Managerial Incentives and Risk Taking: Evidence from Hedge Fund Leverage
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wang, Jay | |
| dc.contributor.author | Xiao, Yi | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-24T17:16:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-09-24T17:16:42Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-09-24 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Using novel leverage and managerial ownership measures derived from public filings, this paper examines the role of managerial incentives in the use of leverage, in the context of hedge fund industry. I find a positive and convex relationship between fund leverage and the option-like compensation incentives, with the leverage level being significantly higher as the fund's asset under management (AUM) nears its high-water mark (HWM). I also find that hedge funds significantly reduce the leverage, when the incentive fee options are deep out of the money. Further, greater managerial ownership is associated with higher leverage, conditional on the incentive fee option being near the money. The findings lend support to option-like compensation contracts and managerial ownership improving incentive alignment between fund managers and investors. Interestingly, I find that investor flows and fund performance have an overall positive reaction to increases in leverage, which is mainly driven by well-performing funds with fund values sufficiently close to the HWMs. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/25639 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon | |
| dc.rights | All Rights Reserved. | |
| dc.subject | hedge fund leverage | en_US |
| dc.subject | incentive fee option | en_US |
| dc.subject | managerial ownership | en_US |
| dc.title | Managerial Incentives and Risk Taking: Evidence from Hedge Fund Leverage | |
| dc.type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Department of Finance | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | University of Oregon | |
| thesis.degree.level | doctoral | |
| thesis.degree.name | Ph.D. |
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