POLITICAL PRISONERS OR VICTIMS OF CHANCE? AN ANALYSIS OF THE WEST GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S RESPONSE TO GERMAN UNIFICATION

by

SANDRA LYNN BANKE

A THESIS

Presented to the Department of Political Science
and the Honors College for the degree of Bachelor of Arts
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of
Bachelor of Arts
March 1992

Approved: 

Dr. Arthur Hanhardt, jr.

An Abstract of the Thesis of

Sandra Lynn Banke for the degree of Bachelor of Arts

in the Department of Political Science

to be taken March 1992

Title: POLITICAL PRISONERS OR VICTIMS OF CHANCE? AN ANALYSIS OF THE WEST GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' RESPONSE TO GERMAN UNIFICATION

Approved: [redacted]
Dr. Arthur Hanhardt, jr.

In 1990, the West German Social Democratic Party, the opposition party in the West German Parliament, presented a disunited response to the imminent unification of the East German and West German states. However, beginning in 1972, the Social Democrats had begun a policy of rapprochement with the German Democratic Republic, in hopes of easing relations and possibly encouraging an eventual unification. In this thesis, this policy has been analyzed to discover why the party, whose goal had appeared to be German unity, was unable to direct the process leading to unification on 3 October 1990. My thesis is that the Social Democrats, whose goal had not been political unity, but cultural unity, had

expected reform in the GDR to come from within the ruling regime, and thus were caught off guard when the democratic revolution in the GDR began with the masses.

DEDICATION

Diese Arbeit widme ich den Oregon Austauschstudenten, die das Seminar 12- 18 November 1989 in Berlin mit mir miterlebt haben. Das was echt einmalig- haben wir es uns wahrgenommen, als die Geschichte uns vor den Augen gelaufen ist?

Ich möchte sie auch meiner Freundin aus Leipzig, Susann, widmen. Sie hatte sich eine neue DDR vorgestellt. Nun, existiert ihr Land nicht mehr.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I.	INTRODUCTION	7
II.	THE FIRST PHASE OF OSTPOLITIK, THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, AND THE GERMAN NATIONAL QUESTION	13
	The German Question	14
	The SPD's Ostpolitik	15
	Willy Brandt & Egon Bahr- the Authors of Ostpolitik	19
	Ostpolitik	21
	The Basic Treaty of 1972	28
	Implications of the First Phase of Ostpolitik	34
III.	THE SECOND PHASE OF OSTPOLITIK, 1982-89	36
	Background Information	37
	The SPD-SED Dialogue	40
	The Common Paper	44
	Public Reaction	51
	Ostpolitik in 1989	55
	A Few Questions	57
IV.	THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE UNIFICATION PROCESS OF 1990	59
	The Initial Response of the SPD up to 18 March 1990- the Volkskammerwahl in the German Democratic Republic	60
	Willy Brandt & Oskar Lafontaine- Two Different Politicians	62
	The East German Social Democratic Party- a New Development	74
	The Volkskammer Election, its Outcome, and the SPD on Unification until 1990	79
V.	CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS	89
	Analysis	89
	Conclusion	93
	Appendix A	95
	Appendix B	96
	Bibliography	97

I. INTRODUCTION

The events of the autumn of 1989 and the ensuing acceleration toward unification of the two German states caught the world off guard. The Cold War politics of the postwar era, not to mention the pride and joy of the Social Democrats, the famous Ostpolitik, were definitively made obsolete. As soon as the Wall opened on 9 November 1989, and rumblings of unification began to be felt, politicians of the German Left were forced to structure a new "Deutschlandpolitik." This was a difficult task, complicated first by the rapidity of the downfall of the communist regime in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Socialist Unity Party (SED), and second by the changing political attitudes toward a unified Germany both east and west of the Wall. The West German Bundestag election was scheduled for December 1990. All too soon the speed and extent of the unification of the two German states became the central theme of an election campaign which saw the victory of the conservative party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who, only a year before, suffered from a negative public image. By the same token, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and their candidate, Saarland's minister president Oskar Lafontaine, favored to win the election before Autumn 1989, suffered as

a result of their response to the changes in the "German Question."

The response of the Social Democrats toward unification with the GDR surprised everyone, including the Social Democrats. Of anyone, the SPD should have been the party of German "re-unification," in light of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, which sought to improve relations with the eastern neighbor, and in light of the Second Phase of Ostpolitik in the 1980s. Both of these policies sought "Wandel durch Annäherung," or change through rapprochment, and dialogue with the SED. Unification, however, if it ever were to be realized, would be through a process of small steps and through a change from within the ruling communist regime. Basically, the authors of Ostpolitik expected change from the top and from within the system.

The groundswell revolution of 1989 and the demise of the SED, however, left the SPD "holding the proverbial bag," and in a state of confusion, which allowed the CDU to grab the opportunity history was passing on to them. Cornered by their former ties with the SED, the SPD was unable to profit from the Kohl-led unification euphoria in the 1990 elections, specifically in the Volkskammer election in the GDR on 18 March 1990, and later in the FRG's Bundestag election of 2 December 1990. An analysis of the Social Democrats' unusual response to the solution of the German Question has been the focus of my research.

My thesis to this perplexing response of the SPD to German unification is that, in spite of the SPD's formerly close ties with the SED and the East, the party was, in fact a prisoner of its former Ostpolitik policies concerning German division and dialogue with the SED. As a result, both parties, the West German SPD and the East German SPD, suffered from their own disunity and lack of organization concerning the unification question. Finally, as the opposition parties in their respective campaigns, the Social Democrats were unable to overcome the popular politics of the incumbent administration. Their difficult position was hindered further by the reputation and the campaign rhetoric of Oskar Lafontaine.

In the course of this thesis, this response will be examined in three sections. First, the SPD's policy on relations with the East and its philosophy on the "Zweistaatlichkeit Deutschlands" will be discussed in an examination of Brandt's Ostpolitik of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Secondly, the continuation of this policy in the 1980s, called the Second Phase of Ostpolitik, will be discussed as cementing the SPD's commitment to the division of Germany, the de facto recognition of the SED regime, German cultural unity, and European security. These two discussions will give us some clues to the disunified response of the SPD to unification of the two German states in 1989-90, including Lafontaine's surprising and difficult

opposition to a speedy unification. In this section, the unique position of the SPD on the GDR will be discussed, as well as why SPD-SPD relations may have been difficult. The reputation of its western "Schwesterpartei" may have cost the GDR-SPD the Volkskammer election of March 1990, in which they had been expected to be victorious.

Finally, in the concluding section, I will take a last look at the major criticism of the SPD since 1990. The question of whether the Social Democrats were indeed political prisoners or victims of chance will also be answered.

Because the events discussed in this paper are of a fairly recent nature and little scholarly work has yet been published on the SPD's response to the unification per se, the nature of this paper is fairly speculative. It can be assumed that the Social Democrats responded as such because of their commitment to Ostpolitik in the 1970s and 1980s. The other argument, that the SPD was simply victim of political chance, i.e. being in the wrong place at the wrong time in history, can also be assumed.

Lastly, before we begin our examination of Ostpolitik, in order to understand the SPD's reluctant response to a unified German state in general over the past thirty years, we should touch on the attitude historically of the Left and political unity. Rolf Schneider, in his article "Die Einheit wird kommen," argues that as a product of 19th century emanicipation and labor movements, the SPD has had

problems with the nation state, or more appropriately, "Reich" idea. (Schneider, 205) The "Vaterlandsverdrossenheit" has prevailed historically in the Social Democrats' philosophy, as political movements promoting a unified fatherland, specifically, Bismarck's conservative unified state and Hitler's Third Reich, had made leftist-socialist movements illegal. (*Ibid.*, 202) During the Adenauer era, when the CDU put its stamp on the "Zweistaatlichkeit Deutschlands" and its commitment ot the western military alliance, the SPD, in the opposition, had the opportunity to create a new approach to this question, but opted for maintenance of the status quo- a so-called "Politik des Realismus." (Ibid., 203) Realistically, Germany could not be politically unified in the forseeable future, but cultural unity of the two states could be a possibility.

Fast forward to 1989-90, and Egon Bahr, SPD foreign policy specialist and participant in the SED dialogue of the 1980s, claims that unification is "diametrically opposed" to the ideals of European integration, upon which Lafontaine and others placed their highest priorities. A unified Germany is likened to a breach of contract and as obstructing the realization of the unified Europe. (*Ibid.*, 202) This is a difficult stance when the sister party to the east is looking forward to a unified Germany within a united Europe. However, the SPD also claimed, were Germany to unify, the SPD "ist nämlich nach Lage der Dinge in den

beiden Deutschländern die einzige politische Kraft, die das soziale Moment überzeugend vertreten und durchsetzen kann." (*Ibid.*, 206) Clearly, the exact SPD stance on the unity of the two German states is influenced by its past, but became obsolete in light of later developments. Let us continue this idea in the first chapter, in which we examine the attitude of the Social Democrats on the German Question at the beginning of their successful Ostpolitik.

II. THE FIRST PHASE OF OSTPOLITIK, THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, AND THE GERMAN NATIONAL QUESTION

For the opposition to argue against the [Basic Treaty], even if it was well-founded from a factual viewpoint, was next to impossible, considering that humanitarian improvements had been moved into the limelight.

- Andreas Hillgruber
(Bark & Gress, vol. II, 216)

Im Begriffe der Nation sind geschichtliche Wirklichkeit und politischer Wille vereint... Niemand kann leugnen, dass es... eine deutsche Nation gibt und geben wird, soweit wir voraus denken vermögen.

- Willy Brandt
1970 State of the Nation
(Richter, 1147)

2.1 The German Question

Before an examination of the Social Democrats' response to the German national question can be addressed, one needs to define the issue. For many in Germany, particularly right after the war, as the Basic Law was being formulated, there was only one answer to the German Question: political reunification within the borders of the German Reich of 1937. The Basic Law mandated that the Federal Republic continually work toward the eventual unity of all German people, which most politicians, particularly in the conservative alliance, took to mean political unification. No legislation or treaty which recognized the German Democratic Republic and its borders, without a free democratic election within those borders, was deemed compatible with the provisions of the Basic Law. (Bark & Gress, 218)

The answer to the German Question can be defined even beyond the concept of political unification. Were Germany ever to be reunited, in which superpower camp would it reside? Or, even more frightening, particularly to the Western military alliance, NATO, would a united Germany decide to remain neutral? Specifically, was the German policy of improving relations with the Eastern Bloc, a policy which the Social Democrats christened Ostpolitik, a signal of a deep desire for political reunification? If so,

would the unified state remain loyal to the Western alliance? (Garton Ash, 71)

2.2 The SPD's Deutschlandpolitik

There developed during the late 1960s and into the 1970s a new approach to the solution of the German Question which did not include political unification. In fact, many on the Left did not support political unity, claiming that it would lead to isolation within the European community. This is according to Egon Bahr, Eastern European expert in the SPD. (Grass, 19)

This new approach was based on the belief that "unity," both European and German, did not depend on political unification. (*Ibid.*, 74) Cultural unity, as a way toward German unity, gained popularity on the German political Left as people began to accept that the political division of Germany, "Zweistaatlichkeit," was a reality that could not be overcome in the forseeable future. Many also believed that three decades of communist rule had fundamentally changed the society of the GDR, making unity practically impossible. Willy Brandt, the father of Ostpolitik, declared that two German states indeed rested on German soil, but that those states made up one German nation, which could never be divided. (Schweigler, 87)

This, in essence, defined the Social Democrats' "Deutschlandpolitik," or policy concerning the German

Democratic Republic. By overcoming the divisions that split Europe into two ideologically opposing spheres through improved relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Social Democrats hoped to break down the barriers dividing the German people. If political unity were impossible, then a peaceful co-existence of the two states could at least promote a unification of the German people into a cultural nation; a nation that shared the same literature, the same philosophers, the same history, and above all, the same language. (Brandt, 143) The idea of a German nation state was rendered all but obsolete, especially by such leftist writers as Günter Grass, who notes that German unity within the past century and a half had always been under stress. (Grass, 74)

In sum, it was thought that people on both sides could benefit from peaceful cooperation and an acknowledgment of the second German state, but especially those in the GDR. In order to overcome the ideological divisions that split Germany, the Social Democrats sought to minimize the status quo of distrust and tension that had defined East-West relations and had effectively hindered inner-German relations. A policy was developed which encouraged peaceful negotiation between the two systems without the burden of pre-conditions set by either side. Unconditional change as a pre-requisite for effective negotiation, a philosophy pursued during the Adenauer era, was in 1968 regarded as isolating the East German state from the West and driving

the German people even farther apart. (Fritsch-Bournazel, 40) The more unwilling one side was to negotiate, the more "wearisome" the process of "Entspannung," or relaxation between the states would prove to be. (Brandt, 148)

Therefore, normalization of the inner-German relations required finding areas of cooperation between the two regimes and celebrating each small success as a step toward the eventual "emotional" unification of the German peoples. This type of unification would be based upon "common heritage [and] common hopes." (Bark & Gress, 182) This best explains what Egon Bahr envisioned as a policy of "small steps"- "Politik der kleinen Schritte." (Grass, 19) Cooperation and political tolerance were important factors leading to the SPD's foreign policy goals, as "alliances have never survived on common values, only on common interests." (Phillips, 423)

The most practical common interest that the two opposing social systems could share was also the main impetus for the SPD to expand relations with the GDR. They wanted to see the creation of an "europäische Friedensgemeinschaft," or European community of peace. In a peacefully organized European community, the bridges between East and West could be restored. Only with their restoration could the animosities of the past be successfully and positively dealt with- an illustration of the German need for "Vergangenheitsbewältigung." (Brandt,

119) Change in the Eastern regimes could then be effected through this peace community

> dass wir [the Federal Republic] unter gegenseitiger Achtung der verschiedenen Ordnungen und des Prinzips der Nichteinmischung eine Basis Gemeinsamer Interessen in Europa schaffen können. (*Ibid.*)

Furthermore, the Social Democrats felt that the two German states shared a common responsibility for creating a peace in Europe, a responsibility stemming from their shared guilt and past in the Third Reich. (Jesse, 22) This common responsibility is also to the German people in both states, to improve conditions for the people on both sides of the Wall. For example, by normalizing relations between the two states and improving contacts, the contrast between the two systems would intensify. This would be followed by an enlivened German consciousness and keep the German Question open. (Schweigler, 86) This reconciliatory philosophy of inner-German relations signaled a marked change of attitude from the immediate postwar era.

