Oregon Law Review : Vol. 89, No. 3, p. 785-810 : The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo?
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Date
2011
Authors
Greaney, Thomas L.
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
University of Oregon School of Law
Abstract
In the run-up to its enactment, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) elicited howls of protest from opponents who
claimed the federal government was taking over the American healthcare system, micromanaging medicine, and generally exposing
the nation to the bête noire of socialized medicine. Hyperbole,
misrepresentation, and chauvinism aside, these sound bites suffer
from a deeper flaw: they mischaracterize the fundamental thrust of the
new law. Though the ACA establishes significant new regulatory
authority, this is not a new development (indeed it can be faulted for
preserving pre-existing regulatory regimes), nor does it impair market
competition. To the contrary, much of the law aims at improving
conditions conducive to effective competition. With numerous
programs designed to correct perverse incentives in the payment
system, to mitigate market imperfections, and to make the delivery
system responsive to market signals, the ACA might well be
rechristened as the “Accommodation of Competition Act.”
Description
36 p.
Keywords
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, market competition
Citation
89 Or. L. Rev. 811 (2011)