ORI Research Bulletin

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Browsing ORI Research Bulletin by Author "Dawes, Robyn M."

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    Slitting the Decision Maker's Throat with Occam's Razor -- The Superiority of Random Linear Models to Real Judges, No. 13
    (Oregon Research Institute, 1972-12) Dawes, Robyn M.
    Two types of linear models have been found to be superior to human judges in predicting codable criterion variables from codable predictor variables: actuarial models (based on the regression of the criterion in the predictors), and bootstrapping models (based on the regression of the judges• predictions on the predictors). In both types of models, the predictors are coded (or recoded) so that each bears a monotonic relationship to the criterion; further, in both models, nonlinear relationships and nonmonotone interactions between variables are ignored. Perhaps these linear models are superior because the expected validity of~ linear model whose weights are in the appropriate direction is superior to that of human judges in this context. Present research reviews a variety of situations in which linear models whose weights are in the appropriate direction but otherwise chosen at random do better than do judges , even boots trapped judges.
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    The Commons Dilemma Game: An N-Person Mixed-Motive Game With a Dominating Strategy for Defection, No. 2
    (Oregon Research Institute, 1973-09) Dawes, Robyn M.
    If individuals were to decide for themselves whether to buy anti-pollution devices for their cars, a commons dilemma would result (Lloyd, 1833; Hardin, 1968). The money saved by not buying the device accrues directly to the individual while the harm done by the resulting pollution is shared equally by all. Moreover, the argument for not buying is independent of others' decisions --because if they do buy, the individual who does not makes no appreciable contribution to pollution, and if they don't the individual who does makes no appreciable contribution to reducing pollution . Yet everyone would prefer to have everyone buy . This paper presents an experimental commons dilemma game that has all the properties of the commons dilemma and that reduces to a prisoner's dilemma game when there are only two players.
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    The Decision to Pollute, No. 4
    (Oregon Research Institute, 1973-12) Dawes, Robyn M.; Delay, Jack; Chaplin, William
    One way of studying the pollution problem is to examine the decision making process in situations in which gain accrues directly to an individual while loss is spread out across the group of which the individual is a member. Such a situation has been termed a commons dilemma by Lloyd in 1833; it is a variant of the well known prisoner's dilemma. The mathematical model of rational decision making when facing the commons dilemma implies the dismal conclusion that individuals acting rationally will end up destroying, or nearly destroying, the common wealth. Suggestions are made concerning ways in which people may be persuaded not to pollute our environment.