The Social Democrats' new philosophy on the solution to the German Question, "Wandel durch Annäherung," or change through rapprochment, caused them to set a myriad of policy precedents in relations with the GDR. These could even be called foreign policy precedents, as the SPD-FDP coalition government in the Federal Republic was dealing with the SED, which for all practical purposes was identical to the government of the GDR. These precedents proved in 1989-90 to be difficult to extricate oneself from, not to mention

embarrassing, particularly when the political developments leading to the unification rush were not expedited by the SPD.

2.3 Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr- the Authors of Ostpolitik

The personal philosophies and strategies of the two major players in the Social Democratic Party, Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt, greatly influenced the increasingly left-leaning attitude of the party during the SPD-FDP coalition from 1968-1974.

Egon Bahr, Eastern European policy strategist for the SPD, had proposed the radical "Change through Rapprochment" with the GDR as early as 1963. This is not surprising, considering the dream of political unification with East Germany all but died with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. His strategy for reconciliation first and foremost required a tacit recognition of the status quo, i.e. the existence of a second German state. This would not constitute legal recognition, however, which could only come to be realized through a peace treaty. (Schweigler, 86) Much to the chagrin of the Western alliance, Bahr also maintained that detente could only be preserved through military disarmament and the dismantling of all existing alliances, which were to be replaced with new organizations including both East and West European states, i.e., the CSCE, the Council of Security and Cooperation in Europe.

These alliances would then be protected under a "European Common Security System." (Bark & Gress, 162) Why change what had existed to maintain stability for over 20 years? Because Bahr felt that the Cold War strategies had all but helped stabilize the two German systems. The demilitarized, neutralized Central Europe that he envisioned would lead to peace in Central Europe quicker than encouraging superpower tension and conflict.

Willy Brandt, however, as chancellor, did not want to go so far as to neutralize the Federal Republic by supporting a dissolution of NATO. In fact, many historians agree that the success of Ostpolitik in the early years resulted from the Social Democrats' keeping the FRG firmly anchored in the West. A neutral Federal Republic at that time may have been too vulnerable to pressure from the Soviet Union to support a confident Ostpolitik. (Larrabee, 9) Brandt also opposed formally recognizing the sovereignty of the GDR. If it did, the Federal Republic could no longer award East Germans automatic Federal citizenship if they successfully escaped. (McAdams, 57) Furthermore, the GDR was not a state based on self-determination, making it impossible for the West to recognize it as a legitimate state.

However, Brandt did agree with Bahr on the point that reconciliation and detente could only be attained through military disarmament and a dismantling of the "Feindbilder," or enemy stereotypes which had grown up between the two

states. Additionally, as a good Social Democrat, Brandt believed the creation of a European order of peace and stability took priority over any dreams of political reunification. Important, too, was that the German nation could be once again culturally united, which did not necessarily mean unification. Therefore it was agreed that some concessions would have to be made to the Eastern regimes in order to preserve European stability and to improve the lives of 16 million Germans in the GDR.

2.4 Ostpolitik

Through the foreign policy objectives outlined below, Willy Brandt became known as the chancellor of reconciliation. (Bark & Gress, 154) Generally, problems between the two spheres of influence could not be solved through open conflict, but rather through peaceful negotiation. Therefore, a mutual renunciation of force would have to be worked toward by both sides in order to preserve freedom on German soil. Finally, with this new German policy, the Social Democrats sought to encourage and preserve the basic human rights of the people of the German nation. (*Ibid.*, 168)

This last objective remained the top priority of the Western partners throughout the years of negotiation and cooperation between the two German states. Brandt's reconciliatory policies were not at their center means to

political success. Rather, they were the means to the improvement of the lot of 16 million East Germans who were living under a hard and undeserved destiny, a destiny placed upon them by the agreements ending World War II. The Federal Republic, lucky enough to have fallen under the control of the Western allies, should do everything possible to make their Eastern brothers' and sisters' lives easier. (Brandt, 125)

But did that mean validating an unjust regime, which deprived its citizens of the basic right of movement, through drawn out negotiations? No, and the FRG, under the SPD, could not morally recognize the SED regime, as it prevented the exercise of self-determination by its people. But, Brandt also claimed that "sich ungeachtet der grossen Unterschiede unserer politischen Systeme und Standpunkte auch innerhalb Deutschlands viele Probleme lösen lassen." (Ibid., 127)

Therefore, on the basis of this idea, I would maintain that the negotiations with the Eastern regimes and the ratification of the Eastern Treaties ("Ostverträge") in 1970 and 1972 were the correct line of politics in light of the political situation at the time. Indeed, these treaties produced many positive results for people on both sides of the Wall, as will be discussed below. Although the "Kulturnation," the emotional unification of the German spirit, may not have been realized, at least these

controversial policies were "small steps" in the right direction, toward reconciliation.

One of the first major German policy acts of the Brandt/Scheel administration (Scheel was the foreign minister to Brandt during the SPD-FDP coalition) was to dismantle the agencies within the government that symbolized unwillingness to truly reconcile with the GDR and were obstacles to negotiations with the Soviet Bloc. The first to be dismantled was the "Ostbüro of the SPD." This represented a Cold War attitude of possible conflict and assumed a West German responsiblity for the Eastern Zone, i.e. the GDR. Also dismantled was the Ministry for All-German Affairs. This was thus renamed the Ministry for Inner-German Relations. Not only did this signal the willingness of the Bonn administration to renounce its claim to responsibility for all German concerns and sole representation of all German people, it also marked a willingess to cooperate with the SED regime as a legitimate negotiating partner for common German concerns. (Bark & Gress, 164)

A second major milestone on the road toward normal relations with the GDR, which shocked the more conservative German politicians, was the rejection of the Hallstein Doctrine. This early postwar piece of legislation refused to engage in diplomatic relations with any state that recognzied the GDR diplomatically. This was seen as severly

hampering any hope for meaningful dialoge with the other German republic, as well as with Moscow. So, already planning for intensified talks with East Berlin, Bonn declared the "Scheel Doctrine." Only meant to be a temporary policy, the Scheel Doctrine suspended the decree that recognition of the GDR constituted hostile actions toward the interests of the FRG. On the contrary, such recognition was allowed, but only after the Bonn politicians had successfully drafted a basic treaty of relations with East Berlin.

Before the Social Democrats could make headway into their planned negotiations with Berlin, a treaty with Moscow had to be drafted. This came 12 August and 7 December 1970, as Bonn signed its first Eastern Treaties ("Ostverträge") with Moscow and Warsaw. In this first attempt to create an atmosphere of understanding, and to accept the status quo as a means for encouraging that understanding, the Federal Republic agreed to recognize as permanent the loss of German territory as a result of World War II. Thereby the present European borders were accepted as permanent. This, then, granted de facto recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line, the border which separated the GDR from former German territory now belonging to Poland. (Schweigler, 82)

Although the Moscow/Warsaw treaties broke little new ground for human improvements in Eastern Europe, they did acknowledge the political facts of postwar Europe. This constituted an important first step toward security and

peaceful co-existence. (Brandt, 143) By signing these agreements with the Eastern Bloc countries, the Federal Republic accepted the Communist regimes as reliable negotiating partners on the road toward a more stabile Europe. Through this acceptance, Bonn hoped to win these regimes' trust as a means of promoting "Entspannung" between East and West, as well as hoping to pave the way toward treaties with East Berlin.

The Social Democrats also realized that the SED would not break new ground on its own without the approval of the Soviet taskmaster. Interestingly, when that nod came, Walter Ulbricht, then general secretary of the SED, was unwilling to negotiate with Bonn unless full diplomatic recognition were granted the GDR. Soviet pressure to cooperate with Bonn's detente strategy forced Ulbricht out of office in May 1971, making Erich Honecker new head of the SED.

Was Bonn, or more correctly, the ruling SPD, justified in granting so much recognition to regimes which unjustly denied their peoples freedom and maintained the division of Europe? Should they have taken matters into their own hands concerning relations with the Eastern Bloc without the approval of the Western alliance? The answer was a clear "yes" if those concessions might bring greater security in Central Europe. Peter Brandt, son of former Chancellor Willy Brandt, saw Ostpolitik as "[improving]... the pre-requisites for emancipating leftist policies in West- as

well as in East Germany." (Jesse, 40) Twenty years later, one political writer reflecting on the achievements of Willy Brandt, stated that "[Ostpolitik] hastened the demoralization of the Communist empire and invigorated the forces of reason and reform within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." (Schlesinger, 12) But many felt that with the Basic Treaty the Federal Republic signed with the GDR, Brandt had gone too far.

Before the Basic Treaty was formulated, another treaty, the "Verkehrsvertrag," or transportation agreement, was signed on 26 May 1972. This first agreement between the FRG and the GDR facilitated travel into the GDR for West Germans by setting up regulations for transit between the West German border and West Berlin. Its purpose, to "promote 'normal, good-neighborly relations'" between the two systems, was a step in the right direction. That direction was to unify the German nation at least emotionally and to re-establish the "Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl" (feeling of belonging together) that defined the reality of the German nation. (Jesse, 22)

However, by admitting that the government of the GDR had a legitimate right to regulate transit within its borders, the Brandt administration provided a "concrete example" of the de facto recognition of the GDR and the negotiating ability of the Socialist Unity Party's regime. (Bark & Gress, 214) It is true that one of Brandt's objectives in normalizing German-German relations included

"[respecting] the independence and separate status of each of the two states in matters concerning their internal sovereign authority." (Ibid., 179) But by confirming its sovereignty on matters of setting regulations for inner-German travel, the Social Democrats were all but recognizing the permanence of the division of Germany.

Furthermore, by working out the two treaties, with the SED as the party that was for all practical purposes the GDR government, the SPD tacitly recognzied that regime as the legitimate negotiating party. But the provisions of the treaties granted acceptance only to the government of the GDR, as the treaties were between states, not to the unjustified regime that administered it. To recognize the government and not the party representing it at the same time is much like talking out of both sides of one's mouth. Realistically, a government cannot recognize one without tacitly recognzing the other. This proves to illustrate the thin ice on which the Brandt administration tred in order to answer the German National Question while affirming the European status quo at the same time.

2.5 The Basic Treaty of 1972

With the signing of the "Vertrag über die Grundlagen der Beziehung zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik" by their respective party representatives, Egon Bahr as SPD Minister for Special Affairs, and Michael Kohl of the SED, on 21 December 1972, the Bonn and East Berlin governments recognized the permanence of the German "Zweistaatlichkeit." They also solidified the course of the Federal Republic's Deutschlandpolitik, "Wandel durch Annäherung," for the next 17 years.

Under the provisions of the Basic Treaty, the SPD administration recognized informally the legitimacy of the GDR as a separate state on the soil of the 1937 German Reich; de facto because to formally recognize the GDR statehood would forever close the German Question and create the legal difficulties discussed earlier. (McAdams, 57) Rather, both states agreed to the following articles which were to facilitate a peaceful co-existence on German soil:

1. The FRG and the GDR agree to develop neighborly relations.

2. According to the U.N. Charter, both states agree to recognize the sovereign equality of all nations, including their right to territorial integrity and self-determination.

3. Both states agree to renunciate the use of force in the settlement of conflicts.

4. The FRG renunciates its claim to represent all Germans ("Alleinvertretungsanspruch.")

5. Both states agree to safeguard European peace and encourage disarmament.

6. Both states agree to respect each state's independence and sovereignty in their domestic and foreign policy concerns.

7. Both agree to regulate humanitarian questions and normalize relations in the areas of science and technology, transportation, economics, the postal service, etc.

8. Both agree to send a permanent representative ("ständige Vertretung") to each state.

9. The treaty does not interfere with any of the previous international agreements signed with other states.

10. "Zu Urkund dessen haben die Bevollmächtigten der Hohen Vertragschliessenden Seiten diesen Vertrag unterzeichnet."

(Entire text in Jesse, 20)

Specifically, through the Basic Treaty, the Federal Republic recognizes the GDR in Article 2- respect of territorial integrity, in Article 4- renunciation of the "Alleinvertretungsanspruch," and in Article 6- the respect of its sovereignty in domestic and international agreements. Perhaps this recognition is justified- unity does not have to mean changing borders and demanding internal change. In fact, to have done so would have forgone the hope of Germany ever reunifying. (Jesse, 23) In order to secure that hope for the future, the past had to be come to terms with and the status quo recognized in the present.

Part of recognizing the status quo meant admitting that both states must remain in their respective alliances. This was the point of a statement Brandt issued in the Spring of

1972, that the Eastern treaties affected none of either state's previous agreements with other treaty organizations (i.e. NATO and the WTO). (Bark & Gress, 212) In fact, to question the membership of the GDR would have broken off relations not only with the GDR, but with the Soviet Union as well. Ostpolitik was meant to secure European stability and that meant each German state's secure membership in their respective alliances. (Jesse, 22) This policy was indeed reasonable, given the world political situation at the time. And one cannot deny that the situations of the people in both states did improve dramatically.

But the treaties were not without their weaknesses and critics.

First, it could easily become difficult to enforce the transportation agreements, as nothing prevented the GDR government from raising, for example, the minimum required exchange of D-Marks into Ostmarks, which they did in the early 1980s.

Also, Article 9 of the Basic Treaty states that the treaty does not take precedence over previous obligations each state may have to its alliances. So what was the purpose of the treaty other than recognizing, yet not recognizing, the existence of another German state within the German Nation?

Third, because the Social Democrats were anxious to get the treaty drafted and signed, the environment of the talks were to the advantage of the GDR, and therefore the SED.

(*Ibid.*, 218) The SED negotiators could easily concede eased travel regulations for West Germans in the East, but they were under no obligation to grant their own citizens the same freedom. Similarly, they gladly agreed that two German states existed, but refused to admit that there was one German nation. (*Ibid.*, 217) This atmosphere, in which one side clearly possessed the upper hand, and in which the SPD may have been pressured to draft a treaty in light of the coming parliamentary elections, perhaps lead to a premature signature of the Basic Treaty before the ground breaking concessions to the GDR could be thoroughly discussed. For example, while portions of the treaty did not reflect the existing internal practices of the GDR, Article 6 guarantees the GDR sovereign jurisdiction over its internal affairs. This means that even though the GDR may break with the provisions they agreed to in the treaty, their internal sovereignty prevents any foreign party from interfering.

Because of these weaknesses, as well as for negotiating with an unjustified regime ideologically opposed to the philosophy of the West, the Social Democrats suffered harsh criticism, particularly from the Christian Democratic Union, then the opposition party in the parliament. The CDU even tried to block the ratification of the treaties in the Bundestag by attempting to break up the SPD-FDP coalition, and by declaring the treaties incompatible with the preamble of the Basic Law. This forbids the closing of the German Question or any policy that might do so. (*Ibid.*, 218) But

the Brandt administration's popularity and the clear humanitarian improvements outlined in the treaties withstood the opposition. The Bundestag ratified the Basic Treaty. As Andreas Hillgruber's quote preceding this chapter suggests, it was practically impossible to successfully pose a well-founded argument against this treaty. Despite the huge concessions to the Soviet Bloc, and the apparent cementing of the German division, the Ostverträge were viewed overall as making the best of a bad situation and as a courageous attempt to normalize the inner-German relations severed on 13 August 1961.

In sum, the attitude of cooperation and peaceful co-existence with Eastern Europe that the Social Democrats sought to develop with Ostpolitik continued to influence German foreign policy decisions concerning East Germany into the Kohl administration of 1982. The concept of unifying the two German states into a cultural national entity gained acceptance as political unity became a dream in light of growing superpower antagonisms in the Reagan years.

In order to create an atmosphere of neighborly cooperation, the early "Ostpolitikers" concerned themselves with balancing the opposing goals and interests of the Western and Soviet-style systems. (Brandt, 170) Although these policies met heavy opposition in the early 1970s and accusations of "selling out" to the GDR, the Social Democrats maintained that finding areas of common interest

and cooperation with ideologically opposing regimes was a necessary policy, and perhaps, a necessary evil. Without it, a long-term and stabile European peace could not be solved through any immediate action. Only by enduring the slow process and celebrating each "small step" toward mutual understanding could the eventual goal of a German "Kulturnation" be realized: "... der Blick muss stets auf grössere Lösungen gerichtet sein." (*Ibid.*)

However, as not everyone shared these attitudes with the Social Democrats in the mid- to late 1980s, especially the East Germans, the memory of these policies proved problematic in the events leading up to the accelerated unification process and election campaigns of 1989-90.

2.6 Implications of the First Phase of Ostpolitik

What are the real implications of the Social Democrats' answer to German Unity, the "Kulturnation," when compared with the reality of political unification in 1990?

The SPD had maintained that the policy of detente should be implemented slowly and patiently, and that the resolution to the German Question should be carried out in the context of a united Europe. As Theo Sommer, a prominent West German journalist for *Die Zeit*, states, in order to avoid suspicion of German nationalism, the FRG should concentrate on the European community.

> Sobald den Verdacht aufkommt, wir wollten bloss Europa vor den Karren des deutschen Nationalismus spannen, wird sich dieses Europa unserem nationalen Ehrgeize verweigern. (Jesse, 15)

Maintaining the trust of the European nations took top priority, even in 1990. Oskar Lafontaine, the SPD's chancellor candidate, warned of German nationalism outrunning the Federal Republic's commitment to the European Community. This, one of many unpopular statements, put Lafontaine in a disadvantageous position as Kohl succeeded in securing unification less than two months before the parliamentary elections.

The SPD had also believed, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the "Second Phase of Ostpolitik," that changes within the communist regimes were not required for

successful negotiation and cooperation. Article 6 of the Basic Treaty clearly states that the Federal Republic would not interfere with the internal concerns of the GDR, a policy that was expanded in 1987, in the Common Paper, to include no criticism of SED decisions. This worked against the SPD, as they sought to carry on talks with a regime that did not acknowledge the "perestroika" reforms of the Soviet Union as necessary in the GDR. The Basic Treaty had tied their hands by "requiring" the FRG not to get involved.

Finally, by signing the Basic Treaty, the Brandt administration de facto recognized the existence of the GDR. This puts a stigma on his party for wanting to cement the German "Zweistaatlichkeit" and stabilize an illegal regime. Although with the ratification of the treaty the SPD had hoped to mend some of the bridges spanning Europe in a new way, two decades later the act could possibly have worked against them in the 1990 parliamentary elections. Their will for unity was seen as missing. (Jesse, 1126)

III. THE SECOND PHASE OF OSTPOLITIK, 1982-1989

Reform von oben durch die Bürokratie und gegen die Bürokratie.

... Keine Partei ist wie die SPD berechtigt und verpflichtet zu verlangen, dass in der DDR mehr Demokratie gewagt wird.
(Gansel, on the SPD in the 1980s)

Whoever here, now and in all seriousness declares the German question 'open' not only destroys the fragile base of Ostpolitik, but also the very foundation of European postwar politics.
-1983 SPD Policy Statement
(Bark & Gress, vol. II, 452)

Lange Zeit hatten sich alte Godesberger und junge 68er [Jusos] um die Ausrichtung der Partei gestritten, seit dem Machtwechsel 1982 aber war das Gewicht zugunsten der 68er verschoben worden, die heute die SPD prägen.
-Seebacher-Brandt on the SPD in the 1980s
(Jesse, 1127)

Der Sündefall lag darin, dass in der Theorie die Systeme in Deutschland West und Deutschland Ost für moralisch gleichwertig galten und in der Praxis niemand wusste, worüber noch oder wieder zu streiten war.
(Seebacher-Brandt, 67)

3.1 Background Information

With the Second Phase of Ostpolitik, the Social Democratic Party continued to pursue their own answer to the German National Question, i.e. the creation of a German "Kulturnation." This answer would take the form of a closer relationship between the two German states instead of the pursuit of the political unification that seemed all but impossible given the status quo. The continuation of this policy, however, would prove to be most damaging to the party once political unification became a reality in 1990. At this time the united German people were deciding which party should direct unification in the December Bundestag elections.

During this phase of Ostpolitik, the Social Democrats were once again influenced by the rapprochment philosophy of foreign policy strategist, Egon Bahr. As a result, more extensive agreements with the East German Socialist Unity Party were sought. The product of this relationship was an array of non-binding security agreements and controversial ideological documents outlining the two socialist parties' common values and interests. Given the international political climate during the 1980s, and given a CDU administration that was perceived as not going far enough to ease relations with the GDR, the SPD more than ever saw the need to cooperate with the SED in order to create stability in Central Europe. The working groups of the SPD hoped to realize this continued goal, to improve the lives of those

living under communist rule, with the continuation of "Wandel durch Annäherung," that is, the reform of the SED regime from within the leadership. (Schneider, 206) The end result of this policy, however, was an apparent strengthening of the party's commitment to the permanence of the German "Zweistaatlichkeit," their policy of "Nichteinmischung," and the de facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic, all of which had their origins in the Basic Treaty of German Relations of 1972.

The Social Democrats eventually became prisoners to these policies, as the East and West German voters questioned the believability of a party that had, for all practical purposes, recognized the permanence of the Socialist Unity Party.

Several reasons motivated the SPD, in the 1980s as the opposition party in the Bundestag, to pursue the intensified contacts with the SED. Some of these reasons claimed policial motivation; others, humanitarian imperatives.

First, with the ascension of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition to the governing position in the Bonn administration under the new chancellor, Helmut Kohl, the Social Democrats lost much political influence concerning foreign policy objectives. Because the Kohl government, although critical of the Basic Treaty, continued Ostpolitik after the 1982 election, one of the major divisions between the two leading West German parties was erased. (Phillips, 12) In fact, despite criticism of the worsening relations between the two

German states in the early 1980s, most West German politicians would never have dreamed of interfering with the internal affairs of the GDR. (Bark & Gress, 412) In light of this, the Social Democratic Party, believing that it was the only party capable of pursuing a dialogue with the East, needed to reclaim their exclusive title as the party of reconciliation and of Ostpolitik.

Second, the increasingly antagonistic superpower relations during the Reagan administration, together with the build up of Soviet SS-20 missiles and U.S. Pershing 2 and intermediate range missiles, contributed to the growing instability in Central Europe. The threat of nuclear war on German soil increasingly became a reality. Both the SPD and the SED realized that their states shared the common interest of maintaining their own military security. The central issue between East and West Germany was no longer ideological struggle, but the avoidance of war on German soil. (*Ibid.*, 413) The superpowers could no longer be relied upon to rationally solve the East-West conflict as long as they played with the fates of millions of German people.

Finally, if normalizing relations with the other socialist party meant improving the chances for democracy and human rights, then the Social Democrats were not against this and other measures which stabilized the status quo. These other measures would include supporting a pull-out of Western forces from Germany. The Social Democrats have been

against NATO involvement in Europe historically, favoring instead an independent European community. In the past, nationalist movements in Germany have led to unstable political conditions and difficulties for the leftist movements. Recognizing German division and favoring "Europeanism" would prevent the rise of yet another potentially dangerous German feeling of nationalism. (Interview)

3.2 The SPD-SED Dialogue

The dialogue between the two German socialist parties actually began at the instigation of the then SED general secretary Erich Honecker. He recognized the need for peace and the establishment of common interests in Central Europe caught between the superpower nuclear arsenals. What he proposed was a "Koalition der Vernunft," or coalition of reason. The intent was to smooth out the differences in political ideology among European socialists. All Western socialist parties were invited to the Karl Marx Peace Conference in April 1983. It was at this meeting that Wilhelm Bruns, director of an SPD public policy organization, and Otto Reinhold, director of the Academy for Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the SED, agreed to continue a dialogue between the two parties. (Phillips, 13)

It is worthy of note at this point that Erich Honecker resumed this reconciliatory attitude toward the West at a

time when Moscow disapproved. Ten years earlier, his predecessor, Walter Ulbricht, was forced to step down because of his failure to comply with Moscow's wishes, i.e. to be cooperative with the West. This irony repeats itself six years later, with the fall of Honecker from the graces of Mikhail Gorbachev.

To say that the SED chose to work with the SPD because of a common socialist tradition arouses memories of the bitterness felt by the Western social democrats after the forced unification of the German Communist Party (KPD) with the SPD in the then Soviet Occupation Zone (later, East Germany), in 1946. (*Ibid.*, see also Bark & Gress, 169) The parties, although ideologically similar, had chosen different routes toward the socialist utopia- the SPD through social democracy and the KPD through Stalinist totalitarianism. It would be better to say that the Social Democrats, with the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972, seemed the party most willing to pursue meaningful negotiations.

Additionally, the SPD and the SED professed to share the same policy goals, albeit motivated by different political agendas. Their common interests lay in the continuation of detente, mutual security agreements, and the improvement of German-German relations in order to prevent a military conflict on German soil. (*Ibid.*) The Social Democrats, while truly interested in preserving the stability and security for both states, were also trying to

pursue a policy that they hoped would elicit as much popular support as detente. If this were to be the case, they could again win the majority in the Bundestag. The SED, however, was seeking political independence for the GDR by striking out on their own with these talks. They hoped not only for independence from Moscow on issues of foreign policy, but also increased legitimacy from the world through recognition by a Western party. (Bark & Gress, 411)

Finally, the SPD was the chosen partner because the Christian Democrats, under Kohl, were unwilling to recognize the validity of any attempt for peace from the SED. (Phillips, 12) As CDU party chairman in the early 1970s, Kohl had opposed the ratification of the Eastern Treaties, although his party had continued to practice detente after 1982. But Kohl was still criticizing the Basic Treaty in 1982 and the supposed humanitarian improvements that it had realized. The barbed wire, death zones, and wall that separated one group of German people from the other in no way resembled the "good-neighborly" relations and normality that the SPD had envisioned with the treaties. (Bark & Gress, 412) The CDU could not have negotiated with the SED, in any case, about mutual security agreements as governing party of the Federal Republic. To do so would have granted the SED official international recognition by a legitimate democratic government.

Again, worthy of note, even at this late stage of the game, over ten years after the ratification of the Basic

Treaty, the Social Democrats were not speaking with a unified voice about their GDR policies. The Young Socialists ("Jusos") of the SPD, including Karsten Voigt and Oskar Lafontaine, supported increased normalization of inner German relations. They were joined by old party leftists such as Herbert Wehner and Egon Bahr. The latter perceived the arsenal build up in Central Europe as damaging to successful detente and capable of destroying any hope of an economic and/or political confederation with the GDR (i.e. the realization of the "Kulturnation" idea.) (Braunthal, 281)

The party Vorstand, or executive branch, while approving the continuation and publication of the SPD-SED talks and any documents coming out of them, did so only with hesitation. Hans-Jochen Vogel, Willy Brandt, and the other moderate to right-leaning members did not want to arouse accusations from the CDU of "flirting with Communists." (*Ibid.*, 271) Also, recognizing that the success of the first phase of Ostpolitik resulted in part from the Federal Republic's solid anchor in the Western alliance organizations, they did not want to risk damaging that close relationship by intensifying talks with Eastern European communists.

Furthermore, the groups that conducted the SED-talks were from the SPD's Bundestagfraktion, not from the party at large, with the exception of Erhard Eppler, a member of the executive and co-author of the Common Paper. (Phillips, 415)

There was no "official" recognition by the party of the SED meetings. These inconsistencies raised many doubts as to whether the Social Democrats could continue this dialogue if it were the governing party of the Federal Republic. It did not command the full support of the party through a referendum, as the talks were still regarded as too controversial. (Phillips, 24)

This lack of "Übereinstimmung" within the ranks resurfaced in 1989, or perhaps just continued, as the party once again split along the same ideological lines over the redefined Deutschlandpolitik.

3.3 The Common Paper

"Wir wissen, dass wir Neuland geflügt haben, wo bisher nur disteln gewachsen sind." (Eppler, 10)

The working groups of the SPD and the SED began their discussions about ideological issues in 1986. One phase took place in the West, in Fruedenstadt in the Black Forest, and the other in the East, in Scharmützelsee in the Mark. Erhard Eppler, of the Social Democrats, emphasized that the questions being worked through had nothing to do with foreign policy, but with the working of questions that could not be addresed at the governmental, and therefore at the official, level. (Eppler, 7) The Common Paper, the product of these SPD-SED talks, is important for its ideological discussion and for its demonstration of just how far social

democracy and communism were willing to go in acknowledging one another's advantages. Of greater significance, however, is what it means concerning the resolution of the German Question. It illustrates the attitude of the SPD in the 1980s- that some issues were more important than the political unification of Germany, such as the peaceful unification of Europe and disarmament. Reconciliation, perhaps to the point of recognizing the other state's *right* to exist and its citizenship, could be more important than ideological conflict and the preservation of human rights. Thinking along these lines, which lead to the Social Democratic Party's vision of a "Kulturnation," could be politically fatal, especially if the borders were to disappear and the East German people determine for themselves what is important.

The Common Paper, or more properly, the "Conflicting Ideologies and Common Security" agreement of the Social Democrats' Basic Values Commission and the Academy for Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the SED, was published in both the FRG's *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the GDR's *Neues Deutschland* on 27 August 1987. (Phillips, 413) (Coincidentally, this was just weeks before Erich Honeckers's visit to the Federal Republic in September 1987.) The paper was designed "to outline a framework within which competition between the two systems could continue peacefully in the nuclear age. (Phillips, 20) The first two sections concerned themselves with "Safeguarding

Peace through Common Security," which, among other issues, included discussions of peaceful co-existence and system cooperation. The last four sections dealt with developing a "culture of political argument," where ideological differences proved themselves to be productive for reconciliation and the enemy stereotypes of each system are destroyed. (SPD, et al., 10)

Upon the first reading of the Common Paper, one is under the impression that these are two socialist parties agreeing to disagree over issues of political philosophy. But upon closer examination, one begins to understand the concessions the SPD was willing to make to the East German communists, and had it been taken seriously, what damage this could have brought even the hope for a cultural unification of the German people.

In the first section (I.) of the paper, the negotiators declare that "to safeguard peace has become the basic premise for the responsible pursuit of policies." (Ibid., 1) Since both states felt threatened by the growing instability of the superpower relationship, it was felt that the recognition of the validity of each state's fear could lead to a common commitment to disarmament. (Phillips, 411) Therefore, both sides had to recognize each other as systems worthy of their own security interests: "Either side *must* concede the other the same measure of security it claims for itself." (SPD, et al., 2)

This means that the Social Democrats, once again, were willing to, de facto, recognize the existence of the German Democratic Republic, and the Socialist Unity Party as its governing party, all in the name of common security and peaceful co-existence. To have acted otherwise, that is, to have given the impression that the West German politicians were united in their "mission" to unify Germany under the terms of the West and to pull the GDR out of the still solid Communist camp would have isolated the two Germanies from each other even more drastically. When regarded in this sense, it is clear that the Social Democratic negotiators felt obligated to grant the SED that much recognition, albeit unofficial, in order to accomplish two goals. First, the securing of the safety of the East German people to some degree, and second, to lay down groundwork toward the goal of opening up the inner German borders and at least unifying the Germans emotionally.

On this policy the SPD's negotiators agreed once again with the SED for the need for peaceful co-existence, the pursuit of detente and mutual stability and the acceptance of all post-World War II boundaries. (Phillips, 19) Assuming that both systems of government would continue to exist indefinitely, and that the Germans have a certain responsiblity to one another to get along, this policy is acceptable. But looking back on this agreement after the collapse of the GDR, it seems this policy only solidified the Social Democrats' recognition of, or perhaps resignation

to, the permanent division of Germany. Furthermore, they changed the meaning of peaceful co-existence, which now was considered a policy to maintain the postwar divisions than as a way to overcome them. (Ibid., 29)

The second section of the Common Paper further commits the Social Democratic negotiators to their philosophy that change in the communist system could only be successfully influenced through a change within the system. Cooperation, and the ambiguous term of "peaceful competition" between ideologically opposing systems, were declared to be positive ways of finding solutions to the problems that affected both states. (SPD, et al., 6) Erhard Eppler reasoned that "Probleme werden in der Geschichte nicht gelöst wie Rechenaufgaben." (Eppler, 10) This means that peaceful competition would enable both states to show the advantages of their respective systems by example so that progress in the humanitarian sphere could be achieved from within.

This philosophy appears sound except for two weaknesses. First neither side saw any need for change on their part to achieve mutual security and solve their societal problems. For example, from the East German point of view, the West was the instigator of the European arms build-up, and that they themselves were already doing all that they could toward societal improvements. (Dean, 168) Second, and more importantly, the paper declares ideological conflict between the two systems as a normal characteristic of international relations. (SPD, et al., 5) This could be

interpreted as justifying the Social Democrats for taking the initiative in talking with the East German communists. That these talks might eventually be considered to be on the international level may have been just what the SED negotiators wanted to hear. The implications of such a declaration on the solution of the German Question is clear.

The last sections of the Common Paper are devoted to the explanation of the unusual term "a culture of political argument." Both parties had claimed this was necessary for further productivity in talks between the social democratic and communist camps. Here the western socialists perhaps granted the largest concessions to their eastern communist counterparts.

First, the "Feindbilder," or enemy stereotypes that had grown up between the two systems and had fueled the Cold War hostilities needed to be dismantled. Policy decisions made by either government should not be regarded with distrust or suspicion, but with an understanding of that goverment's point of view and political philosophy. This included an avoidance on both systems' parts of the perception that both states were bent on expansion of their territory by force. (SPD, et al., 13) This meant, of course, that should the Social Democrats have regained control of the Bundestag, they would have been obliged to forget about any dreams of political reunification; unless, as provided for in the Basic Law, there was a plebiscite that allowed the Germans of both states to decide on the manner of unification. As

this was not to be in the forseeable future, the focus of the SPD's Deutschlandpolitik became to stabilize the GDR.

To be sure, with this mutual agreement, the SED negotiators had to admit that their government would not seek to continue the proletarian revolution into the West by force. Ideologically, this is a big step. But for the West German socialists it may have been a leap. Agreeing to never annex East Germany by force and to accept its right to exist without conflict all but solidifies a commitment to the permanent German division into two different political systems.

The paper concludes with a renunciation of any policies leading toward unification, and therefore a concession to the East Germans. System change was declared unnecessary for successful co-existence and future negotiations. (Ibid., 15) This, however, had already been acknowledged in the Basic Treaty. The new aspect of this fifteen year old idea consisted of both partners' recognition of the other's 1) "Existenzberechtigung," or right to exist, 2) "Reformfähigkeit," or capability to enact reforms, and 3) "Friedensfähigkeit," or capability for peace. (Phillips, 13) The impact of the acknowledgement of these apparently basic diplomatic givens is heightened when one realizes that during the Reagan years the Soviet Union was deemed the "Evil Empire," and the superpower relations did not include seeing the other side as peaceful.

These worsening relations, in one sense, were the impetus for the paper, which sought to "[create] a minimum level of tolerance and respect necessary to defuse the East-West conflict." (Ibid., 31) The resolution of the Cold War could not be a "zero-sum" game. Realistically, concessions needed to be made on both sides for Egon Bahr's philosophy of "Wandel durch Annäherung" to be effective.

However one chooses to interpret this paper promoting a greater European order of peace, it cannot be overlooked that it turned out to be a misjudgment of the Social Democratic policy strategists in light of the events of 1989. It damaged their believability concerning their supposed support in 1990 for quick unification and made them "prisoners of their own policies." The West German Left had, if you will, "barked up the wrong tree" in search of a resolution to the division of the German nation.

3.4 Public Reaction

The criticism that the Social Democratic negotiators, and the executive itself received for allowing the paper to be published in the first place, came from both sides of the political spectrum. From the conservative Christian Democratic Union to the criticism from Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, the wife of the former chancellor, the disapproval of the SPD's unofficial and unconventional continuation of Ostpolitik was exactly the opposite of what the party had expected.

As the opposition party in the Bundestag since 1982, the SPD, through a continuation of their once popular Ostpolitik, had hoped to regain favor in the eyes of the German voters. Their claim that the Germans should take up their special responsibility for peace in Central Europe, as the superpower relations worsened, took form in late 1983. When the INF treaty negotiations in Geneva broke down in November of 1983, the Social Democrats hoped to gain from the growing disarmament sentiment in the Federal Republic. Negotiations between the SPD and the SED began over a highly controversial chemical weapons free zone agreement. (Dean, 168)

Their hope that a regional agreement between the two parties and the two states would gain public support backfired. Not only were the agreements rejected by NATO, but the ensuing success of the Geneva talks overtook the Social Democrats' "success" of having been able to come to any kind of a security agreement with the GDR. (Ibid., 171)

An unsurprising disapproval came from the CDU, which had opposed the philosophy of the Eastern Treaties from the beginning. The quasi-official format of the agreements and the process of all of the SPD-SED talks struck a defensive chord. The agreements were perceived as undermining official government negotiations, which only the CDU/CSU, as the official governing party, could carry out. The criticism may have come from the fact that the challenging SPD policy agreements drew attention to the lack of

substance and "political correctness" of the official government documents. (Ibid., 173) But it could not be denied that the Common Paper was neither an official party nor government document, and because it was not ratified at the diplomatic level, there was absolutely no way to enforce the principles agreed upon therein. ("Kultur", 22)

The criticism from the Left and from within the Social Democratic Party was more from an ideological standpoint. Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, among others, accused the party of blurring the ideological divisions between social democracy and communism, as the original reasoning for Ostpolitik apparently had been forgotten. (Seebacher-Brandt, 62)

Originally, as we recall, the new relations between the two German states were designed to improve the humanitarian conditions for those living in the East and the communication with relatives for those in the West. The larger plan, of course, was to preserve peace in Central Europe and to unify the German "Kulturnation." Now, with the Common Paper, through which no *real* improvements could be realized, the Social Democrats tried to bridge the philosophical gap between the two parties, and in the long run, between the two states. "So gingen die intellektuell erfasste Zweistaatlichkeit und das emotional erfahrene Wohllegen eine unselige Verbindung ein." (*Ibid.*, 67)

The old struggle between the prosperity, democracy, and market economy of social democracy and the totalitarianism

of Soviet communism was reduced to the need for enemy stereotypes to maintain the East-West conflict. (Wettig, 951) The Social Democrats, with these talks, apparently wanted to forget this struggle and *stabilize* the totalitarian regime in the East.

The regime, which the East German people did not support, was being affirmed through negotiations with a western democratic party. The distance that should have been maintained between these parties was disappearing. Most critics of the German Democratic Republic did *not* see the regime as reformable or even reliable. Furthermore, by conducting talks with the communist regime, the SPD was accused of blantantly ignoring the wishes of the East German populace that wanted to be rid of the dictatorship. (Jesse, 1126) The formulators of Ostpolitik had been so convinced that change would come from within the regime voluntarily, that it practically discouraged the opposition outside of the system within the GDR.

Finally, the critics have even gone so far as to accuse the original Ostpolitikers of unintentionally hindering the collapse of the communist regimes and prolonging the misery of the Eastern Europeans. (Wettig, 953) This may be an extreme opinion, but the idea is worth considering. Not only through trying to stabilize the government of the GDR did the SPD, as a representative of the democratic West, discourage popular democratic opposition movements from rising up. Like Günter Grass, the more radical of the

original Ostpolitikers (the 68ers) felt that the German division was a justified punishment for the crimes of the Second World War. (Jesse, 1126) But the concessions made to, as well as the blind eye turned toward, the crimes of the East German government for so long to stabilize it, may have kept it alive longer than it possibly should have. A system of government, communism, that by definition has to expand beyond its borders, cannot be stabilized. (Wettig, 953)

Along these same lines, it can be successfully argued that had the Social Democrats not been so appeasing to Honecker, his regime might have fallen sooner. Had that happened, the reforms that in the mid-1980s then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev advised his satellites to adopt, might have actually been implemented and the GDR loosened up. Instead, Honecker refused to enact any reforms, reforms which were seen as unnecessary in the East German state. The repressive regime continued to restrict it citizens' freedoms until its collapse in 1989.

3.5 Ostpolitik in 1989

Norbert Gansel, a member of the SPD and a speaker at a Berlin SPD party conference, perhaps summed up best the problems of the Social Democratic political philosophy in September 1989. At that point, the refugees from the GDR were beginning to stream into the Federal Republic through the open Austrian-Hungarian border. It was only a matter of

time before the unification debate would once again surface in the public discussion. What he said was this- "Wandel durch Annäherung" was a policy whose time had passed. The Eastern Treaties of the early 1970s and the various agreements under the subsequent administrations had achieved their goals. The humanitarian improvements in areas such as the environment and inner-German transport had been realized. The "Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl," or "feeling of belonging together," had been strengthened. (Gansel)

Treaties on disarmament, however, and negotiations over ideological struggles between East and West were doing little for the beginnings of the democratic movements in Eastern Europe. The Social Democrats' formal compromises with the SED, heralded as quasi-diplomatic successes, discouraged the democratic opposition in the GDR. The agreements represent an idealistic and humanitarian dream gone too far and apparently oblivious to the present realities. (Ibid.) These realities included the flight of thousands of East Germans from the country and the differing goals of the two negotiating parties in the continuation of rapprochment.

Finally, Gansel went on to suggest that the SPD try "Wandel durch Abstand," change through distance. Instead of celebrating the commonalities, the party should emphasize the marked differences between the two economic systems, so as to exert pressure on the SED to change. (Ibid.) By attempting to preserve a continuity in its relations with

the GDR where none existed, the SPD was only discouraging the democratic reformers, and as mentioned above, digging its own grave in light of the changes that the Autumn of 1989 had brought.

One of these "gravediggers" turned out to be the SPD's favorite for the chancellorship in the 1990 parliamentary election, Oskar Lafontaine, much to the party's embarrassment. Lafontaine had been one of the "Jusos" who had favored diplomatic recognition of the GDR. The "Lieblingsenkel des Entspanners Willy Brandt," in 1987 on a visit to Washington, D.C., was seen as a "NATO killer" who "[sang] the song of peace and disarmament and [minimized] the threat of Soviet Communism." ("Rechter Ton", 132) Earlier, in 1985, on a visit to East Berlin, the Saarlander was quoted as saying that the Federal Republic would probably eventually have to recognize the GDR's citizenship in the interest of freer inter-German travel. (McAdams, 68) This attitude turned into skepticism of the unification process in 1990, which was clearly becoming the single campaign issue of this federal election. This "anti-unity" attitude split the party and left the Left marginalized and with an unclear Deutschlandpolitik.

3.6 A Few Questions...

So, were the Social Democrats in the 1980s visionaries of an enlightened European peace order, pursuing the correct policy for the time? Or were they victims of chance, caught

unawares as the Eastern European revolutionaries sprang from the botton, from the masses, and the leaders, in a state of confusion, opened their borders? Or, were they ignorant idealists, blind to the signals the times were giving them and "diggers of their own graves"?

IV. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE UNIFICATION PROCESS OF 1990

For the opposition to argue against the [State] Treaty, even if it was well-founded from a factual viewpoint, was next to impossible, considering that humanitarian improvements had been moved into the limelight.

- Andreas Hillgruber
(Bark & Gress, vol. II, 216)

Why in God's name can't a great party [the SPD] admit that it is in the process of radically revising its national policies? No quotation by Kurt Schumacher or Ernst Reuter can change the impression that for twenty years the SPD had written off German unification.... a captain who claims that a 180-degree turn is travel in a straight line ought not to be surprised if the [GDR] crew... does not trust him.

- Peter Schneider
(Brockmann, 20)

Die Wende in der DDR traf die Partei unvorbereitet, weil sie noch dem Konzept der Revolution von oben und der dauerhaften deutschen Zweistaatlichkeit folgte, als es durch die Entwicklung in der DDR und in der Sowjetunion schon zu Makulatur geworden war.

- Peter Brandt
(Spittman, 756)

4.1 The Initial Response of the SPD up to March 18, 1990- the Volkskammerwahl in the German Democratic Republic

With the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and the growing rumblings of an imminent unification of the two German states, the Social Democrats, totally unprepared, responded with anything but a unified voice. Oskar Lafontaine, the popular Minister President of Saarland, and the strongest Social Democratic candidate for the chancellorship, surprised everyone with a definitive "nein" to unification and the accelerated formulation of an inner-German state treaty (Staatsvertrag). SPD chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel, his deputy chairman Johannes Rau, and the rest of the party executive, countered with a qualified acceptance of German unity, perhaps in the form of a confederation of the two states. (Schneider, R., 206)

The image problems of the Social Democrats are quickly complicated. The hero of German politics and "father of Ostpolitik," Willy Brandt, former chancellor, reappears in the political arena and clearly intends to be part of the upcoming process toward unity. His reemergence becomes problematic as he represents the Social Democratic rapprochment policies of the past which so ill-prepared the SPD for the "Volksrevolution" in the GDR in 1989.

The reemergence of a social democratic party in the eastern zone also contributed to the difficulties of the western comrades. The Social Democrats of the GDR resurfacing after 43 years of Socialist Party rule, first

emerged as one of the "Reformparteien" of the early weeks of the revolution, and had favored an independent East German state. But as the tide of public opinion turned, the GDR-SPD decided to indeed support a quick unification of the two states, a position they held up to the Volkskammer election in the GDR on 18 March 1990. The western SPD, still swinging between "Einheit" and "Zweistaatlichkeit" since 9 November, remained ambiguous about their sister party until just before the Federal Republic's parliamentary elections in December 1990. (von Dohnanyi, 30)

The problems of the Social Democratic Party, both east and west, in the March election, definitively lost to the CDU-supported "Allianz für Deutschland," resulted from a number of factors; not the least of which the influence and legacy of the "Wandel durch Annäherung" politics of the past 20 years. The positions of both parties on unification were difficult to determine, and their believability hampered by the previous dialogue with the SED. As Peter Schneider smugly observed, "anyone with a memory (or an archive) will be amazed at how quickly and adroitly people can exchange old positions and convictions for more current ones." (Schneider, P., 68)

The parties' public images were complicated as well, specifically by the popularity of Brandt and Lafontaine and the Eastern German SPD's lack of an easily recognizable figurehead. Ibrahim Böhme was their candidate for the March

elections, but he hardly became a well-know political figure.

In addition, the voters in the GDR became one-issue oriented, understandably. They wanted a speedy unification no matter what the cost, and voted for the party with the leadership most supportive of that single goal and possessing the greatest "Durchsetzungsfähigkeit" of the FRG's parties- the CDU. Interestingly, while orienting themselves toward the statements of the West German politicians, the East German voters overlooked the popular candidates of their own region. Specifically, Hans Modrow of the PDS (formerly the SED) enjoyed popular support in late 1989. He was not able, however, to secure an election victory for the "reformed" communist party of the past. Supporting instead the West German party promising the realization of their one goal: the standard of living of the Federal Republic, the voters in the GDR failed to support the most practical of the western parties; practical in terms of pointing out the social and economic costs of unification to both states. The SPD, however, was unable to promise 20 million Germans what could take years to realize.

4.2 Willy Brandt and Oskar Lafontaine- Two Different Politicians

Shortly after the Wall opened in November, Willy Brandt resumed an active, public role in German politics 15 years after his resignation from the chancellorship in 1974. He

claimed to have been inspired by the groundswell revolution in the GDR. ("Der macht," 134) The 76 year old honorary chairman of the SPD, president of the Socialist International, and father of Ostpolitik, looked forward to a renewed role in the SPD.

> So langsam schält sich heraus, dass.. führende Leute der SPD den Ehrenvorsitzender nicht allein in seiner Ehrenfunktion betrachten, sondern erwartet, dass man etwas mittut. (Ibid.)

This could not have come at a better time for the Social Democrats, desperately needing someone who could symbolize both the party *and* German unity. Brandt, despite his ignominious withdrawl from politics after a Stasi-spy was found on his staff, was still regarded as an authority figure and "court of appeal" for all major German politicians. ("Das wär's", 65) Hans-Jochen Vogel, as party chairman, took advantage of this authority, hoping to calm his party's fears of Kohl's renewed popularity and of the impact of the SED's collapse. ("Der macht", 134) Brandt succeeded in a comeback that few politicians have been able to manage. His presence provided a much needed positive impulse at the SPD's Berlin party congress in December 1989:

> Wochenlang, von der Entwicklung im Osten überrollt, von Vogel nicht geführt, von Lafontaine lange Zeit irritiert- endlich hörte das SPD-Volk wieder Fanfarentöne.... ("Das wär's", 65)

Brandt, however, expressed a realistic and thoughtul view on the unfolding developments, airing reservations about such a headlong rush into unification. He was perhaps

influenced by the ideals of Entspannungspolitik and the SPD's concern for the social impact of unification in the GDR. He recognized former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev as the one responsible for the developments in Eastern Europe, and that in the rush toward unity, conflict with Soviet interests should be avoided. (Ibid.) This was a very real possiblity in the early weeks after 9 November, as the Soviet Army still occupied East German territory and the Kremlin was unsure of German unity.

The former chancellor also emphasized the importance of the German state, unified or divided, remaining in the European Community. Seeing perhaps a consequence of the coming unification politics, he stated that "bei uns stimmen die beiden Hauptrichtungen der deutschen Politik... überein, dass man nicht aus der Europäischen Gemeinschaft ausschert." ("Einheit", 28) Slightly critical of Kohl's unification policies, Brandt expressed concern about the consequences- "Wie können die Währungen zusammengeführt, können die Sozialgesetzgebungen angeglichen werden?" (Ibid., 26) Fearing political chaos and an increase of the flow of economic refugees, Brandt was concerned that the people of the GDR would demand immediate unity. (Ibid., 27) Clearly, even the champion of the German people was reserved about unification.

When Brandt proclaimed on 9 November 1989 that "jetzt wächst zusammen, was zusammengehört," many took that statement to mean that he supported the quick unification of

the two Germanies. (Ibid., 26) The former chancellor countered that idea: "Wie könnte ich etwas verlangen, was es nie gegeben hat?" ("Der macht", 134) If possible, Brandt expressed a preference for a confederation of the two German states, encouraged by a "Wiederzusammenwachsen," where the division of the German nation could be maintained, yet all would be German citizens under the Federal Republic's Basic Law. At this point, "werden wir den Übergang der Vertragsgemeinschaft zur Konföderation, also zum Staatenbund, einem deutschem Bund in Form von einer Gemeinschaft der beiden Staaten erleben." ("Einheit", 26)

Although finding the unification process proceeding faster than expected, if that was what the East Germans wanted, Brandt claimed that he would have no objection to quick unity with the following qualifications. First, immediate political unity would not solve any of the practical problems facing the GDR in the near future. When the East Germans heard "reunification," they understood it as "the standard of living in the Federal Republic." In this light, the "verfassungsähnliche Dokumente," to speed along unification, could not solve any practical problems; problems such as the gross economic disparities between the two states. ("Einheit", 27)

More importantly, Brandt feared that the euphoria of the autumn of 1989 could develop into an unwanted nationalism and irresponsible behavior in regard to the coming European integration in 1992. "Verantwortungsvolle

und geschichtsbewusste Deutsche dürfen sich zu nationalistischem Verhalten nicht missbrauchen lassen. Es wäre gegen den aufrechten Gang." ("Das wär's", 66) A united cultural national, the endgoal of his Ostpolitik, did not have to equal cultural superiority.

In sum, it appears that Willy Brandt, as one of the popular Social Democratic figureheads, personified the party's "Ja, aber..." stance on unification. That is, their stance was guided by the principles of the past, yet only partially supportive of unification, favoring rather unity in alternative forms at a slower pace.

If Brandt represented German unity for the party, then Oskar Lafontaine represented, if not "Zweistaatlichkeit," then its disunity. The so-called "grandchild" of Willy Brandt, Saarland's favorite son, and already in September 1987 the SPD's top pick for the chancellorship candidacy in 1990, Lafontaine became the thorn in the side of the party. His initial negative response to the idea of unification and his realistic warnings of unity's societal and financial costs plagued the party for the remainder of the 1990 campaign. His unconventional campaign methods and his opposing viewpoints to the majority earned him harsh criticism within and without of the party. His refusal to accept the candidacy until after the Volkskammer election in March, and then only under certain conditions, caused problems and created uncertainty with a party desperately battling marginalization in the German political scene.

However, reconsidering the positions he maintained on unification during 1989 and 1990, I argue that Lafontaine only represented what the Social Democrats had been advocating for years, i.e. the importance of the commitments to the European Community above German concerns, a high priority given to social and human questions, and a "policy of small steps" in the Federal Republic's relations with the eastern republic. The latter's slow approach was now more than ever important, when the biggest event of postwar political history demanded careful planning. It is admirable that Lafontaine stood by these principles as every one else, including members of his own party, seemed to forget them as they became caught up in the unification euphoria.

One of Lafontaine's biggest concerns with the rush toward unification was the fear that the European integration in 1992 would somehow become subordinate to the nationalistic euphoria. Rather,

> die deutsche Einheit habe sich der europäische Einigung unterzuordnen, der Einigungsprozess müsse sich sozialpolitisch abgefedert werden bleiben und mit den Nachbarn abgestimmt werden. ("Unverstand", 17)

The goal became the United States of Europe, the institutions of which would take the responsiblity of the "Zusammenrücken" of the two German states. ("Man muss", 67) German unification was not just the business of the Germans, contrary to the statement by U.S. President Bush, but of all their neighbors as well. The answer to "How does Germany

resign from its responsibility to the EEC in order to fulfill its treaty agreement with the GDR" was

> Übertragung von Zuständigkeiten des Nationalstaates Bundesrepublik [Deutschlands]... der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik auf die Europäischen Gemeinschaft. (Ibid.)

