The Disciplinary Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Taking

dc.contributor.authorNguyen, Tu Cam
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-29T22:04:51Z
dc.date.available2012-02-29T22:04:51Z
dc.date.issued2011-09
dc.descriptionx, 99 p.en_US
dc.description.abstractUsing data for publicly listed commercial banks and bank holding companies around the world, I investigate the market discipline effect of subordinated debt on banking firm risk taking in the period 2002-2008. In addition, I examine whether this effect depends on national bank regulations and legal and institutional conditions. I provide evidence that subordinated debt has a mitigating effect on banking firm risk taking. Further, the results suggest a threshold level of national bank regulations and economic development above which subordinated debt mitigates risk taking. Overall, the evidence supports the efficacy of proposals calling for increased use of subordinated debt in banking firms.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipCommittee in charge: Wayne Mikkelson, Chairperson; Ekkehart Boehmer, Member; Diane Del Guercio, Member; Wesley Wilson, Outside Memberen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/11983
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Oregon theses, Dept. of Finance, Ph. D., 2011;
dc.rightsrights_reserveden_US
dc.subjectFinanceen_US
dc.subjectBankingen_US
dc.subjectSocial sciencesen_US
dc.subjectSubordinated debten_US
dc.subjectBanken_US
dc.subjectRisk-takingen_US
dc.titleThe Disciplinary Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Takingen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Nguyen_Tu_Cam_phd2011su.pdf
Size:
468.27 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Name:
license.txt
Size:
2.13 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: