THE TROUBLES OF NORTHERN IRELAND: AN ARMED CAMPAIGN AND THE ALTERNATIVE PATH OF NONVIOLENCE

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Throughout conflicts around the world, violence is more often the focus than peace. Written accounts tend to put more emphasis on disasters and deaths than on nonviolent efforts. Many people also have more of a tendency to turn to violent methods to resolve societal problems than they do peaceful ones. When they do strive to use nonviolent methods, it is often out of practical rather than ideological reasons. This thesis examines the use of both violence and nonviolence during the time in Northern Ireland known as the Troubles. It studies the transition from civil protest to support of the IRA's armed campaign that occurred during the first half of the conflict, and then compares it to the later transition from that armed campaign back to the alternative route of nonviolence. Relying in part on the information gathered through interviews conducted in Northern Ireland by the author, the thesis focuses on the events that motivated people to turn to both violence and practical nonviolence, and the effects of both methods in the negotiated settlements that ended the thirty years of the Troubles.

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DEDICATION

For my father Bill, who taught me all that I know and
will forever be the greatest inspiration in my life

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Chapter I. Introduction

"Peace is not merely a distant goal that we seek, but a means

by which we arrive at that goal."

–Martin Luther King, Jr.

The thirty years of conflict in Northern Ireland, known as 'the Troubles', were a tumultuous period of both strife and attempts at peace. The conflict centered around the constitutional issue of whether Northern Ireland should remain a part of the United Kingdom, or whether it should be unified with the Republic of Ireland. Some of the factions within the two segregated communities saw violence as the only way to solve this issue, and incurred high costs in both lives lost and in damage to communities. Others looked to nonviolent methods as the solution and steadfastly advocated their use throughout the conflict. However, it would take a combination of the two approaches for any sort of lasting settlement to be reached.

During the initial years of the conflict, the majority of both political leaders and society itself were not ready to stand by nonviolence. In the face of continued failure, they turned away from civil protests and those who still advocated them. It was only after decades of violence that people once again began to support a nonviolent alternative. They first had to experience the cost of the violence before they were willing to support and dedicate themselves to compromise. This is not to say that the violence itself led to peace or that it was effective in bringing about a negotiated resolution, but that it supplied the necessary motivation for people to commit themselves to the peace talks. Once they had found that motivation, they then turned towards the nonviolence that activists such as John Hume had

been promoting throughout the conflict. Hume's work, along with that of a few others, provided the foundation for reconciliation, the space in which peace could grow.

The peace talks of the 1990s built on this foundation and culminated in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Many of the issues that fueled the thirty years of conflict remain unresolved to this day. Nationalists and Unionists are still divided on the debate of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. At the same time, however, they have worked hard to prevent a return to the level of violence experienced during the Troubles.

The peace talks of the 1990s were huge steps in the resolution of the conflict. Through the talks, the leaders of the both Nationalists and Unionists were able to reconcile some of their differences and come to an agreement on some of the key issues that had fueled the conflict. While many of these issues are far from being fully resolved today, people of both of the communities have strived and succeeded in preventing a return to the level of violence of the Troubles. While the future is yet undecided, the nonviolent framework established during the peace talks of the 1990s will hopefully enable forthcoming generations the means with which to work towards an enduring peace.

Chapter II. Historical Background

The English and the Irish first began to interact around the eleventh and twelfth centuries when Norman lords began to conquest the land of Irish Kings. However, the current conflict and the time known as 'the Troubles' are more directly related to the beginning of seventeenth century and the Plantation of Ireland. During the centuries following their first interactions, various Irish chiefs and leaders staged rebellions against their English rulers. Around 1609, the English crown decided that the best way to quell this continuous Irish unrest was to 'settle' Ireland with loyal English and Scottish people, all Protestant. The 'plantation' and 'settlement' of Ireland would also serve as a way for the English to relieve the overpopulation and ever decreasing amounts of arable land in England and Scotland.[1]

The problem with the plantation was that much of the land given to the Protestant 'planters' was already inhabited and farmed by the native Irish Catholics. Consequently, when the Irish weren't pushed off their land entirely, they were forced to become tenants on land now owned by Protestants. The new Protestant settlers also took over existing towns and churches, making them their own and replacing Irish names with English ones. For example, the Irish town of Derry (or Doire in Irish) became Londonderry. In some areas, the natives and the 'planters' were able to live well together, but fighting between the two groups was more commonly the case. According to Carlo Gébler, the continuous contention over the land and the frequent insurrections of the Irish led to a high level of distrust between the Protestant settlers and Irish natives[2].

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[1] For map of the Plantation of Ireland, see Appendix A

[2] (Gebler, The Siege of Derry, 2005, p. 15)

In 1641, the Irish staged a particularly fierce rebellion and reclaimed much of their land. The resistance, and the fighting that followed, resulted in roughly four to five thousand deaths. Gébler wrote that in response to this, Englishman Oliver Cromwell began an even bloodier campaign in 1949, brutally retaking most of the land in Ireland.[3] While the rebellion was subdued for the time, others would continue to rise in its place. Gébler went on to write that Cromwell's brutal campaign further entrenched the mutual fear and distrust between the Protestants and the Irish.[4] Throughout the following centuries, the two communities remained separate and distinct from each other, and the enmity and fear between the two persisted with each successive clash.

The events of the latter part of the century would perhaps play the leading role in intensifying the tension between the Irish and the Protestants. During this time, King James and his son-in-law William of Orange were contending for the English crown. As James was Catholic and William Protestant, the ramifications of their contention carried over to the Catholic and Protestant populations in Ireland. During his reign, King James had alleviated some of the harsher laws against the Irish Catholics and had made living in Ireland more agreeable for them. Gébler stated that, "As always, if one community prospered it was at the other's expense".[5] The Irish therefore feared a return to rule under a Protestant monarch under which the restrictions would be restored. The Protestants, on the other hand, feared that their land and control of Ireland would be given back to the Irish if the English monarchy remained in the hands of a Catholic. These two opposing fears led each population to fight for the contenders of their respective religions.

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[3] (Gebler, The Siege of Derry, 2005, pp. 33-35); For a map showing Cromwell's conquest, see Appendix A
[4] (Gebler, The Siege of Derry, 2005, p. 26)
[5] (Gebler, The Siege of Derry, 2005, p. 54)

In 1688 the Irish Jacobite army, a Catholic group in support of King James, marched to Derry/Londonderry in an attempt to reclaim it and replace the protestant garrison with Catholic soldiers. They were stopped, however, by thirteen apprentice boys inside the city who shut the gates before they could enter. The contention between James and William continued throughout that year and in another attempt to win Derry/Londonderry, the Jacobite army with King James in the lead again attacked the city in 1689. Over the following 105 days, despite a lack of adequate resources, the Protestants inside managed to withstand the siege. This siege became a landmark in the history of the Protestants, and is still remembered and celebrated today. Out of the events of 1689, the Protestants developed a siege mentality, an ethos of fear of the Irish Catholics reclaiming the island. For the Catholic population, however, the Siege of Derry stood out as another Protestant victory in a long history of repression. It became yet another reason to continue their resistance against the English crown.

According to J. Bell, the "latent revolutionary tradition" of the Irish continued to fuel rebellions throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[6] However, each time, the English managed to subdue the insurrections. Then, the Rising of 1916 forever changed that pattern. On Easter of that year, a group of rebels known as the Irish Republican Brotherhood rose up in Dublin and declared Ireland a free Republic, in what became known as the Easter Rising. The Irish Volunteers, later to become the Irish Republican Army (IRA),[7] were faced with overwhelming odds and lost the ensuing battles against the British soldiers. Sixteen of the leaders of the rising were executed and over 5,000 other men and women were deported or arrested. However, Bell noted that instead of diminishing the resistance, the executions and

[6] (Bell, The Secret Army, 1970, p. 6)
[7] For a list of organizations and their acronyms, see Appendix B

arrests fueled sentiments of Republicanism.[8] The defiance grew and subsequently resulted in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and the Partition of Ireland. The thirty-two counties on the island were split into two entities: twenty-six would make up the Irish Free State (later to become the Republic of Ireland), and six of the nine counties in the province of Ulster would become Northern Ireland and remain part of the United Kingdom.[9]

Some, however, weren't content with the Partition and continued to strive for a thirty-two county Irish Free State. The Irish Republican Army made up a large part of this discontented group. They continued the fight for Republicanism and the reunification of the Republic throughout the subsequent decades, and initiated and supplied the momentum for Nationalist movement[10] during the Troubles.

Northern Ireland Post-Partition

Tension between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland remained after the Partition. According to Jonathan Powell, in order to prevent Northern Ireland from falling to Catholic rule as the South had, the Protestant majority set up systems of government and corresponding laws that would keep the Catholic population from power for the next half a century.[11] As the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland James Craig declared, 'I have always said I am an

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[8] (Bell, The Secret Army, 1970, p. 14)

[9] For more information on the historical background, see the following sources: (Bell, The Secret Army, 1970; Gebler, 2005)

[10] Nationalism is an ideology that has come almost exclusively from the Catholic population. There are still many variations in both Catholicism and in levels of Nationalism and the two terms are not fully synonymous with each other. However, Nationalism and Catholicism have been so closely related and overlapping that for the sake of simplicity, they have in some ways become interchangeable. The term Republican is used to describe those Nationalists that are willing to use force to achieve a united Ireland. There is a similar relationship between Unionism, Loyalism and Protestantism. Unionists are those Protestants that advocate a continued union with the United Kingdom, and Loyalists are those that will use force to do so.

[11] (Powell, 2008, p. 42)

Orangeman first and a politician and a member of this Parliament afterwards. All I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant state'.[12] In effect, Craig's statement was quite accurate. Powell noted that, "All judges were Unionists...the heavily armed auxiliary police force, the B Specials, were all Protestant; and the police force itself, the RUC, was 90 per cent Protestant. The jobs in the shipyards and the engineering works and the civil service were overwhelmingly kept for Protestants, while Catholics were twice as likely to be unemployed".[13] In the jobs that Catholics were given, they faced flagrant amounts of discrimination. Furthermore, Michael Doherty, a community relations activist who grew up in Derry during the Troubles, acknowledged that through a system of gerrymandering, Protestants were able to remain in control even in areas of Catholic majority.[14] Gerrymandering was a method of dividing an area of political units for elections in such a way that one political party gains the majority over the other. Derry, for example, had become a city with a Catholic majority and Protestant minority. As a consequence of gerrymandering, however, the Catholic majority was ruled by a Protestant, Unionist government and had little ability to change any other inequalities in society through politics.[15]

In addition to gerrymandering, the housing situation expanded Protestant control in Northern Ireland as well. According to The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland (CSJ), one vote was allocated to all those who owned a home; and then another six votes were given to those who owned businesses.[16] This caused a number of problems for the working class of both communities, many of whom lived in public housing and owned neither homes

[12] James Craig-found in: (Powell, 2008, p. 42)
[13] (Powell, 2008, p. 42)
[14] (Doherty, 2009)
[15] For more detailed information on gerrymandering in Northern Ireland see the following sources: see (Powell, 2008, p. 42; Bell, The Secret Army, 1970, p. 355)
[16] (Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland, 1965)

nor businesses. This was especially true within the Catholic population, as A M Gallagher reported that almost 60 percent of the working class was Catholic.[17] All public housing was allocated by the Housing Corporation, and with Unionists in control of this Corporation, Protestants were more likely to be allocated housing before Catholic families. In the cases where Catholics were given houses by the corporation, discrimination "ensured that Catholics were not housed in areas where their votes might tip the balance in favor of Nationalist control.[18] As a result of this system of housing and voting, CSJ reported that in 1964, there were 19,870 Catholic adults of voting age of which only 14,325 were allowed to vote. This was in comparison to the 9,235 out of 10,573 Protestant adults that had voting rights.[19]

The unequal representation of Nationalists in the Stormont government, discrimination in both jobs and housing, and the power of the Protestant B-Specials and RUC ensured that by the 1960s, the Nationalist population was looking for new ways to change the existing social order. Beginning in the mid-1960s, Nationalists established a number of organizations to help implement this change. The Northern Civil Rights Association (NICRA), the Dungavin Civil Rights Action Committee (housing) and the Derry Housing Action Committee were some of the more prominent ones. Throughout the late 1960s, these groups organized protests and demonstrations across Northern Ireland, most often on the issues of housing or in promotion of a voting system based on 'one man, one vote'. A number of the demonstrations drew large crowds and substantial amounts of support. Initially, the Nationalist leaders attempted to include the Protestant working class as well as the Catholic one as they saw civil rights as way to unite this class across the divided communities. However,

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[17] (Gallagher, 2009)
[18] (Galligan, 2000)
[19] (Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland, 1965)

according to Sinn Féin politician Raymond McCartney, if there was one mistake made by the leaders of the civil rights movement, it was that they didn't focus enough attention on appealing to the working class Protestants.[20] Many of them wanted similar changes, such as one man one vote, equal rights, and a decrease in unemployment. However, Republican Jon McCourt argued that because the leaders sold the movement wrong, the Catholics became isolate and the Protestant working class fell in behind the Unionist state.[21] This would play a key part in the transition of the civil rights movement into a sectarian conflict during the late 1960s.

[20] (McCartney, 2009)
[21] (McCourt, 2009)

Chapter III. The Troubles Begin

In 1968 there was an increase in both the number of organized demonstrations and the variety of new methods of protest. On June 20, 1968, Nationalist Member of Parliament Austin Currie illegally occupied, or 'squatted', with other protestors in a house in County Tyron as part of a larger demonstration against housing discrimination. According to Simon Prince, the house in which Currie was protesting was one that had been given to Emily Betty, a "Protestant teenager that worked for a Unionist parliamentary candidate".[22] She had been allocated the house "ahead of older married Catholic families with children. [Currie and the other] protesters were evicted by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)", one of who was closely related to Emily. Melaugh also stated that Currie's protest gained support from the Nationalist Party and also led to further housing protests because of such blatant, outright discrimination.[23]

Protests and marches continued through the summer of 1968. Then, on October 5, the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC) and the NICRA organized the first official 'civil rights' march through Derry. The official purpose of the march was "to take direct, non-violent, action against those organisations responsible for housing in Derry, particularly the private landlords and the Londonderry Corporation who were responsible for much of the publicly rented housing in the area".[24] However, there were a few hidden agendas as well. Eamonn McCann and the other leaders designed the march to go along a traditional Protestant parading route that had already been set to be used by Protestant English Apprentice Boys[25] that same day-a route that was thus contentious by nature. The intention of this was to prove the

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[22] (Prince, 2007, p. 118).
[23] (Melaugh, The Civil Rights Campaign - A Chronology of Main Events, 2009)
[24] (Melaugh, Abstracts on Organisations, 2009)
[25] See Appendix B for organizations

government's bias toward English Protestants over local Catholics.[26] There was also a second hidden agenda for this march. As McCann later wrote, "our conscious, if unspoken, strategy was to provoke the police into overreaction and thus spark off a mass reaction against the authorities".[27] The leaders gained their proof, as William Craig banned the march in favor of the Apprentice Boys parade. In spite of this ban, however, the NICRA decided carry out the march. According to McCann, around four to six hundred people participated.[28] It was a well publicized march, as some of the participants included prominent Members of Parliament and the well known Republican Labour MP Gerry Fitt, as well as some members of the local media. The marchers were also joined by John Hume, a well respected leader in Derry's Nationalist community who would become one of the foremost non-violent activists throughout the duration of the Troubles. However, protestor Eamonn Deane related that shortly after the march started, the RUC arrived and broke it up, batoning people from all sides without provocation.[29] Doherty stated that he widely-publicized response of the police led to Catholic rioting against the RUC in Derry during the two days following the march. It also led to an increase in civil rights protests and more aggressive protesting tactcs.[30] The march thus demonstrated two important things to all who paid attention to the march. The first was the government bias towards Protestant parades. The second thing it proved was the RUC's willingness to use force against nonviolent street marchers. Demonstration of both of these had been part of the intention of a few of the leaders. McCann had said that he had set up this march in particular because it was guaranteed to provoke the police, and consequently, the

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[26] (Prince, 2007, p. 159)
[27] Eamonn McCann-found in (Prince, 2007, p. 156)
[28] (McCann, Non-violent Efforts of the Troubles, 2009)
[29] (Deane, 2009)
[30] (Doherty, 2009)

protestors could demonstrate their nonviolence in the face violence of the state. They intentionally turned the other cheek in order to demonstrate the willingness of the police to attack them without provocation.

As a response to the roughness of the RUC during the October 5 march, the leaders of nonviolence continued to organize peaceful protests into the fall of 1968. The motive behind their non-violent protests was that they were a way to draw attention to the problems in Northern Ireland without receiving blame for taking violent action themselves. According to Barry White, "everything else had failed, against Unionist intransigence". It put an "irresistible moral pressure on the authorities" to take action[31], especially when the response to such nonviolent action was violence from the authorities themselves. This became more common as the next couple years progressed. John Hume was particularly adept at convincing people to protest through nonviolence. On October 19, he organized a sit-down demonstration in the Guildhall Square in Derry "as a means of...getting the normally volatile crowds used to the ideas of turning the other cheek, whatever the provocation...it [succeeded and] built self-confidence and sent 5,000 people away with a warm glow of communal solidarity".[32] The protest had occurred peacefully.

The success of nonviolence continued in the months that followed the sit-in demonstration. White stated that this was due in large part to the unrelenting efforts and planning of Hume to keep the crowds peaceful.[33] Towards the end of 1968, in response to the civil rights efforts, the government designed a plan to address some of the more prominent concerns of the civil rights movement. The five points of the reform plan included:

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[31] (White, 1984, p. 64)
[32] (White, 1984, p. 65)
[33] (White, 1984, p. 68)

1) "a nine member 'Development Commission' to take over the powers of the Londonderry Corporation;
2) an ombudsman to investigate complaints against government departments;
3) the allocation of houses by local authorities to be based on need;
4) the Special Powers Act to be abolished as soon as it was safe to do so; and
5) some reform of the local government franchise (the end of the company votes)".[34]

According to Terence O'Neill, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland at the time, 'the civil rights movement brought about reforms which would otherwise have taken years to wring from a reluctant Government'.[35] It seemed as if progress was finally being made, and the government was finally addressing the discrimination and sectarianism that had long pervaded Northern Ireland. Furthermore, these changes had occurred through the effort of a movement that espoused nonviolence and peaceful protests in the face of aggression from the authorities. The civil rights movement appeared to be working. Doherty related, however, that over the next couple years a system of escalation of violence began that dashed hopes of further civil rights progress being made. Civil rights protests turned into confrontations between Nationalist crowds and the RUC, yelling turned into stone throwing, and the RUC answered by using batons with more frequency. This in turn begat more stone throwing from the crowds, along with an introduction of petrol bombs and other incendiaries.[36] Added to this was a Protestant backlash. Powell stated that many saw the civil rights movement as a threat to their own rights and privileges in Northern Ireland. Some even saw the movement as a thinly veiled IRA plot to take over Northern Ireland completely.[37] Consequently, the Unionists reacted with increasing amounts of violence to the civil rights protests.

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[34] (Melaugh, A Chronology of the Conflict, 2009)
[35] Terence O'Neill-found in(White, 1984, p. 68)
[36] (Doherty, 2009)
[37] (Powell, 2008, p. 43)

One of the more extreme examples of Loyalist backlash to the civil rights marches up until that time occurred in late January of 1969. The People's Democracy, a civil rights organization, organized a student march from Belfast to Derry that was to last four days. As the march was to run through a couple of Protestant areas, it was guaranteed to elicit some level of response from Loyalists. However, the level of response it did incite was a bit more than the students initially expected. The marchers were attacked by Loyalists a number of times along the route, yet the police did little, if anything, to protect the marchers. Bell stated that "it became clear that the RUC were willing to let the marchers walk into hails of rocks before suggesting alternative routes that would assure still more trouble, bigger ambushes, more dangerous showers of stones". The most violent attack occurred as the marchers crossed Burntollet Bridge, when around "two hundred Protestants, many of them off-duty RUC B Specials," attacked the marchers.[38] According to Bernadette Devlin, the Loyalists came at them "'wielding planks of wood, bottles, laths, iron bars, crowbars, cudgels studded with nails, and...waded into the march beating hell out of everybody'".[39] The entire time this attack was occurring, the police stood by and watched, doing nothing to protect the students. The assault continued as the marchers arrived in the Bogside, a Catholic neighborhood in Derry and a Nationalist stronghold. At this point the RUC entered the Bogside, attacking the residents and causing damage to their property. Some argued "that the march marks the pivotal point at which the Troubles changed from being primarily about civil rights to being about the more ancient disputes concerning national and religious identities".[40] Deane reasoned that it also

[38] (Bell, The Irish Troubles-A Generation of Violence 1967-1992, 1993, pp. 77-78)
[39] Bernadette Devlin-found in(Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 11)
[40] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 12)

augmented the Catholic community's growing distrust in the legal system and the policing force.[41]

The Catholic community's anger and distrust of the RUC was reinforced dramatically on April 19, 1969. Confrontations between NICRA marchers, and Loyalists and RUC members led to rioting in the Guildhall Square in Derry. During part of this rioting, a couple of teenagers ran through an open doorway in their attempt to escape the RUC. The RUC then "proceeded to kick down the door and baton those inside unconscious, splashing blood over the ceilings and walls".[42] Sammy Devenny, one of those inside, was beaten badly enough that he died three months later. Ten thousand people attended his funeral, and his death caused outrage in the Catholic community,[43] as Devenny was described by some as "one of the most innocent and well-loved bystanders in the Bogside".[44] Not only were the RUC attacking civil rights marchers because of their protest, they were now going after innocent bystanders as well.

As the violence intensified and rioting became more and more common, relief centers and safe havens became to spring up in many areas. The Catholic clergy were pivotal in setting up some of these centers. According to Rafferty, the clergy in Derry also worked to prevent some of the riots and to keep some of the agitated protesters from intentionally escalating the situations.[45] Father Neal Carlin was one such priest that helped pacify the protesters. McCourt described him as some who, throughout the conflict, "walked and worked gospel".[46] Other prominent peacemakers in the church included Bishop Cahal Daly and Father Edward Daly. Rafferty stated that both continued to preach peace throughout the conflict, and took a strong

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[41] (Deane, 2009)
[42] (White, 1984, p. 76)
[43] (McCann, Non-violent Efforts of the Troubles, 2009)
[44] (White, 1984, p. 76)
[45] (Rafferty, 2008)
[46] (McCourt, 2009)

stance in opposition to violence.[47] However, some argued that while many clergy spoke out against the fighting, it may not have been enough. Gerald McElroy asserted that despite their criticism of violence, there was a "lack of an effective Church teaching on the morality of war." He drew on centuries of wars that have been waged in the name of Christianity, sometimes with the approval and support of the Church. From the multitude of these religious wars came the doctrine of a 'just war',[48] which played into the Nationalist mentality during the early years of the Troubles.

Defense of the Catholic community was a key issue at this point, as they were repeatedly being attacked by both the RUC and Loyalist mobs. In 1969 alone, "hundreds of Catholics fled in fear from their Belfast homes as whole streets of houses were burned by frenzied Loyalist mobs".[49] McCourt related that Nationalists began to justify violence as community defense. He said that "at some point you have to get up off of your knees...you have to stand up and fight". Many of them joined the IRA for this reason, which was starting to increase their activity.[50] They also drew on the 'latent revolutionary tradition'[51] that had pervaded their own Irish history. The glory of the 1916 Easter Rising in particular was drawn on to support their resistance. Even some of the Catholic clergy looked on the Rising as a "fight for national freedom [that] was just and necessary".[52] In the eyes of some, McElroy argues that this statement seemed to support continued violence if it was done in for the sake of freedom.[53] If people felt that their actions were done as part of a continued fight for freedom,

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[47] (Rafferty, 2008)
[48] (McElroy, 1991, p. 139)
[49] (O'Brian, 1993, p. 20)
[50] (McCourt, 2009)
[51] (Bell, The Secret Army, 1970, p. 6)
[52] (McElroy, 1991, p. 140)
[53] (McElroy, 1991, p. 140)

they would have had much more room to maneuver. This was particularly true of the IRA who, as Tim Pat Coogan wrote, declared defense to be one of their three primary objectives.[54]

Despite the mixed messages of the clergy, they played an important part in community peacekeeping in 1969. However, as the year wore on, such peacekeeping became progressively more difficult to do. On August 12 1960 an Apprentice Boys march took Loyalists near the Bogside which was a Nationalist community. The Apprentice Boys, named after the thirteen apprentice boys that shut the gates during the Siege of Derry, were parading in commemoration of their victory over the Catholics during the Siege. These annual parades were naturally a sore point for Catholics as they reiterated their own defeat. As a result, they commonly became fuel for riots. Deane described the rioting that day as being particularly violent and brutal.[55] The repercussions were even worse. The RUC, "using armoured cars and water cannons, entered the Bogside, in an attempt to end the rioting".[56] In their effort to breach the Bogside barriers, the RUC also allowed access to the Loyalist mobs that followed in their wake, which then proceeded to cause extensive damage to the Catholic neighborhood. When the RUC and Loyalists were finally pushed out by the Bogsiders, the RUC re-entered using CS gas. In total the Battle of the Bogside, as this event latter became known as, resulted in nearly 1,000 casualties and two days of rioting afterward. White wrote that it also had farther reaching effects of sparking riots all across Northern Ireland as Derrymen contacted friends and relatives and called on them to act and protest as well.[57] As the violence spread across the countryside, the number of resulting deaths grew. Austin Currie admitted that

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[54] (Coogan, 2000, p. 365)
[55] (Deane, 2009)
[56] (Melaugh, The Civil Rights Campaign - A Chronology of Main Events, 2009)
[57] (White, 1984, p. 83)

"these were terrible days [...B Specials] were everywhere, and you could have been shot on the side of the road, with no questions asked".[58]

Throughout the escalating violence, there were some that still attempted to keep the peace. John Hume was the most prominent and influential of these. In the days directly following the Battle of the Bogside, a crowd of Catholics surrounded the Rosemount police station in order to keep the police from joining the forces already in the Bogside. They started by throwing stones and were ready to turn even more hostile. White wrote that when Hume saw the dangers of the situation, he took immediate action to prevent an escalation. From the top of a shed he was able to convince the crowd that the best course of action to take was to engage in negotiations with the police trapped inside the station, without using violence.[59] However, as Hume

> Was halfway to the station door it opened and a gas cartridge was fired straight at his chest. It knocked him flat, winding him [...] he was carried half-unconscious to safety, while the crowd seethed. Five minutes later, he was back on his feet and walking the same path to persuade the police not to use any more tear gas. He succeeded.[60]

Hume had become, and would continue to be, the ever-present voice of nonviolence. He continuously strived for and emphasized peaceful activism, and throughout the following couple of years was often able to diffuse angry crowds of Nationalists such as the one surrounding the police station. He did this even when personally faced with violence and danger.

While Hume was willing to withstand such personal attacks without being provoked, Nationalist crowds were not. When met with repeated, often unjustified violence in response to their own peaceful tactics, many began to turn towards violence themselves. Some would

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[58] Austin Currie-found in (White, 1984, p. 84)
[59] (White, 1984, p. 82)
[60] (White, 1984, p. 83)

only take it to the level of stone throwing, and perhaps the use of petrol bombs; others would take it to the next level, of using guns and larger, more damaging bombs. McCourt, himself a young Republican at the time, conveyed that many Catholic youth had difficulty relating to and understanding Hume's passivism.[61] The civil rights movement had encouraged downtrodden people to stand up and protest the inequalities and unfairness in society. White wrote that without a political outlet, though, it became easy for more extreme Republicans to capitalize on this restiveness.[62] It was a time when discontent was prevalent, when crowds on both sides, but especially Catholic working class, had so much over which to be resentful. It became much easier to inflame the already burning fires of hostility and expand the conflict than it was for people such as Hume to instill reason and advocate nonviolence. This would become even less difficult as the violence, death and destruction continued to escalate. Leaders looking to encourage Nationalist crowds to resist drew on Republican ideologies. Stemming in large part from the actions of Patrick Pearse and other rebels of the Easter Rising came a mind-set that one would only lose when they stopped fighting. Failures themselves became glorious, as long as the fight continued. An Irish poem written in 1938 deftly portrayed this sentiment:

> 'Some had no thought of victory
> But had gone out to die
> That Ireland's mind be greater,
> Her heart mount up on high;
> And yet who knows what's yet to come?
> For Patrick Pearse had said
> That in every generation
> Must Ireland's blood be shed'[63]

This concept of 'the triumph of failure' permeated the civil rights movement and affected the attitude toward the efforts of peace activists. Coogan wrote that "many of the older

[61] (McCourt, 2009)
[62] (White, 1984, p. 83)
[63] (Yeats, 1938)

Republicans [...] disagreed violently with the passive resistance policy".[64] If an activist's methods were perceived as being passive, of giving in to the authorities, of giving up on fighting, people gradually turned away from them. This mentality prevailed throughout the conflict, and would play a key role in the struggle to transition to peace during the 1990s.

In answer to the persistent rioting and bombings, the Northern Ireland government introduced internment in 1971. This allowed them to "indefinitely detain suspected terrorists without trial".[65] On July 23 over a hundred houses were raided as part of the search for suspects. However, according to Powell the raid was known of well in advance, giving the most active Republicans enough time to get out. Furthermore, the intelligence files that were used were quite antiquated, and as a result, the search was largely unsuccessful.[66] Regardless of the lack of success, White wrote that the reaction to the brutality with which the raid was carried out led to the deaths of twenty-three people and "hundreds more Catholics and Protestants were burned out of their homes or fled in fear".[67] By the end of the year, the death toll had risen to 172. Deane described how the Bogside Community Organization, a Nationalist group that was created for the defense of the Bogsiders, often attempted to intercede and prevent violence from occurring during the raids. They talked and negotiated with the police, hoping to handle the situation peacefully and prevent further damage to people or their property. In their efforts though, they would often be arrested themselves. This became further evidence to the Nationalists that nonviolent attempts were ineffective and futile.[68] Along with the growing disbelief of the benefits of nonviolence, Doherty stated that the obvious sectarianism

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[64] (Coogan, 2000, p. 332)
[65] (1971: NI activates internment law, 1971)
[66] (Powell, 2008, p. 46)
[67] (White, 1984, p. 114)
[68] (Deane, 2009)

of the arrests further decreased the Catholic trust in the government and led many to begin to look at an end to Partition as the only viable solution.[69] Of the 1,981 suspects that were detained, 1,874 were Catholic. Rather than decrease the hostilities, as the government had hoped, internment thus led to even more violence and a rise in backing for the IRA.

Internment and house raids persisted throughout that summer and into the fall. On August 18, 1971, the British army carried out another house-to-house search in Derry. In order to prevent them from entering the Bogside a huge crowd had gathered to create a human barrier. White wrote that tensions were running high, so in another effort to promote nonviolence John Hume sat down on the ground between the crowd and the army. The Bogsiders then rushed to join him. The pressure of the situation diminished until another army unit showed up.[70] The officer refused to listen to Hume's attempts to dissuade the British Army from entering the Bogside, so Hume bluntly told the officer, 'If you're going through....you're going to have to drive over me".[71] After saying this, he once more went and sat in the middle of the road, at which point the crowd again moved to join him. The army responded by shooting first rubber bullets, then a water cannon, at the crowd. In reply, Hume got up, and

> Slowly walked towards the water cannon, with his hands above his head in gesture of peace and determination. [....] The soldiers were unmoved, however, and the purple water drenched him from head to foot, knocking him down repeatedly with its force before he stumbled to his feet and marched slowly forward. Eventually he came within range of the snatch squad and was grabbed and thrown against the wall while the rest of the crowd was chased down side streets.[72]

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[69] (Doherty, 2009)
[70] (White, 1984, p. 1)
[71] John Hume-found in (White, 1984, p. 2)
[72] (White, 1984, p. 2)

This event was a demonstration of two things to the Nationalists. On the one hand, it was yet another example of the ineffectiveness of peaceful protesting, as Hume and four others were arrested for their efforts that day. On the other hand, it was also an illustration of the perseverance of someone who consistently believed in nonviolence. While this had little effect at the time, McCourt related that it would be remembered and drawn on later on in the conflict, when people began to look for an alternative to the violence.[73]

For the time being, however, the violence remained constant. Sectarian murders on both sides were on the rise, and the Loyalist paramilitaries had also increased their activity. Hence, while the protests continued, so too did the death toll. The number of deaths that had come about as a result of the Troubles had risen from 14 people in 1969 to 25 in 1970, and then had jumped drastically to 174 deaths in 1971. The total 213 deaths by this point included a number of innocent bystanders and children. Deane described that to the army, the children were nothing more than 'collateral damage'.[74] Such was the case with fourteen year-old Annette McGavigan, who was killed by a British Army's bullet in the back of the head during a riot near her home. To the community, in contrast, the death of children evoked a different response. As Gerry Adams, the President of Sinn Fein, adeptly stated, "the death of anyone is tragic, but the death of children is an emotional shock which strikes hard".[75] During the early years of the Troubles, it jolted the community into a desire for vengeance. It gave them even less of a reason to respond peacefully or with pacifism.

By the beginning of 1972, Nationalists had all but given up on expecting any change to come from nonviolent protesting. The death toll and hostility of the rioting had escalated to

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[73] (McCourt, 2009)
[74] (Deane, 2009)
[75] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 116)

the point where few were willing to put the effort into a method of protest that had been so ill-received. One of the last protests took place on January 22 of that year. Led by John Hume and Ivan Cooper, a couple thousand people gathered on the beach to march on Magilligan internment camp. According to Bell, the civil rights marchers had gathered to protest internment, but also in objection to the growing number of bombs that were plaguing Northern Ireland. They still believed that there was a different way to achieve power and political change, aside from violence. "They found neither welcome nor understanding". Bell went on to write that they marched under the assumption that the British Army would resist the urge to attack yet another peaceful march. The reasoning behind such an assumption was that not only had the army's responses to marches in the past done nothing but induce more violence and compel new people to join paramilitaries, but because they were also a respectable British force. The protestors expected them to be above the brutality of the RUC.[76] They were wrong. "The paratroops opened fire with gas guns and a volley of rubber bullets [...The] army and police smashed any resistance with batons, truncheons, and rifle butts, firing rubber bullets at short range directly into the crowd".[77] With a few exceptions, all of the nonviolent, peaceful attempts to promote change were met with nothing but violence. This march further diminished any remaining Nationalist doubts on the effectiveness of nonviolence in promoting change. The events of January 30, 1972 would remove the last vestiges of these doubts and put an end to the civil rights campaign.

