older, more notorious and substantially better documented than the LCCSI – short research trips of one to two weeks were made to the sites of these projects (the Applegate Valley, Oregon and Plumas County, California as well as other points in northern California) in the spring of 1999. In addition to allowing me to conduct interviews with activists and collect documents, these trips provided the opportunity to “get a feel” for the communities and landscape.

I conducted three months of fieldwork in Lake County, Oregon during the late winter and early spring of 2000. By living for three months in Lake County, I was able to

garner substantial information and insight on this less well known effort. This period of residency also provided me with the opportunity to conduct interviews with the Lake County residents involved with the LCCSI. These interviews provided additional perspectives on the collaboration, as well as the relationship between forest activists and the LCCSI.

While in Lake County, I also served as a LCCSI volunteer, working on a near daily basis in the LCCSI office. As a volunteer, I was able to conduct valuable observations of the day-to-day LCCSI operations, including conversations between the consultant that functions as the LCCSI staff person and members of the forest activist community. I was also able to attend meetings of the local Sustained Yield Committee (SYC) as well as two bimonthly meetings of the larger LCCSI collaboration, and in doing so witnessed the “inner workings” of the collaborative effort.

The Remainder of This Study

Chapter II provides a more substantial look at place-based collaboration by examining literature that proponents use to support the concept. This literature is vast, and an exhaustive review is beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, the chapter addresses the breadth, but not necessarily the depth, of the literature. Much of this literature addresses what observers believe to be essential elements of successful collaborations. Chapter II examines these characteristics in some detail, and also provides a brief introduction to a variety of related concepts from which collaboration

proponents draw inspiration and support. Lastly, the chapter begins to explore the critiques of the collaborative model.

Chapter III examines the evolution of both the forest activist movement and the regulatory framework. It also explores how forest activists have utilized the regulatory framework. Additionally, the chapter briefly discusses how rural forest communities and forest activists have perceived the regulatory framework differently. Finally, Chapter III provides a general discussion of the forest activist critique of collaboration.

Chapter IV, V and VI examine the Applegate Partnership, the Quincy Library Group and the Lake County Community Sustainability Initiative respectively. Each chapter provides demographic and geographic information relevant to the collaboration, background on the region's land management and a discussion of the origins of the collaboration. Most central to this study, these chapters discuss the relationships between each collaboration and forest activists.

Chapter VII summarizes the analysis of the preceding chapters. In Chapter VII, I return to the three questions posed at the beginning of this chapter and discuss the lessons learned regarding the relationship of forest activists and place-based collaborations for national forest management. The chapter also briefly discusses questions that are relevant to this thesis which require further research, and provides a final conclusion.

Notes

¹ This study uses the term “forest activist” (and often only the word “activist” for the sake of simplicity) instead of the more common term “environmentalist” to refer to a diverse collection of activists and advocates involved in the effort to protect national forest environments. Included among these activists are professional advocates from national organizations such as The Wilderness Society, Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council. Counterparts to these professionals work on the regional and state wide level for groups such as the California Wilderness Coalition, the Oregon Natural Resources Council, the Klamath Forest Alliance and Headwaters. Also included among forest activists discussed are a number of grassroots activists associated with small groups or who work independent of organizations. While the forest activist term is used throughout the text, in quoted material the term is interchanged liberally with “environmentalist”.

As Chapter III discusses, the term “environmentalist” is more appropriately used to refer to a broader collection of activists and advocates that tackle a variety of issues from toxics exposure to waste disposal to forest protection. Forest activism is best considered as a subset of the larger environmental movement. Environmentalism is a definition defying, amorphous movement shaped by multiple, in some cases seemingly competing, philosophies (Gottlieb 1993, Merchant 1992). Due to this ambiguity, and a variety of others reasons, in interviews conducted for this study many forest protection activists shunned the environmentalist label preferring other identifiers.

² Place-based collaborations are often referred to as community-based collaborations, consensus groups and partnerships (Kenney 2000, Cestero 1999). The labels “place-based” or “community-based” collaborations are the most appropriate to the three collaborations discussed in this work since each of the efforts originated from the initiative of people within rural communities instead of being formed by government mandate or by an outside interest group. The term place-based collaboration instead of community-based collaboration is used in this thesis since it more appropriately describes efforts that focus on landscapes of many thousands of acres and that extend well beyond the boundaries of any one human locale.

³ For the purposes of this thesis the success of collaborations is defined in terms of the involvement of a broad array of relevant stakeholders, including forest activists, in the activities of the collaboration.

⁴ Kenney (2000) notes that place-based collaborations usually operate in “a largely ad hoc and self guided manner” (1). Collaboration participants seldom operate with formalized mechanisms of accountability to the interests that they supposedly represent. Cestero (1999) acknowledges this, stating that participants “represent their own concerns rather than the interests of organized constituencies” (v). Also, as Kenney notes,

representatives of public institutions often participate with private citizens in collaborations although, for different reasons, the participation of federal land managers has been limited in each of this thesis's three case studies.

⁵ The public participation guidelines of NEPA and the NFMA do not provide for collaboration as the concept is presented in this study. These laws do not provide for citizen participation in making decisions. Instead they create avenues for citizens to comment on proposed federal action. Federal managers are then responsible for considering public comments and reporting how public input impacts final decisions.

⁶ The use of the term "community" is often troublesome for scholars studying place-based collaboration. As both Cestero (1999) and Duane (1997) discuss, the term community is most typically used to describe "communities of place" – human inhabitants tied to a specific geographic location. In this study unless otherwise noted the term community applies to communities of place. Also of importance to this work are "communities of interest" which are tied together by common concerns instead of location. The "forest activist community" is an example of a community of interest.

⁷ This skepticism is evident throughout the forest activist community. Professional advocates employed by national organizations, their regional and state-based counterparts and local grassroots activist have all questioned the wisdom of the collaborative model (Kenney 2000, McCloskey 1996, Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign 1997).

⁸ Another activist who is a board member of Headwaters also serves on the Applegate Partnership. In this study this activist is labeled as a grassroots activist since the activist serves on the Applegate Partnership as a representative of a small watershed protection group instead of Headwaters.

CHAPTER II

A REVIEW OF PLACE-BASED COLLABORATION

The Popularity of Collaboration

The popularity of collaboration as a tool for problem solving extends well beyond the national forests of the Northwest and northern California. In the western United States, place-based collaboration has been employed to tackle natural resource concerns such as watershed management and range management issues (Hunnington and Sommarstrom 2000, Kenney 1999, Paulson 1998, Dagget 1995).

Both Kenney (2000) and Cestero (1999) note that it is common for collaborations to arise in an ad hoc manner from the initiative of private stakeholders. However, it is now also common for place-based collaborations to be catalyzed by either federal or state government entities. Government encouragement of place-based collaborations is illustrated by Oregon's watershed councils which receive assistance from the state government's Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board (OWEB), and the Community-based Environmental Protection initiative of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (Wondolleck and Yaffe 2000, Mosley 2000a, Nickelsburg 1998). The Clinton Administration also supports collaborative approaches to natural resource and environmental management through the President's Council on Sustainable Development

which calls for the “new tools and collaborative strategies” to be used in resource and environmental management (President’s Council on Sustainable Development 1999).

Collaborative efforts need not always be place-based. Cestero (1999) makes the distinction between place/community-based collaborations and policy/interest-based collaborations. She states that while place/community-based collaborations “focus on a specific geographic locale” policy/issue-based collaborations “seek to discuss or resolve natural resource policy issues of regional or national significance” (10-12).¹ Over the past two decades, government-industry collaborations that pursue incentive-based, voluntary and market oriented alternatives to regulation have also become popular (Khanna and Damon 1999).²

Collaborations also do not have to be focused on natural resources and environmental issues. Collaboration has been applied to matters ranging from facility sitings to crime prevention to education. Using negotiation instead of conflict to resolve problems has become so popular – not only in the public sphere but also in the business world and in private relationships – that Fisher and Ury’s book *Getting to Yes* (first published in 1981), which serves as a “how to guide” on negotiation, has become a national best seller.

Non-profit organizations and the federal government have gotten into the act of promoting collaboration as a tool to address a wide range of issues. The National Civics League promotes collaboration via its Program for Community Problem Solving (Fee 1999). Through “partnerships” created under the National Program for Reinventing Government, the Clinton Administration also promotes collaboration as a tool to address

a number of public policy concerns (National Program for Reinventing Government 2000).

The idea that cooperative decision making at the local level can be a useful tool for resolving public issues is not unique to the United States. Researchers such as Baland and Platteau (1996), Pinkerton (1989), Berkes et al. (1989) and McKay and Acheson (1987) are among those who draw upon examples from abroad to argue that natural resources can be sustainably managed through local-level stakeholder cooperation. Many of the lessons regarding cooperative, community-based resource management come from the third world. In the third world, community-based resource management has become increasingly popular over the last 25 years as a tool for uprooting the legacy of colonialism and returning natural resource control to peoples with long traditions of providing for their communities through sustainable subsistence management (Western and Wright 1994, Poffenberger 1990).

The remainder of this chapter is primarily devoted to examining the argument in favor of place-based collaboration. This argument is explored from three perspectives:

- 1) A historical perspective, where collaboration is seen as a means of overcoming the shortcomings of resource management traditions that evolved during the progressive era of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
- 2) A conceptual perspective, where observers argue that collaborations tend to be superior to more traditional forms of decision making when four themes – inclusiveness, empowerment, adaptability and stability – are present in collaborative activities.
- 3) In the context of related concepts – including third world community-based resource management, community forestry and ecosystem management – that are often referenced and championed by collaboration proponents.

The chapter also addresses some of the critiques, offered primarily by academics, of place-based collaboration as well as the related concepts.

Collaboration in a Historical Context

The roots of today's national forest management regulatory framework are firmly planted in the progressive era of the late 19th and early 20th century. Critics of this legacy argue that progressive conservation has led to a rigid bureaucracy that discourages innovation and public participation in forest management. Many of these critics look further back in U.S. political history to the ideas of participatory democracy championed by Thomas Jefferson to support their call for greater collaborative citizen involvement in forest management.

At the heart of progressivism is the belief that public welfare should be prioritized over the self-interest of individuals or business entities (Hirt 1994). Public outrage over the liquidation of the nation's forests for private fortune led to the establishment of the federal forest reserves (as the national forests were originally called) in 1891 and the Forest Service in 1897 (Wondolleck and Yaffe 2000, Cortner and Moote 1999). A 1905 policy statement penned by Gifford Pinchot – the tireless advocate for the national forest system and a leading progressive – emphatically demonstrates the ideals on which the national forest system is based. The statement says, “In the administration of the forest reserves it must be clearly borne in mind that all land is to be devoted to its most productive use for the permanent good of the whole people, and not the temporary benefit of individuals or companies” (quoted in Hirt 1994, 33).

Generally, progressives supported greater citizen participation in government. They championed direct elections for U.S. senators, the establishment of primary elections to diminish the power of political party machines, women's suffrage and the ballot initiative process (Cortner and Moote 1999). However, the progressive movement also worried about the adverse impacts of political pressure on public policy decision making. To insulate decision makers from political pressure, progressives advocated increased professionalism, reliance on scientific management and adherence to the rule of law in public policy (Wondolleck and Yaffe 2000, Cortner and Moote 1999).

In the forest management arena, progressivism led to the establishment of the Forest Service as a "bureaucracy of experts". The expert-oriented culture of the USFS has fostered a widely held notion that the agency has been isolated from the general public and that it discounts public concerns in favor of the values and opinions of agency professionals. Cortner and Moote (1999) state:

The reliance on expert opinion has come to have profound consequences for the role of the public in political matters. Experts render judgement, eclipsing the role of the citizen. Under the claim of professionalism and objectivity, experts convey an image that they are not involved in politics or decisions involving values, all the while making decisions reflecting their own professional values and definitions of the public interest. (16)

In part due to concern that Forest Service employees might become too sympathetic to the interests of stakeholders with which they interact on a daily basis, precise laws and administrative rules have been developed to govern national forest management (Wondolleck and Yaffe 2000). As introduced in Chapter I, and as is discussed further in Chapter III, forest activists have played a significant role in building upon the legal foundation for forest management that was laid down during the

progressive era. Critics contend that these laws and rules hinder the ability of agency staff and outside stakeholders to adapt to local circumstances. Wondolleck and Yaffee state:

Many of these policies were well intended and important changes in their day, and elements of them remain relevant to current resource management. But their emphasis on control is problematic.... Flexibility is not necessary when on the ground conditions do not vary from those conceived in policy.... But those conditions do not describe the state of natural resource and environmental management today. (235)

Many who criticize the national forest management regulatory framework as being too rigid, bureaucratic and alienating to the public find philosophical solace in Jefferson's republican vision. Jefferson believed that a nation of rural agrarian communities, where decision making was decentralized to the local level so that all citizens could participate in public policy, would preserve the democratic values on which the United States was founded (Cortner and Moote 1999, Snow 1997, Kemmis 1990). Jefferson's faith in the common man was strong. In 1821 he stated, "I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves" (quoted in Cortner and Moote 1999, 4).

Daniel Kemmis (1990), the former Mayor of Missoula Montana and a leading champion of Jeffersonian republicanism, contends that by drawing upon Jefferson's ideas U.S. citizens – and particularly westerners – can overcome political traditions that "keep citizens apart" and build vibrant, solution oriented, civic cultures. In such settings cooperation and collaboration could serve as valuable alternatives to confrontation and self-interest for developing innovative approaches to dealing with a range of issues.

Kemmis points to a number of examples where parties with seemingly intractable positions have overcome their differences after agreeing to come together, discuss the issues at hand and attempt to collaborate toward mutually agreeable solutions. In one case, Kemmis discusses how a Montana pulp mill and a local environmental group were, to their own surprise, able to avoid hostile public and legal conflicts over the plant's waste discharge into a local river by "coming to the table" and discussing the controversy. In the end, the two former adversaries were able to develop a plan for managing the mill's waste that they jointly presented to the Montana Water Quality Bureau.

Collaboration's Modern Conceptual Grounding

Tying the concept of collaboration to the ideas of Thomas Jefferson places the concept in good intellectual company. However, it does not take a mind of Jefferson's caliber to realize that basing the argument for collaboration on ideas that originated more than two centuries ago puts collaboration on a shaky foundation. Jefferson's ideal called for a nation of small agrarian towns exercising a high level of participatory self-governance. Today civic apathy is at an all time high and the United States is so dominated by large, relatively impersonal urban centers that farmers are no longer counted by the census. In this setting, Jefferson's vision – at least in its pure form – can be challenged as merely a romantic notion from an era long since past (Coggins 1998).

However, the argument for collaboration is not based solely on Jefferson's populism. Over the past decade and a half, a number of thinkers have produced a

substantial body of literature that provides intellectual support for the concept of place-based collaboration. During a review of this literature, four themes – inclusiveness, empowerment, adaptability and stability – consistently presented themselves as common in these thinkers’ perceptions of “successful collaborations”.

Inclusiveness

Participation of all parties that have an interest in the outcome of a decision is considered paramount for deriving resolutions that are acceptable to all parties. Cestero (1999) states:

The most effective [collaborative efforts] tend to foster an open, inclusive and transparent process that encourages broad participation.... Effective place-based collaborative efforts use consistent and proactive outreach to involve interested parties from beyond a specific geographic community. (v)

Wondolleck and Yaffe (2000) argue that by including diverse stakeholders collaborations provide parties with opportunities to share information and learn from each other’s perspectives. More traditional forms of policy making and dispute resolution – such as lobbying and litigation – tend to produce barriers to the interaction of stakeholders, making cross-interest sharing and learning rare if not impossible. By becoming better acquainted with the perspectives of other parties, collaboration advocates contend that even the most ardent of disputants can often learn to see past stated *positions* and come to understand the *interests* on which the positions of other stakeholders are based (Fisher and Ury 1991).

Wondolleck and Yaffe (2000), Fisher and Ury (1991) and Kemmis (1990), among others, contend that when discussions between stakeholders turn from positions to

underlying interests, substantial progress can be made toward agreement. Wondolleck and Yaffe point to a case in Montana where both timber interests and forest activists filed numerous appeals to the land management plan for the Deerlodge National Forest soon after the plan was released by the Forest Service. In response the USFS brought together industry and activist representatives, as well as a professional mediator, to discuss a variety of forest management issues from timber harvest quantities to roads to wildlife issues. Numerous accords were reached prompting one activist to state, "Surprisingly there were more areas of agreement than we thought" (Wondolleck and Yaffe 2000, 33).

Empowerment

A longstanding criticism of how public decisions are made in U.S. society is that wealthy and powerful parties have access to decision-makers that most citizens lack. This inequity in power leads to widespread citizen disenfranchisement in public decision making processes. Proponents contend that collaborative processes are well suited to overcoming power inequities, thus empowering disenfranchised stakeholders.

The use of consensus decision making within collaborative efforts is key to this argument. Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990) cite the work of Susskind and McMahon to argue that consensus prevents more powerful parties from imposing their will on less powerful participants. They state that Susskind and McMahon's research found that "the drive toward consensus embodied in these [collaborative] processes as they progress helps keep parties' behavior in check" (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, 260). Innes (1996) also credits consensus-based decision making as an empowering factor by saying,

“The goal of consensus building is deliberation that is informed [and] takes into account the interests of all parties including the weakest” (465).

The empowering effect of collaborations may persist beyond the resolution of any single issue. Putnam (1993, 173) argues that social networks that bring together “agents of equivalent status and power” – called “horizontal networks” – are likely to generate “social capital”.³ Conversely, he argues that “vertical” social networks – with unequal power distributions and hierarchical structures – do not generate social capital at the local level.⁴ By elevating stakeholders, including those whose participation in the public sphere may have previously been blocked, to a status more equal to decision makers, collaborations appears to be well suited to provide for the horizontal networks Putnam contends are essential to generating social capital. Putnam argues that cooperative “collective actions” are increasingly successful at problem solving as social capital among participants grows.

Adaptability

As noted earlier in this chapter, a common criticism of the current national forest management regulatory framework is that the rules and standards established by federal law are too inflexible for management to adapt to conditions unique to different locales and situations. By involving stakeholders at the local level in developing resource management options, advocates contend that place-based collaborations overcome this perceived shortcoming of the regulatory framework.

Issues of scale enter into importance when the theme of adaptability is discussed. Cestero (1999) states, "The most promising collaborative initiatives work on a relatively small scale with which local people can identify" (v). In his book *Civic Environmentalism* John (1994) posits that the effectiveness of centralized, "top-down" regulations diminishes as the complexity of issues at the local scale increases.⁵ John advocates "bottom-up" approaches to handling issues that are complex at the local scale. Instead of mandating results, the "bottom-up" approach would direct "regulators" to work with stakeholders to develop strategies that are suited to local conditions in order to achieve desired environmental outcomes.

Dagget (1990), whose work focuses on collaborative approaches to range management, also advocates for management and problem solving to be adaptable at the local scale. He argues that resource management has suffered because, under the United States' system of centralized regulation, actual landscape conditions have become less important than adherence to the law. Dagget states, "Our goal [has become] defeating the enemy rather than improving, restoring and reviving our damaged ecosystems" (8). Dagget fervently supports returning the focus of natural resource management to the ecosystem scale. He encourages adversaries to come together and discuss their concerns while visiting the landscapes in question. By focusing discussion at the landscape level, Dagget contends that solutions to disagreements that are uniquely adapted to the lands in question can often be found.⁶

Stability

Recall the discussion earlier in this chapter regarding the land management plan developed by the Forest Service for Montana's Deerlodge National Forest. Neither forest activists nor the timber industry was involved in developing the plan, and within three months of its completion both activists and timber interests had begun the process of appealing the plan (Wondolleck and Yaffe 2000). This example illustrates the propensity for decisions made under the current national forest management framework to be unstable. Proponents contend that the inclusive nature of collaborations provides stakeholders with a sense of ownership over decisions thereby increasing the opportunity for plans to be implemented instead of challenged. In fact – as Wondolleck and Yaffe note – collaboration not only often dissuades participating stakeholders from challenging a decision, but it also has the power to turn stakeholders who may have challenged a decision in which they did not participate in developing into strong champions of the collaboratively crafted outcome.

Innes (1996) argues that decisions reached via collaborative processes tend to be more technically sound and resilient for the simple reason that more stakeholders are involved in the decision making and they bring their unique experiences and knowledge to the process. Referring to a collaborative planning project she studied, Innes notes:

The process studied relied on the experiential knowledge of developers, farmers, managers of water treatment systems, citizens and elected officials. Some stakeholders were agency staff with specialized expertise; and some were staff of private interest groups that went back to their membership to test reactions to proposals. Someone in the group usually understood each aspect of a task in depth or had experience with it. (467)

Finally, some argue that collaborative decision making can be more time efficient than traditional means of decision making and problem solving. This is an interesting contention because, as I discuss later, collaborations are often criticized because they are time-intensive processes. However, Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) argue that the tendency for decisions developed collaboratively to be relatively non-controversial often means that collaborative resolutions are implemented in a more time efficient manner. They argue that decisions reached without building consensus among stakeholders "might receive quick headlines and even preliminary results" (27). However, Susskind and Cruikshank also state that due to dissatisfaction among stakeholders who were not intimately involved in the decision making, implementation problems "almost certainly arise" when non-collaborative processes are used (27).

Related Concepts

Third World Community-Based Resource Management

As is stated earlier, community-based resource management⁷ in the third world is seen as a tool to overcome colonial legacies and return to traditions where resource management benefited local communities but did not significantly degrade the environment (Western and Wright 1994). The popularity of this concept has grown steadily since the late 1970s (Ford Foundation 1998, Western and Wright 1994, Poffenberger 1990). In the United States advocates of place-based collaboration for national forest management point to third world examples of community-based resource management as evidence that communities can take on enhanced roles in resource

management and in the process improve their own socioeconomic conditions and help provide for ecologically sound management.

Volumes of case study literature – including Western and Wright (1994), Poffenberger (1990), Child (1996) and Lansing (1991) – demonstrate the capacity of third world communities to manage resources in more ecologically and socially sound manners than centralized institutions. Much of this case study work is accompanied by theoretical discussions analyzing the shortcomings of centralized management and reasons for why community-based resource management often better serves the environment and communities. For example, Baland and Platteau (1996) have developed a list of six key reasons as to why they believe centralized management is flawed:⁸

- 1) Centralize systems cannot properly obtain and evaluate the information needed to manage complex and diverse ecosystems.
- 2) Rules developed by central authorities are often difficult to enforce at the community level.
- 3) Often authorities within centralized bureaucracies are corrupt and fail to enforce rules in return for payoffs.
- 4) Incentives for local actors to violate central rules are often enhanced by antagonistic relationships between local citizens and central authorities.
- 5) Centralized bureaucracies typically have inadequate budgets to perform their duties.
- 6) Especially in young nations, central governments often see exercising authority over localities as more important than sound resource management.

Baland and Platteau also offer four reasons as to why they believe community-based management is preferable to centralized management:

- 1) Community-based efforts use local knowledge to adapt management to both local ecological and socioeconomic conditions.
- 2) The smaller scale of community-based projects means management can more easily be adapted to unique local conditions.
- 3) Conflict resolution is easier on smaller scales.
- 4) Self-monitoring by local actors is more cost effective than centralized enforcement.⁹

The discussion of community forestry that follows demonstrates how some observers believe that the concept of community-based management can be applied in the United States.

Community Forestry

Many supporters of collaboration for national forest management advocate community forestry to ensure that communities benefit from forest management and that, in turn, communities participate in the sustainable management of forests. At the 2000 Western Forest Activist Conference in Ashland, Oregon, one of the goals of community forestry was stated as “link[ing] the long-term well being of local communities to the long-term sustainability of the forest ecosystem” (Kauffman 2000b). More poetically, a 1998 article in *American Forests* magazine said, “If they succeed [community forestry practitioners] could recreate an interdependence between land and people to last through time” (Braxton-Little 1998, 12).

Community forestry is generally defined as forest management conducted with the explicit goal of benefiting communities that are in close proximity to forests (Brendler and Carey 1998). Community forestry contrasts with the concept of industrial forestry that has historically dominated forest management in the United States, where the benefits of forest management are directed to corporate shareholders.


Third world community forestry projects often benefit communities by providing for the subsistence needs of residence. In the U.S. and other first world nations – where market conditions are more pervasive than in the third world – this model is typically

modified so that individuals and institutions in communities benefit by receiving capital from the sale of commodities generated by forest management (see Figure 3).


In the United States, observers of the history of national forest and other resource management in the west might find it hard to accept that market-oriented forest management, regardless of whether the management is meant to benefit communities or shareholders, can be accomplished in an ecologically responsible manner. Historically, relations between rural western communities and forest activists have been marked by animosity. Since the late 1970s, many residents of rural communities have challenged the goals of forest activists and other environmentalists through a collection of movements such as the Sagebrush Rebellion, the Wise Use Movement and the Property Rights Movement (Brick and Cawley 1996, Echeverria and Eby 1995, Helvarg 1994, Cawley 1993). While some observers, such as Cawley (1993), argue that these movements are complex in nature, others contend that the simple greed of corporations and rural communities that prioritize profit before the environment have driven these movements (Helvarg 1994, Bari 1994). Clashes between activists and rural community interests have come to be known by names like the "Timber Wars" and "Range Wars". While typically wars of words, violence in these clashes has not been unknown (Helvarg 1994, Bari 1994).

However, works produced over the last decade provide evidence that rural western communities – forest communities in particular – value the natural environment and, given the opportunity, will support management alternatives that reduce environmental degradation. Fortmann and Kusel (1990) argue that latent environmental

Subsistence-Based Community Forestry
(Predominantly Third World Contexts)



Market-Based Community Forestry
(Predominantly First World Contexts)



Adapted from: Mallik and
Rahman 1994

Figure 3
Comparison of Community Forestry Models

values exist with long term residents in forest communities.¹⁰ Brown (1995) and Raphael (1994) provide a variety of stories of rural residents expressing dissatisfaction with environmentally destructive forest management practices. Furthermore, as some forest communities have seen their economies shift away from timber they have come to challenge forest management practices that are viewed as destructive to local forests (Solberg 1998, Wilkinson 1992).¹¹

Ecosystem Management

Many collaboration supporters bolster their claims that collaboratively developed resource management plans will be ecologically sound by advocating ecosystem management. Grumbine (1994) states that the general goal of ecosystem management is to maintain ecological integrity of ecosystems while accommodating human use. To meet this goal, ecosystem management requires managers to look at activities in natural systems holistically instead of as independent management disciplines such as timber, wildlife and recreation. Grumbine argues that there are ten diverse themes that characterize ecosystem management. These themes range from support of ecological boundaries and adaptive management to acknowledgement that humans are part of nature and that cooperation between stakeholders and management agencies is necessary for sound resource management.

According to Grumbine (1994) the central themes of ecosystem management first emerged in the 1930s as the science of ecology grew in popularity. However, it was not

until the 1980s, and the growing awareness of a global threat to biodiversity, that the term “ecosystem management” started to work its way into resource management discussions.

The concept of ecosystem management is well suited to today’s political climate surrounding national forest management where both ecological protection and addressing the needs of rural communities are considered paramount. In 1996 Yaffe and his associates documented 619 sites throughout the United States where projects based upon the principles of ecosystem management were underway. This number is likely larger today, considering that the study by Yaffe and his colleagues was not exhaustive and that ecosystem management has grown in popularity in recent years.

Critiquing Collaboration and the Related Concepts

While accolades abound, scholars and other observers also critique the concepts of collaboration for resource management, community forestry and ecosystem management. As mentioned in Chapter I, these critiques are varied in nature. Like the critiques themselves, the scholars that offer challenges to the concepts are from a diverse lot. Some are strictly critical, while others are collaboration champions who are willing to raise tough questions regarding the concepts.

Some observers question the assumption that collaborations can reach mutually agreeable solutions, especially when stakeholders have fundamentally different values. In her work regarding the use of collaborations for range management in Wyoming, Paulson (1998) notes that collaborations often use broad goals to avoid confronting value differences. She contends that attempting to avoid conflict often leads to ineffective

agreements. She also contends that “where differences do come into open conflict success in joint decision making has been limited” (313). Wondolleck and Yaffe (2000) also acknowledge this limitation stating, “Where fundamental value differences exist among the stakeholders and collaboration involves compromising those values, a negotiated approach may not be appropriate” (48).

Concern has also been expressed that collaboration may be an inappropriate, and even dangerous, tool if power imbalances exist among stakeholders. Wondolleck and Yaffe state, “Where perceived power imbalances among stakeholders mean that stronger parties see little need to compromise or otherwise involve weaker parties, it may be in neither group’s interest to collaborate” (48). Amy (1987), in his critique of environmental mediation, argues that, instead of being empowered, stakeholders that are less powerful and skilled in the art of negotiation can be co-opted by other stronger, well-trained stakeholders.

In a time when resource management issues are played out in a politically and economically interdependent world, many scholars of community forestry – and the general concept of community-based resource management – express concern about how community-based management efforts are impacted of market forces. Baland and Platteau (1996), Mallik and Rahman (1994) and Pinkerton (1989) all acknowledge that communities in both the first and third worlds are increasingly tied to external markets. Baland and Platteau discuss extensively how interactions with markets can encourage communities to both knowingly and unknowingly overexploit the environment for economic gain. Studies by political ecologists like Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) support

these claims by noting that the individual agency of “land managers” (in their terminology, the individuals that work directly with natural resources) can be distorted by societal institutions including markets.

In the U.S. context, supporters of the application of Jeffersonian-inspired participatory democracy to resource management acknowledge that market integration presents a challenge to their vision. For example, Kemmis (1990) notes that the communities of the rural west are economically dependent on the federal government and corporate entities and that the inability of these communities to control their economic destinies hinders the true empowerment of citizens at the local level.

Concern about the potential for market influences to negatively impact sustainable community-based resource management has led scholars including Baland and Plateau (1996) and Pinkerton (1989) to argue for “cooperative management”, often referred to as “co-management”. Under co-management the role of communities in resource management is greatly enhanced. However, central institutions do not fully cede authority and theoretically serve as a balance to any influence, including the market, that might overwhelm the capacity of a community.

Finally, the notion of ecosystem management – supported by so many place-based collaboration advocates – is not uncontroversial. Much of the skepticism of ecosystem management is due to the fact that it is a relatively new, poorly defined and untested concept (Cortner and Moote 1999). Stakeholders across the spectrum, from radical environmental activists to die hard timber interests, express concern that the ambiguity of ecosystem management lends to the concept being appropriated by rival parties for their

own political interest (Cortner and Moote 1999). Additionally, Carpenter (1996) worries that within the science of ecology there is too little consensus among scholars for the discipline to serve as the foundation of a management philosophy. These concerns mean that advocates of ecosystem management are often forced to defend the concept rather than use it as a source of support for their positions.

Discussion

There are two pieces to the argument for place-based collaboration. First, there is the case against the current regulatory framework. It is important to note that many collaboration proponents state clearly that they do not wish to see collaboration supplant the regulatory framework. For example Cestero (1999) says, "Constructive collaborative initiatives comply with or exceed the resource protection standards set by existing environmental laws. The issues do not involve revision of or exceptions to current law or policy" (74). Nevertheless, in this chapter it is demonstrated that many collaboration champions see the current national forest regulatory framework as profoundly flawed, claiming that it discourages public input, is overly bureaucratic and does not easily adjust to address unique conditions at the local level. For many critics of the current framework collaboration appears to be a tool that is well suited for overcoming these flaws and thus improving land management decision making.

The second piece to the argument for collaboration is more positive in nature. Proponents claim that when collaborations are devised properly they are, unlike the existing system of forest management rules, inherently inclusive and empowering as well

as adaptive to unique circumstances. When collaborations are properly devised proponents argue that resolutions to conflicts are reached that are significantly more stable than solutions reached via non-collaborative means. In this chapter numerous-real life examples have been shared that academics and other observers use to back up this argument.

However, both elements of the argument for collaboration can be, and are, critiqued. Forest activists are quick to challenge the case against the regulatory framework. As is discussed elsewhere in this study, the views of most forest activists regarding the framework differ dramatically from those of collaboration advocates who criticize the regulatory framework. The fact that forest activists generally value the regulatory framework is extremely important to this study. Since activists typically support the framework, disparaging it likely dissuades rather than encourages activist participation in collaborations.

Finally, it has been shown in this chapter that collaboration is not considered to be foolproof. There are questions as to how successful collaborations can be in the face of extremely divergent values among stakeholders, unbalanced power dynamics and market pressures. Furthermore, unless architects are mindful of the themes of “good collaborations”, collaborative initiatives run the risk of becoming exclusionary, disempowering and actually fostering conflict instead of cooperation. This last point will become increasingly clear as this thesis progresses.

Notes

¹ It is important to note that, as Cestero uses the term, policy/interest-based collaborations can also focus on specific geographic locales. In fact, each of the three policy/interest-based collaborations that Cestero discusses in her work focuses on a specific locale. According to Cestero, while the activities of place/community-based efforts are intended to only impact the locale under discussion, one of the key distinctions of policy/interest-based efforts is that they attempt to establish policy precedent.

² The EPA's 33/50 program to control toxic emissions and Green Lights program to promote energy efficiency are examples of this type of collaboration (Khanna and Damon 1999)

³ Putnam (1993) defines social capital stating that the term refers to, "Features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (167).

⁴ Other observers offer more positive assessments of vertical networks. For example, Mosley (1999) offers that vertical networks – such as government institutions – can offer communities infrastructure and financial resources. She also contends that horizontal networks can build capacity to tie into vertical structures and secure resources.

⁵ A strong case can be made that John's argument is particularly applicable to national forest issues. Complex ecological and human communities are almost always of consideration when national forest management issues are discussed. The varied characteristics of these ecological and human communities almost always make national forest issues unique from location to location.

⁶ Later chapters of this thesis demonstrate that the capacity of a collaboration to adapt in the political realm is as important to success as the capacity of a collaboration to adapt to local ecological and social complexities.

⁷ Community-based resource management efforts in the third world are often not directly analogous to collaborations for resource management in the United States. This is because third world community-based management efforts often are concerned with relatively homogenous user groups and therefore the mediation between diverse, often adversarial, stakeholders that is at the heart of collaboration is not necessary. In their work Baland and Platteau discuss the effect of heterogeneity among resource users in the community-based management context. While they contend that heterogeneity is not always bad, Baland and Platteau (1996) do state that agreements between users must be reached in cases where heterogeneity exists to assure that each interests "enjoys well-delimited rights and faces well-defined constraints" (304).

⁸ It should be noted that while the majority of examples in Baland and Platteau's work are drawn from third world examples in nations such as India, Nepal and Senegal they also draw upon lessons learned in some first world nations – particularly Japan – to reach their conclusions. Other scholars that champion collective action – such as Ostrom (1990), Pinkerton (1989) and Berkes et al (1989) – also draw upon first world experiences to support their work.

⁹ It is of interest that many of Baland and Platteau's findings, and many of the other attributes of community-based resource management in the third world that are mentioned in this section, are closely related to the themes of "good collaborations" discussed earlier.

¹⁰ Fortmann and Kusel contend that the latent environmental values of long-term residents in rural communities are often brought to the surface when migrants from urban communities, who more openly express their environmental views, move into rural areas and begin to raise environmental issues.

¹¹ Economists such as Niemi and Whitelaw (1997) and Power (1996) argue that, as rural economies have shifted away from timber, the economic value of the recreation and "livability" benefits that forests can provide to communities has increased. These economic benefits of keeping forests in tact are considered to be a significant source of motivation for some forest communities to oppose timber operations in their vicinity.

CHAPTER III

FOREST ACTIVISTS, THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

AND COLLABORATION

The Evolution of the Regulatory Framework

Gifford Pinchot, the German trained father of U.S. forestry, disdained the idea that forests might go “unused” (Hirt 1994). Pinchot felt that through scientific management forests could be “improved” to provide for increased “sustained yields” of timber as well as other goods and services deemed to be of value to society (Hirt 1994). This Pinchot-inspired utilitarian philosophy was challenged even before 1897 when the Organic Act established it as the Forest Service’s guiding principle. Throughout the 1890s Sierra Club founder John Muir argued that the Forest Reserves – or at least a portion of the reserves – should be left unmanaged to preserve their wild character (Nash 1982). This argument did not resonate widely in the 1890s and no portions of the Forest Reserves were set aside as unmanaged areas under the Organic Act (Hirt 1994).

The era prior to World War II is regarded as the USFS’s “quiet years” as demand for federal timber was low and the Forest Service functioned more as forest custodial agency than as a timber management agency (Langston 1995, Wilkinson 1992). Beginning with the war, demand for timber boomed. Private forests were unable to meet the demand and timber companies turned to the public lands to meet their supply needs

(Hirt 1994, Wilkinson 1992). Demand for public timber continued with the post war housing boom, and between 1940 and 1950 timber harvests from the national forests doubled from two to four billion board feet annually (Wilkinson 1992, 138). Through the mid-1960s harvest volumes continued to rise with annual harvest levels reaching over 11 billion board feet by 1965. In the early 1970s, and again in the mid 1980s, harvest from the national forests reached their highest levels ever, 12 billion board feet (Wilkinson 1992, 138).

Through the first half of the 20th century citizen advocacy for forest protection was relatively staid (Gottlieb 1993). Beginning with the 1950s, a collection of preservationists, inspired by the passions of John Muir and the science and ethics of Aldo Leopold, along with recreation enthusiasts, whose use of the national forest increased by 900 percent from 1945 to 1960, became increasingly active as a movement concerned about the fate of national forests (Hays 1998, Hirt 1994, Nash 1982). The values of importance to these stakeholders were threatened by the Forest Service's mandate prioritizing timber harvesting. To reign in the agency's timber program and insert their own values into the Forest Service's management directives, forest activists sought to enhance the national forest regulatory framework.

In 1960 Congress passed the first major piece of forest management legislation since the Organic Act, the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA). Supported by most forest advocacy groups, the act relegated timber – at least officially – to equal status with a host of other mandates for the national forests management (Hirt 1994).¹ While it established the precedent of modifying the national forest regulatory framework, the

policy implications of MUSYA were limited. As MUSYA was written, it proved to be vague and unenforceable. The Sierra Club considered the act to be so flawed that the group broke ranks from its allies and did not endorse the MUSYA (Hirt 1994).

Four years after the passage of the MUSYA, the Wilderness Act, which realized John Muir's vision of unmanaged wild preserves, was passed. The act represented the culmination of nearly 20 years of work by The Wilderness Society, a group that under the direction of Howard Zahniser made enhancing the protection of wilderness a priority (Nash 1982). The Wilderness Act immediately withdrew nine million national forest acres from timber management. This land provided the basis for today's wilderness system (Nash 1982).

Over a period of seven years during the late 1960s and the 1970s three major pieces of activist inspired legislation were passed that continue today to significantly shape forest management. The 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) provided citizens with the first vehicle for significant public participation in government projects that impact the environment, including national forest projects (Coggins, Wilkinson, and Leshy 1993). In 1973 the Endangered Species Act (ESA) was passed. The ESA established strict limitations on activities that harm species listed as threatened or endangered under the act. The ESA also provided for the protection of habitat critical to the survival of species listed under the act (Wilkinson 1992). The significance of the ESA's critical habitat provision is demonstrated later in this chapter. In 1975 a ruling on a lawsuit brought by the Izaak Walton League forbade the practice of clearcutting on national forest land as a violation of the Organic Act. This case led to Congress's 1976

passage of the national forest Management Act (NFMA). The NFMA allowed clearcutting to return to the forests, but under stricter controls. The NFMA also – in a blow to the progressive era tradition of expert management of the national forests – built upon the legacy of NEPA and granted the public enhanced opportunities for participation in forest management via the forest planning process (Wilkinson 1992).

Forest activists have not always been fully satisfied with the results of their strategy of enhancing the regulatory framework. Even though their actions have dramatically changed the regulatory framework from the days of Gifford Pinchot, the Forest Service has not been fully weaned away from its late 19th century mandate of timber production. As is noted above, the MUSYA proved to be too vague to be effective. Also, wilderness advocates were disappointed with many provisions of the Wilderness Act.² And while the NFMA did provide for increased regulation of national forest logging, as well as increased public participation in forest management, it also allowed clearcutting on national forests to resume to the chagrin of activists.

The regulatory framework may be imperfect in the mind of many activists. But, as is demonstrated in the next section regarding the Spotted Owl, forest activists have become very adept at using the regulatory system they helped to develop as a tool to significantly reduce logging activity.

Regulation in Action: The Northern Spotted Owl Case

In the 1991 case of Seattle Audubon Society vs. Robertson United States District Court, Judge William Dwyer issued a ruling that redefined the economics and politics of

timber in the Northwest and northern California. The Audubon Society argued that in order to comply with the Endangered Species Act the Forest Service needed to develop a plan to assure the continued viability of the Northern Spotted Owl – a species listed as threatened under the ESA (Yaffe 1994, Dwyer 1991). To protect the owl the Forest Service would have to protect the habitat on which the bird depends – the economically valuable old growth forests of Washington, Oregon and northern California west of the Cascades (the “west side”). Judge Dwyer sided with the Audubon Society and issued an injunction halting all Forest Service timber sales in Spotted Owl habitat until the Forest Service adopted guidelines to assure the continued viability of the owl (Yaffe 1994, Dwyer 1991).

After taking office in 1993, the Clinton Administration made it a priority to see that adequate Spotted Owl protections were developed so that timber harvests on west side forests could resume. In April 1993 President Clinton, Vice President Gore and numerous other federal officials traveled to Portland, Oregon and convened the “Forest Summit”. The summit provided the administration with input from a diverse cross section of stakeholders including forest activists, timber industry representatives, state and local government officials, forest workers and representatives from forest communities. After the summit the President appointed the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT) to formally develop a Spotted Owl management plan for the federal forests³ of the west side. FEMAT developed the Northwest Forest Plan (NFP) within a year; Judge Dwyer approved the NFP and lifted the injunction in 1994.

Under the NFP the management of the lands regulated by the plan was dramatically altered from pre-Spotted Owl days. Of the 13.2 million acres in the region effected by the plan that had not been previously withdrawn from logging by congressional or administrative action, only 6.1 million acres remained available for logging under the NFP (FEMAT 1993). The remaining 7.1 million acres were set aside as either Late Successional Reserves to protect old growth, or as Riparian Reserves to protect rivers and streams (FEMAT 1993). From the reduced timber base FEMAT promised a timber harvest level of 1.1 billion board feet annually. This level represented a reduction of more than 80 percent from the historic high harvests of the 1980s (Carrel 1998). According to the timber industry, the comparatively small harvests promised by the NFP have not materialized (Carrel 1998).⁴

While the Dwyer decision and the NFP only applied directly to the federal forests west of the Cascades, the Spotted Owl issue's ripple effects have been felt throughout the Northwest and northern California. In the wake of the Spotted Owl a new political dynamic emerged in the region. The Spotted Owl case served to demonstrate the capacity of forest activists to shut down logging that they consider to be ecologically destructive by using the regulatory framework and scientific evidence.⁵ With President Clinton in office, conventional wisdom held that the forest activists had more friends in high places than they had had during the Reagan and Bush years. In this new political setting, the federal agencies became more willing to take proactive steps to reduce timber harvests in order to protect forest ecosystems.

Of the case study collaborations, the Applegate Partnership is the only one in an area impacted by the NFP. However each of the other two cases have felt indirect ramifications of the Spotted Owl case. In California's Sierra Nevada, home of the Quincy Library Group, the Forest Service issued guidelines in 1993 (commonly known as the CASPO guidelines) restricting timber harvests in order to protect the California Spotted Owl, a cousin of the Northern Spotted Owl. A year after the imposition of the CASPO guidelines, timber harvests on northern California's Plumas National Forest totaled 50 million board feet (mmbf). This level represented a substantial change from the 1980s when harvests from the Plumas National Forest averaged 200 mmbf annually. By 1995 harvest levels on the Plumas had fallen to 28 mmbf (Braxton-Little 1995). The Forest Service took the action to protect the California Spotted Owl proactively; the agency acted without the impetus of the owl being listed as either threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act. In fact, at the time the rules were issued, scientific studies had not conclusively demonstrated that the owls were in decline (Warren 1993).

The Forest Service also took preemptive action in order to prevent logging from being shut down on the arid forests east of the Cascades – home to Lake County, Oregon and the Lake County Community Sustainability Initiative. In testimony before the Agriculture Subcommittee of the House of Representatives, Department of Agriculture Under Secretary for Natural Resources James Lyons (1997) stated:

The Northwest Forest Plan is a response to gridlock – the situation that had developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s that was no longer tenable. To avoid a similar occurrence in eastern Oregon and Washington, the Administration has undertaken the Interior Columbia River Basin Review. (7)

The review is expected to develop a plan for ecosystem level management for 144 million acres of east side federal land. As of the preparation of this study, the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Plan was still in its developmental stage.

To discourage lawsuits aimed at shutting down logging of the east side federal forests during the development of the Interior Columbia Basin plan the Forest Service has imposed strict interim logging restrictions.⁶ Known as the East Side Screens, PACFISH and INFISH⁷, the restrictions went into effect in 1994 and the rules have significantly reduced timber harvests east of the Cascades. For example, in 1996 on Lake County's Fremont National Forest timber harvests totaled 17 million board feet. The 1996 level was a 73 percent reduction from 1992 harvests, and a 91 percent reduction from the harvest of 190 mmbf in 1986 (Oregon Department of Forestry 1996, Bourhill 1994).

Forest Communities and the Regulatory Framework

A discussion of the national forest regulatory framework would not be complete without addressing how the framework has impacted the rural forest communities of the Northwest and northern California. While forest activists have molded the regulatory framework to suit their interests, residents of rural forest communities have reason to question how they have been affected by the federal forest management policies. Skepticism of the regulatory framework within forest communities helps to explain why, in many of these communities, collaboration has been greeted with relative enthusiasm compared to the cool reception the concept has received among forest activists.

Beginning in the 1940s, federal policies, such as the 1944 Sustained Yield Act (SYA), aimed to provide for community stability by securing the access of private timber companies to federal logs (Hibbard 1999).⁸ Hibbard notes that even in the 1940s there were questions regarding this strategy's capacity to achieve long term community stability. History appears to have proven the skeptics correct. After the recession of the early 1980s the timber industry entered into a period of significant restructuring in order to remain competitive in an increasingly global wood products economy. Timber companies automated, downsized to reduce their labor costs and consolidated operations (Marchak 1995, Foster 1993). Despite the fact that timber harvests from the national forest system reached record highs in the 1980s (Wilkinson 1992), restructuring of the Northwest timber industry actually led to a reduction of employment during the decade. In the Northwest in the late 1970s, 534 sawmills employed 200,000 workers. By 1988 the number of mills had fallen to 453 and the number of people employed by those mills to 160,000 (Hibbard and Elias 1993).

Following on the heels of industry restructuring, the offensive of forest activists in the late 1980s and early 1990s, highlighted by the Spotted Owl legal case, contributed to the anxiety of rural forest communities. Forest communities feared that the environmental protections required by environmental regulations would lead to further reductions in employment. This fear was partially fueled by timber industry estimates that claimed that protecting the Northern Spotted Owl alone could cost up to 100,000 jobs (Foster 1993).⁹ Concern within communities that jobs were on the line led to increased activity in the

Timber Wars as activists attempting to protect forests clashed with community residents worried about feeding their families (Brown 1995, Helvarg 1994, Bari 1994).

The 1980s and 1990s have left forest communities with the sense that federal rules for forest management have failed to adequately address community concerns (Gray and Kusel 1998, Communities Committee 1997). Through much of the last two decades, this perception of abandonment made the rural forest communities of the Northwest and northern California receptive grounds for movements like the Sagebrush Rebellion and the Wise Use movement that champion local control. But while calls for local control make for fiery rhetoric, local control movements have won few substantial changes to policy or land management. Tired of seeing communities fight losing battles, collaboration advocates in rural communities see place-based collaborations as a “third way” where the interests of both communities and forest activists can be served (Gray and Kusel 1998, Communities Committee 1997).

Explaining the Forest Activist Movement

From this point forth, this study focuses on forest activists and how they relate to the three case study collaborations. To better understand these relationships, this section takes a look at the development of the forest activist movement and briefly discusses the philosophical underpinnings of the forest activism. Understanding individual activists and organizations in terms of the historical and philosophical contexts of forest activism helps to explain how they relate to the concept of place-based collaboration.

As is noted in Chapter I, forest activists are best characterized as a subset of the larger environmental movement. Addressing all of the different branches within the environmental movement, and the various different environmental themes on which they focus, is beyond the scope of this study.¹⁰ Forest activists are associated with the “conservationist”¹¹ branch of the environmental movement. Historical works generally credit the conservation movement as being the oldest branch within U.S. environmentalism (Gottlieb 1993, Sale 1993, Nash 1982). Activist groups that focus on issues such as pollution control, energy conservation and international environmental protection generally did not emerge until the 1960s. In contrast, the Sierra Club was founded in 1892, the National Audubon Society in 1905, the Wilderness Society in 1935, and the National Wildlife Federation in 1936 (Sale 1993).

Chroniclers such as Gottlieb and Nash note the elitist nature of the early conservation groups. In the first half of the 20th century, conservation groups were the domain of relatively wealthy, politically conservative individuals who typically used the organizations to promote, and provide for, recreation interests. This legacy of perceiving of forests as a place for people to play but not live or work haunts forest activism today. Many observers criticize forest activists as being uninterested in the concerns of the human world and especially unappreciative of working class rural people (Cronon 1995, White 1995, Foster 1993).

Politically, the early conservation movement took few controversial stances and didn't fight tough political battles. This began to change in the 1950s as the conservation movement – particularly The Wilderness Society and the David Brower-led Sierra Club –

emerged from its relatively passive shell to challenge the building of dams in the Colorado River system (Gottlieb 1993). The movement became increasingly politicized in the 1960s and 1970s. This evolution positioned the national conservation organizations to take a leading role in the shaping the national forest regulatory framework. In the early 1970s the older groups were joined by new organizations such as the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (SCLDF)¹² and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (Sale 1993). Unlike member driven organizations, SCLDF, NRDC and similar groups were strongly controlled by staffs made up of lawyers, scientists and other professionals (Gottlieb 1993). The professional nature of these groups made them particularly well suited to operate in high-level policy arenas and the judicial system, and to shape and utilize the regulatory framework.

Concern regarding the professional, Washington, DC focus of the national organizations led to a grassroots backlash that has significantly shaped forest activism (Gottlieb 1993, Scare 1990, Manes 1990). Starting on a large scale in the 1980s, grassroots activists became increasingly independent from the national groups. Many grassroots activists stuck with traditional forest protection tools such as lobbying elected officials, monitoring Forest Service activities and legal action. Other activists, however, felt these tools to be inadequate and began to use – often under the banner of Earth First! – tactics of civil disobedience and “monkeywrenching” to halt logging operations.¹³ For both Earth First!ers and less flamboyant activists, the rise of the grassroots provided for a level of autonomy at the local level that has allowed grassroots activists to set their agendas independent of the strategies of national organizations.¹⁴ Drawing upon this

history of tension between grassroots and national level forest activists, some observers have highlighted the conflicts between grassroots activists who champion collaboration and national organizations critical of the concept (Braxton-Little 1997, Marston 1997).

A widely held hypothesis for why most forest activists approach collaboration skeptically is that activists are generally unwilling to compromise with other forest management stakeholders whose concerns focus more on the “human world”. This argument is not without merit. As previously noted, forest protection organizations have long been accused of having a narrow view of the role of humans in nature; some prominent forest activists have even issued statements that are outright misanthropic.¹⁵ Earth First! has popularized steadfastness within activist circles with its slogan “no compromise in defense of Mother Earth” (Manes 1990). As is discussed later, a number of forest activists put forth no compromise arguments when they criticize collaboration.

In his 2000 piece “The New Conservationists”, O’Toole argues that the “no compromise” mentality illustrates the rise to dominance within forest activist circles of a once small “preservationist” wing. He contends that in the early 20th century, conservationists – who in the spirit of Pinchot believed in the “wise use” of resources and that nature could benefit from human management – were the dominant voice in efforts to protect forests in the U.S. Today O’Toole sees place-based collaboration as part of a new movement that returns to the themes of early conservationists, and which takes advantage of community level participation to manage resources. In comparison, he characterizes preservationists as believing in a “nature knows best” philosophy and feeling that human management is generally harmful to nature. O’Toole argues that over

the last three decades forest activists have become increasingly uncompromising in their “nature knows best”, anti-management views, and that they use the regulatory framework to uniformly apply these ideals to resource management across the nation.

While it is valid to acknowledge the existence of a “no compromise” element within the forest activist community, to claim that this philosophy dominates forest activism is an oversimplification. If it were so, few activists would pay collaborations the favor of consideration, yet many – even some that are highly critical – are not dismissive of collaboration. Instead of a monolithic ideology, forest activism, as well as the general environmental movement, has a variety of philosophical influences. Some concepts – such as Leopold’s (1966) land ethic, bioregionalism (Durning 1996, Sale 1991), and environmental justice (Lazarus 1994) – envision new models of human inhabitation of nature based upon respect for the non-human world and ecologically sustainable, self-determining communities. These concepts provide philosophical support to activists who might be inclined to participate in place-based collaborations.¹⁶

Forest Activists and Place-Based Collaboration

Forest activists and other environmentalists have produced a large collection of materials documenting their concerns regarding place-based collaborations for the management of national forests and other resources. Despite collaboration advocates’ arguments that the concept promotes local participation in resource management and not local control, these materials reveal that many activists are especially suspicious that collaborations place too much authority at the local level and are prone to industry

domination. Common in activist critiques is a concern that, in the name of local level participation, collaborations will lead to the weakening of the environmental regulatory frameworks.

The critiques offered by activists also reveal that they are concerned that collaborations for resource management tend to not provide for all of the characteristics of “good collaborations” as discussed in Chapter II. An examination of the activists’ critiques further reveals that activists share with the academic critics discussed in Chapter II some of the same concerns about collaboration and the increased localization of resource management.

The Activist Critique of Collaboration

The most prominent activist critic of collaboration is Mike McCloskey, the now retired Chair of the Sierra Club. In a 1996 letter to the Sierra Club board, which was later reprinted in the *High Country News*, McCloskey said:

Industry thinks its odds are better in these forums. It is ready to train its experts in mastering this process. It believes it can dominate them over time and relieve itself of tough national rules. It has a way of generating pressure in communities where it is strong, which it does not have at the national level. (7)

Other forest activist leaders also express concern about the role of industry. Andy Kerr (1998), formerly of the Oregon Natural Resources Council (ONRC), calls participation in collaborations by those with financial concerns in the outcome “unethical”. Jim Britell (1997) of the Kalmiopsis (OR) Audubon Society contends:

Environmental conflict over public land issues arises from extractive industries trying to convert into their gain public assets and resources that belong to all

generations. The best approach is to confront and expose their schemes, not to sit down and play patty cake with the small amount of pie that is left. (11)

A central worry of activists regarding participating in collaborations with industry concerns potential power inequalities between industry and activist stakeholders. Kenney (2000), Britell (1997) and McCloskey (1996) all express concern over the tendency of the activist community to be represented in collaborations by volunteers while industry concerns are represented by paid employees. These observers note that volunteer activists often have neither the time nor money to fully participate in collaborative processes that often take months, or even years, to be completed. Kenney cites the comments of volunteer activist Michael Black:

It is extremely difficult for citizens to take the time and money to participate.... Personally I become frustrated when I take the time and effort to attend these meetings, and look around the room and realize that I am the only person present not getting paid to attend. Volunteer resources only go so far. (45)

Activists also worry that better skilled industry representatives will manipulate activists who are poorly prepared to participate in collaborations. Felice Pace (1996) of northern California's Klamath Forest Alliance has warned of the risk of "coercive harmony", where the cooperative atmosphere of collaborations leads activists to make sacrifices they would not make under other conditions. Britell (1997) argues that activists are ill suited to participate in collaborations because they are seldom trained in the art of negotiation. He states:

Successfully appealing timber sales or serving as the President of a local volunteer environmental group is no preparation for serving on local [collaborative] groups and conducting face to face negotiations with people who may be professionally trained negotiators. (1)

Forest activists and other environmentalists also contend that it is extremely difficult for place-based collaborations to be inclusive of all stakeholders. As shown in the next two chapters, both the Applegate Partnership and Quincy Library Group have been criticized for being unwelcoming to various stakeholders, but cases of explicit exclusion and discouraged participation are only part of this concern. McCloskey argues that instead of empowering stakeholders, the localized nature of place-based collaborations disempowers environmental constituencies since most activists do not reside in the rural areas where collaborations are based. He contends that the fact that collaborative activities typically take place in distant rural locales which are hard to reach for most urban based activists often stifles activist participation.

Many activists believe that what extractive industries hope to gain from collaboration is local control of resources – in essence a revival of the Sagebrush Rebellion. With local control in place, University of Oregon law professor Mike Axline (1999) contends that industry will receive preferential treatment from sympathetic localities. McCloskey (1996) states that he wants to know “whether these collaborators are acting in an advisory role...or whether they are being given power” (7). He contends that if collaborations have decision making power “small local minorities” will have an “effective veto” over the national majority’s will regarding lands owned by the entire U.S. populous. Regarding the Western Governors Association Enlibra Principles,¹⁷ in which place-based collaboration is a central tenet, Tom Turner (1999) of the Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund states, “The [sagebrush] rebels are back, with kinder, gentler, quasi-

libertarian rhetoric and arguments that sound reasonable until you scrape off the gloss and look underneath” (M5).

Under the scenario of industry-dominated collaborations gaining local control of resource management, activists fear that laws that make up the fabric of the national forest regulatory framework – such as the Wilderness Act, NEPA, the ESA, and the NFMA – will be eroded (Kenney 2000). Louis Blumberg (1999) of The Wilderness Society¹⁸ argues that these laws were put into place specifically to guard against the excesses and abuses of local power. He states, “Our system of national environmental laws was designed precisely to ensure that national interests would be properly represented so that local interests wouldn’t manage public resources in an unsustainable manner” (92). Robin Silver, an Arizona activist, expresses his worry that with the erosion of environmental laws activists will lose access to the courts where they have made important gains over the years. Silver expresses his fear stating, “The reality is if there was not environmental litigation, there would be no progress and no true results” (quoted in Yoziwak 1998, A16).

Lastly, many activists express views similar to Paulson’s contention from chapter II that fundamental conflicts of values between stakeholders often prevent consensus-driven collaborations from reaching effective agreements. Kerr (2000) states, “Consensus can work in certain limited situations, say for a group of climbers seeking an agreeable route to ascend a peak. It will not work when some want to save the mountain’s forests and others want to clearcut it” (2). Other activists argue that collaborations may reach agreements but that, in the interest of political stability, these

agreements are often not scientifically sound or technically feasible. Of the collaborative Oregon Plan for salmon recovery Tim Hermach (1998) of the Native Forest Council states, "Collaboration, however well intended, is not science. Today's voluntary agreement made to escape the obligation of law, is tomorrow's dead salmon and fouled stream" (D5).¹⁹ More succinctly, environmental author Marc Riesner (1999) said of collaborations, "We waste tons of money on solutions that everyone can buy into, but don't really work" (30).

Is There Any Optimism About Collaboration?

As is noted earlier in this chapter, the forest activist community is not devoid of optimism regarding collaboration. However the optimism is often muted and by no means universal.

Among those activists who have expressed guarded optimism is Louis Blumberg who in 1998, with Wilderness Society colleague Darrell Knuffke, said:

We must say from the outset that The Wilderness Society believes in consensus building...Local collaboratives are valued in the first instance as a means to defuse tensions, build understanding, and engender tolerance for differences of view and perspective – to wean the best minds away from warfare and toward consensus. (41)

In a 1993 piece Felice Pace of the Klamath Forest Alliance also expressed that he was "cautiously optimistic" regarding collaboration. At that time Pace stated that the timber industry "can be counted on only to promote their own self interests", but that some in the industry have come to realize that there are cases where "corporate interests and the interest of the ecosystem overlap" (1). Since 1993 Pace has been an outspoken

critic of both the QLG and the Applegate Partnership. However, in an interview for this study Pace expressed that he remains optimistic about collaborative processes.

However, other activists are devoid of enthusiasm for collaboration. Many of these activists represent the “no compromise”, “radical” end of the forest activist spectrum.²⁰ Former ONRC leader Kerr (2000) describes collaborations as tools for elected officials and resource management agency personnel to avoid responsibility, and for special interests to protect their concerns. He discounts the value of compromise stating, “The solution of cutting the baby in half results in a dead baby” (2). Britell of the Kalmiopsis Audubon Society goes to the extent of saying that throughout history attempts to achieve win-win solutions in highly charged situations have usually ended in failure. He states:

In fact it is arguable that of most turning points in human history where great issues of human freedom are at stake, in-your-face confrontation saved the day. On the other hand, when key turning points were resolved with win-win solutions like Chamberlain used at Munich on the eve of World War II, the greatest human calamities have ensued. (quoted in Kenney 2000, 43)

University of Kansas law professor George Cameron Coggins (1998) shares the pessimism of Kerr and Britell regarding collaboration. While Coggins acknowledges that the current regulatory framework may have flaws he contends that collaborations are not the way to address the regulatory framework’s failings. Coggins states, “The flaws in the current legal system will not and cannot be cured by the New Age wishful thinking that believes all problems can be solved by just sitting down and talking. The lamb may lie down with the lion, but it will not get much sleep” (33).

