Extended Virtues
| dc.contributor.advisor | Johnson, Mark | |
| dc.contributor.author | Skorburg, Joshua | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-04-10T15:08:55Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-04-10T15:08:55Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018-04-10 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The central argument of this dissertation is that virtue ethics is overly individualistic. In response, I develop and defend a more relational, ecological account - what I call extended virtues. First, following Andy Clark, Kim Sterelny, and others, I argue that cognition and emotion can be embedded in, scaffolded by, or even extended to include various environmental resources. These arguments undermine default internalism about cognitive and affective processes. Next, I show how recent work in social and personality psychology similarly undermines individualism about the bearers of these cognitive and affective processes. Taken together, these arguments have significant but heretofore underappreciated implications for virtue ethics. After reviewing the literature which attempts to spell out the ethical implications of embedded, scaffolded, and extended cognition, I conclude that a more substantive engagement with virtue ethics is needed. I then show how plausible, mainstream theories of virtue assume default internalism and individualism, and are thus subject to charges of empirical inadequacy. Finally, I formulate my account of extended virtues in response to these shortcomings. I begin by making three explicit arguments for why an account of extended virtues is needed. I then develop two further arguments - the process argument and the bearer argument - which yield the conclusion that the processes relevant to, and the bearers of, moral and intellectual virtues can be embedded, scaffolded, or extended. After providing examples and filling in details about the hypotheses of embedded, scaffolded, and extended virtue, I propose that virtues are less like dispositions and more like relations. I conclude by suggesting that ecological metaphors such as stewardship are more fitting than traditional views of morality as inner strength. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/23177 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon | |
| dc.rights | All Rights Reserved. | |
| dc.subject | Extended cognition | en_US |
| dc.subject | Moral psychology | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy of mind | en_US |
| dc.subject | Situated cognition | en_US |
| dc.subject | Social and personality psychology | en_US |
| dc.subject | Virtue ethics | en_US |
| dc.title | Extended Virtues | |
| dc.type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Department of Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | University of Oregon | |
| thesis.degree.level | doctoral | |
| thesis.degree.name | Ph.D. |
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