Lafontaine's concern, similar to Brandt's, was that Germany should not forget the commitments made before the GDR opened its borders. He fundamentally believed that "der von [ihm] vertretene Ansatz des Internationalismus in der europäische Gemeinschaft unstreitig [sei]." (Ibid.)

Lafontaine also concerned himself with the social consequences of the 1989 developments in the GDR, especially the bleeding of the East German population into the Federal Republic and how this might endanger the West German state welfare system.

In his opinion, in the years beore the Wall opened, the West German "Annahme" of East Germans seeking *political* asylum was justified. These refugees left everything behind in order to start a new life in the West. With the Wall open, and thus the disappearance of some of the political reasoning for asylum seekers, the economic refugees from the GDR, streaming into the West each day by the thousands, could possibly cause a collapse of the West German social welfare net. This needed to be stopped. ("Eisige", 81)

The chancellor candidate's solution to the problem included accepting only those refugees who could prove they had employement and residence in the Federal Republic.

("Soll", 44) Funds given to the refugees as "Begrüssungsgeld" from the FRG's state coffers should instead be invested in the East German economy to improve living conditions and make people want to stay. ("Eisige", 81) Although harshly criticized for this unpopular, but perhaps necessary, policy, Lafontaine responded that he had "nun mal den Drang, die Wahrheit zu sagen, auch wenn sie dem einen oder den anderen nicht einleuchtet." (Ibid.) Indeed, from within the SPD, who agreed that these social questions should take highest priority, came this response from Rudolf Dressler of the SPD Bundestagfraktion: "Die Stimmung der Republik wird kippen, wenn der Preis bekannt wird, den wir alle zahlen müssen." (Ibid., 82) This did not happen, however, as Kohl's popularity as "Einheitskanzler" and the unification euphoria subordinated the possible concerns over the financial cost of unity.

It certainly became apparent during the 1990 campaign that there was no real debate among the populace, and among all but a very few politicians, about the pros and cons of unification. As the most important political agreement since Yalta and Potsdam, one would think that the speed at which developments were proceeding would stir up at least a little controversy. This was the reasoning Lafontaine gave when questioned about his controversial campaign statements, that debate about unification needed to be encouraged to prevent it from becoming the single issue of the campaign. "Man muss manchmal innehalten, man muss auch manchmal

anstössig sein, sonst gibt es keine Debatten." ("Man muss", 68) Willy Brandt complained that it would be a lot easier if the party could present compatible views. But despite his controversial stances, Lafontaine, in the past, usually reflected the overall public opinion in the end. ("Jetzt", 19) However, "the end" came too late for Lafontaine, after the unification and the election.

The December 1989 party congress in Berlin saw the tensions between the supporters of Brandt and Lafontaine come to a head, and presented an even more indecisive image of the SPD to the public. Many Social Democrats saw their policies as supportive of German unity, as the events in the GDR were seen as "fulfilling an ancient Social Democratic dream." (Schneider, P., 73) What dream? One of the imperatives of Ostpolitik was not to destroy the SED, but to stabilize it and the political situation in the East. They had not encouraged change from the masses, but from the higher levels of the society. Their policies with the GDR had not encouraged this demand for political unity, so "why pretend continuity," one German author writes, "where none exists?" (*Ibid.*, 73)

Oskar Lafontaine, at the very least extremely skeptical of German unity, (Habermas, 9) though still the most marketable Social Democratic candidate, found himself isolated within his own party as never before. With his proposal to halt the flow of refugees from the GDR, "hat er die Gemütslage seiner Partei falsch eingeschätzt"; "So eine

eisige Atmospäre," [hatte] Johannes Rau, "noch nicht erlebt." ("Eisige", 81) The suggestion, to reenact a refugee law from the early postwar era to stop the influx of East Germans, as well as the Federal Republic possibly recognizing the citizenship of the GDR, caused a most unexpected stir within the party. The criticism was at the very least harsh. The Social Democrats were caught up in the "feverish enthusiasm" of the unification euphoria, and feared the emotional unity slogans of Kohl would hinder their chances at taking part in the unity process, as well as their success in the election campaign. Some examples:

> Wir haben uns jahrelang wegen unserer Ostpolitik prügeln lassen, und jetzt erwecken wir bei den Bürgern den Eindruck, als ob wir Angst vor der Wiedervereinigung hätten. (Ibid.)

Or from the party executive: "Die in der DDR bauen Mauern ab, und du [Lafontaine] versuchst, sie wider aufzurichten." (Ibid.)

In sum the Social Democratic Party, for years know for their "cool rationality" and approach of small steps concerning the GDR, was suddenly thrown into a mass of confusion concerning their Deutschlandpolitik. The dream had been realized- Germany could now be culturally unified- but not as they expected. Someone had changed the rules of the game while they were not paying attention.

Party chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel realized the danger of isolating the party's best candidate for the chancellorship

and softened the tone of his criticism. Vogel admitted that Lafontaine was "on the right track" when expressing concern over what were clear dangers if Germany were too hastily unified. An economic and social policy between the Federal Republic and the GDR was indeed necessary to prevent injury to the welfare system in each state. (Ibid., 81) Even politicians from the CDU agreed with Lafontaine on this point, claiming, "es nutzte nichts wenn Kohl sagt 'Willkommen in diesem Vaterlande'," when what the refugees face is unemployment and an extreme housing shortage. ("Jetzt", 17) A consensus was reached to realistically come to grips with the situation, as the "Deutschlandpolitik ist in dieser Zeit nicht in erster Linie die Freude über das Öffnen der Grenze, sondern die Bewältigung der neuen Situation." (Ibid.) More likely, the SPD needed to learn how to overcome the past.

Oskar Lafontaine's conditions for accepting the candidacy in February again weakened the party's public image and their grip on a solid candidate. One of these conditions included what seemed to be an inevitable currency union in both German states, a step that Lafontaine bitterly opposed. Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU Interior Minister and an author of the state treaty leading to the currency union, claimed that Lafontaine knew all the time that the extension of the D-Mark into the GDR was the only way to stop the refugee flow. (Schäuble, 78) But the SPD's candidate could not support a currency union not in synch with the economic

reforms in the GDR, and an economy with practically no infrastructure and no understanding of a market system. ("Unverstand", 16) His reasoning is understandable and his adherence to principle laudable. No party member of any substance should demand what he cannot represent later as chancellor. (Ibid.) Wise words, ironically, considering Chancellor Kohl's public image problems within months after unification on 3 October 1990 and the election on 2 December 1990.

In an address in February 1990 before the East German Social Democratic Party, Lafontaine solidified his position against the currency union. Supporters of the union should prepare themselves for the consequences of such a move, such as high unemployment and economic chaos in the newly opened GDR territory. Rather, the dignity of the citizens of the GDR should be respected and their self-esteen preserved. (Ibid., 17) Perhaps, like his colleague, Egon Bahr, Lafontaine assumed that the East Germans would not allow their state to be taken away from them, a state they spent nearly 45 years trying to build. (Seebacher-Brandt, 49) Brandt, although supportive of an eventual economic union, did agree that the schedule of unification should be decided only after the Volkskammer, or parliamentary elections in the GDR with the new, hopefully Social Democratic administration in place. ("Unverstand", 17)

In sum, Oskar Lafontaine, in the end, acknowledging that German unification was inevitable, maintained up until

the March election that he wanted to remain the "brake man" to the whole process. He would show himself as a competent manager of German "Zusammenwachsen." (Ibid.) As the most visible Social Democratic figure in the GDR after Brandt, and representing a policy contrary to the wishes of most citizens in the GDR, he isolated himself from his own party colleagues and voters. His impression left in the GDR is best summed up by one East German comrade: "Brandt ist unser Idol. Du [Lafontaine] bist [nur] unser Kanzlerkandidat." (Ibid.)

4.3 The East German Social Democratic Party- a New Development

With their refounding as a political party in late summer 1989, the Social Democrats of the German Democratic Republic were ready to play a part again in the reform movements in their country 43 years after the SPD in the Soviet Occupation Zone was forced to unite with the German Communist Party (KPD) to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED). Although having the advantage of a sister party in the West, the SDP, as they were initially known, was much like the other myriad of reformist parties that sprang up in the GDR in the autumn of 1989, i.e. Neues Forum, Demokratischer Aufbruch, etc. These parties promoted the idea of a "Third Way" for their country separate from the Federal Republic, a sort of humanitarian socialist state. However, their effectiveness as a party up to the Volkskammer election was hindered by a number of problems:

disorganization, indecisive stances on the unification issue, and perhaps most importantly, the reputation of their sister party and its candidates in the Federal Republic. The Social Democrats of the GDR (from here on SDP) again exemplify the fact that the social democratic movements, both East and West, were unprepared for German unification, an event in which most thought that they would take a leading role.

The SPD began at the initiative of four East German pastors and one historian in Schwante, a community in northwest Berlin, on 7 October 1989. (Fink, 181) Helmut Becker, Markus Meckel, Martin Gutzeit, Arndt Noack, and Ibrahim Böhme (later the SPD candidate for the Volkskammer election) founded the party with the goals of liberating social democracy in the GDR after 43 years, cooperating with the other reform groups to instigate change in the GDR, promoting civil rights, and the maintenance of two German states. (Hanhardt, 63) Like the West German Social Democrats in the autumn of 1989, they wanted "ein schrittweises Wachsen der beiden deutschen Staaten im Rahmen des europäischen Hauses." ("SED", 25) Despite the existence of the West-SPD, the SDP was adamant about maintaining their independence from it, as well as from the SED. This may stem from the fact that the SDP did not have their origins as a workers' party, as the others had. The SDP's membership grew out of the peace and human rights groups and the intelligentsia. Ninety percent of their membership came

from this latter group. (Fink, 181) In addition, Thomas Krüger, party manager, stressed that the SDP needed to "learn to walk" before becoming associated with the West-SPD. (Ibid.)

In an attempt to completely disassociate themselves from the SED, and establish themselves as a separate socialist party, the SDP took an extremely hard stance toward the old regime. Under no circumstances were members of the collapsing regime to be allowed membership in the SDP. The new party feared for its identity and its believability as a reformist party in the GDR. (Ibid., 182) Even the reformed SED they regarded as the "Partei des Schreckens", i.e. PDS- "Partei des demokratischen Socialismus." (Ibid., 184) Böhme, however, softened this hardline attitude, conceding that, if a former Unity Socialist "repented" and recognized his/her responsibility to the reform process of the SDP, membership into the party would be considered. (Ibid., 183) This conciliatory attitude probably stems from Böhme's previous contact with the Stasi. (Leonhard, 507)

The GDR's Social Democratic Party, although the most organized of the early reform parties going into the elections, possessing the most elaborate reform program, as well as much help in the form of hardware from the West-SPD, weakened their own image with their ever-changing stance on German unification. In their intial program in late autumn 1989, the SDP recognized the division of Germany as a

permanent reminder of the sins of the past, but encouraged increased trade with the Federal Republic in the GDR's movement toward a social market economy. (Ammer, 47) Furthermore, changes in the status of the German division could only be allowed within the framework of an all-European "Friedensordnung", a policy compatible with that of Lafontaine and the GDR's neighbors to the east. (Ibid.)

The policy, however, changed with the growing popularity of Kohl and the conservatives' support of an accelerated unification in the GDR as the March election drew near. During the SDP's first party congress in Leipzig, 22-25 February 1990, the new Social Democrats declared that their goal was to unify Germany as quickly as politically possible.

> Ziel unser Politik ist ein geeintes Deutschland. Eine sozialdemokratisch geführte Regierung der DDR wird die notwendige Schritte auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit in Abstimmung mit der Regierung der BRD geben. (Fink, 185)

This is a complete change of course from the talk of a "Third Way" for the GDR of a few months before.

Markus Meckel, one of the founders of the SDP, in an interview with *Der Spiegel*, qualified his party's support of unification. "Einheit heisst für uns nicht Anschluss der DDR an der BRD," which would hinder economic, democratic and social development in the soon-to-be five new states. ("Anschluss", 84) Rather, he favored a federated German state, of which the former GDR would receive economic and

strategic help in the development of a social market economy akin to that of the Federal Republic. (Ibid.) Above all, Meckel was critical of Kohl's "unbearable" unification process, identifying much more with Brandt. That the former chancellor identified with the goals of the SDP was regarded by Meckel as a tremendous advantage. (Ibid.) Brandt, however, was not the West-SPD's chancellor candidate, aspiring toward the position that would ultimately direct a unified Germany. This was Mr. Lafontaine.

The West-SPD's relationship with their sister party in the GDR was ambivalent at best. When the SDP was founded in October 1989, the SPD was skeptical, as this new party easily could have developed into another one of the state-controlled "Blockparteien" of the SED. ("SED", 24) Even when the SDP became the "SPD" at a delegates' conferences of the East German SDP in mid January 1990, the alignment with the West German party was only informal. The western party had donated large numbers of computers, telephones, etc. But the West-Social Democrats' reactions at the February party congress could be described as distant, despite their half-hearted attempt at coordinating campaign assistance in the GDR. (Fink, 185) Despite the West-SPD's accepted role as just an advisor, and not the guardian of the East-SPD, because the latter lacked an easily recognizable candidate and stance on the current unification issue, this responsiblity of representing the Social Democrats fell to

the western politicians, particularly Lafontaine. (Ibid., 182)

In a speech at the party congress, Lafontaine, who had spoken against unification and the blocking of the influx of East Germans into the West, now spoke of not "if", but "how" to reunite the two German states. (Leonhard, 508) This is also coming from a man who had stated that "wir [die SPD] stehen zu dem, was wir durch die Kontakte zur Staatspartei SED für die Menschen erreicht haben." ("Man muss", 70) In sum, it is understandable why he became "only their chancellor candidate" to the GDR-SPD. The inconsistencies between the two parties were too much to overcome before the critical election three weeks away, on 18 March 1990.

4.4 The Volkskammer Election, its Outcome, and the SPD on Unification until December 1990

With the victory of the conservative "Allianz für Deutschland" in the first free elections in the GDR, the East German voters gave the western leaders a clear signal of what they wanted- immediate unification with the Federal Republic. The Alliance for Germany won 48% of the vote, and the Social Democrats, 22%. (Winters, 499) This surprised many, as the GDR-SPD claimed the clear majority in some polls before the election. (FGW, 18) It became a one-issue election with almost half of the votes cast going to the party that guaranteed "Wohlstand für alle," and was the most

willing to negotiate with the Kohl administration over a unification treaty. (Winters, 499)

In other words, the East German voters wanted no more political experiments in their country. They liked what they saw in the West and so claimed what was theirs according to the preamble of the Basic Law- unification. The "Third Way", the popular slogan in the Winter of 1989-90, suggesting an independent East German state with a free market economy and a democratic government, became unappealing, and perhaps unfeasible. With no history of democratic interest representation or experience with free market economics, the "Third Way" toward a truly democratic socialist state seemed an experiment doomed to failure. (Roth, 5)

So, with the mandate for the CDU Bonn administration to draw up a state treaty and organize the currency union with the GDR, the countdown to unification began. The SPD's loss in the Volkskammer election marked a turning point for the party. They were not able to get a credible unification program together after this date.

The first of the problems facing the SPD was that they now had to fight their way out of the minority in the Bundestag. This included battling an increasingly popular chancellor, turning their German policy objectives around, and keeping their renegade chacellor candidate in line. The split within the party widened even further when the generational camps- Vogel, Rau, and the conservatives on one

side, Lafontaine, Schröder, and the other Jusos on the other- began arguing over the ratification of the currency union state treaty and the revision of the Basic Law, specifically the preamble and Article 23. Both would make possible the economic union of the two states on 1 July 1990 and a date for unification within a year, without a referendum vote. At best, the entire party was hesitant about unification, and faced tremendous hurdles to convince the public otherwise. Why?

The contradictory nature of the Ostpolitik philosophy appeared to have gotten the best of its formulators. Years of pursuing the idea of a "Kulturnation", which included the recognition of the existence of the East German state, left many on the Left wondering if unification in the real sense was what they really wanted. The sudden nature of the developments in the East left the Social Democrats unprepared to direct the kind of unification that the East Germans wanted. To claim that the revolution in the GDR represented a continuity of their pre-1989 policies would have been ridiculous. Yet that is the impression one received when the SPD-conservatives whole-heartedly supported this race toward unification. But it also represented a 180-degree turn from what their policies had aimed at before. (Brockmann, 20)

Problematical as well was the fact that the GDR-SPD, as part of a coalition government in the GDR, had approved the unification treaties. It now seemed that the Social

Democrats in each state were travelling in completely opposite directions.

Oskar Lafontaine, as one of the few voices in the opposition to such a hard, long leap into the unknown waters of unity, represented the most realistic concerns about the problems of the state treaties and gave the most rational argument against unification less that a year after 9 November 1989. But to join with Lafontaine, despite the reasonableness of his arguments, would be to

> laufe [die SPD] die Gefahr, wie einst die CDU bei den Ostverträgen, für Jahre gelähmt, und von den Entscheidungen beim Zusammenwachsen der beiden deutschen Staaten abgekoppelt zu werden. ("Kohl eindreschen", 24)

Throughout his campaign, Oskar Lafontaine had maintained that he could only represent what he held for morally correct, and to promise what could never be would be deceptive. This explains his skepticism of Kohl's unification politics. He wanted to guarantee social justice in the GDR, illustrated in his arguments against the currency union on 1 July and for the facilitation of a slow integration of the carefully unified Germany into the new European framework. ("Eminente", 28)

Despite the Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble's claim that even Lafontaine had to admit that the only way to halt the flow of refugees into the West was the introduction of the D-Mark into the East, the chancellor candidate posed a rational argument against it. Unemployment in the GDR would

soar, and cost of the 1:1 exchange rate for the Ostmark to the West German government enormous. (Ibid., 27) East German industries would collapse under the pressure of competition from more efficient West German firms.

Instead, he encouraged a policy that would promote a confederation of the German states without the GDR having to give up its independence. The Ostmark should become hard currency with a solid exchange rate, so that the local economy could be stimulated. To aid this latter point, if customs duties were to be raised on Western goods, the weakening industries in the GDR would be protected. (Ibid., 28) Lafontaine claimed that these suggestions were in line with the recommendations of the Bundesbank and the federal finance ministry.

This is not to say that Lafontaine was against a future unification of the German states. But now that the door was open, so to speak, it was not likely to close any time soon regarding travel freedoms for the East Germans. Therefore, in the meantime, it was important to improve the economic situation in the GDR with these proposals instead of shocking the system with the introduction of the D-Mark. But this *does* suggest that Lafontaine may have been influenced by the "Zweistaatlichkeit" philosophy of the SPD of the past.

Hans-Jochen Vogel complained that their only marketable candidate was perhaps too principled, believing Lafontaine did not want to be made responsible for for an economic

fiasco that he had always rejected. ("Kohl eindreschen", 19) But realistically, the equalization of the economic conditions between both regions could take years. Realizing this, Lafontaine's demands to somehow provide for the industries in the GDR during the difficult transition period after the currency union cannot be regarded as unreasonable. ("Dann wird", 28)

Equally unbearable to Lafontaine was the speed at which the unification was moving, especially compared to the years of mutual negotiations that characterized the Saarland's road to becoming a Bundesland in 1957. This began the debate over how the German Democratic Republic should be legally reunited with the Federal Republic. The CDU, looking for the quickest path possible to unity, chose Article 23 of the Basic Law, which would allow the GDR to accede to the Federal Republic without a revision of the German constitution. (See Appendix B)

My purpose here is not to discuss the intricacies of German federal law on this question, nor which article of the Basic Law was the most prudent to implement. Rather, the discussion shall center on trying to determine why the Social Democrats, particularly those on the Left, were so supportive of a referendum to decide the manner of unification, among the other points of contention in the state treaty. The discussion will also include how the Social Democrats' problems in ratifying the State Treaty

resemble the problems the CDU had with the Basic Treaty in 1972.

The CDU-led coalition in Bonn knew that the fastest route to unification was under Article 23 of the Basic Law. The preamble, however, would have to be adapted, for it provides for the unity of Germany to be completed through a free decision of all German people. This obviously presents a problem to the State Treaty authors, who would like to secure unification quickly with the signatures of a few powerful politicians to a very significant treaty. Article 146 would also need to be revised or eliminated, for it states that the Basic Law would no longer be in force the day a free German people could vote on a constitution. With the communist government no longer in power in the GDR, and with the democratically elected government willing to work with the CDU for unity, the obstacles to such a referendum were non-existant.

Wolfgang Schäuble, co-author of the unification treaty, realized that the Social Democrats would never allow Article 146 to be dropped from the Basic Law. (Schäuble, 120) They were not prepared to give up the idea of a free public referendum. Schäuble was hesitant about doing away with Article 146 altogether, fearing that the Social Democrats would not ratify the treaty in the Bundesrat, the upper house of the German parliament, which the SPD controlled.

This conflict over the treaty, which would need a 2/3-majority approval in the Bundestag, and therefore the

support of at least some Social Democrats for the revision of the Basic Law, gave the SPD some maneuvering room. They laid down on the bargaining table several conditions which would have to be met in order to win SPD agreement to the unity treaty. These included primarily concern for the social consequences such a treaty would have on the East German people, i.e. the loss of their homes or property to West German claimants, and the equalization of living conditions between East and West. Most important of these conditions was, again, reserving the right of all the German people to approve an all-German constitution. (*Ibid.*, 212)

This sudden concern for the social welfare and voting rights by the Social Democrats was significant for two reasons. First, it illustrated a continuity in their realistic approach in search of a solution to the German Question. With the precedents set with the early Ostpolitik treaties, the concern was for real humanitarian improvements for the people of the GDR. Similarly, their objections to the state treaty in its early drafts demonstrates their concern for the real effects of a unification, proceeding much too fast, on the East Germans, even if this meant receiving harsh criticism for their actions.

Second, this concern is significant in that it represents a change of course which the East Germans may have found hard to believe in the Social Democratic Party. By continuing the talks with the SED in the mid-1980s, the SPD had ignored the public resentment in the GDR or the

communist regime and the democratic opposition movements' efforts. Then, in 1990, the SPD was suddenly concerned that the public's preferences were not being represented in the unification process led by the CDU. One can hardly question the East Germans' lack of faith in the SPD's ability to successfully direct unity in light of this 180-degree turn.

The split in the SPD over the state unification treaty eventually was overcome, as the Bundestag approved the "Currency, Economic and Social Union" of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on 21 June 1990. The final political Unification Treaty was signed by Wolfgang Schäuble and the GDR's state secretary Günther Krause on 31 August 1990, barely two months later.

Oskar Lafontaine's opinion that "das gesamte Vertragswerk widersprüchlich und unschlüssig ist," uncannily resembles the reaction of the CDU in 1972, then under the chairmanship of Helmut Kohl, to the Brandt administration's Basic Treaty with the GDR. ("Eminente", 28) It was discussed that perhaps the Basic Treaty had been ratified too hastily in 1972 because of a possible closer examination of its legitimacy and because of the Bundestag elections of 1972. The rational objections of the CDU to the treaty, which had been gaining acceptance and an audience with the Social Democrats' coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), were quickly and effectively denounced. This prevented the possibly much needed debate over the

ramifications of a treaty that tacitly recognized the permanence of German division.

So the same with the all-too-frenzied drafting and approval of the unification treaties. Despite Lafontaine's efforts to decelerate the inevitable and his calls for more reasonable debate over the negative effects of such a hasty union of two different societies, the CDU was under pressure. With only months until the Bundestag elections, Kohl realized that the only way to overcome his unpopularity was to become the "Unification Chancellor", even if it meant prematurely ratifying a unification treaty. German unity became a political strategy, much to the chagrin of the perhaps more rational and realistic SPD.

In sum, all of Oskar Lafontaine's reasonable objections to the unification treaty, including his criticism that the race for German unity was quickly becoming just a campaign strategy, went unheard in his party, but not among the electorate. During the first all German elections since 1933, The CDU/CSU won the clear majority with 43.8% of the vote, against the SPD's 33.5%. (FGW, 7) In a campaign defined by the differing personalities and priorities of its major players and their parties, the CDU was viewed as the most competent party in a new and unified Germany. Even if the post-unification Germany had its problems, the Social Democrats probably could not have hoped for much vindication, "weil ihr die ökonomische Lösungskompetenz aus der Sicht der Wähler fehlte. (*Ibid.*, 59)

V. CONCLUSION AND ANYALYSIS OF POST-UNIFICATION CRITICISM

Auf geschichtlichem Wandel war die Generation der 68er nicht vorbereitet und nicht einmal darauf, dass das eigene Weltbild Risse erhielt. (Seebacher-Brandt, 67)

5.1 Analysis

History indeed played a trick on the Social Democratic Party with the collapse of the East German socialist state and the eventual unification of the two territories in less than one year's time. Having done the best they could with the German status quo to somehow improve the lives of 16 million Germans behind the Iron Curtain, the Social Democrats' "policy of small steps" led them to tacitly recognize the permanence of the GDR, which led to their political downfall.

Which brings us to the question I pose in the title of this thesis. Were the Social Democrats "political prisoners", i.e. did they tie the noose around their own necks by basically writing off political unification for 20 years in pursuit of a German "Kulturnation"? Or were they "victims of chance", one of the end of the Cold War's many political victims who were simply unprepared for the revolutionary and democratic developments in Eastern Europe at the end of 1989? The answer to these questions depends upon who is asked.

Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, for example, the wife of former chancellor and Ostpolitiker Willy Brandt, would be the first to tell one that the Social Democrats had only

themselves to blame when in 1990 they were unable to convince the German population that they could lead the unified German nation.

First, "die Überzeugung sass tief, und sie hatte sich auch... verstärkt, dass einstige Wegbereiter der Ostpolitik als entscheidene Zweistaatler hervortraten." (Ibid., 48) This does not just include Willy Brandt, who ironically represented German unity and German division in the same person, but also figures such as Egon Bahr, Oskar Lafontaine, and the other "Young Socialists" of the SPD. Perhaps because the latter group had grown up in a divided Germany, they had no emotional motive to see it unified again. For many children of the postwar era, the GDR was as foreign as Poland, or Austria.

Second, Seebacher-Brandt would accuse the SPD of having a static view of history, and thus preventing the dynamic change that molds the future. Marxism in Eastern Europe, especially in the former Soviet Union, had proven itself to be an enduring political system. Although to bring about the end of Communism, at least in the GDR, may have been one of the original goals of Ostpolitik, one would never have realized it given the SPD's actions outlined at the beginning of this paper. "Die Ehrenrettung des Marxismus durch die westliche Linke erstickte das freiheitliche Bewusstsein... ," (Ibid., 61) stabilized the communist regime in East Germany, and suppressed the democratic constituency perhaps longer than necessary.

Finally, according to Seebacher-Brandt, and a good many others with any common sense, post-Cold War politics is no "zero-sum" game. (Ibid., 77) There was no rule that said the opposition party, riding on a platform of social justice and practical humanitarian concerns, would have the advantage in the process to unify Germany. Kohl, as the incumbent chancellor, was simply in a better position to take the lead, already having all of the necessary diplomatic tools, not to mention the media, within his grasp. Kohl was able to take responsiblity for German unity much easier than the minority SPD, who at the most could vote against it, and thus earn a lasting scorn of the unified German nation.

For a completely different opinion, literary great Günter Grass, a longtime Social Democrat born in Danzig, now Gdansk, Poland, would say that the SPD's dialogue with the SED was the correct policy given the political situation in the mid-1980s. At this point in time, with superpower relations worsening and the political unity of Germany a distant dream, further cooperation between the two states was regarded as a desirable goal for the development of peace in Central Europe. (Grass, 57) The Common Paper allowed the Social Democrats to further define their goal of a cultural unification of Germany. But Grass does not deny that because of the ties with the SED, the SPD was unable to present a clear German policy in 1989. (*Ibid.*, 24) The situation of the party before the unification is likened to

falling victim to the winds of political change beyond their control. Yes, the Social Democrats took the risk of pursuing a reconciliatory policy with the government of the GDR, which they had no idea would become so damning when outside forces wrought the greatest political change in Europe since 1945.

One point that needs to be made quite clear is that I do not put all of the blame on the Social Democrats for what happened to them after 9 November 1989. Chancellor Kohl, in his 1987 State of the Nation address declared that the only way Germany would ever be able to reunify with a GDR no longer in the WTO, was if 1) Gorbachev was no longer a Communist, 2) the USSR became a non-Marxist-Leninist state, and 3) the entire Soviet system broke up. (Dean, 178) But the point is, is that all of that happened, the democratic uprisings and the collapse of the Communist regimes, resulted from one outside factor- Mikhail Gorbachev. Therefore, it is not that the Social Democrats had pursued German cultural unity and then let others reap what they had sown. They were simply caught completely off guard in 1989 and had no time to put together a believable strategy for political unification. They were victims of chance.

> Viele Verfechter der Stabilisierungsphilosophie fanden sich 1989/90 nicht zufällig in der Lage deren wieder, die der Freiheitsbewegung in Ostmitteleuropa sich anbahnenden... Vereinigung Deutschlands verständnis gegenüberstanden. (Wettig, 951)

5.2 Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis has attempted to outline and examine the response of the Social Democratic Party through the unification process of 1989-90 with respect to the party's past relationship with the GDR. As a result of their failure to present an unquestionable stance supporting unification, the Social Democrats will probably remain in their role as the opposition party for years to come, marginalized by history.

It is safe to say that the SPD was "caught on the wrong foot" in November 1989, trapped not only by their stance on the division of Germany, but also by their close ties and de facto recognition of the Socialist Unity Party with the Common Paper. ("Eisige", 82) Striving for a "Wandel durch Annäherung" and change from within the Soviet-style socialist system, the SPD was unprepared for the revolution from the bottom. According to Willy Brandt in 1989, "die Einheit von unten wird weiter wachsen und einen politischen Ausdruck finden." ("Das wär's", 66) Unable to take a decisive stance on unification and the possible social consequences, the SPD was plagued by disunity, due in large part to their chancellor candidate, Oskar Lafontaine.

This disunity, in turn, strongly influenced the East-SPD, plagued as well by its own changing unification policy and lack of a clear public profile. Always felt to be the "party of reunification", should it ever happen, the Social Democrats, when it actually began, responded inadequately

and lost their chance to fashion a united Germany along social democratic principles.

Now, more than a year after unification and the Bundestag election, the Germans are waking up from their unification party with a slight hangover, to use a popular quip. Kohl's popularity is suffering, and unemployment in the five new states is rising, as are the taxes which Kohl had promised would never be raised. Willy Brandt was correct when he said that fast unification would not solve any practical problems. Many years may pass before the five new states see the standard of living of the western states in their own territory. People have to stop leaving first. All Lafontaine could say is a smug "I told you so, but you wouldn't listen." Unfortunately, "I told you so" does not win one much popularity, not to mention very many votes.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDU- Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union)
-West German conservative party

CSU- Christian Socialist Union (Christlich- Soziale Union)
-Bavarian sister party to the CDU

FDP- Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei)
-West German liberal party

FRG- Federal Republic of Germany (West)

GDR- German Democratic Republic (East)

INF- Intermediate Nuclear Forces

Jusos- Young Socialists of the SPD (Jungsozialisten)

KPD- Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands)

PDS- Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus)
-the East German communist party replacing the defunct SED in December 1989

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SALT- Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty

SED- Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands)
-East German communist party

SPD- Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
-West German social democratic "workers'" party

Stasi- Ministry for State Security of the GDR (Staatssicherheitsdienst)
-East German secret police

WTO- Warsaw Treaty Organization

ZK der SED- Central Committee of the SED (Zentral Kommittee)

APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS

Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany- the provisional constitution-like document intended for use until the provisional division of Germany was overcome. (Note: Bonn, as provisional capital, would give up this status to Berlin after Germany became unified. (CDU administration)

Preamble: "Das gesamt deutsche Volk bleibt aufgefordert, in freier Selbstbestimmung die Einheit und Freiheit Deutschland zu vollenden."

Article 23: For the time being, this Basic Law applies in the territory of the Länder... (the West German states). In other parts of Germany it shall be put into force on their accession.

Article 146: This Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the day on which a Constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force.

Basic Treaty of 1972- laid down quasi-diplomatic relational groundrules between the FRG and the GDR. (SPD administration)

State Treaty of 1990- outlined the manner of the unification of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. (CDU administration)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ammer, Thomas, et al. *Analysen, Dokumentation und Chronik zur Entwicklung in der DDR von September bis Dezember 1989.* Bonn: Gesamtdeutsches Institut, Bundesanstalt gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben, 1990. (manuscript)

"Anrede 'Genosse' vermeiden." *Der Spiegel* (29 January 1990) 48-50.

"Auf den Kohl eindreschen." *Der Spiegel* (28 May 1990) 21-25.

Augstein, Rudolf. "Oskar, wohin?" *Der Spiegel* (28 May 1990) 26-29.

Bark, Dennis L. and David R. Gress. *A History of West Germany, Vol. II: Democracy and its Discontents 1963-1988.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989.

Brandt, Willy. *Friedenspolitik in Europa.* Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag GmbH, 1968.

Braunthal, Gerhard. *The West German Social Democrats: 1969-1982: Profile of a Party in Power.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1983.

Brockmann, Stephan. "Introduction ot the Unification Debate." *New German Critique* (Winter 1991) 3-30.

"Dann wird der Kampf heiss." *Der Spiegel* (21 May 1990) 18-29.

"Das wär's." *Der Spiegel* (25 December 1989) 65-66.

Dean, Jonathan. "Changing Security Dimensions of the Inter-German Relationship," in *The Two German States and European Security*, ed. F.S. Larrabee. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989, pp. 156-181.

"Der macht auch was." *Der Spiegel* (20 November 1989) 133-135.

"Deutschland, einig Unverstand." *Der Spiegel* (18 December 1989) 81-82.

von Dohnanyi, Klaus. "Es gibt keine Wahl." *Der Spiegel* (28 May 1990) 30-31.

"Dresdner-SED Delegation traf SPD- und DKP Vertreter." *Neues Deutschland* 27 September 1989, 6.

"Einheit heisst nicht Anschluss." *Der Spiegel* (22 January 1990) 84-85.

"Die Einheit ist gelaufen." *Der Spiegel* (5 February 1990) 26-28.

"Eisige Atmosphäre." *Der Spiegel* (25 December 1989) 66-70.

"Eine eminente Fehlentscheidung." *Der Spiegel* (28 May 1990 26-29.

Eppler, Erhard. Pressemitteilung: "Ärger mit allzu simplen Begriffen." Bonn: SPD-Parteivorstand, 13 November 1987.

_____. "Friede zwischen Ost und West und ungezügelte ideologische Polemik vertrage sich nicht." *Intern: Informationsdienst der SPD* (9 September 1987) 7-11.

Fink, Hans-Jürgen. "Die SPD in der DDR." *Deutschland Archiv* (February 1990) 180-185.

FGW (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, e.V.) *Wahl in der DDR: eine Dokumentation der Volkskammerwahl vom 18. März 1990.* Mannheim: Institut fuer Wahlanalysen und Gesellschaftsbeobachtung, 6 April 1990.

Fritsch-Bournazel, Renata. "The Changing Nature of the German Question," in *The Two German States and European Security*, ed. F.S. Larrabee. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989, pp. 30-52.

Gansel, Norbert. "Wenn alle gehen wollen, weil die Falschen bleiben...." (speech text for the SPD Provincial Association) *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 13 September 1989.

Garton Ash, Timothy. *The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe.* New York: Vintage Press, 1990, pp. 71-104.

Grass, Günter. *Two States- One Nation?* San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1990. (Engish translation of *Deutscher Lastenausgleich: Wieder das dumpfe Einheitsgebot.* Frankfurt am Main: Luchterhand Literatur-Verlag, 1990.)

_____. "What am I still talking for? Is anyone still listening?" *New German Critique* (Winter 1991) 66-72.

Habermas, Jürgen. "Yet Again: German Identity- A Unified Nation of Angry DM-Burghers?" *New German Critique* (Winter 1991) 84-101.

Hanhardt, Arthur M., jr. "Demostrations, Groups, Parties, and the Volkskammer Election: Aspects of Political Change in East Germany." Eugene, Oregon, 1990. (manuscript)

Interview. Dr. Ann Phillips, per telephone. Washington, D.C., 11 November 1991, 3:30 pm, Eugene, Oregon.

Jesse, Eckhard. Book Review- *Die Linke und die Einheit*, by Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt. *Deutschland Archiv* (October 1991) 1125-1127.

_____. *Renaissance der deutschen Frage?* Stuttgart: Ernst-Klett-Verlag GmbH und Co. KG, 1987.

"Jetzt robben sich alle ran." *Der Spiegel* (22 January 1990) 16-19.

"Kultur des Streits." *Der Spiegel* (24 August 1987) 21-22.

Larrabee. F. Stephan. "From Reunification to Reassociation: New Dimensions of the German Question," in *The Two German States and European Security*, ed. F.S. Larrabee . New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989, 1-29.

Leonhard, Elke. "Eine junge Partei mit alter Tradition: Erster Parteitag der neuen SPD in der DDR." *Deutschland Archiv* (April 1990) 506-508.

Löwenthal, Richard. "SPD und SED: Ein Versuch der Bewusstmachung." *Die Welt*, 2 September 1987.

Mc Adams, A. James. "The Origins of a New Inter-German Relationship," in *The Two German States and European Security*, ed. F.S. Larrabee, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989, pp. 53-72.

"Mann muss auch anstössig sein." *Der Spiegel* (February 1990) 180-185.

"Offene Linie." *Der Spiegel* (6 July 1990) 24-25.

Phillips, Ann L. "Seeds of Change in the German Democratic Republic: SED-SPD Dialogue." Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Comtemporary German Studies, 1989.

_____. "The West German Social Democrats' Second Phase of Ostpolitik in Historical Perspective," in *The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty*, ed. Peter H. Merkl. New York: NYU Press, 1989, pp. 408-424.

"Rechter Ton." *Der Spiegel* (28 September 1987) 132-133.

Richter, Michael. "Parteien für ganz Deutschland?" *Deutschland Archiv* (October 1991) 1144-1153.

Roth, Dieter. "Die Wahlen in der DDR: Der Versuch einer Erklärung." *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (3/1990) Mannheim: FGW, 1990. (manuscript for forthcoming article)

Schäuble, Wolfgang. *Der Vertrag: Wie ich über die deutsche Einheit verhandelte.* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, 1989.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., jr. "The Difference Willy Brandt has made." *The New Leader* 73(29 October 1990) 11-13.

Schneider, Peter. *The German Comedy: Scenes of Life after the Wall.* New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, Inc., 1991. (English translation of *Extreme Mittellage: Eine Reise durch das deutsche Nationalgefühl.* Reinbeck: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, GmbH, 1990.)

Schneider, Rolf. "Die Einheit wird kommen." *Deutschland Archiv* (February 1990) 202-207.

Schweigler, Gebhard. "German Questions or the Shrinking of Germany," in *Two German States and European Security*, ed. F.S. Larrabee. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989, pp. 73-105.

Seebacher-Brandt, Brigitte. *Die Linke und die Einheit.* Berlin: Wolf-Jobst Siedler Verlag, GmbH, 1991.

_____. "Die Einheit zerfällt, der Traum zerinnt." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Beilage* (1991) 56-57.

"Die SED in der Opposition." *Der Spiegel* (30 October 1989) 24-25.

SPD Basic Values Commission and the Academy for Social Sciences of the Central Committe of the SED. "Conflicting Ideologies and Common Security." Berlin/Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 27 August 1987.

SPD. "Kommunique der gemeinsamen Arbeitsgruppe der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion und der SED zu sicherheitspolitischen Fragen in Europa." Bonn: SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 27 January 1988.

SPD. Pressemitteilung. Bonn, 11 December 1989.

SPD. Pressemitteilung: "Erklärung des Parteirats zum gemeinsamen Papier der Grundwertkommission der SPD und der Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED." Bonn: SPD Parteivorstand, 19 November 1987.

Spittman, Ilse. "Fragen wichtiger als Antworten." *Deutschland Archiv* (July 1991) 755-757.

"Ein System kann das andere nicht Abschaffen." *Der Spiegel* (31 August 1987) 27-30.

Wettig, Gerhard. "Wandel durch Annäherung im geschichtlichem Rückblick." *Deutschland Archiv* (September 1991) 950-953.

Winters, Peter Jochen. "Zum ersten Mal frei: Die Wahlen zur Volkskammer." *Deutschland Archiv* (April 1990) 497-501.

"Wird Lafontaine Kanzler?" *Der Spiegel* (5 February 1990) 38-47.