The Commons Dilemma Game: An N-Person Mixed-Motive Game With a Dominating Strategy for Defection, No. 2
| dc.contributor.author | Dawes, Robyn M. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-01-16T00:32:04Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-01-16T00:32:04Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1973-09 | |
| dc.description | 15 pages | |
| dc.description.abstract | If individuals were to decide for themselves whether to buy anti-pollution devices for their cars, a commons dilemma would result (Lloyd, 1833; Hardin, 1968). The money saved by not buying the device accrues directly to the individual while the harm done by the resulting pollution is shared equally by all. Moreover, the argument for not buying is independent of others' decisions --because if they do buy, the individual who does not makes no appreciable contribution to pollution, and if they don't the individual who does makes no appreciable contribution to reducing pollution . Yet everyone would prefer to have everyone buy . This paper presents an experimental commons dilemma game that has all the properties of the commons dilemma and that reduces to a prisoner's dilemma game when there are only two players. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/30343 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Oregon Research Institute | |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0-US | |
| dc.subject | commons dilemma, prisoner's dilemma, pollution, children, unions | |
| dc.title | The Commons Dilemma Game: An N-Person Mixed-Motive Game With a Dominating Strategy for Defection, No. 2 | |
| dc.type | Other |