[76] (Bell, The Irish Troubles-A Generation of Violence 1967-1992, 1993, p. 256)
[77] (Bell, The Irish Troubles-A Generation of Violence 1967-1992, 1993, p. 257)

Chapter IV. The End of Civil Protest

By January of 1972, Nationalists had all but given up on any concrete changes resulting from civil rights protesting. Throughout the month of January, civil rights activists still held occasional protests which serving as counterpoints to the constant explosion of bombs and gunfire. It was so common by this point for marches to turn into at the least mild trouble between the RUC and the protestors that it with each new march it was almost expected. That was certainly the case with the NICRA demonstration that was held on January 30 in Derry, the day that would be remembered as Bloody Sunday. In a city that had become so symbolic in the history of Northern Ireland, Bowyer-Bell stated that both the demonstrators and the crowds that came to watch and defy Faulkner's marching ban expected a bit of the routine trouble: stone throwing, "CS gas, broken head, rubber bullets, outrage and arrogance".[78]

The march was held as another protest to internment. Eamonn McCann, a prominent leader of the civil rights movement who was there that day, noted that initially, there were roughly 10,000 people there to demonstrate, but by the end the number had increased to 20,000.[79] It began as so many others had, with speeches, a few thrown stones here and there, yelling and chanting. Then, however, the Parachute Regiment, or Paras, came out of the army barracks to do a sweep of the area to prevent any more trouble. Suddenly thirteen civilians were dead by Paras fire, and another eighteen were wounded. To this day, there is much contention over who fired the first shot, over whether the Paras had been shot at by some unknown gunmen first, or whether they shot without provocation. Afterward, the British Army

[78] (Bell, The Irish Troubles-A Generation of Violence 1967-1992, 1993, p. 266)
[79] (McCann, What Happened in Derry, 1972)

claimed that they had only open fired in response to being attacked. However, Bowyer-Bell claimed that "no member of the IRA was a casualty. There was no convincing evidence of guns or bombs".[80] All of the bullets that injured or killed the victims were from Paramilitary's guns. The victims were all from the same area, most of them around the same age, and only one of those shot was a woman. To many, such as McCann this proved that the shooting was not indiscriminate, impartial shooting as nothing more than a reaction to gunfire.[81] To others, it showed the carelessness of the British army, who "had reacted without discipline and without restraint, shooting recklessly at obviously fleeing men and women, shooting at those crouched on the ground, shooting at movement..."[82] Some of those that were killed were shot on their way to assist others who had been injured, not because they had guns. Witnesses such as McCann saw this fact as clear evidence that there had been no enemy gunfire.[83]

Regardless of the argument that still surrounds Bloody Sunday, the immediate effect on the Catholic community was substantial. Never before had the army so brazenly attacked the Irish community. According to McCann, in part it was this that had the greatest impact.[84] Some thought that the impact could be used to support the side of nonviolence. In response to Bloody Sunday, John Hume organized a mass meeting in a football stadium and advised that nothing be done until then, and White wrote that "in fact, nothing was. Not a stone was thrown in Derry in the week following Bloody Sunday.....Derry held its breath, focusing on the non-violent alternative".[85] For many, though, the events of that Sunday were too much for them to turn back to nonviolence. Powell maintained that Nationalists joined the IRA in

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[80] (Bell, The Irish Troubles-A Generation of Violence 1967-1992, 1993, p. 270)
[81] (McCann, Non-violent Efforts of the Troubles, 2009)
[82] (Bell, The Irish Troubles-A Generation of Violence 1967-1992, 1993, p. 271)
[83] (McCann, What Happened in Derry, 1972)
[84] (McCann, Non-violent Efforts of the Troubles, 2009)
[85] (White, 1984, p. 121)

greater amounts than ever before.[86] The *Irish Press* contended that, "If there was an able-bodied man with Republican sympathies within the Derry area who was not in the IRA before yesterday's butchery there will be none tonight".[87] To the IRA and others in the Catholic community, Bloody Sunday was the final straw. They had attempted civil protests for four years, and with the devastating consequence of this last attempt, many finally decided that they had tried "all other avenues to pursue freedom",[88] only to fail. Republicans then turned to the armed campaign of the IRA as the only answer.

In the years since the beginning of the Troubles, the Nationalist community's trust in the government had diminished substantially. After Bloody Sunday, this distrust was reinforced even more. "All the Irish Catholics were now absolutely alienated, North and South".[89] They felt they could no longer turn to the British government or army for help or protection. Hence, they turned towards the force that had for over half a century proclaimed themselves as the defenders of Irish Catholics. While not everyone joined the ranks of the IRA, few would say anything against them at this point. McCann said that there was a general fear to be seen not supporting a group that had more authority in the Catholic community than the police.[90] Doherty, another witness of Bloody Sunday, alleged that while many would not openly support them, the events of Bloody Sunday ensured that neither would they openly speak out against them.[91]

Bloody Sunday also signified an end to civil rights marches. From this point on, there would be no more campaigning or street protests. Advocates of nonviolence were faced with

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[86] (Powell, 2008, p. 45)
[87] *Irish Press* new article(Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 45)
[88] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 108)
[89] (Bell, The Irish Troubles-A Generation of Violence 1967-1992, 1993, p. 271)
[90] (McCann, Non-violent Efforts of the Troubles, 2009)
[91] (Doherty, 2009)

a government that used only violence, one that had, as Eamonn Deane expressed, no compunctions about killing civilians in broad daylight.[92] Earlier marches had already demonstrated this and had shown activists that the Northern Ireland policing force and government could not be trusted to act justly. Deane related that one of the key elements of Bloody Sunday that made it more shocking was that the perpetrators that caused such an atrocity were the British soldiers, not Northern Ireland ones.[93] Nationalists had expected a degree of justice from the British. They received none. The denial of the British government for any blame in the event further angered the Catholic community. Even before an official inquiry was conducted on the actions of the soldiers, British Home Secretary Reginald Maudling calmly defended the Paras. The inquiry, conducted by Lord Widgery, reaffirmed the soldiers' disavowal for responsibility. As Bernadette Devlin eloquently put, through Bloody Sunday and their response to it, "The Government may well have lit a fire in Ireland, the flames of which may not die out until the last vestige of British rule has gone from the country".[94] In the eyes of Republicans, the next step in the process of forcing the British out of Ireland was the introduction of Direct Rule.

On March 24, British Prime Minister Edward Heath announced the end of the Stormont government and the beginning of Direct Rule, which began six days later. England again directly ruled Northern Ireland, and the Protestant-majority government was at an end. Through this, the Nationalists hope to have a better chance of equality and more anti-discrimination laws, as well as the future opportunity of re-uniting with the Republic. A year later, the British government released a document called "*Northern Ireland Constitutional*

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[92] (Deane, 2009)
[93] (Deane, 2009)
[94] Bernadette Devlin (White, 1984, p. 123)

Proposals". This document proposed the creation of a Northern Ireland Assembly of roughly 80 members to be elected by proportional representation as well as a Council of Ireland. Decisions regarding "law and order matters" would be under Westminster control.[95] The bill was passed through parliament and on June 28, Northern Ireland held elections for the Assembly. The elections were highly contested and caused a bit of violence the day they were held as well as the day the Assembly first met. From there, the Assembly agreed to set up a power-sharing Executive in the fall of 1973.

Despite the progress, there was still much controversy on some of the key issues surrounding Northern Ireland government. The security of Northern Ireland was one of the primary ones, with many of the concerns specific to the policing force. Other contentious matters included the continuation of internment, and the Council of Ireland, which was a body that was created to oversee all-island issues such as agricultural matters, tourism and roads and transport.[96] It was strongly opposed by Unionists and was thus a matter to be discussed. In order to address some of these concerns, a conference was held in Sunningdale from December 6 through the 9. Bew and Gillespie reported that the conference also addressed the more prominent concern of the 'Irish Dimension', or the level of involvement of the Republic in the affairs of a future government in Northern Ireland. Those included in the conference were the British Prime Minister Edward Heath, the Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) Liam Cosgrave, and representatives from the SDLP, UUP and APNI parties.[97]

The outcome of the Sunningdale Agreement was that the Executive took office on January 1, 1974. From the outset, however it met with widespread hostility from the

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[95] (Northern Ireland Office, 1973)
[96] (The Sunningdale Agreement, 1993)
[97] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 72)

Protestant community. According to M. Melaugh, many Unionists saw the Executive, and more specifically the Council of Ireland, as just another step toward a dreaded united Ireland.[98] One of the principal forces that the Unionists created in order to oppose the Executive was the Ulster Workers Council strike (UWC), begun on May 15. It caused massive difficulties across Northern Ireland, cutting off electricity, preventing food collection and distribution from farms and greatly hurting prosperity of many shops and businesses. After the strike few doubted the Protestant resolve to see the Executive come to an end.

During this time period, there was also a great deal of continued violence. Paramilitary murders had persisted throughout the debates over the creation of the Executive, and intensified during the months that the Executive held office. Rioting spread and caused extensive damage to business and whole neighborhoods. In further opposition to the Executive the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a Loyalist paramilitary, set off car bombs in Dublin and Monaghan on May 17. The bombs killed 33 innocent people, including an unborn child, and injured a further 258. It was the most costly attack in lives in a single day since the civil rights movement and was yet another demonstration of the high opposition to any lasting agreements between the two sides.

Eleven days after the Dublin-Monaghan bombings, on the fourteenth day of the UWC strike, the Executive collapsed to be replaced by Direct Rule once more. Bew and Gillespie argued that one of the primary reasons why the Sunningdale Agreement failed was that many Protestants were unwilling to compromise on the issue of Dublin involvement in Northern Ireland.[99] At this point, Unionists were still very hostile to any interaction with the Irish

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[98] (Melaugh, The Sunningdale Agreement - Chronology of Main Events, 2009).
[99] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 90)

government. Unsurprisingly then, they opposed the Council of Ireland, through which Dublin would have small but direct say in Northern Ireland. On the opposing side, Bew and Gillespie stated that the Nationalists made no attempt to hide the fact that they saw the Council of Ireland as a progressive jump towards a united Ireland that they hoped to occur within the following months. As this was one of the Unionists' greatest fears at the time, the Nationalist stance led Unionists even more staunchly oppose the Agreement.[100] However, although the Executive had at this point failed and a power-sharing agreement was still a long way off, the Sunningdale Agreement did set the foundation for future talks. It established the thread of a willingness to address the 'Irish Dimension'.

The Sunningdale Agreement also had the more immediate effect of setting in motion the process of political talks. On December 10, 1974, leaders of the IRA held secret meetings with eight Protestant churchmen. The two groups discussed the provisions under which the IRA would consider a possible IRA cease-fire. Melaugh stated that unfortunately the talks were interrupted when the IRA were told the Irish Special Branch knew of the location of the talks and preparing to arrest them.[101] Despite the interruption, the meeting had beneficial long-lasting effects. Melaugh went on to write that progressing from the Feakle talks, the IRA announced a cease-fire on December 22.[102] Lasting for almost a month, the cease-fire initiated a temporary truce between the IRA and the British government. The IRA announced that if the British government would be willing to set a specific date on which they would leave Ireland, the IRA would declare a permanent cease-fire.[103] However, the Protestants were as outraged by this as they were by the Sunningdale agreement, if not more so. Consequently, "the Loyalist

[100] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 90)
[101] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 90)
[102] (Melaugh, A Chronology of the Conflict, 2009)
[103] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 100)

death squads immediately embarked on the greatest assassination campaign of innocent Catholics up to [that time]". Alongside the increase in Loyalist violence, the Irish government also did not support complete British withdrawal from Northern Ireland.[104] This truce, however temporary, illustrated that unless all parties were committed to a peace process and were willing to make sacrifices for that process, a lasting agreement could never be reached. In 1974 and 1975, in the midst of continued violence, none of the parties were willing to compromise. The British government was unwilling to give up Northern Ireland completely, the IRA wasn't willing to consider anything less than full British withdrawal, and the Loyalists weren't willing to give up their violent campaign at the price of the concessions to the IRA.

[104] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 100)

Chapter V. A Nonviolent Foundation

Renewed nonviolence

During the mid-1970s, factions on both sides of the conflict had shown that they were as yet unwilling to compromise. The incessant hostilities at that time acted as counterpoint to their unwillingness. The first months of 1976 saw a significant rise in violence, especially in the number of civilian deaths and property damage. Melaugh reported that by January 1976, the Government found that over 25,000 houses had been damaged because of violence from the Troubles.[105] The violence persisted, unabated, through the spring and summer of that year. Then, on August 10, an atrocity occurred that would act as a catalyst for peace. It marked a decrease in the death toll that would last throughout the rest of the Troubles. On that day, British soldiers shot at a car driven by an IRA member. The car swerved after being hit by the gunfire and crashed straight into the Maguire family which was walking on the sidewalk nearby. Three of the Maguire children, aged eight years, two years, and a six week old baby, were killed from the impact. According to the organization called the Peace People, the mother of the three children, Anne McGuire, took her life not long after because of the death of this incident.[106]

The deaths of the Maguire family engendered a dramatic cross-community response. Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan, the aunt of the children that were killed, began to organize peace rallies in Belfast and other parts of Northern Ireland. The first was held two days after crash, and was attended by about 1,000 people, mostly women. During the second rally, the number of women that attended had increased to 10,000, and by the fourth rally the

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[105] (Melaugh, A Chronology of the Conflict, 2009)
[106] (The Peace People, 2006)

number had jumped to 25,000. Betty Williams, Mairead Corrigan and a third woman, Ciaran McKeown, subsequently founded the Peace People out of these rallies. Despite Mairead's relation to the children, and the overall horror at the deaths of innocent children, the Peace People declared that they were choosing not to focus their attention on blaming either the Republicans or the British soldiers for the incident. Instead, they described the "reaction of the community [as] one of pure anguish at the needless deaths".[107]

These rallies became landmarks in the course of the peace process. Not only did they draw huge crowds in the interest of peace, but Bew and Gillespie noted that they were also the first time since the before the Troubles began that great amounts of people from both the Catholic and Protestant communities had drawn together for a common, peaceful purpose.[108] The Peace People continued to organize rallies and community events in an effort to encourage people to see a peaceful alternative to the conflict. The number of deaths decreased significantly during the next six months "and things would never return to the terrible rate of death and destruction experienced in 1976 when it looked like the community was spiralling into all out civil conflict".[109] By the end of that year, there had been 297 deaths resulting from the conflict.[110] According to a list of deaths compiled by Malcolm Sutton, a total of 1581 people had been killed between the years of 1972 to 1976, almost half the total number killed during the Troubles.[111] Bloody Sunday had been the catalyst that dramatically increased the violence, and some such as the Peace People argue that the Maguire children's'

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[107] (The Peace People, 2006)
[108] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 114)
[109] (The Peace People, 2006)
[110] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 117)
[111] (Sutton, 2002); for a more detailed account of the death toll, see Appendix C

deaths were the impetus that began the decrease the death numbers.[112] The death count did drop significantly after this point. Whether this was a direct result of the Peace People's rallies or whether it was a result of the general mentality of the communities at this time that had led them to rally together is difficult to argue. They can be linked, but proving one caused the other would be more difficult. Most likely, it was a general feeling of fatigue with the violence and death that simultaneously caused the rallies of the Peace People to be attended by both Catholics and Protestants, and the overall decrease in the number of deaths.

However, despite the huge crowds that the Peace People drew, they were not received well nor trusted by everyone. According to Eamonn McCann, many thought that the Peace People, and the peace movement as a whole, was being manipulated by the British government.[113] Partly because the peace movement had been well received by so many, the government began "to patronized it and use it as an ideological weapon against the Provisionals [which lent] credence to Republican statements that it [was] pro-British".[114] Anti-peace movement sentiments increased after a number of deaths during the fall of 1976. On October 10, a 13 year old boy was killed by a rubber bullet. During the rioting that followed, a number of the Peace People were attacked by rioters. To McCann, the attack on the Peace People was an illustration of the general feeling of distrust of the nonviolent groups by both Nationalist and Loyalist communities during this time.[115] The unrelenting violence also added to the distrust of peace movement. Michael Doherty attested that those that had been closely impacted by the violence often saw the peace movement as support and forgiveness for the very people that had committed the atrocities. He spoke of how, during a time of so much

[112] (The Peace People, 2006)
[113] (McCann, Non-violent Efforts of the Troubles, 2009)
[114] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 116)
[115] (McCann, Non-violent Efforts of the Troubles, 2009)

hate, revenge and anger came easier than forgiveness, especially to friends and family of those lost.[116]

There were further complications that held back the success of the grassroots peace movement at this time as well. The rise of the Peace People was a major milestone during the Troubles. Valerie Morgan stated that it

> Succeeded in moving outside traditional political structures and mobilizing large scale support for an end to violence with mass street demonstrations, parades and petitions. In the longer term, however, it proved very difficult to sustain the momentum and to translate the rather amorphous anti-violence sentiments expressed through a mass movement into agreed policies which could influence the established, male dominated, structures. These relative failures caused some disillusionment with generalized peace groups.[117]

Accordingly, while organizations such as the Peace People added to the nonviolent resolution of the Troubles by organizing ground support of an alternative path than violence, they were not the ultimate, essential force that led to the political accord of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). The violence, and in particular the death of children, had motivated people to unite together across community lines in an effort to find a nonviolent way to solve the issues of Northern Ireland. Although it proved to have less impact in the final politics of the GFA, the Peace People's movement was an elemental example of how violence could motivate people to reach past their anger and revenge for the sake of an overall peace. Groups such as this helped germinate the seed of reconciliation that would come to fruition through the GFA.

Regardless of its affect, the peace movement that began in the late 1970s reflected a change in the mindset toward the Troubles. Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's Secretary of State, said that both the Catholic and the Protestant communities were "becoming weary of the cycle of blood" and were realizing the futility of violence. The IRA in particular was beginning

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[116] (Doherty, 2009)
[117] (Morgan, 1996)

to see that an armed campaign may not be the most efficient way to reach the outcome they desired.[118] Powell noted that the British government was also coming to the conclusion that it may not be able to win by military force. During the early years of the 1980s, "Everyone started to look for the exits".[119] One of the key events that would pave the way to these 'exits' were the hunger strikes.

The hunger strikes had initially begun in 1976 with the 'blanket protests' as a demand for special political status. Up until this point, Republicans had been given special category status by the British government. When this ended, they began the 'blanket protest', in which they refused to wear prison clothes and instead wore only blankets. The protest eventually progressed into hunger strikes in the H block section of the Maze Prison. According to Powell, it was in response to communications between Republican leaders and the British that the prisoners stopped the first hunger strike. However, when the prisoners continued to find their demands unmet, they began a second, more influential hunger strike in 1981.[120] White stated that during this second wave, all of the prisoners called off their blanket protests so that Bobby Sands, the main hunger striker, would be the focus of attention.[121] The hunger strikes drew a great deal of notice when Archbishop O'Fiaich reported on the conditions of the strikers and insisted that they be given better treatment. He declared that "One would hardly allow an animal to remain in such conditions, let alone a human being. The nearest approach to it that I have seen was the spectacle of hundreds of homeless people living in sewer pipes in the slums of Calcutta".[122] McElroy stated that the Archbishop's attention to the prisoners had the

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[118] (Powell, 2008, p. 59)
[119] (Powell, 2008, p. 59)
[120] (Powell, 2008, p. 71)
[121] (White, 1984, p. 221)
[122] Archbishop O'Fiaich statement issued 1978-found in (McElroy, 1991, p. 149)

double effect of heightening its priority on the Nationalist agenda and giving it a sense of respect.[123] The hunger strikes gained even more attention and support when Nationalist MP Frank Maguire died on March 5, 1981. A month later, Bobby Sands ran for the Westminster seat left empty by Maguire's death, and won. His election demonstrated the massive amounts of Nationalist support for the hunger strikes. Unfortunately, Thatcher remained unwilling to concede special status to the Republican prisoners, and their status as common criminals remained unchanged until the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

However, while the hunger strikes failed to achieve their intended goal, they did have a more lasting effect in the long-term outcome of the peace process. Bew and Gillespie wrote that one of the key consequences of the hunger strikes was a new rise of nationalism and Irish pride in the Catholic community.[124] According to Brendan O'Brian, it led to "a resurgence of defiance on the streets, in the townlands and in the homes"[125], a "volcanic upsurge in popular support for the Republican Movement". O'Brian went on to state that out of this Nationalist revitalization came a significant increase in military support for the IRA and an increase in electoral votes for Sinn Féin.[126] During the 1980s, "The fear of Sinn Fein superseding the SDLP...was the decisive impulse behind the process that led to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement".[127] The hunger strikes also gave Sinn Féin the community backing to make them a major political player in the peace talks of the 1990s. They were no longer a party that could be ignored and kept out of political negotiations. Perhaps the most significant effect of the hunger strikes, however, was that they demonstrated the success that nonviolence and

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[123] (McElroy, 1991, p. 149)
[124] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 143)
[125] (O'Brian, 1993, p. 21)
[126] (O'Brian, 1993, p. 124)
[127] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 159)

political strategies could have once again. It showed Republicans that there was an alternative way to achieve their goals aside from an armed campaign. Thus, while the hunger strikes didn't succeed in obtaining special category status for the prisoners, they laid the foundation for renewed belief in the potential of future political approaches.

On November 15, 1985, as part of ongoing talks between the British and Irish governments, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met with the Taoiseach of Ireland, Garret FitzGerald to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA). Bew and Gillespie wrote that the negotiations in the months leading up to the Agreement were largely done in secrecy, unknown to all but a few high officials.[128] The articles of this agreement introduced a number of changes in the governing of Northern Ireland. In article 1 (*a*) the British and Irish government "affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland". Article 1 (*c*) went on to state "that, if in the future a majority of the people of' Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish".[129] However, although these two articles acknowledged the two governments' acceptance of a possible future change in the status of Northern Ireland, they failed to explicitly degree how 'majority consent' and a clear 'wish' would be measured. This allowed a degree of ambiguity in any future decisions.

The Agreement also included an intention to create "measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of' the two traditions in Northern Ireland, to protect

[128] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 189)
[129] (British and Irish Governments, 1985)

human rights and to prevent discrimination".[130] This recognition was a progressive step in Northern Ireland's history. It furthered the efforts to change some of the major issues that had plagued Northern Ireland since the partition. Discrimination and infringement of human rights were some of the primary concerns that initiated the civil rights movement, which in turn sparked the Troubles. Another very progressive step taken by the Anglo-Irish Agreement was the increase in the role of the Irish government in Northern Ireland. It set up an Inter-Governmental Conference that would cover "(i) political matters; (ii)security and related matter; (iii) legal matters, including the administration of justice; [and] (iv) the promotion of cross-border co-operation" (British and Irish Governments, 1985). By giving the Irish government a measure of control over these issues, the Agreement formally acknowledged Ireland as protectorate of the rights of Nationalists.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement brought mixed reactions from the Northern Ireland population. Bew and Gillespie described the response from the Nationalist community as largely positive, given the increased role of the Irish government in Northern Ireland through the AIA.[131] Hence Nationalists also looked upon the AIA as progress because, as Hume described it, it set up "a real framework within which to address the problem." Furthermore, Hume maintained that through this framework, the Agreement finally acknowledged the necessity of a British-Irish relationship in relation to the governance of Northern Ireland.[132] In contrast to the mostly positive reaction from the Nationalist community, the Agreement was severely opposed by the Unionists. The recognition of the Irish government's role in the future

[130] (British and Irish Governments, 1985)
[131] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 194)
[132] John Hume-found in (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 194)

course of Northern Ireland "accentuated [Unionist] fears of British betrayal".[133] Over the next couple years, Unionists continued to protest the Anglo-Irish Agreement through business closures, walkouts, rallies and rioting.

