Finance Theses and Dissertations

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Browsing Finance Theses and Dissertations by Author "Julio, Brandon"

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    How Do Technological Innovations Affect Corporate Investment and Hiring?
    (University of Oregon, 2020-09-24) Liu, Ying; Julio, Brandon
    Using various measures for technological innovation, I show that corporate investment and hiring go up following technological advancements. The effect is stronger for firms with more industry- or firm-level innovations, among firms with lower capital intensity or greater marginal benefits from innovative outputs. In addition, firm-level production efficiency increases following innovations, with this effect concentrated among firms with greater industry- or firm-level innovative activity. Further, although cross-sectional heterogeneity exists, the firm-level capital-to-labor ratio does not increase significantly. Supporting the view of endogenous growth theory that firms with successful innovations tend to expand, these findings highlight the possible channels for innovations to propagate in the economy. These results also suggest, although making firms more efficient, technology does not reduce employment, suggesting technological innovations are, to some extent, Hicks-neutral.
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    Patent Trolls and the Market for Acquisitions
    (University of Oregon, 2020-09-24) Dayani, Arash; Julio, Brandon
    Frivolous patent-infringement claims increase the cost of innovation for small businesses and force them to exit via premature and discounted acquisitions. This study investigates the effect of abusive patent-infringement claims by patent trolls on acquisitions of small firms. I exploit the staggered adoption of anti-patent troll laws in 35 states as a quasi-natural experiment and find that the laws have two effects on acquisitions. First, the number of acquisitions of small businesses by large firms declines after these laws are passed. Second, the anti-troll laws increase the acquisition price for large firms. I find that the market reflects the increased cost of acquisition following the passage of anti-troll laws as measured by the lower acquisition announcement returns. Moreover, I find evidence that large firms increase R&D expenditure after the adoption of state laws. Using a sample of acquisitions that are plausibly unaffected by the state laws, I disentangle alternative explanations such as local economic shocks, industry-wide changes and merger waves. Overall, the findings suggest that the anti-patent troll laws increase the value of small innovative firms.