Principal-Agent Relations in Oregon Education Policymaking: The Case of Full-Day Kindergarten

dc.contributor.advisorConley, David
dc.contributor.authorRieke-Smith, Susan
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-18T23:12:41Z
dc.date.available2015-08-18T23:12:41Z
dc.date.issued2015-08-18
dc.description.abstractThe exercise of federal and/or state power is inherent to policymaking. The principal-agent theory, borrowed from economics, describes the difficulties in motivating one party (agent) to act in the best interests of the other party (principal). The theory provides insights into the roles of self-interested choice, information asymmetry, and sense making in political relationships. The extent to which the state understands the inherent challenges expressed in this dynamic and is responsive to the local school district’s specific circumstances is not well understood and thus presents an opportunity for research. This mixed methods study uses a confirmatory approach to analyze Oregon’s 40-40-20 education reform legislation and the state’s ability to operationalize education reform through the principal-agent framework, focusing on the implementation of full-day kindergarten legislation.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/19334
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved.
dc.subjectEducationen_US
dc.subjectImplementationen_US
dc.subjectIntergovernmentalen_US
dc.subjectKindergartenen_US
dc.subjectPolicyen_US
dc.subjectReformen_US
dc.titlePrincipal-Agent Relations in Oregon Education Policymaking: The Case of Full-Day Kindergarten
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
thesis.degree.disciplineDepartment of Educational Methodology, Policy, and Leadership
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Oregon
thesis.degree.leveldoctoral
thesis.degree.nameD.Ed.

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