While the Anglo-Irish Agreement did set good foundations for the inclusion of the Irish government in Northern Ireland politics, its progress was limited. One of the key issues that it failed to address was the activities of the RUC. By the 1980s, a study on the RUC reported that most of the police were still Protestant.[134] Adams related that the RUC were also still allegedly using torture for interrogational purposes and continued to treat Catholics much rougher than they did Protestants. Along these same lines, it also didn't change the shoot-to-kill policy of British forces.[135] These 'executions' continued through the second half of the 1980s and into the 1990s. SDLP raised further objections with the Agreement. Their sources stated that their "objections to Loyalist marches going through Nationalist areas are virtually ignored. Plastic bullet incidents have increased, homes are being wrecked during searches and gratuitous beatings are happening on a regular basis".[136]

The continued use of plastic bullets was particularly ill-received by Nationalists. Over the previous ten to fifteen years, the British Army had begun to use rubber and plastic bullets increasingly more often in attempts to diffuse rioting. Although they did help in preventing riots from escalating into more damaging violence, they also had drastic consequences. Rubber bullets had a tendency to bounce off the pavement at random, killing unintended victims. Plastic bullets had also taken quite a number of lives, including those of innocent civilians and children such as Annette McGavigan. According to Powell, up until April of 1986,

[133] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 190)
[134] (Hamilton, Moore, & Trimble, 1995)
[135] (Adams, A Pathway to Peace, 1988, p. 19)
[136] Anonymous SDLP source-found in (Adams, A Pathway to Peace, 1988, p. 22)

all deaths resulting from use of plastic bullets were Catholic. The first year that a Protestant was killed was by one was 1986. He argued that more often than not, these types of deaths led to further support of the IRA, especially since all of the deaths were Catholic.[137]

During the late 1980, and moving into the 1990s, there were still a number of other major problems outside of the RUC that had not been resolved as well. Doherty said that housing estates were even more segregated after the rioting and sectarian violence of the previous decade.[138] Furthermore, while discriminatory practices had diminished substantially, McKenna reported that in 1985, there were still 24,468 people on the waiting list for housing.[139] Unemployment was also still fairly high at this time. Smith and Chambers reported that "the rate of unemployment has been substantially higher among Catholics than among Protestants in Northern Ireland for many years. Over the period 197 1-1985, Catholic men were about two and a half times as likely as Protestant men to be unemployed".[140] This had been ameliorated through the Fair Employment bill, which had instituted regulations that prohibited employment discrimination.[141] However, there was still more work to be done to decrease employment discrimination and housing segregation.

Another area in which people had long pushed for change was the education sector. Throughout the existence of Northern Ireland, Catholic and Protestant children had gone to completely separate schools. Catholics attended private schools run through the church and Protestants attended public, state-funded schools. It was not until 1981 that a single school

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[137] (Powell, 2008, p. 48)
[138] (Doherty, 2009)
[139] (McKenna, 2010)
[140] (Smith & Chambers, 1987)
[141] (United Kingdom Parliament, 1989)

was integrated. They were taught different histories respective to their religion.[142] Children thus grew up knowing little, if anything, about the history and perspectives of those of the opposing community. They grew up with little understanding about the cultural backgrounds that motivated Nationalists to respond to events one way, and Unionists to respond in an entirely different way. Educational segregation "initiates children into the conflict by emphasizing and validating group differences and hostilities, and encouraging mutual ignorance and, perhaps more importantly, mutual suspicion".[143] Consequently, if Northern Ireland were to have any chance of achieving peace, the extensive segregation in the education system was something that needed to be addressed.

Belfast Charitable Trust for Integrated Education, founded in October of 1984, was one of the first initiates set up to take up this issue. Melaugh stated that the Trust built on the foundation laid by the few integrated schools that had been established since 1981 and extended this development.[144] A number of other integrated education programs and organizations were started in the years that followed, such as the Northern Ireland council for Integrated Education, and the Education for mutual Understanding, set up in 1988.[145]

The Peace Talks

The year of 1986 began a new chapter of the Troubles. According to Gerry Adams, this was the year that he and John Hume first began to meet and discuss the future of Northern Ireland together. Initially, their talks were conducted in secret. A year later, Adams and Hume

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[142] (Doherty, 2009)
[143] (Gallagher, Majority Minority Review 1: Education in a Divided Society, 1995)
[144] (Melaugh, Abstracts on Organisations, 2009)
[145] (Doherty, 2009)

agreed to talks between their respective parties-Sinn Féin and SDLP.[146] These talks set in motion a series of joint discussions and mutual cooperation between Sinn Féin and SDLP, through Adams and Hume, in working together to bring about peace.

Running counterpoint to the initiation of the Hume-Adams talks were the overtones of sectarian murders on both sides that still permeated Northern Ireland life. July and August saw the typical level of rioting that year after year resulted from the Protestant parading season. According to Rowan, there was also an escalation in Loyalist paramilitary activity that would remain unrelenting throughout the 1990s.[147] Furthermore, the support that the IRA had garnered from deaths from plastic bullets and from the hunger strikes remained high. Then on November 8, 1987, an IRA bomb exploded in Enniskillen, county Fermanagh. The bomb went off in a building next to marchers who were assembling for a Remembrance Day ceremony. Eleven people were killed, with another sixty-three injured. Bew and Gillespie asserted that

> The revulsion that the atrocity [aroused did] much to improve community relations in the area and [lost] the IRA support throughout the world. Pressure from the local Catholic community [led] the SDLP to change its policy of supporting Sinn Fein for the posts of chairman and deputy chairman of Fermanagh District Council and to support Ulster Unionists instead. The move [helped] improve relations in the area.[148]

The reaction to the bombing stood in stark contrast to the reaction to Bloody Sunday in 1972. The horror engendered by Bloody Sunday led to a huge increase in IRA recruits, the highest it would ever see. It also led to complete Catholic alienation from the state and rapid decrease in trust in both the British government. During the four years after January 30th, reactions to violence followed the pattern/type of response to that of Bloody Sunday. People answered in kind to the death and violence they received from the British Army, the police, and the other

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[146] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. xviii)
[147] (Rowan, 1995, p. 12)
[148] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 210)

community. They saw an armed campaign as the only answer to the treatment they were receiving from the government.

The deaths of the Maguire children in 1976 marked a change in the typical response to violence. The leaders of the Peace People, and all those that rallied with them, chose to break out of the pattern of revenge, and counter the deaths with nonviolence. The incident had been caused by the British Army, the same people that ended the lives of those killed on Bloody Sunday. The reaction, however, was different. People from both the Catholic and Protestant communities, a remarkable thing in and of itself, gathered in great numbers in a call for the rejection of chronic violence. The effect of the Enniskillen bomb in 1987 continued along these lines, although not to the full extent of the 1976 incident. Although the deaths were caused by the IRA and not the British Army, the resulting attitude was none-the-less one of revulsion of more violence, rather than a call for more. Gordon Wilson, the father of one of the victims, even went on to meet with the IRA and publicly forgive them in an effort to promote peace. In explanation of his reasoning, Gordon's wife said that "anger makes you a victim and causes more pain. Gordon believed in loving your neighbour. And if your neighbour included terrorists, you loved them too"[149]. This sentiment was of course was not supported by everyone. For example, Jim Dixon, one of the victims of the bomb, avowed afterward that "No, I don't forgive the bombers. All terrorists should be wiped out"[150]. However, these two incidents did show a gradual shift away from violence and a renewed desire to respond with nonviolence. This shift was supported by the decline in deaths that resulted from the conflict. In 1972, Malcolm Sutton reported that 479 people were killed. In contrast, the death count

[149] Jean Wilson-found in (Breen, 2007)
[150] Jim Dixon-found in (Breen, 2007)

had dropped to 98 people in 1987.[151] However, although the death toll had dropped, it didn't disappear completely, and it was this that provided fuel for the continued peace talks.

In January of 1988, Gerry Adams and John Hume, along with other members of their respective parties, met publicly for the first time. In attendance at the meeting with Adams and Hume, the meeting was attended by the Seamus Mallon who was the most senior member of the SDLP, and prominent Sinn Féin members Martin McGuinness, Danny Morrison, Mitchell McLaughlin and Tom Hartley. The three other noteworthy attendees were Austin Currie and Sean Farren. Rowan claimed that "the make-up of the two delegations [provided] some indication of how seriously each party approached this project".[152] The two parties met to discuss a "common ground on the conditions for an all-Ireland settlement".[153] During this meeting, and all those that would follow, Hume was essential in proposing and encouraging an end to the military violence of the IRA. In a St. Patrick's Day letter to Adams, Hume asked,

> Is it not time for the IRA and the members of the Provisional Republican Movement to seriously reconsider the methods that they have chosen to achieve their objectives or are they in danger of moving to a situation, or are they already in it, where the methods have become more sacred than the cause?.[154]

Rowan stated that at this time, Hume also persuaded Sinn Féin to consider talks with representatives of the Unionists and both the Irish and British governments.[155] Although the political atmosphere was not yet right for this during the late 1980s, Hume succeeded in setting the idea of all-party talks in motion.

One of the key methods that was used during the Troubles that played a crucial role in the peace process was the backchannel of communication between the IRA and the British

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[151] (Sutton, 2002) For a full list of the death toll see Appendix C
[152] (Rowan, 1995, p. 11)
[153] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 212)
[154] John Hume-found in (Rowan, 1995, p. 12)
[155] (Rowan, 1995, p. 12)

government. The back channel was first established in 1973 through Brendan Duddy, a local businessman in Derry. Jonathan Powell described Duddy as being a staunch "Irish Republican" while at the same time being "a firm believer in dialogue".[156] He became known as 'the Contact', and remained unrecognized for his work until very recently. Michael Oatley, a SIS officer, served as the British contact, and became known to the IRA as 'Mountainclimber'. Powell wrote that after 1975, the British government closed down the 'line of contact, as the political atmosphere at the time was not appropriate for them to make full use of this channel. However, Oatley and Duddy keep the backchannel, or the 'Link', alive, which in turn enabled it to be reopened when both sides were ready. Powell related that Duddy "worked diligently to maintain the relationship, meeting members of the leadership and providing political discussion and strategy papers in his bid to promote peace".[157] His work, alongside Oatley's, laid the groundwork and trust for it to work in the future.

In 1990, Peter Brooke, the new secretary of state of Northern Ireland, was briefed on the Link. It had lain inactive up until this point, but through the initiation of Brooke, it was reopened.[158] O'Grady stated that Brooke spent the rest of that year working to arrange talks between the Irish government, the British and the Unionists. He succeeded, and was able to introduce the idea of the Three Strand approach in negotiations. The first strand was between the parties in Northern Ireland, the second between Belfast and Dublin, and the third between the British and Irish governments.[159]

Despite the general acceptance of the Three Strand approach, Grady stated that Brooke met with a degree of reluctance from the parties and governments in getting the

[156] (Powell, 2008, p. 67)
[157] (Powell, 2008, p. 70)
[158] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. xix)
[159] (O'Grady, 2001)

actual meetings to take place.[160] In order to overcome this hesitation, Brooke took a huge leap and publicly stated that the British government no longer had a "selfish, economic or strategic interest" in Northern Ireland.[161] This statement of neutrality had been done as a part of a continuing effort to talk the IRA into giving up their armed campaign, which in turn would mean that Sinn Féin could enter the peace talks. While the IRA did not at this point announce a cease-fire because of their continued misgivings, they had taken the important step of renewing the backchannel. Adams reported that through a variety of both inconsequential details and "confidential reports" such as the release date of Republican prisoners, the backchannel built up IRA trust in the British government's commitment to the political talks. It convinced them that the political talks had a chance of succeeding. This was essential, as the only way that the leaders of the IRA would consider giving up their armed struggle was if they believed that the alternative, nonviolent way would further the Nationalist cause.[162] They had to be convinced that choosing nonviolence did not mean that they were forsaking their cause. The ideology of 'the triumph of failure' that had been threaded through the Republican cause still influenced the mind-set of Republicans in relation to nonviolence. According to Adams, the IRA was both willing and "capable of carrying on the war against the British for a very long time",[163] even if doing so meant continued failure. As long as they were still willing to put up a fight, the battle was not lost. This was the reason for which it became crucial to work with the IRA. Without their support, the peace talks would make little difference in ending the conflict as they, alongside the Loyalist paramilitaries and the British army, were the ones that were perpetuating the violence. Adams stated that in 1990 and 1991, the IRA had not yet been

[160] (O'Grady, 2001)
[161] Peter Brooke in a public statement to his constituency-found in (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 241)
[162] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 99)
[163] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 96)

convinced they had enough reason to give up their campaign, and so they persisted in setting off bombs and attacking British forces.[164]

As part of the effort to convince the IRA to give up their armed campaign, Adams stated that in 1991 Sinn Féin was working to come up with its own strategy of how to proceed in the peace talks. He said that one of the first goals they worked towards was an agreement with Irish government representatives and the SDLP on a joint declaration.[165] After this was drawn up and agreed upon, they could then put forward a more united Nationalist agenda to the British government. Hume's and Adams' work on this point provided the foundation for path that SDLP and Sinn Féin would take over the next 7 years, through what became known as the 'Irish peace process'.[166]

As a result of the work of Peter Brooke and John Hume in talking with the Irish and British governments, inter-party negotiations finally took place on June 12, 1992. Bew and Gillespie wrote that after twelve hours of talks, the parties involved were willing to "tentative moves towards strands 2 and 3 of the talks process." However, deliberations with regards to the internal government of Northern Ireland were at a standstill.[167] Part of the disagreement revolved around the paramilitary violence that remained interlaced with the peace talks. Jim Gibney, a leading Sinn Féin member, acknowledged that

> We know and accept that the British government's departure [from Ireland] must be preceded by a sustained period of peace and will arise out of negotiations [involving] the different shades of Irish nationalism and Irish Unionism.[168]

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[164] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 102)
[165] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 105)
[166] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 107)
[167] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 260)
[168] Jim Gibney in a statement during annual Wolfe Tone commemoration-found in] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 261)

However, although Sinn Féin and the IRA were closely linked, Adams insisted that Sinn Féin "did not represent the IRA on any issue, that [they] did not negotiate for them".[169] Consequently, although Sinn Féin was by this point convinced of the necessity of political talks, that did not mean that the IRA was as well. This presented a problem, as the IRA had already stated that the only way that they would be willing to give up an armed campaign was if they saw the merits of a nonviolent campaign.

While the IRA discussed a possible cease-fire, they also demonstrated their continuing willingness to prolong the bombing campaign. On March 20, 1993, an IRA bomb exploded in Warrington England. The blast was extensive enough that over fifty-five people were injured. The bomb also had the unintentional but devastating consequence of injuring two young boys. Jonathan Ball, only three years old, died during the explosion. Twelve year old Tim Parry sustained injuries so severe "that five days later his parents had to approve the decision to turn off his life support system". The bombing "brought universal condemnation. Thousands of people took to the streets of Dublin in protest".[170] The parents of Tim and Jonathan later founded The Tim Parry Jonathan Ball Foundation for Peace. This reaction of revulsion to this atrocity demonstrated the growing fatigue of violence and the senseless death of innocents. The death of Tim and Jonathan provided further impetus for people to turn away from violence, just as the deaths of the Maguire children had. While many Republicans were willing to use an armed campaign for the cause of 'Brits out', especially directly following Bloody Sunday, they were not willing to do so at the cost of the death of so many children. In this, they were not so much shifting toward nonviolence, but simply shifting away from violence.

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[169] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 95)
[170] (The Tim Perry Jonathan Ball Foundation for Peace, 2003)

The IRA's actions were also indicating their consideration for a shift away from an armed campaign. Later in 1993, the IRA informed the British government, through the channel of the Contact, that they were willing to "suspend military operations to facilitate talks between Sinn Féin and the British".[171] According to O'Brian, part of their willingness stemmed from the fact that their strategy had changed from attempting to drive the British entirely out of Ireland to promoting and striving for "Irish national self-determination, exercised by consent".[172] This sentiment was mirrored in the Hume-Adams document, which the IRA made clear that they supported. Adams reported that the document was a joint statement that Hume and Adams had been working towards for over seven years.[173] In the statement, Hume and Adams decreed that they saw self-determination as the best way to move forward and that it was a goal that had to be achieved through peaceful means of accord, as not everyone in Northern Ireland shared the same view-point in relation to Irish nationalism.[174] This statement, and more significantly, the IRA's agreement with the statement, showed a general shift in the Republican mentality that the goals that they sought might not be achievable through violence alone. In November of 1993, the IRA issued a statement in relation to this saying that,

> The Hume-Adams initiative has acted as a major catalyst forcing many people, in some cases for the first time, to seriously address the question of how we move from a situation of conflict towards a position where we lay the foundations of a peace process which removes the causes of conflict and provides a political framework for a negotiated settlement and lasting peace.[175]

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[171] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. xx)
[172] (O'Brian, 1993, p. 28)
[173] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 122)
[174] John Hume & Gerry Adams Joint Statement issued April 24 1993-found in (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 273)
[175] IRA statement issued November 1993-found in (Rowan, 1995, p. 61)

The unceasing efforts on Hume and Adams were beginning to pay off. They were finally able to bring the IRA on board with the peace process. The only thing left to do was convince the British government to respond on the same level.

One of the main elements in the reluctance of the British government to fully engage in the peace talks was uncertainty of the IRA's objectives. Powell stated that John Major, the British Prime Minister from 1990-1997, was "skeptical about Republican motives and wanted a lengthy period of 'decontamination' before they could enter politics, to reassure Unionists".[176] Powell wrote that Major thus had to do a balancing act between appeasing the Republicans without scaring the Unionists.[177] In an attempt to maintain this balance while still progressing forward, John Major issued a statement in which he said that the British government relinquished the power to decide the fate of Northern Ireland. Instead they would become facilitators to the peace process and would endeavor to enable the two communities to implement their own self-determinism.[178] This statement led to a three day IRA cease-fire in December. It also demonstrated a huge turning point in the dialog and conception of the future of Ireland. Eamonn O'Kane argued that it showed a willingness of the British to finally "devote considerable care and attention" to the dilemma of Northern Ireland, one that they had for so long ignored.[179] At the same time, and along similar lines, there was a gradual shift in the perception of 'success' by all parties. It revealed a "burning desire on each side of the community for peace: not a peace at any price but a peace that was fair and just".[180] It was a push for 'Irish agreed', rather than a struggle for 'Irish unity' as it had been in the past.

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[176] (Powell, 2008, p. 83)
[177] (Powell, 2008, p. 85)
[178] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 285)
[179] (O'Kane, 2010, p. 244)
[180] (Rowan, 1995, p. 59)

In April of 1994, the IRA announced another cease-fire. It was short-lived, but did provide the opportunity for continued talks. Hume, Adams and Albert Reynolds, the new Taoiseach, met throughout that year in an effort to provide the opportunity for a longer-lasting cease-fire. On August 31, 1994 they succeeded. On that day, the IRA leadership issued the following statement:

> Recognising the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic peace process and underline our definitive commitment to its success the leadership of Óglaigh na hÉireann have decided that as of midnight, Wednesday, 31 August, there will be a complete cessation of military operations. All our units have been instructed accordingly [...] We believe that an opportunity to secure a just and lasting settlement has been created.[181]

Rowan wrote that the declaration came as a shock to many on both sides of the conflict because of its definitiveness and lack of "apparent attached conditions in terms of time or later review".[182] Some argued that the declaration of this cease-fire had come about because of pressure from people in the Nationalist community to find another way to solve the conflict. Furthermore, Sir Hugh Annesley, Chief Constable in Northern Ireland, asserted that the "consistent condemnation of violence from within the Churches, the media, by politicians of all shades and from other community leaders" had a sustaining influence on the IRA and pressured them to initiate the cease-fire. Chief Annesley also maintained that this pressure resulted in part from the rise in Loyalist killings, which had actually surpassed those of the IRA.[183] In a study of the patterns of deaths, Michael McKeown reported that the Loyalist paramilitary actions throughout the Troubles was based on two basic strategies: "pressurizing the Security authorities into taking more coercive measures against the Republican paramilitaries, while intimidating Catholic communities into withdrawing moral and practical

[181] (Irish Republican Army, 1994)
[182] (Rowan, 1995, p. 99)
[183] Sir Hugh Annesley statement-found in (Rowan, 1995, p. 100)

support from them. Accordingly they adopted initially a strategy of attacks both upon individuals presumed to be Catholic and upon social centres where Catholics might gather".[184] The Ulster Defense Association (UDA) articulated their purpose in a statement on 1993 when a representative said, "We are out to terrorise the terrorists. To get to the stage where old grannies up the Falls will call on the IRA to stop, because it is ordinary Catholics that are getting hit".[185] Their list of murders was high enough that it most likely did create pressure from the Catholic community for the IRA to stop their own campaign.[186]

Despite the progress that the 1994 IRA cease-fire indicated, the parties were still running into problems with the peace talks on the issue of decommissioning. Bew and Gillespie asserted that the British had made it clear that until the IRA had fully decommissioned, Sinn Féin would not be included in negotiations.[187] The problem with this was that the IRA had taken a major step by initiating cease-fire without any condition, but refused to decommission until all-party talks had begun. Adams related that they saw removal of arms from the Northern Ireland political process as the goal of the peace talks and were thus frustrated when it was set as a precondition.[188] The talks consequently were again at a standstill, despite the cessation of violence. Throughout the year following the IRA cease-fire, the British government continued to refuse to include Sinn Féin in the peace talks.

The IRA cease-fire lasted throughout the rest of 1994 and all of 1995. However, when the negotiations repeatedly failed to yield results, the IRA leadership announced an end to the cessation on February 9, 1996. In their statement, they said:

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[184] (McKeown, 2001; revised 2009)
[185] UDA statement-found in (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 135)
[186] For a list of sectarian deaths, see Appendix C
[187] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 294)
[188] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 208)

> It is with great reluctance that the leadership of the IRA announces that the complete cessation of military operations will end at 6pm on February 9. As we stated on August 31, 1994, the basis for the cessation was to enhance the democratic peace process and to underline our definitive commitment to its success. We also made it clear that we believed that an opportunity to create a just and lasting settlement had been created. The cessation presented an historic challenge for everyone and the IRA commends the leaderships of Nationalist Ireland at home and abroad. They rose to the challenge. The British Prime Minister did not. Instead of embracing the peace process, the British government acted in bad faith with Mr. Major and the Unionist leaders squandering this unprecedented opportunity to resolve the conflict. Time and again, over the last 18 months, selfish party political and sectional interests in the London parliament have been placed before the rights of the people of Ireland.[189]

Adams said that failing to talk to John Hume, paying "more attention to the British agenda", and failing to demilitarize were just some of the actions that Republicans saw as British attempts to stall the process.[190] As a result, on February 9, 1996 they exploded a 3,500 pound bomb in Manchester, England. The sheer scale of the explosion caused massive amounts of damage. According to Bew and Gillespie, in response to the bombing, four thousand people gathered at a trade union peace rally in Belfast six days later. One of the peace organizations that attended collected "more than half a million signatures calling for the cease-fire to be reinstated".[191] It was a clear indication to the IRA that people wanted an end to the violence and were willing to gather from across the community borders in order to encourage them to consider an alternative path to their armed campaign. Bew and Gillespie wrote that as further encouragement, Adams also reaffirmed his commitment to a nonviolent, political path, based on the dedication of the Irish government and John Hume and the SDLP, along with the aid of the American government.[192]

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[189] (Irish Republican Army, 1996)
[190] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 233)
[191] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 325).
[192] (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, p. 322)

Despite the renewed armed campaign, Adams related that the IRA made it clear that if a nonviolent path again presented itself, they would be willing to once again declare a cease-fire.[193] This was not because they had "suddenly come to believe that violence was morally wrong but that the debate within the movement had been won on the argument that 'more could be gained along an unarmed path'".[194] In a further attempt to get the peace talks back on track, the British and Irish governments announced that, given a restored IRA cease-fire, they would allow Sinn Féin inclusion into talks. Adams related that both he and John Hume were key in convincing the British to accept this concession.[195] As a result of their efforts and the agreement to include Sinn Féin in the negotiations, the IRA restore the 1994 cease-fire on July 19, 1997, this time on a permanent basis. Thus, the violence, or more accurately the desire for an end to violence, provided an impetus for continuing the peace process. It gave reluctant parties the drive to overcome the obstacles that stood in the way of progress. The fear of a return to the violence and the memory of past violence also ensured that the needs of one side would not be ignored or forgotten, as it had in the past.

During the peace of the months following the declaration of the cease-fire, the parties continued dialog and worked to draw up a document on the future of Northern Ireland on which all would agree. Jonathan Powell said that the negotiations were long and difficult, with many drafts and revisions of the document.[196] Finally, on April 10 of 1998, the parties succeeded on signing the agreement. The agreement, known as the Good Friday Agreement, included a number of provisions on the Three Strands approach (Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, North/South Ministerial Council, and the British-Irish interactions). The

[193] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. 235)
[194] (Rowan, 1995, p. 85).
[195] (Adams, A Farther Shore, 2003, p. xxiii)
[196] (Powell, 2008).

Agreement also addressed the issue of human and civil rights, decommissioning, policing, and prisoners.[197]

The Good Friday Agreement met with mixed reactions, particularly from the Unionist side. Some of the more dissident groups rejected the GFA outright, and continued sectarian attacks throughout the following couple of years. One such splinter group, calling themselves the real IRA, exploded a 500 pound bomb in Omagh on August 15, 1998 in protest to the Agreement. Twenty-nine people were killed, including a number of children. However, McCann related that the response from all communities was sheer horror.[198] Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Féin, issued a statement condemning the atrocity and reaffirmed Sinn Féin's commitment to peace.[199] Many other political leaders echoed his affirmation for peace. While the Good Friday Agreement was not an end-all solution to the problems of Northern Ireland, it did mark a substantial step in the peace process and laid the foundation for a lasting peace.

Disagreements have continued over the practical application of some of the more contentious article so of the Agreement. Many of the issues are still being addressed and reformulated to this day. However, despite the continued obstacles in Northern Ireland politics and society, people across the board have rejected a return to the violence of the Troubles. With each new bomb or killing by dissident groups comes a staunch renunciation of violence. An example of this occurred on November 22, 2009, when dissident Republicans planted a bomb outside the PSNI headquarters. In response, Northern Ireland Security Minister Paul Goggins stated that "When attacks like these happen it bring people together

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[197] (The Agreement: Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations, 1998)
[198] (McCann, Non-violent Efforts of the Troubles, 2009)
[199] (Adams, Keynote Statement from Gerry Adams MP outlining his view of the current state of the peace process - issued by the the Sinn Féin press centre in Belfast, 1 September 1998.)

with the strong message that these dissidents will not succeed".[200] The attacks indicate that much work still needs to be done to address the continuing problems in Northern Ireland. However, the responses to them demonstrate the continued desire for peace.

[200] Security Minister Paul Goggins quoted in (400lb bomb left at Policing Board, 2009)

Chapter VI. Conclusion

Over the course of the thirty years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, there were a great variety of methods used to change the status quo. During the initial years, the status quo meant rampant inequalities and discriminatory practices used in government, employment, housing and many other areas of Northern Ireland life. It meant two very segregated communities, divided on the constitutional issue of whether Northern Ireland belonged to the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland. Perhaps the greatest struggle during these decades was in finding the best way to effect this change. Many people initially saw nonviolent, civil protest as the solution to the problems that afflicted society, but when faced with the repeated failure of those methods, they turned instead to the alternative that the IRA provided-an armed campaign .There were only a few that stuck with their belief in nonviolence, and it would take almost thirty years before others would again stand with them against violence.

As the civil rights movement gained momentum, it irrevocably transformed into a movement defined by sectarian lines. Civil protests degenerated into community clashes. Nonviolent activists, with John Hume leading the way, persisted in trying to convince the protestors to abstain from the use of violence, to turn the other cheek no matter what the provocation. In the face of escalating hostilities, however, the activists' efforts seemed to be in vain. They were up against hundreds of years of ingrained distrust and dislike between the Catholics and Protestants. Added to this history was an entirely new set of atrocities and grievances on which both side could draw. The sentiments of anger and revenge incurred from the death of a family member or the destruction of one's property were often more influential

than those of pacifism or forgiveness. This was especially true when the perpetrators were governmental forces, such as on Bloody Sunday.

Bloody Sunday was the event that effected the end of the civil rights movement and the complete alienation of the Catholic community. For over four years, Nationalists made no further attempt to create change through public protest. The political parties and Irish and British governments did what they could to reach some political agreement on the problem of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. The problem, however, was that at that time, no one was willing to compromise their own goals for the sake of peace; neither side was willing to allow even minor concessions to those that had been their adversary for so long. Another part of the reason why political solutions and social change were unsuccessful during these early years of the Troubles was that peace was a gradual process that needed time to mature. Many Nationalists wanted immediate political and social change. The difficulty with this was that Nationalists were faced with a Protestant community that was dedicated to maintaining the status quo, whatever the cost. People on both sides were drawing on hundreds of years of conflict and community division to back up their viewpoint, a hundred years of ingrained distrust.

It was not until the late 1970s that people once again began to advocate peace. The death of the Maguire children seemed to shock people back into considering an alternative to the continuous violence. The day that atrocity occurred in 1976 acted as a catalyst for renewed protest and immediately drew large crowds from both communities. The reason that the Peace People's rallies gained such support most likely stemmed from a general, growing fatigue with the violence. The high attendance of the rallies seemed to reflect a realization that perhaps the IRA's armed campaign was just as ineffectual at generating change as the civil

protests had been. The difference, however, was that the futility of the violence came a much higher cost. The unremitting violence of the 1980s and 1990s gradually increased the support for peace, often through other rallies. While they didn't directly end the violence, they did influence the actors who were perpetuating it. Given that the IRA was so closely tied to the Catholic community, the community's aversion to the continued violence could not but affect the decision to perpetuate such an armed campaign. It assisted in convincing the IRA that the Nationalist community would support a decision to turn towards a political path.

While the peace groups provided grassroots support of peace, the secret negotiations of the 1980s provided the framework for the political talks. The work of Brendan Duddy and the British agents provided a lasting thread upon which the British and the Nationalists could build their talks. John Hume and Gerry Adams then furthered this tread by diligently working to convince both the IRA and the British government to increase their talks with each other. When these talks began, the IRA was still unwilling to fully give up their armed campaign. They were, however, beginning to understand that violence was not the end-all solution. By the 1990s, they saw that it had only led to more violence, a vicious cycle that had already lasted almost thirty years.

It was the steadfast work of Hume and those who worked with him that provided Republicans with an alternative political framework to which they could turn. This framework then gave Sinn Féin and the other parties an avenue through which they could address the concerns of society, such as housing discrimination, equal representation in government, and problems with the policing force. Furthermore, it established the political steps through which the divided sides could reach a negotiated settlement on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland in the future. The debate is ongoing to this day, and sectarian issues still trouble

Northern Ireland. As a result of the political efforts of the 1990s, however, both communities and political leaders have prevented the violence from returning to what it was before the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. They finally seemed willing to dedicate themselves to the nonviolent alternative, but only after a great cost.

Throughout the thirty years of the Troubles, John Hume remained one of the only figures that never gave up on upholding the standard of nonviolence. His efforts did little during the civil rights movement. However, his perseverance inculcated him as a figure of integrity, one who never gave up his advocacy of nonviolence. Hume became a constant of peace, someone people could trust to hold to the ideals of nonviolence. It was on this foundation that he helped bring about conciliation when the two sides were finally ready to consider it.

It took years of devastation to compel people to turn away from the use of violence and to become ready to compromise. When they were ready, Hume then gave them something to turn towards. This is not to say that the violence was essential to peace, or was the most effective way of solving the issues that troubled society. In effect, it was more the ineffectiveness of the violence that became the crucial component. It showed that an armed campaign only begat more violence from the British forces, rather than diminish it. In this, the armed campaign of the IRA did not directly have their intended outcome of forcing the British out of Ireland. It did, however, result in such a high cost of life that it forced people to look for the alternative path. It motivated people to support the political efforts of leaders such as John Hume to end the Troubles. It showed people of both communities some of the worst things that could happen if peace was not achieved. It instilled a fear of returning to the height of the

violence during the 1970s. This then pushed them, and more specifically the political leaders, to strive more diligently towards a working compromise.

Greater Context

It must be asked why it took so much bloodshed for nonviolence to finally be accepted, to finally be effective. Perhaps it was because, as it is in so many other situations, people needed to see the darkness before they could appreciate the light. Society as a whole seemed to need to experience the horrors of the Troubles in order to have the perseverance and tenacity to fight for peace through nonviolent means. In larger context of world conflicts, this begs the question of whether all conflicts must take the course of violence as a necessary precursor to peace; whether people always need to experience the horrors of violence before they will stand steadfastly by a nonviolent path. Perhaps the key is to increase the knowledge of such conflicts and the steps that were taken to resolve them. An increase in this knowledge and awareness would then motivate other divided societies to strive for agreements without having to deteriorate in the devastation of the Troubles.

Appendix A-Maps

Plantation of Ireland



http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/maps/ire_1609.gif

Oliver Cromwell's campaign



http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/maps/mapcromwell.gif

Distribution of Protestants in Ireland, 1861 & 1991

All based on county figures



Unlike the rest of this site, this map is declared to be in the public domain.

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/maps/protestants_in_ire.gif

Appendix B

Abbreviations

AIA	Anglo-Irish Agreement
CSJ	The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland
DCAC	Derry Citizens' Action Committee
DHAC	Derry Housing Action Committee
GFA	Good Friday Agreement
IRA	Irish Republican Army
LVF	Loyalist Volunteer Force
NICRA	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
NIO	Northern Ireland Office
PD	People's Democracy
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
SF	Sinn Féin-political wing of the IRA
UDA	Ulster Defense Association
UDP	Ulster Defence Regiment
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force

Appendix C

Agency Group	Fatalities	% Of Total
Republican	2013	55. 71%
Loyalist	1018	28. 02%
Security Forces	378	10. 46%
Other	214	5. 92%

List of sectarian deaths caused by paramilitaries

Found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/mckeown/mckeown01.pdf

Year of Deaths during the Troubles

Year	Count
1969	16
1970	26
1971	171
1972	479
1973	253
1974	294
1975	260
1976	295
1977	111
1978	82
1979	121
1980	80
1981	113
1982	110
1983	85
1984	69
1985	57
1986	61
1987	98
1988	104
1989	76
1990	81
1991	96
1992	89
1993	88
1994	64
1995	9
1996	18
1997	22
1998	55
1999	8
2000	19
2001	16
TOTAL	3526

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