The DOJ’s Defense of Deception: Antitrust Law’s Role in Protecting the Standard-Setting Process
| dc.contributor.author | Leslie, Christopher R. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-07-02T19:46:03Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-07-02T19:46:03Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-07-01 | |
| dc.description | 48 pages | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Until recently, conventional wisdom held that antitrust law should help ensure that patentholders honor their commitments to standard-setting organizations (SSOs) to charge a reasonable royalty. Like many conventional wisdoms, this one has been turned on its head since Donald Trump’s ascent to power. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | 98 Or. L. Rev. 379 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0196-2043 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/25382 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon School of Law | en_US |
| dc.rights | All Rights Reserved. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Antitrust law | en_US |
| dc.subject | Patent law | en_US |
| dc.subject | Economics | en_US |
| dc.subject | Monopoly | en_US |
| dc.title | The DOJ’s Defense of Deception: Antitrust Law’s Role in Protecting the Standard-Setting Process | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |