On the Psychology of Prediction, No. 4
| dc.contributor.author | Kahneman, Daniel | |
| dc.contributor.author | Tversky, Amos | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-01-29T23:29:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-01-29T23:29:42Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1972 | |
| dc.description | 41 pages | |
| dc.description.abstract | A judgmental heuristic--representativeness--is often applied in intuitive predictions. In predicting by representativeness s , one selects or orders outcomes by the degree to which these outcomes represent one's impression of the case, with little or no regard for factors such as the prior probability of outcomes or predictive accuracy. The hypothesis that people predict by representativeness is supported in a series of studies, with both naïve and sophisticated subjects. In nominal prediction, the ran king of outcomes by likelihood is shown to coincide with the ranking of outcomes by representativeness . Numerical predictions are shown to be nonregressive with respect to an evaluation of the impression on which they are based. In both cases, intuitive predictions violate the normative principles of prediction in fundamental ways . | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/30372 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Oregon Research Institute | |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0-US | |
| dc.subject | prediction, likelihood, possible outcomes, category prediction, numerical prediction | |
| dc.title | On the Psychology of Prediction, No. 4 | |
| dc.type | Other |