COINdinistas and Contradictions: US Adoption of Counterinsurgency in 2007
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Date
2025-02-20
Authors
Li, Alex
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
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Publisher
University of Oregon
Abstract
Multiple theories of politics—specifically, rational actor theory and organization theory—have been used to explain decision-making processes for military actions. Rational actor theory states that military actors base decisions on value calculations and incremental changes. Organization theory suggests that military organizations push a specific doctrine to preserve power in the face of civilian challenges or criticism. While organizations generally wish to appear rational, doctrinal decisions may betray irrationality. This paper aims to identify a clear history of US counterinsurgency (COIN) and test the existing literature on organization and rational actor theory against the US military’s readoption of the counterinsurgency doctrine in 2007. The US military COIN operations in Iraq that accompanied the Surge of 2007 followed a legacy of failed COIN experiments. Beginning in Vietnam with the strategic hamlet program, the continued use of COIN despite its empirical inefficacy throughout the 20th century demonstrates the military’s pattern of irrational action. This paper concludes that COIN existed quietly in the background of the Cold War before its implementation in 2007. Moreover, COIN’s doctrinal adoption in 2007 is better explained through organization theory as the military organization pushed COIN onto a desperate Bush administration. Finally, the history of COIN indicates that rational actor theory is insufficient to explain doctrine during low-intensity conflicts.
Description
Alex Li (ali5@uoregon.edu) graduated from the UO in 2022 with a Bachelor of Science in Political Science and Human Physiology and Anatomy.
Keywords
rational actor theory, organization theory, counterinsurgency, COIN