The proceeding discussion should serve as a lesson to collaboration advocates interested in encouraging activist participation in collaborative activities. While collaborations may be able to be structured to address the concerns of some activists, there will be those who are steadfastly opposed to the collaboration concept and it is highly unlikely these activists will become collaborative partners.

Discussion

This chapter has addressed a number of points that are central to this study. It has discussed how in the latter half of the 20th century, forest activists successfully pushed for a variety of legislative acts that fundamentally reshaped the national forest regulatory framework. The discussion of the Spotted Owl case demonstrates how activists were able to use the laws of the regulatory framework to bring about substantial federal forest logging reductions in the name of ecological concerns throughout the Northwest and northern California. While the reductions in timber harvests throughout the region illustrates the capacity of activists to use the regulatory framework to suit their purposes, the chapter also touches on how the experience of forest communities with the regulatory framework has been much different. The execution of forest protection laws has contributed to anxiety in forest communities and for this reason many in rural communities tend to be highly receptive to alternative approaches for forest management – such as collaboration.

This chapter also demonstrates that concerns about place-based collaborations – such as worries that they may lead to local control, excessive timber industry influence in

federal forest management and an assault on the regulatory framework – are pervasive throughout the forest activist movement. However, the chapter also shows that the forest activist movement is not monolithic. While activists are generally skeptical about collaboration, some are more willing to consider the concept than others.

The next two chapters examine the Applegate Partnership and the Quincy Library Group. These chapters illustrate that when collaborations openly challenge the regulatory framework and fail to abide by the themes of “good collaborations”, forest activists – ardent critics and cautious optimists alike – become generally unified in opposition to the collaborations’ activities. Chapter VI discusses the Lake County Community Sustainability Initiative and shows that, unlike the other two case studies, forest activists can be brought into the collaborative process when the regulatory framework is respected and collaboration organizers foster an open and inclusive atmosphere.

Notes

¹ In addition to timber, the other national forest management priorities established under MUSYA include outdoor recreation, range, watershed, wildlife, and fish management (Coggins, Leshy and Wilkinson 1993).

² The fact that the Wilderness Act allowed grazing to continue in wilderness areas is a criticism often raised by forest activists and other environmentalists. Nash (1982) notes that upon passage in 1964 wilderness proponents expressed disappointment the act respected mining claims in wilderness areas until 1984 and that only nine million of the 60 million acres that were once considered for designation were given formal wilderness status.

³ In addition to national forests, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) controls nearly three million acres of federal forests on Oregon's west side. While the Dwyer injunction only applied to national forests, the FEMAT worked to develop a plan applicable to both national forest and BLM land.

⁴ While the timber industry complains of harvests that are too small, many forest activists say that the cut remains too high under the NFP. For example, the Forest Water Alliance – a coalition of twenty-one forest and watershed protection groups – criticizes the USFS and BLM claiming that they clearcut 7,032 acres of old growth forests in 1997 (Carrel 1998).

⁵ For example – in the case of the west side old growth forests – publications began to demonstrate that old growth forests of the Northwest were significantly more ecologically complex than younger forests, were the exclusive home to organisms that had yet to be catalogued but were endangered because of over exploitation of their habitat and that the forests stored a significant amount of carbon and therefore helped to regulate the global climate. For a sample of the science that was available in the early 1990s see Waring and Franklin (1979), Kelly and Braasch (1988), Maser (1988) and Norse (1990).

⁶ In the early 1990s, forest activists were using well tested legal strategies to slow logging on the east side. Administrative appeals were filed challenging whether the east side's NFMA required "forest plans" complied with the law. Cases were brought to require Environmental Impact Statements be completed by the Forest Service on a timber sale by timber sale basis. According to the Forest Service, in the 1991 fiscal year the agency was only able to meet about 40 percent of its harvest goals due to the delaying tactics used by activists (Robertson 1991).

⁷ The East Side Screens prohibit the cutting of trees over 21 inches in diameter on federal land; PACFISH and INFISH protect anadromous and nonanadromous fish respectively by restricting management activities in riparian areas (Mosley and Kauffman 2000).

⁸ The actual on-the-ground implications of the SYA were limited, but like the MUSYA of a decade and a half later, the SYA's spirit proved to have longer lasting implications than the act itself. Under the SYA the federal government attempted to entice timber companies to establish permanent sawmill operations in rural areas by promising to limit competition for federal timber from rivals whose operations were outside the area of "sustained yield units" (Hibbard 1999). The act also required for annual harvest levels to be no greater than could be replaced by growth (Hibbard 1999). The federal government anticipated that rural towns would grow up around the sawmills and thrive with timber-based economies. In all only six sustained yield units were established under the act and in 1957 the Forest Service announced that it would authorize no new units (Cheek 1996). Despite the relatively limited application of the SYA, the act did help to set the trend of changing the logging industry in the Northwest and northern California from one based upon nomadic production and itinerant labor to one based upon hundreds of "permanent" sawmills supporting small rural towns throughout region.

⁹ In 1998 the *Portland Oregonian* reported that 10,300 forest products industry jobs had been lost in Oregon and Washington between 1991 and 1998 (Bernton 1999).

¹⁰ Other branches of the environmental movement include – but are not limited to – activism focused on pollution and human health issues that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s with Rachel Carson's publication of *Silent Spring* and the first Earth Day (Sale 1993, Gottlieb 1993), the environmental justice movement which focuses on the empowerment of poor – often minority dominated – communities so that the communities can address the environmental issues they face (Lazarus 1994), and the international movement surrounding issues of environment, development, economic justice and human rights (Friends of the Earth 2000, Fifty Years Is Enough 2000, Sachs 1995).

¹¹ Using the term "conservationists" to describe these activists is somewhat confusing. Resource managers, following in the legacy of Gifford Pinchot who purportedly coined the term conservation (Hirt 1994), also claim the label as theirs. Many observers use the term conservationist to describe actors who advocate the "wise use" of resources, and terms like "preservationists" and "environmentalists" to describe protection-oriented actors such as the forest activists discussed in this study. However, many resource-oriented environmentalists, including the likes of Earth First! founder Dave Foreman, claim the conservationist identifier to distinguish themselves from environmentalists that focus on issues of the human environment (Foreman 1996/1997). Many activists interviewed for this study also stated they prefer the conservationist label.

¹² The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund has since changed its name to the Earth Justice Legal Defense Fund.

¹³ Many Earth First!ers felt themselves to be at odds with “mainstream” activists over more than just tactics. In the 1980s the concepts of “ecocentrism” and “deep ecology”, which advocate seeing the world from the “ecological perspective” (Sessions 1995, ix) as well as fundamental changes to societal institutions to bring about societies that exist in harmony with nature (Naess 1986), grew in popularity. These concepts resonated particularly strongly with Earth First! activists, who increasingly saw mainstream activists as too “anthropocentric” and “shallow” in their ecological thinking (Sessions 1995, Manes 1990, Naess 1986).

¹⁴ Over the course of the interviews conducted for this study, a variety of activists shared the perception that in recent years much of the tension between grassroots activists and national groups has been relieved. These activists generally credit regional and statewide groups – such as Headwaters, the Oregon Natural Resources Council and the California Wilderness Coalition – for serving as a bridge to bring national activists and the grassroots together.

¹⁵ For example, Earth First! founder Foreman stated (and later retracted) that “the best thing would be...to let the people over there just starve,” with regard to the Ethiopian famine of the 1980s (Bookchin and Foreman 1991, 108).

¹⁶ Of course it should be kept in mind that activists being disposed toward the idea of collaboration does not mean that most activists won’t typically require that certain parameters – many of which will be discussed in the next section – be met in order to secure a cooperative agreement.

¹⁷ Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber (D) and Utah Governor Mike Leavitt (R) developed the Enlibra Principles in an effort to create a “balanced” approach to environmental and natural resource issues. The principles were officially adopted as a policy of the Western Governors Association (WGA) in July 1999. According to the WGA (2000), the Enlibra principles:

...form the basis of a new shared doctrine for environmental management. The doctrine speaks to greater participation and collaboration in decision making, focuses on outcomes rather than just programs, and recognizes the need for a variety of tools beyond regulation that will improve environmental and natural resource management.

¹⁸ Since the publication of his writings discussed in this section, Blumberg has left The Wilderness Society for a position with the California Department of Forestry.

¹⁹ It is common for all sides in the debates regarding forest management and collaboration – from forest activists to timber industry representatives, collaboration proponents and opponents alike – to say that the “best science” must be used in the process of making management decisions. However, what a particular stakeholder considers to be the “best science” depends upon the values of importance to that stakeholder. For example, a forest activist concerned primarily about wildlife habitat and a timber manager concerned about producing enough timber to service a sawmill will very likely have different concepts of the “best science”. Rittel and Webber (1973) call conflicts, such as forest management issues, that are based on value differences instead of technical matters “wicked problems”, and contend that such problems cannot be solved with technical or scientific expertise alone.

²⁰ Many activists in this camp advocate the passage of HR 1396, the National Forest Protection and Restoration Act. The bill’s primary objective is to end the commercial timber sale program on the national forests (U.S. Congress 1999). It is not difficult to understand why many activists that support such a position find it does not serve their interests to participate in collaborations where some stakeholders are invested in the USFS’s timber program.

CHAPTER IV

THE APPLGATE PARTNERSHIP

The Applegate Partnership focuses on the management of the lands – both public and private – in the Applegate Valley. The valley covers 496,500 acres and lies primarily in southwestern Oregon, straddling the California border. According to the Applegate Partnership's folklore, the idea of the collaboration originated in 1992 with an Applegate environmental activist¹ and the owner of a timber company that worked in the valley. The two unusual partners advocated an ecosystem management approach to managing the Applegate Valley that considered the entire landscape – including Forest Service, BLM and private holdings (Mosely 1999). As part of their vision, the partnership's initiators placed a great deal of emphasis on building a cooperative relationship among concerned stakeholders – including forest activists, timber industry interests, farmers and ranchers, local residents and federal land managers.

Members of the Applegate Partnership adamantly contend that the collaborative model is not an assault on the national forest regulatory framework (I-501, I-509).² One of the partnership's founders emphatically argues that the perceptions of many forest activists that collaborations threaten the regulatory framework and are foils for local control are nothing more than fantasy. This partnership leader states:

National environmentalists say that we have tried to replace environmental laws. Not true! National environmentalists manifest this. National environmentalists and regionals also manifest that locals are trying to take over. We don't want to

take over and the agencies [the Forest Service and the BLM] wouldn't let us if we did. (I-501)

The same person also argues that, over the Applegate Partnership's history, all interested parties – including national, regional and grassroots forest activists – have been invited to participate in all partnership activities. He says:

There is a standing offer to have the DC guy from The Wilderness Society come out and see what is going on on the ground...ONRC has had the offer to see what we are doing before they rail about it...the Sierra Club, Pacific Rivers Council, they have all been asked. (I-501)

Despite these claims, since its creation the Applegate Partnership has had a rocky relationship with the forest activist community. The high profile effort of the partnership to wean forest management stakeholders from confrontation to cooperation raised suspicion in forest activist circles that the partnership would sacrifice environmental safeguards in order to secure harmonious relationships with the timber industry and other stakeholders (Mosley 1999).

As is shown in this chapter, early actions of the collaboration served to fuel this suspicion. While circumstances have changed the partnership dramatically in recent years, concern that the collaboration does not respect the regulatory framework lingers among some activists, as does a feeling that the partnership does not warmly welcome the views and participation of a broad array of forest activists.

Geography and Demographics

Most of the Applegate Valley is split between Oregon's Jackson and Josephine counties. The California border bisects the southern extreme of the valley placing a small

portion in California's Siskiyou County. Ninety-eight percent of the Applegate's 12,500 people are Oregon residents (Reid and Young 1996). The Applegate is not near any major metropolitan area, although it is within commuting distance of three smaller population centers – Medford, Grants Pass and Ashland – with populations of 59,000, 20,600 and 19,000 respectively (Oregon Employment Department 2000a). The federal government owns 70 percent of the valley. The Forest Service manages just under 40 percent and the BLM just over 30 percent. There are a number of small communities in the valley, however none are incorporated and thus there are no municipal government structures.

Resource-based activities – such as timber, mining and agriculture – have dominated the Applegate since European American settlement began in the mid-19th century (KenCairn 1996). Since the 1970s the Applegate Valley has been a favorite destination of retirees and other “urban migrants” interested in leaving behind cities in favor of rural lives. These urban migrants often do not have ties to resource-based economic sectors, and their influx has diluted the economic importance of such sectors in the valley. However, Reid and Young's 1996 report³ on the economic and demographic characteristics of the valley found that Applegate residents considered the continued vitality of the forest products and agricultural sectors to be a significant economic concern.

With regard to income and unemployment statistics for the Applegate Valley, Reid and Young's report relies on 1989 figures and, therefore, the percentages and dollar amounts do not reflect today's conditions. However, Reid and Young do note that the

Applegate's unemployment and income levels in 1989 were roughly comparable to those of Jackson and Josephine counties as a whole. Assuming this correlation still applies, figures from the two counties can be used to assess the valley's economic condition. Analysis shows that both counties have unemployment rates higher than Oregon's statewide average. In 1998 the average monthly unemployment rate was 6.8 percent for Jackson County and 8.7 percent for Josephine County compared to the statewide average of 5.8 percent (Oregon Employment Department 2000a). In 1997 per capita annual income levels stood at \$21,933 for Jackson County and \$18,574 for Josephine County compared to \$23,920 for Oregon as a whole (Oregon Employment Department 2000a).⁴

Land Management History

A period of significant land exploitation – associated primarily with ranching and gold mining – subsided around 1900 leaving the valley to small and medium-sized timber and agricultural operations during the first half of the 20th century. During the 1950s and 1960s many of these small operators were eliminated due to competition from larger companies in increasingly competitive commodity markets. By the 1960s timber management on the Applegate's federal lands had shifted to mostly large-scale industrial production (KenCairn 1996).

The Applegate Valley was an early epicenter of the land management conflicts that had gripped the entire Northwest by the 1990s; at least in part this was due to the high proportion of urban migrants in the valley who readily expressed their environmental values. New residents participated in campaigns to end clearcutting and to

stop the use of herbicide sprays to remove undesirable vegetation from the federal forests (KenCairn 1996). Mosley (1999) shows that by 1992 there were seven grassroots organizations active in the Applegate Valley that focused on forest and other environmental issues. Activist groups that emerged in and around the Applegate Valley received support in their campaigns from established regional and national organizations such as the Oregon Natural Resources Council and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (KenCairn 1996).

The Northwest Forest Plan significantly impacted federal timber harvests in the Applegate. Reid and Young's 1996 report tracks timber harvests in the valley for the five-year period 1989-1994 and finds that harvests from federal land plummeted. In 1989, 61 million board feet (mmbf) of timber were harvested from the valley's federal land, 70 percent of the valley's total harvest. In 1994 the federal harvests had fallen to 7.67 mmbf, only 13 percent of total Applegate Valley harvests. Interestingly, the impact of the reduction in federal harvest was cushioned in many years by increased harvests from private forestland. For example, in 1991 – the year of the Dwyer decision – total harvests in the Applegate fell to just over 35 mmbf. However, in 1992 – while the Dwyer injunction was in effect – harvest levels climbed to over 100 mmbf, a high for the five year 1989-1994 period.

Beginnings of the Applegate Partnership

In early 1992 the Applegate Partnership's two initiators began to share their ideas with individuals they felt might be interested in their proposal for valley-wide ecosystem

management. In October of that same year they convened a meeting of a group of individuals representative of many of the stakeholder interests concerned about the management of the valley's lands.⁵ The result of this initial meeting was that eighteen people stepped forward to help refine an agreement on the sustainable management of the valley's forests and officially form the Applegate Partnership (KenCairn 1996).

In subsequent meetings the partnership agreed to a two paragraph vision. It states:

The Applegate Partnership is a community-based project involving industry, conservation groups, natural resource agencies and residents cooperating to encourage and facilitate the use of natural resource principles that promote ecosystem health and diversity.

Through community involvement and education, this partnership supports management of all lands within the watershed in a manner that sustains natural resources and that will, in turn, contribute to economic and community stability within the Applegate Valley. (Applegate Partnership 1992)

Until its vision was established, the partnership intentionally shunned media attention and avoided the scrutiny of high ranking land management agency officials. In December 1992 the partnership stepped out of the shadows when they invited the regional forester from the USFS and the head of the state office of the BLM to meet with the group (KenCairn 1996). Although the group was initially greeted cautiously by agency officials, the federal government eventually grew to embrace the partnership with enthusiasm. Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt was so enthralled with the partnership he championed it as a model for the Adaptive Management Areas established under the NFP (KenCairn 1996).⁶

Since its formation, the Applegate Partnership has been meeting on a weekly basis in an effort to realize its vision. However, as the following analysis demonstrates, the partnership has had difficulty achieving its goals in part due to a tense relationship with the forest activist community.

The Applegate Partnership-Forest Activist Relationship

An Early Controversy: The Partnership One Debacle

Given the context of the Applegate Partnership's formation, scrutiny of the group's activities from the forest activist community – particularly national and regional activists – was almost inevitable. In 1992 the federal lands on which the partnership focused had reached national notoriety as the locus of the Spotted Owl debate. Forest advocacy groups helped to raise the national profile of the debate by arguing that the Northwest's federal forests belong to all U.S. citizens, not just those that live and work in the area. Yet the partnership was made up entirely of stakeholders who lived or worked in the Applegate Valley or nearby areas (Applegate Partnership 1992). Considering that the Timber Wars were still raging, it is understandable that forest activists closely monitored the partnership as a potential tool of local control advocates who argued for weakening the regulatory framework.

Mosley (1999) notes that despite the membership of Headwaters, southwestern Oregon's highly respected forest advocacy group, in the Applegate Partnership, leading forest activist organizations – such as the Western Ancient Forest Campaign (WAFC)⁷ and ONRC – were suspicious of the partnership from its founding. Activists viewed the

most ambitious of the partnership's early projects, a timber sale called Partnership One, on the Rogue River National Forest, as justification for their concerns. Partnership One was seen as a dramatic, and potentially dangerous, departure from the norms of the regulatory framework. In the traditional timber sale process, federal managers design the sale and citizen oversight of the sale is governed by the public participation guidelines of NEPA. Conversely, the Partnership One process attempted to create a new model where members of a collaboration made up entirely of local interests intimately worked with federal land managers in the project's design.

Activists looked for irregularities in Partnership One and found them. Forest activists challenged Partnership One on the grounds that the timber sale skirted federal public participation rules. Activists argued that the terms of Partnership One were finalized without adequate opportunity for public comment, a violation of NEPA (Associated Press 1994a). As well, many expressed concern that if a timber firm involved with the partnership bid upon and won the sale the conflict of interest rules of the Federal Advisory Committees Act (FACA) would be violated (Nickelsburg 1998).⁸ Concern that FACA guidelines were being violated by federal agencies actively working with the partnership on land management decisions forced federal agency employees to officially withdraw from the partnership in the summer of 1994 (Associated Press 1994b). Arguing that NEPA and FACA had been violated, the Oregon Natural Resources Council and the Siskiyou Regional Education Project filed an administrative appeal of the timber sale. The Forest Service withdrew Partnership One from sale in November 1994 (Associated Press 1994a).

Partnership One also strained the Applegate Partnership's relationship with Headwaters, a relationship which had been tenuous from the start. An activist involved with Headwaters recounts that Headwaters and partnership disagreed conflicted regarding the necessity to do a watershed analysis as part of the environmental assessment of Partnership One (I-701). Concern about the sale contributed to what KenCairn (1996, 269) contends was intense pressure directed at Headwaters "from allied organizations [national and regional activists groups] openly hostile to the partnership," and Headwaters withdrew from the collaboration in the spring of 1994.

The departure of Headwaters left the partnership without formal ties to the forest activist community. A prominent Headwaters board member stayed with the partnership but not as a Headwaters representative (Mosley 1999, KenCairn 1996). Currently, the other three individuals filling official "environmental" positions on the Applegate Partnership as board members or alternates possess limited credentials within the forest activist community. One is an active member of a national environmental advocacy organization (I-507), but none of the activists interviewed in the course of this research – other than those that are active with the Applegate Partnership – volunteered his name as someone active on forest issues. A second individual is an independent activist with no close ties to any forest activist organizations (I-502), although she was spoken of highly by grassroots activists in the Applegate Valley not associated with the partnership (I-508a). The third individual appears to have no close connections to the activist community and went virtually unmentioned in interviews.⁹

Forest Activists and the Applegate Partnership Today

Since 1994 the character of the Applegate Partnership has substantially changed. Forest Service and BLM staff were briefly forced to not attend partnership meetings due to FACA concerns. While they have regained the federal government's blessing to participate, guidelines restrict how directly partnership members can take part in agency decisions and vice versa (Mosley 1999). Within these bounds, the partnership has evolved into a forum for dialogue between valley residents and agency officials regarding forest management.

Grassroots activists generally appreciate this function of the partnership. One Applegate Valley activist said:

It's great for the community that the partnership exists. The partnership is a place to learn about forest practices, to learn about the people who are actually doing the management. It's a place for the community to go and express their views. (I-504)

Another activist, whose philosophy and actions can be described as congruent with the ideals of Earth First!, said, "I actually have been going to the [partnership] meetings for a while and I have gotten a lot out of them. I think there is massive information sharing...it is a forum that exists to get a lot of information" (I-508a).

After Partnership One, the collaboration shifted much of its focus to private instead of public land issues. The partnership's private land work is conducted by the Applegate River Watershed Council (ARWC), a subcommittee of the partnership that is officially chartered by the state of Oregon as a watershed council. The ARWC works with private landowners in developing environmentally sound land management practices

(I-509). Many forest activists have greeted this shift in focus from public to private land issues favorably, with a staff person from a national forest protection group stating, "As I understand it the partnership dropped their push for their plans on public lands issues. They moved to private land which is in my opinion where collaborative processes work best" (I-607).

With the partnership's move away from shared decision making with the BLM and Forest Service, and its shift to private land issues, national and regional activists have largely turned their attention away from the partnership (I-607, I-702). However, many forest activists in the Applegate Valley and the surrounding area still view the partnership with suspicion. One local activist challenged the assertion made earlier in this chapter that the Applegate Partnership respects the national forest regulatory framework. He said, "The partnership has this ideology that you don't want to stick to the letter of the law...the law is there, but let's not get stuck with it" (I-701).

Grassroots activists also recount stories of partnership members employing the "coercive harmony" discussed by Pace in Chapter III to discourage activists from using confrontational forest protection tactics. For example, a number of activists interviewed recount a story of a forest activist involved with the partnership being chastised by other Applegate Partnership members for participating in a direct action against a timber sale in the Yale Creek watershed (I-502, I-508a, I-510). According to the activists, the crux of the argument against her participation was that individuals who participate in collaborative activities with federal agencies should not also participate in demonstrations against those same agencies.

Finally, some forest activists claim their participation and input is often discounted by the partnership in favor of more “mainstream” positions and harmony within the group.¹⁰ One collection of activists accused the partnership of being too “human-centered” and dismissive of activist’s “biocentric” views (I-508a, I-508b). One of the same activists contends that in the interest of harmony the partnership refuses to tackle tough issues. She states:

I don't go there wanting to make people mad at me, but we have salmon going extinct and we have the last of our old growth habitat being cut down...we are talking about life and death and people just want to be nice, saying we can agree to disagree. I think that they aren't willing to look very deeply...I think that their view is so narrow that they are not very creative and they are not trying very hard. (I-508a)

Another activist simply described the partnership as generally supporting “mainstream logging and ranching” (I-504).¹¹

Discussion

The case of the Applegate Partnership illustrates many of the pitfalls of place-based collaboration for federal forest management. These hurdles, which are largely a result of the partnership’s structure and actions, have made the partnership itself a source of conflict in addition to being a forum for stakeholders to address concerns about land management in the Applegate Valley.

The Partnership One story demonstrates that statements of “environmental friendliness” and the support of some local activists do not by themselves provide collaborations with credibility within the forest activist community. In the forest activist community, the partnership was on a sort of probation from the group’s inception. To

allay activist concerns, through its actions the collaboration needed to demonstrate its environmental friendliness and willingness to adhere to the rules of the regulatory framework. Instead Partnership One – the partnership's first major project – appeared to forest activists as a step beyond the bounds of the regulatory framework, and the wheels of conflict between activists and the partnership were set into motion.

The experience of the Applegate Partnership also demonstrates that, contrary to the contentions of collaboration proponents, collaborations can be viewed as exclusionary and disempowering. Within activist circles the partnership is considered to be less than receptive of the views of many activists.¹² Furthermore, as the brief discussion of the protest at Yale Creek shows, activists are concerned that in the name of collaboration the partnership discourages activists from engaging in confrontational tactics that have a proven track record. It should be noted that many activists who in interviews expressed concern about the exclusionary and disempowering nature of the partnership do not blame all partnership members but instead point to a small group of individuals as responsible for creating this atmosphere (I-502, I-503, I-504, I-508a, I-508c). These comments demonstrate how much of an impact the actions and personalities of a few individuals can have on a collaboration.

Finally, this chapter has also provided real life illustrations of the concerns voiced by Paulson in Chapter II and echoed by Hermach and Reisner in Chapter III that – in exchange for group harmony – collaborations are prone to develop agreements that may be considered weak and technically unsound by some to secure the consensus of collaboration partners. Chapter V further explores this critique by looking at the

contention that the Quincy Library Group's collaborative agreement relies on outdated science.

This chapter is not meant to leave the impression that activists consider the Applegate Partnership completely valueless. In fact, with few exceptions, activists did find positive things to say about the partnership. As is noted above, one interviewee who could accurately be described as a "radical" and "no compromise" forest activist finds the partnership to be a good learning venue. In interviews some of her like-minded compatriots expressed similar sentiments as well as support for community-based, decentralized approaches to forest management (I-508b, I-508c). Instead of lambasting the Applegate Partnership, the activist who described the group as supportive of mainstream logging and ranching says she has an interest in the partnership motivated by her years of studying bioregionalism, and offered suggestions as to how to improve the partnership (I-504). Finally, as is also illustrated above, a number of activists who have had a history of being critical of the partnership are supportive of the group's private land efforts (I-607, I-701, I-702).

The next chapter's discussion of the Quincy Library Group shows that many of the critiques offered of the Applegate Partnership are also directed at the QLG. In the face of criticism the QLG has remained defiant and much more brazen than the Applegate Partnership has ever been in their efforts to see their vision implemented. The QLG's aggressiveness has led to a level of conflict between the collaboration and forest activists that is leaps and bounds beyond the Applegate Partnership's experience.

Notes

¹ The case of this individual illustrates the difficulty of confirming an actor's activist credentials. While the story told by the partnership and many other observers refers to this person as an "environmentalist" and touts his experience as a forest advocate, the person is not an active part of any established forest activist organization. In fact many activists who are well established in the forest activist community disavow this person.

² Some (although not all) persons interviewed for this study requested that their responses be kept confidential. Therefore interview quotes and references do not acknowledge the interviewee by name and the respondent is identified by a code that includes the letter "T" followed by three digits (I-999 for example). Interview transcripts are kept on file with the author. In some instances, withholding the name does not fully conceal the person's identity. In each case where this occurs, the person in question had not requested confidentiality.

³ Since the Applegate Valley is split between two counties, demographic information for the valley is difficult to obtain. Two reports have been conducted in the last six years to assess the Applegate's demographic characteristics, Priester's 1994 *Words into Action: A Community Assessment of the Applegate Valley* and Reid and Young's 1996 *Analysis of Demographic and Economic Aspects of the Applegate Watershed*.

⁴ 1997 income data and 1998 unemployment figures were the most recent available from the Oregon Employment Department.

⁵ Hoping to keep the meeting from degenerating into a battle between adversaries, those facilitating the meeting asked that participants not identify themselves by the organization or interest group with which they were associated (KenCairn 1996).

⁶ Adaptive Management Areas are zones within Spotted Owl habitat where innovative "development and testing of technical and social approaches to achieve desired ecological, economic and other social objectives" is encouraged (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1997).

⁷ WAFC is now known as the American Lands Alliance.

⁸ While perhaps conceptually justified, this concern proved unwarranted in the Partnership One case. As it was finally devised, the Partnership One timber sale was also greeted reluctantly by the timber industry. Believing that the sale was not profitable, timber companies chose to not bid on the sale when it was initially offered (Mosley 1999).

⁹ Three of the four “environmental” participants in the partnership were interviewed for this study. Only the final individual noted in this discussion was not interviewed.

¹⁰ A case that a number of activists mentioned in interviews as indicative of the partnership’s “moderate bias” was the Scattered Apples timber sale proposed for the Williams Creek Watershed in the Applegate Valley. As part of the NEPA process, members of the Williams Creek Watershed Council – and others from the community of Williams – submitted a “restoration only” alternative to the BLM. Among the alternative’s recommendations was a call for a five year logging moratorium in the watershed (Williams Creek Watershed Council 1998). Supporters of the moratorium approached the Applegate Partnership and asked for the partnership’s endorsement of the alternative. According to one partnership participant, the moratorium’s proponents made a strong case for their proposal, but the partnership chose to not issue an endorsement (I-510). Another partnership participant explained why the group did not offer an endorsement:

In Williams one of their goals is to have no commercial harvest. A lot of the members [of the partnership] can’t agree to that.... Since we have to reach consensus on decisions, if some of the members don’t agree we are in a position where we can’t say the partnership supports the proposal. (I-509)

¹¹ While forest activists may contend that the Applegate Partnership is oriented toward activities like logging, since the mid-1990s support from timber companies for the partnership has been lacking. Mosley (1999) notes that a variety of factors have contributed to limited industry participation. First, many timber interests felt that the partnership was not facilitating increased harvests. Second, as the passage of the Timber Salvage Rider in the 104th Congress demonstrates, the election of a Republican Congress made some in the timber community feel that they could have their needs met in venues other than the negotiating table. Finally, due to downsizing of the timber industry, dues payments to the Southern Oregon Timber Industries Association (SOTIA) – the industry umbrella group that represents timber companies at the partnership – decreased in the 1990s and SOTIA had less financial capacity to participate in the partnership. Today, SOTIA remains a partnership member but their participation is relatively limited.

¹² The same activist who states that she is more concerned about “life and death” issues than “being nice” also laments that while that she feels her views are discounted by the partnership, when a timber industry representative is expected at a partnership meeting partnership members tend to become excited (I-508a).

CHAPTER V

THE QUINCY LIBRARY GROUP

As with the Applegate Partnership, the nucleus of the Quincy Library Group was formed in 1992 by a collection of odd bedfellows. In the QLG case, the initiators included a rural county commissioner and long time timber industry ally, a representative of a large timber company and an environmental attorney. By early 1993 the group had grown beyond the original three and no longer could fit comfortably in the lawyer's office. Meetings began being held in the library in the town of Quincy – the county seat of Plumas County, California – and hence the collaboration's name. Stories differ as to why the collaboration chose the library for its meetings. Some accounts say it was because it was of adequate size, others say it was because the library was the only location where long time adversaries would not fight with one another and still others contend that it simply had a room available (Marston 1997).

Like the Applegate Partnership, leaders of the Quincy Library Group largely dismiss the criticisms leveled at the QLG by forest activists. The attorney who helped found the group argues that the QLG is neither about local control nor a threat to the national forest regulatory framework stating, "We don't have control; we have to conform to NEPA" (I-603a). He also contends that, contrary to the widely expressed concerns of forest activists, it is the timber industry that has been co-opted by activists through the collaborative process, not vice versa. He says, "We use them [the timber

industry] for ecosystem management.... To me they are a tool; if they are not a tool for ecosystem management then their day is done" (I-603a). Furthermore, the QLG contends that forest activists are welcome to participate in QLG activities. Of one of the QLG's activist critics, the attorney says, "She could have tried to be involved at the steering committee level and move the group in a different direction, but she didn't do that" (I-603a).

As the QLG emerged in 1992 and 1993, a number of activists involved with forest issues in the Sierra Nevada expressed reserved enthusiasm about the QLG's collaborative nature and the group's land management plan. However, as is shown in this chapter, the forceful approach the QLG used to win the implementation of their plan raised concerns within the activist community about the implications of the QLG. After the QLG chose to pursue a legislative avenue for the enactment of the plan, forest activist support for the group's efforts quickly eroded. An extremely divisive conflict between forest activists – including national and regional forest advocacy organizations as well as most grassroots activists – ensued in response to the QLG's foray into the legislative arena. The result of this conflict is that, instead of facilitating a cooperative forum where a diversity of stakeholders work toward mutually agreeable solutions, the QLG has catalyzed a classic political battle.¹

Geography and Demographics

The majority of QLG members either reside or have business interests in Plumas County. At 4.5 hours from Sacramento by car, and six hours from San Francisco, Quincy

is isolated from California's urban centers. While the QLG is identified with the town of Quincy and Plumas County, the landscape with which the QLG is concerned extends well beyond the boundaries of either. The Quincy Library Group plan was devised to be applied to the Plumas and Lassen National Forests, as well as the Sierraville Ranger District of the Tahoe National Forest. In all, the Quincy Library Group area consists of 2.5 million acres – about a third of the Sierra Nevada range (Marston 1997, Duane 1997).

The QLG land base covers national forest lands in a number of counties, including all of the national forests in Plumas, Lassen and Sierra counties. In each of these three counties, the U.S. government is the owner of the majority of the land. Plumas County is 75 percent federally owned, compared to 59 percent and 54 percent of Sierra and Lassen counties respectively (Coates 1999).

Poverty has persistently plagued the communities of the northern Sierra Nevada. According to the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project's report to Congress (1996), despite increases in timber harvests during the 1980s, poverty did not decrease in the region. Examining per capita income levels and unemployment rates demonstrates that the weakness of the northern Sierra Nevada economy persisted into the late 1990s. In 1999 Plumas County had an unemployment rate of nine percent compared to the state average of 5.3 percent. In terms of per capita income, the 1997 level for Plumas County was more than \$3,300 below the state average – \$21,953 versus \$25,298 (California Department of Finance 2000b).² The figures for Sierra and Lassen counties are similar. Sierra County had a 9.5 percent unemployment rate in 1999, and a 1997 per capita income level of \$20,573 (California Department of Finance 2000c). In Lassen County

unemployment stood at seven percent for 1999, and per capita income in 1997 was a mere \$14,502 – the third lowest average of the state's 60 counties (California Department of Finance 2000a).

Land Management History

The Quincy Library Group area has long been tied to the timber industry. In the early 20th century Quincy was home to the Red River Lumber Company, one of that era's largest wood products companies on the west coast (Marston 1997). Logging of the area's national forests has been extensive. The Lassen National Forest provides an illustration. In 1908, when the forest was first designated, 70 percent of its trees were over 30 inches in diameter indicating they had reached maturity. Throughout the century logging removed most of the older, larger, more economically valuable trees and by 1997, only 13 percent of the Lassen's trees were over 30 inches in diameter (Marston 1997).

Today, Sierra Pacific Industries (SPI) runs Quincy's only commercial sawmill. In addition to purchasing national forest timber, SPI owns 1.3 million acres of private forest placing the company in competition with media mogul Ted Turner for the title of the largest private landowner in the nation (Draffan 1999). In 1999 SPI owner Red Emerson ranked 161st on *Forbes* list of the 400 richest U.S. citizens (Draffan 1999).

As happened in the Applegate Valley, in the northern Sierra Nevada, the Timber Wars reached their apex in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Plumas County a small but active local group of forest activists – called Friends of Plumas Wilderness – came

together to challenge the timber industry and the Forest Service's timber program (Marston 1997). As was also the case in the Applegate Valley, the local grassroots activists were provided with support from national organizations such as The Wilderness Society, Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council (Marston 1997). In the Sierra Nevada the Timber Wars reached their climax in 1993 with the imposition of the California Spotted Owl guidelines (which are discussed in Chapter III).

The CASPO guidelines were another blow to an already reeling timber-dependent economy in the area. As happened throughout the Northwest and northern California beginning in the 1980s, SPI automated its Quincy mill and downsized its workforce in order to remain competitive in the global wood products industry (Duane 1997). Automation, combined with the CASPO guidelines and the simple fact that the area's most valuable trees had already been liquidated, made the long term viability of timber-based economies in the northern Sierra Nevada tenuous at best.

Beginnings of the Quincy Library Group

As mentioned above, the seed of the QLG was planted in the fall of 1992 when a Plumas County supervisor – and long time timber industry supporter – along with an official from Sierra Pacific Industries approached an environmental attorney who helped lead Friends of Plumas Wilderness (Marston 1997). In anticipation of restrictions on logging under the CASPO guidelines, their goal was to solicit the attorney's assistance in the development of a plan on which they could each agree for the management of the area's national forests (Marston 1997, Duane 1997).

The QLG quickly grew to include over 30 people on its steering committee, including elected officials, timber industry representatives, local forest activists,³ scientists, educators and union representatives. After months of meetings they issued their ambitious plan known as the Community Stability Proposal (Marston 1997). Based upon a plan originally put forward by Friends of Plumas Wilderness in 1986, provisions of the Community Stability Proposal (Quincy Library Group 1993) include:

- 1) The reduction of clearcuts and implementation of group selection harvesting (mini-clearcuts of only one to three acres) and individual tree selection. Using such techniques, the number of forest acres available for timber harvesting would be increased.
- 2) The creation of Defensible Fuel Profile Zones (DFPZs) – fuel breaks – to reduce the risk of catastrophic fire. Wood taken from the DFPZs would service the SPI sawmill.
- 3) The designation of approximately 150,000 acres as roadless area off limits to logging.
- 4) Increased buffer zones near streams.

The QLG first attempted to convince the Forest Service to implement the Community Stability Proposal over the 2.5 million acres of national forest via administrative action. Initially the Forest Service seemed to express enthusiasm about the plan (Christensen 1996).⁴ However, Forest Service support for the QLG was reportedly squelched at the highest level of the agency. The Forest Service had been explicitly left out of the development of the plan⁵ and Jack Ward Thomas, the Forest Service chief at the time, apparently believed that the QLG had broken the established channels for public participation in forest planning. Additionally, Thomas evidently did not like the fact that SPI and its chairman Red Emerson were involved with the QLG. Thomas was quoted in the *High Country News* saying, "They're [the QLG] not properly chartered, and they are sitting there cutting deals back and forth.... I like cooperation, but

I don't like Emerson; who the hell turned over my national forests to him?" (Marston 1997, 10).

Failure in the administrative arena filled the QLG with frustration. Linda Blum, an activist with Friends of Plumas Wilderness and a key QLG member said, "We'd been waiting four years for the administrative solution, and had gotten nothing but excuses and obfuscation and sabotage by various persons working for the U.S. Forest Service at various levels" (Marston 1997, 10). Out of this frustration the QLG began to seek a legislative remedy. Forest activists were not sympathetic with the QLG's plight. For example, Blumberg of The Wilderness Society said of the QLG's hardships at the administrative level:

We have all spent many years waiting for the Forest Service to make changes. It's slow to change, but to say that because the QLG is unable to have their plan adopted within two years is testimony to a failure of forest planning – I can't buy that. (quoted in Marston 1997, 10)

The lines for the ensuing battle were set.

The Quincy Library Group-Forest Activist Relationship

Where is the Devil: In the Details or the Process?

In 1996 the QLG found support from Wally Herger, the local Republican Congressman, who introduced a bill based on the QLG proposal entitled the Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery and Economic Stability Act. Introduced late in the term, the bill – which called for the QLG plan to be implemented as a five-year pilot project – failed to move through the 104th Congress. Following the 1996 elections Mr. Herger⁶

reintroduced the legislation and, after California Democrat George Miller added amendments stating implementation of the act would comply with existing environmental laws, the bill passed by a nearly unanimous 429-1 margin (Duane 1997). In 1998 the legislation passed the Senate as an appropriations rider and was signed into law by the President.⁷ Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), who championed the bill in the Senate, summed up the prevailing sentiment on Capitol Hill regarding the legislation stating:

This legislation launches a significantly worthy pilot project that is real victory for local consensus decision making. It proves that even some of the most intractable environmental issues can be resolved if people work together toward a common goal. (Feinstein 1998)

Forest activists organized a high profile national campaign against the QLG legislation. Over 140 national, regional and grassroots organizations – spearheaded by the Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, and a Sacramento-based coalition called the Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign – publicly opposed the legislation (Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign 1997). While a number of Quincy-based forest activists actively lobbied for the bill as QLG members, California's grassroots forest activist community largely opposed the legislation. Thirty-seven other California-based grassroots organizations and independent activists, including one Quincy-based activist, officially signed onto the campaign against the bill (Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign 1997).

A number of forest activists cite concerns about the scale of the QLG proposal, as well as concern regarding the accuracy of the science behind the group's plan, as reasons for opposing the legislation (I-312, I-605, I-607).⁸ For example, David Edelson – at the time a staff person for the Natural Resource Defense Council – criticized the bill both for

attempting to address such a vast area with unproven science, and for not being compliant with the science of the CASPO guidelines (Duane 1997). Other activists also criticize the QLG's 2.5 million-acre scope, claiming that the scale impairs the ability of management to be adapted if the QLG's plan proves to be ecologically unsound (I-312, I-602, I-607). Others contend that the collaboratively reached QLG agreement is based on outdated science from the mid-1980s. For example one activist argues that the science behind the QLG plan is inadequate for species protection stating, "Now, with the endangered species knowledge that we have, we don't think the [QLG] plan goes far enough. The plan needs to incorporate the most recent scientific facts" (I-702).

However, despite these technical concerns, some forest activists admit that they were not originally inclined to oppose the QLG plan. Instead, had the QLG chosen to continue to pursue an administrative resolution, these activists indicate that they may have been supportive of the QLG plan (I-602, I-606). In 1997 Congressional testimony on the bill, Felice Pace of the Klamath Forest Alliance said:

We in the Klamath Forest Alliance believe that whenever a broad based group of citizens come together to seek solutions in a consensus process, they deserve a fair test of their ideas even if those ideas run contrary to our judgement and our reading of the best available science.... In that process, the environmental community offered to support appropriations report language instructing the Forest Service to implement the QLG proposal on the entire Plumas, Lassen and Sierraville District of the Tahoe National Forests. (2)

Forest activists' publicly expressed support for administrative implementation⁹ of the QLG plan indicates that technical concerns are not at the heart of the opposition to the QLG's efforts. Instead activist opposition was driven primarily by concern about the process the QLG was using to try to implement their plan. Forest activists feared the

legislation would set the precedent of local collaborations using the legislative arena to implement locally developed plans with the power to trump the regulatory framework.

In interviews, a variety of activists expressed concern that the QLG actions are a step toward local control of resources. One grassroots activist and Sierra Nevada resident stated, "What got me is the whole idea of legislating the administrative process.... I don't want to see more local control of rural lands because in cases like that the environment always loses" (I-610). Another grassroots activist said, "The local folks [in Quincy] assumed they had superior rights to what would happen on the forest.... National forests belong to people around the country and they have as much as a right to say what happens as locals" (I-609). Regional and national level activists expressed similar sentiments (I-606, I-607, I-702).

While Congressman Miller's amendments officially require that the implementation of the QLG legislation complies with existing environmental laws, many activists question if compliance is possible under the terms of the act. One forest activist argues that the QLG legislation and NEPA contradict each other. He states, "NEPA and the environmental impact statement process is intended to give a range of alternatives. But under the QLG law they [the Forest Service] have to chose the QLG alternative" (I-602). Another activist who focuses on Sierra Nevada issues notes that a number of administrative appeals have been filed opposing the implementation of the QLG legislation on the grounds that it is non-compliant with a variety of environmental laws and Forest Service rules (I-312). Sentiments similar to those expressed in Chapter III by Blumberg, regarding the importance of environmental laws, were common in the

interviews. A staff person with a California-based group said, "I can't imagine a future without those [environmental laws]. That is our insurance policy" (I-606).

Who Are the Collaborators?

Consternation among forest activists about local control, and concern that the QLG legislation would violate the integrity of the regulatory framework, were exacerbated by perceptions that the QLG plan was meant primarily to serve the interests of Sierra Pacific Industries. Additionally, the vast majority of national, regional and local activists felt their views were not represented within the QLG, and that the input provided to the group by the activist community was ignored.

As Chapter III discusses, a deep current of concern about the objectives of timber companies active in collaborations for national forest management runs through the forest activist community. Some forest activists interviewed with regard to the QLG posit questions, similar to those in Chapter III, regarding efficacy of trying to reach common ground where industrial and environmental interests are concerned. One stated, "I don't think those two things can be rectified together – it's a flaw in the goal [of the QLG]" (I-312).

In the QLG case, suspicion regarding the role of industry is intensified by the fact that the principal timber company involved with the QLG is Sierra Pacific Industries. Because of their aggressive accumulation of private land and their heavy reliance on the practice of clearcutting, SPI's reputation within the forest activist community is particularly poor (Thompson 2000, Draffan 1999). Many activists express beliefs that

SPI's objectives – instead of community or ecological concerns – drive the QLG. A regional forest activist leader summed up this sentiment:

The QLG is fairly unique. It is an initiative of a timber company that is based outside of the community. And the land base is greater than the community and corresponds to the area of company concern, so I don't think QLG qualifies as community based. I think it is driven by industry, and it should be judged by its actions. (I-605)

Another regional activist expressed the sentiment more succinctly, stating that he would have titled the QLG legislation the "Sierra Pacific Industries Protection Act" (I-602).

One of the greatest criticisms of the QLG is that the input of all stakeholders was not considered by the QLG, and that the views of actors who did not accept the premise of the QLG plan were ignored. Concerns that the QLG is not inclusive of all stakeholder interests were central to the 1997 congressional testimony of Neil Dion, a Plumas County activist and opponent of the QLG. He stated in his testimony:

As a 'local' who has experienced first hand what these groups can be about, I can unequivocally state that the Quincy Library Group represents a consensus of certain people within our mountain community and does not represent a compromise reached by all effected parties.

Cestero (1999), who in her work documents many of the concerns expressed in this chapter about the scale of the QLG, notes that the vast 2.5 million acre scope of the QLG plan made taking the concerns of non-local stakeholders into account imperative. However, in interviews a number of activists expressed frustration over their impression that non-local activists were locked out of the QLG process (I-606, I-607, I-608). Some activists noted the existence of a history of tension between national and regional forest activists and members of Friends of Plumas Wilderness who were involved with the QLG

(I-602, I-606, I-607).¹⁰ This tension has been cited as at least partially responsible for the relative exclusion of non-local activists.

The sense of hostility toward, and exclusion of, many forest activists from the QLG is expressed in the words of a staff person from a national forest advocacy group. He states, "Those that disagreed were marginalized and harassed, including myself. Anyone who did not agree was demonized. That is not a collaborative, inclusive process" (I-607).¹¹ The same activist also uses the example of negotiations between the activist community and the QLG to demonstrate that QLG participants were unwilling to reach accords outside their small circle. According to the activist:

In 1996¹² there were negotiations between us [national, regional and local activists] and the QLG convened by Assistant Agriculture Secretary Jim Lyons. We made three offers to do something less than the full thing. They were all rejected. Jim Lyons made two proposals, the second of which we accepted and the QLG rejected. The QLG was unwilling to make any counter proposals, they were unwilling to change anything in their plan. (I-607)

The evolution of the QLG and its conflict with the activist community is ironic considering the QLG's collaborative roots. Instead of serving to empower all stakeholders to work toward cooperative decisions as "good collaborations" are supposed to do, the QLG process served to alienate most forest activist stakeholders from the collaborative process.

Discussion

In many ways the Quincy Library Group represents the antithesis of what is considered a good collaboration. Each of the four themes of good collaborations – inclusiveness, empowerment, adaptability and stability – failed, at least to some degree,

to be met. In the process the QLG was interpreted by the majority of the forest activist community to be a significant play for local control and a threat to the national forest regulatory framework. In the end the QLG served to fuel to the Timber Wars rather than deescalate them.

Despite claims from QLG members that activists have been invited to participate in QLG activities, the statements presented in this chapter indicate that a great many activists felt shunned by the QLG. Since they were not empowered to be part of the collaborative process, social capital was not built between the QLG and the excluded stakeholders. Duane (1997) cites this lack of social capital between all relevant stakeholders as one of the QLG's greatest shortcomings.

Contrary to Fisher and Ury's (1991) urging in Chapter II for negotiating parties to get past positions and to interests, the QLG apparently became entrenched in their support for the legislation the Community Stability Proposal inspired, and were blinded to alternatives. This unwillingness to adapt in the political realm has led to a highly unstable outcome from the QLG process. As is noted above, implementation of the QLG legislation is being challenged with administrative appeals and lawsuits. One activist familiar with the situation believes that in the end – after years of battling – nothing will come from the QLG. He states, “We are back to square one...the QLG didn't get us anywhere” (I-312).

As with the Applegate Partnership, many activists are supportive of the collaborative approach and the basic goals of joint environmental protection and community well-being that the QLG supposedly embodies. For example, in reference to

the concept of collaboration, a California-based activist said, "I like it"; and of the QLG specifically, the same activist said, "As for the details, I approved of a lot of it" (I-606). However, also like the Applegate Partnership case, the same activists that support the idea of the QLG caution against the potential for collaborations to serve the interests of local control and to trump the regulatory framework. For example, the same activist who said that he likes collaborations also said:

I think [collaborations] should be focused on a small area, and they should focus on things that lend themselves to consensus...such as watershed restoration, and some fuels treatment.... If it gets beyond the watershed level, they have the potential to preempt the authority of the American people. (I-606)

In alienating the vast majority of the forest activist community, both the Applegate Partnership and the QLG weaken the argument favoring place-based collaboration for national forest management. As a new approach to resource management, demonstration cases must be able to show that collaborations can indeed bring diverse stakeholders together. This study now turns to the experiences of the Lake County Sustainability Initiative. The LCCSI has attempted to learn from the experiences of the Applegate Partnership and the QLG. In doing so they have consciously avoided challenging the regulatory framework and have made significant outreach efforts to the activist community. To date, the efforts of the LCCSI appear to be yielding positive results.

Notes

¹ Forest activist sentiments that the QLG is indicative of a political interest group instead of a true collaboration are summed up in written materials and interviews conducted for this study. Former Wilderness Society staff person Louis Blumberg has referred to the QLG as merely “one special interest group” (Marston 1997, 10). Another regional activist calls the QLG “basically a little fiefdom, just like the middle ages, where a few people get together in one town to make a decision about 2.5 million acres of land” (I-312).

² 1997 per capita wage figures were the most recent available from the California Department of Finance.

³ Quincy-based forest activists involved in the QLG include many – but not all – of the activists involved with Friends of Plumas Wilderness as well as leaders from the local Audubon Society chapter.

⁴ QLG members claim that as early as 1994 the group was promised \$4.7 million to begin implementing the Community Stability Proposal and that local Forest Service managers were instructed to implement the plan. However, neither the money nor agency action materialized (Marston 1997, Christensen 1996).

⁵ Unlike the Applegate Partnership, which tried to work with federal agency personnel as equals, in the QLG case one of the only points of agreement between forest activists and industry representatives in the early days of the collaboration was that there was mutual dissatisfaction with the Forest Service (Christensen 1996, Braxton-Little 1995). In this atmosphere the QLG excluded agency staff from their initial negotiations and only took their plan to the Forest Service once it had been finalized.

⁶ The fact that Representative Herger championed the bill was in itself reason for concern within the activist community. According to the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), Mr. Herger has a solidly anti-environmental record. During the 105th Congress – in which the QLG legislation passed – the LCV found Mr. Herger voted “pro-environment” only seven percent of the time (League of Conservation Voters 2000). The Congressman also clashed with the QLG before becoming the group’s champion in Congress. Regarding the Barkley salvage timber sale (authorized under the 1995 Timber Salvage Rider) which QLG members, including timber companies, agreed should not be logged, Mr. Herger said that anything other than harvesting the sale was “a senseless waste of money and resources and a violation of the law” (Christensen 1996).

⁷ Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) blocked passage of the QLG legislation in the Senate forcing proponents to push the legislation through as a rider. Boxer initially supported the bill, but later dropped her support and sided with the bill's activist opponents.

⁸ Cestero (1999) also criticizes the QLG for taking on such a large landscape, questioning if the area is too large to be dealt with adequately by a place-based collaboration. She states:

It is questionable whether a "sense of place" unites participants when such a large area is being discussed. QLG's legislation affects three national forests, three counties, and numerous small towns, raising doubts about whether a group of thirty people can adequately include or represent the interests of such a large, diverse region. (76)

⁹ It should be noted that the QLG took exception to many of the details of the proposal of forest activists to have the QLG plan implemented via appropriations language. Among other concerns, the QLG took exception to the fact that the activists' proposal called for the plan to be implemented at a smaller geographic scale and for only one year. The QLG also opposed the activists' proposal that no special legislation would move forward while the appropriations language was in effect (Quincy Library Group 1997).

¹⁰ These activists offer that much of the tension between Quincy-based activists and the regional and national forest activist movement originates from personality conflicts between the activists and not institutional differences of opinion. In short, like in the Applegate Partnership case, the personalities of individuals have contributed to the lack of forest activist participation in collaboration activities.

¹¹ While the majority of activists share such sentiment, it is not universal. In addition to activists from Quincy who have been involved with the QLG since the beginning Terry Terhaar, a former Sierra Club regional vice president and Pacific Rivers Council employee, was involved with the QLG for 10 months and found the group welcomed her participation. However, she does note that her input was welcomed only within the context of supporting the premise of the QLG agreement. Terhaar states, "The fundamentals were that they had a deal. They were going to resolve it together. I couldn't dispute that deal. But I could influence all of the details between the broad planks. And I believe I did" (Marston 1997, 12).

¹² In his 1997 *High Country News* article Marston states that these negotiations took place in early 1997 and not 1996 as this activist recalls.

CHAPTER VI

THE LAKE COUNTY COMMUNITY SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE

The LCCSI – which involves what remains of Lake County’s timber industry, residents of the county, and a number of non-local forest activists – focuses on issues surrounding the management of the Lakeview Federal Sustained Yield Unit (LFSYU). Established in 1950, the LFSYU is one of the six sustained yield units authorized under the 1944 Sustained Yield Act. The 492,000-acre unit covers the eastern portion of the Fremont National Forest – nearly 40 percent of the total forest. Throughout most of the post-World War II era three to five primary sawmills concurrently operated in Lake County. The LFSYU contributed a substantial amount of timber to these mills. However, by 1996 – due to restructuring of the timber industry and environmental regulations – only the Fremont sawmill in the county seat of Lakeview remained open (Mosely and Kauffman 2000).

Lake County seems an unlikely place for a collaboration involving an array of forest activists to emerge. In 1995, illustrating the local control sentiment that is popular in rural Oregon, county residents voted to reclaim the Fremont National Forest from the federal government (Associated Press 1995). According to a Lake County Commissioner, the proposal to buy the forest was motivated by the county’s desire to get “wood out of the forest” and to “show to the people of the U.S. that we could take good care of it” (I-207). The same County Commissioner also acknowledges that unhappiness

with regulatory burdens helped spark the effort that has grown into the LCCSI.

Regarding the origins of the effort she states, “Maybe there was a way that we could get around federal requirements like NEPA. That was the germ of the idea” (I-207).

Additionally – unlike the Applegate Valley and Plumas County – there is no organized forest activist presence within Lake County. The LCCSI reflects Lake County’s lack of an organized forest activist constituency in that no activist participant involved with the collaboration resides in Lake County.

Yet, compared to the other case studies, a collaboration that includes among its partners a number of forest activists has been built in Lake County. Furthermore, it has successfully functioned for over two years with no significant hostility developing among the participants or with outside stakeholders. In this chapter I contend that the relative success of the LCCSI at engaging activists in the collaborative process is partially a function of the stakeholders from Lake County – despite the statement above regarding their dissatisfaction with the regulatory framework – demonstrating a respect for the views of forest activists and the laws and rules that govern national forest management. Additionally, I contend that, compared to the other two case study collaborations, the LCCSI has more successfully remained true to the themes of “good collaborations”, and that this too has played a role in facilitating activist participation.

Geography and Demographics

At 8,340 square miles – and sparsely populated by 7,500 people – Lake County is bigger than the state of Delaware and the most isolated of the three case study locales

(Oregon Employment Department 2000b). Lake County lies east of the Cascades on the western extreme of the Great Basin. Only about 15 percent of the county is forested. Most of the landscape is dominated by sagebrush desert. Lakeview is a one-hour drive from Klamath Falls, which, with a population of nearly 58,000, is the nearest town of appreciable size (Oregon Employment Department 2000b). Lakeview is a 6.5-hour drive from Portland, Oregon's largest population center.

Approximately 75 percent of Lake County is publicly owned. The BLM is the largest of the federal landholders, controlling 49 percent of the county. The Forest Service manages 16 percent of the county's lands, including the LFSYU. The remaining public land is split between the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the state of Oregon.

The demise of the county's sawmill operations has had a significant impact on employment in Lake County. By 1998 employment in the lumber and wood products sector had fallen from 600 in 1994 to 280, a drop of 55 percent (Oregon Employment Department 2000b). In 1998 Lake County's unemployment rate stood at 11.9 percent, more than twice Oregon's average of 5.8 percent (Oregon Employment Department 2000b). In 1997 Lake County's per capita income level stood at \$19,115 compared to the statewide average of \$23,920.¹ Along with a stagnant agricultural sector, the downturn of county's timber economy contributed to Lake County being the only county in Oregon to experience a decline in total jobs in the 1990s (Mosley and Kauffman 2000).

Land Management History

Established as a ranching community in the 1870s, Lake County's timber industry developed slowly until 1928 when the Southern Pacific Railroad purchased and improved the railway connecting the county to outside markets. During the 1930s the ascending timber sector began to displace ranching as Lake County's primary economic driver. During the Great Depression ranchers found it increasingly difficult to make a profit due to weak commodity markets, and many took jobs in the relatively stable timber industry. In 1936 the local *Timberman* newspaper stated:

Less than two decades ago the talk in Lakeview was exclusively beef, cattle, range and cow hands. All that has now changed and the cowboy has now replaced their high-heeled boots with the spiked boot [sic] of the logger. (quoted in Bach 1990, vi)

By the 1940s, after less than 20 years of large-scale commercial timber operations, the long term stability of Lake County's timber industry was in question due to the liquidation of private forests. The importance of federal timber to the industry grew in the 1940s. By 1950, 87 percent of the timber harvested in Lake County came from public land, rising from only 13 percent in 1940 (Ratke 1990). Hoping to assure federal harvests would continue to support the industry, county officials lobbied the Forest Service for and won the establishment of the LFSYU.

The LFSYU's policy statement, which has been modified various times since the unit was established, requires that timber harvested from the LFSYU be processed by primary sawmills in either Lakeview or Paisley (45 miles north of Lakeview). It also forbids Lakeview and Paisley mills from purchasing federal timber from outside of the

unit.² Furthermore, the policy statement calls for secondary manufacturing to occur within Lakeview or Paisley whenever possible and for local loggers and road construction crews to be employed in timber management as is practical (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1992).

Periodic reviews of the LFSYU and public opinion have generally looked upon the unit favorably, crediting it with providing for jobs and economic stability in Lake County (Cheek 1996).³ However, beginning in the 1980s the unit was unable to buffer Lake County from the changes sweeping the region's timber economy. Of five sawmills open in the county after the recession of the early 1980s, two were closed at the end of the decade.

In the 1990s both the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council filed petitions claiming there were deficiencies in the forest plans of the Interior Columbia Basin's national forests. Absent changes, these organizations threatened to sue to shut down logging operations on east side forests (Mosley and Kauffman 2000). It was these threats that led to the imposition of the east side logging restrictions,⁴ the development of the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Plan, as well as substantially reduced harvests on the Fremont and other east side national forests – all of which are detailed in Chapter III (Mosley and Kaufman 2000).

After imposition of the logging restrictions, two of the three primary sawmills in Lake County closed.⁵ Lakeview Lumber ceased operations in 1995 and the Fremont sawmill in Paisley closed in 1996 (Mosley and Kauffman 2000). During the 1990s, Lakeview's Fremont Sawmill has become increasingly reliant on private timber and

overseas sources. In 1990 the sawmill received over 90 percent of its timber from federal land. Today the percentage has dropped to only about 40 percent (Mosley and Kauffman 2000).

Beginnings of the Lake County Community Sustainability Initiative

The LFSYU's policy statement requires a review of the unit upon the closure of all of the primary sawmills in either Lakeview or Paisley (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1992).⁶ The 1996 closure of Paisley's Fremont Sawmill triggered such a review and opened the possibility that the LFSYU would be found non-compliant with the Sustained Yield Act and abolished (Mosley and Kauffman 2000). Despite the downturns in the timber economy in the 1980s and 1990s, community leaders continue to see the LFSYU as a tool to provide jobs to Lake County residents (I-203, I-207). Therefore, shortly after the closure of the Paisley sawmill county leaders began to work to secure the unit's survival.

Within Lake County the Sustained Yield Committee (SYC), a long-standing citizen committee that has facilitated community input over the years regarding the Forest Service's management of the LFSYU, was revitalized. Traditionally only three members, after the Paisley mill's closure the committee was significantly expanded to include elected officials, county economic development professionals, a number of retired Forest Service staff who still reside in Lake County and a representative from Paisley. Realizing that the U.S. public's views of the environment in general – and forest management in particular – had changed over recent decades, the SYC began exploring

options for revising the unit's management to be more compatible with current social values. The SYC hoped that with an alternative approach, management of the LFSYU would be able to support jobs without generating conflicts with forest activists (O'Keefe 1998).

Based upon the recommendation of Collins Pine (the owner of Lakeview's Fremont Sawmill who had also run the Paisley facility), the committee decided to pursue certification of the LFSYU as a "sustainably managed forest" (I-207). At the time the Paisley mill was shut down, Collins Pine was pursuing certification of their private Lakeview Forest through the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).⁷ The FSC accredits independent, third party assessors to evaluate forest management to determine if, based upon the organization's regional guidelines, the management is ecologically appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable (Forest Stewardship Council 2000). The SYC viewed certification of the LFSYU's management as a means of alleviating activists' fears, as well as a way of generating employment by providing certified wood products to niche markets of environmentally and socially conscious consumers.

County leaders shared their interest in certification with the Oregon Economic Development Department (OEDD) which in turn recommended the county contact Sustainable Northwest (SNW). SNW is a Portland-based non-profit group with a mission to "assist rural communities in implementing strategies that benefit both land and people" (Kauffman 2000a, 1). In 1997 the SYC invited Sustainable Northwest to assist the community with their effort to certify the LFSYU.⁸

The LCCSI-Forest Activist Relationship

Debating Certification

As with the first steps of the Applegate Partnership and QLG, the SYC's interest in certification of national forest land generated alarm among forest activists. The Forest Stewardship Council's certification guidelines are supported by some forest advocacy groups – such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the American Lands Alliance (AMA) – for privately owned forests (I-301, Jontz and Hall 1998). However, the activist community is unified in opposition to certification on publicly owned lands. This opposition is motivated by fear that certification will be used as a political tool to preference timber production over other values and support anti-environmental arguments against strong regulatory safeguards. One activist illustrates this sentiment:

The concern is that if we start to see federal forests being certified, what will be certified is the logging.... Another political aspect is the concern of what happens in the policy sphere. It is easy for someone like Larry Craig [Idaho's Republican Senator with whom forest activists have a long and hostile relationship] to stand up and say we don't need to reform the Forest Service because the forests have been certified. (I-301)

Wariness about the precedent certification of the LFSYU might set catalyzed the forest activist community to launch a campaign against the proposal. A sign-on letter circulated by the American Lands Alliance stated:

Even the best FSC guidelines are not adequate for our federal public lands. While existing certification standards begin to limit the ecological damage of logging and other forest practices, they fail to ask the more fundamental question, "Where should logging occur [on federal land] if at all?" (Jontz and Hall 1998)

A high profile battle between the advocates of certification and the forest activist community seemed to be brewing. However, instead of pressing forward with their effort to certify the unit, the SYC and Sustainable Northwest took a step backward and chose to conduct a "summit" on the controversy and invite forest activists to meet with Lake County leaders and other certification proponents in Lakeview. In a bow to activists, certification was dropped as a predetermined preferred alternative and the discussion broadened to the management of the LFSYU and the Fremont National Forest in general (Sustainable Northwest 1998a). Four days of meetings were held in July 1998 and over 60 people attended, including more than a dozen representing the forest activist community. Among the groups represented were grassroots organizations such as Concerned Friends of Winema, regional groups like the Oregon Natural Resource Council, and national organizations such as The Wilderness Society, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the American Lands Alliance (Elmore et al. 1999).

After the 1998 meeting the Sustained Yield Committee and SNW shifted their focus from certification to pursuing three broader goals:

- 1) Sustaining and restoring a healthy, diverse and resilient forest ecosystem that can accommodate human and natural disturbance.
- 2) Sustaining and restoring the land's capacity to absorb, store and distribute water.
- 3) Providing opportunities for people to realize their material, recreational and spiritual values and relationships with the forest. (Sustainable Northwest 2000)

The SYC and SNW also invited forest activists and other participants to meet regularly in Lake County to continue to work with the local community on a plan to achieve the goals. The Lake County Community Sustainability Initiative is the

outgrowth of this call and eight activists have chosen to remain involved in the process. The three most prominent organizations represented in the LCCSI are The Wilderness Society, Defenders of Wildlife and the Pacific Rivers Council. The other activists involved are generally regional and grassroots activists who are well-respected within the forest activist community.

The LCCSI After the Certification Debate

In its two-year history the LCCSI has pursued a number of actions aimed at achieving its goal of providing for the ecological restoration of the unit's forests and the socioeconomic well-being of the local community. The LCCSI has taken on developing a new policy statement for the LFSYU that incorporates the collaboration's goals.⁹ The group has commissioned studies to examine both the conditions of the unit's ecosystems and the opportunity for ecological restoration to provide jobs to the community (Elmore et al 1999, Schlenker-Goodrich 1999). In early 2000, in the LCCSI's first step to move from their "study and discuss" phase to an "implementation" phase, the collaboration chose a single watershed within the LFSYU – the Chewaucan River drainage – in which to work with the Forest Service on developing and overseeing ecosystem management activities.¹⁰

Interviews with activist participants in the LCCSI indicate that the recruitment activities of Lake County leaders and Sustainable Northwest – both before and after the initial meeting – has been key to the continued participation of many forest activists. For

example, an activist from a group based in Oregon's Willamette Valley noted how important this recruitment has been to the continued participation of her organization:

We don't have organizational funding for this project, but [one of the Lake County Commissioners] came to our board meeting and the board was interested.... I hear she gave an impressive speech and people on the board still ask about it. (I-311)

Lake County participants in the LCCSI give much of the credit for the successful recruitment of forest activists to Sustainable Northwest's list of activist contacts. One Lake County resident active with the LCCSI offers, "They [SNW] have been a very necessary part of this process. I don't have the time to devote to this that they do. I also don't have the connections to pull this together that Sustainable Northwest does" (I-202).

Like their allies who have frowned upon the Applegate Partnership and the QLG, the forest activists involved in the LCCSI have uniformly stated that they support the existing national forest regulatory framework and insist that all activities of the collaboration comply with environmental laws. One participating activist summed up the general sentiment of his colleagues, stating:

We have made it clear that what we recommend for this unit will be subject to existing plans and regulations. We are not trying to come up with new management plans per se. We have been careful to remain aware of environmental laws and the planning processes and we are not trying to take them over. (I-304)

Another argues that the goal of the LCCSI – and collaborations in general – should be to meet or exceed the standards set by regulations. This activist states, "We [society] can draw a line in the sand, set a bar – environmental laws – and then the role of the collaborative groups should be to work within those. If negotiations happen above that bar that is great" (I-311).

As with the other case study collaborations, local leaders of the LCCSI explicitly state that they have no desire for local control or intention of stepping beyond the bounds of the regulatory framework. One Lake County resident who has been prominently involved in the LCCSI argues that the effort is the antithesis of the Sagebrush Rebellion. He contends, "In the Sagebrush Rebellion it was about burning and sacking the government and taking it over ourselves. In this we are inviting people to come in and see what we we're doing and work with us. I'd say it is the anti-Sagebrush Rebellion" (I-202). In background materials on the project produced prior to the July 1998 meeting, Lake County leaders declared, "The project is not an attempt to preempt or circumvent any existing laws. The community expects to comply with all applicable statutes and administrative guidelines", and "The project requires no special legislation" (Sustainable Northwest 1998b).

Unlike the Applegate Partnership and QLG, forest activists have generally accepted these statements from LCCSI participants as credible. One activist, who has not remained involved with the LCCSI, argues that the willingness of the Sustained Yield Committee to forgo certification engendered trust from the forest activist community (I-301). Another activist who is also not involved with the LCCSI argues that Collins Pine's reputation as a relatively environment-friendly timber company alleviates fear that the LCCSI will be controlled by industry as the QLG is perceived to be dominated by Sierra Pacific Industries.¹¹ The activist states:

Collins Pine is of course a corporation interested in making profit, but I think they have shown through their own management of their lands some different attitudes about the land itself. Rather than just being something to exploit they say there

are some long term values that we can manage for and still get some product out. (I-205)

The openness of Lake County residents to work with forest activists has also been commonly cited as a reason activists have remained involved and less suspicious of the LCCSI compared to other collaborations.¹² One of the activists involved in the LCCSI sums up this general sentiment saying, “What has kept me involved is the sincerity and earnestness of the local people involved” (I-306).

Discussion

Unlike the Applegate Partnership and QLG cases, the architects of the LCCSI have crafted a multi-stakeholder place-based collaboration that has not been perceived by forest activists as a threat to the national forest regulatory framework. While all three case study collaborations have publicly stated that they do not advocate local control or the subversion of environmental laws, the LCCSI is the only one of the three collaborations whose actions make such claims appear as more than hollow promises. Forest activists who are open to the concept of collaboration have been able to comfortably find a niche within the LCCSI, as the collaboration is seemingly free of the threat of being co-opted by interests hostile to the environment.

Activist participation in the LCCSI has also been facilitated by the collaboration staying true to the themes of good collaborations. Unlike the Applegate Partnership and QLG, activists have generally found the LCCSI to be inclusive and empowering instead of exclusionary. Furthermore, the willingness of the Sustained Yield Committee and Sustainable Northwest to step back and adapt to emerging political conditions as they

explored the certification option allowed the Lake County effort to avoid a high profile conflict. In the process the effort generated trust from many activists. The openness of the LCCSI has created an atmosphere that allows the collaboration to serve as a forum for activists and other stakeholders to investigate how locally based collaboration can complement, instead of conflict with, the regulatory framework.

The LCCSI example should provide collaboration advocates with encouragement that, under the right circumstances, it is possible for place-based collaborations for national forest management to draw support from, and the participation of, prominent forest activists. However, the discussion provided in this chapter should not be interpreted to indicate that all activists are enthusiastic about the LCCSI process. While there is no active opposition to the collaboration at this time, a number of key organizations – such as the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense Council and Oregon Natural Resources Council – have chosen to not participate in the LCCSI process. As Chapter III notes, many of these groups are highly skeptical of the general concept of collaboration – citing issues such as the amount of time and energy it takes to participate in collaborations, the distance that often needs to be traveled, and an unwillingness to compromise on what they consider to be core principles – as primary reasons for their pessimism (I-205, I-402, I-505).

It is also important to recall that, prior to the QLG's advocacy of a legislative solution, a variety of activists claimed to support the QLG effort, and that early in its history the Applegate Partnership had the support of Headwaters. However, as these efforts got increasingly involved in the details of implementing their plans they lost

activist support. In interviews, LCCSI participants – both forest activists and Lake County residents – acknowledged that the driving forces behind their respective involvement in the collaboration differ. While activists are primarily motivated by an opportunity to enhance the ecological vitality of LFSYU ecosystems, most local participants contend that job creation from ecosystem management is their primary concern (I-202, I-203, I-207, I-303, I-306, I-307, I-311). While forest activist participation in the LCCSI has been carefully and deliberately cultivated up to this point, it is possible that disagreements over these fundamental goals will arise in the future, forcing at least some stakeholders to abandon the collaboration. Without the support of the wide array of stakeholders currently involved, it would be difficult for the LCCSI to develop forest management recommendations that are any more politically stable than those of the Applegate Partnership or QLG.

Notes

¹ 1997 income data and 1998 unemployment figures were the most recent available from the Oregon Employment Department.

² In cases where local processors choose to not bid upon sales from the LFSYU, the Forest Service is allowed to sell LFSYU timber to outside purchasers.

³ However, the unit has not gone without criticism. Because the LFSYU policy statement limits competition, the unit has been accused of depressing bid prices and thus reducing federal revenue and repayments to Lake County (Mosley and Kauffman 2000, Cheek 1996). Forest activists have often criticized the LFSYU, claiming that the unit has led to a prioritization of timber harvesting over non-timber values (Friemark 1991, Kerr 1991).

⁴ Since there are no anadromous fish runs in Lake County, only the Eastside Screens and INFISH apply to the management of the Fremont National Forest.

⁵ While primary sawmills in the county have been in decline, secondary facilities have actually increased from three in 1973 to four today, and secondary production has diversified (Mosley and Kauffman 2000)

⁶ Reviews are regularly scheduled approximately every ten years unless there are circumstances – such as those that developed in 1996 – which require a special review. The last regularly scheduled review of the unit occurred in 1992.

⁷ Collins Pine is a pioneer in forest product certification. After securing certification of their Lakeview Forest, Collins became the first timber company in the U.S. to have their entire operation certified (Collins Companies 2000).

⁸ Sustainable Northwest has remained active in Lake County since first becoming involved. A SNW employee serves as the staff person of the LCCSI. Both environmentalists and community residents consider SNW's involvement essential to the success the effort has enjoyed (I-202, I-207, I-306, I-311). Of the three case study collaborations, SNW's relationship with the LCCSI is the closest association between a collaboration and an outside consultant.

⁹ As a step toward crafting a new LFSYU policy statement, Sustainable Northwest contracted with the Forest Service to write the review of the LFSYU. Released in July 2000, the draft review recommends five changes be made to the policy statement:

- 1) Introduce goals to the policy statement that reflect the philosophies of ecological-based management and restoration, and the values of diverse constituents of unit forests.
- 2) Introduce evaluation criteria to the policy statement that reflect these goals.
- 3) In order to facilitate access of local, non-industrial millers to LFSYU timber, reintroduce a labor-based definition of five worker hours of processing per 1000 board feet for primary and further manufacturing. Such a definition was part of older policy statements.
- 4) Foster the use of local ecosystem service firms in unit management activities.
- 5) Include in the evaluation criteria for the unit consideration of the number and percentage of local contracting firms that obtain USFS service contracts.

¹⁰ The choice to focus their initial on-the-ground work on a single watershed instead of the LFSYU as a whole has helped the LCCSI avoid controversy. As Chapter V discusses, the ecological ramifications and precedent-setting nature of trying to address a 2.5 million acre landscape has been a source for criticism of the QLG. While the Applegate Partnership has never taken on a landscape scale project, their initial commitment to holistic management for the entire Applegate Valley was also a source of discomfort for activists.

¹¹ Collins Pine is also a participant in the Quincy Library Group but they are a second tier player compared to SPI.

¹² The relatively prominent participation of forest activists has also served to change the views of some Lake County participants involved in the LCCSI regarding forest activists. For example, one county resident said that he was surprised to find that some “powerful environmental groups have the best interest of the community in mind instead of just steamrolling for the good of the environment” (I-305).

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

The relationship between forest activists and place-based collaborations for national forest management is not a simple one. A few forest activists have taken active roles in – and have even been founding members of – the Applegate Partnership and the Quincy Library Group, the two controversial case study efforts. Many more activists have said that they support the concept of collaboration, provided conditions are right. A number of activists have backed up such statements by participating the Lake County Community Sustainability Initiative. However, other activists provide various logistical and philosophical reasons for resolutely opposing collaboration.

This study now returns to the three research questions offered at the beginning of Chapter I:

- 1) Forest activists and other environmentalists have extensively critiqued the concept of place-based collaboration for natural resource management. What are the main points of the activist critique, and what motivates activists to offer their criticisms?
- 2) How can the relative success, compared to the other collaborations, of the LCCSI at building a working relationship between forest activists and other stakeholders be explained?
- 3) To what degree, if any, should the LCCSI experience be held up as a model to other emerging place-based collaborations for resource management?

Over the course of this research, seven specific lessons have emerged regarding the relationship between forest activists and place-based collaborations (see Table 2).

These lessons are examined next within the context of the three research questions.

Table 2
Summary of Lessons Learned

<i>Exploring the Activist Critique of Collaboration</i>
<p><i>Lesson #1:</i> Forest activists have played a significant role in crafting the national forest regulatory framework, and have used the framework to substantially reduce logging on the federal forests of the Northwest and northern California. Therefore, forest activists are generally suspicious of management alternatives that may threaten the regulatory framework.</p> <p><i>Lesson #2:</i> Activist support of collaborative efforts is facilitated by collaborations possessing the qualities of “good collaborations”. The absence of these characteristics – particularly inclusiveness and empowerment – tends to foster activist criticism.</p> <p><i>Lesson #3:</i> While many activists state they will support collaborative activities when conditions are appropriate, others are resolutely opposed to collaborations and are highly unlikely to engage in collaborative activities. Both logistical and philosophical reasons contribute the wariness of these activists regarding collaboration.</p>
<i>Explaining the LCCSI’s Success</i>
<p><i>Lesson #4:</i> The organizers of the LCCSI have demonstrated that they are willing to work within the bounds of the regulatory framework. Doing so has alleviated some of the potential wariness of forest activists regarding the collaboration.</p> <p><i>Lesson #5:</i> The LCCSI’s architects used a strategy of aggressive recruitment to involve a number of forest activists from outside the Lake County community in the collaboration. Doing so has helped the LCCSI avoid the characterization of not being open to outside perspectives.</p> <p><i>Lesson #6:</i> The LCCSI has had success building a broad collaboration during its study and discussion phase. However, as the collaboration attempts to implement its vision, disagreements among stakeholders over implementation strategies may strain the collaborative relationship.</p>
<i>Can the LCCSI Be a Model?</i>
<p><i>Lesson #7:</i> Characteristics that are unique to a collaboration’s locale, and to the persons involved, greatly impact a collaborative effort. Therefore, it would be unwise to assume that a collaboration might work in one locale based simply on the experience of another.</p>

Exploring the Activist Critique of Collaboration

Lesson #1: Forest activists have played a significant role in crafting the national forest regulatory framework, and have used the framework to substantially reduce logging on the federal forests of the Northwest and northern California. Therefore, forest activists are generally suspicious of management alternatives that may threaten the regulatory framework.

As discussed in Chapter III, the regulatory framework is based upon a foundation of centralized authority. Over the latter half of the 20th century, forest activists have become adept at maneuvering within the regulatory framework. Because place-based collaborations are decidedly local in focus, they can be perceived as challenging to the centralized nature of the regulatory framework. With memories of the Timber Wars far from faded, many activists worry that collaborations may simply be the latest strategy of the timber industry and other extraction-oriented interests to devolve resource management authority to the local level where they can easily influence management policy.

The Applegate Partnership and the Quincy Library Group demonstrate this lesson. From their beginnings both of these collaborations have generated concern among forest activists. The Applegate Partnership emerged at a time when forest activists had just won in the Northern Spotted Owl case, their most significant victory in the Timber Wars. In this context the decidedly local nature of the Applegate Partnership meant that activists, especially non-local activists, closely scrutinized the partnership's actions out of concern the group would serve local control, anti-regulatory interests. In the QLG case, the prominent role of Sierra Pacific Industries raised concern that the collaborative effort was

little more than a sophisticated corporate plot to use local consensus to generate support for challenging Forest Service rules and increasing timber harvests.

Given these circumstances, if the Applegate Partnership and QLG wished to avoid conflict with forest activists both efforts needed to be especially careful to assure their activities did not appear as threats to the regulatory framework, or as supportive of local control and corporate agendas. Both were largely unsuccessful in avoiding such perceptions. National, regional and grassroots activists found the proposals and tactics developed by both collaborations – including the Partnership One timber sale and the QLG legislation – to be objectionable. Both collaborations fanned the fires of conflict by pushing their proposals forward in the face of activist opposition, and thus hostility instead of cooperation ensued.

Lesson #2: Activist support of collaborative efforts is facilitated by collaborations possessing the qualities of “good collaborations”. The absence of these characteristics – particularly inclusiveness and empowerment – tends to foster activist criticism.

This lesson is a logical corollary to the first lesson. Considering that activists have reason to be suspicious of collaborations, it is understandable that their participation in collaborations will increase as they see threats to their interests minimized. When collaborations truly accept activists as full partners – and other stakeholders are willing to adapt to accommodate activists’ concerns – activist worries about collaborations serving anti-regulatory, local control and corporate agendas are reduced. Only in such setting are collaborations capable of crafting stable alternatives for forest management.

Again, both the Applegate Partnership and Quincy Library Group demonstrate this lesson. Within collaboration circles the Applegate Partnership popularized the “no

they” button – the word “they” with a slash through it meant to signify that the group is accepting of all viewpoints (Communities Committee 1997). However, many Applegate Valley activists consider such sentiment from the partnership to be merely a façade and feel that their views have been unwelcome by the collaboration. Furthermore, there is the impression – as the situation with the Yale Creek protest demonstrates – that in the interest of collaboration more adversarial tactics, such as direct action, are discouraged by the partnership. Similarly, the Quincy Library Group has been accused of being exclusionary and, to borrow the words of an activist quoted in Chapter V, prone to “demonizing” and “harassing” those that disagree with the terms of the QLG’s Community Stability Proposal.

Through their dealings with forest activists, both collaborations have shown a relative inability to adapt, at least in the political sphere.¹ Instead of crafting a broader consensus by acknowledging and incorporating the concerns of critical forest activists, both the Applegate Partnership and QLG plunged into conflict with activists over Partnership One and the QLG legislation respectively. In the QLG case the push for legislation persisted despite talks mediated by the Department of Agriculture and the offer of forest activists to support administrative implementation of the QLG plan.

By not staying true to the themes of good collaborations, both the Applegate Partnership and the QLG failed to develop stable alternatives for forest management. The Applegate Partnership’s Partnership One timber sale ended up being abandoned after administrative appeals were filed by forest activists, and the QLG’s legislation has

spurred administrative appeals and law suits that may in the end may scuttle the implementation of the QLG's work.

Lesson #3: While many activists state they will support collaborative activities when conditions are appropriate, others are resolutely opposed to collaborations and are highly unlikely to engage in collaborative activities. Both logistical and philosophical reasons contribute the wariness of these activists regarding collaboration.

Activists who have voiced the strongest opposition to the concept of collaboration provide a variety of reasons for why they hold such views. Many activists, especially those that operate on the regional and national levels, argue that the nature of place-based collaborations makes forest activist participation impractical. These activists contend that their ability to participate is impaired by the substantial resources collaborations require. They also contend that the forest activist community simply lacks the human resources to be adequately involved in collaborative activities. Others simply share strong philosophical misgivings about the collaboration concept.

Recall from Chapter VI that some activists have chosen not to participate in the LCCSI because of the time commitment and the travel difficulties. One activist expresses this sentiment stating:

I almost got sucked into it [the LCCSI] because I kept listening to good people tell me I should be there. Can you imagine the six-hour drive? Can you imagine me taking my time, taking it away from what I am supposed to be doing, so I can sit in this process? (I-505)

Another states, "I don't know of any non-profit with extra money and staff. So in many cases it doesn't make a lot of sense to participate in these. Instead we push for environmental protection in other ways [such as] lobbying and getting better legislation passed" (I-402).

An activist involved with the Applegate Partnership suggests that environmental organizations can supplement their resources by recruiting volunteers to participate in collaborations (I-510). However, as Britell (1997) notes in Chapter III, many forest activists find the utilization of volunteers in the relatively high level negotiating process of collaborations problematic. Others, such as McCloskey (1996) argue that there simply are not enough activists available, especially in rural communities where place-based collaborations are centered, who are willing and able to participate in collaborative activities.

Many activists who are ideologically predisposed to not compromising do not even pay the concept of place-based collaboration the favor of consideration. For example, recall Britell's statement equating collaboration for national forest management with Britain's sacrifice of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in the days before World War II. The perspective of another Oregon activist illustrates the general disdain of collaborative processes expressed in some activist circles. When he was asked to compare and contrast the Applegate Partnership, QLG and LCCSI the activist responded, "They're all the same. Talk and log" (I-505).

Explaining the LCCSI's Success

Lesson #4: The organizers of the LCCSI have demonstrated that they are willing to work within the bounds of the regulatory framework. Doing so has alleviated some of the potential wariness of forest activists regarding the collaboration.

Like the first lesson, this lesson speaks to issues related to the close association of the forest activist community with the national forest regulatory framework. Lesson #4

illustrates that forest activist participation in collaborative activities can be facilitated by a collaboration demonstrating, through its actions, that it is not intent on challenging the regulatory framework

As discussed in Chapter VI, the activists involved in the LCCSI are no more willing to let the national forest regulatory framework be subverted than are other forest activists. However, unlike the Applegate Partnership and the QLG, the LCCSI's architects have successfully avoided fostering the perception that the collaboration threatens the regulatory framework. When the initial proposal to certify the LFSYU raised activist concerns, the Lake County community and Sustainable Northwest extended an olive branch to activists by agreeing to step back from the certification proposal. This move was an essential step in convincing at least some activists that within Lake County existed the potential to avoid the pitfalls encountered by the Applegate Partnership and QLG.

By not brazenly challenging the rules and institutions that govern national forest management, it can be argued that the LCCSI has increased its capacity to achieve implementation of future proposals that the group develops. Recall from Chapter II that Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) contend that often stakeholders, who would likely oppose a proposal that they did not help to develop, will champion proposals developed through an inclusive collaborative process. There is evidence that this is already happening in the LCCSI case. For example, The Wilderness Society – which was out front in the battle against the QLG – has taken the lead in reaching out to non-participating activists to educate them about the LCCSI process. Staff from The Wilderness Society have also

participated in meetings with government officials in Washington, DC to build federal support for the LCCSI collaboration.

Lesson #5: The LCCSI's architects used a strategy of aggressive recruitment to involve a number of forest activists from outside the Lake County community in the collaboration. Doing so has helped the LCCSI avoid the characterization of not being open to outside perspectives.

Whether or not a collaboration has an inclusive and empowering atmosphere, as is generally considered necessary for success, does not have to be a matter of chance. Such characteristics can be proactively developed. The LCCSI experience illustrates how this can occur.

In developing activist participation in the LCCSI, the aggressive recruitment of activists has been as important as the acceptance by Lake County leaders of the regulatory framework. In interviews a number of the activists, including each of the representatives from the three national forest advocacy organizations involved, indicated that they participate in the LCCSI because they were actively recruited (I-303, I-304, I-307, I-311). Many Lake County participants credit Sustainable Northwest's contacts within the forest activist community for facilitating their recruitment. However, forest activists express that they are particularly impressed that members of the community have personally reached out to activists, often traveling long distances to meet with forest activists in places like Portland and Seattle (I-304, I-311).²

Both the Applegate Partnership and the QLG have made statements that activists are welcome to participate in their activities. However many forest activists, especially those that might "rock the boat", feel they are not truly welcome and are in fact discouraged from participating in these collaborations. By actively pursuing activist

participation the LCCSI has created an atmosphere that is decidedly more hospitable to activists than either of the other two case study efforts.³

Lesson #6: The LCCSI has had success building a broad collaboration during its study and discussion phase. However, as the collaboration attempts to implement its vision, disagreements among stakeholders over implementation strategies may strain the collaborative relationship.

This lesson serves as a note of caution. Recall from Chapter II that Paulson (1998), in her work regarding collaborations for range management in Wyoming, found that as collaborative efforts move past broad visions and goals to the details of implementation, consensus among diverse stakeholders becomes increasingly hard to maintain. While to date the LCCSI appears to have had success in bringing together a diverse collection of former adversaries, time will tell as to whether the collaboration will have staying power.

The experiences of the Applegate Partnership and QLG supports Paulson's argument. In the Applegate Partnership case, Headwaters signed onto the broad vision of the partnership but became increasingly uncomfortable as the Partnership One timber sale became the tangible manifestation of that vision. In the QLG case, as Pace's Senate testimony from Chapter V attests to, many forest activists claim they were supportive of the collaborative process and administrative implementation of the QLG proposal prior to the collaboration's pursuit of legislation. However, because of the precedent setting nature of the legislation, forest activists aggressively fought the QLG bill.

The LCCSI has yet to move into its implementation phase, and as Chapter VI notes, Lake County community members and activists have different objectives regarding the LCCSI – job creation and enhanced ecological vitality respectively. As the LCCSI

moves into its implementation phase it will be interesting to observe whether or not these different motivations lead to disagreement and the exit of stakeholders from the group.

Can the LCCSI Be a Model?

Lesson #7: Characteristics that are unique to a collaboration's locale, and to the persons involved, greatly impact a collaborative effort. Therefore, it would be unwise to assume that a collaboration might work in one locale based simply on the experience of another.

Of the three research questions, the third, regarding to what degree the LCCSI can be used as a model by other collaborations, has not been addressed thus far in this thesis. However, this question is as important as the other two. It is important because there are regular calls for localized resource management and place-based collaboration to be used on a larger scale. For example, Donald Snow (1997) of Montana's Northern Lights Institute calls for a "radical experiment", where with the sanction of Congress, "several citizen management councils...take over managerial authority of various well-defined units of federal land" (199). Snow argues that such councils would not be "advisory" but "decisional" (200). Enthusiasm regarding the expanded use of collaboration also exists among power brokers in Washington, DC. Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) echoes the sentiment of many of her colleagues by saying of the QLG, "If it is successful, then it can serve as a model for other communities" (1997, 3). If collaboration is indeed going to be used on a wider scale, advocates of the concept need successful demonstration projects to support their cause, and the LCCSI appears to have the potential to serve as such a case.

Without question, future collaborators should learn from the LCCSI, as they should learn from the successes and failures of other collaborations including the

Applegate Partnership and the QLG. Emerging collaborations should heed the lessons shared in this thesis. For example, they should be mindful about the implications of challenging the rules and laws that govern natural resource management, and should be open to and inclusive of all stakeholders interested in the issues before the collaboration. However, I contend that the ability of demonstration projects to serve as models is limited. The evolution of any collaboration is highly dependent upon conditions that are endemic to the specific effort. Therefore, the skills and knowledge of any given collaboration may be difficult to transfer to other locations. Collaboration architects must factor this into their equation for success. The Applegate Partnership, QLG and LCCSI illustrate the impact unique conditions can have on collaborations.

First, the characteristics of any corporate partners in a collaboration can significantly impact the effort's direction. In Lake County the presence of Collins Pine and its reputation as a progressive timber company has minimized concerns about corporate domination of the collaborative effort. Conversely, in the QLG case, concerns about corporate influence have been especially prevalent because Sierra Pacific Industries – a company of which many activists are extremely suspicious – plays a leading role in the collaboration.⁴

Second, the degree to which a local forest activist constituency is active can also shape the course of a collaborative effort. Some LCCSI participants, activists among them, question if perhaps the lack of an organized forest activist constituency in Lake County simplifies the LCCSI dynamic, and helps to facilitate better relationships between outside forest activists and local stakeholders (I-201, I-304). In different fashions local

activists have impacted both the QLG and Applegate Partnership. In the QLG case tension between local and non-local forest activists has been cited as a contributor to the conflict between the collaboration and outside activists. In the Applegate Partnership case, suspicion among Applegate Valley activists has been source of difficulty for the partnership since its beginning.

Third, the power of a locale's ecological and social traits to shape a collaboration should not be underestimated. One of the architects of the LCCSI project posits that such traits may contribute to the LCCSI's success relative to the Applegate Partnership and the QLG:

I think that some would argue that the ecological driver in a place like Quincy is a lot more forceful than in a place like this. In Quincy one would argue that they had no other choice. I don't think the ecological crisis here is as severe and that gives us time and flexibility....Southern Oregon has been a hot bed of Spotted Owl conflict for decades, that is not a place to go in and work collaboratively, its too polarized. Lake County on the other hand is not known for a lot of controversy. (I-201)

Finally, the personalities of individuals involved in any given effort play an important role. In the LCCSI case, activists especially cite the open mindedness of the Fremont Sawmill manager and a Lake County Commissioner involved with the project as important (I-304, I-306). Conversely, in both the Applegate Partnership and QLG cases, activists cite the personalities of key collaboration leaders as being discouraging to activist participation.⁵

Questions Needing Further Exploration

This section discusses some of the questions piqued by this research that are beyond the scope of this thesis. Further exploration of these questions would provide

valuable insight regarding the concept of place-based collaboration for resource management. Additional study would also further illuminate the relationships between collaborations, forest activists and the environmental community in general.

The question of how place-based collaborations are shaped by economic institutions has been alluded to throughout this thesis but not directly addressed. The concern of forest activists and other environmentalists about the role of corporate interests in collaborations begs this question. Recall from Chapter II that many academics are concerned about how market forces impact efforts at localizing resource management. Yet, despite such concerns, academic research that addresses how U.S.-based localized management efforts are impacted by an increasingly globalized economy is conspicuously limited.

Exploring the relationship between economic institutions and collaborations might also provide clarity as to why many activists who themselves advocate increased local autonomy view collaborations with suspicion. While current collaborations exist within the structure of our economic system, many activists who support localization do so while also supporting parallel radical restructuring of the economy to minimize the power of corporations and the wealthy.⁶

Collaboration advocates claim that place-based collaborations allow for enhanced participation from the public in decision making, however, in each of the three case studies, the participation of “the public” has actually been quite limited. In each case study, those that participate in collaborative activities are drawn generally from community leadership circles and leading voices from traditional forest management

constituencies – such as timber industry interests and forest activists. Typically absent have been members of the general public, particularly working class people whose livelihoods have over the years depended on “work in the woods”. The limited participation in collaborations of more than the most likely of stakeholders raises the question of whether place-based collaborations truly demonstrate a move to participatory democracy or if instead collaborations simply serve as another venue for the expression of interest group pluralism.

This study has provided insight as to why many forest activists choose to not participate in collaborations. It also demonstrates that many activists can be encouraged to participate in collaborative processes given the right circumstances. However, what this thesis does not do is explore what activists who are involved in collaborations believe they will gain from their participation. This question is of interest because, as is alluded to in the discussions of the work of Dagget (1995) and John (1994) in Chapter II, it has been widely questioned whether the regulatory framework can accomplish much more than the prevention of “bad actions”.⁷ It would be interesting to explore to what degree activists who are involved in collaborations believe that collaborative efforts encourage “good land management practices” that cannot be catalyzed through regulatory means.

This thesis has also not explored in great detail the degree to which there truly are areas of “common ground” among often adversarial resource management stakeholders. From the literature and the research conducted for this study this issue appears to be open for debate. Some – such as Wondolleck and Yaffe (2000), Dagget (1995) and Kemmis (1990) – provide illustrations of where substantial common ground has been discovered.

Yet others, like Paulson (1998), as well this study's discussions of the Applegate Partnership and the QLG, seem to indicate that when it comes to details agreement between diverse stakeholders is difficult to reach. Rigorous analysis of the positions of different stakeholders, and the ideals that underlie their positions, would provide valuable information on the degree to which common ground solutions can ultimately be found.

Lastly, what this thesis, and most of the existing literature on place-based collaboration for resource management in the U.S., does not do is examine the actual impacts of the work of collaborations with regard to the vitality of human communities and ecological conditions. Of course this is in large part due to the fact that collaborations have only become prominent in recent years and therefore quantifiable data on the success or failure of collaborative efforts is limited. However, in the coming years this will be a rich area for research by both social scholars and hard scientists.

Final Discussion

The concept of place-based collaboration represents a significant departure from the traditions of national forest management in the U.S. that were laid down more than a century ago. Emerging out of the progressive era, the regulatory framework is based upon centralized rules that originate with federal elected officials and bureaucrats. In this tradition, on-the-ground management is the responsibility of Forest Service experts and the avenues for citizen access to these experts are rigidly defined.

Conversely, place-based collaborations encourage locally driven management. In many rural forest communities of the Northwest and northern California, this local

orientation makes the collaboration concept an exciting new tool for the development of forest management alternatives. Proponents argue that collaboration's focus on deliberate, cooperative decision making – where the role of citizens is more equal to agency experts – facilitates the development of management alternatives that serve the interests of both forest environments and rural human communities.

Understanding how forest activists relate to the regulatory framework provides valuable insight regarding the general activist reception of place-based collaboration. In the latter decades of the 20th century, forest activists and other environmentalists helped to build the centralized regulatory framework that governs national forest management. They have used this framework to inject environmental values into forest management and, using the courts and other arenas of adjudication, activists have substantially curbed the Forest Service's timber mandate. In short, from the perspective of most forest activists, the regulatory framework has served the interests of the forest environment.⁸ Therefore, it is not very surprising that the forest activist community has tended to greet place-based collaborations with skepticism.

But to make the blanket statement that activists are disinclined toward collaboration based upon their association with the regulatory framework would be an over simplification. Recall, from Chapter III, that activists are influenced by a diversity of ideas, and that many of these philosophies provide a basis for accepting approaches to resource management that are more decentralized than the regulatory framework. Therefore, in cases where collaborations exist within an atmosphere that is welcoming to

the views and interests of activists, numerous forest activists are inclined to accept, and participate in, the work of place-based collaborative efforts.

The three collaborations studied for this thesis illustrate the complex relationship between place-based collaborations and activists. The actions of the Applegate Partnership and Quincy Library Group have served to sour the views of activists regarding collaboration. Activists have generally perceived these collaborations as uninviting with regard to forests activists and hostile toward the regulatory framework.⁹ In the LCCSI case, however, Lake County community participants consciously avoided challenging the regulatory framework and activists were actively recruited and welcomed into the collaboration. In this atmosphere of acceptance, the LCCSI serves as a forum to explore using locally based collaboration in a manner that complements, rather than challenges, the regulatory framework.

Notes

¹ Recall that the QLG plan has also been criticized as not being adaptive in ecological terms, since it is scheduled to be applied to a vast 2.5 million acre landscape.

² Since activists are asked to travel to Lake County multiple times a year, trips by Lake County residents to Seattle, Portland and other points may serve to indicate to activists that the residents are willing to contribute time and travel to the effort themselves.

³ Over the course of this study's interviews, only one activist mentioned that he had felt discouraged from participating in an LCCSI meeting. In this case the activist expressed an interest in attending one day of a three day long meeting. He claims that he was told that participants had to be available for all three days in order to participate at all (I-205). In other interviews and informal conversations a variety of activists not involved with the group noted that they have been asked to participate in the collaboration on multiple occasions.

⁴ One of the forest activists involved with the LCCSI, who is a staff person of a national forest advocacy group, offers that his group is in general wary of place-based collaboration because of the threat of industry domination but is more optimistic about the LCCSI process. He states:

We are very skeptical of collaborative processes or legislation that gives any sort of preference to collaborative groups. There is a real possibility for collaborative groups to become industry dominated. If they are not receptive of the environmental community they will involve us as little as possible and they will stack the group in a way that is beneficial to the industry. But this Lakeview process demonstrates that this is not necessarily going to be a problem in every situation. (I-304)

⁵ While experiences associated with unique circumstances might not be directly transferable, this section is not intended to imply that collaborations cannot learn from each other's experiences with endemic conditions. Valuable lessons can be learned from the unique experiences of other collaborations. For example, the final point in this section indicates that combative personalities can hinder the capacity of a collaboration to build a vibrant multi-stakeholder effort. Aware of such experiences elsewhere, an individual or group attempting to organize a collaboration can learn to be watchful for combative persons and can have structures in place to moderate the influences of such personalities.

⁶ For example, Murray Bookchin – the leading proponent of “social ecology” – draws heavily from Marxist and anarchist traditions as he envisions a radical departure from hierarchical institutions and the establishment of ecologically sound, socially just

“libertarian” communities (Bookchin 1991). Other “local friendly” concepts popular among activists – including environmental justice and bioregionalism – also call for significant modifications to social and economic institutions (Lazarus 1994, Sale 1991).

⁷ Further research regarding the promise and limits of the regulatory framework would also be a useful area of study.

⁸ It should be remembered from Chapter III that while the forest activists have made a substantial investments in the regulatory framework, and has generally benefited from it, they are not always satisfied with the outcomes the framework yields.

⁹ Recall though, that while their sentiments have been mostly critical, in interviews and written documents, activists have volunteered some supportive statements regarding these two collaborations. The Applegate Partnership has been commended for its private land work and its role as a forum of discussion. In the QLG case, activists generally expressed support for the collaborative ideal, and many promoted implementation of the QLG plan via administrative avenues. It was only when the QLG sought legislation that the collaboration became a high-profile source of controversy.

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