The Interaction of Incentive and Opportunity in Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Financially Constrained Firms

dc.contributor.advisorGuenther, David
dc.contributor.authorWu, Kaishu
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-06T21:57:11Z
dc.date.available2018-09-06T21:57:11Z
dc.date.issued2018-09-06
dc.description.abstractI hypothesize and find that the variation in corporate tax avoidance is jointly determined by firms’ incentive and opportunities to avoid taxes. Specifically, the positive relation between financial constraints (my proxy for an incentive to avoid taxes) and tax avoidance is significantly stronger for firms with high tax planning opportunities (TPO), where TPO is the distance between a firm’s actual and predicted ETRs. I further show that firms with TPOs based on high permanent (temporary) book-tax differences exhibit more permanent (temporary) book-tax differences under financial constraints. From a risk perspective, I find no evidence that financially constrained firms with low TPO exhibit more tax risk but some evidence that those with high TPO do so. In general, the findings in this paper provide evidence consistent with an incentive-opportunity interaction story to help explain differences in corporate tax avoidance.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/23753
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved.
dc.subjectFinancial constrainten_US
dc.subjectIncentivesen_US
dc.subjectOpportunityen_US
dc.subjectRisken_US
dc.subjectTax avoidanceen_US
dc.titleThe Interaction of Incentive and Opportunity in Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Financially Constrained Firms
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
thesis.degree.disciplineDepartment of Accounting
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Oregon
thesis.degree.leveldoctoral
thesis.degree.namePh.D.

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Wu_oregon_0171A_12178.pdf
Size:
1.41 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format