Oregon Law Review : Vol. 89, No. 3 (2011)

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Browsing Oregon Law Review : Vol. 89, No. 3 (2011) by Subject "Antitrust law"

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    Oregon Law Review : Vol. 89, No. 3, p. 1059-1106 : Replacing Antitrust Exemptions for Transportation Industries: The Potential for a “Robust Business Review Clearance”
    (University of Oregon School of Law, 2011) Carstensen, Peter C.
    Congress has scattered among various statutes at least thirty exemptions or modifications of antitrust law. The greatest concentration of these exemptions is in the area of commercial transportation where there are six such exemptions, the oldest relating to ocean shipping. Indeed, until the deregulatory movement of the 1970s and 1980s, most rates, routes, and terms for transportation were the subject of direct regulatory control. However, starting in the 1970s, legislative policy toward transportation dramatically changed. Increasingly, federal policy favors market competition in transportation sectors and discourages regulatory interference. Yet the exemptions remain on the books, and companies regularly seek their benefit. This leads to an empirical question, which will form the core of this Article: what kinds of conduct are now being presented to regulators for approval and antitrust immunity? The analysis of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief summary of the six statutes that provide immunity for some aspect of transportation as well as the contemporary business review clearance process used by the Antitrust Division; Part II sets forth plausible alternative explanations for retaining antitrust immunity in the transportation industries; Part III then provides the empirical part of this Article, analyzing agency grants of antitrust immunity in light of the possible explanations for the transactions being immunized; Part IV explains why the exemption process is not well adapted to the needs of the parties or the public interest; Part V presents the basic concept of a robust business review clearance process; Part VI considers two arguments against the proposal; Part VII then identifies and discusses some key elements of the process that involve important choices if it were to be implemented.
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    Oregon Law Review : Vol. 89, No. 3, p. 753-774 : An Introduction to the American Antitrust Institute’s 11th Annual National Conference: Are the Boundaries Between Public and Private in Transition?
    (University of Oregon School of Law, 2011) Foer, Albert A.
    The theme of the American Antitrust Institute’s (AAI) conference on June 24, 2010, was embedded in a question: are the boundaries between what is public and what is private in transition? Our premise was that antitrust strikes a balance between government regulation of the economy and an extremely free market system. Another way to say this is that there is, on one hand, the public sector, represented by the government, and on the other hand, the private sector, represented by individuals, families, commercial units, and various other associations. Our concern as experts in antitrust and competition policy is in the nuances of the relationship between what, at any point in time, is public and what is private because the balance establishes the framework in which competition plays its role.
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    Oregon Law Review : Vol. 89, No. 3, p. 885-914 : Antitrust Immunities
    (University of Oregon School of Law, 2011) Farmer, Susan Beth
    Iam pleased to be here today to speak about an important issue in American antitrust law: immunities and exemptions that limit or preclude the application of antitrust laws to certain conduct or industries. The core message of my remarks today is that the changing dynamics of many industries coupled with the increasing analytical rigor that courts and antitrust enforcement agencies apply should alleviate the concerns that have been cited by advocates of exemptions. Free market competition is a fundamental and core principle of this country. As the bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission recognized, just as private constraints on competition can be harmful to consumer welfare, so can government restraints. Thus, the use of such restraints should be minimized.
©2011 University of Oregon