Public Sector Collective Bargaining, Majoritarianism, and Reform
| dc.contributor.author | Rosenthal, Daniel M. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-01-13T18:52:19Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-01-13T18:52:19Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-05-21 | |
| dc.description | 52 pages | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | This Article explores the majoritarian implications of collective bargaining for public employees, focusing in particular on teachers. To critics, collective bargaining supplants the ordinary legislative and administrative processes for determining public policy such as the length of the school day, teacher personnel policies, class size, and many other topics. Critics argue that bargaining thus allows teacher unions to exert disproportionate control on these issues at the expense of the broader public. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | 91 Or. L. Rev. 673 (2013) | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0196-2043 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/13592 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon School of Law | en_US |
| dc.rights | All Rights Reserved. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Collective barganing | en_US |
| dc.subject | Public employees | en_US |
| dc.subject | Unions | en_US |
| dc.title | Public Sector Collective Bargaining, Majoritarianism, and Reform | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |