U.S. AID TO HAITI: DOLLARS TO THE DUVALIERS, 1957 - 1986

By

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
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Professor Philip W. Scher

U.S. aid to Haiti during the Duvalier dictatorships supported two analogous anti-democratic regimes in the name of democracy and humanitarian purposes. This thesis provides an overview of development theory and a basic overview of foreign aid as a context for looking at aid to Haiti. The historic precedent is set through a brief look at Haitian independence and the American Occupation of Haiti in the early 20th century. By critically examining U.S. Government document publications in comparison with contemporary primary and secondary sources, this thesis finds that economic and military assistance to Haiti continued despite official freezes, flagrant human rights abuses and an openly kleptocratic regime. The conclusion drawn from such research suggests an overhaul in foreign aid policy and calls for a closer examination in U.S.-Haiti relations.

This project is dedicated to the youth of the Americas, that in knowing our history we may work to prevent its reoccurrence.



This graffiti in Port-au-Prince says *Jenès Poto Mitan* (youth are the center post)—a contrast to the traditional Haitian proverb *Fanm se poto mitan* (women are the center post). The center post in Haitian culture is the critical support for an entire structure, but also within Vodou, the center post is what the *loas* (spirits) descend to engage in the possession rituals. This shift from women to the youth reflects a coming-of-age of Haiti's youth. Recent statistics show that almost 70% of Haiti's population is under 30 and it is this population that voted in large force to recently elect President Michel Martelly (populationaction.org, accessed 5 May 2011).

Photo taken by Hannah Carr, February 4, 2011 in Port-au-Prince. All rights reserved.

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PREFACE

I was privileged to spend the winter of 2011 in the beautiful Republic of Haiti. I spent 10 weeks with 5 different organizations, traveling the country from the capital of Port-au-Prince, to the beautiful beach city of Jacmel, from a tent village in Carrefour to the 2010 earthquake's epicenter in Léogâne and finally finishing the trip in a rural health clinic north of Gonaïves in an area called Terre Blanche.



I had initially intended to conduct research while there volunteering with these various organizations. I had gone through the process of submitting an application with the Human Subjects Research Board (HSRB) and completed an online multiple choice course designed to inform about ethical research. I had submitted my questions and had acquired a voice recording device and extra batteries for my trip. My interviewees were to be Haitians over the age of 40 who were willing to discuss their experiences under the Duvaliers and what, if anything, they recalled about U.S. involvement, namely in the form of aid (see Appendix – Interview Script).

Even if I had received word from the HSRB before returning to the States, which I didn't, that my project was acceptable, I doubt I would have been able to conduct research with a large enough pool of interviewees. In a ten-week period, I encountered 3 people over the age of 40 with whom I was able to converse. To have an entire generation of middle-aged people largely missing from a population invites curiosity. The tens of thousands of people who were murdered under Duvalier (both father and son), the hundreds of thousands who immigrated to the United States and other countries around the world have left a noticeable dent in the current resident population of Haiti.

Of the people with whom I did engage, I was surprised to hear of how little they knew of the Duvaliers. One incident in particular stands out in my mind. It was a Monday evening and I was in the yard of two friends' home, sitting beneath a *pye bwa* and helping a small group of 6 or 7 adults in their late 20s/early 30s practice English. These people were all fairly educated, having at least finished secondary school and were all now employed in relatively well-paying jobs. They had surplus income enough to take optional English classes through the Jacaya English Institute in Jacmel. They comprised, one might say, a type of Haitian middle class.

I was trying to find a topic of conversation that everyone could partake in and simultaneously practice their English. We touched on the subject of the Duvaliers' regime, as they knew I was interested and I was shocked to have everyone ask me what I knew, for they expressed knowing very little. One man, Mesye Noel, an upper-level employee at Plan Haiti, explained to me that in school, the history books end with a few

brief pages on the two dictators –pages most students never get to reading before taking their end-of-year exams. Even in the best of private schools, Mesye Noel explained, the subject of Haiti's recent political past is barely covered.

This lack of understanding of recent history helped me to make sense of the lack of protest when Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier returned to Haiti, just a few days prior to this conversation. So few people knew his history, knew of his profiting from Haiti's misery, and the millions he took from aid monies designated for their fellow countrymen. There are many complications in current Haitian politics, as evidenced by the numerous analysts and countless articles written on the recent election turmoil and discrepancies –the majority of which are written, of course, in English and French, the languages of the educated elite.

If the young people of the Americas, those who shaped history in the election of President Obama in 2008, and those who are creating history now in Haiti with the election of President Michel "Sweet Mickey" Martelly in Haiti do not understand the complicated relations between these two countries, history may be destined to repeat. As aid dollars reach into the billions and digital technology gives previously inaccessible information to those who know how to use it best –young people, it is increasingly important that along with this power comes knowledge and understanding. This thesis is an effort to educate the English-speaking youth who are interested in having a voice in Haiti-U.S. affairs. Ideally, it will also be translated and sent to the youth in Haiti, so that they may use their recently found democratic voice for the betterment of Haiti.

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, the time period of this thesis, the United States used its financial affluence to persuade less affluent countries in the direction of capitalism. This battle for the world's hearts and minds often came at the expense of sustaining dictatorships in the name of democracy and freedom. This thesis uses Haiti as a case study for United States foreign policy in the Americas during the Cold War. The most prominent political figures in Haiti during the Cold War were President-turned-dictator François "Papa Doc" Duvalier, who ruled in Haiti from 1957 to 1971, and his son Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, who ruled from 1971 to 1986. Papa Doc Duvalier attracted U.S. attention and aid by playing to the U.S. desire to stamp out communism "in its own backyard." Despite being a brutal dictator responsible for gross human rights abuses, Duvalier not only remained in office, he received military and economic aid from the United States for the majority of his tenure. In 1971, at his father's death, Baby Doc Duvalier became President-for-Life of Haiti, and the U.S. continued its financial support regardless of numerous calls to address glaring human rights issues.

The following thesis will examine chronologically how foreign aid, specifically from the United States with an initially Modernization Theory polemic, worked to dissuade Haiti from the lure of communism and accept an oppressive regime in its stead. The first step is to understand the context in which the U.S. began to dispense foreign aid as well as the general logic of its foreign aid policy. In order to understand the particular character of U.S. aid to Haiti, it is necessary to explain the context for the particular political and economic situation in Haiti when Duvalier became President in 1957. The establishment of this crucial background information will provide the

framework for an in-depth look at specific examples of U.S. allocation of aid and reactions and non-reactions to François "Papa Doc" Duvalier's political tactics. This paper will next examine the evolution of U.S.-Haiti relations as Duvalier's son "Baby Doc" assumed the presidency after his father's death, until his own departure in 1986. The examination of aid to Haiti during Baby Doc's rule will expose the discrepancies and complications of foreign assistance. To conclude, this paper will provide a brief evaluation of the lasting role that U.S. foreign aid has played in the current political and economic situation in Haiti.

METHODOLOGY

It is with great humility that this thesis recognizes the overwhelming amount of further research needed to reach more definitive conclusions, but such are the limitations of an undergraduate thesis.

This thesis was written primarily using government publications of the hearings before the various subcommittees on foreign relations, foreign assistance, human rights commissions, and economic development. The publications varied in length from 60 pages to thousands. The indices were inconsistently present, and when present even more inconsistently detailed. Nevertheless, the documents provided the transcripts from congressional subcommittee hearings, giving the characters of the various players and presenting the charts and graphs just as the congressmen—and occasional congresswoman—had access to them. The contemporary nature of the publications was both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, it gave the sense of what the subcommittees had to work with; and on the other hand, as will be shown later, the inconsistencies and discrepancies were rampant and contradictory.

In addition to the literally thousands of pages perused in search of the word "Haiti" from the government documents, several secondary sources became my most consistent resources. In particular, Elizabeth Abbott's *Haiti: an Insider's History of the Rise and Fall of the Duvaliers* (Touchstone 1988) not only traveled through Haiti with this author, it became a near constant companion. Abbott's detail is heart-wrenching and her precision makes for a researcher's prize possession. Another indispensable resource was *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People 1492-1971* by Colonel Robert Debs Heinl Junior and his wife, Nancy Gordon Heinl. Colonel Heinl served in Haiti in the early 1960s with the U.S. Marines and his experiences, along with his wife's historical perspective was invaluable. The final go-to source for this thesis was Michel-Rolph Trouillot's *Haiti: State against Nation: the Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism* (Monthly Review Press 1990). Trouillot's Haitian heritage offers a unique insight into the cultural and political genesis and ramifications of 30 years of Duvalierism.

The historical overview of foreign aid originated in a course taken in fall 2009 at the University of Oregon: *Aid to Developing Countries* taught by Professor Anita Weiss. A basic understanding of the origins of foreign aid and international financial institutions was gathered from this class and supplemented through individual research. In addition to this class were primary source readings of development theorist W.W. Rostow and his *The Stages of Economic Growth: the Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge University Press 1960) and secondary analyses of development theory throughout history (Pearce 2001; Buss and Gardner 2008; Isbister 1998). Of particular assistance was secondary source *A Fragile Balance: Re-examining the History of*

Foreign Aid, Security, and Diplomacy (Picard and Buss, Kumarian Press 2009). This overview of foreign policy refreshed what had been muddled in the years since Weiss' class and succinctly explained the differences in policy over the course of this thesis' time period.

Multiple anthologies were also considered, with gratitude for the precision of their indices. Anthologies on the Caribbean proved helpful in providing initial context for Haiti's political and economic situation (Hillman and D'Agostino 2010; Palmer 1984; Scher 2010). Others were more valuable for their historical perspective (Legler, Lean and Boniface 2007; Humphrey 2003; Dubois and Garrigus 2006). Several Haiti-specific anthologies also proved fascinating, especially in the gathering of background information and in fueling the curiosity needed for this project (Arthur and Dash 1999; Lundahl 1992).

The highlight of the research for this project was the time spent in Haiti. As previously mentioned (see Preface), this author lived in Haiti for 10 weeks, traveling the country and volunteering with multiple organizations. Just over two weeks into the trip, news of Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier's return spread across the country, invoking curiosity and, in keeping with Haitian tradition, giving birth to countless rumors as to why he had returned and for how long he intended to stay. In the tradition of international journalism, rumors also proliferated and at this writing, it is still unclear of his intentions (Charles 2011; swissinfo.ch 2011). His return provided a unique opportunity to ask people their opinions on his motivations, his presidency and the effects of such. All interviews were informal and dictated by the level of confidentiality

the circumstance allowed as well as the level of relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee. Most shocking was the level of ignorance and it was often the interviewer who was questioned as to what had occurred during the reign of Baby Doc as President-for-Life of Haiti. This illogical debt of knowledge propelled this project into further research and has inspired the continuation of the project well-past the scope of this particular thesis.

The variety of sources used for this thesis further prove the actual thesis itself– that the issue of foreign aid is utterly convoluted, that U.S.-Haiti relations have always been complicated and that no single source can be considered fully comprehensive, including this thesis. What can be determined is that the United States gave millions of dollars to the regimes of the Duvaliers despite acknowledged anti-democratic practices and gross human rights violations.

CHAPTER 1: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN AID

Despite common perceptions, foreign aid is a surprisingly recent development. It rests on two basic prerequisites that are of fairly recent origin—the existence of countries that are both independent and needy, and the political incentive for other countries to provide assistance to these countries. These prerequisites appeared in the wake of World War II at the beginning of the Cold War. The incentive to supply aid came from the physical and economic destruction caused by World War II, as well as the accurate assumption that areas of economic deprivation were fertile grounds for communist propaganda. The combination of the existing prerequisites and the threat of

communism prompted the United States to begin distributing economic aid to devastated nations as diplomatic, humanitarian and political gestures.

Within the context of this paper, economic aid refers to Official Development Assistance (ODA). It can be distributed through contracts with non-governmental organizations (NGOs); by multilateral donor agencies, which fundraise from multiple donor countries; or through soft-loans, which are low interest–long term loans, in the form of bilateral checks from one government to another. Donor countries give aid for four main reasons: first, for national security; second, for economic growth of the receiving country (which in turn benefits the giving country through international trade) through international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; third, for commercial benefit, for example hiring American companies to facilitate aid distribution; and fourth for humanitarian purposes – though at times, even this can be better described as furthering public relations for the donor country (Weiss 2009). These reasons reprioritize where and when donor countries send aid. In the Cold War period, national security played a particularly integral role in the process of aid allocation.

Foreign aid, as it is recognized today, began as a result of the structural and economic destruction of World War II. Recognizing the need to reconstruct Europe and stimulate international economic growth, world leaders met in July 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Representatives from 43 countries gathered to discuss what could be done about the dire situation of the global economy. Out of this conference

came the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank's creation was

> to assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes [and] to promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment ... thereby assisting in raising the productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labour [sic] in their territories. (BrettonWoodsProject.org, accessed 22 February 2010)

The International Monetary Fund maintains monetary exchange stability and provides loans to countries struggling to make payments on other loans. The two Bretton Woods Institutions were established to encourage international economic integration and to rebuild a devastated postwar economy.

The Truman Doctrine in the late 1940s initiated the United States' participation in foreign aid. In what is now recognized as the first example of U.S. bilateral aid, President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress to request that $400 million be given to Greece and Turkey in March of 1947. The request came after an announcement by the British stating that they would no longer support Greece in its Civil War against Communists. The Truman Doctrine reoriented U.S. foreign policy and "established that the United States would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces" (State.gov accessed 22 February 2010). The Truman Doctrine held that a threat to freedom anywhere was a threat to freedom everywhere and the U.S. must act in the interest of its own national security and intervene, militarily as well as financially.

Similar in spirit to the economic corollary of the Truman Doctrine, only months later the Marshall Plan developed. In June of 1947 then-Secretary of State George Marshall gave an address at Harvard University calling for the economic recovery of certain European countries through United States' assistance. One month later, the Paris Economic Conference adopted the idea that became known as the Marshall Plan. It led to the creation of the Organization for the European Economic Co-operation and was an initial step in European economic integration. Created to facilitate economic growth and international trade, its secondary intent was to contain Soviet expansion. One example of the Marshall Plan's anti-communism is the Berlin Airlift of 1948-9, during which the U.S. supplied, at its height, nearly 8,000 pounds of supplies each day to the Soviet-blockaded city of West Berlin (Weiss 2009). The following decades would see an increase of analogous aid—i.e., aid given to deter threatening Communist activities in what came to be known as the Third World.

The *Third World* as a term originated post-World War II and morphed during the Cold War to refer to politically and economically contested countries. The First World consisted of free market countries, i.e. the U.S. and its allies. The Second World was the communist countries and the Third World was the contested, generally underdeveloped and dependence-susceptible countries. As historian L.S. Stavrianos states in his book *The Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age*:

> Third World status, then, involves a second distinguishing feature in addition to low-income level, namely, economic growth without economic development—growth determined by foreign capital and foreign markets rather than by local needs (Stavrianos 1981: 8).

Third World countries have since become synonymous with low-growth aid-dependent countries, and though it would be too conspiratorial to assume that the creators of aid programs intended dependence –this effect has been debated (Diaz 2010; Buss 2008; Farmer 1992; Bodenheimer 1971). Foreign aid was not simply an economic gift, and not all independent and needy countries received aid.[1]

MODERNIZATION THEORY

In each Third World, aid-receiving country, the kind and purpose of the aid given was determined by development theory, namely Modernization Theory. Modernization Theory was born in the 1950s and formed the basis of U.S. foreign aid for many decades. It influenced and was influenced by contemporary international politics and the fight to defend capitalism against communist threats. It originated from a set of theoretical assumptions regarding the perceived relation between a competitive market economy, economic growth, technological development, general prosperity, and the "free world," all based on the economic theories of Simon Kuznets. Kuznets was an American economist of the neoclassical paradigm, "which held that short-period factors were the appropriate units for the statistical analysis of economic growth trends" (Pearce 2001:2). Kuznets thought that the income differentiation in poor countries was greater than that in wealthy countries. If the gaps were closed, Kuznets argued, poor countries would develop following the path of the West.

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[1] It should also be noted that the term "Fourth World" has also been used, though less extensively, for countries neither capitalist nor communist nor contested, but rather un-integrated with the international economy. These countries are now also recipients of international aid; and though they were not the primary objectives initially, they are often lumped into the Third World category as well.

To lessen income differentiation, Modernization Theory called for an injection of capital into a promising sector within an institutionally stable environment, ensuring the transfer of stimulus throughout the economy. It also stressed the need for changing government policies. The roots of poverty were internal and through injections of capital any country could follow the same trajectory as the West, Modernization Theory argued. Three key components of the theory were: 1) that receiving countries would restructure their economies to maximize the effectiveness of aid; 2) the aid would allow for the diversion of funds to other high priority but previously non-funded projects and 3) that receiving countries would be motivated by aid to not only plan and implement projects but also to invest wisely for the future economic success of themselves (Weiss 2009). These components, when properly integrated, would lead to economic growth along the same course of increasing wealth that the West had followed.

Modernization Theory was a uniquely Western ideology whose aim was to develop free market economies in underdeveloped countries. In 1960, American economist and politician W.W. Rostow published a book *The Stages of Economic Growth: the Non-Communist Manifesto* (University Press, 1960) that came to be considered Modernization Theory's handbook. Rostow challenged the neoclassical theory of short-period factors and argued for the use of narrative and the reconstruction of historical patterns to predict future long-term economic growth trends (Pearce 2001:2). Rostow's theories appealed to policymakers during the Cold War due to their relevance to "development assistance policy; managing the competition between older and newer industrial societies; and phasing out the cold war" (5). In his *Manifesto*,

Rostow created what he considered the five stages of economic development that all economies will inevitably follow if not impeded.

The primary stage is traditional society, wherein a ceiling on production exists and what Rostow titles a long-run fatalism is held – "that is, the assumption that the range of possibilities open to one's grandchildren would be just about what it had been for one's grandparents" (Rostow 1960:5). The second stage of growth is when the preconditions for take-off are developed. This is accomplished through modern science spreading the idea of economic progress as a necessity; risks are taken and certain enterprising individuals begin to pursue profit. The third stage in this sequence is the take-off, when former limitations are overcome and growth becomes normalized. The fourth stage is the drive to maturity. Rostow defines maturity as the ability of an economy to produce "not everything, but anything that it chooses to produce" (10). The fifth and final stage of economic development, and the goal of Modernization Theory, was the age of high mass-consumption as was – and arguably is – present in the U.S., Western Europe and Japan. These five stages were seen as the trajectory to wealth that underdeveloped countries ought to follow and Modernization Theory the method to take them there.

U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Prior to World War II, Franklin Delano Roosevelt established the Good Neighbor Policy in 1933, intending to improve relations in the Western Hemisphere by ending direct U.S. intervention. Following World War II however, direct U.S. intervention in the Western Hemisphere, namely Latin America and the Caribbean, resumed. Thomas J. D'Agostino in his essay "Caribbean Politics" (Lynne Reine

Publisher 2010:87-131) argues that in the stead of U.S. forces, the local institutions which replaced these stabilizing forces actually facilitated the rise of infamous dictators such as Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, and François Duvalier in Haiti. D'Agostino claims "In each case, domestic political development was sacrificed in the interest of preserving the status quo and safeguarding US national security, sowing the seeds of future conflict that would involve further US intervention, albeit in different forms" (D'Agostino, 2010:92). U.S. foreign relations with Latin America have frequently resulted in the stagnation of economic growth in the name of security.

The conclusion of World War II led to heightened tensions and U.S. sensitivity to communist insurgencies. The outbreak of the Cold War led to the U.S. "putting the Good Neighbor Policy in mothballs and giving the Monroe Doctrine new life" (Maingot 1994:87 as quoted in D'Agostino, 2010:99). The new life of the Monroe Doctrine came in the form of foreign aid, only instead of freeing the New World from fears of re-colonization from Old World colonial powers, the United States hoped to free its neighbors from communism. The U.S. sought stability in self-professed anticommunist administrations, even if those administrations were dictatorial regimes.

As method for improving relations between the United States and the world – the Third World in particular—President John F. Kennedy established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID or AID) in 1961, two months after Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 reorganized the way the U.S. did foreign assistance. It separated military and non-

military aid and mandated the creation of an agency (AID) to administer economic assistance programs (usaid.gov, accessed 22 Feb. 2010). This new agency combined previously existing aid operations such as the International Cooperation Agency, the Development Loan Fund, the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), and Public Law 480. AID unified assistance efforts and refocused foreign aid. As then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated in 1963, the goals of foreign aid were "to provide assistance and encouragement to nations so that they can grow independence, security, and freedom. We seek no satellites; we seek no domination; we are not trying to buy friends. America is working to make the world safe for freedom" (Committee on Foreign Affairs 1964:1). In working to make the world safe, America was giving away billions of dollars worth of aid (Picard and Buss 2009:96).

One of the primary methods of distributing these billions was Public Law 480. Officially titled the Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act, as signed into effect by President Eisenhower in 1954, in 1961 President Kennedy renamed the law the "Food for Peace" program. Three components comprised PL480. Title I: US-produced, submarket-priced food sold on the private sector in the Third World. Title II: emergency relief free food. Title III: food given as part of development projects (Picard and Buss 2009:94). Taking agricultural surpluses and shipping them overseas to be sold for profit, PL 480 served both American agricultural interests as well as the economies of developing countries' need for income. What it did not address however, was local farmers' inability to compete with domestically subsidized American products. Criticism of food aid began shortly after the program began and by the end of the

1950s, the presence of cheaper foodstuffs was recognized as undermining local production (120).

Foreign aid became a permanent fixture in the United States' foreign policy in the 1960s. No longer seen strictly as temporary economic assistance, aid was "part of the arsenal and security policy tools available to the government" (Picard and Buss 2009:103). The policymakers' formative years during World War II had infused them with "a missionary idealism to change their world," and they sojourned out into the world full of illusions (107). The Vietnam War flattened many dreams of progress through AID, as quick-fixes were neither quick nor they did fix much, if anything. The Vietnam War also militarized aid and impressed upon the Third World that the U.S. was no different than former Western European colonial powers (110, 115). The conclusion of the Johnson administration in 1969 brought the end of Modernization Theory's reign in U.S. foreign policy.

BEYOND MODERNIZATION THEORY

During the 1970s, foreign aid followed a "basic needs approach," addressing poverty through "'integrated' rural development—[a] combination of technical assistance to farmers with the delivery of social services to rural villages" (Picard and Buss 2009:121). President Carter, in addition to his focus on human rights, also adopted basic needs as part of his foreign policy. Basic needs were difficult to generalize as every country had its own peculiarities, and even within that, needs varied from region to region. However, a certain hierarchy of needs could be established with variations from A.H. Maslow's Basic Needs Theory, which was then the focal point of developmental policy. These needs were, at most base-level: physiological needs—

homeostasis and food; next were safety needs; followed by love needs, esteem needs and finally the need for self-actualization—a sense of doing what one is called to do (Maslow 1943:384). There was a certain amount of flexibility and pre-conditionality to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, but in general, these were considered requirements for every human being, independent of all other variables. The 1970s saw a shift towards emphasizing these needs, as had been reformulated into more contemporary terms (Burton 1979; Sites 1973 as described in Rubenstein 2001).

President Reagan's administration changed aid policy drastically. Reagan refocused foreign aid on democratization, "except where Cold War concerns required support for authoritarian rulers" (Picard and Buss 2009:124). Most impactful was the Reagan administration's treatment of international debt through structural adjustment and conditionality. The "Washington Consensus" came into being in 1989 and described how American policy had shifted to the notion that poverty originates internally within a country (Williamson 2004:1). The report from which the "Washington Consensus" term originated, explicitly stated 10 reforms upon which the author, John Williamson, thought Washington (in the political and in the technocratic sectors (2)) agreed. They are as follows:

- Fiscal discipline
- Reordering public expenditures priorities
- Tax reform
- Liberalizing interest rates
- A competitive exchange rate
- Trade liberalization
- Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment
- Privatization
- Deregulation

- Property rights (3).

These terms came to define foreign policy during the Reagan administration. Foreign aid was given to countries that followed these reforms and shifted their economies to market-orientation. Conditions of policy reforms, public service and stability went hand in hand with structural adjustment. As foreign aid grew increasingly complicated, responsibilities were delegated away from the government to private sector for-profit and non-governmental organizations (Picard and Buss 2009:129). Despite limited successes, structural adjustment continues to define aid policy (130).

CONCLUSION

In the case of Haiti, aid policy shifted along with the larger international trends. The trials of modernization played out in Haiti in full scale. Under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, Modernization Theory materialized itself in capital injections into Haiti's weak economy as will be explored in Chapter Three. The beginning of the Vietnam War and the increase in military attention to Haiti under Johnson followed larger global patterns of U.S. aid. President Nixon's administration improved relations to Haiti and continued to support its anti-communism. Chapter Four details the 1970s, which saw aid to Haiti emphasize rural agriculture and food aid, as fits with the contemporary Basic Needs theory. President Carter's administration filled the end of the decade with human rights focused foreign policy. The final years of Baby Doc Duvalier during Reagan restructured Haiti's economy to a more international manufacturing market-oriented policy. Before a detailed examination of the Duvaliers' rule in Haiti and the United States subsequent support, it is important to first understand Haiti's origins.

CHAPTER 2: HAITI BEFORE DUVALIER

The history of Haiti begins like that of much in the New World. Prior to Christopher Columbus running aground on her shores in 1492, Haiti was home to the Arawak Taino people. The native inhabitants called the island Hayti, also written Ayiti, which meant mountainous. Columbus named the island *Ysla Española* (Spanish Island), later Latinized by historian Peter Martyr to Hispaniola (Heinl and Heinl 1978:11). When Columbus landed, he introduced foreign bacteria and intercontinental contact; the Taino people suffered the consequences. In his journals, Columbus wrote of the Indians:

> They are lovable, tractable, peaceable, gentle, decorous. They bear no arms and are so completely defenseless and of no skill in arms, and very cowardly, so that a thousand would not face three; and so they are fit to be ordered about and made to work, to sew and do all else that may be needed (Columbus, as quoted in Heinl and Heinl 1978:12).

Slavery proved fatal for the native people. From an estimated 3 million people in 1492, by 1508 only 60,000 could be counted; by 1533 only 600; and by 1550 only 150 could be found. When sugar came to Hispaniola in 1506 from the Canary Islands, Indians came from the Bahamas to replace the dwindling labor force. By 1510, less than 20 years since original contact, the Spanish began to import African slaves to work in the gold mines and the cane fields (13).

By the latter half of the sixteenth century, the gold left in Hispaniola was little in comparison to the riches of Mexico and Peru, and Spain's troubles in Europe caused Hispaniola to suffer. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 weakened the Spanish state and piracy in the Caribbean further threatened her colonies. Spain placed an embargo on Hispaniola in an attempt to prevent British and French ships from

underselling Spanish merchants, much to the detriment of the entire colony. After decades of piracy, battles over territory, and Huguenots establishing trade in Hispaniola's prosperous ports, the French conquered western Hispaniola in 1659 (Heinl and Heinl 1978:17). The Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 officially recognized the French colony as Saint Domingue (Abbott 1988:10).

Saint Domingue was not always a slavery-based economy. In 1681, the census counted only 2000 slaves. However, by 1764 the annual importation of slaves was 4000. In 1787, adding to the 450,000 slaves already present, the French imported 40,000 more (Heinl and Heinl 1978:25). Contemporaneously, the white population numbered only 40,000 and the mulatto/freed people of color only 30,000 (Nicholls 1996:19). According to Junius P. Rodriguez in his book, Encyclopedia of Slave Resistance and Rebellions (2007), "The mortality rate for slaves working the plantations on the island [of Saint Domingue] was the highest in the Western Hemisphere. Africans were constantly imported during the [eighteenth century] as the mortality rate among slaves always outpaced the birthrate" (Rodriquez 2007:229). The conditions of slavery in Saint-Domingue were horrendous (Abbott 1988: 10-13).

In less than 100 years, Saint Domingue had transformed from a small-scale mining colony to a full-fledged agricultural powerhouse. The island was a fertile tropical paradise, the cool blue seas surrounding the hillsides of coffee, mango and banana trees. The colony became the richest of France's colonies, producing the majority of the world's sugar. Saint Domingue was also rich in coffee, cotton and indigo plantations and supplied half of Europe's consumption of tropical produce. With

two-thirds of France's overseas trade coming from the island, it effectively employed 1,000 ships and 15,000 French sailors (Abbott 1988:10). This economic prosperity came at the cost of high slave mortality, as the French calculated that it was poor business to keep a slave alive after 4 to 7 years of back-breaking labor (11). Generations of torture and oppression came to a head in the late 18th century, and the economic wealth of Saint Domingue disappeared in one of the bloodiest revolutions in modern history.

THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION 1791-1804

The night of August 20, 1791 was the beginning of a fiery and bloody insurrection. Swearing vengeance on all whites, thousands of slaves and freed men of color assembled across the Northern plantations of Saint-Domingue and set fire to hundreds of sugar works. Antoine Dalmas, a colonist who left Saint-Domingue for the United States in 1793, described in detail the premiere days of the revolution. In his *History of the Revolution of Saint-Domingue* published in 1814, Dalmas gave his perspective, as a colonist who survived the fatal attacks. Dalmas interpreted the revolution's beginning as such:

> This was just the fourth day of the revolt, and already the whites of six parishes were either refugees, prisoners, or corpses. Flames had consumed one hundred sugar works; and twenty thousand slaves, once peaceful and submissive, were now so many cannibals, threatening Cap Français with the same fate" (Dalmas 1814:93).

The insurrection was not executed as neatly as planned due to unanticipated resistance as well as hesitation from the slaves to murder their masters (90). The fighting carried on for years and eventually concluded with a historical anomaly: the only successful slave rebellion turned independence movement. In direct contrast to the chronology of

the United States' conception, Haiti abolished slavery in 1793, wrote a constitution in 1801 and finally declared independence in 1804.

At the time of independence, Haiti's sovereignty went unrecognized, including by the United States who only years prior, fought alongside Haitians in its own Revolutionary War. France, Haiti's colonizer at the time of its revolution, accepted Haiti's sovereignty twenty years later in 1824, but only under certain, extreme conditions. France forced Haiti to agree to pay 150 million francs as reparation to the slaveholders who had lost property through the emanicipation (Farmer *Who Removed Aristide?* 2004). Not until 1862 under President Lincoln, and with the absence of southern representatives in Congress, did the United States formally recognize Haiti as a sovereign nation. Lincoln appointed Frederick Douglass as the American consul general in Port-au-Prince (Buss 2008:22)

AMERICAN OCCUPATION 1915-1934

After the recognition, the United States increased its involvement in Haitian affairs. U.S. investors began to expand their interests and activities in Haiti. However, all was not the tropical paradise people hoped. Between 1908 and 1915, Haitians rose up 20 times against their government. And between 1876 and 1913, the United States dispatched the Navy to Haiti on 15 separate occasions to protect Americans and American interests (Buss 2008:23) German interest in Haiti in the 1910s led President Woodrow Wilson to search for means of asserting U.S. dominance. After a year of preparations, on 28 July 1915, Marines and sailors landed in Haiti (Abbott 1988:34). The Marines were tasked with bringing about political stability in Haiti, securing

strategic interests in the Caribbean, and integrating Haiti into the international capitalist economy (Renda 2001:10).

Relations between the U.S. Marines and the Haitians were tense at best. The primarily white armed forces of the United States in the almost entirely black nation of Haiti caused considerable tension between the two groups and racism ran high. Not only was racism a source of conflict, U.S. policy humiliated Haiti's sovereignty and collective self-worth. Mary A. Renda in her book *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940* describes the situation:

> While in Haiti, Marines installed a puppet president, dissolved the legislature at gunpoint, denied freedom of speech, and forced a new constitution on the Caribbean nation –one more favorable to foreign investment (Renda 2001: 10).

Renda states later that paternalism was the "cultural flagship" of the U.S. in Haiti and that it reinforced and extended violence against the Haitians (29, 35). U.S. official estimates place the number of Haitians killed during the occupation at 3,000; "more thorough accounting" places the figure at upwards of 11,500 (10). Needless to say, intense racial conflict between whites, mulatto elites and blacks characterized much of this period (Buss 2008:23).

The United States had several major accomplishments in Haiti—accomplishments in the sense of goals met. One of the primary goals of the United States was to abolish the constitutional prohibition of foreign ownership of land in Haiti. The U.S. accomplished this through persevering treaty officials and political bullying, "gunboat diplomacy." Another of the goals was to link rural communities to facilitate military and police operations and to increase economic productivity across

the country. Forced labor of peasants through a "long-defunct corvée law" accomplished a massive road-building project (Renda 2001:32). U.S. officials also "seized the customshouses [sic], took control of Haitian finances, and imposed their own standards of efficiency on the administration of Haiti debt" (10). All was done through the presence of the Marines who were simultaneously waging war against armed insurgents, *Cacos,* in the countryside.

Achievements were minor; damage seemingly irreversible. Economically, Haiti grew more dependent on foreign markets and more vulnerable by the increase of production of only coffee. Socio-economically, the disparity between the wealthy elite and the peasant masses expanded enormously as the value of imports increased and the duty on exports filled only the pockets of the custom houses. The occupiers also levied taxes on basic products like salt and matches and per usual the poorest people suffered most deeply (Trouillot 199:103).

Needless to say, the occupation of Haiti was not largely popular. In August 1915, two weeks after the Marines landed in Haiti, then-Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote a letter to President Wilson, expressing his views with regards to the occupation.

> I have to confess that this method of negotiations, with our Marines policing the Haitian capital, is high handed. It does not meet my sense of a nation's sovereign rights and is more or less an exercise of force and an invasion of Haitian independence. From a practical standpoint, however, I cannot but feel that it is the only thing to do if we intend to cure the anarchy and disorder which prevails in that Republic (Renda 2001:31).

Despite Mr. Lansing's concerns, the United States remained in Haiti for 19 years and the anarchy and disorder that prevailed in the Republic was anything but cured. In 1920,

during the U.S. presidential elections, opponents of Wilson published scathing reports of the Occupation. African-American missionaries returned from Haiti with horror stories of the war raging between the Marines and the *Cacos*, the resistance group. After the election of President Harding however, opposition died down. A period of relative tranquility followed, due to the lack of press in both the U.S. and Haiti where respectively, media was uninterested and repressed (33).

Opposition rose again in 1929. A student strike in the fall led to a general strike across the nation. Haitians gathered in large numbers in opposition to the occupation and the relatively small-scale Marine detachments reacted violently. On December 6, 1929 in Aux Cayes a coastal town in southern Haiti, 1500 Haitians demonstrated. Marines opened fire on the crowd. They killed 12 people and 23 were wounded (Renda 2001:34). Another U.S.-chosen president was installed in Haiti within a few months, but the damage was done. President Hoover commissioned an investigation into the occupation and shortly thereafter plans for the removal of the troops began. Four long years later, the last U.S. Marine departed, but it was not until 1942 when the U.S. stopped its direct supervision of the Haitian economy (34).

In the 19 years the U.S. occupied Haiti, they did not set up the Haitians for the self-governance that Haiti needed when the U.S. departed. At best, the United States tried to establish some internal financial institutions (Buss 2008:24). The U.S. left little long-term infrastructure in Haiti and even the financial institutions established did not survive until Duvalier in 1957. Instead, what Haiti received was an institutionalized dependency on the U.S. (Picard and Buss 2009:50). The remnants of the occupation

were: collective resentment towards international intervention specifically from the U.S., the opinion "that power comes out of the barrel of a gun," and the increased political power of the military (Trouillot 1990:104).

CONCLUSION

Haiti's early independence (relative to other colonies in the New World) limited the opportunities for Haiti to benefit from France's experience in city planning and the creation of infrastructure. John A. Bushnell, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in 1979 explained Haiti's underdevelopment in this way:

> Haiti did not inherit the benefits of enlightened colonial rule and related infrastructure. In almost 200 years of independence, Haiti has never been free from authoritarian rule or political and economic disorder (Committee on Foreign Affairs 1979: 15).

The United States' occupation of Haiti was a similar opportunity to reap benefits from an otherwise oppressive regime. However, as previously noted, the little infrastructure established did not last. The history of Haiti can, at best, be described as turbulent, and at worst, as violently tragic. This brief overview of the complicated and intricate history of Haiti sets the background for the poverty and tension of François Duvalier's rise to power, as shall be discussed in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER 3– "PAPA DOC": THE MAN, THE MANIAC, THE MACOUTE

François Duvalier grew up under the American Occupation. Born in 1907, Duvalier's formative years were during the American rule of Haiti. Duvalier witnessed the humiliation and the strife of his fellow Haitians and with two close friends created an intellectual group to discuss their surrounding situation. The group discussed Pan-

Africanism and idealized the tenants of *noirisme* –the political and social movement of black power. The racism of the white American occupiers fomented the group's hatred for the mulatto elite and formulated the blueprint for Duvalier's political ideology. In his second year of medical school, Duvalier joined the nationwide student-strike against the occupation. His graduation paralleled the end of the occupation (Abbott 1988:44-6).

Dr. François Duvalier later set aside his hatred towards Americans to join in the successful international campaign against the widespread tropical disease: yaws. Yaws afflicted more than half of Haiti's population and from July 1950 until late in 1954, UNICEF conducted house-to-house treatment, reaching 97% of the population. By late 1958 they had administered more than 3.7 million treatments and reduced active cases from 40-50% of the population to a mere 1%. By 1961, UNICEF had spent $576,400 on this project and was able to declare that "Yaws is no longer a health problem in Haiti"[2]. Dr. Duvalier was the director of the Rural Clinic of Gressier, 15 miles south-west of Port-au-Prince in the most yaws-ridden area of Haiti, and became well-known throughout the country for his healing abilities.

François Duvalier, at the outset of this campaign, had been a struggling doctor who was more interested in his country's culture and Vodou than in the medicine he had struggled financially to learn. His poor eyesight had kept him from being an army doctor and he barely survived professionally by working at the Emilie Séguineau Clinic, a home for the elderly ten miles south of Port-au-Prince. However in 1943, the Inter-American Affairs Commission hired Duvalier, primarily on his ability to speak heavily

[2] (U.S. House. Subcommittee on the Committee of Appropriations 1961, Part III:271)

accented but largely understandable English. Enthralled by the wonders of penicillin, Duvalier set about curing Haiti, and simultaneously transforming from a "shy scholarly myopic little Duvalier into the great country doctor who cured hundreds of thousands, and whose reputation as their "Papa Doc" spread as steadily as yaws contracted" (Abbott 1988:51).

Duvalier entered politics in 1946 as the secretary-general of the *Mouvement des Ouvriers et Paysans* (Movements of Workers and Peasants). Soon afterward he became the Director of Public Health, the Under-Minister of Labor in 1948, and in 1949 a Cabinet member, as Minister of Public Health and Labor; all under his friend and former teacher, *noiriste* revolutionary President Dumarsais Estimé. President Estimé won the hearts of Haitians, who after decades of white and mulatto rule, approved of his bitter racism and "his real efforts to improve their lots" (Abbott 1988:56). Duvalier's modest new career however, ended abruptly after an army coup in 1950 deposed of Estimé and replaced him with the black-but-mulatto-friendly Colonel Paul Magloire. Duvalier was forever impacted by this first-hand experience with army rule and his mistrust of men in uniform continued throughout his life. Duvalier hid for much of Magloire's presidency and according to friends, "read Machiavelli's *The Prince* to tatters" (Abbott 1988:61).

President Magloire succeeded Estimé with the support of the Catholic Church, the army, the elites, the Americans and "even dictator of the Dominican Republic Trujillo had nothing against him" (Abbott 1988:58). Magloire benefitted from American aid immensely and tourism boomed in this "Golden Age" of Haiti. Vodou

became a source of great American intrigue and tourists came in large numbers to experience this fascinatingly dark spirituality (Johnson 2006:429). By the early 1950s, however, Haiti faced internal economic and political crisis. In October of 1954, Hurricane Hazel struck Haiti destroying coffee and cacao crops and severely affecting Haiti's economy.

The United States provided immediate emergency aid of over $2 million worth of agricultural commodities and accoutrements. Additional aid was discussed but not placed in the 1955 budget program. Within two months however, President Magloire sent a request for additional aid. By 1956, rumors of political unrest and Magloire's upcoming resignation reached the U.S. Department of State. In a Memorandum, reasons were listed for the economic crisis that spurred Magloire's hypothesized departure: Hurricane Hazel's devastation to an already short coffee crop, France's poor economy which reduced coffee exports to France thereby reducing income to Haiti, droughts in the North, floods in the South and a food shortage as a result. Magloire officially resigned December 6, 1956; however, he immediately assumed control of the army and jailed the opposition leaders. A general strike and government paralysis within six days led Magloire to yield and he flew to Jamaica on December 13, 1956. The "rapid political, financial and economic deterioration in Haiti" was acknowledged in the United States and stopgap and stabilization aid was developed in corroboration with the IMF to give Haiti $1 million in grant aid (Department of State 1987).

In Haiti's second popular election, four candidates vied for the presidency: Clément Jumelle, the favorite of Magloire; Daniel Fignolé, the choice of the urban

proletariat; Louis Déjoie, the poster child of the elite; and François "Papa Doc" Duvalier, the country doctor-in-hiding (Abbott 1988:61-62). The campaign was intensive and deadly serious. Duvalier rode the coattails of Estimé's previous success and Madame Estimé even campaigned alongside of him. Slowly eroding his opponents' support, Duvalier traversed the provinces promising Haitians dignity and prosperity with the sincerity of the doctor who had treated their crippling yaws only years beforehand. Duvalier rallied previously disenfranchised people: rural, poor, black, peasants, Vodouists, and even women (Johnson 2006:430). Though Duvalier's real competition was Fignolé, by Election Day, only Déjoie remained to face Duvalier. The other two candidates' elimination was "murky and complex, [and] is one of the first indications of Duvalier's stunning ability to diagnose his country's politics and to jab the right remedy in the right place" (Abbott 1988:65). Nearly one million Haitians voted; 679,884 for Duvalier, 266,992 for Déjoie and 9,980 for Jumelle though he was no longer eligible (64).

The people of Haiti elected François Duvalier on September 22nd, 1957. The elections have been described as "elections that cannot be considered completely honest but which nevertheless probably reflected popular opinion fairly well" (Lundahl 1992). Duvalier campaigned on the promise of increasing the budget for the Ministry of Agriculture, noting that Haiti was "a poor, essentially agrarian country" with land that at "the slightest disturbance caused by natural phenomena" resulted in dependence on "friends abroad" (Duvalier, as quoted in Lundahl 1992). Duvalier even flattered the army. He praised them as the "immaculate sword at the service of Democratic Civilization," thanking the officers he would later kill, for their service to the Haitian

people in restoring democracy (Abbott 1988:64). He entered office with the support of poor blacks that he had rallied with cries of reform and *noirisme*. Though his support came primarily from the North and the rural areas, Dr. François Duvalier entered Port-au-Prince as President-elect of Haiti, with the Senate and Legislature also filled with supporting figures (75).

THE APOTHEOSIS OF DUVALIER[3]

Duvalier's longtime interest in Vodou and his nation's spirituality enabled him to use his extensive knowledge on the subject to wield its powers of seduction. Previous Haitian leaders also employed Vodou as a means of connecting with their subjects. The majority of Haitians adhered strongly to the supernatural explanations Vodou provided for their fortunes and misfortunes. Vodou enabled believers to have a say in their fate by carrying out specific rituals, a voice not otherwise given to most peasants. The Vodou clergy, the *hougans* and *mambos,* male and female priests, composed a class of natural leadership in Haitian communities. The Vodou clergy are also inherently conservative, as their existence is threatened by the very nature of modernization (Lundahl 1992:179). Duvalier showed his political savvy in his extensive use of Vodou as one of many means to controlling the populace.

Never a supporter of the Catholic Church that had helped to oust President Estimé, Duvalier however, did frequently liken himself to Christ and enjoyed his image as Savior for the black Haitian people. Duvalier ordered the State Printing Press to issue

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[3]Borrowed from (Johnson, Paul Christopher. "Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier" *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* June 2006, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 420-445) Accessed April 21, 2011 on http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/content/74/2/420.full.pdf+html

the *Catechism of a Revolution* in 1964, after the bloody squashing of opposition in the southwest town of Jérémie. After comparing himself with heroes from the Haitian Revolution, the little booklet of propaganda closed with the Duvalierist rendition of the Lord's Prayer:

> Our Doc, who art in the National Palace for life, hallowed be Thy name in the present and future generations. Thy will be done in Port-au-Prince and in the provinces. Give us this day our new Haiti and never forgive the trespasses of the anti-patriots who spit every day on our country. Let them succumb to temptation, and under the weight of their venom, deliver them not from any evil. (Abbott 1988:133)

Lord Duvalier was to be worshipped with the hearts of his followers and the blood of his opponents.

In March of 1958, less than 5 months in office, Duvalier "rededicated" a popular place for worshippers in an opposition hotspot, Bel-Air a tempestuous slum near the National Palace. An old wooden cross on a corner of two streets where thousands of people came each week to worship was desecrated by Duvalier's men over the course of a day. A large pit was dug in front of the cross while armed men stood guard. Next, a team of masons came and built a wall around the hole. That night, as the residents of Bel-Air hid in their homes watching in fear, two trucks filled with men, women and children, gagged and bound, drove up to the still-wet cement cavity. With muffled screams of terror, uniformed men emptied the trucks of their cargo and slowly began filling the pit, burying the living sacrifices in this new monument to Duvalierism. The tomb was filled and silent; a smooth cement floor into which the wooden cross was placed. The people never worshipped there again (Abbott 1988:80-81).

In 1959 when students protested the infiltration of Tonton Macoutes, Duvalier's secret police, into teachers' ranks, they looked, as previous generations of student

activists had, to the Church for support. Duvalier retaliated and Tonton Macoutes violently disrupted a farewell service for priests being expelled. The Macoutes entered firing, "knocking down priests and sacred objects alike," sweeping down worshipers, arresting sixty battered and bleeding parishioners (Heinl and Heinl 1978:610). The Minister of Cults later told the *New York Times* that even Christ emptied the Temple of evildoers (610). The archbishop was expelled without even his set of false teeth and the students who had partaken in the protesting were summarily arrested on charges of communist conspiracy. All youth groups were silenced and the 88-day strike at the University only led to Duvalier filling the vacancies with the children of Macoutes (611). The Vatican excommunicated Duvalier in 1961 but the expulsions continued unfazed (611).

In addition to destroying Christian places of worship, Duvalier came to embody Vodouism and struck reverent fear into the hearts of his constituents. As rumor has it, around the same time as the Bel-Air massacre, Duvalier partook in an extensive ritual in a greatly feared cave, Trou Foban, where only the especially powerful held ceremonies. Following this ritual, as Duvalier returned to the National Palace, a host of spirits accompanied him to live in his mystic room until he died –thereby ensuring no living human could defeat him (Abbott 1988:82). Duvalier's manner of dress further perpetuated his peoples' belief in his spiritual power. He was often seen wearing a black top hat, glasses and a cane– representative of the powerful Vodou spirit Baron Samedi, the guardian of the grave. Even his speech, in nasal tones, was reminiscent of a *Gede,* a spirit that guards the borders between life and death (Johnson 2006:422).

Entering the National Palace, Duvalier was the healthiest he would ever be again. Already burdened with Type-2 diabetes, Duvalier depended on daily insulin shots. He walked with a crooked gait due to phlebitis – inflamed veins in his legs, a condition caused by his chronic heart disease and poor circulation. His wrists were swollen with arthritis and a source of shame – those who stared too long were swiftly dismissed. A large shoe-box sized box sat upon his desk and he frequently fumbled through it for the appropriate painkiller. On May 24, 1959, early in Duvalier's presidency, he had a massive heart attack and went into a coma. The treatment was complicated by his diabetes and the uncertainty of whether he needed more insulin or more glucose. Both were administered, by his personal doctor Jacques Fourcand and by Tonton Macoute chief Clément Barbot, respectively. The glucose revived him after nine hours of being comatose, but those closest to him said that the President was never quite the same (Abbott 1988:95-97).

Rumors spread widely as to the new mental state of the president. Both Clément Barbot and American Dr. Loughlin repeatedly informed U.S. officials of Duvalier's mental condition, but to no avail. "The Americans dismissed the information and declared that Duvalier's government was constitutional and they would support it" (Abbott 1988:97). The heart attack,

> Without killing Duvalier, [had] transformed him into a man who lacked mental balance, a dictator who, Hitler-like, would suddenly rant and rave and foam at the mouth like a true lunatic, astonishing and horrifying onlookers…Before that he had repressed and murdered, but so had his opponents, and most Haitian presidents before him. After 1959 he smashed, crushed, and slaughtered and committed crimes so unpardonable…[P]ower in all its dimensions was Duvalier's obsession…He surrounded himself with illiterate Macoutes who did not

> reproach him and who guaranteed his political survival. He defied the Church he could not dominate and turned instead to the native practitioners of the Haitian religion, whom he could" (98-99).

The heart attack increased the rumors proliferating about Duvalier's Vodou powers. American dancer Katherine Dunham reported hearing Haitian people attributing his craze to a Vodou ritual gone wrong. People said that "he had been done in by his own creatures and zombie-ized –that is, made into a controlled robot, the dead come to the fringes of life. This was a man…ill with the Faustian bargain and its price" (Dunham, as quoted in Abbott 1988:97).

Countless *yodi*s (rumors) extrapolated on Duvalier's powers, and still do. He may have sought council from spirits in his National Palace bathtub while wearing his infamous top hat (Johnson 2006:427). He may have kept the head of one of his more powerful enemies, army captain Blücher Philogènes, to know his living enemies' tactics (Heinl &Heinl 1978:638). He may have studied goat entrails in the Salon Jaune of the Palace to gain further power and information. Regardless of the truthfulness of these rumors, the fact that these rumors existed and were circulated with Duvalier's full blessing, and perhaps his origination, helped to make "his actual versus alleged engagements with Vodou, and likewise his 'real belief in' versus mere 'use of' the religion, ultimately intractable questions," further solidifying his authority (Johnson 2006:427).

More than just a powerful Vodouist, as President, Duvalier also represented the state. With great rhetoric, Duvalier explained Vodou as a religion specifically Haitian, and therefore that Haiti is a nation specifically of Vodou (Johnson 2006: 431). Vodou was already infused with nation, race and religion; what Duvalier did was to effectively

transform Vodou from a religious group that was once state-persecuted to being state-sanctioned. There is a concept within Vodou of being in a constantly alert state to potential spiritual attack from opponents. Within Haiti, Duvalier propagated the need to be in a constant state of readiness for any sign of impending opposition (Johnson 2006: 424). In a country that has been described as "90% Catholic, 100% Vodou," Duvalier's utilization of religious power as inseparable from national authoritarian power firmly established his control in the deeply spiritual country of Haiti (Leland and Richards 1988).

This fear-based mentality linked the Haitian people to their state in ways never before accomplished and never since so effectively completed. Duvalier linked himself to Haitian Independence leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines. Dessalines was a black Haitian, the first Emperor of Haiti, a Kreyol nationalist, and the returning warrior spirit whom Duvalier chose as the ancestor to possess him. Within Vodou, it is believed that Dessalines became Ogou, the spirit of war and iron, after his death in 1806. Duvalier is said to have become the *Loa 22 Os* (Spirit of 22 –his lucky number—Bones). In order to further his own apotheosis, Duvalier had his portrait hung on the *poto mitan (*center poles) in Vodou centers throughout Haiti (Johnson 2006:437). The center poles are the conduits for spirits to enter the ritual and possess a particular participant (Leland and Richards 1988). Not only was Duvalier's image present at all rituals in this way, Carnival parades also included "mandatory giant images and triumphal songs in homage of Papa Doc (Johnson 2006:437). In a 1963 speech, Duvalier declared "As President of Haiti today I am here to continue the tradition of Dessalines and of

Toussaint Louverture...I am already an immaterial being" (Diederich and Burt 1969:217).

Despite his own personal powers, or perhaps in addition to, Duvalier read the French astrological magazine *Horoscope* religiously. It was the *Horoscope* that, the summer before, had foretold of Kennedy's assassination that fateful November day. It was the *Horoscope* that confirmed Duvalier's rituals had worked to assassinate his enemy. It was also the *Horoscope* that the CIA "put up a substantial sum to buy space, so to speak, in" (Heinl and Heinl 1978:638). Duvalier's credence in astrology not only instilled reverent fear in his people, for they were made sure to know of his meddling in the dark arts, it also provided Duvalier one more source of assurance in his own mettle. His powers, confirmed through his reading of astrological signs further empowered him in his diabolic despotism.

Duvalier, unlike his predecessors, established enough reverence that he was able to dispel the ruling force of the military. Indeed, after witnessing President Estimé's removal by the army, he came into office with the specific intent to significantly weaken the Army. As the Ambassador of the Unites States to Haiti wrote in late November 1957, "It is generally conceded that President Duvalier would not long stay in office without Army support and that on the other hand the Army could not long rule without the reasonably popular President as its front man" (Department of State 1987:938). Prior to Duvalier's election, the mulatto elite had ruled the Army, but as Duvalier came to power the black majority of the Army turned and sided with Duvalier and his *noirisme.* In addition to enlisting the lower-ranks' support, Duvalier emptied the

upper ranks by telling the Chairman of the Military Council (and former President of Haiti) Kébreau that many of his trusted officers were in fact, plotting against him. Kébreau obediently cleaned house and even checked himself into the Dominican Embassy where he sought asylum until Duvalier shipped him to Rome as Haiti's ambassador to Italy (Abbott 1988:82).

Duvalier significantly lessened the army's authority. And, after a small but threatening invasion by the exiled ex-Captain Alix "Sonson" Pasquet in late July 1958, Duvalier shifted into dictator-mode (Abbott 1988:86). He established curfews, executed plotters and imprisoned opposition. He blamed the United States for encouraging the invasion by its own citizens and then accepted increased aid. Most importantly, the invasion justified the creation of his own secret police, the Volunteers of National Security, who came to be known throughout the world as the infamous *Tonton Macoutes* (literally "uncle knapsack" after a Haitian folklore bogeyman character who carried away naughty children in his knapsack). They served Duvalier and his "relentless pursuit of all internal political opposition" and became synonymous in Haitian history with brutality and oppression (Schiller 2010:266).

The Tonton Macoutes served Duvalier much like the SS served Adolf Hitler. They were above the distrusted Army and were weapons of vigilante justice—a network of informants across the country and into the Diaspora. Organized by Clément Barbot, the Tonton Macoutes dressed in a recognizable uniform of sorts: denim clothes, dark glasses, a red handkerchief of Ogun (a *loa*) and the all-important bulge of a pistol at his or her hip. The most infamous *fillette-laleau* (female Macoute) was Madame Max

Adolphe, wardress of Fort Dimanche; her brutality silenced any doubt about the weakness of female Macoutes. The Macoutes recruited the slums of Port-au-Prince and the strong men in every rural village in the country. Within two years, by 1961, they doubled the size of the army and were given subordinating authority. That same year, Duvalier closed the doors of the Military Academy due to his suspicions of internal opposition. The Academy remained closed throughout his presidency. The Macoutes, numbering roughly 12,000 members throughout the country, had superseded the army in numbers, authority and arms (Heinl and Heinl 1978:608). They were loosely controlled, ignorant, armed and historically repressed. They served their purpose of terrifying those Duvalier wanted submissive.

THE EARLY YEARS OF PRESIDENT DUVALIER

Duvalier was an astute and tactically minded politician. He manipulated international politics to acquire personal wealth and one of his primary sources of funds was foreign aid from the United States. Shortly after his election, the Ambassador in Haiti Gerald A. Drew, wrote to the Department of State explaining the situation. He wrote, "[There is a] surface calm...due largely to the public's fear of the strong repressive policy of the Army to intimidate the masses and the opposition leadership [as well as] the emotional exhaustion of much of the politically conscious public after a year of tension and economic crisis" (Department of State 1987). Regardless of U.S. knowledge of Duvalier's manner of rule, the willingness to interact is evident in the foreign policy and aid distribution of the period. According to Mats Lundahl in his book *Politics or Markets? Essays on Haitian Underdevelopment* (Routledge 1992):

> Duvalier was not the 'United States candidate' in the 1957 elections...but the US did not oppose him either, and after having been elected, Duvalier stressed the importance of good relations with that country. He was in a comparatively favorable position as far as these relations were concerned, the obvious comparison after 1959 being the one with Castro's Cuba. The American government was quite sensitive regarding the presence of a socialist regime in the Caribbean and thus presented Duvalier with a benevolent, cooperative attitude (Lundahl 1992:274).

Duvalier was fully cognizant of the leverage that he held with the United States, even if it was at times tentative and uncertain.

From the beginning of his presidency, Duvalier wasted no time in establishing working relations with those around him. For example, he arranged a deal with Cuban leader Batista for a $4 million "loan" in return for not harboring any anti-Batista opponents. Duvalier also settled a slavery-esque business venture with the dictator of the neighboring Dominican Republic, Raphael Trujillo. Duvalier supplied 30,000 Haitian laborers to harvest sugar cane every year in the Dominican Republic and Trujillo paid Duvalier $8.00 a head plus half of daily wages "to be held until return." This arrangement garnered an estimated $7 million for Duvalier every year from 1957 until 1963 when the practice was halted by Juan Bosch (Heinl and Heinl 1978:590). Duvalier was also busy counterattacking opposition members and within two months over one hundred people were in hiding; at least that many were political prisoners in Fort Dimanche, and asylum seekers were already filling the embassies (591).

Less than two years after Duvalier's election, the Cuban Revolution in 1959 amplified the paranoia and reactionary tendencies of the United States to political movement within Latin America and the Caribbean (Randall 2010:79). A small-scale invasion of Haiti by Castro's Cuba in 1959 justified U.S. aid:

> Haiti needed economic and military assistance for legitimate self-defense against Cuba and communism. International Cooperation Agency officials complained that Haiti was not only not trying to help itself economically, but also refusing constructive help designed to bring economic development. ICA argued against budgetary support, but lost to the foreign policy considerations of the threat of Cuba (Department of State 1991:817).

It is likely that the U.S. Marines involved with defeating the small-scale Cuban invasion on Haiti's north-west shore are the only United States troops to have engaged in ground combat with Castro's forces (Heinl and Heinl 1978:600). Adhering to the Truman Doctrine of the previous decade, highest priority was placed on Haiti's status as anti-communist over its long-term economic development and stability. This stance was taken even with full awareness of Duvalier's political brutality, his defaults on previous loans and the outstanding nature of his government's pledges.

Furthermore, in the same section of the publication from the Department of State, labeled "U.S. Relations with Haiti" it is stated:

> In effect, the United States was reluctant to give up on Duvalier even though his government's graft and mismanagement had crippled the U.S. aid program and notwithstanding his flirtation with the left, Duvalier was a force for stability in a country characterized by political instability. Despite his occasional anti-American tirades, he was a staunch anti-Communist (Department of State 1991:818).

In 1960 with the arrival of a new ambassador, the U.S. committed "$5 million for budgetary support, $4.5 million for balance-of-payments support and economic development, and $3 million for additional development projects" (819).

For the specific purpose of enforcing democracy the United States helped to establish power in a man beyond the length of his democratically elected term. For example, even before the 1959 invasion Duvalier had convinced the U.S. Marine Corps

to train the Haitian Army, as they were his primary means of enforcing democracy. The United States agreed and Colonel Heinl, the commander of the Marines in Haiti was given this statement before leaving by a State Department deputy under secretary:

> Colonel, the most important way you can support our objectives in Haiti is to help keep Duvalier in power so he can serve out his full term in office, and, maybe a little longer than that is everything works out. Good luck. (Heinl and Heinl 1978:618)

Duvalier also insisted that the Tonton Macoutes be trained as well. Colonel Heinl refused to train the openly oppressive secret police and eventually left Haiti in 1963 (Lundahl 1992:275).

Duvalier did not succumb to U.S. pressures for democratization. He was, however, attentive to the changes at the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince and would occasionally call private meetings with the ambassadors in order to communicate and ensure that the U.S. knew his desires and demands. Indeed, Duvalier's near total suppression of the press and his destruction of unions showed his intentions were contrary to pleasing the United States. Duvalier maintained his power by keeping his opponents divided and afraid; the Tonton Macoutes assured this. The press in Haiti did not resist Duvalier's tactics for very long. By mid-1958 only the Catholic paper *La Phalange* still printed any sort of opposition voice (Heinl and Heinl 1978:602). The other journalists had been cowed or been beaten into silence. Several papers had their editors replaced by Tonton Macoutes, others had their access to electricity, newsprint, and labor cut off. The unions fared no better. In early 1959 after Duvalier had the president of the National Haitian Workers' Union (*Union Nationale des Ouvriers Haïtiens)* arrested, he stated "All popular movements will be repressed with utmost

rigor. The repression will be total, inflexible, and inexorable" (603). By 1963 all unions in Haiti were dead, save for the *Syndicat des Chauffeurs-Guides*, the "mother lodge of the Macoutes" (603).

Duvalier also subordinated the international diplomatic corps through expulsions, snobbery and threats of conversions. In 14 years in the Palace, he never once threw a diplomatic dinner (Heinl and Heinl 1978:606). He strong-armed ambassadors, even Americans. In 1960, he attempted to blackmail the United States for $300 million of aid. He did so by accusing the U.S. of abandoning its Haitian friends and by threatening to convert to communism. On 21 June 1960 in the *Cri de Jacmel* (cry of (the city) Jacmel) speech, Duvalier proclaimed:

> We need a massive injection of money to reset the country on its feet, and this injection can come only from our great, capable friend and neighbor, the United States [...] Two great poles of attraction, one situated in the new World, the other in old Europe, lure groups of people and associations of countries to a pilgrimage during which they always lose some pieces of their flesh and suffer lacerations of the soul [...] Observing and living in such an international context, in the era of national independence...we need solid ground to make a choice (Duvalier as quoted in Lundahl 1992:275).

American aid totaled $9.3 million in 1960, composing more than 30% of Haiti's budget. Duvalier was still not satisfied. He wanted aid in his own terms, even though "as a percentage of a recipient country's budget, this was the third highest level of U.S. aid extended anyplace in the world" (Heinl and Heinl 1978:616). Duvalier's anti-communist stance was a primary factor in the United States' ongoing financial support of Haiti.

The United States foreign policy to Haiti was initially tentative due to Ambassador Drew's expression of concern and the International Cooperation Agency's insistence that Haiti agree to controls and reforms in its economy before budgetary support be granted. However, this hesitation did not mean that economic assistance was not given to Haiti. On the contrary, in the period of July 1, 1945 through June 30, 1961 Haiti received $92.6 million in foreign aid from the United States[4]. In addition to aid from the United States, Haiti received $106,835 of assistance from UNICEF from 1958-1960, after UNICEF's Yaws campaign had ended. Other UN programs gave assistance as well. For the fiscal years 1959 to 1961, Haiti pledged $44,800 to the UN expanded technical assistance program and in exchange received $854,899 and had 6 technicians working in the program (206). Haiti also pledged $58,000 for the UN Special Fund and received $338,000 from the Food and Agriculture Organization (which receives its funding from the U.N. Special Fund) as of May 31, 1961 (196-202). By June 20, 1961, all of Haiti's pledges of the previous 3 years were still outstanding (222).

PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1961-1963

President Kennedy's election in the United States effectively reduced aid to Haiti. Simultaneously, there was also increased attention on Latin America and the Caribbean due to Kennedy's Alliance for Progress in 1961 (Legler, Lean and Boniface 2007). The Alliance for Progress was a program that emphasized military and economic aid as a means to discourage Latin American countries from following the path of Cuba. Then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk, waxed poetic regarding its origins in a 1967 speech before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rusk said, "even the soundest social

[4] (U.S. House. Subcommittee on the Committee of Appropriations 1961, Part III:151-2)

traditions are vulnerable to the threat of material want. Poverty is no friend of justice; hunger no ally of democracy" (U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs 1967:3). The Alliance for Progress aimed to address material conditions to avoid political conflicts of interest. In her essay "International Relations" Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner writes:

> [T]he Alliance for Progress was designed to provide development aid in order to ameliorate the conditions that US policymakers viewed as conducive to leftist insurgency. One of the conditions for aid was the initiation of land reform programs, based on the belief that such "pacific revolutions" would make violent revolutions avoidable. 'Reform, not revolution' became the mantra of those seeking alternative to the Cuban model (Braveboy-Wagner 2010:170).

Through the Alliance for Progress the United States government gave Haiti $4.5 million from fiscal years 1961-1965, administered by voluntary relief agencies[5].

However, according to the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies under the Alliance for Progress, Haiti's Gross National Product actually decreased during that same period: from $368 million in 1961 to $327.3 million in 1964. Additionally, life expectancy hovered around 42 years and infant mortality increased[6]. At the third-year anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk acknowledged shortcomings but encouraged his fellow politicians, "In sum, in spite of numerous short-run problems and crises –and these will continue—the long-range prospects are promising. It will be a long, tough battle against poverty, illiteracy, and disease, but it is one that all Americans—in both our continents—working together—can win." The Alliance was dismantled by the Organization of

[5] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1966, Part II:632)
[6] (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies 1967: 58)

American States in 1973 after the U.S., distracted by the Vietnam War, shifted away from its dedication to financially assist Latin American countries make reforms (Picard and Buss 2009).

At the same time that President Kennedy established the Alliance for Progress, Duvalier re-elected himself in a recognized sham election in 1961, two full years before his term would have expired. By doing so, he eliminated the threat of democratic opponents and created political stability through election fraud. Mats Lundahl writes that Duvalier was

> re-elected without the knowledge of the voters in what has been qualified as 'a novel ruse in the history of fraudulent elections.'...Papa Doc declared that he had been re-elected for another six years and that 'as a revolutionary' he had 'no right to disregard the voice of the people' (Lundahl 1992:273).

Duvalier established himself through political maneuvering so as to inhibit any surviving political contestants. The blatantly undemocratic practice garnered international attention, including that of the United States; and on 13 May 1961 the *New York Times* protested "Latin America has seen many rigged elections in its history, but none more outrageous than the proceedings of May 7 in Haiti" (Heinl and Heinl 1978:614). Duvalier and his slate for the newly consolidated legislative branch swept the elections 1,320,748 to 0, in a country with barely one million eligible voters (613).

President Kennedy limited aid to Haiti due to his disapproval of Duvalier's brutality and questionable democratic practices. President Kennedy had even sworn to destroy Duvalier. In fact, in the fall of 1962, U.S. Marine Colonel Heinl and the embassy's CIA chief had offered Haitian Chief of Staff General Gérard Constant help

in staging a coup d'état (Abbott 1988:108). Nevertheless, despite declared opposition, an anti-malaria program continued throughout Kennedy's time in office, as did military assistance of $205,000 in fiscal year 1961-1962 alone, as well as an airport project and other loans including one for "economic development" of $3.5 million[7]. According to transcripts from Congressional Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee hearings in 1961, Mr. Robert Cutler, then-U.S. Executive Director for the Inter-American Development Bank described why this $3.5million fourth loan was given to Haiti, even while the previous three had not been repaid. He stated,

> Our function is to help these countries. It is to help them to the best of our ability. We worry over these things very much...We know the difficulties these hard-pressed countries have, but we also know that if we do not help, as we are bound to under our charter through the special operations fund, these countries are not going to be able to pull through on *the free world side* (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1961:120, emphasis added).

By the end of 1965, only $421,580 had been disbursed and despite the conditions stating that repayment would begin February 17, 1965 with 24 semiannual payments, none had been made. Meanwhile the interest, at 4%, had accumulated to $8,214[8].

The first American loan of $4.3 million was to restart the Artibonite Development, a previous project that already burdened Haiti with $25 million of debt to the Export-Import Bank. This $4.3 million was administered by the Development Loan Fund and attempted to convert the Artibonite project from a burden to an asset. The U.S. also gave Haiti $3.5 million for "budgetary support, mainly to pay salaries" (Heinl and Heinl 1978: 615); by the end of 1961, Duvalier had received $24.4 million from

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[7] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1963, Part I: 152; 1965, Part I:130)
[8] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1965, Part I:130)

Washington, not including technical assistance and American foodstuffs. Instead of being grateful, Duvalier "knew he could do better by being difficult" (615), and set about replacing all of the hired personnel for the Artibonite project with Macoutes. Duvalier also later removed all of the engineering equipment in the Artibonite Valley for use in the construction of his model community, *Duvalierville,* where most of the machinery rusted in the backdrop of dusty unoccupied buildings (616).

Aid to Haiti –though never officially terminated—was however lessened by Duvalier's refusal to adhere to U.S. demands for reform. For example, in 1961, Haiti received $13.5 million of supporting assistance and grants. In 1962, $13.3 million was allocated to Haiti but because "they did not perform the reforms," they received instead a total of $7,118,000— $25,000 in development grants and $7,093,000 in support assistance[9]. Later during the same subcommittee hearing, Chairman Otto E. Passman from Louisiana asked, "Is this the country where the President says honesty would be inconsistent with this program? Is this not the country where there is some question as to whether we are even going to stay in there?" He was responded with "That is the country we are reviewing" (547). As of February 28, 1962, Haiti was $27.5 million in debt and still receiving additional funds[10]. The United States, cognizant of Duvalier's undemocratic practices and brutality, maintained an aid program to preserve open relations in the name of democracy.

For the aid that was given to Haiti, the accountability left much to be desired. Take for example, the case of a certain $350,000 given to Haiti in 1962. When

[9] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1962, Part II:453)
[10] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1963, Part I:98)

discussed at the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations in 1963, this information was brought forth: the World Bank had granted a $2.6 million loan to Haiti for a 3-year highway maintenance program. After successful completion of the project, these funds were exhausted in 1961. In 1962, Haiti requested an International Development Association (IDA) credit of about $6 million for expanded maintenance and new construction; IDA declined due to internal instability and the lack of available additional internal funding for the project. However,

> since complete withdrawal of support from the highway administration would probably have resulted in the abandonment and consequent loss of the good results achieved over the years, IDA felt it appropriate to make an interim credit of $350,000 to provide for completion of improvement work now underway and continued ordinary maintenance for about 1 year. (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1963:148)

The overall budget for the highway construction program was for $3.4 million (210). When Mr. Passman asked whether or not Haiti was simply given $350,000 and replied with an affirmative he stated "That is a pretty good deal for them. I thought that is about the way it would figure out. That is the system" (148).

In January 1962, Duvalier worked "the system" again. At the meeting of Foreign Ministers regarding Cuban containment held by the Organization of American States in Punta del Este in Uruguay, Haitian minister Chambers delivered a shockingly pro-Castro speech. After his speech, Chambers spoke briefly with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk about how Haiti's neediness influenced its swing vote. The following day, Secretary Rusk's expense account read: "Breakfast……$2.25; Lunch with Haitian Foreign Minister……$2,800,000.00" (Heinl and Heinl 1978:617). The Tonton Macoute Foreign Minister had persuaded the United States to increase aid to Haiti in exchange

for Haiti's deciding vote to expulse Cuba from the Organization of American States. The funds were designated for the construction of the François Duvalier International Airport in Port-au-Prince, a project with an estimated total cost of $2.6 million (Trouillot 1990:203; U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Part I: 210).

Later in the year, Washington began closing its AID program due to Duvalier's refusal to hire American-approved personnel. The airport was put on hold (though not terminated) and the AID staff shrunk from 70 people to a mere 8 to oversee the malaria eradication program and supervise the distribution of PL 480 food aid (Heinl &Heinl 1978:623). The Marines' training program also terminated in June of 1962. Duvalier was skeptical of so many army members going to the United States for training and he instructed his soldiers to "foment difficulties" (624) and then retracted all the Haitian military students in the U.S. due to "blatant American racism" (624). During the Cuban Missile Crisis the U.S. accepted Duvalier's formal invitation to use Haitian ports. However, when the Marines, without forewarning, held an "exercise march," Duvalier was unaware until the troops were under the Foreign Minister's windows. "The President's reaction was to load his limousine with bulky black suitcases and prepare to make a run for the Colombian embassy" (625). Duvalier's embarrassment was revenged within 6 months, when he expelled the entire U.S. Naval and Air Missions and American ambassador from the country (625).

Washington was looking for a replacement for Duvalier and Duvalier knew the months preceding his original termination date would determine his and Haiti's future.

Disappearances increased within Haiti, and when university students distributed anti-Duvalier pamphlets *Caca Doc* (Doc is shit) in the streets, they were summarily arrested and many were executed in the President's own basement. Leading up to the official termination date, several attempted coups were preemptively shut down by Duvalier and scores of former army officials were arrested. Most of the plotters had received American training (Heinl and Heinl 1978:630).

Less than one month before the anticipated day, an attempt by a former Macoute on Duvalier's children's lives brought the entire city to chaos. Macoutes were given shoot-to-kill orders, and those who drove the same make of vehicle as the attacker were shot in the streets and their cars destroyed (Heinl and Heinl 1978:630). The violence escalated to the point of U.S., British, Canadian and Dominican warships, destroyers, and troops were deployed as Macoutes surrounded the Dominican embassy in Port-au-Prince seeking out the suspected assassin (631). An OAS commission arrived in Haiti only to find Duvalier had called for impromptu Carnaval and flooded the streets with 150,000 peasants and equally excessive amounts of *clairin* (rot-gut liquor). Not only did Duvalier thwart OAS intentions, he also taunted, "If the OAS claims the right to intervene because of repressive internal conditions, why don't they land troops in Birmingham?" (634). The council left after 2 ½ days of insult and defiance from Duvalier "in the foulest Créole" (Diederich and Burt, as quoted in Heinl and Heinl 1978:632).

The United States had an entire contingency plan established for when Duvalier boarded his already-reserved-flight to Algeria after his term was to expire. The Marines

remained in the bay of Port-au-Prince to provide security for the American and international communities and all radios were tuned to news from the capital. Yet despite international attention and pressures, Duvalier remained unyielding. When his term as President expired May 14, 1963, he remained in office. He calmly told the press gathered in the palace that there was no crisis, save for that manufactured by the U.S. government. The country was calm and peaceful and as "Chief of the Revolution," he had more pressing matters to attend to and retired to his office (Heinl and Heinl 1978:635). The U.S. pulled its ambassador from Port-au-Prince for two-and-a-half weeks. The official statement was that the U.S. did not break diplomatic relations it just "temporarily interrupt[ed] its diplomatic contacts with the Haitian Government"[11]. The system also allowed for the continuation of the jet airport development project, despite economic assistance being officially terminated and relations with Haiti suspended for two-and-a-half weeks.

Later in the same hearings before the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, Senator Karl E. Mundt (Republican, South Dakota) questioned the Administer of AID, David E. Bell: "What kind of aid can we conceivably be giving today to Haiti?" Bell responded with the details of the construction of the airport in Port-au-Prince that would be capable of receiving jet airplanes. Senator Mundt chastised the American aid program, saying that it needed commonsense pounded hard into it and mockingly imitated the negotiations that led to the continuation of the airport, despite Duvalier's remaining past his term's end:

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[11] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Part III:95)

> It certainly goes far to discredit the whole AID program. Here we are providing a jet airport for a dictator who violates every single semblance of human rights, civil rights, individual rights, and constitutional rights in his country. He says, "I am here with the army and the guns. I am going to stay in power," we say, "That is fine, old chap; we will buy you a jet airport." That doesn't make any sense to me (U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations 1963:590-1).

Despite Mr. Bell's adamant denial that this was the case, Mundt continued to express his apprehensions: "I am concerned about this jet airport which can very well become an airport in which Castro can land planes or Russia can land planes, probably as easily or perhaps more easily than a freedom-loving country like ours" (591). When asked to submit for the records the State Department's reasons to continue the jet airport under the circumstances, Mr. Bell submitted this explanation: "The Department of State considers construction of a jet airport at Port-au-Prince important to the long-term development of one of Haiti's more promising economic assets—tourism" (592).

Regardless of internal acknowledgement of the glitches within the aid system, aid was still a primary method of containing communism in "America's backyard," though it shifted from primarily economic to include military strategy as well, especially after President Johnson assumed office. At the hearings of Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee in late 1963, a message from former President Truman was read which stated the failure thus far of U.S. foreign policy to persuade Latin American countries to the side of freedom. This reading served as an introduction for a military request for appropriations for various countries. Money was requested specifically to provide military assistance should Papa Doc be removed from office. Primary concerns voiced at Duvalier's potential ouster focused on Haiti's

proximity to Cuba, its political instability and the possibility of agent infiltration from Cuba into Haiti. It was stated that "the Navy [was] maintaining pretty good control of the Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti." Also "our authorities were given permission to travel by helicopter over Haiti for the ostensible purpose of checking the American nationals in the area outside of Port au Prince" (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1963: 174-5). By this time, the Latin American Military Assistance Program since 1950 through 1963 had already spent $4,413,000 in Haiti; $1,244,000 in fiscal year 1962 alone and with at least $972,000 more for 1963 "in the pipeline" should Duvalier be removed by June 1963[12].

Late in 1963, the night of John F. Kennedy's death, while the rest of Port-au-Prince was dark with electricity rations, the National Palace was alit with festivities. Duvalier claimed credit for the assassination and pointed to the date of the murder as proof: the 22nd of November –his lucky number. Duvalier even sent people to Arlington Cemetery to bring back "a vial of graveside air, a morsel of earth, and shreds of funeral flowers for new rituals" (Abbott 1988:114). Within two years Duvalier's new relationship with President Lyndon B. Johnson came to financial fruition for Haiti.

PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1963-1969

Under President Johnson, in addition to military assistance, consideration of bilateral aid to Haiti beyond the limits established by President Kennedy slowly recommenced despite Duvalier's undemocratic policies. On April 1, 1964 Dr. Duvalier declared himself as *président-à-vie.* By June, a week after officially being ratified by referendum as President-for-Life, a new flag, black and red vertical stripes replaced the

[12] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1964, Part II:494)

horizontal blue and red (Heinl and Heinl 1978:643). The Haitian press printed the image of Jesus Christ's hand on the shoulder of Duvalier with the caption "I have chosen him." The people of Haiti approved whole-heartedly of their leader according to the government reports of the ballots cast. Exactly 2,800,000 people voted *Oui* on preprinted ballots. The brave 3234 who returned ballots marked *Non* were arrested on charges of "ballot defacing" (643). On April 8, 1964, President Johnson told the new Haitian ambassador André Théard, "This Government looks forward to close cooperation and solidarity with the Government of Haiti" (644).

Later that month, in a policy paper prepared in the U.S. Embassy in Haiti and the Office of Caribbean Affairs, a Proposed Plan of Action was put forth. It stated:

> [I]t is in the United States interest to seek to bring about at least a minimum level of mutual accommodation, realizing that room for such accommodation may be very limited and of dubious duration. United States interests range from the need to protect American citizens and property interest to ensuring that Haiti votes on the merit of questions of importance to the United States and the free world in international organizations and forums...In any event, the well-being of the Haitian people or lack thereof has an important long-term bearing on the key United States interest of denying Haiti to the Communists" (Department of State 2005:762).

The Embassy also called for increased participation by Haiti in the Alliance for Progress initiated under Kennedy. At the same time, Duvalier's health continued to deteriorate and the United States policy was to maintain an effective presence "so as to be in position [to] influence events when Duvalier passes from the scene and to frustrate any Communist attempt to take over before or after" (Department of State 2005: 820). The human rights abuses that had given Kennedy cause to caution, were temporarily

cast aside so that should Duvalier need replacing, the United States would not be too far away.

At the hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations in May of 1964, the brief discussion of the situation in Haiti revealed the extensiveness of the overarching aid program. Most recent data showed total aid to Haiti since 1946 equaled $101.6 million, with $2,362,000 more for fiscal year 1964[13]. Despite the lack of contention about these large figures stemming primarily from the auspices of AID, Chairman Otto Passman did raise concern over the perception of U.S. backing of a certain Inter-American Development Bank loan of $2.3 million. The Inter-American Development Bank, established by Eisenhower in 1959 to support economic and social development in the region, had designated the loan to improve waterworks in Port-au-Prince and one of its wealthier suburbs, Pétionville[14]. Mr. Passman's concern was that IADB funds were almost 100% U.S. dollars, a fact that was widely known, and he did not want the U.S. to seem supportive of the Duvalier regime due to the growing anti-Duvalier sentiment among diasporic Haitians and those still in Haiti. When Passman's concerns went largely unanswered he stated matter-of-factly: "I have no apologies for pointing these things out. It seems we cannot help but to give every nation money regardless of the type of government"[15]. As recorded in the 1965 hearings, total U.S. assistance to Haiti in the fiscal year of 1963 equaled $6.2 million, bringing the total

[13] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1964)
[14] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1965, Part II:1074)
[15] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1965, Part II:1075)

since 1950 to $106 million[16]. Regardless of concerns over the IADB loan, the U.S. supported Duvalier.

THE JÉRÉMIE VESPERS, 1964

Chairman Passman's concerns were justified. Haiti had once again become the site of unthinkable tragedy in one of the most shocking examples of brutality during Duvalier's regime, the Jérémie Vespers of August, September and October 1964. The Vespers began in early August when 13 expatriates who called themselves *Jeune Haiti,* landed in the little village of Dame Marie, on the western tip of the southern peninsula of Haiti. The invaders were originally from Jérémie and had hoped to begin the eventual takeover of Duvalierist Haiti from their home-city. They were mainly mulatto (only one of the 13 was black), U.S.-based and university-educated –all characteristics that Duvalier loathed and feared, and he wasted no time in squashing them. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as Duvalier referred to himself by this time, delegated his most brutal officers to squelch the invaders. Yvan Laracque was the first of *Jeune Haiti* to be killed. Duvalier ordered the body brought to the capital where it sat—bloated, bulleted, and bloody on a street corner for ten days, guarded by Tonton Macoutes (Abbott 1988:122).

In addition to the army officials Duvalier sent, commandant of the local Tonton Macoutes Sanette Balmir and her Macoute colleague Saint-Ange Bontemps also took the occasion to settle some long-held personal scores; they too, engaged in the bloodbath. All mulattoes were at risk, and many were murdered because of their skin color, others because of their relation to the invaders. One lower-ranking Macoute later

[16] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1966: 148)

confessed to knowing Bontemps had a mulatto family humiliatingly murdered in order to dig up the gold they had buried in their front yard (Abbott 1988:126). The Sansaricq family was personally selected by Duvalier for "rigorous action" (telegram from Duvalier, as quoted in Abbott 1988:128). The family, including a crippled woman and a two-year-old little girl, Régine, were rounded up into Macoute jeeps and driven out to the wooded plain of Numéro Deux were they were stabbed, raped, cigarette burned in the eyes and shot to death in the light of the full moon (128-9). As the rebel invaders hid, marooned in the mountains, their Jérémie connections were arrested by the Tonton Macoutes, interrogated, and imprisoned to await their torture and murder. Few were released. One woman, a mentally retarded woman was also executed by the Macoutes. Though the woman's cousin had the political connections to save her, the cousin knew the victim's care would fall upon her shoulders and chose to do nothing (131).

By late October, the remaining fighting guerillas were dead. Duvalier ordered the severed heads of the final 3 delivered to the palace as personal assurance the invasion was finished. A photograph was published of the heads and Duvalier nationalized the traitors' possessions—torching their buildings and properties (Heinl and Heinl 1978:641). Two of the previously captured members of Young Haiti, remained in Fort Dimanche, the notoriously fatal prison where so many under Duvalier breathed their last wretched gasps. Thinking optimistically that their lives would be spared, the two remaining members of Young Haiti, Louis Drouin and Marcel Numa shared smiles as they were shaved and bathed and dressed in clean clothes. They realized their error as they were driven to the Port-au-Prince cemetery's south wall where television and radio crews, thousands of spectators, including schoolchildren

forced to attend, witnessed their execution. The literate few among the witnesses read the distributed pamphlets; "Dr. François Duvalier will fulfill his sacrosanct mission...The Duvalier revolution will triumph. It will trample the bodies of traitors and renegades and those who sell out" (Abbott 1988:132). The *New York Times* and Amnesty International both reported total death figures "in the hundreds" though no one source knew exact figures (Heinl and Heinl 1978:641).

AID CONTINUES

Despite the bloodbath occurring in Jérémie, in Washington, D.C. the Johnson Administration not only maintained its priority in aiding Haiti as stemming Communism's tide, it also resumed economic assistance. The IADB loan of $2.5 million to improve the waterworks in Port-au-Prince and Pétionville about which Chairman Passman had been so apprehensive, was approved at an amount of $2.36 million. By 1966 over $100,000 had been disbursed with repayments not scheduled to begin until 1972[17]. Meanwhile, the Government of Haiti was still in debt $27,124,875 from a loan in 1948 for irrigation and agricultural development (266). By early 1966, Haiti was one of the few countries in Latin America that had not achieved the expected growth rate, nor did Haiti carry through on any of the promised tax reforms as other countries had. Nevertheless, under the Alliance for Progress, $1.1 million was authorized for Fiscal Year 1966 (220). According to *Written in Blood* (Houghton Mifflin Company 1978), the regime was taking in around $5 million a year during the Johnson Administration, not including the "nonfiscal accounts" estimated at around $10

[17] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1967, Part I:218-19)

million a year— $10 million which never saw the official government budget (Heinl and Heinl 1978:645).

By 1965, Duvalier had mastered Haiti. The United States was supplying large amounts of money for natural disaster relief as hurricane after hurricane ravaged, flooded and eroded Haiti. Hurricane Flora in 1963, Cleo in 1964, Inez in 1966 and flooding in Cap Haitian in 1968; the storms killed thousands, destroyed coffee crops in the south, wiped out 95% of the cattle and left hundreds of thousands homeless (Heinl and Heinl 1978:647). Duvalier had also regained the Vatican's approval and Pope Paul VI visited Haiti in 1966 and approved Duvalier's nominations for Haitian clergymen. Less than three years later Duvalier would expel entire faculties of clergy and all of the Fathers of the Holy Spirit, replacing them with Macoutes in the name of anti-communism (646). Despite Duvalier's mastery, much of Haiti remained the same as it had for years – occasional electricity, minimal plumbing, no telephone service and poor roadways. However, it is by this poverty that Duvalier gained his wealth. Selling *la misére*, Duvalier benefitted from the misery of his people. One of his former closest advisors revealed in 1963, his millions already in Swiss accounts (637).

On St. Valentine's Day in 1967, a new loan to the Republic of Haiti was approved for $1.3 million at 2.25% interest rate, to be paid over 25 years beginning in 1972. This loan was for improvements in teaching agricultural sciences and medicine—both things Haiti could benefit from as its GNP per capita was below $75[18]. However, by 1968 the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings were

[18] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1969, Part I:346)

consumed with discussion of the Vietnam War, as th Tet Offensive marked U.S. involvement's height. Talk of Haiti consisted of minor charts showing outstanding loans to AID of $4,523,258.96 repayable in local currency, the Haitian Gourde, and another outstanding loan of $5,041,673.36, due to the Development Loan Fund[19]. The IADB, less distracted by the Vietnam War, spent $14,114 on technical assistance in Haiti for the year ended December 31, 1968[20]. That same year, the World Food Program committed to spending $449,000 (though none was spent as of the end of 1968) in the southern peninsula of Haiti (Part II:1104). By 1969, the World Food Program spent $1.182 million to assist victims of drought and crop failure[21].

Kennedy's aid cut-off did not continue under Johnson. Some speculate that this is due to business ties between Johnson's Administration and the U.S. milling enterprise in Haiti, Caribbean Mills as well as HAMPCO, a meat-packing venture in Croix-des-Missions a small city just north of Port-au-Prince (Heinl and Heinl 1978:644). As reported by Edward T. Long, an AID representative to the Haitian Subcommittee of the Alliance for Progress "AID is currently providing far more assistance to Haiti than seems to be generally realized...It may be of interest that in 1964-1968 AID has given $15.2 million, all grants of course" (644). These grants do not appear in the hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations and it is not terribly shocking that Mr. Long assumed his audience's ignorance regarding how much funding Haiti was receiving. The Johnson Administration's policy was self-described as "cool and correct" towards Duvalier, and apparently preferred remaining aloof. Haiti's votes

[19] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1969, Part II:76, 99)
[20] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1970, Part I:327)
[21] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1971, Part II: 266)

in the OAS and the UN had enough value to instigate renewed foreign aid instead of resumed tension. Duvalier often referred to Johnson as "my great colleague" and aid from the U.S., the U.N., Canada, West Germany, the IADB and American private and voluntary organizations continued until Duvalier's death in 1971 (644-645).

While direct capital injections were supposedly avoided due to the awareness that they would "simply go into pockets of regime without benefit to Haiti's people" (Department of State 2005: 820), AID projects were considered viable options to avoid political and administrative problems, projects such as Food for Peace. However, these gifts of food aid later caused political and administrative problems by increasing urban density and decreasing food production as will alter be discussed. Table 3.1 shows the amount of food aid the United States sent to Haiti during Fiscal Years 1966 through 1970. It also shows for comparison purposes, total agricultural exports to the Dominican Republic (D.R.).

TABLE 3.1 U.S. Concessional Agricultural Exports: Latin American Countries of Destination by Sections of Public Law 480, Fiscal Years 1966-70 [in thousands of dollars][22]

	Haiti-Total	Title I	Title II	D.R. - Total	Title I	Title II
1966	700	0	700	7,300	400	6,900
1967	600	0	600	100	100	0
1968	1,300	0	1,300	13,000	9,300	3,700
1969	1,300	0	1,300	12,100	5,600	6,500
1970	1,000	0	1,000	11,100	5,300	5,800

Title II aid is emergency relief, free food. U.S. Concessional Agricultural Exports to Haiti from PL 480 amounted to nearly $5 million, and consisted of primarily wheat and

[22] (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 1971: 216)

flour, animal fats and oils, vegetable fats and oil and "other." Table 3.2 provides a comparison between total agricultural exports and exports given under PL 480.

TABLE 3.2 Total Agricultural Exports [in thousands of dollars] including food exported for relief or charity[23]:

Year	Haiti	Dominican Republic	Total to Alliance for Progress Countries
1966	9,545	23,336	484,988
1967	9,065	22,841	509,039
1968	7,849	24,824	501,230
1969	8,678	24,710	469,185
1970	6,006	28,502	545,406

Despite receiving only 10% of the food aid that its neighbor the Dominican Republic received, Haiti's reception of any aid during a time when recognized human rights abuses were occurring is telling. It also was not entirely beneficial ad the motives for giving food aid ought to be more thoroughly questioned. But that is another project for another time.

PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON, 1969-1974

Under President Nixon, the United States' foreign policy again shifted. In July of 1969, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller arrived in Port-au-Prince as part of a Latin-American fact-finding mission. The majority of his mission had been filled with anti-American sentiments and protests. Greeted with 30,000 cheering Haitians outside the National Palace, Rockefeller clutched Duvalier's hand and waved back, smiling broadly as was his politician's "natural instinct to respond" (Abbott 1988:153). Soon afterward, the United States sent a new ambassador, Dr. Clinton E. Knox a black man who was encouraged by the progress Duvalier had made for blacks in Haiti. Per Knox's

[23] (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 1971: 214-5)

recommendation, aid increased to the starving country and Duvalier, despite rapidly deteriorating health congratulated himself on his diplomatic maneuvering (153).

In 1969, the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations reconsidered its activities in Haiti. The malaria eradication program, which had been continuous even during Kennedy's "aid freeze" to Haiti, was to be phased out by 1972. The Special Development and Activities Fund was to continue as would the CARE program. AID considered supporting some of the Organization of the American States' efforts and family planning was also contemplated[24]. By 1982, Planned Parenthood was on the list of 110 Private and Voluntary Organizations in Haiti receiving financial support from AID[25]. In the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971 hearings, the total amount of Haiti's loans that had been rescheduled, some as recently as July of 1965 was $34,973,911.34[26]. The state of Haiti was growing more indebt while Duvalier's bank accounts continued to grow more full.

Despite ever-increasing physical fragility Duvalier continued to seize opportune political situations and manipulate them to his advantage, furthering rumors of his immortality. For example, in the late 1960s as the Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH) rose in popularity, Duvalier was given a perfect opportunity to prove his staunch anticommunist stance. He arrested and eliminated hundreds of PUCH members and affiliates, in typical Duvalier-style, leaving the corpses to rot outside of Fort Dimanche. The final tally of Communists killed: 204 (Abbott 1988: 251). Duvalier used

[24] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1970, Part II:1726)
[25] (U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Inter-American Affairs 1982:66)
[26] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1970, Part I:116)

the uprising to push through the Anti-Communist Law of April 1969, which made any affiliation with Communism punishable by death. According to Michel-Rolph Trouillot in his book *Haiti: State Against Nation: the Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism* (Monthly Review Press 1990) these events

> provided the perfect occasion for the U.S. government to make public a change of position which it had already showed in deeds. The period from the election of Richard Nixon...to the crowning of Jean-Claude Duvalier as President-for-Life of Haiti saw the formalization of the alliance between the two governments. The massacres of communists and the stifling of all those who spoke, even timidly, of economic redistribution, constituted the symbolic fulfillment of the deal on the Haitian side. In 1971, Washington's blessing of Jean-Claude Duvalier's access to the presidency sealed the pact. U.S. vessels patrolled the sea around Haiti to ensure that the inauguration proceeded undisturbed (Trouillot 1990: 204).

Relations between the United States and Duvalier only improved throughout the 1960s and by decade's close the visit from Norman Rockefeller solidified U.S. Haiti relations and the aid streamed in freely. Nixon also dropped pretense on arms sales –which had gone on since as early as 1964. By 1971, the U.S. had approved over $1 million in private arms sales to Haiti (Heinl and Heinl 1978:657).

At the end of Duvalier's reign, Haiti had a population of 4,205,755 and a growth rate of 2.0%. There was an estimated $55,000 of U.S. investment (in comparison to $150,000 in the Dominican Republic and $1 million in the Bahamas), and there were approximately 200,000 Haitians living in the United States both legally and illegally. Sixty percent of Haitian nurses were leaving Haiti within 1 year of receiving their diplomas and U.S. Congress was stumped at how to effectively slow the "brain drain"

of the Caribbean but most particularly in Haiti[27]. Educated Haitians fulfilled U.N. needs in Africa by being black and speaking French and the U.N. had more Haitian economists on its payroll than the Haitian government did. Haiti supplied more technicians to the U.N. Technical Assistance Program than any other country in Latin America. There were more Haitian physicians in Montreal and New York than in all of Haiti (where there were only 3 of the 246 graduates from 1959-1969). Many brilliant Haitians found jobs in Africa and elsewhere overseas. While aid workers and volunteers entered Haiti, the same professionals escaped Haiti in pursuit of sustaining jobs. They left the country in droves under Duvalier, who thought the country quieter without them (Heinl and Heinl 1978:648).

Duvalier left a lasting mark on Haiti. At the end of his tenure Haiti had $42.9 million of total debt outstanding (World Bank, as cited in Palmer 1984:52). Duvalier remained in office until 1971 – the only Haitian president to die in office of natural causes. As Dr. François Duvalier's once closest companion turned mortal enemy, Clément Barbot told reporter Jeremiah O'Leary of the Washington *Star*, "Duvalier, [was] not a communist, a democrat, or anything else. He [was] an opportunist" (Heinl &Heinl 1978:637). Described by American Marine Colonel Heinl who had lived and served in Haiti in the early 1960s, Duvalier was "in every respect a remarkable man…a master of calculated obscurity…a connoisseur of human weakness and contradictions, and his unsleeping suspicion played ceaselessly on people and governments like radar sweeping the skies" (664). His presence remained long after his death.

[27] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 1974: 50)

CONCLUSION

The United States, despite complete awareness of the atrocities of Papa Doc's reign of terror, gave money to Haiti every single year. The amounts varied, and even when aid was officially frozen, as it was under Kennedy, money is still recorded as given to Haiti in both the government publications and the online records of AID (See Appendix Table 1.1). The utter absurdity that the money of the American people went to support a government that violently murdered its own people is only made more aggravating by the inability to determine exactly how much money at any given point went to the afflicted nation. Not only was money sent, but weapons, food and human resources too. The discrepancies and the inconsistencies, the complications of the record-keeping, the obvious manipulation by Duvalier of the United States' fear of communism –all point to a weakness buried in the bureaucracy of the most powerful nation in the history of the modern world. On top of all of this, the transition from Papa Doc to Baby Doc was smooth, uncontested, and U.S.-assisted (Trouillot 1998:204).

CHAPTER 4 – BABY DOC: THE EXTRAVAGANCE CONTINUES

Little changed in Haiti when Baby Doc took office April 22, 1971. The country remained under Duvalier control, under Macoute justice and under the watchful eyes of the United States. "From Duvalier to Duvalier" was the chant of the season, and that the family-rule of the country was to continue, none doubted. The Tonton Macoutes lined the streets to guarantee a smooth transition of power, and the U.S. Navy patrolled the seas throughout the inauguration, ensuring the transfer of power. And if that wasn't

enough, it seemed as though Papa Doc himself was present to oversee that his people accepted the commencement of his son's rule.

The day of Dr. François "Papa Doc" Duvalier's funeral procession, Port-au-Prince was filled with mourners, both sincere and relieved. No one knew exactly what to anticipate with the inauguration of the new president, 19-year-old Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier. Thousands passed the refrigerated casket where Duvalier laid, his signature glasses on his face and his book *Memoirs of a Third World Leader* on his pillow. Thousands more gathered outside to watch the hearse pass through the streets. As the casket pulled into the National Cemetery, the country doctor instilled the fear of himself in his people's hearts one last time. "A wind suddenly gusted out of the palace, and like a mystical cyclone whipped along the funeral route, raised dusty whorls, and obliterated the sunlight" (Abbott 1988:163). The crowds panicked and fled, Macoutes shot the guns in the air, and people yelled "Duvalier has burst his grave!" (163). Duvalier's presence remained in Haiti many years after his physical passing; the fear of him obscuring the light of hope for change.

LOST IN THE FIGURES

Baby Doc's entrance into office only seemed to further complicate the publications of figures in U.S. Government documents. As the records progressed, the total economic assistance to Papa Doc grew increasingly more difficult to determine. For example, according to a 1972 chart labeled Distribution of Assistance to Latin America by Country, Official Bilateral and Multilateral Development Aid, 1961-1970 the assistance to Haiti is recorded as far less than had been listed throughout the years of Hearings Before the various Subcommittees of the House of Representatives. The total

International Development Association loans, is listed as only $300,000 even though in 1962 alone, the IDA gave $350,000 for a highway maintenance project[28]. In addition to this omission, this 1971 publication lists total grants given to Haiti by AID as $0.00[29]. However, according to the same publication, a mere 432 pages later in a chart titled Total Aid to Latin America, Haiti received $3,660,000 in FY 1970 from AID, PL 480, Peace Corps, the Foreign Military Assistance Programs and the Foreign Military Credit Sales Program (760).

Detailed use of AID funding for Haiti is rare within the hearings before the various subcommittees. When they were present, they were often full of statistics but hard to prove. For FY 1971 an estimated $6,027,000 in total economic assistance went to Haiti and for 1972, $6,600,000 is recorded as proposed funds for Haiti (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1971, Part I: 761). AID requested $3 million of that $6.6 for its programs in Haiti, more than half of its total economic assistance requested for Latin America that year (761). Mr. Kleine, the deputy U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, Bureau for Latin America, for the Agency for International Development, explained the $3 million's uses as such:

> First, $2,075 million has been requested for malaria eradication. AID funds, using the U.S. Public Health Service's technical management, have helped reduce incidence of malaria to 1%. A Public Health Service evaluation indicates that 2 more years will be needed to reduce the remaining malaria cases to a negligible level. Second, $650,000 has been requested to permit CARE to continue and expand community development and family planning programs. This program has helped establish 46 community councils, grain storage facilities, schools, water systems and roads; and provide family planning services for 4,500

[28] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1963:148)
[29] (U.S. House. Committee on Appropriations 1971:328)

> patients per month. Finally, $275,000 has been requested for the Special Development Activities Fund to foster community self-help projects, and support small pilot activities for humanitarian assistance designed to help alleviate poverty and disease (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1976, Part I: 883).

While this description of AID's intended use of the $3 million is detailed and statistic-filled, proving these projects existed is difficult at best, as Chairman Long discovered when he travelled to Haiti in the late 1970s[30].

Family planning programs in Haiti are particularly difficult to track and verify. On a chart titled AID assistance to family planning programs in Latin America during FY 1971, when CARE supposedly provided family planning services for 4,500 patients per month, Haiti does not even appear on the chart as receiving funds for family planning programs[31]. And when a $400,000 population program is proposed for FY 1974, it is footnoted as being a "new AID program, not yet developed"[32]. Chairman Otto E. Passman questioned Mr. Kleine, asking why there was a family planning project for Haiti when the annual growth rate was "only 2 percent" (993). Mr. Kleine gave a two-fold response. The first was that Haiti's population density was already 480 persons per square mile, the most densely populated country in Latin America. Secondly, the 2% annual population growth rate is actually hiding beneath it tragic infant and child mortality rates. Mr. Kleine explained "As health services are extended in Haiti, the rate of population growth will increase dramatically if the birth rate remains unchanged." (994) Family planning continued as a priority in delegation of assistance funds to Haiti.

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[30] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1979, Part II:903-904)
[31] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1971: 798)
[32] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1974, Part II: 1180-1)

In 1971, two more loans were given to Haiti, totaling $1.3 million dollars. These were in addition to the previous four loans totaling $12,137,000 from the Fund for Special Operations[33]. The Fund for Special Operations (FSO) is lent "where Ordinary Capital financing is not appropriate. The loans are made on easy repayment terms and are extended entirely from resources provided by the United States and Latin American members of the Bank"[34]. Certainly, Haiti deserved easy repayment terms due to its dire poverty and national debt; but did Haiti's government warrant additional loans due to the same reasons?

In 1972, the Republic of Haiti requested a $7.4 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) for the purpose of expansion and improvements of ports[35]. The IADB-Funds for Special Operations signed a $10 million loan in September of 1972 to Haiti for "transportation purposes" (Part II: 860). Whether the request made by the Government of Haiti (GOH) correlated to the loan from the IADB is unable to be determined from the Hearings. At this time, Haiti was the only country in the Western Hemisphere listed as a "least developed country" by the United Nations (992). Haiti also had a literacy rate of 10% (958). Nevertheless, Mr. Kleine, realistically hopeful, expounded

> In the two years since the current Government came into power, the Haitian authorities have given increasing attention to the social and economic problems confronting that country....however concerted effort over many years will be required before demonstrable progress toward economic modernization can be anticipated (992)

[33] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1973, Part I: 152)
[34] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1972, Part I:258)
[35] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1973, Part I:127-30)

Unfortunately, for AID which Mr. Kleine represented, and for Haiti the country at hand, the "many years" would be much longer than anyone anticipated, and arguably has still not yet concluded.

Despite the long road ahead, AID yearly expanded its program in Haiti, though in an arguably unclear fashion, as seen in this AID-provided chart:

Summary of Program by Country and Appropriation Account FY 1972, 1973, 1974 (in millions of dollars)[36]

	1972 Total	1973 Total	1974 Total	1972 dev't loans	1973 dev't loans	1974 dev't loans	1972 dev't grants	1973 dev't grants	1974 dev't grants
Haiti	3.182	6.8	8.9	--	3.7	5.0	3.182	3.1	3.9

Upon further investigation, it can be determined for what some of these figures were allocated. AID designated the $5 million development loan in 1974 for rural development (936). The $3.7 million development loan in 1973 was designated for road maintenance (935). Perhaps it is the same road maintenance project for which AID requested $1,050,000 in 1974 (927). In 1975 AID requested an additional $9 million for a road maintenance project, specifically for training and equipment[37]. It is unknown whether a communicable disease control program that would span 4 years, costing $1.5 million in 1974 and $5.5 million in total is included in this chart[38]. Definitely not included in these figures is the $2,123,000 that Haiti received in 1974 from Title I and Title II food aid assistance under PL 480 (938).

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[36] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1973, Part II: 926)

[37] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1976, Part III page 578-9)

[38] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1973, Part II: 927)

With these complicated proceedings, it is good to know that AID had a paid consultant, Reynold P. Dahl, living in Haiti at the cost of $108 per day[39]. Assuming Mr. Dahl worked a 5 day work-week and took only 2 weeks of vacation per year, his annual salary would have been $27,000. It is unlikely the cost of Mr. Dahl's services is included in the Summary of Program figures above.

For fiscal year 1976 AID gave Haiti $9 million, representing 3% of total aid given to Latin America[40]. Part of this $9 million AID allocated towards a crop production program. When asked if the crop production program would be enough to pull Haiti out of the severe economic situation it was facing, AID responded in the negative, explaining that a myriad of factors caused Haiti's poverty. AID expressed its plans to use a multi-faceted approach of crop production and soil conservation to increase local food production and slow the movement of resources from rural to urban areas[41]. To supplement this multi-faceted approach AID requested $3 million to loan to Haiti to set up a Development Finance Corporation in hopes to interest private sector investors in Haiti's potential for agribusiness (352, 404).

During the following year's hearings, the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations heard that the funds for the Development Finance Corporation in Haiti were not going directly to the Corporation. Rather, the funds went to the Government of Haiti in grant form; after which the GOH loaned the money to the Development Finance Corporation. Needless to say, Chairman Long was distressed and asked rhetorically

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[39] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1973, Part II: 939)
[40] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1976, Part III: 600)
[41] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1977, Part II:228)

whether or not that was "just lining the pockets of the Government"[42]. AID reasoned that it would rather provide grants than loans; it did not want to increase the burden of debt but instead enable countries to invest resources into development purposes. When Mr. Long pointed out that the government reaps the benefit from this method, not the poor people, the AID representative responded "These resources are being added to the resources they are dedicating to development purposes in their economy" (621).

It is easy to get lost in the figures. It is worse to compare figures for the same country, same year, but different publication. It is difficult to imagine serving on Foreign Affairs committees and being charged with relations between the U.S. and the entire world. Simply trying to trace aid to Haiti is difficult enough. For example, printed in the hearings for 1980 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee: For FY 1978: Total U.S. economic assistance and military assistance to Haiti was $25,999,000, the bulk of which was economic at $25,251,000. Development assistance totaled $7,702,000 and PL 480, both Title I and Title II totaled $17,549,000. Military assistance was $748,000 – $248,000 from foreign military training and $500,000 from military credit sales[43]. Despite this seemingly solid information, the hearings for 1984 for the same subcommittee record entirely contradictory information which listed total economic assistance at $27.5 million (See Table 3.1 in the Appendix). Furthermore, the hearings for 1981 also contradict. The "total ODA to Haiti from U.S. in 1978 was $27.4 million, out of $45.4 million given by all DAC Member Countries" (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part II: 393).

[42] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1978, Part II:620)
[43] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1980, Part IV:897)

While the latter difference is only $100,000, it is the risk of coming to the point where "only $100,000" is an acceptable discrepancy that can lead to uninhibited spending. It is of little surprise, then, that Congressmen repeatedly questioned AID representatives as to the details of their programs.

Every year's worth of statistics offers insight into the U.S. foreign policy towards Haiti. The paradigm preferred figures over clarity and adopted an attitude of throwing money at complicated situations. Congressmen Bushnell explained it best in 1980 when he described the trade-off in foreign aid, "In my view, if we don't give foreign aid we're paying 10 times the cost either in the defense budget or in various sorts of other programs"[44]. Even before "paying 10 times the cost," every chart concerning foreign aid was already full of large figures. For example, the estimated programs for 1979: Total U.S. economic assistance and military assistance was $39,297,000, over a $10 million increase from the previous year. Again, the majority came in the form of economic assistance, $38,897,000. Development assistance almost doubled at $15,647,000. PL 480 also increased to $23,250,000. Military assistance decreased to only $400,000 – $200,000 from foreign military training and $200,000 from military credit sales[45].

In 1979, when AID proposed a $3 million education and human resources development program and a $2.5 million development program both in grant form, it was met with opposition from Mr. Long who had recently returned from Haiti. He questioned AID representatives whether they were actually doing anything there.

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[44] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part II:374)
[45] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1980, Part IV:903)

> I didn't see any evidence anybody has ever done anything for those poor people except the Church World Services and a couple of groups like that, voluntary organizations ...I probably will never go down to Haiti again. One trip to Haiti in one lifetime is enough. I am very delighted I got back without permanent damage to my constitution (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1979, Part II:903-904).

After Mr. Long's visit to Haiti where he was unimpressed with what was being done there, his interests in AID's activities in Haiti increased dramatically. The questioning of AID representatives intensified.

Skeptical criticisms peppered the conversations between Congressmen and AID representatives and with good reasons. According to the Economic and Social Progress in Latin America 1979 IADB report, the 1970 per capita income in Haiti was $194.40; by 1979 it was only $247.50, and less than $100 in rural areas despite millions of dollars of economic assistance[46]. On charts, however, it appeared that Congress fully supported and approved of AID proposals for millions of grant money for Haiti. For example in 1979 before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Abelardo L. Valdez, the Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean for AID, defended programs in Haiti, denying their failures. On the contrary, Valdez summarized AID's assistance to Haiti:

> In the six years since the AID program was reinstated [though it never fully stopped], the following has been achieved:
>
> In the agriculture sector:
>
> - Some 10,000 coffee farmers have been formed into groups to facilitate the flow of credit and technical assistance;
> - More than 200 kilometers of feeder roads have been built or improved;

[46] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1982, Part IV:37, 25)

- An effective road maintenance institution has been established;
- The planning, programming, and management capacity of the ministries of agriculture and public works has been strengthened.

In the health sector:

- A rural health delivery system which should reach 70 percent of all Haitians has been planned and is at the point of execution;
- Family planning services have been expanded to the point where approximately 10 percent of the target couples are participating;
- Approximately 10,000 children suffering from malnutrition have been treated;
- Tens of thousands of children have been the beneficiaries of school feeding programs;
- Potable water systems have been brought to within reach of tens of thousands of people.

(U.S. House. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 1979: 47-8).

This evidence of AID success in Haiti must have been convincing enough, for AID received $11.1 million for its projects in Haiti for the next fiscal year, 1980 and $9.2 million for fiscal year 1982[47].

The figures representing economic assistance to Haiti are complicated and confusing. In 1980, when AID justified its FY 1981 request, the representative of AID Mr. Coy, explained "For 1980 in our presentation to Congress last year we talked in terms of a higher amount, $18.4 million last year. In this presentation we are requesting $5.7 million." To which, Mr. Lehman asked "5.7 in 1981? Are you looking at the same chart I'm looking at?"[48] Even present at the meetings, with charts current and in front of him, Mr. Lehman was lost in the figures. Later hearings revealed that for FY 1980, the

[47] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1984, Part 1A:929)
[48] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part II:372)

United States gave $1,090,000 divided by 4 US Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) projects. That same year, there was also 1 indigenous PVO project which the United States sponsored for $350,000. The other Latin American countries averaged much lower amounts of money in comparison to the $1.09 million figure, let alone the $18.4 million Mr. Coy referenced[49].

In addition to the mind-boggling figures, the copious amounts of money given to Haiti also seemed to be ineffective. In the hearings for Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1982 Chairman Long expressed frustrations over AID in Haiti. Despite decades of assistance and millions of dollars, Mr. Long stated his concern about long-term accomplishments "I don't know how we get anything done in Haiti using the Haitian people…we may have to bypass the government almost entirely if we really want to accomplish certain programs like reforestation and things like that"[50]. Mr. McPherson, the Administrator for AID, addressed Long's concerns; "we are now running almost half our programs through PVOs or through other than governmental channels. I concur that that is an approach that we need to continue, if not augment" (2). Years of working in Haiti had brought little encouragement to Congressmen and AID representatives alike.

Mr. Long later returned to the topic of reforestation and explained that if AID does not do something about it, the U.S. would have "all those Haitians on [its] doorstep"[51]. Mr. McPherson reported that AID had signed a four-year $850,000 grant

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[49] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1982, Part V:83)
[50] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1982, Part III: 2)
[51] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1982, Part III: 41)

for Operation Double Harvest, a non-profit organization that worked in Haiti doing reforestation (42). Mr. Long, still unsatisfied, stated that Haiti development "is simply stymied. Right now, you get the feeling it is like pushing a freight train uphill with a bruised left shoulder. The inertia in that county is just appalling. The inertia seems to have spread to our own AID agency...Urgency is one thing we need for Haiti" (43). Perhaps in trying to stimulate organizational inertia, Mr. Long again mentioned deforestation in Haiti to the Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan (Part IV: 180). Momentum among administrators slowed in the early 1980s, yet the funds did not. For FY 1982, the Subcommittee approved $34.4 million in total economic assistance to Haiti[52].

At the hearings on the Caribbean Basin Initiative before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1982, more questioning of AID's progress in Haiti arose. Mr. McPherson deflected the question not to the successes of AID as his colleague Mr. Valdez had in 1979; rather Mr. McPherson emphasized the significant Private and Voluntary Organization (PVO's) programs in Haiti.

> [While] the PVO's will not be implementing any program with the $350 million supplemental assistance...In a broader context, however, they will be doing a great deal For example, in Haiti over 50% of the AID funds provided that country are administered by private voluntary organizations. They are a very important part of our program...such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and a number of others are actively involved in our programs. In Haiti there are over 110 PVO's, about 15 of which directly implement AID programs and many of which have the potential to provide valuable development services for AID (U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Inter-American Affairs 1982:66).

[52] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1985, Part I: 906)

Mr. McPherson continued to emphasize AID's support for nongovernment entities and the private sector, recognizing that "the governmental apparatus of Haiti continue[d] to need strengthening" (68). Within the same hearings the Congressman from Florida Mr. Mica, also questioned AID practices. Specifically, Mr. Mica doubted the wisdom behind the $5 million AID proposed to give to Haiti "for certain types of private sector activities" (73). Mr. Mica also questioned the additional "$12 million of development assistance appropriated for Haiti legislation for fiscal year 1982" if the Haitian Government had no central banking system and no auditing procedures established for the funds (73). According to the Prepared Statement by Otto J. Reich, the assistant administrator for Latin American and the Caribbean with AID, the total U.S. economic assistance to Haiti in 1982 was $34.16 million[53].

Continued support of the Government of Haiti (GOH) came under scrutiny in the subcommittee hearings. Nevertheless, the hearings for 1983 show that AID gave $9 million to Haiti in 1981 and proposed $15 million for 1983. (Other sources list the total economic assistance given by AID to Haiti in 1981 as somewhere in $30-million-range though exact figures differ.) When questioned regarding the increase in support and also whether the programs were successful, AID responded:

> Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. To address this condition, AID in Haiti is working with other international donors, who together provide assistance amounting to approximately $120 million per year. This assistance, for the most part, has been effectively utilized, and is likely to have substantial impact on development of the country. AID's role in meeting U.S. objectives in Haiti is quite well defined" (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1983, Part IV:157).

[53] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1984, Part IV:371)

Describing a program as impactful and effective is an easy thing to say, proving it is far more difficult. The Subcommittee's concerns were not satisfactorily met and they questioned the extent of the involvement of the GOH. AID explained that 50% of their projects were run by PVOs but the program in Haiti was also described as intentionally beneficial to the Government of Haiti. "In those cases where the GOH's commitment to or ability to benefit from specific projects has been demonstrated to be lacking, AID has not hesitated to terminate the projects and deobligate funds"[54]. Again, the words of AID sound good but are not proven within the records of the Subcommittees.

The Subcommittee was not pleased with the open intention to support Duvalier[55] but did not act in opposition. Instead, questioning turned to the topic of deforestation. Chairman Long stated that deforestation in Haiti "could be one of the most serious problems facing any country in the world"[56]. And yet, even though the AID project began in 1966 starting to plant trees (Part IV: 25) when Mr. Long went to Haiti in 1981 he could not find a single tree that AID had planted. Instead what he found was a comedy of errors:

> Everything went wrong. Obviously what had happened was they got the word to show us something, and they cooked something up overnight. It was a total piece of incompetence, and that is what we find out goes on everywhere in Haiti...We look at a typical thing. One was a typical water pump, which was nothing fancy. They started pumping water and the handle fell off. Then we were looking at a ram pump that uses hydraulic principles to get water at a higher elevation. It sprayed water all over us. Then, they had some sort of silver thing that was not very impressive. It was after about a 2 ½ -hour drive to get there. It was just awful...We couldn't find any trees, and I have climbed over more

[54] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1983, Part IV:158)
[55] From this instance on, "Duvalier" refers to Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier.
[56] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1983, Part V:298)

> pastures, stepped on more cow pies and more meadow muffins than anybody in creation. I have done my job going out looking for these things. I tried to find some trees we had planted...They have done practically nothing so far" (Part V:305).

The continued emphasis on the reforestation in Haiti is explained by the U.S. Delegation, Sixth Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization Committee on Agriculture report on Soil and Water Conservation. The Position Paper stated 4 reasons why reforestation is important, the 2 most outstanding were: 1) internal political stability, of which availability of food is a key factor; and 2) also the reduction of impact and burden on the U.S.'s soil and water resources (312).

Needless to say, despite Mr. Long's comedy of errors, funding to AID for reforestation in Haiti continued. The Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations revisited the issue of reforestation in Haiti in 1983 and noted progress. Mr. Long's visit to Haiti had spurred an extra $300,000 commitment and the doubling in size of the number of seedlings planted goal. Statistically however, despite planting 2 million trees in the first year, AID provided the figure of 27 to 30 million trees each year as the necessary number to stem the deforestation in Haiti[57]. By the end of 1983, AID and its affiliates planted over 5.2 million trees with a 50-60% survival rate, "far exceed[ing] the project's goals"[58].

The subcommittee kept questioning the AID program in Haiti's success, but the money kept flowing into Haiti. In the AID Congressional Presentation for FY 1983, total authorized monies for Haiti equaled $96,888,000, though later reports list it at

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[57] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1984, Part IV:136-7)
[58] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1985, Part IV:70)

$43,890,000 and $27,323,000[59]. Of this all but $7.8 million was in grant form. Despite all of these funds, according to the AID Congressional Presentation for Fiscal Year 1984 Annex III on Latin America and the Caribbean, Haiti's population of a little over 6 million had an expected life expectancy of around 54 and the most recent literacy rate data came from 1971, when adult literacy was a mere 23% (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1984, Part IA: 928). Cuba's life expectancy at this same time period was over 72— and of all Latin American countries, only Haiti was categorized as low-income by the World Bank (Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress 1984: 73).

The funds given to Haiti were not small change. However, neither were the discrepancies. Take for example, this chart compiled from three separate AID Congressional Presentations, one from 1983, one from 1985 and one from 1986. The bold numbers are from the 1983 report, and the parenthetical numbers are the figures reported in the 1986 report[60].

Haiti – in thousands of dollars	Total	Agricultural Rural development and Nutrition	Population Planning	Health	Education and Human Resources Development	Selected development activities	Economic Support Fund
1982	12,015	3,625	1,530	5,445	830	585	--
1983	27,323 **96,888**	9,793 **52,353**	1,530 **13,554**	4,651 **24,872**	587 **3,689**	724 **2,420**	10,000
1984	25,200 (25,738)	10,110 (10,228)	2,840 (2,820)	5,850 (6,179)	490	910 (925)	5,000 (5,096)

[59] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1984, Part IV: 371 and U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1985, Part II: 614 respectively)

[60] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1983, Part VI:553-555, U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1985, Part II:614 and U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1986, Part II:797)

1985	29,000 (30,700)	13,209 (12,039)	2,550 (3,004)	6,041 (5,170)	300 (1,000)	1,900 (1,487)	5,000
1986	30,300	14,232	1,880	4,108	1,400	3,380	5,300

The discrepancies here are not unique. Millions of dollars in differences between reports! And there are still discrepancies in the most current data and the contemporary records! For example, the total AID assistance according to this chart in 1982 was $12,015,000. According to the Country Program Report on AID's website, total AID was $34,300,000. An even larger discrepancy is from the 1986 figures. The contemporary report from 1986 holds the total at $30,300,000. The online chart: $77,800,000 (USAID.gov "Custom Program Report: Haiti" accessed 28 April 2011).

OTHER INVESTORS IN HAITI

In addition to AID, other sources of U.S. money also flowed into Haiti; one example is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Formally organized in 1971, OPIC's main function is to insure U.S. private investors going into less developed countries against a risk of expropriation, currency in convertibility, and fiscal damage due to war[61]. In 1974 a hotel billed as "the most extraordinary hotel in the world" was partially financed because of a decision of Mr. Mays, the President of OPIC. The hotel cost $150 per day which was admittedly "a luxury tourist trade" but was justifiable because "mass public tourist business [tends] to follow the luxury trade" (298). Mr. Roybal, the Representative from California wondered what the effect the construction and advertisement of the hotel had on the people of Haiti. He also admonished the project stating that at $150 a day perhaps the president could afford to stay, but few others. Even after admitting that $150 a day was too expensive for the average man,

[61] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1975, Part I:303)

even for some heads of government, Mr. Mays continued to say that the $2 million project was financed in large part by the developer, a private loan and only received $415,000 from OPIC. Questions arose as to the origins of the $1.2 million the developer already had, as well as to the logic behind the loan.

In support of the loan, Mr. Mays referred to the American Ambassador to Haiti's active encouragement of the loan[62]. He also defended the loan by stating that the $61 million in applications for investments in Haiti since OPIC approved this hotel proposal were direct results of the first inkling of support for tourism in Haiti. After further debate between Mr. Mays and the Congressmen, Mr. Mays described how other investment applications had come in since the construction of this hotel, things such as agribusiness—fruits, vegetables, forestry, brewery, strawberries, oil seed processing and a tomato farm. There were also 24 applications for light manufacturing. Mr. Mays, defended his decision to invest in this luxury hotel, the Habitation Leclerc, as an instigator for these other applications, saying that without hotels, investors could not come to Haiti to investigate other opportunities. He argued that the tourism industry in Haiti was only just beginning and because this project was funded, 5 other proposals for more modest hotel construction had also been made. The hole in his defense however, is that by January 1973 *Time* magazine had already run an article in their Modern Living section titled "Haiti: A New Island in the Sun." This article described the various pre-existing hotels in Haiti and how the construction of this newest luxury hotel would only serve to continue the hospitality theme of Haitian hotels (Time.com accessed 19 April 2011).

[62] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1975, Part I:303)

Another investor in Haiti, with primarily U.S. money, was the Inter-American Foundation (IAF). The IAF is an organization that grants money to locally-based initiatives[63]. During the period of March 15, 1974 through February 1, 1975 the IAF funded three grants to Haiti: one, to the Centre Haitien d'Investigation en Sciences Sociales (CHISS) for $5,000 to "study consumption habits and patterns in Port-au-Prince as one element of a ten-part survey of the internal marketing structure of agricultural produce in Haiti"[64]; the second, to the Christian Community Development/ Diocese of Les Cayes for $294,000 to "assist a comprehensive Haitian program of rural development [to] organize and train rural leadership for social action, [and to establish] ten federations of agricultural groups with associated programs in education, health, and women's organizations" (43); thirdly, to the Cooperative de Pecheurs Dirigée par les CRESHS for $13,918 to "assist in the establishment of a fishing cooperative in a small fishing village near Port-au-Prince" (44).

The Inter-American Foundation was very active in Haiti since its inception in 1971 and with positive results. As of February 28, 1975 the Inter-American Foundation had approved 9 projects in Haiti since 1971 for a total of $772,167. Of this, $726,667 was obligated[65]. By year's end, IAF recorded 10 projects in Haiti for a total of $826,781 with one upcoming project for $199,500[66]. In 1976, the IAF made a grant of $186,000 to a community development group in the mountains in Pilate, Haiti. At the beginning of the grant, there were 1,800 members who borrowed capital and learned farming

[63] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part III:341)
[64] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1976, Part I:43)
[65] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1976, Part I:10-11)
[66] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1977, Part I: 76-78)

techniques through the cooperative, by 1981 there were 2,700 members[67]. The project was deemed successful for showing "that poor people in Haiti, working through private organizations, can manage their own projects well and produce tangible results that allow them to look forward to a better future within their communities" (27).

The success stories of the IAF before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations led the Subcommittee to intrigue IAF with further expansion. When asked to assume some of AID's projects in Haiti, the president of IAF reminded the Subcommittee that the foundation was an organization that responded to locally-based initiatives, and politely declined, though he did pledge concern and committed to increase capacity to respond to Haitian initiatives[68]. The next year Mr. Long asked Mr. Bell, President of the IAF, to potentially begin a reforestation program through IAF, Mr. Bell sympathized that the "spreading desertification of Haiti is enormously depressing," but he also reminded Mr. Long that IAF only works with grass roots projects that local people initiate[69].

Despite refusal to adopt AID projects, the IAF followed the pattern set by AID in complicated record-keeping of monies distributed. By 1980, the IAF had 18 projects at $1,405,101 approved by September 30, 1979 in Haiti, with 17 projects for $1,363,995 already obligated[70]. A few pages later in the report the Inter-American Foundation analyzed matching funds by grantees for all obligated projects by the same date and Haiti is listed at $1,346,657 from Foundation Funds and $1,223,568 for a total of

[67] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1982, Part IV:26)
[68] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part III:341)
[69] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1982, Part IV:51)
[70] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part III:304-305)

$2,570,225 (310). Where does the extra $1,206,230 factor in with IAF programs? By 1981, the IAF reported more than $1.7 million worth of grants to locally-based initiatives in Haiti[71]. Somehow, by 1982, an additional $163,137 in grants in 1981 and $174,000 in 1982 made the total amount in grants to Haiti since 1971, $2,798,000 through 34 separate grants, not the $2,807.362 the figures suggest[72]. By 1986, the IAF reported that they gave Haiti $588,000 in grants in FY 1984 and from 1973 to 1984, had given 47 grants to Haiti[73]. The IAF shared with AID its practice of inconsistent reporting and total economic assistance is hard to determine.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—largely influenced by U.S. politics—also sent aid to Haiti. The IMF lends short-term crisis loans called standbys, which overlook domestic politics. Haiti has received more standbys from the IMF in the last half century than any other country, with twenty-two. Twenty of those standbys went to the Duvalier family. William Easterly in his book *The White Man's Burden* writes

> The politics were bad, but the Duvaliers made up for it with even worse economics. The income of the average Haitian was lower at the end of the Duvalier era than at the beginning. Half of all children did not go to elementary school when Papa Doc came to power; half of all children were still out of school when Baby Doc left power (Easterly 2006:351).

Because the IMF ignores domestic policy in the giving of standbys, these issues were not considered when deciding to give funds to Haiti. Cumulative lending to Haiti as of

[71] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1982, Part IV:51)
[72] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1985, Part II:902-903)
[73] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1986, Part I: 1545, 1665)

June 30, 1978 from the World Bank group: $96.1 million, from the Regional Bank/Fund $110.7 million[74].

MORE THAN AID, BUT STILL JUST AID...

Under Baby Doc, Haiti developed a considerable manufacturing industry for U.S. export. According to Dr. Paul Farmer's *Aids and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame* (California 1992), "Haitian assembly of U.S. goods was touted by both countries as 'aid' to Haiti." Case in point, in 1977 AID allocated $85,000 for use in "intermediate technology" in Haiti. AID used it to cover costs of surveys of contemporary small scale technology suitable for Haiti, possibilities for manufacture of suitable items in Haiti with emphasis on using locally available raw material, and pilot designs for items identified as having good potential for manufacture and use in Haiti[75]. This invasion of industry took advantage of "docile laborers" in the name of democracy, as evident in the words of Stanley Urban, then-President of the Haitian-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry:

> I honestly believe that a dictatorship is the best form of government for these people. There are six million illiterates on that island. Think of what the Ruskies could do there...There's more democracy for business in Haiti than for business in the United States. [Regarding the minimum wage of $2.64 per day, Urban explained] In other words, the whole country is virtually a free trade zone! (Sklar 1988:115-116, as quoted in Farmer 1992:188)

The Duvaliers' economic policy and relations with the United States was mutually beneficial. That is, the United States gained a source of cheap labor for the manufacturing of such products as baseballs, stuffed toys, dolls, apparel and brassieres

[74] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1980, Part II:35)
[75] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1978, Part II:638)

(Farmer 1992:188) and Duvalier was able to divert an average of $15 million a month to his private Swiss bank account (Hancock 1989:180, as quoted in Farmer 1992:189).

The successes of the industrial growth in Haiti were minimal. Cost far outweighed benefits to almost all affected by the manufacturing industry. One striking example of costs is the price of electricity. As factories increased demand for electricity, disparities between the haves and the have-nots increased. Rates for *kouran* rose by 53% between 1971 and 1981 as the Port-au-Prince metropolitan areas required 93% of all electricity produced in Haiti (Trouillot 1990:210). The assembly industries did not create sustainable economic development because the regime was "based on the appropriation of investable economic surpluses without providing any of the subsidies and the public goods and services necessary for economic development...without undermining the very sources of the wealth and power of its officials (Dupuy 1994:97). The limited jobs made available by manufacturing (estimated between 40,000 and 60,000) fell victim to the instability within the job market. The profits from exports were reduced by raw material imports and tax evasion, and by 1985 even the World Bank recognized the assembly industry had made "almost no fiscal contribution" to Haiti's economy (Hooper 1987b:37, as quoted in Trouillot 1990:213).

In addition to the limited benefits of manufacturing, the lure of jobs drew people away from the rural areas, increasing the demand for imported food and reducing local food production. Concurrently, the U.S. was less interested in the development of small-

scale agriculture –what Haiti needed—than it was in industry and manufacturing[76]. According to Research Associate at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, Dr. Robert L. Paarlberg, tax policies in the Caribbean discriminated against agriculture. Dr. Paarlberg used Haiti as an example, citing the export tax imposed on coffee, equal to as much as 30% of the export price. Dr. Paarlberg explained:

> This tax has long had the effect of siphoning resources out of the countryside. Nearly the entire burden of this tax falls on Haiti's 2 million impoverished peasant cultivators, reducing their income from coffee by as much as 40%. Nor do the revenues from this export tax ever find their way back to rural areas. More than 80% of all government expenditures in Haiti still go to nonagricultural projects, despite the fact that three-quarters of all Haitians still live in the countryside. Meantime, the government continues to exempt from heavy taxation many of the luxury purchases of the relatively well-to-do urban elite (56-7).

The excessiveness of government officials' lifestyles came at the price of the entire country's foodstuffs. Haiti relied heavily on P.L. 480 Food for Peace Title II (emergency food relief) for over $100 million worth of food aid from fiscal years 1977 to 1982 (See Table 3.1 in the Appendix). Despite being one of the most productive colonies in history, 200 years of limited technological advances and growing overpopulation stagnated Haiti's agricultural production.

In a discussion of whether PL 480 Title II emergency food aid is a de-motivating factor, the Assistant Administrator and chief official for Latin America and the Caribbean for AID, Mr. Valdez, denied it. He also said that it hadn't been proven that the food-for-work program food wound up for sale in markets despite a Mennonite

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[76] (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the Committee on Agriculture 1982:20-8)

Central Committee Staff report saying the contrary[77]. Chairman Long continued to question Mr. Valdez, asking why AID money was being spent on the construction of 14 huge warehouses to store Food Aid food and not instead to store locally produced food, 30% of which gets lost every year due to poor storage facilities? (816) Mr. Valdez responded saying that some space in each warehouse would be allocated for locally grown food and that "consideration will be given to a request for financing small storage facilities in [a] rural area in northwest Haiti" (817). Mr. Long also mentioned that food aid is discouraging local production and questioned AID's strategy in food distribution. Mr. Valdez replied "The AID Mission in Haiti is addressing this problem and in fact plans to undertake a through [sic] evaluation of food-for-work programs" (817).

It is unknown if AID completed the evaluation that Mr. Valdez said was in AID's future plans. What is known is that in Haiti received $9 million a year from PL 480 Title 1 in 1980 and 1981 and $9 million was proposed for 1982 as well[78]. Title I, under PL 480 is designated for non-emergency food aid. The FY 1980 was the first recorded time Haiti received Title I food aid. In 1982, under PL 480 both Title I and Title II, Haiti received $22.2 million of food aid and development assistance and $3.6 million in grants and loans for agricultural, rural and nutritional development. The very next year a summary of the Caribbean by the Department of Agriculture noted that Jamaica and Haiti composed almost all of the region's food aid needs. Haiti, at this time

[77] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1980, Part IV: 816)
[78] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1982, Part VI: 116)

could only afford half of its cereal import needs due to dwindling foreign exchange reserves and stagnating export earnings.

CHARACTERS OF CORRUPTION

The early 1980s saw the decline of value in the Haitian gourde, largely due to the escalating corruption within the government. Millions of U.S. dollars were siphoned into Duvalier's personal foreign accounts, never entering Haiti's economy. Members of the Duvalier's family had individual "internal revenue" accounts to fund their private expenditures, "often without bothering to engage in any intermediate transaction to cover the embezzlement" (Trouillot 1990:211). Baby Doc accumulated more than $500 million while in office, not including the funds spent on his luxurious lifestyle during his years in office (214). For example, the charitable agency "Social Works" to which government agencies were forced to write checks to, went into the private accounts of Jean-Claude, his wife Michèle, and his mother Simone (Abbott 1988:251). Duvalier's own Finance Minister, before being fired, revealed Duvalier stashed away $15 million a month, mostly coming from development assistance (Hancock 1989: 180, as quoted in Farmer 1992:189).

Meanwhile, the super ministers of Baby Doc's administration also filled their private coffers, treating Haiti as their own feudal kingdom. Dummy agencies, blank checks, and millions of dollars in embezzled funds were issued to various high officials. Perhaps nothing is more evident of the corruption than that seen in the man of Ernest Bennett, father-in-law to Jean-Claude. A coffee exporter by trade and a crook by nature, Ernest Bennett diverted every dollar he could into his own accounts. Bennett ran cocaine through Haiti, earning himself the title of "The Godfather" (Abbott 1988:251).

Bennett also had the impudence to sell crude oil from Mexico, intended for Haiti, to Arab-embargoed South Africa in an attempt to earn $7 million for himself. The plan fell through, but it did not hurt Bennett's standing within the Duvalier administration (250). Regardless of Bennett's audacity, he confessed to being afraid of another person, one in his family in fact, his daughter, Michèle Duvalier (220).

Michèle Duvalier has been the subject of much attention. She has been labeled everything from hussy to explosive, from hysterical to saint. Michèle wanted to be known for her charitable actions, as well as for her extravagant acts of excess. A living dichotomy, she has rightfully been described as crazy. Michèle and Jean-Claude had an emotionally intense and sexually-charged love affair to the dismay of Jean-Claude's closest friends and advisors and to the fear of Michèle's father, who had been imprisoned for bad debts under Papa Doc (Abbott 1988:220). The affair climaxed in the most extravagant wedding in the history of Haiti, an event that qualified for the *Guinness World Book of Records* for one of the world's three costliest at an estimated $3 million (226). Michèle accepted her position as Madame Jean-Claude Duvalier with enthusiasm and drive. Her reign as First Lady of Haiti is marked both by social works and charity hospitals, earning the laudation of even Mother Theresa, and extravagant parties of cocaine, sexual escapades and weekend shopping trips to Paris, earning her the angst of her people (241-255).

The Duvalier fortunes disgust the statistics they comprise. A meager salary as President-for-Life did not impact the expenditures of the Duvaliers, who had the national budget include a $1.5 million account for presidential expenses and an extra

$1.2 million for the First Lady. Examples of their extravagant *mode de vie* are innumerable. Michèle imported $50,000 worth of Floridian flowers every month for the Palace and had so much jewelry she needed a 5-story vault and floor-to-ceiling jewel boxes (Abbott 1988:253). Jean-Claude matched her in extravagance with yachts and villas around the world[79]. The luxurious lifestyles, the millions in foreign accounts –no sources say exactly how much was siphoned away from Haiti during the Duvaliers' rule—all at the expense of the Haitian people.

SWINE FEVER

One of the most memorable instances of American assistance in Haiti is the eradication of the Creole Pig in the early 1980s. The pigs were peasants' form of insurance. When a child needed new school books, uniforms, medical treatment, a pig was sold or butchered and then sold. Devastatingly, in 1978 African Swine Fever (ASF) was identified in the Dominican Republic. ASF is an incurable, highly infectious virus that kills pigs within 48 hours of contact. The disease is non-threatening to humans, even if they eat contaminated meat. However, when the US Department of Agriculture along with the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture recognized ASF as a threat, the Creole Pig became a target. Typically, ASF cyclically kills only 20% of a swine population, an endurable level of decimation for Haiti's small-scale production, but not for the United States. The United States' industrial-style pig farming would not have been able to sustain the introduction of the ASF (Trouillot 19901:215).

In 1981, there was an outbreak of African Swine Fever in Haiti. Blood tests done across Haiti showed a 22.86% rate of infection (Abbott 1988:247). Duvalier, at the

[79](U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1979, Part III:269)

urging of the United States ordered the eradication of the entire population of the native pigs and the slaughter began in May 1982. From fiscal year 1981 to the completion of the program in FY 1984, the program cost USDA $14,500,000[80]. Over 1 million pigs were slaughtered at a devastating effect on the low-income people who owned them (Trouillot 1990:215). Despite the program paying compensation for the pigs: $40 for a large pig, $20 for a medium and $5 for a piglet in cash, many Haitians chose to slaughter their pigs themselves to fetch a better price on an unfortunately flooded market (Abbott 1988:248).

The effects of the Creole Pig Eradication Program (officially called PEPPADEP), headed by American veterinarian Dr. Bob Amelingmeier, continued long after the last pig died (Abbott 1988:249). The replacement, light pink pigs people sometimes received required imported food and had little profit and no intrinsic value associated with them. The price of meat rose greatly as pork-production became "a bourgeois venture" (Trouillot 1990:215). Haiti's economy continued its landslide. Agriculture employed 80% of the people, but only provided 35% of Haiti's GNP (Jean-Claude Duvalier, as quoted in Abbott 1998:249). The death of the Creole pigs was the beginning of the death of the Haitian peasant. More and more people left the rural areas for Port-au-Prince and the United States in search of work.

STEMMING THE TIDE OF THE "BOAT PEOPLE"

Haiti's close proximity to the U.S. initially gave cause to the United States' fear of communism in "its own backyard." However, as Haiti became less and less likely a

[80] (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the Committee on Agriculture 1982: 193)

target for Cuban invasion, attention turned more and more to the "Haitian invasion" of immigrants onto the shores of South Florida. The United States' policy toward the Caribbean was less focused on communist containment but rather the containment of the poor and struggling masses, who were literally dying to live in the economic prosperity of the United States. Confusion over whether the arrivals were political or economic refugees led the Subcommittee on Foreign Appropriations to discuss the situation. Mr. Frank L. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Refugee and Migration Affairs, explained

> We are still reviewing the requests for asylum of Haitians who arrive in the United States in small boats. The majority do not appear to be refugees, and once their cases are fully processed, will return or be deported to Haiti. Those who are refugees will be allowed to remain in the United States (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1976 Part I:766).

When asked if any returnees suffered reprisals attributed to the Haitian Government, Mr. Kellogg responded in the negative. He mentioned both a small follow-up study conducted by the State Department as well as a study by a Canadian sociologist that did not show any harassment or mistreatment (504). Later, presentations by human rights advocates argued the exact opposite[81].

In the early 1980s under the Administration of President Reagan, concerns of Caribbean emigration into the United States consumed discussion of foreign assistance to the region. In a statement by Dr. Robert A. Pastor, a Faculty Research Associate at the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, Dr. Pastor explained U.S. policy in this way:

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[81] (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 1982: 43-46, 105-149)

> [I]t makes sense for us to think about the Caribbean Basin...because the nature of the challenge it poses for the United States. Again, not because of strategic, but because of immigration, because of economic reasons. Because we happen to very often share in the consequences of economic or political instability. The state of Florida, for example, right now spends more on health services on illegal Haitians than the U.S. aid program spends vis-à-vis Haiti (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the Committee on Agriculture 1982:20).

Dr. Pastor was not the only one concerned with Haitian immigration into Florida. Mr. Lehman, the representative from South Florida repeatedly initiated discussion of "the Haitian problem" into the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs hearings on Foreign Appropriations.

Mr. Lehman was primarily concerned with "how these people can go back safely"[82]. He expressed great concern for the Haitians deported from Florida back into what he recognized as "an oppressive form of government" (91). Mr. Lehman continued later in the hearings "What we have got to do is, while due process is being worked out, give them a chance to survive and get the taxpayers of Dade County off the hook" (767). Mr. Lehman went to Haiti to discover what happens to Haitians who are sent back to Haiti. He talked to all of the official agencies, the Embassy and other American agencies and no one could lead him to a single returned refugee. Meanwhile 7,000 or so immigrants in Miami, about half with work permits, were costing local government agencies $3 million a year (767).

A year later, in the hearings for 1981, discussion of the situation of the "boat people" i.e. the Haitian refugees arose again. Refugees were landing upon the shores of

[82] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1980 Part I: 91)

South Florida in numbers of approximately 1,000 a week. Mr. Lehman presented the dilemma as such: "If Haitians are economic refugees they cannot stay here but Haiti is entitled to military aid. If they are political refugees they are entitled to stay here, and Haiti is not entitled to military aid. Now [we] can't have it both ways"[83]. At the same time, Haiti had nearly $500,000 in military assistance in the pipeline. Chairman Long described the reasons for the mass migration as "because they have a tyrannical, corrupt, murderous regime and have had for a great long time" (156). Nevertheless, Secretary Nimetz stated the government's official position that the "boat people" are not political refugees and not entitled to stay in the United States under political asylum laws, unless on individual basis refuges can prove they will be persecuted upon return. Nimetz did acknowledge the law's inability to "provide adequately for people coming to our shores in the manner the Cubans and Haitians have" (156).

As years passed, and the immigrant situation intensified, concerns expressed by Congressmen grew to seem less compassionate towards the refugees and far more concerned with the complications created in the United States. Chairman Long, who was usually sympathetic to the plight of Haiti, especially after he visited the struggling nation, in the 1982 hearings expressed a different sentiment: "The only good thing about [Haiti], I suppose, is that the people are too poor to try to make it to the United States, although they are still doing it, I understand"[84].Congressman Lehman echoed Mr. Long's harsh posture and exposed his own declining clemency:

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[83] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part IV: 155)
[84] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1982, Part V: 81)

> The amount of our formal foreign assistance to Haiti is really small in comparison to the 'foreign assistance' they get from refugees who are sending money back from South Florida. So it is a problem. If they are getting a hundred million dollars a year from South Florida refugees, it is hard to be able to really provide the kind of incentives through foreign assistance so the government will keep people from going to Florida (99).

AID representative, Mr. Coy remarked that the remittances most likely went to fund more people's passage to the U.S. (99). The long years of trying to fix the "Haitian Problem" had taken their toll on the benevolence of the Subcommittee.

Not all Congressmen had exhausted supplies of mercy however. At the hearings on the Caribbean Basin Initiative before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1982, Representative Mervyn M. Dymally (D, California) stated, after listing multiple countries the U.S. was supporting arms to who were engaged over illegitimate border disputes, in no soft language:

> In refugees, nowhere is the racist foreign policy of this administration more evident than in our treatment of Haitian refugees interned in camps as prisoners of war. The dual policy of the Immigration and Nationalization Service is a disgrace to this country, which has prided itself on granting asylum to displaced peoples all over the world (U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Economic policy and Trade and on Inter-American Affairs 1982:4).

At the same hearings, a Congressman for Florida, Mr. Dan Mica criticized U.S. foreign policy to Haiti over the same issue of immigration. The Floridian however, had a slightly different motivation. Mr. Mica stated the cost of 1 year's care of direct and indirect expense for 10,000 Haitians was $10 million (73). When Mr. Mica later asked

> Would it be appropriate for this committee, in your estimation, any of you, to consider any conditions to go in addition to this, with regards to subjects such as illegal immigration, human rights, social progress, do

> you think that we are tying the wrong two packages together, and I am looking for some guidance on this (113)

The question was totally evaded by Mr. Alexander Wolfe Jr. vice chairman, Council of the Americas. The conversation diverted to "too many strings" and how to ask a government to keep its citizens from entering the US illegally would be too tall an order. Simultaneously, economic assistance was touted as one of the most effective methods of reducing immigration. One of the other Congressmen from Florida, Mr. Lehman bluntly summarized one reason to continue to assist Haiti economically "I'm just saying if we spend a dime in Haiti, it might prevent us from spending a dollar in south Florida on the same people"[85].

HUMAN RIGHTS

President Carter initiated a shift in the focus of foreign aid from stringent anti-communism to human rights. However, even before Carter was elected in 1976, Congress approved the Harkin amendment. It required a U.S. Director on the IADB Board to vote against a loan to any government that engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, including torture and arbitrary arrests[86]. The Harkin Amendment contributed greatly to the discussion of human rights within the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs. Just by looking at the hearings on Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations starting in 1977, Human Rights as a subcategory filled the indices. Haiti was a frequent subject of discussion for its known abuses and violations, especially its "boat people."

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[85] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part II:373)
[86] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1978, Part I:521)

When questioned about human rights abuses and government corruption, including the use of torture, in the case of Haiti Mr. Kleine, the deputy U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, Bureau for Latin America, for AID, denied the insinuations, stating that since Haiti's independence human rights have suffered as a consequence of the violent, turbulent political history. "The present government in Port-au-Prince, however, seems to have greater sensitivity concerning human rights than previous regimes"[87]. Mr. Kleine also denied any awareness on the use of torture in Haiti, instead he said "Certainly the prisons in Haiti, the poorest Nation in the Western Hemisphere, would not come up to such standards as we are able to maintain in the United States" (578).

In 1977, Haiti released "Prisoners of Conscience" and agreed for the first time to inspection by the International Committee on Human Rights[88]. Elizabeth Abbott denounced the effectiveness of the inspections, reporting on the quick clean-ups of the prisons and the quick return to their cesspool-like condition upon the inspection's end (Abbott 1988:214). The Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations hearings for 1979 included a chart labeled "U.S. and World Bank Aid to Human Rights Violators, Fiscal Year 1979;" for Haiti it listed U.S. aid at $33.5 million and World Bank aid at $23 million[89]. Throughout the hearings Haiti is repeatedly listed as having gross human rights violations (84, 130, 169, 173, 184-5).

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[87] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1976, Part III:578)
[88] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1979, Part II:130)
[89] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1979, Part III: 84)

In a report by the Office of Haitian Refugee Concerns and the National Council of Churches within the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy critique on the U.S. government's security assistance program for Fiscal Year 1979, the State Department report on Haiti is harshly criticized.

> Perhaps the most telling omission is the report's total failure to note the fact that more than 2700 Haitians have fled their country since 1972 seeking political asylum in the United States from the political repression and economic misery which are the hallmarks of the current government. *The mistreatment afforded these refuges by U.S. agencies would fill several reports in itself, but it is little compared to the situation from which they flee.* The most recent boats of refugees arrived in November, 1977, indicating that the situation remains serious, and the absence of any [sic] mention of the problem in the report can only be construed as a deliberate attempt to mislead (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1979, Part III:184, emphasis added).

Gross human rights violations were presented both in report form, media coverage and in personal testimony to the State Department Human Rights Office (185). The Inter-American Press Association in its August 1977 report listed Haiti's press not as "restricted" but as "deprived of this freedom" (185). There was also no freedom of movement within the country, and certainly not outside of the country.

Furthermore, before the same Subcommittee hearings, a group of Haitian ex-pats living in the United States in exile from Haiti presented their Statement of the *Union Patriotique Haitienne* (Union of the Patriotic Haitians, UPH) and of the Haiti Tribune. The group appealed to President Carter's known human rights focus and then called attention to Duvalier's abuses, not ignoring the fact that for over 20 years the U.S. Government and international organizations had given almost $200 million to Haiti. They stated:

> It is estimated that in the past 20 years a rough amount of 24 to 30 million dollars of internal revenues have been diverted each year to the private accounts of the Duvaliers. [Journalist] Jack Anderson, in July 1976 evaluated the deposits of the Duvalier Family in foreign banks to be about 200 million dollars (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1979, Part III:269).

The group listed Baby Doc's expenditures (a $5 million mausoleum for his father, a million dollar yacht, a villa in Monaco for $3 million, multiple luxury automobiles, etc.) all somehow purchased on his $144,000 total salary for all of his years as President. They also described the brutal treatment of prisoners, the suspension of the press, the prohibition of political opposition and the denial of exit and re-entry to citizens. The statement concluded with a call to Congress to cut the funds allocated for the Haitian Government, noting that $50 million of revenues for FY 1975 was still unaccounted for[90].

Mr. Paul Louis Cassagnol, collaborator of the Haiti Tribune and President of the *Union Patriotique Haitienne* (UPH) discussed at length the problems of foreign aid to Haiti with Mr. Long, Chairman of the Subcommittee. When Mr. Cassagnol referenced President Carter's human rights focus, Mr. Long replied "I am not so sure Mr. Carter is so committed to human rights. He was elected on that platform but we have been somewhat disillusioned"[91]. Mr. Cassagnol advocated the temporary termination of:

> all military, economic, financial and security supporting assistances to Haiti until and when all revenues are fiscalized and accounted for, all waste, embezzlement and corruption are eliminated and all available internal revenues are spent and invested in projects for the welfare of the needy people and for the social and economic development of the country (274).

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[90](World Bank Report No 1243-HA September 28, 1976 as quoted in U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1979: 269)

[91] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1979, Part III: 273)

At the end of their conversation, it was clear Mr. Long appreciated the perspective the Haitians brought and would cut aid to Haiti if he felt the committee or Congress would approve it. However, he said that they "can always argue the humanitarian needs" and the money gets put back into the government, regardless of the recognized human rights abuses (274). Despite being chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Long expressed a helpless feeling when it came to the distribution of aid.

The Union Patriotique Haitienne returned to speak before the Subcommittee again in 1979. Mr. Paul Louis Cassagnol again presented before Mr. Long a compelling argument to cut funds to Haiti, stating that Jean-Claude had by then accumulated over $300 million in his private accounts[92]. The statement by the UPH urged the Amnesty International report on the human rights conditions in Haiti be read in full (23). The statement also condemned the subcommittee of being equally at fault as AID for supporting a dictator widely recognized as violating international human rights (23). In much harsher terms than the prior year's address, the UPH stated:

> Let us be candid, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee and try to identify the real motives of the aid to Duvalier and of the blocking of the democratic process in Haiti. It is a form of neo-colonialism in substitution to the old colonialism, a new sugar-coated bitter pill that allows an abusive and unjust exploitation of a people, like mainly: [1] exploitation of its cheap labor: yesterday in agriculture (sisal, banana), today in small factories; [2] exploitation of its migrant labor to cut the sugar cane in the American plantations: yesterday in Cuba, today in the Dominican Republic; [3] exploitation of its mineral resources: copper, bauxite. Haiti is, in fact, the Soweto of the United States, the Soweto of the Western Hemisphere (24).

Despite a powerful statement of condemnation for foreign policy and inaction, the UPH was met with Mr. Long's "you realize, of course, that...you should appear before the

[92] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1980, Part V:21)

Ethics Committee or before the U.S. Departments of Justice. This Committee has no jurisdiction over that" (26). Mr. Long later directed them to the Agriculture Committee to discuss the food aid given to the government which is then sold by the government to line its own coffers (28). Nevertheless, Mr. Long stated his agreement with the UPH statement and finished the conversation stating the Subcommittee's sympathy for the cause (30).

Regardless of concession by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs and the overall recognition of human rights abuses in Haiti under Duvalier, little was done. If nothing else, things worsened as Duvalier noted the relative looseness of the Reagan Administration's policy in comparison with President Carter. Michel-Rolph Trouillot in *Haiti: State Against Nation* describes the end of Duvalier's "liberal phase."

> The phase ended abruptly on November 20, 1980, with a wave of arrests, the expulsion of many journalists, and the closing down of independent press organs. We cannot help but notice [when] the change came...it is...important to point out that it occurred less than three weeks after the 1980 U.S. elections. No matter who actually gave the orders, the new wave of repression expressed the Haitian government's reading of the implications of the Reagan landslide for human rights in Latin American and the Caribbean (Trouillot 1990:242*n*).

The reports of human rights abuses increased under Reagan but responses were few. The focus on social justice that the Carter Administration had instilled in the international affairs community persisted, even as the political weight behind it receded.

Mr. Franz Voltaire, a Haitian-Canadian working for the Canadian Agency of Development, described the situation in Haiti as worse in 1980 than it was in 1970, despite having received more money in the last 10 years than the previous 40 years.

"You can't separate in Haiti economy and politics"[93]. Lawyer Dale Swartz of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, presented testimony as well, describing the harsh living condition in Haiti under the Duvalier regime. Swartz quoted an Amnesty International telegram which read "in practice the VSN [Volunteers for National Security] and other security forces enjoy apparently unfettered discretion in arresting suspected or denounced critics of the Duvalier family or the Haitian government" (176). Swartz cited the State Department's acknowledgement that outside of Port-au-Prince there was not "much of a judicial system" and even within the capital, the right to be taken before a judge was "only sporatically [sic]" implemented (77).

Mr. Swartz detailed the human rights abuses in Haiti in his 13-page statement to the Subcommittee. He reported the disruption of the Haitian Human Rights League meeting by an estimated 200-250 Tonton Macoutes November 9, 1979 in Port-au-Prince[94]. He described the conditions of Fort Dimanche and the treatment of returned Haitians (180-181, 183). Swartz explained the ongoing subjugation of Haitians as laborers in the Dominican Republic from which the Duvaliers directly benefitted (182-183). Swartz extrapolated on the process of returned Haitians and their arrests, tortures and re-arrests, quoting the testimony of Daniel Voltaire a member of the Palace Guard (183-185). The undisputed evidence that Swartz had presented at a previous trial, he presented again to the Congressmen-and-women, calling their attention to the fact that Amnesty International, the Organization of American States and the Council on

[93] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part V:172)
[94] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part V:179-180)

Hemispheric Affairs ranked the Duvalier regime "among the prime violators of human rights in the world" (185).

In discussion following the official statement by Mr. Swartz, Mr. Voltaire described Haiti as "a totalitarian state where everybody can be killed for anything, people are afraid for their lives, [and] take a boat to go 800 miles because you have one chance in two to arrive alive in this case"[95]. The risk in sailing for Florida was not only the size of the boat in comparison to the number of occupants (average boats were 20 to 25 feet in length with upwards of 70 to 80 people per crossing), but also persecution by the U.S.-trained Haitian Navy. Mr. Swartz gave an example of 400 Haitian boat people being drowned "allegedly by smugglers" in April of 1980. Mr. Swartz explained the persecution as thus:

> They are making every effort recently to stop the flight of people, because I think they recognize that it is the refugees who are telling the truth about Haiti. That is the great risk to this regime, that the truth will be known through the exiles and through the refugees (192).

Unfortunately, even with the truth made known, as Mr. Swartz did, to the Subcommittee of the Committee of Appropriations in 1980, it would be 6 more long years of Duvalierism before the regime collapsed.

The primary focus of human rights issues in Haiti was the treatment of Haitians deported back into Haiti. Michael Posner, the Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights chastised the State Department's Country Report on Haiti. Posner stated "the report ha[d] apparently been tailored to support the

[95] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part V:190)

Reagan Administration's efforts to curb the flow of refugees to the United States"[96]. The report stated that returnees from the U.S. and elsewhere were not persecuted by the Duvalier regime even though, as Posner reported, in *Haitian Refugee Center v. Civilleti* (S.D. Fla., 1980) Judge James Lawrence King concluded that persons who had fled Haiti were viewed as political opponents of the Duvalier Regime and the Haitian government mistreated those persons seen as opponents (45). Posner also summarized the Report's failure to address the oppression of the press, the expulsion of unionists and the prohibition of political opposition. In short, the report's omissions "result[ed] in a serious understatement of the problems in a particular country and suggest[ed] an undue optimism about ill-defined improvements" (46).

Posner was not the only one to present the extravagant human rights violations carried out by Baby Doc's regime. Many advocates for human rights denounced the Reagan Administration's continued support of Baby Doc. In the aforementioned hearing on human rights, Harry Scoble, a Human Rights Internet Reporter presented his review of the State Department's Country Report on Haiti. In addition to not discussing the "waste and corruption...the vicious brutality of the Tonton Macoutes...the repressive closure of the system," the report perplexed Scoble. He provocatively stated

> It is difficult to understand why the State Department shields the Duvalier regime so –unless the Reagan Administration believes that it is necessary to support the Haitian elite as is in order to prevent masses of black and "economic only" Haitian refugees from landing on the Florida coast. But this puts the Reaganites in an untenable position; for it means tolerating denials of individual rights for security and integrity of the person and traditional civil and political rights—which the

[96] (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 1982: 109)

> Administration says it values—and those violations of human rights are what drive Haitian citizens to escape; and then the violations of international law—in its interdiction of Haitian and other boats on the high seas—in order to deal with the problem created by the Duvalier/Haitian system (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 1982:117).

The connection between anti-Haitian sentiments in U.S. immigration policy and assistance to the Haitian Government was cause for frequent admonishment of AID.

Likewise, in a special report by the Center on International Policy and Americans for Democratic Action on behalf of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy dated May 2, 1982, this stinging indictment is found:

> This consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights seems to have had no measurable impact on administration policy...Human beings do not willingly consent to the violation of their most basic rights. Consequently, those whose power depends on abusing these rights require force—force to inflict pain and force to kill. U.S. security assistance supplies them this force, while helping to insulate them from the economic effect of procuring it themselves (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 1982:149).

The Reagan Administration support of the Duvaliers was at the cost of human rights, but arguably, all administrations prior had similarly assisted Haiti and were therefore, also at fault.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Despite the numerous outcries of human rights violations, as the Cold War continued, the United States' attention remained on its neighbors in the Caribbean. Military assistance came in the form of grants, training and discounted defense equipment. International Military Education and Training (IMET) is the grant-based

military training as provided for under Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; "when adequately funded [IMET] is one of our most effective and relatively inexpensive instruments for the achievement of US security and foreign policy objectives"[97]. The United States also sold excess defense equipment at discounted rates through the Foreign Military Sales (FMW). FMS financing is a direct result of Section 1 of the Arms Export Control Act which allows the U.S. Government to sell defense articles and defense services "to friendly countries having sufficient wealth to maintain and supply their own military forces at adequate strength" (227) for the purpose of "strengthen[ing] the security of the United States by enhancing the defense posture of the recipients" (227).

In general, military assistance for Haiti went to lessen demands on the U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. military requested $200,000 to provide training to Haiti in FY 1976 "to increase the search and rescue capability of the Haitian Armed Forces, principally the Navy. Small boats were arriving in Haitian waters in increasing numbers. The grant training program "would substantially...[reduce] the requirements placed on our own Coast Guard"[98]. This training program had been instated in 1975, though not actually commenced until 1976 due to necessary screening and administrative details (409). In 1979, despite dismal human rights records, the United States continued to include Haiti in its foreign military sales because it was intended for "sea rescue craft—which is of great interest to our navy as well as to shippers and even the pilots of aircraft—for a few sea patrol and sea rescue patrol boats. They are not used

[97] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part IV:230)
[98] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1976, Part IV:341-343)

by the Government of Haiti, cannot be used by any stretch of the imagination for civilian control and that is the reason." This military aid was defended by Mrs. Benson because "our Air Force and commercial airliners fly in the Caribbean. It is part of a very small program, from the point of view of overall international peace or international security or ever our own international security, is not a very big thing. It is a small program"[99].

Discussion of sending in the Marines to get Duvalier to cooperate finally after so "many years without some repercussions" led Mr. Long to adamantly state:

> There is a middle ground, you know, between doing nothing and sending the Marines. We can use our brains for once and stop throwing so much money into an area where a lot of people are getting rich on it. We know that. That is common gossip all over Haiti that it is not really getting to the poor people except by dribbles here and there. For God's sake, let our government get on the stick and get going and tell the Haitian Government they have to shape up (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1980, Part I:768).

Congresswoman Derian responded with a polite rebuttal that current policy "may not be hard enough, and it may not be good enough, but we are trying the best possible way we can" (768). To which Mr. Long replied: "My answer to that is 'uh-huh'" (768).

In the Congressional Presentation on Security Assistance Programs for FY 1981, military assistance is methodically reported. In 1977, Haiti purchased $2,048,000 of excess military equipment that the U.S. had determined it no longer needed for the paltry sum of $102,000. In 1979, Haiti received $200,000 in FMS financing and acquired $246,000 worth of equipment for $123,000[100]. From 1955 to 1979, 20 years of

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[99] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1979, Part II:125)
[100] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1981, Part IV:239)

Duvalier rule, Haiti had $1.243 million of foreign military sales deliveries with the United States, over $1 million of that from 1974 to 1979 (264). In 1979, Haiti received $182,000 for International Military Education and Training and $149,000 in 1980 for the same purpose (232). The United States trained 50 people, military officials and civilians between 1979 and 1981, all of which took place in the U.S. (235). Between 1975 and 1979, Haiti received $522,000 in IMET (287). In 1982 under FMS Haiti received $300,000 and under IMET: $415,000[101].

Military assistance was often tied together with economic assistance. One man repeated to the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs in 1982 what an unnamed high-ranking general told him:

> If we could make it known that we are putting that kind of commitment in the Caribbean Basin, we could forget about our security problems in this region. It if were understood that the United States was committed to that magnitude and we were going to get in with both feet and do it, we could forget about insurgency and guerilla problems because the prospect and reality of development would be such that our military concerns...would essentially disappear (U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Economic policy and Trade and on Inter-American Affairs 1982:22).

Mr. McPherson, the Administrator for AID agreed, stating that "there is a real interchangeability here between economic assistance and our security needs" (24-25). Military assistance to Haiti this same year, 1982 was $500,000 (See Table 3.1 in the Appendix). However, when asked if Haiti had any substantial external threats, the answer was a simple "no"[102]. Haiti was "one of the most repressive and least threatened

[101] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1982, Part VI:1018)
[102] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1986, Part III, Page 61)

nations in the Western Hemisphere"[103]. However, the lack of external threats did not keep the U.S. from giving Haiti $7 million in military assistance from 1946 to 1982—$2.7 million of that administered just from 1977 to 1982 (see Table 3.1 in the Appendix).

By late 1985, popular sentiment and international pressure raised the tension in Haiti to the point that the Duvaliers listened to their advisors and left the country for a luxurious exile in France. The people were starving and food riots across the country weakened the stability of the regime (Trouillot 1990: 224). Tonton Macoute response to the riots –shooting at the starving protesters in the streets increased international pressure to remove Duvalier. The U.S. froze $26 million in aid in early 1986 for reasons of human rights violations (Abbott 1988:310). Duvalier's hold was weakening. The top conspirators, including the U.S., understood that the best option, the least bloody transition, was to transfer power to the Haitian Army, rather than the constitutional successor, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; "nobody doubted that the gun was mightier than the gavel" (306). In an odd combination of popular demonstrations and internal recognition that the time had come for the Duvaliers to resign, the official transition of power occurred in an oddly non-Duvalierist manner--that is with minimal extravagance. February 7, 1986 Duvalier drove his favorite BMW to the airport where press members, diplomats and his possessions were waiting –"hardly the behavior of a deported captive" (Trouillot 1990:225).

[103] (U.S. House. Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 1982: 149)

The established temporary authority was a group of distinctive individuals: civilians and army officers (Trouillot 1990:225). As history has shown, the interim governments followed the ill-fated Haitian pattern of temporary and deposable leadership. While the details of the coup d'état may remain forever slightly murky as many coups do, the supervision of Duvalier's departure was international, high-level and prevented the complete *déchoukaj* (uprooting) that most Haitians called for, though violent rioting and looting occurred even before Duvalier left the palace (Trouillot 199:226; Abbott 1988:318). Elizabeth Abbott argues in *Haiti* (Touchstone 1988) that what remained of the Duvalier's rule "reflected their phenomenal greed, [and] their total failure to grasp that the consequence of their bludgeoning thieving was the permanent paralysis of national development" (250). The departure of the Duvaliers brought further bloodshed to the already blood-let nation. Many Vodou leaders were killed as the magic of the Duvaliers wore off and fearful practitioners distanced themselves from the religion (Johnson 2006:440). Furthermore, the exodus of the Duvaliers stripped the authority of the Tonton Macoutes almost overnight and years of torture and pitiless murder were avenged by people across the country (Abbott 1988:319-20).

CONCLUSION

As tempting as it is to say "like father, like son" and blame the continued corruption in Haiti on genetics or a childhood of luxury, intolerance and self-absorption, to place responsibility solely on Jean-Claude and his Haiti, is to remain ignorant of U.S. foreign policy. The overlapping and missing data of foreign economic and military assistance suggest a lack of bureaucratic foresight and organization. International financial organizations funded with U.S. dollars further complicate issues. The various

names and programs through which aid is given increase the entanglement of statistics. The most exposing aspect of the United States' policy towards Haiti is not, however, the discrepancies and convoluted figures, but rather the discussion of human rights abuses followed by the continuation of aid. The U.S.' stance on Haitian immigrants is where whatever charity there may have been for Haiti ends. Generosity has its limit and the desperation of the Boat People found that limit on Florida's shores and in its detention camps. To think that the U.S. chose to give arms and military training to Duvalier and his murderous Tonton Macoutes rather than assist the thousands of refugees dying to reach her shores is appalling. The rule of Jean Claude Duvalier saw increased U.S. assistance to Haiti in comparison with the reign of his father, but the benefit to the Haitian people did not increase in relation.

CONCLUSION

In the defense against communism, the United States supported Haiti to the effect of supporting a father-son dictatorship for nearly 3 decades. In the name of capitalism and free-markets, the United States tolerated the loss of democracy in Haiti as journalists were jailed, opposition members were exiled or worse and unions were squashed. In effort to modernize Haiti, the United States fostered a situation of economic dependency. In the securing of political stability, the United States sponsored a devastating duo of dictators, filling their private bank accounts with hundreds of millions of dollars. In all of this the moral imperative, the ethics of assistance, is lacking.

As Duvalier apotheosized himself, so political scientists have labeled U.S. foreign policy as having "a tradition of political messianism, and of a conception of itself as different, and better, than other nations—as a 'redeemed' political society with a mission of redemption to others" (Stillman and Pfaff 1966 as quoted in Picard and Buss 2009: 113). Despite flagrant human rights abuses and the trampling of the very notion of democracy throughout the brutal regimes of François "Papa Doc" Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude "Baby Doc," the United States maintained economic and military assistance, ostensibly in the name of human decency. When congressmen were questioned as to why the Foreign Affairs committees continued to year after year supply millions and millions of dollars to an obviously corrupt and inebriated government, the response was essentially 'if we stop, the poor people will starve.' Without U.S. assistance, it was assumed that the fate of millions of poor people would turn for the worse, but it is easy to see that even with U.S. assistance millions of poor people still suffered needlessly under the rule of the Duvaliers.

Haiti has stayed the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere for decades[104]. From the tragic genocide of her native people, to her bloody struggle for her independence, through the state-sanctioned violence of the Duvaliers, to the tragedy of the January 12, 2010 earthquake, Haiti has seen her more than her share of heartache. The international community in its self-interest—as in the case of the colonial powers; and its self-preservation—as in the United States' refusal to acknowledge Haiti's independence for over 50 years; has been neither generous nor sympathetic to the seemingly cursed country.

[104] (U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1983, Part IV:157)

For over 50 years, the United States has been supplying Haiti with varying levels of assistance and creating varying levels of dependency (Buss 2008; Picard and Buss 2009; Bodenheimer 1971). Food aid under Public Law 480 in particular, has undermined the local agricultural production and created a situation of complete dependency. The fields that once produced two-thirds of France's overseas trade in the 18th century, making it the richest colony in the world, now lie fallow and depleted. In addition to rampant deforestation to supply fuel needs, the introduction of the manufacturing industry under Baby Doc in the 1970s, which was touted as aid, is partially to blame for this. In exchange for the roughly 60,000 unstable jobs created for people in Port-au-Prince, the factories lured in thousands more from the rural areas, increasing the demand for imported food and reducing local production. Prior to the January 12, 2010 earthquake, Haiti spent 80% of its income on food imports (reliefweb.int accessed 2 May 2011).

There is a human tendency to seek out the positive, to assume that unintended consequences caused the problems that still face Haiti and not purposeful aid policy. The question of accountability of course, must be raised in these moments of naïve optimism. If food dependency truly was an unintended consequence and not merely a convenient way for U.S.-subsidized agriculture to find a marketplace, why have decades passed without marked improvement in Haiti's agricultural production? Why have these noted consequences, not been prevented? There is cause for hope for the future, if not for optimism about the past. In 2010, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization prepared a $721 million investment blueprint along with the Haitian government, to develop the agricultural sector and increase production in rural areas as well as

improving distribution channels and agricultural services (Fletcher 2010). Despite the hopefulness, it is hard not to notice the similarities in terms of former development strategies in the agricultural sector, even after decades and decades of evolution within the field of international development. Indeed, one can only look at the American Occupation in the early 20th century to see that one of the primary goals was the improvement of roads and infrastructures of distribution.

Despite official shifts away from the original development paradigm, Modernization Theory, there is still a persistent theme of paternalism in U.S. foreign policy towards Haiti. In 1972, renowned anthropologist Sydney Mintz wrote: "If ever there were a society that ought to have ended up totally annihilated, materially and spiritually, by the trials of 'modernization,' it is Haiti" (as quoted in Farmer 1992: vi). The same Modernization Theory sentiment is evident today in articles such as David Brook's opinion piece "The Underlying Tragedy" published in the *New York Times* on 14 January 2010, two days after a horrific earthquake forever altered Haiti. Brooks states that Haiti "suffers from a complex web of progress-resistant cultural influences." He later calls for a strategy of development assistance that follows an "intrusive paternalism" methodology (Brooks, The Underlying Tragedy 2010). The 2000s included over $4 billion of aid to Haiti (Buss 2008: 1), and the recent earthquake saw an unprecedented international outpouring of money to Haiti. But how the majority of that money will be spent remains to be seen (Huffingtonpost.com accessed 6 May 2011).

Haiti is unique in her plight and history and should be respected for her place in the world narrative; but it in no way does Haiti stand alone as a representation of U.S.

foreign policy. The American Occupation of Haiti occurred contemporaneously with the American Occupation of the Dominican Republic. The United States supported Dominican dictator Raphael Trujillo at the same time as François Duvalier (D'Agostino 2010: 94). Haiti shares much in common with El Salvador during the 1980s, as both were places where U.S. manufacturing companies sought seemingly unlimited supplies of cheap labor (Lundahl 1992: 278). As previously stated, Haiti comprised usually small portions of AID's total assistance to Latin America, let alone the entire world. Haiti did not happen in a vacuum. Nor will it continue as an isolated instance of U.S. interventionism.

This project has really only just begun. One cannot begin to study U.S. foreign aid policy without the itch to understand more. Haiti is only one country in a literal sea of dozens. It is the intent of this project that with increased understanding of historical precedent, the enthusiastic youth of Haiti, who have just elected a non-politician, and the hopeful youth of the United States, who recently elected a long-shot who promised change, can prevent the repetition of amoral foreign policy.

> *"Are the Haitian people, living endlessly in a perverse continuum, oblivious of their past, doomed always to repeat a history that has been written in blood?" (Heinl and Heinl 1972:665).*

APPENDIX

INTERVIEW SCRIPT:

Recruitment Script:

Hello, my name is Hannah and I am a student from the United States. I study American aid to Haiti during the time of Duvalier. I'm asking people who remember this time, how they saw the U.S. actions. Would you like to participate?

Translation: Lapawòl Rekritman:

Bonjou, m rele Hannah e mwen se yon elèv ki soti peyi Etazini. M etidye èd Ameriken an Ayiti pandan laj tou de Duvalier. M'ap mande moun ki sonje tan sa a, kouman yo te we aksyon ozetazini. Eske ou ta renmen patisipe ?

Verbal Consent:

Thank you for agreeing to participate in my research project. This research will help me to understand U.S. and Haiti relations. This interview is voluntary and you may stop anytime. Your name will not be included in the final report and I will only share this information with my friend who speaks better Creole than I do. I would like to record this interview for my own notes. Are you okay with this?

Thank you again for your help. If you have any questions, here is my contact information.

Translation: Vèbal konsantman:

Mèsi pou patisipe nan projè rechèch mwen an. Projè sa a ap ede m konprann relayson Etazini ak Ayiti . Entèvyou sa a, se voluntè li ye, e ou pa gen pou reponn tout kesyon. M pa mete nom ou sou projè final la e m va pataje enfòmasyon a sèl ak youn zanmi'm ki pale Kreyol pi bon pase mwen. Mwen ta vle anrejistre entèvyou sa a pou nòt mwen. Èske ou oke ak sa a ?

Mèsi ankò pou èd ou. Men kontakte enfòmasyon mwen, si ou genyen nènpot kesyon.

Questions:

1. How old are you?

2. What is your livelihood?
3. Where were you living in 1956? What did you do at this time?
4. Did you participate in the 1956 elections? How did you understand the 1956 election of François "Papa Doc" Duvalier?
5. Did you consider Castro's Communist Cuba a threat to Haiti in 1959? If not, were you aware of it at the time?
6. During Papa Doc, what did you perceive the role of the United States in Haiti?
7. Did this change during Baby Doc's reign?
8. Were you personally affected by U.S. aid and/or policy?
9. Are you aware of "projects" of U.S. origin?
10. How did relations between Haiti and the United States change over the years as you see it?

Translation: Kesyon yo:

1. Ki laj ou genyen?
2. Ki metye ou?
3. Ki kote ou t'ap rete nan mil nèf san senkant-sis? Ki sa ou te fè nan tan sa a?
4. Èske ou te patisipe nan eleksyon pou Papa Doc yo? Kouman ou konprann eleksyon sa yo?
5. Eske ou te konsidere Kiba Kominis e Castro youn menas pou Ayiti nan mil nèf san senkant nèf? Si non, ou te okouran ak sitiasyon sa a'?
6. Anba Papa Doc, ki jan ou te wè wòl peyi Etazini an Ayiti ?
7. Wòl sa a te chanje anba Baby Doc?
8. Pou ou menm, eske èd Ameriken a te afekte ou menm menm, ou byen eske politik Ameriken te afecte ou?
9. Eske ou konnen yon « pwojè » ki gen orijin ameriken?
10. Kom ou wè li, kouman relasyon ant Ayiti ak Etazini te chanje depi zane Duvalye jiska kounyea?

TABLE 1.1 Discrepancies in Accounting

The overwhelming complications of this chart and its representational difficulties are intentional. The far left column is the dates of this project's timeframe. The next column represents total AID assistance to the Dominican Republic as a source of comparison. The next column represents the same information but for Haiti. Both of these columns are sourced from USAID.org's database. The rest of the chart represents numbers this author has gathered in her research through the various government publications of the time period. The color blocks represent the years represented by the figures in bold at the bottom of the block, or in some case to the extreme right. These totals are not calculations that were made through the data gathering, rather these totals are totals given in the sources; hence, the discrepancies. The far right column titled "Totals" is also representative of totals given in publications, not totals created by the researcher. The parenthetical numbers are those that were also found in the research process, and conflicted with previously acquired information. Not knowing which figure was more accurate, both and sometimes, all three are recorded.

List of Abbreviations:

D.R.: Dominican Republic

FSO: Funds for Special Operations

IDA: International Development Association (a part of the World Bank)

AID: Agency for International Development

PL 480: Public Law 480 – Food for Peace

FMAP: Foreign Military Assistance Program –the training branch of military assistance, also called IMET

FMS: Foreign Military Sales – the defense equipment sales branch.

UN: United Nations

IADB: Inter-American Development Bank

PVOs: Private Voluntary Organizations, including the World Food Program, CARE, and Planned Parenthood, the PVOs column often served as an "Other" category.

Haiti Total Economic Assistance 1957 - 1986

	From AID chart:		From Thesis Research:										
	Total Ec. Assistan		FSO	IDA	AID	PL 480	FMAP	FMS	UN	UN	IADB	PVOs	Total'''
Year:	D.R.	Haiti											
1957	0.2	3.1											
1958	0.2	4.1											
1959	0.2	12.7											
1960	0.3	12.1			12.5				**0.1**				9.3
1961	0.1	14.8			**32.6'''**				0.3	**0.9**			**24.4**
1962	27	7.8		0.35	3.5 [7.12] [2.6]		0.205 [1.244]						**101.6''' [106'']** 6.2
1963	50.2	5.8					**4.413''**						
1964	14.5	3.7			2.362						2.3		
1965	66.2	2.5										**4.5**	
1966	100.6	3.3				0.7							
1967	58.8	2.7			1.3	0.6					0.014	0.45	
1968	58.7	3.4			**15.2**	1.3							
1969	26.3	3.3				1.3						1.18	
1970	19.8	3.7	**12**	**0.3**		1							**3.66**
1971	26.8	4.3			1.3			6.027					**6.027**
1972	26.9	4.9	10		3.162								
1973	15.7	7.5			6.8								
1974	17.3	11.4			8.9	2.123						0.4	
1975	11.7	9.3			9								
1976	29.7	35.3			9 + 3								
1977	13.9	40.7			4.6								
1978	6.1	27.5		7.7	25.251	17.549	0.248	0.5					25.999 [27.4]
1979	48.4	24.8		15.6	38.897	23.25	0.2	0.2					39.297 [33.5]
1980	55.8	27.1		18.4	11.1	27.666 [9]	0.2	0				1.44	46.289
1981	38.4	34.5			9 [30]	9							
1982	82.4	34.3		12	9.2	22.2							34.4 [34.16 ec]
1983	63	46.2											
1984	98.2	46.6										**0.9**	
1985	170.7	55.5											
1986	101.8	77.8											
"Totals from 1950 to 1963													
"Totals from Thesis Research are from records, not from my own calculations - hence the vast discrepancies.													
'''Total from 1945													

TABLE 3.1 (in millions of USD)

Program	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Total 1946-1982
Total economic assistance	40.7	27.5	24.8	27.1	34.6	34.3	342.0
AID and predecessor agencies	21.4	8.9	9.1	11.1	9.2	12.0	176.8
Food for Peace PL 480	19.3	18.5	15.4	15.8	24.5	22.2	159.4
Military assistance	.6	.7	.4	.1	.4	.5	7.0
Total economic assistance	41.3	28.2	25.2	27.2	35.0	34.8	349.0
-In loans	11.2	11.0	8.8	8.6	8.9	13.3	89.3
-In grants	30.1	17.3	16.4	16.6	26.1	21.5	259.7

(U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1984, Part 1A:929 and

U.S. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations 1985, Part I: 906)

TABLE 3.2 Basic Economic Data, Region: Latin America

Year	GNP Current Prices (Millions of local currency)		Central Gov't expenditures Current Prices (Millions of local currency)		Defense Expenditures Current Prices (Millions of local currency)		Total imports of G & S Current Prices (Millions of dollars)		Military imports Current Prices (Millions of dollars)		Int'l reserves Current Prices (millions of Dollars)	
	Haiti	D.R.	Haiti	D.R.	Haiti	D.R.	Haiti	D.R.	Haiti	D.R.	Haiti	D.R.
1974	3284	2833	441	513	47	48	140	1011	0	0	20	91
1975	4078	3487	667	610	52	55	169	1127	0	0	13	116
1976	5662	3812	647	568	55	64	228	1132	0	0	28	127
1977	6684	4344	782	643	58	76	278	1235	0	0	34	185
1978	6636	4655	895	708	67	86	318	1258	0	0	39	168

(USAID 1980: 68)

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