Oregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1, p. 069-112 : Federal Judicial Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysis

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dc.contributor.advisorJudges -- Recusal
dc.contributor.authorBuhai, Sande L.
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-16T23:34:42Z
dc.date.available2011-11-16T23:34:42Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.description44 pagesen_US
dc.description.abstractThe issue of judicial recusal has become front-page news. House Democrats have called on Justice Thomas to recuse himself from cases challenging the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act because of his wife’s role as a paid lobbyist against that Act. Republicans are calling for the recusal of Justice Kagan from the same cases because of her service as Solicitor General when the Obama administration was considering how to structure health care reform legislation to survive constitutional challenge. Over the past two centuries, judicial recusal standards have been tightened repeatedly. Nevertheless, in case after high-profile case, they still sometimes fail to ensure the kind of legitimating impartiality we demand of our courts.en_US
dc.identifier.citation90 Or. L. Rev. 69 (2011)en_US
dc.identifier.issn0196-2043
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/11756
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon School of Lawen_US
dc.titleOregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1, p. 069-112 : Federal Judicial Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysisen_US
dc.title.alternativeFederal Judicial Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysisen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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Oregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1 (2011)